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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 2100 RENAISSANCE BLVD. KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-2713 | {{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES | ||
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | |||
REGION I | |||
2100 RENAISSANCE BLVD. | |||
KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-2713 | |||
August 30, 2016 | |||
Mr. Anthony J. Vitale | Mr. Anthony J. Vitale | ||
Site Vice President Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Indian Point Energy Center | Site Vice President | ||
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. | |||
Indian Point Energy Center | |||
450 Broadway, GSB | 450 Broadway, GSB | ||
P.O. Box 249 | P.O. Box 249 | ||
Buchanan, NY 10511-0249 | Buchanan, NY 10511-0249 | ||
SUBJECT: | |||
INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING - INTEGRATED INSPECTION | |||
REPORT 05000247/2016002 AND 05000286/2016002 | |||
Dear Mr. Vitale: | Dear Mr. Vitale: | ||
On June 30, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at | |||
Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Indian Point Nuclear Generating (Indian Point), Units 2 and 3. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on August 4, 2016, with Larry | your Indian Point Nuclear Generating (Indian Point), Units 2 and 3. The enclosed inspection | ||
report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on August 4, 2016, with Larry | |||
Coyle and other members of your staff. Based on additional information provided, the | Coyle and other members of your staff. Based on additional information provided, the | ||
inspectors conducted an updated exit meeting on August 30, 2016 with John Kirkpatrick, Plant Operations General Manager and other members of your staff. | inspectors conducted an updated exit meeting on August 30, 2016 with John Kirkpatrick, Plant | ||
Operations General Manager and other members of your staff. | |||
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the | The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and | ||
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. | |||
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed | The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed | ||
personnel. | personnel. | ||
This report documents three NRC-identified findings of very low safety significance (Green). These findings involved violations of NRC | |||
This report documents three NRC-identified findings of very low safety significance (Green). | |||
is treating these findings as non-cited violations, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest any non-cited violation in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to | These findings involved violations of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low | ||
safety significance, and because they are entered into your corrective action program, the NRC | |||
is treating these findings as non-cited violations, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC | |||
Enforcement Policy. If you contest any non-cited violation in this report, you should provide a | |||
response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to | |||
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC | the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC | ||
20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of | 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of | ||
Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the | Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the | ||
NRC Senior Resident Inspector at Indian Point. In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the | NRC Senior Resident Inspector at Indian Point. In addition, if you disagree with the | ||
cross-cutting aspect assigned to any finding in this report, you should provide a response within | |||
30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the | |||
Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at Indian Point. | Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at Indian Point. | ||
A. Vitale | |||
A. Vitale -2- | -2- | ||
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390 of the NRCs | |||
Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be | |||
available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the | |||
Publicly Available Records component of the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and | |||
Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at | |||
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). | |||
Sincerely, | |||
Docket Nos. 50-247 and 50-286 License Nos. DPR-26 and DPR-64 | |||
Enclosure: | |||
Inspection Report 05000247/2016002 and 05000286/2016002 w/Attachment: Supplementary Information | /RA/ | ||
cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ | |||
Glenn T. Dentel, Chief | |||
Reactor Projects Branch 2 | |||
Division of Reactor Projects | |||
Docket Nos. | |||
50-247 and 50-286 | |||
License Nos. DPR-26 and DPR-64 | |||
Enclosure: | |||
Inspection Report 05000247/2016002 and 05000286/2016002 | |||
w/Attachment: Supplementary Information | |||
cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ | |||
ML16243A245 | ML16243A245 | ||
SUNSI Review | |||
Non-Sensitive | |||
Sensitive | |||
Publicly Available | |||
Non-Publicly Available | |||
OFFICE | |||
RI/DRP | |||
RI/DRP | |||
RI/DRS | |||
RI/DRP | |||
RI/DRP | |||
NAME | |||
BHaagensen/bh | |||
NFloyd/nf | |||
MGray/mg | |||
GDentel/gtd | |||
MScott/dlp for | |||
DATE | |||
8/29/16 | |||
8/24/16 | |||
8/30/16 | |||
8/30/16 | |||
8/30/16 | |||
1 | |||
Enclosure | |||
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | |||
REGION I | |||
Docket Nos. | |||
50-247 and 50-286 | |||
License Nos. | |||
DPR-26 and DPR-64 | |||
Report Nos. | |||
05000247/2016002 and 05000286/2016002 | |||
Licensee: | |||
Entergy Nuclear Northeast (Entergy) | |||
Facility: | |||
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3 | |||
Location: | |||
450 Broadway, GSB | |||
Buchanan, NY 10511-0249 | |||
Dates: | |||
April 1, 2016, through June 30, 2016 | |||
Inspectors: | |||
B. Haagensen, Senior Resident Inspector | |||
G. Newman, Resident Inspector | |||
S. Rich, Resident Inspector | |||
S. Galbreath, Reactor Inspector | |||
J. Furia, Senior Health Physicist | |||
N. Floyd, Senior Project Engineer | |||
K. Mangan, Senior Reactor Inspector | |||
J. Poehler, Senior Materials Engineer | |||
Approved By: | |||
Glenn T. Dentel, Chief | |||
Reactor Projects Branch 2 | |||
Division of Reactor Projects | |||
2 | |||
TABLE OF CONTENTS | |||
SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................... 3 | |||
REPORT DETAILS ....................................................................................................................... 5 | |||
1. | |||
REACTOR SAFETY .............................................................................................................. 5 | |||
1R04 | |||
Equipment Alignment .................................................................................................. 5 | |||
1R05 | |||
Fire Protection ............................................................................................................. 6 | |||
1R07 | |||
Heat Sink Performance ............................................................................................... 7 | |||
1R08 | |||
Inservice Inspection Activities ..................................................................................... 7 | |||
1R11 | |||
Licensed Operator Requalification Program ............................................................... 8 | |||
1R12 | |||
Maintenance Effectiveness ....................................................................................... 10 | |||
1R13 | |||
Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control .................................. 13 | |||
1R15 | |||
Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments ..................................... 14 | |||
1R18 | |||
Plant Modifications .................................................................................................... 19 | |||
1R19 | |||
Post-Maintenance Testing ........................................................................................ 20 | |||
1R20 | |||
Refueling and Other Outage Activities ...................................................................... 21 | |||
1R22 | |||
Surveillance Testing .................................................................................................. 24 | |||
1EP6 | |||
Drill Evaluation .......................................................................................................... 25 | |||
2. | |||
RADIATION SAFETY .......................................................................................................... 25 | |||
2RS1 | |||
Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls ........................................ 25 | |||
2RS2 | |||
Occupational As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning | |||
and Controls .............................................................................................................. 26 | |||
2RS7 | |||
Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) ........................................ 26 | |||
4. | |||
OTHER ACTIVITIES ............................................................................................................ 27 | |||
4OA1 | |||
Performance Indicator Verification ............................................................................ 27 | |||
4OA2 | |||
Problem Identification and Resolution ....................................................................... 28 | |||
4OA3 | |||
Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion .................................... 34 | |||
4OA5 | |||
Other Activities .......................................................................................................... 37 | |||
4OA6 | |||
Meetings, Including Exit ............................................................................................ 39 | |||
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION ........................................................................................ A-1 | |||
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT .................................................................................................... A-1 | |||
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED ..................................... A-2 | |||
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED ........................................................................................ A-3 | |||
LIST OF ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................. A-12 | |||
3 | |||
SUMMARY | |||
Inspection Report 05000247/2016002 and 05000286/2016002; 04/01/2016 - 06/30/2016; Indian | |||
Point Nuclear Generating (Indian Point), Units 2 and 3; Operability Determinations and | |||
Functionality Assessments, Refueling and Other Outage Activities, and Follow Up of Events and | |||
Notices of Enforcement Discretion. | Notices of Enforcement Discretion. | ||
This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced | This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced | ||
inspections performed by regional inspectors. The inspectors identified three findings of very low safety significance (Green), which were non-cited violations (NCVs). The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) | inspections performed by regional inspectors. The inspectors identified three findings of very | ||
and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, | low safety significance (Green), which were non-cited violations (NCVs). The significance of | ||
Process, | most findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red) | ||
and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination | |||
Process, dated April 29, 2015. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310, | |||
the | Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas, dated December 4, 2014. All violations of | ||
safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, | U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements are dispositioned in accordance with | ||
the NRCs Enforcement Policy, dated February 4, 2015. The NRCs program for overseeing the | |||
safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor | |||
Oversight Process, Revision 6. | |||
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems | Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems | ||
Green. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, | |||
"Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," because Entergy did not adequately accomplish | |||
the actions prescribed by procedure EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, for a | |||
degraded condition associated with the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts. Specifically, Entergy | degraded condition associated with the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts. Specifically, Entergy | ||
incorrectly concluded that no degraded or non-conforming condition existed related to the | incorrectly concluded that no degraded or non-conforming condition existed related to the | ||
Unit 3 baffle-former bolts and exited the operability determination procedure. Entergy subsequently performed the remaining steps in the procedure and provided appropriate justification for their plans to examine the baffle-former bolts at the next Unit 3 refueling | Unit 3 baffle-former bolts and exited the operability determination procedure. Entergy | ||
outage (RFO). | subsequently performed the remaining steps in the procedure and provided appropriate | ||
justification for their plans to examine the baffle-former bolts at the next Unit 3 refueling | |||
outage (RFO). Entergys immediate corrective actions included entering the issue into its | |||
corrective action program (CAP) as CR-IP3-2016-01961 and documenting an operability | corrective action program (CAP) as CR-IP3-2016-01961 and documenting an operability | ||
evaluation to support the basis for operability of the baffle-former bolts and the emergency core cooling system (ECCS). This performance deficiency is more than minor because it was associated with the | evaluation to support the basis for operability of the baffle-former bolts and the emergency | ||
core cooling system (ECCS). | |||
This performance deficiency is more than minor because it was associated with the | |||
equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the | equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the | ||
cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that | cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that | ||
respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). In accordance with IMC 0609.04, | respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). In | ||
accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 2 of | |||
IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, | |||
issued June 19, 2012, the inspectors screened the finding for safety significance and | issued June 19, 2012, the inspectors screened the finding for safety significance and | ||
determined it to be of very low safety significance (Green), because the finding did not represent an actual loss of system or function. After inspector questioning, Entergy performed an operability evaluation, which provided sufficient bases to conclude the Unit 3 baffle assembly would support ECCS operability. This finding is related to the cross-cutting | determined it to be of very low safety significance (Green), because the finding did not | ||
represent an actual loss of system or function. After inspector questioning, Entergy | |||
performed an operability evaluation, which provided sufficient bases to conclude the Unit 3 | |||
baffle assembly would support ECCS operability. This finding is related to the cross-cutting | |||
aspect of Problem Identification and Resolution, Operating Experience, because Entergy did | aspect of Problem Identification and Resolution, Operating Experience, because Entergy did | ||
not effectively evaluate relevant internal and external operating experience. Specifically, | |||
Entergy did not adequately evaluate the impact of degraded baffle bolts at Unit 3 when | |||
relevant operating experience was identified at Unit 2. [P.5 - Operating Experience] | |||
(Section 1R15) | |||
4 | |||
containment failed to maintain at least one (of two) flow channeling gate closed to ensure availability of the containment sumps to provide suction for the ECCS. Entergy immediately coached the gate monitor and restored the gates to an acceptable position. Entergy | |||
Green. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1, | |||
Procedures, for Entergys failure to implement procedure OAP-007, Containment Entry | |||
and Egress. Specifically, workers transiting the inner and outer crane wall sections of | |||
containment failed to maintain at least one (of two) flow channeling gate closed to ensure | |||
availability of the containment sumps to provide suction for the ECCS. Entergy immediately | |||
coached the gate monitor and restored the gates to an acceptable position. Entergy | |||
generated CR-IP2-2016-04036 to address this issue. | generated CR-IP2-2016-04036 to address this issue. | ||
This performance deficiency is more than minor because it was associated with the | This performance deficiency is more than minor because it was associated with the | ||
configuration control (shutdown equipment lineup) attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences | configuration control (shutdown equipment lineup) attribute of the Mitigating Systems | ||
cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and | |||
capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences | |||
(i.e., core damage). A detailed risk assessment was conducted and determined that the | (i.e., core damage). A detailed risk assessment was conducted and determined that the | ||
change in core damage frequency was determined to be 7E-9, therefore, this issue | change in core damage frequency was determined to be 7E-9, therefore, this issue | ||
represents a Green finding. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Avoid Complacency, because Entergy did not consider potential undesired consequences of actions before performing work and implement appropriate error-reduction tools. Specifically, the work crew did not understand the requirements and potential | represents a Green finding. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human | ||
Performance, Avoid Complacency, because Entergy did not consider potential undesired | |||
consequences of actions before performing work and implement appropriate error-reduction | |||
tools. Specifically, the work crew did not understand the requirements and potential | |||
consequences prior to commencing work and the gate monitor did not enforce these | consequences prior to commencing work and the gate monitor did not enforce these | ||
requirements to maintain at least one gate locked or pinned closed as required by OAP-007. [H.12 - Avoid Complacency] (Section 1R20) | requirements to maintain at least one gate locked or pinned closed as required by OAP-007. | ||
Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity | [H.12 - Avoid Complacency] (Section 1R20) | ||
by the main boiler feedwater pumps ( | Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity | ||
Green. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(b)(1) for Entergys failure to | |||
include a function of a safety-related system within the scope of the maintenance rule | |||
program. Specifically, Entergy failed to include the feedwater isolation function performed | |||
by the main boiler feedwater pumps (MBFPs) discharge valves, MBFPs, and feedwater | |||
regulating valves, which are required to remain functional during and following a design | |||
basis event to mitigate the consequence of the accident within the scope of the maintenance | |||
rule monitoring program. Entergy initiated corrective actions to include the feedwater | rule monitoring program. Entergy initiated corrective actions to include the feedwater | ||
isolation function performed by the MBFP discharge valves, MBFPs, and feedwater | isolation function performed by the MBFP discharge valves, MBFPs, and feedwater | ||
regulating valves within the maintenance rule monitoring program. Entergy entered this issue into the CAP as CR-IP2-2016-03963. | regulating valves within the maintenance rule monitoring program. Entergy entered this | ||
issue into the CAP as CR-IP2-2016-03963. | |||
This performance deficiency is more than minor because it was associated with barrier | This performance deficiency is more than minor because it was associated with barrier | ||
performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the | performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the | ||
cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect | cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect | ||
the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the failure to properly scope the feedwater isolation function prevented Entergy from identifying that equipment reliability was no longer effectively controlled through preventive maintenance. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, | the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the failure | ||
0609, Appendix A, | to properly scope the feedwater isolation function prevented Entergy from identifying that | ||
June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment, containment isolation system, and heat removal | equipment reliability was no longer effectively controlled through preventive maintenance. | ||
In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 2 of IMC | |||
0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, issued | |||
June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance | |||
(Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical | |||
integrity of reactor containment, containment isolation system, and heat removal | |||
components. This finding does not have a cross-cutting aspect since the failure to scope | components. This finding does not have a cross-cutting aspect since the failure to scope | ||
this equipment into the maintenance rule program was not recognized when Entergy | this equipment into the maintenance rule program was not recognized when Entergy | ||
combined the maintenance rule basis documents for Units 2 and 3 in 2012 | combined the maintenance rule basis documents for Units 2 and 3 in 2012 and, as a result, | ||
is not indicative of current licensee performance. (Section 4OA3) | |||
Summary of Plant Status | 5 | ||
REPORT DETAILS | |||
Summary of Plant Status | |||
Unit 2 began the inspection period during RFO 2R22 which lasted 102 days. Upon completion | Unit 2 began the inspection period during RFO 2R22 which lasted 102 days. Upon completion | ||
| Line 179: | Line 427: | ||
93 percent for fuel preconditioning. On June 23, 2016, the operators shutdown the reactor to | 93 percent for fuel preconditioning. On June 23, 2016, the operators shutdown the reactor to | ||
repair a service water leak on the 21 component cooling water (CCW) heat exchanger (Hx) inlet | repair a service water leak on the 21 component cooling water (CCW) heat exchanger (Hx) inlet | ||
line and replace switchyard breaker 9. Unit 2 returned to 100 percent power on June 29, 2016. Unit 2 remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period. | line and replace switchyard breaker 9. Unit 2 returned to 100 percent power on June 29, 2016. | ||
Unit 2 remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period. | |||
Unit 3 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On April 26, 2016, a failed controller | Unit 3 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On April 26, 2016, a failed controller | ||
caused both heater drain pumps to trip; and the operators reduced power rapidly, stabilizing the | caused both heater drain pumps to trip; and the operators reduced power rapidly, stabilizing the | ||
unit at 48 percent power. Operators returned Unit 3 to 100 percent power on April 27, 2016, and remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period. | unit at 48 percent power. Operators returned Unit 3 to 100 percent power on April 27, 2016, | ||
1. REACTOR SAFETY | and remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period. | ||
1. | |||
REACTOR SAFETY | |||
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity | |||
Partial System Walkdowns (71111.04Q - 5 samples) | 1R04 Equipment Alignment | ||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
Partial System Walkdowns (71111.04Q - 5 samples) | |||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems: | The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems: | ||
Unit 2 | Unit 2 | ||
Unit 3 | |||
The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed | |||
Spent fuel pool cooling system following core offload on May 19, 2016 | |||
Shutdown cooling system following core reload on June 6, 2016 | |||
CCW system following maintenance on June 28, 2016 | |||
Unit 3 | |||
32 emergency diesel generator (EDG) following maintenance on May 9, 2016 (this | |||
sample was part of an in-depth review of the EDG system) | |||
Residual heat removal pumps following CCW system testing on May 20, 2016 | |||
The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the | |||
reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed | |||
applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the updated final safety analysis | applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the updated final safety analysis | ||
report (UFSAR), TSs, work orders (WOs), condition reports (CRs), and the impact of | report (UFSAR), TSs, work orders (WOs), condition reports (CRs), and the impact of | ||
ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify | ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions | ||
that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The | |||
inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify | |||
system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. | system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable. | ||
The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed | The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed | ||
operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The | operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The | ||
6 | |||
6 | |||
No findings were identified. | |||
inspectors also reviewed whether Entergy had properly identified equipment issues and | |||
entered them into the CAP for resolution with the appropriate significance | |||
characterization. Documents reviewed for each section of this inspection report are | |||
a. Inspection Scope | listed in the Attachment. | ||
The inspectors conducted tours of the areas listed below to assess the material | |||
b. Findings | |||
No findings were identified. | |||
1R05 Fire Protection | |||
Resident Inspector Quarterly Walkdowns (71111.05Q - 6 samples) | |||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The inspectors conducted tours of the areas listed below to assess the material | |||
condition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that | condition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that | ||
Entergy controlled combustible materials and ignition sources in accordance with | Entergy controlled combustible materials and ignition sources in accordance with | ||
administrative procedures. The inspectors verified that fire protection and suppression equipment were available for use as specified in the area pre-fire plan (PFP) and passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition. The inspectors also | administrative procedures. The inspectors verified that fire protection and suppression | ||
equipment were available for use as specified in the area pre-fire plan (PFP) and | |||
passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition. The inspectors also | |||
verified that station personnel implemented compensatory measures for out-of-service | verified that station personnel implemented compensatory measures for out-of-service | ||
(OOS), degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment, as applicable, in accordance | (OOS), degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment, as applicable, in accordance | ||
with procedures. | with procedures. | ||
Unit 2 | |||
Containment, 95-foot elevation, during baffle bolt repair activities with hot work in | |||
progress (PFP-203 was reviewed) on June 2, 2016 | |||
Residual heat removal pump rooms in primary auxiliary building (PAB), 15-foot | |||
elevation (PFP-204 was reviewed), on June 6, 2016 | |||
CCW pump room, 68-foot elevation (PFP-209 was reviewed), on June 25, 2016 | |||
PAB, 80-foot elevation, CCW heat exchanger area with hot work in progress | |||
(PFP-211 was reviewed) on June 25, 2016 | |||
Unit 3 | |||
32 EDG room, 10-foot elevation (PFP-354 was reviewed), on May 9, 2016 | |||
480V switchgear room, 15-foot elevation (PFP-351 was reviewed), on June 30, 2016 | |||
b. Findings | |||
No findings were identified. | |||
7 | |||
1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07A - 1 sample) | |||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The inspectors reviewed the 32 EDG jacket water and lube oil heat exchanger to | |||
determine its readiness and availability to perform its safety functions. The inspectors | |||
reviewed the design basis for the component and verified Entergys commitments to | |||
NRC Generic Letter 89-13, Service Water System Requirements Affecting | |||
The inspectors reviewed the 32 EDG jacket water and lube oil heat exchanger to | Safety-Related Equipment. The inspectors observed the annual cleaning and | ||
determine its readiness and availability to perform its safety functions. The inspectors reviewed the design basis for the component and verified | inspection of the heat exchangers and reviewed the results of previous inspections of | ||
NRC Generic Letter 89-13, | the Unit 3 EDG heat exchangers. The inspectors discussed the results of the most | ||
recent inspection with engineering staff. The inspectors verified that Entergy initiated | recent inspection with engineering staff. The inspectors verified that Entergy initiated | ||
appropriate corrective actions for identified deficiencies. The inspectors also verified that the number of tubes plugged within the heat exchanger did not exceed the maximum amount allowed. | appropriate corrective actions for identified deficiencies. The inspectors also verified | ||
that the number of tubes plugged within the heat exchanger did not exceed the | |||
maximum amount allowed. | |||
No findings were identified. | |||
b. Findings | |||
No findings were identified. | |||
1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities (71111.08P - 1 sample) | 1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities (71111.08P - 1 sample) | ||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
Inspectors from the NRC Region I Office, specializing in materials and inservice examination activities, observed portions of | a. Inspection Scope | ||
Inspectors from the NRC Region I Office, specializing in materials and inservice | |||
