05000352/FIN-2009005-03: Difference between revisions
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| description = 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that all applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis for structures, systems, and components are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures and instructions. Contrary to the above, inadequate isolation actuation instrumentation setpoints were translated into Units 1and 2 Technical Specification 3.2.2, Isolation Actuation Instrumentation, Table 3.3.2-2, Isolation Actuation Instrument Setpoints, Item 4.e, HPCI Equipment Room Temperature - High. This condition existed from January 1995, when Technical Specification Amendments 85 and 46 were issued, until the condition was discovered on August 27, 2009. This issue was identified during a review of the steam leak detection system calculations and was identified in Exelon's CAP as IR 958587. Upon discovery, appropriate compensatory actions (i.e., disabling of the room coolers) were implemented to return the system to an operable status. This finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) using NRC IMC 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, because it did not represent a finding of greater significance for LERF using Table 6.2, Phase 2 Risk Significance-Type B Findings at Full Power. | | description = 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, requires, in part, that measures shall be established to assure that all applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis for structures, systems, and components are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures and instructions. Contrary to the above, inadequate isolation actuation instrumentation setpoints were translated into Units 1and 2 Technical Specification 3.2.2, Isolation Actuation Instrumentation, Table 3.3.2-2, Isolation Actuation Instrument Setpoints, Item 4.e, HPCI Equipment Room Temperature - High. This condition existed from January 1995, when Technical Specification Amendments 85 and 46 were issued, until the condition was discovered on August 27, 2009. This issue was identified during a review of the steam leak detection system calculations and was identified in Exelon\'s CAP as IR 958587. Upon discovery, appropriate compensatory actions (i.e., disabling of the room coolers) were implemented to return the system to an operable status. This finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) using NRC IMC 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, because it did not represent a finding of greater significance for LERF using Table 6.2, Phase 2 Risk Significance-Type B Findings at Full Power. | ||
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Latest revision as of 10:38, 30 May 2018
| Site: | Limerick  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000352/2009005 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2009 (2009Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | A Rosebrook N Sieller P Krohn E Torres N Lafferty E Dipaolo W Schmidt |
| INPO aspect | |
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