examination activities, observed portions of Entergys activities involving baffle-former | |||
bolt examinations and replacements during Unit 2 RFO 2R22. The inspectors reviewed | |||
work documentation and examination procedures and results, and discussed these | work documentation and examination procedures and results, and discussed these | ||
activities with Entergy. The inspectors were on-site from April 27 to April 28, 2016, and on May 23, 2016. The inspectors verified that Entergy completed baffle-former bolt examinations in accordance with their approved procedures which implemented activities described in the Materials Reliability Program (MRP)-227-A, | activities with Entergy. The inspectors were on-site from April 27 to April 28, 2016, and | ||
Water Reactor Internals Inspection and Evaluation Guidelines, | on May 23, 2016. The inspectors verified that Entergy completed baffle-former bolt | ||
examinations in accordance with their approved procedures which implemented | |||
activities described in the Materials Reliability Program (MRP)-227-A, Pressurized | |||
Water Reactor Internals Inspection and Evaluation Guidelines, as they relate to this | |||
component. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the results of the visual and volumetric | component. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the results of the visual and volumetric | ||
examinations of the baffle-former bolts, including capabilities, limitations, and acceptance criteria that were performed during the current RFO. | examinations of the baffle-former bolts, including capabilities, limitations, and | ||
acceptance criteria that were performed during the current RFO. | |||
Non-Destructive Examination Activities | Non-Destructive Examination Activities | ||
The inspectors reviewed the ultrasonic testing (UT) procedure used for the examination | |||
of the Unit 2 baffle-former bolts to verify the procedure was in accordance with the | |||
applicable guidance in MRP-227-A and MRP-228. The inspectors reviewed the UT data | |||
records and the detailed UT channel analysis for a sample of baffle-former bolts to verify | records and the detailed UT channel analysis for a sample of baffle-former bolts to verify | ||
the examinations and evaluations were performed in accordance with approved | the examinations and evaluations were performed in accordance with approved | ||
procedures and applicable guidance. The inspectors reviewed video recordings of the | procedures and applicable guidance. The inspectors reviewed video recordings of the | ||
visual examinations of the baffle-former bolts during the current RFO. The inspectors also reviewed recorded video of visual examinations performed in 2006 at Unit 2, completed as part of the existing inservice inspection program for the 10-year reactor | visual examinations of the baffle-former bolts during the current RFO. The inspectors | ||
also reviewed recorded video of visual examinations performed in 2006 at Unit 2, | |||
completed as part of the existing inservice inspection program for the 10-year reactor | |||
vessel examinations, to independently assess the past conditions of the baffle-former | vessel examinations, to independently assess the past conditions of the baffle-former | ||
bolts and assembly. | bolts and assembly. | ||
8 | |||
8 | |||
The inspectors reviewed certifications of the UT technicians performing the ultrasonic | |||
examinations to verify the examinations were performed by qualified individuals and to | |||
verify the results were reviewed and evaluated by certified level III non-destructive | |||
examination personnel. | |||
Baffle-Former Bolt Replacement Activities | Baffle-Former Bolt Replacement Activities | ||
The inspectors reviewed the baffle-former bolt replacement activities performed as part | The inspectors reviewed the baffle-former bolt replacement activities performed as part | ||
of a corrective action to resolve the degraded condition identified at Unit 2. The inspectors observed a sample of in-process bolt removal activities, which included lock bar milling and bolt hole machining. The inspectors reviewed the documentation for | of a corrective action to resolve the degraded condition identified at Unit 2. The | ||
inspectors observed a sample of in-process bolt removal activities, which included lock | |||
bar milling and bolt hole machining. The inspectors reviewed the documentation for | |||
in-process and completed bolt installation activities and verified that loose parts | in-process and completed bolt installation activities and verified that loose parts | ||
generated as part of the bolt replacements were properly tracked. The inspectors | generated as part of the bolt replacements were properly tracked. The inspectors | ||
verified that bolt replacement activities were performed in accordance with approved procedures. The inspectors also reviewed the Engineering Change (EC) package associated with the new baffle-former bolt design. This review is documented in | verified that bolt replacement activities were performed in accordance with approved | ||
procedures. The inspectors also reviewed the Engineering Change (EC) package | |||
associated with the new baffle-former bolt design. This review is documented in | |||
Section 1R18 of this report. After completion of the bolt replacement activities, the | Section 1R18 of this report. After completion of the bolt replacement activities, the | ||
inspectors reviewed the video of the final visual examination of the baffle assembly to | inspectors reviewed the video of the final visual examination of the baffle assembly to | ||
verify that the baffle-former bolt work was accomplished as planned and that there were no visual indications of deficiencies. | verify that the baffle-former bolt work was accomplished as planned and that there were | ||
b. Findings | no visual indications of deficiencies. | ||
b. Findings | |||
No findings were identified. | No findings were identified. | ||
Update to URI 05000247/2016001-01, Baffle-Former Bolts with Identified Anomalies | |||
This inspection was conducted to follow-up on NRC Unresolved Item (URI) | |||
This inspection was conducted to follow-up on NRC Unresolved Item (URI) | |||
05000247/2016001-01, Baffle-Former Bolts with Identified Anomalies, to determine | 05000247/2016001-01, Baffle-Former Bolts with Identified Anomalies, to determine | ||
whether there was a performance deficiency associated with the degraded baffle-former bolt condition discovered at Unit 2. The inspectors plan to review additional technical information from Entergy as it becomes available, including any revisions to the root | whether there was a performance deficiency associated with the degraded baffle-former | ||
bolt condition discovered at Unit 2. The inspectors plan to review additional technical | |||
information from Entergy as it becomes available, including any revisions to the root | |||
cause evaluation. The URI remains open until review of this additional information is | cause evaluation. The URI remains open until review of this additional information is | ||
completed. (URI 05000247/2016001-01, Baffle-Former Bolts with Identified | completed. (URI 05000247/2016001-01, Baffle-Former Bolts with Identified | ||
Anomalies) | Anomalies) | ||
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11Q - 5 samples) | |||
Unit 2 | 1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11Q - 5 samples) | ||
.1 Quarterly Review of Unit 2 Licensed Operator Requalification Testing and Training | |||
Unit 2 | |||
.1 | |||
Quarterly Review of Unit 2 Licensed Operator Requalification Testing and Training | |||
(71111.11Q - 1 sample) | (71111.11Q - 1 sample) | ||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The inspectors observed Unit 2 licensed operator simulator training on May 24, 2016, | a. Inspection Scope | ||
which included reactor coolant pump seal failure with loss of normal heat sink requiring implementation of feed and bleed cooling. The inspectors evaluated operator performance during the simulated event and verified completion of risk significant | |||
The inspectors observed Unit 2 licensed operator simulator training on May 24, 2016, | |||
which included reactor coolant pump seal failure with loss of normal heat sink requiring | |||
implementation of feed and bleed cooling. The inspectors evaluated operator | |||
performance during the simulated event and verified completion of risk significant | |||
operator actions, including the use of abnormal and emergency operating procedures. | operator actions, including the use of abnormal and emergency operating procedures. | ||
The inspectors assessed the clarity and effectiveness of communications, | The inspectors assessed the clarity and effectiveness of communications, | ||
9 | |||
implementation of actions in response to alarms and degrading plant conditions, and the | |||
oversight and direction provided by the control room supervisor. The inspectors verified | |||
the accuracy and timeliness of the emergency classification made by the shift manager | |||
and the TS action statements entered by the shift technical advisor. Additionally, the | |||
inspectors assessed the ability of the crew and training staff to identify and document | |||
crew performance problems. | crew performance problems. | ||
.2 Quarterly Review of Unit 3 Licensed Operator Requalification Testing and Training | b. Findings | ||
No findings were identified. | |||
.2 | |||
Quarterly Review of Unit 3 Licensed Operator Requalification Testing and Training | |||
(71111.11Q - 1 sample) | (71111.11Q - 1 sample) | ||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The inspectors observed a Unit 3 licensed operator simulator requalification training | a. Inspection Scope | ||
The inspectors observed a Unit 3 licensed operator simulator requalification training | |||
evaluated scenario on May 24, 2016, which included failure of a pressurizer pressure | evaluated scenario on May 24, 2016, which included failure of a pressurizer pressure | ||
instrument, charging pump trip, loss of 480V safety bus 5A, a small break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), and entry into FR-C.2 core cooling. The inspectors evaluated operator performance during the simulated event and verified completion of risk significant | instrument, charging pump trip, loss of 480V safety bus 5A, a small break loss-of-coolant | ||
accident (LOCA), and entry into FR-C.2 core cooling. The inspectors evaluated operator | |||
performance during the simulated event and verified completion of risk significant | |||
operator actions, including the use of abnormal and emergency operating procedures. | operator actions, including the use of abnormal and emergency operating procedures. | ||
The inspectors assessed the clarity and effectiveness of communications, | The inspectors assessed the clarity and effectiveness of communications, | ||
implementation of actions in response to alarms and degrading plant conditions, and the | implementation of actions in response to alarms and degrading plant conditions, and the | ||
oversight and direction provided by the control room supervisor. The inspectors verified the accuracy and timeliness of the emergency classification made by the shift manager and the TS action statements entered by the shift technical advisor. Additionally, the inspectors assessed the ability of the crew and training staff to identify and document | oversight and direction provided by the control room supervisor. The inspectors verified | ||
the accuracy and timeliness of the emergency classification made by the shift manager | |||
crew performance problems. b. Findings | and the TS action statements entered by the shift technical advisor. Additionally, the | ||
inspectors assessed the ability of the crew and training staff to identify and document | |||
crew performance problems. | |||
b. Findings | |||
No findings were identified. | |||
.3 | |||
Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance (71111.11Q - 3 samples) | |||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The inspectors conducted a focused observation of operator performance in the main | |||
control room. The inspectors observed pre-job briefings and control room | control room. The inspectors observed pre-job briefings and control room | ||
communications to verify they met the criteria specified in | communications to verify they met the criteria specified in Entergys administrative | ||
coordination of activities between work groups similarly met established expectations and standards. | procedure EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations. Additionally, the inspectors observed | ||
restoration activities to verify that procedure use, crew communications, and | |||
coordination of activities between work groups similarly met established expectations | |||
and standards. | |||
10 | |||
10 | |||
.1 Routine Maintenance Effectiveness | Unit 2 | ||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The inspectors reviewed the samples listed below to assess the effectiveness of | |||
maintenance activities on SSCs performance and reliability. The inspectors reviewed | Plant startup from RFO 2R22 on June 16, 2016 including response to a turbine trip | ||
without a reactor trip and the subsequent turbine-generator synchronization and | |||
transfer of plant electrical loads from offsite power to the unit auxiliary transformer. | |||
documents to ensure that Entergy was identifying and properly evaluating performance problems within the scope of the maintenance rule. For each SSC sample selected, the inspectors verified that the SSC was properly scoped into the maintenance rule in | |||
Reactor startup and grid synchronization conducted on June 27, 2016. | |||
Unit 3 | |||
Operator response to the feedwater transient which occurred on April 26, 2016 | |||
b. Findings | |||
No findings were identified. | |||
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12Q - 4 samples) | |||
.1 | |||
Routine Maintenance Effectiveness | |||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The inspectors reviewed the samples listed below to assess the effectiveness of | |||
maintenance activities on SSCs performance and reliability. The inspectors reviewed | |||
system health reports, CAP documents, maintenance WOs, and maintenance rule basis | |||
documents to ensure that Entergy was identifying and properly evaluating performance | |||
problems within the scope of the maintenance rule. For each SSC sample selected, the | |||
inspectors verified that the SSC was properly scoped into the maintenance rule in | |||
accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 and verified that the (a)(2) performance criteria | accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 and verified that the (a)(2) performance criteria | ||
established by Entergy was reasonable. As applicable, for SSCs classified as (a)(1), the | established by Entergy was reasonable. As applicable, for SSCs classified as (a)(1), the | ||
inspectors assessed the adequacy of goals and corrective actions to return these SSCs | inspectors assessed the adequacy of goals and corrective actions to return these SSCs | ||
to (a)(2). Additionally, the inspectors ensured that Entergy was identifying and addressing common cause failures that occurred within and across maintenance rule system boundaries. | to (a)(2). Additionally, the inspectors ensured that Entergy was identifying and | ||
addressing common cause failures that occurred within and across maintenance rule | |||
system boundaries. | |||
Unit 2 EDGs | |||
Unit 3 EDGs (this sample was part of an in-depth review of the EDG system) | |||
Units 2 and 3 CVCS | |||
b. Findings | |||
No findings were identified. | |||
URI Opened, CVCS Goal Monitoring Under the Maintenance Rule | |||
Introduction | |||
The inspectors identified issues of potential concern with Entergys application of | |||
10 CFR 50.65(a)(1), Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at | |||
Nuclear Plants, (the maintenance rule) in regards to the reliability of the Unit 2 CVCS | |||
system. These concerns included the establishment of appropriate (a)(1) goals and | |||
11 | |||
whether appropriate justification was established that the corrective actions to address | |||
identified maintenance weaknesses were effective prior to removal from (a)(1) status. | |||
Specifically, Entergy may have established restrictive goals without defensible | |||
justification and may not have demonstrated their chosen goal before ending the goal | |||
Specifically, Entergy may have established restrictive goals without defensible justification and may not have demonstrated their chosen goal before ending the goal | |||
monitoring interval. | monitoring interval. | ||
Description | Description | ||
The maintenance rule requires that licensees shall monitor the performance or condition | The maintenance rule requires that licensees shall monitor the performance or condition | ||
of structures, systems, or components, against licensee-established goals, in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that these structures, systems, and | of structures, systems, or components, against licensee-established goals, in a manner | ||
sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that these structures, systems, and | |||
components are capable of fulfilling their intended functions. These goals shall be | components are capable of fulfilling their intended functions. These goals shall be | ||
established commensurate with safety and, where practical, take into account | established commensurate with safety and, where practical, take into account | ||
industrywide operating experience. When the performance or condition of a structure, system, or component does not meet established goals, appropriate corrective action shall be taken. EN-DC-206, | industrywide operating experience. When the performance or condition of a structure, | ||
system, or component does not meet established goals, appropriate corrective action | |||
shall be taken. EN-DC-206, Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Process, provides the | |||
requirements and processes for managing SSCs for which (a)(2) monitoring has not | requirements and processes for managing SSCs for which (a)(2) monitoring has not | ||
demonstrated effective maintenance. EN-DC-206 specifies that (a)(1) action plans | demonstrated effective maintenance. EN-DC-206 specifies that (a)(1) action plans | ||
should not be closed until effectiveness of all corrective actions has been demonstrated by meeting performance goals through the monitoring period (or by other means specified in the action plan). | should not be closed until effectiveness of all corrective actions has been demonstrated | ||
by meeting performance goals through the monitoring period (or by other means | |||
specified in the action plan). | |||
Since 2013, there have been several repeat functional failures of equipment in the | Since 2013, there have been several repeat functional failures of equipment in the | ||
CVCS resulting in a failure to meet the performance criterion for reliability. These | CVCS resulting in a failure to meet the performance criterion for reliability. These | ||
failures included: | failures included: | ||
had failed in the same way in 2011, with earlier failures of other valves for the same cause going back to 1997. | |||
A failure of the 23 charging pump on August 6, 2013, after the internal oil pump | |||
discharge tubing broke causing the pump to trip on low oil pressure and a loss of | |||
charging. The 21 charging pump had tripped for the same reason in 2010. | |||
A failure of the 22 charging pump on January 14, 2014, due to cracked internal | |||
check valves caused by an inadequate fill-and-vent that left air in the pump following | |||
maintenance. The 21 charging pump had failed due to the same cause in 2013. | |||
A failure of the Unit 2 valve FCV-110A, boric acid flow control valve, to fully open on | |||
January 5, 2015. The valve had insufficient insulation; and as a result, boron | |||
crystalized above the valve plug and blocked its movement. The Unit 3 FCV-110A | |||
had failed in the same way in 2011, with earlier failures of other valves for the same | |||
cause going back to 1997. | |||
In each case, the CVCS for Unit 2 was already (a)(1), so Entergy either updated the | In each case, the CVCS for Unit 2 was already (a)(1), so Entergy either updated the | ||
existing (a)(1) action plan or created another one to operate in parallel with the existing | existing (a)(1) action plan or created another one to operate in parallel with the existing | ||
one. Upon reviewing the associated (a)(1) action plans, the inspectors noted that in each example | one. Upon reviewing the associated (a)(1) action plans, the inspectors noted that in | ||
operating SSCs, at least three surveillances for SSCs monitored by surveillance and long enough to detect recurrence of the applicable failure mechanism. It also states that | each example Entergys goals may not have been in accordance with EN-DC-206(a)(1) | ||
Process. It specifies that monitoring intervals should be at least six months for normally | |||
operating SSCs, at least three surveillances for SSCs monitored by surveillance and | |||
long enough to detect recurrence of the applicable failure mechanism. It also states that | |||
performance goals that provide reasonable assurance that the SSC is capable of | performance goals that provide reasonable assurance that the SSC is capable of | ||
performing its intended functions should be monitored throughout the time the SSC is classified (a)(1). EN-DC-206 defines an SSC as any discreet component grouping that has caused a monitoring failure, including any applicable extent of condition. In the | performing its intended functions should be monitored throughout the time the SSC is | ||
classified (a)(1). EN-DC-206 defines an SSC as any discreet component grouping that | |||
has caused a monitoring failure, including any applicable extent of condition. In the | |||
examples provided, NRC inspectors challenged whether Entergy either chose a shorter | |||
12 | |||
monitoring interval or a goal that did not include the applicable extent of condition. | |||
Specifically: | |||
The (a)(1) action plan for the broken oil tubing had a goal of no noticeable decrease | |||
in 23 charging pumps running oil pressure for the next three quarterly surveillances. | |||
The chosen monitoring interval met the procedural expectation, but Entergy limited | |||
the monitoring to the 23 charging pump without written justification, when the 21 | |||
charging pump had failed previously for the same reason and the other pumps were | charging pump had failed previously for the same reason and the other pumps were | ||
susceptible to the same failure mechanism. During the monitoring interval, the 21 | susceptible to the same failure mechanism. During the monitoring interval, the 21 | ||
charging pump experienced low oil pressure. When Entergy performed repairs on | charging pump experienced low oil pressure. When Entergy performed repairs on | ||
the 21 charging pump for an unrelated issue, they discovered that the oil tubing had failed in the same way the 23 charging pump oil tubing had failed, although it had not | the 21 charging pump for an unrelated issue, they discovered that the oil tubing had | ||
yet caused a pump trip. The (a)(1) action plan for the cracked check valves had a goal of no check valve | failed in the same way the 23 charging pump oil tubing had failed, although it had not | ||
failure for six months for the next charging pump that underwent maintenance. This happened to be the 22 charging pump. Entergy chose a six-month monitoring | yet caused a pump trip. | ||
interval, even though only one of the three | The (a)(1) action plan for the cracked check valves had a goal of no check valve | ||
failure for six months for the next charging pump that underwent maintenance. This | |||
happened to be the 22 charging pump. Entergy chose a six-month monitoring | |||
interval, even though only one of the three charging pumps is in service at any given | |||
time, and the 22 charging pump only ran for four out of the six months it was | |||
monitored. Additionally, the action plan did not justify why a single successful fill- | |||
and-vent demonstrated adequate corrective actions. On November 19, 2014, during | |||
the six month monitoring interval, the 21 charging pump underwent maintenance | the six month monitoring interval, the 21 charging pump underwent maintenance | ||
requiring a fill-and-vent, and experienced check valve failure two weeks later on | |||
requiring a fill-and-vent, and experienced check valve failure two weeks later on December 4. Entergy documented this as a maintenance rule functional failure, and discussed the possibility that it could be due to an inadequate fill-and-vent, but did not change the (a)(1) action plan. The (a)(1) action plan for FCV-110A specified a monitoring interval of six months to include the winter because the previous valve failures had all occurred during the winter months. However, the actual monitoring interval documented in the corrective | December 4. Entergy documented this as a maintenance rule functional failure, and | ||
discussed the possibility that it could be due to an inadequate fill-and-vent, but did | |||
not change the (a)(1) action plan. | |||
The (a)(1) action plan for FCV-110A specified a monitoring interval of six months to | |||
include the winter because the previous valve failures had all occurred during the | |||
winter months. However, the actual monitoring interval documented in the corrective | |||
action was from April to October 2015, and therefore did not cover the winter months | action was from April to October 2015, and therefore did not cover the winter months | ||
as intended. In January 2016, Entergy performed maintenance on valve CH-297 on | as intended. In January 2016, Entergy performed maintenance on valve CH-297 on | ||
Unit 3, which is a heat-traced boric acid valve, and did not properly restore the insulation. The valve function was not impacted because it does not often contain high concentrations of boric acid. | Unit 3, which is a heat-traced boric acid valve, and did not properly restore the | ||
insulation. The valve function was not impacted because it does not often contain | |||
high concentrations of boric acid. | |||
The (a)(1) action plans described above were all reviewed and approved by the | The (a)(1) action plans described above were all reviewed and approved by the | ||
maintenance rule expert panel. | maintenance rule expert panel. | ||
Further information regarding the performance of these SSCs is required to determine | |||
Further information regarding the performance of these SSCs is required to determine | |||
whether these issues of concern represent performance deficiencies and whether they | whether these issues of concern represent performance deficiencies and whether they | ||
are more than minor. (URI 05000247/2016002-01, CVCS Goal Monitoring Under the | |||
Maintenance Rule) | |||
.2 | |||
Quality Control | |||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The inspectors reviewed the weld repair performed on the 21 CCW heat exchanger | |||
service water inlet nozzle for Unit 2 to verify Entergy was properly applying quality | |||
controls specified in their quality assurance program. The inspectors reviewed CAP | |||
documents, maintenance WOs, ECs, and engineering procedures associated with the | |||
weld repair. The inspectors verified Entergy specified quality control hold points in | |||
13 | |||
accordance with their procedures, properly controlled the quality of materials used | |||
during the repair, and adequately justified deviations from the existing design. | |||
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the welding procedure specification qualification by | |||
the vendor to ensure it was in accordance with American Society of Mechanical | |||
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the welding procedure specification qualification by the vendor to ensure it was in accordance with American Society of Mechanical | |||
Engineers code. | Engineers code. | ||
No findings were identified. | b. Findings | ||
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 - 7 samples) | |||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The inspectors reviewed station evaluation and management of plant risk for the maintenance and emergent work activities listed | No findings were identified. | ||
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 - 7 samples) | |||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The inspectors reviewed station evaluation and management of plant risk for the | |||
maintenance and emergent work activities listed below to verify that Entergy performed | |||
the appropriate risk assessments prior to removing equipment for work. The inspectors | |||
selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety | selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety | ||
cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that Entergy performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and that the assessments were accurate and complete. When Entergy performed emergent work, | cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that Entergy | ||
performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and that the | |||
assessments were accurate and complete. When Entergy performed emergent work, | |||
the inspectors verified that operations personnel promptly assessed and managed plant | the inspectors verified that operations personnel promptly assessed and managed plant | ||
risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work and discussed the results | risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work and discussed the results | ||
of the assessment with the | of the assessment with the stations probabilistic risk analyst to verify plant conditions | ||
were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the TS requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met. | were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the TS | ||
requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to | |||
verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met. | |||
Unit 2 | |||
Temporary loss of spent fuel pool cooling due to 345-kilovolt disturbance on | |||
April 3, 2016 | |||
Equipment hatch closure plug seal demonstration for outage risk on April 5, 2016 | |||
Reduced inventory operations during vessel reassembly on June 7, 2016 | |||
21 CCW heat exchanger OOS during mode 4 on June 25, 2016 | |||
Unit 3 | |||
32 EDG OOS while Bus Tie BT 4-5 was OOS on May 4, 2016 (this sample was part | |||
of an in-depth review of the EDG system) | |||
33 EDG OOS while Bus Tie BT 4-5 was OOS on June 2, 2016 | |||
31 EDG OOS while Bus Tie BT 4-5 was OOS on June 21, 2016 | |||
b. Findings | |||
No findings were identified. | |||
14 | |||
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (71111.15 - 7 samples) | |||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The inspectors reviewed operability determinations for the following degraded or | |||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The inspectors reviewed operability determinations for the following degraded or | |||
non-conforming conditions: | non-conforming conditions: | ||
Unit 2 | Unit 2 | ||
23 EDG failure to run on March 7, 2016, and subsequent failure to pass the | |||
surveillance test on March 10, 2016, as identified in CR-IP2-2016-01260 | |||
Operability determination for N33 gamma metrics wide range nuclear instrument | |||
channel in CR-IP2-2016-03660 on June 13, 2016 | |||
Pressurizer level transmitter LT-461 reads high in CR-IP-2016-3806 on June 14, | |||
2016 | |||
Through-wall leak in line 411, service water inlet to the 21 CCW heat exchanger, on | |||
June 15, 2016 | |||
Unit 3 | |||
Immediate operability determination of the degraded condition of the baffle-former | |||
bolts identified from Unit 2 operating experience in CR-IP3-2016-01035 on April 1, | |||
2016 | |||
Anomalies noted during digital metal impact monitoring system self-test in | |||
CR-IP3-2015-03468 on April 1, 2016 | |||
Prompt operability determination of the degraded condition of the baffle-former bolts | |||
identified from Unit 2 operating experience in CR-IP2-2016-03660 on June 30, 2016 | |||
The inspectors selected these issues based on the risk significance of the associated | |||
components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the | components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the | ||
operability determinations to assess whether TS operability was properly justified and | operability determinations to assess whether TS operability was properly justified and | ||
the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized | the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized | ||
increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the TSs and UFSAR to | increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in | ||
the appropriate sections of the TSs and UFSAR to Entergys evaluations to determine | |||
whether the components or systems were operable. | |||
The inspectors confirmed, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations | The inspectors confirmed, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations | ||
associated with the evaluations. Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled by Entergy. The inspectors | associated with the evaluations. Where compensatory measures were required to | ||
maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would | |||
function as intended and were properly controlled by Entergy. The inspectors | |||
determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the | determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the | ||
evaluations. | evaluations. | ||
Introduction. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," because Entergy did not | b. Findings | ||
Introduction. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, | |||
Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," because Entergy did not | |||
adequately accomplish the actions prescribed by procedure EN-OP-104 for a degraded | adequately accomplish the actions prescribed by procedure EN-OP-104 for a degraded | ||
condition associated with the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts. Specifically, Entergy incorrectly concluded that no degraded or non-conforming condition existed related to the Unit 3 | condition associated with the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts. Specifically, Entergy incorrectly | ||
concluded that no degraded or non-conforming condition existed related to the Unit 3 | |||
15 | |||
baffle-former bolts and exited the operability determination procedure. Entergy | |||
subsequently performed the remaining steps in the procedure and provided appropriate | |||
justification for their plans to examine the baffle-former bolts at the next Unit 3 RFO. | justification for their plans to examine the baffle-former bolts at the next Unit 3 RFO. | ||
Description. On March 29, 2016, Entergy identified baffle-former ( | |||
Description. On March 29, 2016, Entergy identified baffle-former (baffle) bolt | |||
degradation at Indian Point Unit 2 that was determined to be unanalyzed because it did | |||
not meet the minimum acceptable bolt pattern analysis developed to support plant | not meet the minimum acceptable bolt pattern analysis developed to support plant | ||
startup. Entergy staff identified a total of 227 baffle bolts out of a population of 832 that | startup. Entergy staff identified a total of 227 baffle bolts out of a population of 832 that | ||
were potentially degraded (182 bolts had UT indications; 31 had visual indications of failure; and 14 were inaccessible for testing and conservatively assumed to be degraded). Entergy staff entered this problem into the CAP as CR-IP2-2016-02081, | were potentially degraded (182 bolts had UT indications; 31 had visual indications of | ||
failure; and 14 were inaccessible for testing and conservatively assumed to be | |||
degraded). Entergy staff entered this problem into the CAP as CR-IP2-2016-02081, | |||
performed a root cause evaluation, and replaced the degraded bolts on Unit 2. Due to | performed a root cause evaluation, and replaced the degraded bolts on Unit 2. Due to | ||
the number of baffle bolt indications discovered on Unit 2, Entergy staff initiated CR-IP3- | the number of baffle bolt indications discovered on Unit 2, Entergy staff initiated CR-IP3- | ||
2016-01035 on April 21, 2016, and performed an immediate operability determination (IOD) in accordance with Entergy procedure EN-OP-104 Section 5.3, to evaluate the baffle bolts and baffle-former assembly structure on Unit 3. Entergy staff planned further | 2016-01035 on April 21, 2016, and performed an immediate operability determination | ||
(IOD) in accordance with Entergy procedure EN-OP-104 Section 5.3, to evaluate the | |||
baffle bolts and baffle-former assembly structure on Unit 3. Entergy staff planned further | |||
corrective actions to move up the planned Unit 3 baffle bolt ultrasonic examinations to | corrective actions to move up the planned Unit 3 baffle bolt ultrasonic examinations to | ||
the next RFO in spring 2017. | the next RFO in spring 2017. | ||
The inspectors reviewed the design basis and current licensing basis documents for | |||
Indian Point Unit 3 to identify the specific safety functions of the baffle bolts. The baffle | |||
bolts are part of the baffle former assembly structure located in the reactor pressure | bolts are part of the baffle former assembly structure located in the reactor pressure | ||
vessel. The bolts secure a series of vertical metal plates called baffle plates, which help | vessel. The bolts secure a series of vertical metal plates called baffle plates, which help | ||
direct water up through the nuclear fuel assemblies to ensure proper cooling of the fuel. | direct water up through the nuclear fuel assemblies to ensure proper cooling of the fuel. | ||
A sufficient number of baffle bolts are required to secure the plates to ensure proper core flow during normal and postulated accident conditions, and also to ensure that control rods can be inserted to shut down the reactor. | A sufficient number of baffle bolts are required to secure the plates to ensure proper | ||
core flow during normal and postulated accident conditions, and also to ensure that | |||
control rods can be inserted to shut down the reactor. | |||
The inspectors reviewed | The inspectors reviewed Entergys IOD issued on April 21, 2016, and concluded the | ||
immediate determination was completed in accordance with Section 5.3 of procedure | immediate determination was completed in accordance with Section 5.3 of procedure | ||
EN-OP-104. The IOD provided sufficient technical detail to support the initial conclusion, based on limited information, that the Unit 3 baffle bolts would retain sufficient capability | EN-OP-104. The IOD provided sufficient technical detail to support the initial conclusion, | ||
based on limited information, that the Unit 3 baffle bolts would retain sufficient capability | |||
to perform their intended functions. Specifically, the IOD stated that Unit 2 baffle bolt | to perform their intended functions. Specifically, the IOD stated that Unit 2 baffle bolt | ||
failures were likely due to irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC) and that | failures were likely due to irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC) and that | ||
the Unit 3 baffle bolts were also susceptible because they both utilize a baffle bolt design | the Unit 3 baffle bolts were also susceptible because they both utilize a baffle bolt design | ||
with similar geometry and material to other plants with bolt failures. The IOD concluded that Unit 3 baffle bolt degradation would likely not be as significant as Unit 2, and that the Unit 3 baffle former assembly was currently operable pending further evaluation | with similar geometry and material to other plants with bolt failures. The IOD concluded | ||
that Unit 3 baffle bolt degradation would likely not be as significant as Unit 2, and that | |||
the Unit 3 baffle former assembly was currently operable pending further evaluation | |||
because of the following differences with Unit 2: (1) less effective full power years of | because of the following differences with Unit 2: (1) less effective full power years of | ||
operation; (2) less neutron fluence levels (i.e., irradiation); (3) less pressure differential | operation; (2) less neutron fluence levels (i.e., irradiation); (3) less pressure differential | ||
across the baffle plates; and (4) less fatigue-induced loading cycles on the bolts over the operating life of the plant. The inspectors concluded that there was no immediate safety | across the baffle plates; and (4) less fatigue-induced loading cycles on the bolts over the | ||
operating life of the plant. The inspectors concluded that there was no immediate safety | |||
concern. | concern. | ||
On May 5, 2016, Entergy staff revised the operability input for CR-IP3-2016-01035 under | On May 5, 2016, Entergy staff revised the operability input for CR-IP3-2016-01035 under | ||
corrective action #2. The inspectors noted that Entergy staff concluded an operability | corrective action #2. The inspectors noted that Entergy staff concluded an operability | ||
evaluation was not needed, in part, because | evaluation was not needed, in part, because the baffle-former bolts are not required by | ||
TS and are not described in the UFSAR. The inspectors noted that while the baffle | |||
bolts are not described in these documents, their failure in sufficient numbers could have | |||
consequential effects on the TS-controlled ECCS if the baffle plates were to become | consequential effects on the TS-controlled ECCS if the baffle plates were to become | ||
detached or deformed. This was described in | detached or deformed. This was described in Entergys bolt pattern analysis report | ||
be operable. The inspectors concluded that since the baffle bolts support the ECCS, which is subject to TS, | 16 | ||
of | |||
documenting an acceptable bolt pattern prior to the spring 2016 RFO. The inspectors | |||
reviewed Unit 3 TS 3.5.2, ECCS - Operating, which requires multiple trains of ECCS to | |||
be operable. The inspectors concluded that since the baffle bolts support the ECCS, | |||
which is subject to TS, Entergys decision to not perform further evaluation of the | |||
operability determination was inconsistent with EN-OP-104. Specifically, Section 5.1(7) | |||
of Entergys procedure EN-OP-104 requires that an operability determination be | |||
performed whenever a condition exists in the supporting SCC that may affect the ability | performed whenever a condition exists in the supporting SCC that may affect the ability | ||
of the TS-controlled SSC to perform its specified safety function. | of the TS-controlled SSC to perform its specified safety function. | ||
Further, the inspectors noted that Entergy staff concluded a degraded condition did not | |||
exist in Unit 3, and therefore, an operability evaluation was not required as a follow-up to | |||
the immediate determination. The documented basis provided was the differences | the immediate determination. The documented basis provided was the differences | ||
between the two units, plant operating data, and fuel performance. The inspectors noted | between the two units, plant operating data, and fuel performance. The inspectors noted | ||
that plant operating data and fuel performance from Unit 2 did not result in identification of the bolt degradation; therefore, the absence of indications for these problems on Unit 3 was technically insufficient to support | that plant operating data and fuel performance from Unit 2 did not result in identification | ||
of the bolt degradation; therefore, the absence of indications for these problems on Unit | |||
3 was technically insufficient to support Entergys conclusion that there was no degraded | |||
condition on Unit 3. | condition on Unit 3. | ||
The inspectors | The inspectors review of procedure EN-OP-104, Section 3.0, identified that examples of | ||
the effects of equipment aging and operating experience can be sources of information | |||
considered to enter the operability or functionality process. The inspectors | |||
acknowledged that licensees apply judgment in these decisions. In this particular | acknowledged that licensees apply judgment in these decisions. In this particular | ||
instance, the inspectors considered that operating experience was available that showed | instance, the inspectors considered that operating experience was available that showed | ||
the Unit 3 baffle bolts were subject to IASCC and that plants of similar design (4-loop | the Unit 3 baffle bolts were subject to IASCC and that plants of similar design (4-loop | ||
Westinghouse pressurized water reactors with a down-flow configuration and baffle bolts of 347 material and similar dimensions) were subject to greater amounts of bolt degradation compared to other reactor designs. Furthermore, the inspectors noted the | Westinghouse pressurized water reactors with a down-flow configuration and baffle bolts | ||
of 347 material and similar dimensions) were subject to greater amounts of bolt | |||
degradation compared to other reactor designs. Furthermore, the inspectors noted the | |||
baffle bolts had experienced levels of neutron radiation exposure above the threshold for | baffle bolts had experienced levels of neutron radiation exposure above the threshold for | ||
IASCC initiation as referenced in NUREG/CR-7027, | IASCC initiation as referenced in NUREG/CR-7027, Degradation of LWR Core Internal | ||
Materials due to Neutron Irradiation. | Materials due to Neutron Irradiation. | ||
Based on the above information available to Entergy staff, the inspectors concluded that | |||
Based on the above information available to Entergy staff, the inspectors concluded that | |||
Entergys basis for determining that a degraded condition did not exist on Unit 3 was not | |||
technically supported. The inspectors noted that in completing an IOD in EN-OP-104, | technically supported. The inspectors noted that in completing an IOD in EN-OP-104, | ||
Step 5.3.2 states | Step 5.3.2 states determine if there is an ongoing degradation mechanism that may | ||
impact future operability based on changing conditions, specifically consider the SSCs specified safety function and mission time. | impact future operability based on changing conditions, specifically consider the SSCs | ||
specified safety function and mission time. On May 5, 2016, Entergys basis for | |||
concluding an operability evaluation was not required and exiting the operability | |||
determination procedure at Step 5.3.3 was inconsistent with this procedural requirement | determination procedure at Step 5.3.3 was inconsistent with this procedural requirement | ||
because their IOD concluded Unit 3 was susceptible to baffle bolt degradation, which is | because their IOD concluded Unit 3 was susceptible to baffle bolt degradation, which is | ||
time based and subject to changing conditions including fatigue inducing loading cycles and neutron fluence. As a result, the inspectors concluded Entergy staff did not complete the additional actions prescribed by EN-OP-104 to perform an operability | time based and subject to changing conditions including fatigue inducing loading cycles | ||
evaluation. Specifically, Step 5.3.9 states in part | and neutron fluence. As a result, the inspectors concluded Entergy staff did not | ||
then perform the following: Proceed to Subsection 5.5, Operability Evaluation. | complete the additional actions prescribed by EN-OP-104 to perform an operability | ||
evaluation. Specifically, Step 5.3.9 states in part if an Operability Evaluation is required | |||
then perform the following: Proceed to Subsection 5.5, Operability Evaluation. | |||
On July 11, 2016, Entergy staff subsequently completed the steps in EN-OP-104 and | |||
performed an operability evaluation, which assumed an estimated number of baffle- | |||
former bolt failures based on the degradation found in Unit 2, and adjusted to take credit | |||
for the small number of inaccessible bolts and a sample of bolts extracted with high | |||
removal torque that indicated residual structural capacity. The inspectors determined | |||
17 | |||
this estimated number of bolt failures was conservative because the evaluation did not | |||
credit the baffle-edge bolts or the differences in operational history between the two units | |||
such as neutron fluence levels or fatigue from thermal cycles. The operability evaluation | |||
concluded that the Unit 3 baffle bolts would perform as intended to secure the baffle | |||
such as neutron fluence levels or fatigue from thermal cycles. The operability evaluation concluded that the Unit 3 baffle bolts would perform as intended to secure the baffle plates from being dislodged. The inspectors concluded that | plates from being dislodged. The inspectors concluded that Entergys operability | ||
evaluation provided appropriate basis to conclude that the Unit 3 baffle assembly would | evaluation provided appropriate basis to conclude that the Unit 3 baffle assembly would | ||
support ECCS operability until the planned Unit 3 RFO in spring 2017. | support ECCS operability until the planned Unit 3 RFO in spring 2017. | ||
Analysis. The inspectors determined that | Analysis. The inspectors determined that Entergys failure to adequately accomplish the | ||
actions prescribed in EN-OP-104 for a degraded condition and perform an operability | |||
evaluation associated with the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts was a performance deficiency. | evaluation associated with the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts was a performance deficiency. | ||
Specifically, Entergy incorrectly concluded that no degraded or non-conforming condition | |||
Specifically, Entergy incorrectly concluded that no degraded or non-conforming condition existed related to the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts and exited the operability determination | existed related to the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts and exited the operability determination | ||
procedure. As a result, | procedure. As a result, Entergys initial documentation did not provide sufficient basis | ||
for operability and continued operation until questioned by NRC inspectors. | |||
This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance | This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance | ||
attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to | attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to | ||
ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). This issue was also similar to example 3.j of IMC 0612, Appendix E, | ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating | ||
events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). This issue was also | |||
similar to example 3.j of IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, because | |||
the condition resulted in reasonable doubt of operability of the ECCS and additional | the condition resulted in reasonable doubt of operability of the ECCS and additional | ||
analysis was necessary to verify operability. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, | analysis was necessary to verify operability. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial | ||
Characterization of Findings, | Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance | ||
Determination Process for Findings At-Power, | Determination Process for Findings At-Power, issued June 19, 2012, the inspectors | ||
screened the finding for safety significance and determined it to be of very low safety | |||
significance (Green), since the finding did not represent an actual loss of system or | |||
function. After inspector questioning, Entergy performed an operability evaluation, which | function. After inspector questioning, Entergy performed an operability evaluation, which | ||
provided sufficient bases to conclude the Unit 3 baffle assembly would support ECCS | provided sufficient bases to conclude the Unit 3 baffle assembly would support ECCS | ||
operability. This finding is related to the cross-cutting aspect of Problem Identification and Resolution, Operating Experience, because Entergy did not effectively evaluate | operability. This finding is related to the cross-cutting aspect of Problem Identification | ||
relevant internal and external operating | and Resolution, Operating Experience, because Entergy did not effectively evaluate | ||
relevant internal and external operating experience. Specifically, Entergy did not | |||
adequately evaluate the impact of degraded baffle bolts at Unit 3 when relevant | |||
operating experience was identified at Unit 2. [P.5] | operating experience was identified at Unit 2. [P.5] | ||
Enforcement. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, | Enforcement. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and | ||
Drawings, states, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by | |||
documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be | documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be | ||
accomplished in accordance with those procedures. The introduction to Appendix B | accomplished in accordance with those procedures. The introduction to Appendix B | ||
states that | states that quality assurance comprises all those planned and systematic actions | ||
necessary to provide adequate confidence that a structure, system, or component (SSC) | |||
will perform satisfactorily in service. Procedure EN-OP-104, Step 5.3[2], related to | |||
immediate operability, states Determine if there is an ongoing degradation mechanism | |||
that may impact future operability based on changing conditions, specifically consider | that may impact future operability based on changing conditions, specifically consider | ||
the SSCs specified safety function and mission time. | the SSCs specified safety function and mission time. Step 5.3(3) follows with, in part If | ||
no Degraded or Non-conforming Condition exists, then perform the following as the | no Degraded or Non-conforming Condition exists, then perform the following as the | ||
Immediate Determination: | Immediate Determination: Declare the SSC Operable and Exit this procedure. | ||
Contrary to the above, from May 5, 2016 until July 11, 2016, Entergy did not adequately | |||
Contrary to the above, from May 5, 2016 until July 11, 2016, Entergy did not adequately | |||
accomplish actions as prescribed by EN-OP-104 for a degraded condition associated | accomplish actions as prescribed by EN-OP-104 for a degraded condition associated | ||
with the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts. Specifically, Entergy incorrectly concluded that no | with the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts. Specifically, Entergy incorrectly concluded that no | ||
to EN-OP-104 because a comparison of Unit 2 and 3 operational factors resulted in Entergy concluding that the Unit 3 baffle bolts would likely be affected due to the same degradation mechanism. | 18 | ||
degraded or non-conforming condition existed related to the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts | |||
and exited the operability determination procedure. The NRC determined this is contrary | |||
to EN-OP-104 because a comparison of Unit 2 and 3 operational factors resulted in | |||
Entergy concluding that the Unit 3 baffle bolts would likely be affected due to the same | |||
degradation mechanism. Entergys corrective actions included entering the issue into | |||
the CAP and documenting an operability evaluation to support the basis for operability of | the CAP and documenting an operability evaluation to support the basis for operability of | ||
the baffle bolts and ECCS. Because this issue is of very low safety significance (Green) and Entergy entered this into their CAP as CR-IP3-2016-01961, this finding is being | the baffle bolts and ECCS. Because this issue is of very low safety significance (Green) | ||
treated as an NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000286/2016002-02, Failure to Follow Operability Determination Procedure for | and Entergy entered this into their CAP as CR-IP3-2016-01961, this finding is being | ||
treated as an NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy. (NCV | |||
05000286/2016002-02, Failure to Follow Operability Determination Procedure for | |||
Unit 3 Baffle-Former Bolts) | Unit 3 Baffle-Former Bolts) | ||
Introduction. The NRC opened a URI in Inspection Report 05000247/2016001 related to two failures of the 23 EDG to run and maintain bus voltage on March 7, 2016, and to | Update to URI 05000247/2016001-06, 23 Emergency Diesel Generator Automatic | ||
Voltage Regulator Failure | |||
Introduction. The NRC opened a URI in Inspection Report 05000247/2016001 related to | |||
two failures of the 23 EDG to run and maintain bus voltage on March 7, 2016, and to | |||
provide adequate control of bus voltage on March 10, 2016. This report provides an | provide adequate control of bus voltage on March 10, 2016. This report provides an | ||
update of the status of this URI. | update of the status of this URI. | ||
Description. On March 7, 2016, approximately one hour after the trip of the 3A normal feed breaker, the 23 EDG tripped on overcurrent while powering the 6A 480V safety bus. | |||
Description. On March 7, 2016, approximately one hour after the trip of the 3A normal | |||
feed breaker, the 23 EDG tripped on overcurrent while powering the 6A 480V safety bus. | |||
The 6A bus remained de-energized for approximately one hour until the crew restored | The 6A bus remained de-energized for approximately one hour until the crew restored | ||
the 6A bus via off-site power. The 23 EDG was declared inoperable. All four 480V | the 6A bus via off-site power. The 23 EDG was declared inoperable. All four 480V | ||
safety buses were restored to off-site power. Entergy replaced the overcurrent relays and retested the 23 EDG satisfactorily on March 8, 2016. However, bench testing of the overcurrent relays demonstrated that they were accurately calibrated. | safety buses were restored to off-site power. Entergy replaced the overcurrent relays | ||
and retested the 23 EDG satisfactorily on March 8, 2016. However, bench testing of the | |||
overcurrent relays demonstrated that they were accurately calibrated. | |||
Subsequently, on March 10, 2016, during performance of PT-R14, | Subsequently, on March 10, 2016, during performance of PT-R14, Automatic Safety | ||
Injection System Electrical Load and Blackout Test, | Injection System Electrical Load and Blackout Test, the 23 EDG exhibited anomalous | ||
6A dropped to approximately 200V when | behavior during the train B load sequencing. During this test, the voltage on safety bus | ||
the 23 auxiliary feedwater pump was sequenced onto the bus (CR-IP2-2016-01430) and the sequencer failed to complete the | 6A dropped to approximately 200V when the 23 auxiliary feedwater pump was | ||
sequenced onto the bus (CR-IP2-2016-01430) and the sequencer failed to complete the | |||
first two sequences. The 23 EDG was again declared inoperable and the period of | first two sequences. The 23 EDG was again declared inoperable and the period of | ||
inoperability was backdated to March 7, 2016, when it originally tripped. Further | inoperability was backdated to March 7, 2016, when it originally tripped. Further | ||
troubleshooting and additional failure modes analysis by Entergy initially determined that the cause of both events may have been a degraded resistor (R25) on the 23 EDG | troubleshooting and additional failure modes analysis by Entergy initially determined that | ||
the cause of both events may have been a degraded resistor (R25) on the 23 EDG | |||
automatic voltage regulator (AVR) card. | automatic voltage regulator (AVR) card. | ||
The 23 EDG AVR card was replaced, and the 23 EDG was again tested satisfactorily. | The 23 EDG AVR card was replaced, and the 23 EDG was again tested satisfactorily. | ||
The voltage anomaly issues exhibited during the March 10, 2016, test were documented in CR-IP2-2016-01430 which was closed in CR-IP2-2016-01260 to be included in the causal assessment associated with the tripping of 23 EDG breaker on March 7, 2016. | The voltage anomaly issues exhibited during the March 10, 2016, test were documented | ||
in CR-IP2-2016-01430 which was closed in CR-IP2-2016-01260 to be included in the | |||
causal assessment associated with the tripping of 23 EDG breaker on March 7, 2016. | |||
Entergy assigned a vendor to perform laboratory bench testing and failure analysis of | Entergy assigned a vendor to perform laboratory bench testing and failure analysis of | ||
the 23 EDG AVR card. The vendor report attributed the cause of the March 10, 2016, | the 23 EDG AVR card. The vendor report attributed the cause of the March 10, 2016, | ||
loss of voltage control to a degraded solder joint on the AVR card. However, the vendor | loss of voltage control to a degraded solder joint on the AVR card. However, the vendor | ||
report explicitly did not attribute the event on March 7, 2016, to the same cause. Entergy assigned a corrective action in CR-IP2-2016-01260 to review the cause of the | report explicitly did not attribute the event on March 7, 2016, to the same cause. | ||
Entergy assigned a corrective action in CR-IP2-2016-01260 to review the cause of the | |||
19 | |||
23 EDG overcurrent trip on March 7, 2016, in light of the vendor report. The inspectors | |||
determined that the issue of concern remains open as a URI until this causal | |||
assessment has been completed by Entergy and assessed by NRC. (URI | |||
05000247/2016001-06, 23 Emergency Diesel Generator Automatic Voltage | |||
Regulator Failure) | Regulator Failure) | ||
Permanent Modifications | 1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18 - 2 samples) | ||
.1 Control Rod Guide Tube Repairs in Location E-9 | |||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The inspectors evaluated a modification to the reactor vessel upper internals to swap damaged control rod guide tube in location E-9 with abandoned guide tube in location | Permanent Modifications | ||
.1 | |||
Control Rod Guide Tube Repairs in Location E-9 | |||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The inspectors evaluated a modification to the reactor vessel upper internals to swap | |||
damaged control rod guide tube in location E-9 with abandoned guide tube in location | |||
D-10. The inspectors verified that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance | D-10. The inspectors verified that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance | ||
capability of the affected systems were not degraded by the modification. In addition, | capability of the affected systems were not degraded by the modification. In addition, | ||
the inspectors reviewed modification documents associated with the design change, including evaluation of equivalency and core flow changes, and post-modification testing. The inspectors also reviewed revisions to the affected drawings and interviewed | the inspectors reviewed modification documents associated with the design change, | ||
including evaluation of equivalency and core flow changes, and post-modification | |||
testing. The inspectors also reviewed revisions to the affected drawings and interviewed | |||
refueling and engineering personnel. | refueling and engineering personnel. | ||
.2 Core Baffle-Former Bolt EC 64038 | b. Findings | ||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The inspectors reviewed EC 64038, | No findings were identified. | ||
Baffle-to-Former Bolt. | |||
.2 | |||
Core Baffle-Former Bolt EC 64038 | |||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The inspectors reviewed EC 64038, IP2 Reactor Vessel Equivalent Replacement | |||
Baffle-to-Former Bolt. This modification was completed during RFO 2R22 and involved | |||
the replacement of 278 baffle-former bolts out of a total of 832 located in the Unit 2 | the replacement of 278 baffle-former bolts out of a total of 832 located in the Unit 2 | ||
reactor vessel. Entergy replaced all of the bolts that were potentially degraded as | reactor vessel. Entergy replaced all of the bolts that were potentially degraded as | ||
observed by visual indications of a protruding bolt head or lock bar problem, bolts that did not pass UT, and bolts inaccessible for UT. Entergy staff also replaced 51 additional bolts that passed ultrasonic and visual examinations to increase the structural margin of | observed by visual indications of a protruding bolt head or lock bar problem, bolts that | ||
did not pass UT, and bolts inaccessible for UT. Entergy staff also replaced 51 additional | |||
bolts that passed ultrasonic and visual examinations to increase the structural margin of | |||
the baffle-former assembly for future operating cycles. | the baffle-former assembly for future operating cycles. | ||
The inspectors reviewed the equivalency evaluation completed by Entergy staff to install baffle-former bolts of a different material and configuration than the original bolts. The inspectors reviewed the associated EC package to determine whether the replacement | The inspectors reviewed the equivalency evaluation completed by Entergy staff to install | ||
bolts | baffle-former bolts of a different material and configuration than the original bolts. The | ||
inspectors reviewed the associated EC package to determine whether the replacement | |||
bolts form, fit, and function were maintained compared to the original bolts and whether | |||
the change conformed to the design and licensing bases of the baffle-former assembly. | the change conformed to the design and licensing bases of the baffle-former assembly. | ||
Specifically, this change involved replacing the original baffle-former bolts made of type 347 stainless steel with bolts made of type 316 stainless steel. The baffle-former bolt head configuration was also changed from an original internal hex and slot design (secured with a welded lock bar) to an external hex configuration with an integral locking | Specifically, this change involved replacing the original baffle-former bolts made of | ||
cup design. The design change document further evaluated a more gradual fillet | type 347 stainless steel with bolts made of type 316 stainless steel. The baffle-former | ||
bolt head configuration was also changed from an original internal hex and slot design | |||
(secured with a welded lock bar) to an external hex configuration with an integral locking | |||
cup design. The design change document further evaluated a more gradual fillet | |||
b. Findings | 20 | ||
No findings were identified. | |||
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - 8 samples) | |||
a. Inspection Scope | geometry between the bolt head and shank intended to reduce the stress concentration | ||
The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance tests for the maintenance activities listed | at that transition and provide for improved fatigue resistance. | ||
b. Findings | |||
No findings were identified. | |||
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - 8 samples) | |||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance tests for the maintenance activities listed | |||
below to verify that procedures and test activities ensured system operability and | below to verify that procedures and test activities ensured system operability and | ||
functional capability. The inspectors reviewed the test procedure to verify that the procedure adequately tested the safety functions that may have been affected by the maintenance activity, that the acceptance criteria in the procedure was consistent with | functional capability. The inspectors reviewed the test procedure to verify that the | ||
procedure adequately tested the safety functions that may have been affected by the | |||
maintenance activity, that the acceptance criteria in the procedure was consistent with | |||
the information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and that | the information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and that | ||
the test results were properly reviewed and accepted and problems were appropriately | the test results were properly reviewed and accepted and problems were appropriately | ||
documented. The inspectors also walked down the affected job site, observed the pre-job brief and post-job critique where possible, confirmed work site cleanliness was maintained, witnessed the test or reviewed test data to verify quality control hold points | documented. The inspectors also walked down the affected job site, observed the | ||
pre-job brief and post-job critique where possible, confirmed work site cleanliness was | |||
maintained, witnessed the test or reviewed test data to verify quality control hold points | |||
were performed and checked, and that results adequately demonstrated restoration of | were performed and checked, and that results adequately demonstrated restoration of | ||
the affected safety functions. | the affected safety functions. | ||
Unit 2 | |||
21 EDG fuel oil transfer pump after planned maintenance on May 5, 2016 | |||
Replacement of pressurizer level transmitters LT-459 and LT-460 on May 25, 2016 | |||
21 CCW heat exchanger service water outlet weld repair on June 26, 2016 | |||
Flux mapping system drive repairs following motor failures on June 28, 2016 | |||
Unit 3 | |||
Maintenance on service water components associated with the 32 EDG on May 5, | |||
2016 (this sample was part of an in-depth review of the EDG system) | |||
Modification of the 32 EDG space heaters on May 5, 2016 (this sample was part of | |||
an in-depth review of the EDG system) | |||
Maintenance on the 32 EDG air start system on May 6, 2016 (this sample was part | |||
of an in-depth review of the EDG system) | |||
Replacement of failed bistable LC-427K, steam generator 32 low level mismatch trip | |||
interlock, on May 18, 2016 | |||
b. Findings | |||
No findings were identified. | |||
21 | |||
1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (71111.20 - 2 samples) | |||
.1 | |||
Unit 2 RFO 2R22 | |||
.1 Unit 2 RFO 2R22 | |||
a. Inspection Scope | a. Inspection Scope | ||
The inspectors reviewed the | |||
The inspectors reviewed the stations work schedule and outage risk plan for the Unit 2 | |||
maintenance during RFO 2R22, which was conducted from March 7, 2016, to June 16, | maintenance during RFO 2R22, which was conducted from March 7, 2016, to June 16, | ||
2016. The inspectors reviewed | 2016. The inspectors reviewed Entergys development and implementation of outage | ||
plans and schedules to verify that risk, industry experience, previous site-specific | |||
problems, and defense-in-depth were considered. During the outage, the inspectors | |||
observed portions of the shutdown and cooldown processes and monitored controls | observed portions of the shutdown and cooldown processes and monitored controls | ||
associated with the following outage activities: | associated with the following outage activities: | ||
work or testing Installation and configuration of reactor coolant pressure, level, and temperature instruments to provide accurate indication and instrument error accounting Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that | |||
TSs were met Monitoring of decay heat removal operations Impact of outage work on the ability of the operators to operate the spent fuel pool cooling system Reactor water inventory controls, including flow paths, configurations, alternative means for inventory additions, and controls to prevent inventory loss Activities that could affect reactivity Maintenance of secondary containment as required by TSs Refueling activities, including fuel handling and fuel receipt inspections Fatigue management Tracking of startup prerequisites, walkdown of the primary containment to verify that debris had not been left which could block the ECCS suction strainers, and startup and ascension to full power operation Foreign Object Search and Retrieval for missing baffle bolts and locking tabs Identification and resolution of problems related to RFO activities | Configuration management, including maintenance of defense-in-depth, | ||
During this outage, Entergy replaced 278 degraded baffle bolts in the Unit 2 reactor | commensurate with the outage plan for the key safety functions and compliance with | ||
vessel baffle assembly. This emergent project resulted in the extension of the outage schedule from 30 days to 102 days. | the applicable TSs when taking equipment OOS | ||
b. Findings | |||
Introduction. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of TS 5.4.1 for | Implementation of clearance activities and confirmation that tags were properly hung | ||
and that equipment was appropriately configured to safely support the associated | |||
work or testing | |||
Installation and configuration of reactor coolant pressure, level, and temperature | |||
instruments to provide accurate indication and instrument error accounting | |||
Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that | |||
TSs were met | |||
Monitoring of decay heat removal operations | |||
Impact of outage work on the ability of the operators to operate the spent fuel pool | |||
cooling system | |||
Reactor water inventory controls, including flow paths, configurations, alternative | |||
means for inventory additions, and controls to prevent inventory loss | |||
Activities that could affect reactivity | |||
Maintenance of secondary containment as required by TSs | |||
Refueling activities, including fuel handling and fuel receipt inspections | |||
Fatigue management | |||
Tracking of startup prerequisites, walkdown of the primary containment to verify that | |||
debris had not been left which could block the ECCS suction strainers, and startup | |||
and ascension to full power operation | |||
Foreign Object Search and Retrieval for missing baffle bolts and locking tabs | |||
Identification and resolution of problems related to RFO activities | |||
During this outage, Entergy replaced 278 degraded baffle bolts in the Unit 2 reactor | |||
vessel baffle assembly. This emergent project resulted in the extension of the outage | |||
schedule from 30 days to 102 days. | |||
b. Findings | |||
Introduction. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of TS 5.4.1 for Entergys failure to | |||
implement procedure OAP-007, Containment Entry and Egress. Specifically, workers | |||
transiting the inner and outer crane wall sections of containment on June 11, 2016, failed | |||
to maintain at least one (of two) flow channeling gate closed to ensure availability of the | to maintain at least one (of two) flow channeling gate closed to ensure availability of the | ||
containment sumps to provide suction for the ECCS. | containment sumps to provide suction for the ECCS. | ||
22 | |||
Description. On June 11, 2016, in mode 4, in preparation for reactor startup, Entergy | |||
was performing maintenance in containment required prior to mode 3, such as reactor | |||
coolant pump motor balancing and steam flow transmitter troubleshooting. These | |||
activities required scaffolds to be temporarily erected for workers to safely perform | |||
maintenance. While transiting from the inner to outer section of containment, the | maintenance. While transiting from the inner to outer section of containment, the | ||
inspectors noted that both flow channeling gates were maintained open simultaneously | inspectors noted that both flow channeling gates were maintained open simultaneously | ||
as workers carried scaffold poles and hardware out of the area. | as workers carried scaffold poles and hardware out of the area. | ||
In the event of a postulated LOCA, Unit 2 relies on two sumps to provide a suction | |||
source for the internal recirculation pumps and residual heat removal pumps, | |||
respectively, after the injection phase of the accident. The sumps have cylindrical | respectively, after the injection phase of the accident. The sumps have cylindrical | ||
screens with large surface area and small holes to filter small debris and maintain | screens with large surface area and small holes to filter small debris and maintain | ||
adequate net positive suction head for the associated pumps. The reactor cavity sump and large intervening barriers prevent large debris generated from the accident, such as insulation, from reaching and blocking the recirculation and containment sump screens. | adequate net positive suction head for the associated pumps. The reactor cavity sump | ||
and large intervening barriers prevent large debris generated from the accident, such as | |||
insulation, from reaching and blocking the recirculation and containment sump screens. | |||
Entergy procedure OAP-007, | Entergy procedure OAP-007, Containment Entry and Egress, precaution and limitation | ||
step 2.30.2, states, | step 2.30.2, states, In mode 1, 2, 3, or 4, entry inside the crane wall shall use the | ||
double gate entry point via gates 17 and 23. One gate shall remain shut and secured at | |||
all times to maintain flow channeling and sump operability. Securing gates requires a | |||
padlock or nut and bolt closure from the outside. This will require posting a gate monitor | padlock or nut and bolt closure from the outside. This will require posting a gate monitor | ||
to allow exit. | to allow exit. The inspectors noted, while a gate monitor was posted, both gates were | ||
maintained open during passage and not secured with a padlock or nut and bolt closure. | maintained open during passage and not secured with a padlock or nut and bolt closure. | ||
Upon questioning by the inspectors, Entergy immediately coached the gate monitor and restored the gates to an acceptable position. Entergy generated CR-IP2-2016-04036 to address this issue. | Upon questioning by the inspectors, Entergy immediately coached the gate monitor and | ||
restored the gates to an acceptable position. Entergy generated CR-IP2-2016-04036 to | |||
address this issue. | |||
Analysis. The inspectors determined that | Analysis. The inspectors determined that Energys failure to maintain either gate 17 or | ||
gate 23 closed during passage in accordance with OAP-007 was a performance | |||
deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it is associated | |||
with the configuration control (shutdown equipment lineup) attribute and adversely | |||
affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, | affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, | ||
reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent | reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent | ||
undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors evaluated the finding in | undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors evaluated the finding in | ||
accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Exhibit 3, and determined that a detailed risk evaluation was necessary because the finding represented a loss of system safety function. A detailed risk | accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Exhibit 3, and determined that a | ||
detailed risk evaluation was necessary because the finding represented a loss of system | |||
safety function. A detailed risk assessment was conducted conservatively assuming | |||
complete failure of the recirculation and containment sumps due to the performance | |||
deficiency. Given that Unit 2 was in mode 4, in plant operating state 1, with a late time | deficiency. Given that Unit 2 was in mode 4, in plant operating state 1, with a late time | ||
window, the at-power simplified plant analysis risk model for large-break LOCAs was determined to best model the degrade condition and plant response. An exposure time of one day was assumed. No credit was assumed for the decrease in energy that would | window, the at-power simplified plant analysis risk model for large-break LOCAs was | ||
determined to best model the degrade condition and plant response. An exposure time | |||
of one day was assumed. No credit was assumed for the decrease in energy that would | |||
be anticipated in a release during a LOCA in mode 4, nor the corresponding reduction in | be anticipated in a release during a LOCA in mode 4, nor the corresponding reduction in | ||
debris generation. This was also considered conservative. Utilizing Systems Analysis | debris generation. This was also considered conservative. Utilizing Systems Analysis | ||
Program for Hands-On Integrated Reliability Evaluation, version 8.13, with Indian Point Unit 2 Simplified Plant Analysis Risk Model, version 8.19, for the assumed conditions, the change in core damage frequency was determined to be 7E-9. Therefore, this issue represents a Green finding. | Program for Hands-On Integrated Reliability Evaluation, version 8.13, with Indian Point | ||
Unit 2 Simplified Plant Analysis Risk Model, version 8.19, for the assumed conditions, | |||
the change in core damage frequency was determined to be 7E-9. Therefore, this issue | |||
represents a Green finding. | |||
23 | |||
actions before performing work and implement appropriate error-reduction tools. Specifically, the work crew did not understand the requirements and potential consequences prior to commencing work and the gate monitor did not enforce these | |||
This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Avoid | |||
Complacency, because Entergy did not consider potential undesired consequences of | |||
actions before performing work and implement appropriate error-reduction tools. | |||
Specifically, the work crew did not understand the requirements and potential | |||
consequences prior to commencing work and the gate monitor did not enforce these | |||
requirements to maintain at least one gate locked or pinned closed as required by | requirements to maintain at least one gate locked or pinned closed as required by | ||
OAP-007. [H.12] | OAP-007. [H.12] | ||
Enforcement. Unit 2 TS 5.4.1.a requires that the procedures listed in Attachment A to Regulatory Guide 1.33, | Enforcement. Unit 2 TS 5.4.1.a requires that the procedures listed in Attachment A to | ||
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements, Revision 2, be | |||
established and implemented. Attachment A states that instructions should be prepared, | established and implemented. Attachment A states that instructions should be prepared, | ||
as appropriate, for access to containment and changing modes of operation of the | as appropriate, for access to containment and changing modes of operation of the | ||
ECCS. Entergy procedure OAP-007, | ECCS. Entergy procedure OAP-007, Containment Entry and Egress, Step 2.30.2, | ||
states, | states, In mode 1, 2, 3, or 4, entry inside the crane wall shall use the double gate entry | ||
and bolt closure from the outside. | point via gates 17 and 23. One gate shall remain shut and secured at all times to | ||
maintain flow channeling and sump operability. Securing gates requires a padlock or nut | |||
and bolt closure from the outside. Contrary to the above, on June 11, 2016, Entergy did | |||
not maintain one gate secured at all times with a padlock or nut and bolt closure. | not maintain one gate secured at all times with a padlock or nut and bolt closure. | ||
Entergy entered this issue into the CAP as CR-IP2-2016-04036. Because this violation was of very low safety significance (Green), and Entergy entered this performance deficiency into the CAP, the NRC is treating this as a NCV in accordance with | Entergy entered this issue into the CAP as CR-IP2-2016-04036. Because this violation | ||
Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000247/2016002-03, Failure to Maintain Flow Channeling Gates Closed in Accordance with the Containment | was of very low safety significance (Green), and Entergy entered this performance | ||
Procedure) | deficiency into the CAP, the NRC is treating this as a NCV in accordance with | ||
Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000247/2016002-03, Failure | |||
.2 Unit 2 Forced Outage | to Maintain Flow Channeling Gates Closed in Accordance with the Containment | ||
a. Inspection Scope | Procedure) | ||
Unit 2 conducted a forced outage from June 24 to 27, 2016, in order to complete weld repairs on a through-wall leak on the service water inlet line to the 21 CCW heat | |||
exchanger. These repairs required shutting down to mode 4 in order to meet the TS 3.7.7, | .2 | ||
Unit 2 Forced Outage | |||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
Unit 2 conducted a forced outage from June 24 to 27, 2016, in order to complete weld | |||
repairs on a through-wall leak on the service water inlet line to the 21 CCW heat | |||
exchanger. These repairs required shutting down to mode 4 in order to meet the | |||
TS 3.7.7, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, limiting condition for operations | |||
for CCW operability. While these repairs were being completed, the grid operator | for CCW operability. While these repairs were being completed, the grid operator | ||
completed repairs to breaker 9 in the offsite switchyard. During the outage, the | completed repairs to breaker 9 in the offsite switchyard. During the outage, the | ||
inspectors observed portions of the shutdown and cooldown processes and monitored controls associated with the following outage activities: | inspectors observed portions of the shutdown and cooldown processes and monitored | ||
controls associated with the following outage activities: | |||
work or testing Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that | |||
TSs were met Monitoring of decay heat removal operations Reactor water inventory controls, including flow paths, configurations, alternative means for inventory additions, and controls to prevent inventory loss Activities that could affect reactivity | |||
Configuration management, including maintenance of defense-in-depth, | |||
commensurate with the outage plan for the key safety functions and compliance with | |||
the applicable TSs when taking equipment OOS | |||
Implementation of clearance activities and confirmation that tags were properly hung | |||
and that equipment was appropriately configured to safely support the associated | |||
work or testing | |||
Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that | |||
TSs were met | |||
Monitoring of decay heat removal operations | |||
Reactor water inventory controls, including flow paths, configurations, alternative | |||
means for inventory additions, and controls to prevent inventory loss | |||
Activities that could affect reactivity | |||
b. Findings | 24 | ||
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22 | |||
- 6 samples) | |||
a. Inspection Scope | Tracking of startup prerequisites | ||
The inspectors observed performance of surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of | |||
Identification and resolution of problems related to RFO activities | |||
When all repairs had been completed, Entergy restarted Unit 2 on June 27, 2016. | |||
b. Findings | |||
No findings were identified. | |||
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22 - 6 samples) | |||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The inspectors observed performance of surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of | |||
selected risk-significant SSCs to assess whether test results satisfied TSs, the UFSAR, | selected risk-significant SSCs to assess whether test results satisfied TSs, the UFSAR, | ||
and | and Entergys procedure requirements. The inspectors verified that test acceptance | ||
criteria were clear, tests demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with | |||
design documentation, test instrumentation had current calibrations and the range and | |||
accuracy for the application, tests were performed as written, and applicable test | accuracy for the application, tests were performed as written, and applicable test | ||
prerequisites were satisfied. Upon test completion, the inspectors considered whether | prerequisites were satisfied. Upon test completion, the inspectors considered whether | ||
the test results supported that equipment was capable of performing the required safety | the test results supported that equipment was capable of performing the required safety | ||
functions. The inspectors reviewed the following surveillance tests: | functions. The inspectors reviewed the following surveillance tests: | ||
Unit 2 | |||
Unit 3 | Unit 2 | ||
b. Findings | |||
WO 446385, 21 EDG AVR card inspection, on May 24, 2016 | |||
25 | 2-PT-Q013 for containment isolation valve 851B (22 safety injection (SI) pump tie to | ||
23 SI pump discharge) on June 6, 2016 | |||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The inspectors evaluated the conduct of | 2-PT-Q029B quarterly in-service surveillance test for the 22 SI pump on June 6, | ||
2016 | |||
Unit 3 | |||
3-PT-M079B 32 EDG monthly surveillance on May 30, 2016 (this sample was part of | |||
an in-depth review of the EDG system) | |||
34 steam generator pressure instrument channel check on June 21, 2016 | |||
0-SOP-LEAKRATE-001, RCS Leakrate Surveillance, Evaluation and Leak | |||
Identification, beginning on June 28, 2016 | |||
b. Findings | |||
No findings were identified. | |||
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness | |||
25 | |||
1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06 - 1 sample) | |||
Training Observations | |||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The inspectors evaluated the conduct of Entergys ingestion pathway emergency | |||
preparedness drill on April 19, 2016, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in the | preparedness drill on April 19, 2016, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in the | ||
classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development activities. The inspectors observed emergency response | classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development activities. | ||
operations in the emergency operations facility to determine whether the event classification, notifications, and protective action | The inspectors observed emergency response operations in the emergency operations | ||
facility to determine whether the event classification, notifications, and protective action | |||
recommendations were performed in accordance with procedures. The inspectors also | recommendations were performed in accordance with procedures. The inspectors also | ||
attended the facility drill critique to compare inspector observations with those identified | attended the facility drill critique to compare inspector observations with those identified | ||
by Entergy staff in order to evaluate | by Entergy staff in order to evaluate Entergys critique and to verify whether the staff was | ||
b. Findings | properly identifying weaknesses and entering them into the CAP. | ||
No findings were identified. | |||
2. RADIATION SAFETY | b. Findings | ||
2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01) | No findings were identified. | ||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
During May 10-12 and June 13-17, 2016, the inspectors reviewed | 2. | ||
performance in assessing the radiological hazards and exposure control in the workplace. The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR 20, TSs, applicable industry standards, and procedures required by TSs as criteria for determining | RADIATION SAFETY | ||
Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety and Occupational Radiation Safety | |||
2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01) | |||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
During May 10-12 and June 13-17, 2016, the inspectors reviewed Entergys | |||
performance in assessing the radiological hazards and exposure control in the | |||
workplace. The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR 20, TSs, applicable | |||
industry standards, and procedures required by TSs as criteria for determining | |||
compliance. | compliance. | ||
Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage | |||
The inspectors reviewed: | Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage | ||
b. Findings | The inspectors reviewed: | ||
Ambient radiological conditions during tours of the radiological controlled area, | |||
posted surveys, radiation work permits, adequacy of radiological controls, radiation | |||
protection job coverage, and contamination controls | |||
Controls for highly activated or contaminated materials stored within spent fuel pools | |||
Posting and physical controls for high radiation areas and very high radiation areas | |||
b. Findings | |||
No findings were identified. | No findings were identified. | ||
26 | |||
26 | |||
2RS2 Occupational As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls | |||
(71124.02) | (71124.02) | ||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
During May 10-12 and June 13-17, 2016, the inspectors assessed performance with | a. Inspection Scope | ||
During May 10-12 and June 13-17, 2016, the inspectors assessed performance with | |||
respect to maintaining occupational individual and collective radiation exposures ALARA. | respect to maintaining occupational individual and collective radiation exposures ALARA. | ||
The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR 20, TSs, applicable industry standards, | The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR 20, TSs, applicable industry standards, | ||
and procedures required by TSs as criteria for determining compliance. | and procedures required by TSs as criteria for determining compliance. | ||
Radiological Work Planning | |||
The inspectors reviewed: | Radiological Work Planning | ||
The inspectors reviewed: | |||
requirements ALARA work planning, use of dose mitigation features and dose goals Work planning and the integration of ALARA requirements | |||
b. Findings | |||
No findings were identified. | ALARA work activity evaluations, exposure estimates, and exposure mitigation | ||
requirements | |||
ALARA work planning, use of dose mitigation features and dose goals | |||
Work planning and the integration of ALARA requirements | |||
b. Findings | |||
No findings were identified. | |||
2RS7 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) (71124.07 - 3 samples) | 2RS7 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) (71124.07 - 3 samples) | ||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The inspectors reviewed the REMP to validate the effectiveness of the radioactive | a. Inspection Scope | ||
The inspectors reviewed the REMP to validate the effectiveness of the radioactive | |||
gaseous and liquid effluent release program and implementation of the groundwater | gaseous and liquid effluent release program and implementation of the groundwater | ||
protection initiative (GPI). The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR 20, | protection initiative (GPI). The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR 20, | ||
40 CFR 190, 10 CFR 50, Appendix I, TSs, offsite dose calculation manual (ODCM), Nuclear Energy Institute 07-07, and procedures required by TSs as criteria for determining compliance. | 40 CFR 190, 10 CFR 50, Appendix I, TSs, offsite dose calculation manual (ODCM), | ||
Nuclear Energy Institute 07-07, and procedures required by TSs as criteria for | |||
determining compliance. | |||
The inspectors reviewed | |||
Inspection Planning | |||
The inspectors reviewed Entergys 2014 and 2015 annual radiological environmental | |||
and effluent monitoring reports, REMP program audits, ODCM changes, land use | |||
census, the UFSAR, and inter-laboratory comparison program results. | census, the UFSAR, and inter-laboratory comparison program results. | ||
Site Inspection | |||
The inspectors walked down various thermoluminescent dosimeter and air and water | Site Inspection | ||
The inspectors walked down various thermoluminescent dosimeter and air and water | |||
sampling locations and reviewed associated calibration and maintenance records. The | sampling locations and reviewed associated calibration and maintenance records. The | ||
inspectors observed the sampling of various environmental media as specified in the | inspectors observed the sampling of various environmental media as specified in the | ||
ODCM and reviewed any anomalous environmental sampling events including assessment of any positive radioactivity results. The inspectors reviewed any changes to the ODCM. The inspectors verified the operability and calibration of the meteorological tower instruments and meteorological data readouts. The inspectors | ODCM and reviewed any anomalous environmental sampling events including | ||
assessment of any positive radioactivity results. The inspectors reviewed any changes | |||
to the ODCM. The inspectors verified the operability and calibration of the | |||
meteorological tower instruments and meteorological data readouts. The inspectors | |||
reviewed environmental sample laboratory analysis results, laboratory instrument | reviewed environmental sample laboratory analysis results, laboratory instrument | ||
measurement detection sensitivities, laboratory quality control program audit results, and | measurement detection sensitivities, laboratory quality control program audit results, and | ||
GPI Implementation The inspectors reviewed groundwater monitoring results, changes to the GPI program since the last inspection, anomalous results or missed groundwater samples, leakage or | 27 | ||
the inter- and intra-laboratory comparison program results. The inspectors reviewed the | |||
groundwater monitoring program as it applies to selected potential leaking SSCs. | |||
GPI Implementation | |||
The inspectors reviewed groundwater monitoring results, changes to the GPI program | |||
since the last inspection, anomalous results or missed groundwater samples, leakage or | |||
spill events including entries made into the decommissioning files (10 CFR 50.75(g)), | spill events including entries made into the decommissioning files (10 CFR 50.75(g)), | ||
evaluations of surface water discharges, and | evaluations of surface water discharges, and Entergys evaluation of any positive | ||
groundwater sample results including appropriate stakeholder notifications and effluent reporting requirements. | groundwater sample results including appropriate stakeholder notifications and effluent | ||
reporting requirements. | |||
Initiating Events Performance Indicators | |||
a. Inspection Scope | Identification and Resolution of Problems | ||
The inspectors reviewed | |||
The inspectors evaluated whether problems associated with the REMP were identified at | |||
an appropriate threshold and properly addressed in Entergys CAP. | |||
b. Findings | |||
No findings were identified. | |||
4. | |||
OTHER ACTIVITIES | |||
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151 - 6 samples) | |||
Initiating Events Performance Indicators | |||
a. | |||
Inspection Scope | |||
The inspectors reviewed Entergys submittals for the following Initiating Events | |||
cornerstone performance indicators for the period April 1, 2015, to March 31, 2016: | cornerstone performance indicators for the period April 1, 2015, to March 31, 2016: | ||
Unit 2 | |||
Unit 3 | Unit 2 | ||
To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those | |||
Unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours (IE01) | |||
Unplanned power changes per 7000 critical hours (IE03) | |||
Unplanned scrams with complications (IE04) | |||
Unit 3 | |||
Unplanned scrams (IE01) | |||
Unplanned power changes (IE03) | |||
Unplanned scrams with complications (IE04) | |||
To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those | |||
periods, inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy | periods, inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy | ||
Institute 99-02, | Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7. | ||
The inspectors reviewed | The inspectors reviewed Entergys operator narrative logs, maintenance planning | ||
schedules, CRs, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports to validate the | |||
b. Findings | |||
No findings were identified. | 28 | ||
accuracy of the submittals. There were no unplanned power changes or scrams with | |||
complications during the review period. | |||
b. Findings | |||
No findings were identified. | |||
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152 - 4 samples) | 4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152 - 4 samples) | ||
.1 Routine Review of Problem Identification and Resolution Activities | |||
a. Inspection Scope | .1 | ||
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, | Routine Review of Problem Identification and Resolution Activities | ||
inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that Entergy entered issues into the CAP at an appropriate | |||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, the | |||
inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant | |||
status reviews to verify that Entergy entered issues into the CAP at an appropriate | |||
threshold, gave adequate attention to timely corrective actions, and identified and | threshold, gave adequate attention to timely corrective actions, and identified and | ||
addressed adverse trends. In order to assist with the identification of repetitive | addressed adverse trends. In order to assist with the identification of repetitive | ||
equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the CAP and periodically attended CR screening meetings. The inspectors also confirmed, on a sampling basis, that, as | equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow up, the inspectors | ||
performed a daily screening of items entered into the CAP and periodically attended CR | |||
screening meetings. The inspectors also confirmed, on a sampling basis, that, as | |||
applicable, for identified defects and non-conformances, Entergy performed an | applicable, for identified defects and non-conformances, Entergy performed an | ||
evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR 21. | evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR 21. | ||
.2 Semi-Annual Trend Review | b. Findings | ||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The inspectors performed a semi-annual review of site issues, as required by Inspection | No findings were identified. | ||
Procedure 71152, | |||
.2 | |||
Semi-Annual Trend Review | |||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The inspectors performed a semi-annual review of site issues, as required by Inspection | |||
Procedure 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, to identify trends that might | |||
indicate the existence of more significant safety issues. In this review, the inspectors | indicate the existence of more significant safety issues. In this review, the inspectors | ||
included repetitive or closely-related issues that may have been documented by Entergy outside of the CAP, such as trend reports, performance indicators, major equipment problem lists, system health reports, maintenance rule assessments, and maintenance or CAP backlogs. The inspectors also reviewed | included repetitive or closely-related issues that may have been documented by Entergy | ||
outside of the CAP, such as trend reports, performance indicators, major equipment | |||
problem lists, system health reports, maintenance rule assessments, and maintenance | |||
or CAP backlogs. The inspectors also reviewed Entergys CAP database for the first | |||
and second quarters of 2016 to assess CRs written in various subject areas (equipment | and second quarters of 2016 to assess CRs written in various subject areas (equipment | ||
problems, human performance issues, etc.), as well as individual issues identified during the NRCs daily CR review (Section 4OA2.1). The inspectors reviewed the Entergy quarterly trend report for the first quarter of 2016 to verify that Entergy was appropriately | problems, human performance issues, etc.), as well as individual issues identified during | ||
the NRCs daily CR review (Section 4OA2.1). The inspectors reviewed the Entergy | |||
quarterly trend report for the first quarter of 2016 to verify that Entergy was appropriately | |||
evaluating and trending adverse conditions in accordance with applicable procedures. | evaluating and trending adverse conditions in accordance with applicable procedures. | ||
b. Findings and Observations | |||
No findings were identified. | |||
The inspectors identified a trend in work being performed that was contrary to written | |||
work instructions and procedures, and work packages had been closed out without | |||
29 | |||
documenting the deviation from the work order. While reviewing completed work order | |||
WO 447966 Task 10, Internal Coating Repair for 21 CCW HX, the inspectors found a | |||
note in the work order stating that the internal coating repair to the pipe had not been done in accordance with the engineering change. The engineering change had been written when the coating repair was expected to be small, but the actual area that was | note in the work order stating that the internal coating repair to the pipe had not been | ||
done in accordance with the engineering change. The engineering change had been | |||
written when the coating repair was expected to be small, but the actual area that was | |||
recoated was much larger. A larger area of coating increases the impact on the heat | recoated was much larger. A larger area of coating increases the impact on the heat | ||
exchanger if the coating were to flake off and block the flow of service water. The work | exchanger if the coating were to flake off and block the flow of service water. The work | ||
package was closed and no condition report was written. This performance deficiency is | package was closed and no condition report was written. This performance deficiency is | ||
minor because the coating was applied with procedurally directed quality controls and the likelihood that it would flake off is very small; and is the same as the original smaller area specified in the work package. However, the work package was closed without | minor because the coating was applied with procedurally directed quality controls and | ||
the likelihood that it would flake off is very small; and is the same as the original smaller | |||
area specified in the work package. However, the work package was closed without | |||
documenting the deviation and no CR was written. | documenting the deviation and no CR was written. | ||
In another example, the inspectors noted that WO 412920 Task 15 to perform a surge test on 11 centrifugal air compressor (CENTAC) after overhaul was completed on December 22, 2015. However, the completion notes and documentation for the task | In another example, the inspectors noted that WO 412920 Task 15 to perform a surge | ||
test on 11 centrifugal air compressor (CENTAC) after overhaul was completed on | |||
December 22, 2015. However, the completion notes and documentation for the task | |||
showed that the test was unable to be performed due to a test equipment problem. The | showed that the test was unable to be performed due to a test equipment problem. The | ||
work package was closed and no CR was written. Subsequently, after being returned to | work package was closed and no CR was written. Subsequently, after being returned to | ||
service, the compressor failed in service due to multiple surging events on January 7, 2016. Troubleshooting under WO 433939 revealed that the motor high load limit had not been adjusted to account for the increased load due to reduced compressor clearances | service, the compressor failed in service due to multiple surging events on January 7, | ||
2016. Troubleshooting under WO 433939 revealed that the motor high load limit had not | |||
been adjusted to account for the increased load due to reduced compressor clearances | |||
introduced by the overhaul. This performance deficiency is screened to minor because | introduced by the overhaul. This performance deficiency is screened to minor because | ||
the 11 CENTAC is not a safety-related piece of equipment and would not affect the MC | the 11 CENTAC is not a safety-related piece of equipment and would not affect the MC | ||
0609 cornerstone thresholds or other generic criteria. Unit 2 and Unit 3 have dedicated | 0609 cornerstone thresholds or other generic criteria. Unit 2 and Unit 3 have dedicated | ||
instrument air compressors that are credited in the FSAR to respond to a loss of instrument air event. If the 11 CENTAC (located in Unit 1) were to fail, the unit-specific IACs would automatically start to prevent a loss of instrument air at both Units 2 and 3. | instrument air compressors that are credited in the FSAR to respond to a loss of | ||
instrument air event. If the 11 CENTAC (located in Unit 1) were to fail, the unit-specific | |||
IACs would automatically start to prevent a loss of instrument air at both Units 2 and 3. | |||
A third recent example of work being performed contrary to written instructions occurred | A third recent example of work being performed contrary to written instructions occurred | ||
during 2RFO22 when the inspectors identified that the workers deviated from the surveillance procedure by demonstrating the installation of the emergency containment hatch plug without properly inflating the plug seals as directed by the procedure. This | during 2RFO22 when the inspectors identified that the workers deviated from the | ||
performance deficiency was previously documented in a prior inspection report as non-cited violation 05000247/05000286/2016001-02, | surveillance procedure by demonstrating the installation of the emergency containment | ||
Management Actions for the Containment Key Safety Function. | hatch plug without properly inflating the plug seals as directed by the procedure. This | ||
performance deficiency was previously documented in a prior inspection report as non- | |||
cited violation 05000247/05000286/2016001-02, Failure to Adequately Implement Risk | |||
Management Actions for the Containment Key Safety Function. | |||
In all cases, the deviations from written work instructions were directed by Entergy | |||
supervision. In addition, the inspectors noted that Entergy had self-identified similar | |||
observations where work packages or condition reports had been closed without fully | observations where work packages or condition reports had been closed without fully | ||
completing the specified actions including CR-IP2-2015-05833, CR-IP2-2016-00103, | completing the specified actions including CR-IP2-2015-05833, CR-IP2-2016-00103, | ||
CR-IP3-2015-04729, CR-IP3-2016-00072, CR-IP3-2016-00075, and CR-IP3-2015-04019. These CRs are further examples of work orders that were closed with deviations that were not documented or resolved. Nuclear Oversight had identified several of these | CR-IP3-2015-04729, CR-IP3-2016-00072, CR-IP3-2016-00075, and CR-IP3-2015- | ||
04019. These CRs are further examples of work orders that were closed with deviations | |||
that were not documented or resolved. Nuclear Oversight had identified several of these | |||
condition reports. Entergy has taking immediate corrective action in response to these | condition reports. Entergy has taking immediate corrective action in response to these | ||
performance deficiencies. | performance deficiencies. | ||
30 | |||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The inspectors performed an in-depth review of | 30 | ||
with self-assessment LO-IP3LO-2015-72, | |||
.3 | |||
Annual Sample: Maintenance Rule Self-Assessment of Corrective Actions | |||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Entergys corrective actions associated | |||
with self-assessment LO-IP3LO-2015-72, Maintenance Rule (a)(3) Assessment. The | |||
self-assessment was performed to satisfy both the self-assessment criteria in EN-LI-104, | |||
Self-Assessment and Benchmark Process, and the maintenance rule periodic | |||
assessment criteria in EN-DC-207. | assessment criteria in EN-DC-207. | ||
The inspectors assessed | |||
The inspectors assessed Entergys problem identification threshold, extent of condition | |||
reviews, and the prioritization and timeliness of Entergy corrective actions to determine | reviews, and the prioritization and timeliness of Entergy corrective actions to determine | ||
whether Entergy was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems | whether Entergy was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems | ||
associated with this issue and whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate. The inspectors compared the actions taken to the requirements of | associated with this issue and whether the planned or completed corrective actions were | ||
engineering personnel to assess the | appropriate. The inspectors compared the actions taken to the requirements of | ||
Entergys CAP and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. In addition, the inspectors interviewed | |||
engineering personnel to assess the effectiveness of the implemented corrective | |||
actions. | |||
No findings were identified. | b. Findings and Observations | ||
No findings were identified. | |||
Entergy identified three standard deficiencies during their self-assessment and wrote | Entergy identified three standard deficiencies during their self-assessment and wrote | ||
CRs to document each one. One of the standard deficiencies was that the maintenance rule basis documents were not being reviewed at least once every two years as required by procedure EN-DC-204, | CRs to document each one. One of the standard deficiencies was that the maintenance | ||
rule basis documents were not being reviewed at least once every two years as required | |||
by procedure EN-DC-204, Maintenance Rule Scope and Basis. The purpose of this | |||
review was to ensure that the documents were updated if the configuration of the system | review was to ensure that the documents were updated if the configuration of the system | ||
changed or if the performance criteria needed to be adjusted. Entergy wrote CR-IP3- | changed or if the performance criteria needed to be adjusted. Entergy wrote CR-IP3- | ||
2015-03628 and assigned a corrective action to create work trackers to perform the basis document reviews. They chose to use work trackers instead of corrective actions under the CAP because the work had historically been assigned using work trackers. | 2015-03628 and assigned a corrective action to create work trackers to perform the | ||
basis document reviews. They chose to use work trackers instead of corrective actions | |||
under the CAP because the work had historically been assigned using work trackers. | |||
However, because work trackers do not receive the same priority as corrective actions, | However, because work trackers do not receive the same priority as corrective actions, | ||
some of the maintenance rule basis documents had still not been reviewed at the time of | some of the maintenance rule basis documents had still not been reviewed at the time of | ||
this inspection, over a year after the completion of the self-assessment. The inspectors | this inspection, over a year after the completion of the self-assessment. The inspectors | ||
determined that this was not a more than minor issue because the systems in question did not show signs of inadequate maintenance. | determined that this was not a more than minor issue because the systems in question | ||
did not show signs of inadequate maintenance. | |||
.4 Annual Sample: Unit 2 Reactor Trip on December 5, 2015 | .4 | ||
a. Inspection Scope | Annual Sample: Unit 2 Reactor Trip on December 5, 2015 | ||
The inspectors performed an in-depth review of | |||
actions associated with | a. Inspection Scope | ||
The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Entergys evaluations and corrective | |||
actions associated with CR-IP2-2015-05484 and the related apparent cause evaluation | |||
for the December 5, 2015, manual reactor trip in response to indications of multiple | |||
dropped control rods caused by the loss of control rod power due to a power supply | dropped control rods caused by the loss of control rod power due to a power supply | ||
failure. Entergy performed an apparent cause evaluation and determined the | failure. Entergy performed an apparent cause evaluation and determined the direct | ||
cause of the event was the loss of motor control center (MCC)-24 due to an internal fault | |||
at the line side leads at cubicle 2H where they connect to the bucket stab assemblies. | |||
The apparent cause was an unanticipated loss of power to the control rod system due to | The apparent cause was an unanticipated loss of power to the control rod system due to | ||
the degradation of the primary control rod power supply (PS1) which failed to function for | the degradation of the primary control rod power supply (PS1) which failed to function for | ||
The inspectors assessed | 31 | ||
more than 10 minutes when the operating alternate power supply (PS2) was | |||
deenergized. | |||
The inspectors assessed Entergys problem identification threshold, problem analysis, | |||
extent of condition reviews, compensatory actions, and the prioritization and timeliness | |||
of Entergy's corrective actions to determine whether Entergy was appropriately | of Entergy's corrective actions to determine whether Entergy was appropriately | ||
identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with this issue and | identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with this issue and | ||
whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate. The inspectors | whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate. The inspectors | ||
compared the actions taken to the requirements of Entergy's CAP and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, | compared the actions taken to the requirements of Entergy's CAP and 10 CFR 50, | ||
b. Findings and Observations | Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action. | ||
No findings were identified. | |||
The inspectors found that Entergy took appropriate actions to identify the direct and | b. Findings and Observations | ||
apparent cause of the issue. The | |||
No findings were identified. | |||
stab assemblies. The apparent cause was an unanticipated loss of power to the control rod system due to the degradation of the primary control rod PS1, which failed to function when PS2 was lost. Entergy replaced the degraded rod control PS1; and the | |||
The inspectors found that Entergy took appropriate actions to identify the direct and | |||
apparent cause of the issue. The direct cause of the event was the loss of MCC-24 due | |||
to an internal fault at the line side leads at cubicle 2H where they connect to the bucket | |||
stab assemblies. The apparent cause was an unanticipated loss of power to the control | |||
rod system due to the degradation of the primary control rod PS1, which failed to | |||
function when PS2 was lost. Entergy replaced the degraded rod control PS1; and the | |||
MCC-24 compartments were removed to facilitate inspection and testing of the MCC | MCC-24 compartments were removed to facilitate inspection and testing of the MCC | ||
bus, control wires, and MCC internal. PS2 was also restored to operation after the fault | bus, control wires, and MCC internal. PS2 was also restored to operation after the fault | ||
was cleared. | was cleared. | ||
The inspector determined that the internal electrical fault that deenergized PS2 and the prior degradation in PS1 was not within | |||
Therefore, there was no performance deficiency identified. | The inspector determined that the internal electrical fault that deenergized PS2 and the | ||
prior degradation in PS1 was not within Entergys ability to foresee and prevent. | |||
Therefore, there was no performance deficiency identified. Entergys overall response to | |||
the issue was commensurate with the safety significance, was timely, and the actions | the issue was commensurate with the safety significance, was timely, and the actions | ||
taken and planned were reasonable to resolve the failure of the primary control rod PS1. | taken and planned were reasonable to resolve the failure of the primary control rod PS1. | ||
.5 Annual Sample: Unexpected Number of Degraded Baffle-Former Bolts Discovered in | |||
.5 | |||
Annual Sample: Unexpected Number of Degraded Baffle-Former Bolts Discovered in | |||
the Unit 2 Reactor Pressure Vessel | the Unit 2 Reactor Pressure Vessel | ||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The inspectors performed an in-depth review of | a. Inspection Scope | ||
The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Entergys root cause evaluation and | |||
corrective actions associated with CR-IP2-2016-02348 for baffle-former (baffle) bolts | |||
found with indications of degradation during the Indian Point Unit 2 RFO 2R22. Entergy | found with indications of degradation during the Indian Point Unit 2 RFO 2R22. Entergy | ||
performed ultrasonic examinations of the baffle bolts in accordance with their procedures | performed ultrasonic examinations of the baffle bolts in accordance with their procedures | ||
as part of a planned activity. After an unexpected number of degraded baffle bolts were discovered, Entergy staff reported the issue to the NRC as Event Notification No. 51829 on March 29, 2016, because the as-found number and location of degraded bolts | as part of a planned activity. After an unexpected number of degraded baffle bolts were | ||
discovered, Entergy staff reported the issue to the NRC as Event Notification No. 51829 | |||
on March 29, 2016, because the as-found number and location of degraded bolts | |||
represented an unanalyzed condition. Entergy staff completed corrective actions to | represented an unanalyzed condition. Entergy staff completed corrective actions to | ||
replace all of the potentially degraded baffle bolts on Unit 2. Entergy staff further | replace all of the potentially degraded baffle bolts on Unit 2. Entergy staff further | ||
replaced a population of additional bolts that exhibited no indications of degradation and | replaced a population of additional bolts that exhibited no indications of degradation and | ||
performed an evaluation to determine the potential for baffle bolt failures at Unit 3. | performed an evaluation to determine the potential for baffle bolt failures at Unit 3. | ||
The baffle-former bolts help secure vertical plates (also referred to as baffle plates) | |||
The baffle-former bolts help secure vertical plates (also referred to as baffle plates) | |||
inside the reactor vessel, which then forms a structure surrounding the reactor fuel | inside the reactor vessel, which then forms a structure surrounding the reactor fuel | ||
assemblies to orient the fuel and to direct coolant flow through the core. A sufficient | assemblies to orient the fuel and to direct coolant flow through the core. A sufficient | ||
postulated accident conditions. Bolt heads that separate and are no longer held in place by bolt lock-tabs can also become a loose parts concern. | 32 | ||
number of baffle bolts are required to remain intact to secure the baffle plates in place so | |||
as to not affect control rod insertion or impede emergency core cooling flow during | |||
postulated accident conditions. Bolt heads that separate and are no longer held in place | |||
by bolt lock-tabs can also become a loose parts concern. | |||
The inspectors determined whether | The inspectors determined whether Entergys acceptable baffle bolt pattern analysis for | ||
Unit 2 was completed in accordance with the NRC-approved methodology and provided | Unit 2 was completed in accordance with the NRC-approved methodology and provided | ||
appropriate structural margin for the next cycle of operation to ensure the Unit 2 baffle | appropriate structural margin for the next cycle of operation to ensure the Unit 2 baffle | ||
plates will remain in place during both normal operation and limiting postulated accident conditions. The inspectors further determined whether | plates will remain in place during both normal operation and limiting postulated accident | ||
conditions. The inspectors further determined whether Entergys evaluations of the | |||
baffle bolts installed in Indian Point Unit 3 were technically sufficient to conclude the | |||
Unit 3 baffle assembly will perform as intended until the next planned RFO, at which time | Unit 3 baffle assembly will perform as intended until the next planned RFO, at which time | ||
Entergy plans to examine the bolts. The inspectors reviewed | Entergy plans to examine the bolts. The inspectors reviewed Entergys procedures for | ||
determining the functionality and operability of degraded SSC as they relate to Unit 3. The inspectors further interviewed Entergy engineering personnel and contractor staff to discuss the results of | determining the functionality and operability of degraded SSC as they relate to Unit 3. | ||
The inspectors further interviewed Entergy engineering personnel and contractor staff to | |||
discuss the results of Entergys technical evaluations and to assess the effectiveness of | |||
the implemented and planned corrective actions. | the implemented and planned corrective actions. | ||
The inspectors assessed Entergys problem identification threshold, cause analyses, | |||
extent of condition, compensatory actions, and the prioritization and timeliness of | |||
Entergys corrective actions to determine whether Entergy staff were properly identifying, | |||
characterizing, and correcting problems associated with this issue and whether the | characterizing, and correcting problems associated with this issue and whether the | ||
planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate. The inspectors compared the | planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate. The inspectors compared the | ||
actions taken to | actions taken to Entergys CAP, operability determination process, and the requirements | ||
of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. The inspectors observed portions of baffle bolt replacement activities at Unit 2 and reviewed the final visual examination of the baffle bolts and plates once the work was completed. | of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. The inspectors observed portions of baffle bolt replacement | ||
b. Findings and Observations | activities at Unit 2 and reviewed the final visual examination of the baffle bolts and plates | ||
One Green NCV was identified and documented in Section 1R15 of this report. The NRC responded to the initial discovery of an unexpected number of baffle bolts | once the work was completed. | ||
b. Findings and Observations | |||
One Green NCV was identified and documented in Section 1R15 of this report. | |||
The NRC responded to the initial discovery of an unexpected number of baffle bolts | |||
found degraded at Indian Point Unit 2 by implementing a comprehensive inspection plan | found degraded at Indian Point Unit 2 by implementing a comprehensive inspection plan | ||
consisting of various baseline inspection samples to assess the extent of the issue and | consisting of various baseline inspection samples to assess the extent of the issue and | ||
to determine the necessary NRC actions. A follow-up inservice inspection sample | to determine the necessary NRC actions. A follow-up inservice inspection sample | ||
(Refer to Section 1R08) was conducted to review the capability of the non-destructive examination techniques, evaluate the UT results, and observe a portion of bolt replacement activities on-site. A permanent modification sample (Refer to Section | (Refer to Section 1R08) was conducted to review the capability of the non-destructive | ||
examination techniques, evaluate the UT results, and observe a portion of bolt | |||
replacement activities on-site. A permanent modification sample (Refer to Section | |||
1R18) was conducted to review the design change package and evaluations associated | 1R18) was conducted to review the design change package and evaluations associated | ||
with the new, replacement baffle bolts. The NRC resident inspectors reviewed Entergys | |||
with the new, replacement baffle bolts. The NRC resident inspectors reviewed | foreign material controls and loose parts analysis (Refer to Section 1R20) to address the | ||
foreign material controls and loose parts analysis (Refer to Section 1R20) to address the potential for missing bolt heads and concluded it would not impact safe operation of the | potential for missing bolt heads and concluded it would not impact safe operation of the | ||
plant. | plant. | ||
NRC Region I based inspectors accompanied by an expert from the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation completed an annual problem identification and resolution | NRC Region I based inspectors accompanied by an expert from the NRC Office of | ||
inspection, documented in this section of the report, to verify that | Nuclear Reactor Regulation completed an annual problem identification and resolution | ||
inspection, documented in this section of the report, to verify that Entergys evaluations | |||
and corrective actions to replace Unit 2 baffle bolts were completed in accordance with | |||
an NRC approved methodology to support a conclusion that the Unit 2 baffle assembly | |||
meets the plant design basis. The inspectors also determined the adequacy of | meets the plant design basis. The inspectors also determined the adequacy of | ||
Entergys evaluations completed to determine there is a reasonable expectation that the | |||
Entergy staff determined the cause of the degraded baffle bolts was primarily due to IASCC in combination with increased fatigue loading on the baffle plates. This cause | 33 | ||
Unit 3 baffle assembly will perform as intended during the current operating cycle. The | |||
results of this review are discussed herein and in Section 1R15 of this report. | |||
Entergy staff determined the cause of the degraded baffle bolts was primarily due to | |||
IASCC in combination with increased fatigue loading on the baffle plates. This cause | |||
determination was based on industry operating experience related to baffle-former bolt | determination was based on industry operating experience related to baffle-former bolt | ||
failure in both foreign and domestic plants. IASCC is a cracking mechanism that occurs | failure in both foreign and domestic plants. IASCC is a cracking mechanism that occurs | ||
over a long period of time when susceptible metals are exposed to neutron radiation | over a long period of time when susceptible metals are exposed to neutron radiation | ||
from the reactor core and stresses as part of normal design and operation. Entergy staff concluded that failure of a critical number of bolts in a localized area subsequently imposed increased loading on adjacent bolts, which propagated failures and generated | from the reactor core and stresses as part of normal design and operation. Entergy staff | ||
concluded that failure of a critical number of bolts in a localized area subsequently | |||
imposed increased loading on adjacent bolts, which propagated failures and generated | |||
the moderate clustered pattern observed in the examination results. No other | the moderate clustered pattern observed in the examination results. No other | ||
contributing causes were identified. | contributing causes were identified. | ||
The inspectors reviewed Entergys root cause evaluation and the supporting operating | |||
experience related to baffle bolt failures at other plants. The inspectors determined that | |||
there is documented evidence in the existing technical literature (including materials | there is documented evidence in the existing technical literature (including materials | ||
testing of bolts from other plants) and operating experience to conclude that the likely | testing of bolts from other plants) and operating experience to conclude that the likely | ||
cause is IASCC; however, the inspectors found that Entergy staff did not define the cause of the fatigue failure mechanism. The inspectors noted that Entergy staff sent a sample of baffle bolts removed from the reactor pressure vessel to a metallurgical | cause is IASCC; however, the inspectors found that Entergy staff did not define the | ||
cause of the fatigue failure mechanism. The inspectors noted that Entergy staff sent a | |||
sample of baffle bolts removed from the reactor pressure vessel to a metallurgical | |||
laboratory for detailed failure analysis and materials property testing. Entergy indicated | laboratory for detailed failure analysis and materials property testing. Entergy indicated | ||
their plans to use the results of the laboratory testing to confirm the likely root cause. | their plans to use the results of the laboratory testing to confirm the likely root cause. | ||
The inspectors concluded that Entergy staff conducted an appropriate review to identify | The inspectors concluded that Entergy staff conducted an appropriate review to identify | ||
the likely causes of the degraded baffle bolts and noted that further test results will be used to confirm these causes. | the likely causes of the degraded baffle bolts and noted that further test results will be | ||
used to confirm these causes. | |||
Following identification of the degraded baffle bolts on Unit 2, | Following identification of the degraded baffle bolts on Unit 2, Entergys immediate | ||
corrective action was to analyze the as-found condition and begin replacing bolts that | corrective action was to analyze the as-found condition and begin replacing bolts that | ||
either had visual indications of bolt failure (protruding bolt head for example), did not pass UT examination, or were not accessible for UT examination. The as-found number and pattern of these bolts exceeded the acceptance criteria in the | either had visual indications of bolt failure (protruding bolt head for example), did not | ||
pass UT examination, or were not accessible for UT examination. The as-found number | |||
and pattern of these bolts exceeded the acceptance criteria in the plants analysis that | |||
was prepared in advance of the baffle bolt examinations; therefore, Entergy reported this | was prepared in advance of the baffle bolt examinations; therefore, Entergy reported this | ||
discovery to the NRC as an unanalyzed condition. Entergy staff completed corrective | discovery to the NRC as an unanalyzed condition. Entergy staff completed corrective | ||
actions to replace all of the 227 potentially degraded baffle bolts, plus an additional 51 | actions to replace all of the 227 potentially degraded baffle bolts, plus an additional 51 | ||
bolts for increased structural integrity, for a total of 278 bolts. The inspectors noted the 51 additional bolts were installed in strategic locations to prevent clustering of potential bolt failures during the next operating cycle. | bolts for increased structural integrity, for a total of 278 bolts. The inspectors noted the | ||
51 additional bolts were installed in strategic locations to prevent clustering of potential | |||
bolt failures during the next operating cycle. | |||
The inspectors determined that Entergy staff performed an acceptable bolt pattern | The inspectors determined that Entergy staff performed an acceptable bolt pattern | ||
analysis that evaluated the replacement bolt pattern for Unit 2 and modeled the potential for future bolt failures. The inspectors found the results of the analysis accounted for a conservative failure rate of bolts and provided appropriate margin for one cycle of | analysis that evaluated the replacement bolt pattern for Unit 2 and modeled the potential | ||
operation. The inspectors verified that | for future bolt failures. The inspectors found the results of the analysis accounted for a | ||
conservative failure rate of bolts and provided appropriate margin for one cycle of | |||
operation. The inspectors verified that Entergys methodology for its acceptable bolt | |||
pattern analyses, including its determination of margin, was consistent with the NRC- | pattern analyses, including its determination of margin, was consistent with the NRC- | ||
approved methodology in topical report WCAP-15029-NP-A (ML15222A882). The | approved methodology in topical report WCAP-15029-NP-A (ML15222A882). The | ||
inspectors determined that Entergy staff tracked corrective actions to re-examine the Unit 2 baffle bolts during the next planned RFO. The inspectors noted the new baffle bolts were made of a material with improved resistance to IASCC and included an | inspectors determined that Entergy staff tracked corrective actions to re-examine the | ||
Unit 2 baffle bolts during the next planned RFO. The inspectors noted the new baffle | |||
bolts were made of a material with improved resistance to IASCC and included an | |||
improved design to reduce the stresses at the head to shank transition, both of which | improved design to reduce the stresses at the head to shank transition, both of which | ||
are enhancements compared to the original bolts. | are enhancements compared to the original bolts. | ||
performed an IOD and concluded that the baffle assembly was operable. Entergy staff performed a subsequent | 34 | ||
As part of an extent of condition assessment, Entergy entered CR-IP3-2016-01035 in its | |||
CAP to evaluate the potential for degraded baffle bolts on Unit 3. Entergy operators | |||
performed an IOD and concluded that the baffle assembly was operable. Entergy staff | |||
performed a subsequent extent of condition review that concluded Unit 3 would | |||
experience less baffle bolt degradation than Unit 2 based on several plant factors. | |||
Entergy also conducted sensitivity analyses to show acceptable bounding conditions in | Entergy also conducted sensitivity analyses to show acceptable bounding conditions in | ||
the event of bolt failures. The inspectors reviewed | the event of bolt failures. The inspectors reviewed Entergys evaluations and noted that | ||
Entergy staff concluded there was not a degraded condition at Unit 3. In consideration | Entergy staff concluded there was not a degraded condition at Unit 3. In consideration | ||
of the guidance in their operability procedure and operating experience from Unit 2 and other plants, the NRC issued an NCV in this report because Entergy did not perform an operability evaluation for Unit 3 as a follow-up to the immediate determination for the | of the guidance in their operability procedure and operating experience from Unit 2 and | ||
other plants, the NRC issued an NCV in this report because Entergy did not perform an | |||
operability evaluation for Unit 3 as a follow-up to the immediate determination for the | |||
potential impact on supported systems controlled by the TS (Refer to Section 1R15). | potential impact on supported systems controlled by the TS (Refer to Section 1R15). | ||
As a corrective action, Entergy staff performed an operability evaluation and demonstrated that the Unit 3 baffle former assembly remained operable. The inspectors concluded that this supplemental evaluation provided appropriate technical justification | As a corrective action, Entergy staff performed an operability evaluation and | ||
demonstrated that the Unit 3 baffle former assembly remained operable. The inspectors | |||
concluded that this supplemental evaluation provided appropriate technical justification | |||
for the continued operation of Unit 3 until the next RFO in spring 2017, at which time | for the continued operation of Unit 3 until the next RFO in spring 2017, at which time | ||
Entergy plans to examine the baffle bolts. Entergy also implemented a corrective action | Entergy plans to examine the baffle bolts. Entergy also implemented a corrective action | ||
as part of an enhancement to plant operations to monitor the RCS for any signs of fuel leakage, which could be an indicator of baffle bolt failures. | as part of an enhancement to plant operations to monitor the RCS for any signs of fuel | ||
leakage, which could be an indicator of baffle bolt failures. | |||
The inspectors reviewed Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter NSAL-16-1, | The inspectors reviewed Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter NSAL-16-1, | ||
which discussed the results of recent baffle-former bolt inspections and provided | which discussed the results of recent baffle-former bolt inspections and provided | ||
Westinghouses recommendations on this issue. The letter described the plants as most | |||
susceptible (i.e. Tier 1a) to this degradation as Westinghouse 4-loop reactors limited to those with a down-flow configuration and using Type 347 stainless steel bolts. The inspectors noted the recommendation was to complete UT volumetric examination of the | susceptible (i.e. Tier 1a) to this degradation as Westinghouse 4-loop reactors limited to | ||
those with a down-flow configuration and using Type 347 stainless steel bolts. The | |||
inspectors noted the recommendation was to complete UT volumetric examination of the | |||
baffle bolts at the next scheduled RFO, and that Entergy had already planned this action | baffle bolts at the next scheduled RFO, and that Entergy had already planned this action | ||
for Unit 3. Entergy also planned a long-term corrective action to convert Units 2 and 3 | for Unit 3. Entergy also planned a long-term corrective action to convert Units 2 and 3 | ||
from a | from a down-flow baffle configuration to an up-flow configuration, which would | ||
significantly reduce the load on baffle-former bolts and provide for increased structural margin of the baffle-former assembly. The inspectors determined | significantly reduce the load on baffle-former bolts and provide for increased structural | ||
margin of the baffle-former assembly. The inspectors determined Entergys overall | |||
response to the issue was commensurate with the safety significance, was timely, and | response to the issue was commensurate with the safety significance, was timely, and | ||
included appropriate compensatory actions. The inspectors concluded that the actions | included appropriate compensatory actions. The inspectors concluded that the actions | ||
completed and planned were reasonable to address the ongoing aging management of | completed and planned were reasonable to address the ongoing aging management of | ||
baffle bolts. | baffle bolts. | ||
.1 Plant Events | 4OA3 Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153 - 5 samples) | ||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
For the plant events listed below, the inspectors reviewed and/or observed plant | .1 | ||
Plant Events | |||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
For the plant events listed below, the inspectors reviewed and/or observed plant | |||
parameters, reviewed personnel performance, and evaluated performance of mitigating | parameters, reviewed personnel performance, and evaluated performance of mitigating | ||
systems. The inspectors communicated the plant events to appropriate regional | systems. The inspectors communicated the plant events to appropriate regional | ||
personnel, and compared the event details with criteria contained in IMC 0309, | personnel, and compared the event details with criteria contained in IMC 0309, Reactive | ||
emergency classification assessments and properly reported the event in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73. The inspectors reviewed | Inspection Decision Basis for Reactors, for consideration of potential reactive inspection | ||
activities. As applicable, the inspectors verified that Entergy made appropriate | |||
emergency classification assessments and properly reported the event in accordance | |||
with 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73. The inspectors reviewed Entergys follow-up actions | |||
35 | |||
related to the events to assure that Entergy implemented appropriate corrective actions | |||
commensurate with their safety significance. | |||
The | Unit 2 | ||
Turbine trip occurred while synchronizing Unit 2 to the grid on June 15, 2016 | |||
Shutdown required by TS for repairs to a leak on the 21 CCW heat exchanger | |||
service water inlet on June 23, 2016 | |||
Unit 3 | |||
Rapid power reduction from 100 percent to 45 percent power in response to a loss of | |||
both heater drain pumps on May 26, 2016 | |||
b. Findings | |||
No findings were identified. | |||
.2 | |||
(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000247/2015-003-00: Manual Reactor Trip | |||
Due to Indications of Multiple Dropped Control Rods Caused by Loss of Control Rod | |||
Power Due to a Power Supply Failure | |||
The inspectors reviewed Entergys actions and reportability criteria associated with LER | |||
05000247/2015-003-00, which was submitted to the NRC on February 3, 2016. On | 05000247/2015-003-00, which was submitted to the NRC on February 3, 2016. On | ||
December 5, 2015, control room operators initiated a manual reactor trip after observing indications consistent with multiple dropped control rods following an alarm for the trip of MCC-24/24A. No control rod indication was available due to MCC-24 being faulted and | December 5, 2015, control room operators initiated a manual reactor trip after observing | ||
de-energized. The | indications consistent with multiple dropped control rods following an alarm for the trip of | ||
MCC-24/24A. No control rod indication was available due to MCC-24 being faulted and | |||
de-energized. The direct cause of the event was the loss of MCC-24 due to an internal | |||
fault at the line sides leads at cubicle 2H where they connect to the bucket stab | |||
assemblies. The apparent cause was an unanticipated loss of power to the control rod | assemblies. The apparent cause was an unanticipated loss of power to the control rod | ||
system due to the degradation of the primary control rod PS1 which failed to function when the operating PS2 was lost. The inspectors determined that both the unexpected failure of PS2 and the internal fault in PS1 was not within | system due to the degradation of the primary control rod PS1 which failed to function | ||
when the operating PS2 was lost. The inspectors determined that both the unexpected | |||
failure of PS2 and the internal fault in PS1 was not within Entergys ability to foresee and | |||
prevent and was not a performance deficiency. The inspectors reviewed the LER, the | prevent and was not a performance deficiency. The inspectors reviewed the LER, the | ||
associated apparent cause evaluation analysis, and interviewed Entergy staff. This LER is closed. | associated apparent cause evaluation analysis, and interviewed Entergy staff. This LER | ||
.3 (Closed) LER 05000247/2016-003-00: TS Prohibited Condition Due to an Inoperable 21 MBFP Discharge Valve for Greater Than the TS Allowed Outage Time | is closed. | ||
.3 | |||
(Closed) LER 05000247/2016-003-00: TS Prohibited Condition Due to an Inoperable 21 | |||
MBFP Discharge Valve for Greater Than the TS Allowed Outage Time | |||
The | The inspectors reviewed Entergys actions and reportability criteria associated with LER | ||
05000247/2016-003-00, which was submitted to the NRC on May 6, 2016. On March 7, | |||
2016, during the shutdown to enter 2RFO22, the control switch for the 21 MBFP was | |||
tripped from the control room but the MBFP discharge valve BFD-2-21 failed to fully | tripped from the control room but the MBFP discharge valve BFD-2-21 failed to fully | ||
close as designed. The MBFP discharge valve was declared inoperable and TS 3.7.3 | close as designed. The MBFP discharge valve was declared inoperable and TS 3.7.3 | ||
Condition C was entered. The MFD-2-21 isolation valve was then manually closed. The | Condition C was entered. The MFD-2-21 isolation valve was then manually closed. The | ||
direct cause of the failure to close the MBFP discharge valve BFD-2-21 was the motor operated | direct cause of the failure to close the MBFP discharge valve BFD-2-21 was the motor | ||
operated valves (MOVs) close torque switch contact finger out of position. The | |||
apparent cause was that the MOV preventative maintenance procedure lacked the level | |||
of detail and direction due to an unrecognized susceptibility associated with the | of detail and direction due to an unrecognized susceptibility associated with the | ||
orientation of the close torque switch contact finger bracket opening and spreading of | orientation of the close torque switch contact finger bracket opening and spreading of | ||
36 | |||
36 | |||
Introduction. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(b)(1) for | |||
the U shape bracket. The downward arrangement made it easier for the torque switch | |||
contact finger to move out with spreading of the U shaped contact holder. The | |||
inspectors reviewed the LER, the associated apparent cause evaluation analysis, and | |||
interviewed Entergy staff. This LER is closed. | |||
Introduction. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(b)(1) for Entergys | |||
failure to include a function of a safety-related system within the scope of the | |||
maintenance rule program. Specifically, Entergy failed to include the feedwater isolation | maintenance rule program. Specifically, Entergy failed to include the feedwater isolation | ||
function performed by the MBFP discharge valves, MBFPs, and feedwater regulating | function performed by the MBFP discharge valves, MBFPs, and feedwater regulating | ||
valves and feedwater isolation valves which are required to remain functional during and following a design basis event to mitigate the consequences of an accident, within the | valves and feedwater isolation valves which are required to remain functional during and | ||
following a design basis event to mitigate the consequences of an accident, within the | |||
scope of the maintenance rule monitoring program. | scope of the maintenance rule monitoring program. | ||
Description. On March 7, 2016, during an RFO, the control switch for the 21 MBFP was | |||
positioned to trip and the 21 MBFP tripped as designed, but the MBFP discharge valve | |||
BFD-2-21 failed to fully close. Entergy declared MBFP discharge valve BFD-2-21 | BFD-2-21 failed to fully close. Entergy declared MBFP discharge valve BFD-2-21 | ||
inoperable and entered TS 3.7.3 Condition C. After troubleshooting, Entergy determined | inoperable and entered TS 3.7.3 Condition C. After troubleshooting, Entergy determined | ||
the MOV close torque switch contact finger was out of position within the contact holder. | the MOV close torque switch contact finger was out of position within the contact holder. | ||
The misalignment allowed the contact finger to move out of the proper position causing the MOV BFD-2-21 to fail to close. This is the same failure mechanism which caused MOV BFD-2-21 to fail to close in 2010 which is referenced in CR-IP2-2010-07013. On | The misalignment allowed the contact finger to move out of the proper position causing | ||
the MOV BFD-2-21 to fail to close. This is the same failure mechanism which caused | |||
MOV BFD-2-21 to fail to close in 2010 which is referenced in CR-IP2-2010-07013. On | |||
December 5, 2015, the 21 MBFP failed to trip and required closure of the steam | December 5, 2015, the 21 MBFP failed to trip and required closure of the steam | ||
admission valves to secure it. This failure occurred because of contaminated control oil | admission valves to secure it. This failure occurred because of contaminated control oil | ||
that prevented the solenoid valves from operating. | that prevented the solenoid valves from operating. | ||
The inspectors reviewed | |||
The inspectors reviewed Entergys maintenance rule basis documents and identified the | |||
feedwater isolation function was not properly included in the maintenance rule | |||
monitoring program as required by 10 CFR 50.65(b)(1). The basis document for the | monitoring program as required by 10 CFR 50.65(b)(1). The basis document for the | ||
feedwater system did identify the need to monitor the feedwater isolation function under | feedwater system did identify the need to monitor the feedwater isolation function under | ||
the maintenance rule and stated that it would be monitored as a part of the vapor containment supersystem. However, the basis document for the vapor containment supersystem does not include the feedwater isolation components within the system boundaries. As a result, when component failures occurred which affected the | the maintenance rule and stated that it would be monitored as a part of the vapor | ||
containment supersystem. However, the basis document for the vapor containment | |||
supersystem does not include the feedwater isolation components within the system | |||
boundaries. As a result, when component failures occurred which affected the | |||
feedwater isolation function, they were not reviewed to determine if they were | feedwater isolation function, they were not reviewed to determine if they were | ||
maintenance rule functional failures; and Entergy was unable to identify that the | maintenance rule functional failures; and Entergy was unable to identify that the | ||
performance of the main feedwater isolation equipment was not effectively controlled through preventative maintenance. Entergy entered this issue into the CAP as CR-IP2-2016-03963 and initiated actions to include the MBFP discharge valves into the | performance of the main feedwater isolation equipment was not effectively controlled | ||
through preventative maintenance. Entergy entered this issue into the CAP as | |||
CR-IP2-2016-03963 and initiated actions to include the MBFP discharge valves into the | |||
maintenance rule program. | maintenance rule program. | ||
Analysis. The failure to appropriately scope the safety-related feedwater isolation function within the maintenance rule program was a performance deficiency. This | Analysis. The failure to appropriately scope the safety-related feedwater isolation | ||
function within the maintenance rule program was a performance deficiency. This | |||
finding is more than minor because it is associated with the SSC and barrier | finding is more than minor because it is associated with the SSC and barrier | ||
performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone | performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone | ||
objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the | objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the | ||
public from radionuclide releases caused by | public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the failure | ||
to properly scope the feedwater isolation function prevented Entergy from identifying that | |||
IMC 0609.04, | equipment reliability was no longer effectively controlled through preventative | ||
maintenance. Additionally, this issue is similar to example 7.d described in IMC 0612, | |||
(Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment, containment isolation system, and heat removal components. There are redundant methods of feedwater isolation. They include | Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, dated August 11, 2009. In accordance with | ||
IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix | |||
37 | |||
A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, issued June 19, | |||
2012, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance | |||
(Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical | |||
integrity of reactor containment, containment isolation system, and heat removal | |||
components. There are redundant methods of feedwater isolation. They include | |||
tripping the MBFPs and closing the MBFP discharge valves, closing the main feedwater | tripping the MBFPs and closing the MBFP discharge valves, closing the main feedwater | ||
regulating valves and low flow bypass valves, and closing the main feedwater isolation | regulating valves and low flow bypass valves, and closing the main feedwater isolation | ||
valves. On both December 5, 2015, and March 7, 2016, the main feedwater regulating | valves. On both December 5, 2015, and March 7, 2016, the main feedwater regulating | ||
valves and isolation valves were functional; so there was no loss of the ability to isolate feedwater to mitigate accident and transient conditions. | valves and isolation valves were functional; so there was no loss of the ability to isolate | ||
feedwater to mitigate accident and transient conditions. | |||
This finding does not have a cross-cutting aspect, since the failure to scope this | This finding does not have a cross-cutting aspect, since the failure to scope this | ||
equipment into the maintenance rule program was not recognized when Entergy | equipment into the maintenance rule program was not recognized when Entergy | ||
combined the maintenance rule basis documents for Units 2 and 3 in 2012 and as a result, is not indicative of current licensee performance. | combined the maintenance rule basis documents for Units 2 and 3 in 2012 and as a | ||
result, is not indicative of current licensee performance. | |||
Enforcement. | Enforcement. 10 CFR 50.65(b)(1) requires, in part, that the holders of an operating | ||
license shall include within the scope of the monitoring program, specified in | |||
design basis events. Contrary to the | 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1), SSCs that are relied upon to remain functional during and following | ||
above, since the combined maintenance rule scoping for Units 2 and 3 in 2012, Entergy failed to include within the scope of the | design basis events. Contrary to the above, since the combined maintenance rule | ||
scoping for Units 2 and 3 in 2012, Entergy failed to include within the scope of the | |||
monitoring program specified in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1), the safety-related MBFP discharge | monitoring program specified in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1), the safety-related MBFP discharge | ||
valves. These SSCs are relied upon during and after design basis events to mitigate the | valves. These SSCs are relied upon during and after design basis events to mitigate the | ||
consequences of a feedwater line break accident inside containment. | consequences of a feedwater line break accident inside containment. Entergys | ||
corrective action included entering this issue into the corrective action program. Because the violation was of very low safety significance (Green) and Entergy entered this issue into their CAP as CR-IP2-2016-03963, this violation is being treated as an | corrective action included entering this issue into the corrective action program. | ||
NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000247/2016002-04, Failure to Scope Safety-Related Main Boiler Feedwater Pump Discharge Valves into the Maintenance Rule Program) | Because the violation was of very low safety significance (Green) and Entergy entered | ||
this issue into their CAP as CR-IP2-2016-03963, this violation is being treated as an | |||
NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. | |||
(NCV 05000247/2016002-04, Failure to Scope Safety-Related Main Boiler Feedwater | |||
Pump Discharge Valves into the Maintenance Rule Program) | |||
4OA5 Other Activities | |||
.1 | |||
Groundwater Contamination | |||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
On February 5, 2016, Entergy notified the NRC of a significant increase in groundwater | |||
tritium levels measured at three monitoring wells (MWs) (MW-30, MW-31, and MW-32) | |||
located near the Unit 2 fuel storage building. These samples were drawn on | |||
January 26 to 27, 2016, and analyzed and confirmed on February 2 to 4, 2016. The | |||
tritium levels measured at three monitoring wells (MWs) (MW-30, MW-31, and MW-32) located near the Unit 2 fuel storage building. These samples were drawn on | highest concentration was detected at MW-32, which increased from 12,000 pCi/l on | ||
January 26 to 27, 2016, and analyzed and confirmed on February 2 to 4, 2016. The highest concentration was detected at MW-32, which increased from 12,000 pCi/l on January 11, 2016, to 8,100,000 pCi/l on January 26, 2016, and subsequently up to | January 11, 2016, to 8,100,000 pCi/l on January 26, 2016, and subsequently up to | ||
14,800,000 pCi/l on February 4, 2016. This increased tritium concentration event was | 14,800,000 pCi/l on February 4, 2016. This increased tritium concentration event was | ||
documented by Entergy in CR-IP2-2016-00564 which documents its investigation of this | documented by Entergy in CR-IP2-2016-00564 which documents its investigation of this | ||
event including a root cause evaluation. The inspectors reviewed | event including a root cause evaluation. The inspectors reviewed Entergys root cause | ||
evaluation for this event during this inspection period as well as recent groundwater | |||
38 | monitoring results. | ||
Update to URI 05000247/2016001-07, January 2016 Groundwater Contamination | |||
Entergy continues to conduct weekly, biweekly, and monthly groundwater sampling of | |||
38 | |||
b. Findings and Observations | |||
No findings were identified. | |||
Update to URI 05000247/2016001-07, January 2016 Groundwater Contamination | |||
Entergy continues to conduct weekly, biweekly, and monthly groundwater sampling of | |||
MWs at the initial site of groundwater contamination and at downstream wells towards | MWs at the initial site of groundwater contamination and at downstream wells towards | ||
the Hudson River. For the initial three MWs (MW-30, MW-31, and MW-32), the general trend in tritium activity has been downward, with periodic increases seen in some weekly samples. The downstream MWs located in the Unit 2 switchyard (especially MW-55) | the Hudson River. For the initial three MWs (MW-30, MW-31, and MW-32), the general | ||
trend in tritium activity has been downward, with periodic increases seen in some weekly | |||
samples. The downstream MWs located in the Unit 2 switchyard (especially MW-55) | |||
showed an initial increase in activity up to 117,000 pCi/l, but the activity at that location | showed an initial increase in activity up to 117,000 pCi/l, but the activity at that location | ||
has plateaued at the end of the reporting period. | has plateaued at the end of the reporting period. | ||
Entergy documented its investigation of this event as root cause evaluation for CR-IP2-2016-00564. The inspectors reviewed | |||
event. Entergy concluded that the source of the groundwater contamination was from the reject water of a temporary reverse osmosis unit used to process water from the | Entergy documented its investigation of this event as root cause evaluation for | ||
refueling water storage tank at Unit 2 in preparation for RFO 2R22. Although this analysis documents a number of issues identified during the operation of the contractor reverse osmosis unit, which is believed to be the source of the groundwater | CR-IP2-2016-00564. The inspectors reviewed Entergys root cause evaluation for this | ||
event. Entergy concluded that the source of the groundwater contamination was from | |||
the reject water of a temporary reverse osmosis unit used to process water from the | |||
refueling water storage tank at Unit 2 in preparation for RFO 2R22. Although this | |||
analysis documents a number of issues identified during the operation of the contractor | |||
reverse osmosis unit, which is believed to be the source of the groundwater | |||
contamination, one of two leakage paths to groundwater have still not been established. | contamination, one of two leakage paths to groundwater have still not been established. | ||
The established pathway involves leakage from two cut drain lines located above the floor on the 35-foot elevation of the PAB. Further investigation by Entergy following the | The established pathway involves leakage from two cut drain lines located above the | ||
floor on the 35-foot elevation of the PAB. Further investigation by Entergy following the | |||
conclusion of the Unit 2 RFO 2R22 must be conducted to verify the second pathway to | conclusion of the Unit 2 RFO 2R22 must be conducted to verify the second pathway to | ||
groundwater via the floor of the fuel storage building truck bay. | groundwater via the floor of the fuel storage building truck bay. | ||
Entergys long-term corrective action for reducing tritium levels in the groundwater is the | |||
same as previously identified for the March 2014 tritium spike (CR-IP2-2015-03806), the | same as previously identified for the March 2014 tritium spike (CR-IP2-2015-03806), the | ||
start-up and operation of recovery well (RW)-1. Following installation of equipment and system testing, full operation of the RW system is expected later this year. This system will allow for the collection of tritiated groundwater in the vicinity of Unit 2 to be returned | start-up and operation of recovery well (RW)-1. Following installation of equipment and | ||
system testing, full operation of the RW system is expected later this year. This system | |||
will allow for the collection of tritiated groundwater in the vicinity of Unit 2 to be returned | |||
inside the Unit 2 PAB for processing. The NRC will be conducting an inspection in | inside the Unit 2 PAB for processing. The NRC will be conducting an inspection in | ||
August 2016 to review the testing plan and results of the RW-1 tests. This inspection | August 2016 to review the testing plan and results of the RW-1 tests. This inspection | ||
will include a specialist region-based inspector, and a staff hydrogeologist. | will include a specialist region-based inspector, and a staff hydrogeologist. | ||
The NRCs continuing assessment of the safety significance of this event focused on | |||
significance of this event focused on validating the safety impact of dose to the public from the release of tritium to the site | validating the safety impact of dose to the public from the release of tritium to the site | ||
groundwater, and ultimately to the Hudson River. The NRC verified that | groundwater, and ultimately to the Hudson River. The NRC verified that Entergys | ||
bounding public dose calculations on the groundwater contamination leak was | bounding public dose calculations on the groundwater contamination leak was | ||
sufficiently conservative and a maximum worst case scenario would result in a dose of | sufficiently conservative and a maximum worst case scenario would result in a dose of | ||
0.000112 millirem per year, which represents a very small fraction of the allowable dose (liquid effluent dose objective of 3 millirem per year). This low value is due to | 0.000112 millirem per year, which represents a very small fraction of the allowable dose | ||
(liquid effluent dose objective of 3 millirem per year). This low value is due to | |||
groundwater at Indian Point not being a source of any drinking water. There are no | groundwater at Indian Point not being a source of any drinking water. There are no | ||
drinking water wells on the Indian Point site, groundwater flow from the site is to the | drinking water wells on the Indian Point site, groundwater flow from the site is to the | ||
Hudson River and not to any near site drinking water wells, and the Hudson River has | Hudson River and not to any near site drinking water wells, and the Hudson River has | ||
no downstream drinking water intakes as it is brackish water. Pathways to the public are therefore limited to the consumption of fish and river invertebrates. The inspection determined that there is no safety impact to the public as a result of this groundwater | no downstream drinking water intakes as it is brackish water. Pathways to the public are | ||
therefore limited to the consumption of fish and river invertebrates. The inspection | |||
determined that there is no safety impact to the public as a result of this groundwater | |||
contamination event. (URI 05000247/2016001-07, January 2016 Groundwater | |||
Contamination) | |||
39 | |||
a. Inspection Scope | .2 | ||
The inspectors also reviewed the final report for the INPO equipment reliability scram | Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Report Review | ||
a. Inspection Scope | |||
The inspectors also reviewed the final report for the INPO equipment reliability scram | |||
review visit that was conducted to review the scrams that occurred over the past two | review visit that was conducted to review the scrams that occurred over the past two | ||
years, conducted in June 2016. The inspectors reviewed the report to ensure that any | years, conducted in June 2016. The inspectors reviewed the report to ensure that any | ||
issues identified were consistent with NRC perspectives of Entergy performance and to determine if INPO identified any significant safety issues that required further NRC | issues identified were consistent with NRC perspectives of Entergy performance and to | ||
determine if INPO identified any significant safety issues that required further NRC | |||
follow-up. | follow-up. | ||
b. Findings | |||
No findings were identified. | |||
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit | No findings were identified. | ||
On August 4, 2016, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Larry Coyle, Site Vice President, and other members of Entergy. Based on additional information provided, the inspectors conducted an updated exit meeting on August 30, 2016 with | |||
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit | |||
On August 4, 2016, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Larry Coyle, | |||
Site Vice President, and other members of Entergy. Based on additional information | |||
provided, the inspectors conducted an updated exit meeting on August 30, 2016 with | |||
John Kirkpatrick, Plant Operations General Manager and other members of Entergy. | John Kirkpatrick, Plant Operations General Manager and other members of Entergy. | ||
The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or | The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or | ||
documented in this report. | documented in this report. | ||
A-1 Attachment SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION | ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION | ||
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT | |||
A-1 | |||
Attachment | |||
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION | |||
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT | |||
Entergy Personnel | |||
A. Vitale, Site Vice President | A. Vitale, Site Vice President | ||
J. Kirkpatrick, Plant Operations General Manager | J. Kirkpatrick, Plant Operations General Manager | ||
R. Alexander, Unit 2 Shift Manager | R. Alexander, Unit 2 Shift Manager | ||
R. Andersen, Maintenance Instrumentation and Controls Superintendent N. Azevedo, Engineering Supervisor | R. Andersen, Maintenance Instrumentation and Controls Superintendent | ||
N. Azevedo, Engineering Supervisor | |||
J. Baker, Shift Manager | J. Baker, Shift Manager | ||
S. Bianco, Operations Fire Marshal | S. Bianco, Operations Fire Marshal | ||
K. Brooks, Assistant Operations Manager | K. Brooks, Assistant Operations Manager | ||
R. Burroni, Engineering Director T. Chan, Engineering Supervisor C. Chapin, Training Superintendent | R. Burroni, Engineering Director | ||
T. Chan, Engineering Supervisor | |||
C. Chapin, Training Superintendent | |||
D. Dewey, Assistant Operations Manager | D. Dewey, Assistant Operations Manager | ||
J. Dignam, Unit 3 Control Room Supervisor | J. Dignam, Unit 3 Control Room Supervisor | ||
R. Dolansky, Inservice Inspection Program Manager W. Durr, Outage Control Center Manager R. Drake, Engineering Supervisor | R. Dolansky, Inservice Inspection Program Manager | ||
W. Durr, Outage Control Center Manager | |||
R. Drake, Engineering Supervisor | |||
K. Elliott, Fire Protection Engineer | K. Elliott, Fire Protection Engineer | ||
J. Ferrick, Regulatory and Performance Improvement Director | J. Ferrick, Regulatory and Performance Improvement Director | ||
L. Frink, Radiation Protection Supervisor | L. Frink, Radiation Protection Supervisor | ||
D. Gagnon, Security Manager L. Glander, Emergency Preparedness Manager D. Gray, Radiological Environmental Manager | D. Gagnon, Security Manager | ||
L. Glander, Emergency Preparedness Manager | |||
D. Gray, Radiological Environmental Manager | |||
J. Johnson, Unit 2 Control Room Supervisor | J. Johnson, Unit 2 Control Room Supervisor | ||
M. Johnson, Unit 3 Shift Manager | M. Johnson, Unit 3 Shift Manager | ||
M. Khadabux, Instrumentation and Controls Supervisor F. Kich, Performance Improvement Manager M. Lewis, Unit 3 Assistant Operations Manager | M. Khadabux, Instrumentation and Controls Supervisor | ||
F. Kich, Performance Improvement Manager | |||
M. Lewis, Unit 3 Assistant Operations Manager | |||
N. Lizzo, Training Manager | N. Lizzo, Training Manager | ||
S. McAllister, Baffle Bolt Replacement Project Manager | S. McAllister, Baffle Bolt Replacement Project Manager | ||
M. McCarthy, Unit 3 Control Room Supervisor | M. McCarthy, Unit 3 Control Room Supervisor | ||
B. McCarthy, Operations Manager | |||
B. McCarthy, Operations Manager F. Mitchell, Radiation Protection Manager E. Mullek, Maintenance Manager | F. Mitchell, Radiation Protection Manager | ||
E. Mullek, Maintenance Manager | |||
S. Stevens, Radiation Protection Operations Superintendent | S. Stevens, Radiation Protection Operations Superintendent | ||
B. Sullivan, Training Superintendent | B. Sullivan, Training Superintendent | ||
J. Taylor, Unit 3 Shift Manager | J. Taylor, Unit 3 Shift Manager | ||
M. Tesoriero, Outage Control Center Manager M. Troy, Nuclear Oversight Manager | M. Tesoriero, Outage Control Center Manager | ||
M. Troy, Nuclear Oversight Manager | |||
R. Walpole, Regulatory Assurance Manager | R. Walpole, Regulatory Assurance Manager | ||
A. Zastrow, Assistant Operations Manager | A. Zastrow, Assistant Operations Manager | ||
A-2 | |||
A-2 | |||
05000247/2016002-01 URI CVCS Goal Monitoring Under the Maintenance | LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED | ||
Opened | |||
05000247/2016002-01 | |||
URI | |||
CVCS Goal Monitoring Under the Maintenance | |||
Rule (Section 1R12) | |||
Opened/Closed | Opened/Closed | ||
05000286/2016002-02 NCV Failure to Follow Operability Determination | |||
05000286/2016002-02 | |||
NCV | |||
Failure to Follow Operability Determination | |||
Procedure for Unit 3 Baffle-Former Bolts | Procedure for Unit 3 Baffle-Former Bolts | ||
(Section 1R15) | (Section 1R15) | ||
05000247/2016002-03 NCV | 05000247/2016002-03 | ||
NCV | |||
05000247/2016002-04 NCV Failure to Scope Safety-Related Main Boiler | Failure to Maintain Flow Channeling Gates Closed | ||
in Accordance with the Containment Procedure | |||
(Section 1R20) | |||
05000247/2016002-04 | |||
NCV | |||
Failure to Scope Safety-Related Main Boiler | |||
Feedwater Pump Discharge Valves into the | |||
Maintenance Rule Program (Section 4OA3) | Maintenance Rule Program (Section 4OA3) | ||
Closed | Closed | ||
05000247/2015-003-00 LER Manual Reactor Trip due to Indications of Multiple | |||
05000247/2015-003-00 | |||
LER | |||
Manual Reactor Trip due to Indications of Multiple | |||
05000247/2016-003-00 LER Technical Specification Prohibited Condition Due to an Inoperable 21 Main Boiler Feedwater | |||
Dropped Control Rods Caused by Loss of Control | |||
Rod Power Due to a Power Supply Failure | |||
(Section 4OA3) | |||
05000247/2016-003-00 | |||
LER | |||
Technical Specification Prohibited Condition | |||
Due to an Inoperable 21 Main Boiler Feedwater | |||
Pump Discharge Valve for Greater Than the TS | Pump Discharge Valve for Greater Than the TS | ||
Allowed Outage Time (Section 4OA3) | Allowed Outage Time (Section 4OA3) | ||
| Line 1,293: | Line 2,553: | ||
Discussed | Discussed | ||
05000247/2016001-01 URI Baffle-Former Bolts with Identified Anomalies | 05000247/2016001-01 | ||
URI | |||
Baffle-Former Bolts with Identified Anomalies | |||
(Section 1R08) | |||
05000247/2016001-06 URI Emergency Diesel Generator Automatic Voltage | 05000247/2016001-06 | ||
URI | |||
Emergency Diesel Generator Automatic Voltage | |||
Regulator Failure (Section 1R15) | Regulator Failure (Section 1R15) | ||
05000247/2016001-07 URI January 2016 Groundwater Contamination | |||
05000247/2016001-07 | |||
URI | |||
January 2016 Groundwater Contamination | |||
Common Documents Used Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, UFSARs | |||
Section (Section 4OA5) | |||
A-3 | |||
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED | |||
Common Documents Used | |||
Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, UFSARs | |||
Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, Individual Plant Examinations | Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, Individual Plant Examinations | ||
Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, Individual Plant Examination of External Events | Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, Individual Plant Examination of External Events | ||
Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, TSs and Bases | Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, TSs and Bases | ||
Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, Technical Requirements Manuals | Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, Technical Requirements Manuals | ||
Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, Control Room Narrative Logs Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, Plans of the Day | Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, Control Room Narrative Logs | ||
Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment | Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, Plans of the Day | ||
Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment | |||
Procedures | |||
2-COL-4.2.1, Residual Heat Removal System, Revision 30 | |||
2-COL-4.3.1, Spent Fuel Pit Cooling, Revision 10 | 2-COL-4.3.1, Spent Fuel Pit Cooling, Revision 10 | ||
2-COL-24.1.1, Service Water System, Revision 50 | 2-COL-24.1.1, Service Water System, Revision 50 | ||
3-COL-EL-005, Diesel Generators, Revision 37 | 3-COL-EL-005, Diesel Generators, Revision 37 | ||
OAP-019, Component Verification and System Status Control, Revision 7 OAP-044, Plant Labeling Program, Revision 3 | OAP-019, Component Verification and System Status Control, Revision 7 | ||
OAP-044, Plant Labeling Program, Revision 3 | |||
Condition Reports (CR-IP2) | Condition Reports (CR-IP2) | ||
2016-01311 2016-01505 2016-01761 2016-02330 2016-02428 2016-02470 | 2016-01311 | ||
2016-01505 | |||
2016-01761 | |||
2016-02330 | |||
2016-02428 | |||
2016-02470 | |||
Condition Reports (CR-IP3) | Condition Reports (CR-IP3) | ||
2016-01382 2016-01810 | 2016-01382 | ||
2016-01810 | |||
Drawings | |||
209762, Flow Diagram Service Water System Nuclear Steam Supply Plant, Revision 75 | |||
227781, Flow Diagram Auxiliary Coolant System, Revision 22 | |||
9321-2720, Auxiliary Coolant System, Sheet 2, Revision 22 | |||
Miscellaneous | |||
IP3-DBD-308, CCW System, Revision 3 | |||
Section 1R05: Fire Protection | |||
Procedures | |||
EN-MA-133, Control of Scaffolding, Revision 12 | |||
Condition Reports (CR-IP2) | Condition Reports (CR-IP2) | ||
2016-04148 | 2016-04148 | ||
Condition Reports (CR-IP3) | Condition Reports (CR-IP3) | ||
2016-01272 | 2016-01272 | ||
Miscellaneous PFP-203, Containment Building, 95-Foot Elevation (Fire Zone 86A), Revision 15 | Miscellaneous | ||
PFP-203, Containment Building, 95-Foot Elevation (Fire Zone 86A), Revision 15 | |||
PFP-204, General Floor Plan, PAB, 15-Foot Elevation, Revision 0 | PFP-204, General Floor Plan, PAB, 15-Foot Elevation, Revision 0 | ||
PFP-209, Component Cooling Pump Room, PAB, 68-Foot Elevation, Revision 0 | PFP-209, Component Cooling Pump Room, PAB, 68-Foot Elevation, Revision 0 | ||
PFP-211, General Floor Plan, PAB, 80-Foot Elevation, Revision 14 | PFP-211, General Floor Plan, PAB, 80-Foot Elevation, Revision 14 | ||
PFP-351, 480V Switchgear Room, Revision 15 | PFP-351, 480V Switchgear Room, Revision 15 | ||
A-4 | |||
Section 1R07: Heat Sink Performance | |||
Procedures | |||
0-HTX-405-EDG, EDG Lube Oil and Jacket Water Heat Exchanger Maintenance, Revision 4 | |||
Condition Reports (CR-IP3) | Condition Reports (CR-IP3) | ||
2010-02900 2011-03594 2011-03596 2011-03961 2012-02071 2012-03912 | 2010-02900 | ||
2011-03594 | |||
2013-02338 2013-02695 2013-03009 2014-00957 2014-01239 2014-03158 | 2011-03596 | ||
2011-03961 | |||
2014-03175 2015-00031 2015-00599 2015-02848 2015-05209 2015-05526 | 2012-02071 | ||
2016-00886 2016-00895 2016-00899 | 2012-03912 | ||
2013-02338 | |||
2013-02695 | |||
2013-03009 | |||
2014-00957 | |||
2014-01239 | |||
2014-03158 | |||
2014-03175 | |||
2015-00031 | |||
2015-00599 | |||
2015-02848 | |||
2015-05209 | |||
2015-05526 | |||
2016-00886 | |||
2016-00895 | |||
2016-00899 | |||
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders | |||
WO 52489888 | |||
WO 52626563 | |||
Miscellaneous | |||
SEP-SW-IPC-001, Indian Point Energy Center NRC Generic Letter 89-13 Service Water | |||
Program, Revision 0 | Program, Revision 0 | ||
Section 1R08: Inservice Inspection Activities | |||
Procedures GBRA-104-659, Collection of Protocols for Baffle Bolt Replacement, Revision C | Section 1R08: Inservice Inspection Activities | ||
Procedures | |||
GBRA-104-659, Collection of Protocols for Baffle Bolt Replacement, Revision C | |||
GBRA-175-115, Field Service Procedure for Baffle Bolt Replacement, Revision 3 | GBRA-175-115, Field Service Procedure for Baffle Bolt Replacement, Revision 3 | ||
WDI-STD-088, Underwater Remote Visual Examination of Reactor Vessel Internals, Revision 13 WDI-STD-1073, Ultrasonic Test Procedure for the Inspection of Internal Hex Head Baffle-Former Bolts with Welded Lock Bars, Revision 4 | WDI-STD-088, Underwater Remote Visual Examination of Reactor Vessel Internals, | ||
Revision 13 | |||
WDI-STD-1073, Ultrasonic Test Procedure for the Inspection of Internal Hex Head | |||
Baffle-Former Bolts with Welded Lock Bars, Revision 4 | |||
Condition Reports (CR-IP2) | Condition Reports (CR-IP2) | ||
2016-02081 | 2016-02081 | ||
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders | |||
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders | |||
442412-13 | 442412-13 | ||
Miscellaneous Indian Point Unit 2 Baffle Bolt Ultrasonic Examination Expanded Analysis Report, dated April 28, 2016 IP2 Reactor Vessel Visual Examination Report, dated May 2006 | Miscellaneous | ||
Indian Point Unit 2 Baffle Bolt Ultrasonic Examination Expanded Analysis Report, dated | |||
April 28, 2016 | |||
IP2 Reactor Vessel Visual Examination Report, dated May 2006 | |||
Loose Parts Inventory Log for Baffle Bolt Replacements, dated May 24, 2016 | Loose Parts Inventory Log for Baffle Bolt Replacements, dated May 24, 2016 | ||
MRP-227-A, Materials Reliability Program: Pressurized Water Reactor Internals Inspection and Evaluation Guidelines (ML120170453) MRP-228, Materials Reliability Program: Inspection Standard for PWR Internals - 2012 Update, Revision 1 SEP-ISI-IP2-001, IP2 Fourth Ten-Year Interval Inservice Inspection (ISI)/Containment Inservice Inspection (CISI) Program Plan, Revision 2 WDI-PJF-1315504-EPP-001, Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant MRP-227-A Reactor Vessel Internals Examination Program Plan, Revision 0 WDI-PJF-1315505-FSR-001, Indian Point Unit 2 2R22 MRP-227-A Baffle-Former Bolt Ultrasonic Inspections Field Service Report, dated March 29, 2016 WDI-TJ-1100, Technical Justification for the Ultrasonic Inspection of Baffle-Former Bolts for Indian Point Units 2 and 3, Revision 1 | MRP-227-A, Materials Reliability Program: Pressurized Water Reactor Internals Inspection and | ||
Evaluation Guidelines (ML120170453) | |||
MRP-228, Materials Reliability Program: Inspection Standard for PWR Internals - 2012 Update, | |||
Revision 1 | |||
SEP-ISI-IP2-001, IP2 Fourth Ten-Year Interval Inservice Inspection (ISI)/Containment Inservice | |||
Inspection (CISI) Program Plan, Revision 2 | |||
WDI-PJF-1315504-EPP-001, Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant MRP-227-A Reactor Vessel | |||
Internals Examination Program Plan, Revision 0 | |||
WDI-PJF-1315505-FSR-001, Indian Point Unit 2 2R22 MRP-227-A Baffle-Former Bolt | |||
Ultrasonic Inspections Field Service Report, dated March 29, 2016 | |||
WDI-TJ-1100, Technical Justification for the Ultrasonic Inspection of Baffle-Former Bolts for | |||
Indian Point Units 2 and 3, Revision 1 | |||
A-5 | |||
Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program | |||
Procedures | |||
2-AOP-480V-1, Loss of Normal Power to Any 480V Vital Bus, Revision 8 | |||
2-AOP-RCP-1, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction, Revision 14 | 2-AOP-RCP-1, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction, Revision 14 | ||
2-AOP-TURB-1, Main Turbine Trip without a Reactor Trip, Revision 5 | 2-AOP-TURB-1, Main Turbine Trip without a Reactor Trip, Revision 5 | ||
2-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Revision 7 | 2-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Revision 7 | ||
2-FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, Revision 11 | 2-FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, Revision 11 | ||
2-POP-1.2, Reactor Startup, Revision 59 2-SOP-26.4, Turbine Generator Startup, Synchronizing, Voltage Control and Shutdown, Revision 62 3-AOP-480V-1, Loss of Normal Power to Any Safeguards Bus, Revision 7 | 2-POP-1.2, Reactor Startup, Revision 59 | ||
2-SOP-26.4, Turbine Generator Startup, Synchronizing, Voltage Control and Shutdown, | |||
Revision 62 | |||
3-AOP-480V-1, Loss of Normal Power to Any Safeguards Bus, Revision 7 | |||
3-AOP-CVCS-1, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, Revision 8 | 3-AOP-CVCS-1, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, Revision 8 | ||
3-AOP-FW-1, Loss of Feedwater, Revision 8 3-AOP-INST-1, Instrument/Controller Failures, Revision 11 | 3-AOP-FW-1, Loss of Feedwater, Revision 8 | ||
3-AOP-INST-1, Instrument/Controller Failures, Revision 11 | |||
3-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Revision 6 | 3-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Revision 6 | ||
3-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Revision 4 | 3-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Revision 4 | ||
3-FR-C.2, Response to Degraded Core Cooling, Revision 3 | 3-FR-C.2, Response to Degraded Core Cooling, Revision 3 | ||
Condition Reports (CR-IP2) | |||
2016-03946 2016-04162 2016-04164 2016-04165 2016-04169 2016-04178 | 2016-03946 | ||
2016-04162 | |||
2016-04164 | |||
2016-04165 | |||
2016-04169 | |||
2016-04178 | |||
Condition Reports (CR-IP3) | |||
2016-01087 | |||
2016-01092 | |||
2016-01098 | |||
2016-01336 | |||
Miscellaneous | |||
13SX-LOR-SES026, Licensed Operator Requalification Program Scenario | |||
Emergency Action Level Table, Revision 15.2 | |||
LRQ-SES-04, IPEC Simulator Evaluated Scenario, Revision 6 | |||
Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness | |||
Procedures | |||
CEP-NDE-0640, Non-Section XI Liquid Penetrant Examination, Revision 9 | |||
CEP-WP-WIIR-1, Attachment 5.1, Inprocess Inspections for Installation and Replacement | |||
Welds Located Inside the ASME Section XI Boundary, Revision 3 | |||
EN-DC-206, Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Process, Revision 3 | |||
Condition Reports (CR-IP2) | |||
2010-00864 | |||
2013-03130 | |||
2014-00162 | |||
2014-00185 | |||
2014-01144 | |||
2014-02184 | |||
2015-00278 | |||
2016-01260 | |||
2016-01430 | |||
2016-01500 | |||
Condition Reports (CR-IP3) | Condition Reports (CR-IP3) | ||
2012-03836 | |||
2013-04758 | |||
2015-01396 | |||
2015-03404 | |||
2015-03653 | |||
2015-04053 | |||
2015-04162 | |||
2015-04184 | |||
2015-04539 | |||
2015-05316 | |||
2015-05384 | |||
2015-05729 | |||
A-6 | |||
2016-00098 | |||
2016-00653 | |||
2016-00723 | |||
2016-01189 | |||
2016-01227 | |||
2016-01274 | |||
2016-01313 | |||
2016-01531 | |||
2016-01536 | |||
2016-01543 | |||
2016-02432 | |||
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders | |||
WO 00397793 | |||
WO 00408019 | |||
WO 00414886 | |||
WO 00416091 | |||
WO 00421841 | |||
WO 00429532 | |||
WO 00429532 | |||
WO 00431497 | |||
WO 00446165 | |||
WO 00447042 | |||
WO 00447966 | |||
WO 52602429 | |||
WO 00446165 WO 00447042 WO 00447966 WO 52602429 | |||
WO 52621178 | WO 52621178 | ||
Miscellaneous | |||
Change IPEC Maintenance Rule Basis Document - Chemical and Volume Control System, Revision 0 | EC 65389, 21 CCW HX Leak Repair: Service Water Inlet Nozzle - Elbow Weld Configuration | ||
PQR 913, 134 F42 MN-GTAW ASME IX Welding Procedure Qualification Record, Revision 0 System Health Report, Unit 3, EDG, Q1-2016 | Change | ||
IPEC Maintenance Rule Basis Document - Chemical and Volume Control System, Revision 0 | |||
PQR 913, 134 F42 MN-GTAW ASME IX Welding Procedure Qualification Record, Revision 0 | |||
System Health Report, Unit 3, EDG, Q1-2016 | |||
Weld Map Number 447966-20-01, Revision 0 | Weld Map Number 447966-20-01, Revision 0 | ||
WPS 134 F42, MN-GTAW, ASME Section IX Welding Procedure Specification, Revision 0 | WPS 134 F42, MN-GTAW, ASME Section IX Welding Procedure Specification, Revision 0 | ||
Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control | |||
Procedures | |||
EN-OP-119, Protected Equipment, Revision 8 | EN-OP-119, Protected Equipment, Revision 8 | ||
IP-SMM-OU-104, Attachment 9.1, Shiftly Outage Shutdown Safety Assessments, Revision 15 | |||
IP-SMM-OU-104, Attachment 9.1, Shiftly | IP-SMM-OU-104, Attachment 9.2, Shiftly Outage Shutdown Safety Assessment Guidelines, | ||
Revision 15 | |||
IP-SMM-OU-104, Attachment 9.2, Shiftly | |||
Condition Reports (CR-IP2) | |||
Condition Reports (CR-IP2) | |||
2016-04141 | 2016-04141 | ||
Condition Reports (CR-IP3) | Condition Reports (CR-IP3) | ||
2016-01545 | 2016-01545 | ||
Miscellaneous EOOS Risk Assessment Software Tool | Miscellaneous | ||
Section 1R15: Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments | EOOS Risk Assessment Software Tool | ||
Section 1R15: Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments | |||
Procedures | |||
2-PC-R3-1, Pressurizer Level Transmitters, Revision 10 | |||
3-ARP-010, Metal Impact Monitoring System, Page 10, Revision 32 | 3-ARP-010, Metal Impact Monitoring System, Page 10, Revision 32 | ||
3-SOP-RCS-016, Operation of the Metal Impact Monitoring System, Revision 8 EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, Revision 10 | 3-SOP-RCS-016, Operation of the Metal Impact Monitoring System, Revision 8 | ||
EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, Revision 10 | |||
Condition Reports (CR-IP2) | |||
2016-2221 | |||
2016-2356 | |||
2016-2961 | |||
2016-3345 | |||
2016-3418 | |||
2016-3660 | |||
2016-3636 | |||
2016-3784 | |||
2016-3806 | |||
2016-3818 | |||
2016-4085 | |||
Condition Reports (CR-IP3) | |||
2014-01670 | |||
2015-03468 | |||
A-7 | |||
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders | |||
WO 00327574 | |||
WO 00425980 | |||
Miscellaneous | WO 52571030 | ||
EN-LI-100, Attachment 9.1, Change Channel Check Comparison Criteria/2-PT-M100, 2-PT-D001, Revision 0 | |||
Section 1R18: Plant Modifications | Miscellaneous | ||
Drawings 10073E87-001, Indian Point Unit 2 Baffle Bolt Replacement - Core Barrel and Baffle Assembly | EN-LI-100, Attachment 9.1, Change Channel Check Comparison Criteria/2-PT-M100, | ||
Elevation, Revision 0 10111D06, Indian Point Unit 2 Baffle Bolt Replacement - Replacement Baffle Bolt .625 | 2-PT-D001, Revision 0 | ||
Section 1R18: Plant Modifications | |||
Drawings | |||
10073E87-001, Indian Point Unit 2 Baffle Bolt Replacement - Core Barrel and Baffle Assembly | |||
Elevation, Revision 0 | |||
10111D06, Indian Point Unit 2 Baffle Bolt Replacement - Replacement Baffle Bolt .625 | |||
and .750, Revision 0 | and .750, Revision 0 | ||
Miscellaneous EC 64308, IP2 Reactor Vessel Equivalent Replacement Baffle-to-Former Bolt, Revision 0 | |||
Miscellaneous | |||
EC 64308, IP2 Reactor Vessel Equivalent Replacement Baffle-to-Former Bolt, Revision 0 | |||
Process Applicability Determination Form for EC 64308, dated April 21, 2016 | Process Applicability Determination Form for EC 64308, dated April 21, 2016 | ||
WCAP-18136-P, Replacement Type 316 Cold-Worked Baffle-Former Bolt Qualification for Indian Point Unit 2, Revision 0 | WCAP-18136-P, Replacement Type 316 Cold-Worked Baffle-Former Bolt Qualification for | ||
Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing | Indian Point Unit 2, Revision 0 | ||
Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing | |||
Procedures | |||
3-PT-M079B, 32 EDG Functional Test, Revision 52 | |||
2-PC-Q109-4, Recalibration of NIS and OT/OP Delta-T Parameters - Channel IV, Revision 44 | |||
Condition Reports (CR-IP2) | Condition Reports (CR-IP2) | ||
2016-03961 2016-04266 | 2016-03961 | ||
2016-04266 | |||
2016-01189 2016-01199 2016-01218 | Condition Reports (CR-IP3) | ||
2016-01189 | |||
2016-01199 | |||
2016-01218 | |||
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders WO 00414886 WO 00420649 WO 00446094 WO 00447966 | Maintenance Orders/Work Orders | ||
WO 52545181 WO 52626563 WO 52626564 WO 52630619 WO 52630620 WO 52658943 WO 00236158 WO 00277374 | WO 00414886 | ||
WO 00420649 | |||
WO 00446094 | |||
WO 00447966 | |||
WO 52545181 | |||
WO 52626563 | |||
WO 52626564 | |||
WO 52630619 | |||
WO 52630620 | |||
WO 52658943 | |||
WO 00236158 | |||
WO 00277374 | |||
WO 52571030 | WO 52571030 | ||
Drawings | |||
5651D72, Logic Diagrams Steam Generator Trip Signals, Revision 7 | |||
Miscellaneous | |||
EC 64545, Emergency Temporary Modification to Disconnect 32 EDG Generator Space Heater | |||
Adjacent to End Plate on Outboard End of Generator | |||
FIX00091, Pressurizer Level Uncertainty - Indication, Trip Setpoints, and Annunciation | |||
Setpoints, Revision 1 | |||
E-mail from J. Michetti to G. Newman, dated July 19, 2016, Subject: Westinghouse Report | |||
on E9 | |||
A-8 | |||
Section 1R20: Refueling and Other Outage Activities | |||
Procedures | |||
2-POP-1.1, Plant Heatup from Cold Shutdown, Revision 90 | |||
Procedures 2-POP-1.1, Plant Heatup from Cold Shutdown, Revision 90 | |||
2-POP-1.2, Reactor Startup, Revision 59 | 2-POP-1.2, Reactor Startup, Revision 59 | ||
2-POP-1.3, Plant Startup from Zero to 45 Percent Power, Revision 89 | 2-POP-1.3, Plant Startup from Zero to 45 Percent Power, Revision 89 | ||
2-POP-3.1, Plant Shutdown from 45 Percent Power, Revision 58 | 2-POP-3.1, Plant Shutdown from 45 Percent Power, Revision 58 | ||
2-POP-3.3, Plant Cooldown, Hot to Cold Shutdown, Revision 81 | 2-POP-3.3, Plant Cooldown, Hot to Cold Shutdown, Revision 81 | ||
2-POP-3.4, Secondary Plant Shutdown, Revision 10 2-POP-4.1, Operation at Cold Shutdown, Revision 5 2-POP-4.2, Operation Below 20 Percent Pressurizer Level with Fuel in the Reactor, Revision 8 | 2-POP-3.4, Secondary Plant Shutdown, Revision 10 | ||
2-POP-4.1, Operation at Cold Shutdown, Revision 5 | |||
2-POP-4.2, Operation Below 20 Percent Pressurizer Level with Fuel in the Reactor, Revision 8 | |||
2-POP-4.3, Operation without Fuel in the Reactor, Revision 1 | 2-POP-4.3, Operation without Fuel in the Reactor, Revision 1 | ||
Condition Reports (CR-IP2-) | Condition Reports (CR-IP2-) | ||
2016-04118 2016-04119 2016-04123 2016-03124 2016-04126 2016-04129 | 2016-04118 | ||
2016-04130 2016-04131 2016-04132 2016-04139 2016-04141* 2016-04142* | 2016-04119 | ||
2016-04144 2016-04145 2016-04146 2016-04148* 2016-04151 2016-04152 | 2016-04123 | ||
2016-03124 | |||
2016-04155 2016-04161 2016-04162 2016-04165 2016-04169 | 2016-04126 | ||
2016-04129 | |||
2016-04130 | |||
2016-04131 | |||
2016-04132 | |||
2016-04139 | |||
2016-04141* 2016-04142* | |||
2016-04144 | |||
2016-04145 | |||
2016-04146 | |||
2016-04148* 2016-04151 | |||
2016-04152 | |||
2016-04155 | |||
2016-04161 | |||
2016-04162 | |||
2016-04165 | |||
2016-04169 | |||
*NRC identified | |||
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders | Maintenance Orders/Work Orders | ||
52681465 | 52681465 | ||
Miscellaneous 2R22 Performance Indicator Curves Daily from March 7 to June 14, 2016 | Miscellaneous | ||
2R22 Performance Indicator Curves Daily from March 7 to June 14, 2016 | |||
Outage Schedules and Plans of the Day from March 7 to June 14, 2016 | Outage Schedules and Plans of the Day from March 7 to June 14, 2016 | ||
Westinghouse LTR-PL-16-16, Operability Assessment for Primary Side Loose Parts at Indian | Westinghouse LTR-PL-16-16, Operability Assessment for Primary Side Loose Parts at Indian | ||
Point Unit 2, Revision 0, dated March 27, 2016 | Point Unit 2, Revision 0, dated March 27, 2016 | ||
Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing | Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing | ||
Procedures | |||
0-SOP-LEAKRATE-001, RCS Leakrate Surveillance Evaluation and Leak Identification, | |||
Revision 6 | |||
2-PT-D001, Control Room Operations Surveillance Requirements, Revision 16 | |||
2-PT-M029B, 22 Safety Injection Pump, Revision 20 | |||
2-PT-Q013, Inservice Valve Tests, Revision 51 | |||
2-PT-Q013-DS040, Valve 887B Inservice Test Data Sheet, Revision 22 | 2-PT-Q013-DS040, Valve 887B Inservice Test Data Sheet, Revision 22 | ||
3-PT-M079B, 32 EDG Functional Test, Revision 52 | 3-PT-M079B, 32 EDG Functional Test, Revision 52 | ||
Condition Reports (CR-IP2) | |||
2016-03360 2016-03363 | 2016-03360 | ||
2016-03363 | |||
Condition Reports (CR-IP3) | Condition Reports (CR-IP3) | ||
2016-01716 2016-01752 | 2016-01716 | ||
2016-01752 | |||
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders | |||
WO 00443040 | |||
WO 00446385 | |||
WO 00446867 | |||
WO 52681652-01 | |||
WO 52681646-01 | WO 52681646-01 | ||
A-9 | |||
Miscellaneous | |||
Section 1EP6: Drill Evaluation | EC 64855, EC Reply to Provide Input Regarding MPR Maintenance Bulletin MB-2007-01 for | ||
Procedures IP-EP-120, Emergency Classification, Revision 10 IP-EP-410, Protective Action Recommendations, Revision 11 | Auto Voltage Regulator Solder Joints | ||
MB-2007-01, Potential for Solder Joint Cracks on Basler SBSR Auto Voltage Regulator Cards | |||
and Technical Manual Addendum TM-2007-01, November 5, 2007 | |||
Procedures | Unit 3 RCS Routine Activity Sample, 28-June-16-10006 | ||
Section 1EP6: Drill Evaluation | |||
Procedures | |||
IP-EP-120, Emergency Classification, Revision 10 | |||
IP-EP-410, Protective Action Recommendations, Revision 11 | |||
Section 2RS7: Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program | |||
Procedures | |||
0-CY-1920, REMP Land Use Census, Revision 1 | 0-CY-1920, REMP Land Use Census, Revision 1 | ||
0-CY-1980, Preparation, Placement and Collection of Site Environmental Thermoluminescent | 0-CY-1980, Preparation, Placement and Collection of Site Environmental Thermoluminescent | ||
Dosimeters, Revision 2 | Dosimeters, Revision 2 | ||
Condition Reports (CR-IP2) | |||
2014-05319 2015-00948 2015-01300 2015-02687 2015-02800 2015-02987 | Condition Reports (CR-IP2) | ||
2014-05319 | |||
2015-03271 2015-03396 2016-02313 | 2015-00948 | ||
2015-01300 | |||
2015-02687 | |||
2015-02800 | |||
2015-02987 | |||
2015-03271 | |||
2015-03396 | |||
2016-02313 | |||
Condition Reports (CR-IP3) | Condition Reports (CR-IP3) | ||
2016-00514 | 2016-00514 | ||
Miscellaneous 2014 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report, Indian Point Nos. 1, 2, and 3 | Miscellaneous | ||
2015 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report, Indian Point Nos. 1, 2, and 3 Environmental Dosimetry Company, Annual Quality Assurance Status Report, January to December 2015 Indian Point Energy Center ODCM, Revision 4 | 2014 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report, Indian Point Nos. 1, 2, and 3 | ||
2015 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report, Indian Point Nos. 1, 2, and 3 | |||
Environmental Dosimetry Company, Annual Quality Assurance Status Report, | |||
January to December 2015 | |||
Indian Point Energy Center ODCM, Revision 4 | |||
June 2015 to May 2016 Meteorological Data Recovery | June 2015 to May 2016 Meteorological Data Recovery | ||
Met One Instruments, Inc. Certificates of Calibration for Temperature, Wind Direction, and Wind | Met One Instruments, Inc. Certificates of Calibration for Temperature, Wind Direction, and Wind | ||
Speed Teledyne Brown Engineering Environmental | Speed | ||
Teledyne Brown Engineering Environmental Services Annual 2015 Quality Assurance Report | |||
Exelon PowerLabs Certificates of Calibration for Gas Meters | Exelon PowerLabs Certificates of Calibration for Gas Meters | ||
3471875 3482909 3471871 3471867 3482920 3471873 | 3471875 | ||
3482909 | |||
3471871 | |||
3471867 | |||
3482920 | |||
3471873 | |||
3482910 | |||
3482916 | |||
3471877 | |||
3482914 | |||
3482918 | |||
3482921 | |||
3471881 | |||
3471879 | |||
3471872 | |||
3471869 | |||
3471880 | |||
3482908 | |||
Quality Assurance | |||
Quality Assurance Audit Report QA-2-6-2015-IP-1, Chemistry, Effluents, and Environmental | |||
Monitoring Snapshot Self-Assessment, LO-IP3LO-2015-00126, Chemistry-REMP | |||
Section 4OA2: Problem Identification and Resolution | |||
Procedures | |||
EN-DC-204, Maintenance Rule Scope and Basis, Revision 3 | |||
EN-DC-204, Maintenance Rule Scope and Basis, Revision 3 | |||
EN-DC-207, Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment, Revision 3 | |||
A-10 | |||
EN-LI-102, Corrective Action Program, Revision 26 | |||
EN-LI-104, Self-Assessment and Benchmark Process, Revision 11 | |||
EN-LI-110-01, Equipment Failure Evaluation, Revision 0 | EN-LI-110-01, Equipment Failure Evaluation, Revision 0 | ||
EN-LI-119, Apparent Cause Evaluation Process, Revision 11 EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, Revision 10 | EN-LI-119, Apparent Cause Evaluation Process, Revision 11 | ||
EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, Revision 10 | |||
Condition Reports (CR-IP2) | Condition Reports (CR-IP2) | ||
2010-07013 2015-04574 2015-05458 2015-05460 2015-05461 2015-05464 | 2010-07013 | ||
2015-04574 | |||
2015-05466 2015-05467 2016-01374 2016-02348 | 2015-05458 | ||
Condition Reports (CR-IP3) 2015-3628 2016-01035 2016-01961 | 2015-05460 | ||
2015-05461 | |||
2015-05464 | |||
2015-05466 | |||
2015-05467 | |||
2016-01374 | |||
2016-02348 | |||
Condition Reports (CR-IP3) | |||
2015-3628 | |||
2016-01035 | |||
2016-01961 | |||
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders | Maintenance Orders/Work Orders | ||
WO 00442412 | WO 00442412 | ||
Apparent Cause Evaluations | Apparent Cause Evaluations | ||
IP2-2015-05458 | IP2-2015-05458 | ||
Drawings | |||
504405, Sheet 1 of 2, Replacement Baffle Bolt Location Matrix, Revision 0 | |||
504405, Sheet 2 of 2, Replacement Baffle Bolt Location Matrix, Revision 0 | 504405, Sheet 2 of 2, Replacement Baffle Bolt Location Matrix, Revision 0 | ||
Miscellaneous | |||
61265, Temporary Modification Control Form-Install Additional Temporary Spare Power Supply | |||
Inside Rod Control Cabinet 2BD to Restore Margin, Revision 0 | |||
Appendix A to Facility Operating License DPR-64, Technical Specifications and Basis For The | |||
Indian Point 3 Nuclear Generating Station Unit No.3, Through Amendment 260 | |||
CN-RIDA-15-43, Indian Point Units 2 and 3 Acceptable Baffle-Former Bolting LOCA and | |||
Seismic Analysis, Revision 2 | |||
Engineering Change 63938, As-left condition of the baffle-former plate assembly following the | |||
replacement of degraded bolts, Revision 0 | |||
EPRI TR-112209, Analysis of Baffle Former Bolt Cracking in EDF CPO Plants (PWRMRP-03), | |||
dated June 1999 | |||
Indian Point Entergy Center (IPEC) Unit 3, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, dated May | |||
2013 | |||
IP-RPT-16-00025, Evaluation of Indian Point Unit 3 Reactor Core Baffle Bolting Following MRP- | |||
227-A Inspection Findings at Indian Point Unit 2 during 2R22, Revision 0 | |||
LO-IP3LO-2015-72 | |||
LTR-PL-16-21, Transmittal of Indian Point Unit 3 Final Engineering Evaluations Supporting | |||
Extent of Condition Review, Revision 0 | |||
LTR-RIDA-16-103, Indian Point Unit 2 Baffle Bolting Anti-Clustering Pattern and Margin | |||
Assessment, Revision 0 | |||
LTR-RIDA-16-152, Indian Point Unit 3 Baffle Bolt Leak Before Break Operability Assessment, | |||
Revision 0 | |||
LTR-RIDA-16-60, Indian Point Unit 2 Baffle Bolting One Cycle Replacement Pattern Summary | |||
Letter, Revision 0 | |||
MRP-227-A, Materials Reliability Program: Pressurized Water Reactor Internals Inspection and | |||
Evaluation Guidelines (ML120170453) | |||
Operation Decision Making Issue Action Plan for IP3 Baffle Bolt Monitoring, dated May 19, 2016 | |||
WCAP-15029-NP-A, Westinghouse Methodology for Evaluating the Acceptability of Baffle- | |||
Former-Barrel Bolting Distributions Under Faulted Load Conditions, Revision 0 | |||
(ML15222A882) | |||
A-11 | |||
WCAP-17949-P, Background and Technical Basis Supporting Engineering Flaw Acceptance | |||
Criteria for Indian Point Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Internals MRP-227-A Primary and | |||
Expansion Components, Revision 1 | |||
WCAP-18048-P, Determination of Acceptable Baffle-Former Bolting for Indian Point Units 2 and | |||
Expansion Components, Revision 1 WCAP-18048-P, Determination of Acceptable Baffle-Former Bolting for Indian Point Units 2 and | |||
3, Revision 0 | 3, Revision 0 | ||
Section 4OA5: Other Activities | |||
Section 4OA5: Other Activities | |||
Miscellaneous | Miscellaneous | ||
INPO Letter, INPO Equipment | INPO Letter, INPO Equipment Reliability Scram Review Visit, May 31, 2016 | ||
Root Cause Evaluation for CR-IP2-2016-00564 | |||
A-12 | |||
A-12 | |||
Code of Federal Regulations ADAMS Agencywide Document Access and Management System ALARA as low as is reasonably achievable | |||
AVR automatic voltage regulator | |||
CAP corrective action program | LIST OF ACRONYMS | ||
CCW component cooling water | |||
CR condition report | 10 CFR | ||
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations | |||
ECCS emergency core cooling system | ADAMS | ||
EDG emergency diesel generator | Agencywide Document Access and Management System | ||
GPI groundwater protection initiative IASCC irradiation-assisted stress-corrosion cracking IMC Inspection Manual Chapter | ALARA | ||
INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operations | as low as is reasonably achievable | ||
LER licensee event report | AVR | ||
LOCA loss-of-coolant accident MBFP main boiler feedwater pump MCC motor control center | automatic voltage regulator | ||
MOV motor operated valve | CAP | ||
MRP materials reliability program | corrective action program | ||
MW monitoring well | CCW | ||
NCV non-cited violation NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S. ODCM offsite dose calculation manual | component cooling water | ||
OOS out of service | CR | ||
PAB primary auxiliary building | condition report | ||
PFP pre-fire plan RCS reactor coolant system REMP radiological environmental monitoring program | CVCS | ||
RFO refueling outage | chemical and volume control system | ||
RW recovery well | EC | ||
SI safety injection | engineering change | ||
SSC structure, system, and component TS technical specification UFSAR updated final safety evaluation report | ECCS | ||
URI unresolved item | emergency core cooling system | ||
UT ultrasonic testing | EDG | ||
WO work order | emergency diesel generator | ||
GPI | |||
groundwater protection initiative | |||
IASCC | |||
irradiation-assisted stress-corrosion cracking | |||
IMC | |||
Inspection Manual Chapter | |||
INPO | |||
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations | |||
LER | |||
licensee event report | |||
LOCA | |||
loss-of-coolant accident | |||
MBFP | |||
main boiler feedwater pump | |||
MCC | |||
motor control center | |||
MOV | |||
motor operated valve | |||
MRP | |||
materials reliability program | |||
MW | |||
monitoring well | |||
NCV | |||
non-cited violation | |||
NRC | |||
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S. | |||
ODCM | |||
offsite dose calculation manual | |||
OOS | |||
out of service | |||
PAB | |||
primary auxiliary building | |||
PFP | |||
pre-fire plan | |||
RCS | |||
reactor coolant system | |||
REMP | |||
radiological environmental monitoring program | |||
RFO | |||
refueling outage | |||
RW | |||
recovery well | |||
SI | |||
safety injection | |||
SSC | |||
structure, system, and component | |||
TS | |||
technical specification | |||
UFSAR | |||
updated final safety evaluation report | |||
URI | |||
unresolved item | |||
UT | |||
ultrasonic testing | |||
WO | |||
work order | |||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 20:40, 9 January 2025
| ML16243A245 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point |
| Issue date: | 08/30/2016 |
| From: | Glenn Dentel Reactor Projects Branch 2 |
| To: | Vitale A Entergy Nuclear Operations |
| References | |
| IR 2016002 | |
| Download: ML16243A245 (54) | |
See also: IR 05000247/2016002
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
2100 RENAISSANCE BLVD.
KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-2713
August 30, 2016
Mr. Anthony J. Vitale
Site Vice President
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
Indian Point Energy Center
450 Broadway, GSB
P.O. Box 249
Buchanan, NY 10511-0249
SUBJECT:
INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING - INTEGRATED INSPECTION
REPORT 05000247/2016002 AND 05000286/2016002
Dear Mr. Vitale:
On June 30, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at
your Indian Point Nuclear Generating (Indian Point), Units 2 and 3. The enclosed inspection
report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on August 4, 2016, with Larry
Coyle and other members of your staff. Based on additional information provided, the
inspectors conducted an updated exit meeting on August 30, 2016 with John Kirkpatrick, Plant
Operations General Manager and other members of your staff.
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
personnel.
This report documents three NRC-identified findings of very low safety significance (Green).
These findings involved violations of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low
safety significance, and because they are entered into your corrective action program, the NRC
is treating these findings as non-cited violations, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC
Enforcement Policy. If you contest any non-cited violation in this report, you should provide a
response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC
20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of
Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the
NRC Senior Resident Inspector at Indian Point. In addition, if you disagree with the
cross-cutting aspect assigned to any finding in this report, you should provide a response within
30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the
Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at Indian Point.
A. Vitale
-2-
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390 of the NRCs
Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be
available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the
Publicly Available Records component of the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Glenn T. Dentel, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos.
50-247 and 50-286
License Nos. DPR-26 and DPR-64
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000247/2016002 and 05000286/2016002
w/Attachment: Supplementary Information
cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ
SUNSI Review
Non-Sensitive
Sensitive
Publicly Available
Non-Publicly Available
OFFICE
RI/DRP
RI/DRP
RI/DRS
RI/DRP
RI/DRP
NAME
BHaagensen/bh
NFloyd/nf
MGray/mg
GDentel/gtd
MScott/dlp for
DATE
8/29/16
8/24/16
8/30/16
8/30/16
8/30/16
1
Enclosure
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Docket Nos.
50-247 and 50-286
License Nos.
Report Nos.
05000247/2016002 and 05000286/2016002
Licensee:
Entergy Nuclear Northeast (Entergy)
Facility:
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3
Location:
450 Broadway, GSB
Buchanan, NY 10511-0249
Dates:
April 1, 2016, through June 30, 2016
Inspectors:
B. Haagensen, Senior Resident Inspector
G. Newman, Resident Inspector
S. Rich, Resident Inspector
S. Galbreath, Reactor Inspector
J. Furia, Senior Health Physicist
N. Floyd, Senior Project Engineer
K. Mangan, Senior Reactor Inspector
J. Poehler, Senior Materials Engineer
Approved By:
Glenn T. Dentel, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................... 3
REPORT DETAILS ....................................................................................................................... 5
1.
REACTOR SAFETY .............................................................................................................. 5
1R04
Equipment Alignment .................................................................................................. 5
1R05
Fire Protection ............................................................................................................. 6
1R07
Heat Sink Performance ............................................................................................... 7
1R08
Inservice Inspection Activities ..................................................................................... 7
1R11
Licensed Operator Requalification Program ............................................................... 8
1R12
Maintenance Effectiveness ....................................................................................... 10
1R13
Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control .................................. 13
1R15
Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments ..................................... 14
1R18
Plant Modifications .................................................................................................... 19
1R19
Post-Maintenance Testing ........................................................................................ 20
1R20
Refueling and Other Outage Activities ...................................................................... 21
1R22
Surveillance Testing .................................................................................................. 24
1EP6
Drill Evaluation .......................................................................................................... 25
2.
RADIATION SAFETY .......................................................................................................... 25
2RS1
Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls ........................................ 25
2RS2
Occupational As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning
and Controls .............................................................................................................. 26
2RS7
Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) ........................................ 26
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES ............................................................................................................ 27
4OA1
Performance Indicator Verification ............................................................................ 27
4OA2
Problem Identification and Resolution ....................................................................... 28
4OA3
Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion .................................... 34
4OA5
Other Activities .......................................................................................................... 37
4OA6
Meetings, Including Exit ............................................................................................ 39
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION ........................................................................................ A-1
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT .................................................................................................... A-1
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED ..................................... A-2
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED ........................................................................................ A-3
LIST OF ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................. A-12
3
SUMMARY
Inspection Report 05000247/2016002 and 05000286/2016002; 04/01/2016 - 06/30/2016; Indian
Point Nuclear Generating (Indian Point), Units 2 and 3; Operability Determinations and
Functionality Assessments, Refueling and Other Outage Activities, and Follow Up of Events and
Notices of Enforcement Discretion.
This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced
inspections performed by regional inspectors. The inspectors identified three findings of very
low safety significance (Green), which were non-cited violations (NCVs). The significance of
most findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red)
and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination
Process, dated April 29, 2015. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310,
Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas, dated December 4, 2014. All violations of
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements are dispositioned in accordance with
the NRCs Enforcement Policy, dated February 4, 2015. The NRCs program for overseeing the
safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor
Oversight Process, Revision 6.
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
Green. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V,
"Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," because Entergy did not adequately accomplish
the actions prescribed by procedure EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, for a
degraded condition associated with the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts. Specifically, Entergy
incorrectly concluded that no degraded or non-conforming condition existed related to the
Unit 3 baffle-former bolts and exited the operability determination procedure. Entergy
subsequently performed the remaining steps in the procedure and provided appropriate
justification for their plans to examine the baffle-former bolts at the next Unit 3 refueling
outage (RFO). Entergys immediate corrective actions included entering the issue into its
corrective action program (CAP) as CR-IP3-2016-01961 and documenting an operability
evaluation to support the basis for operability of the baffle-former bolts and the emergency
core cooling system (ECCS).
This performance deficiency is more than minor because it was associated with the
equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the
cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that
respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). In
accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 2 of
IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power,
issued June 19, 2012, the inspectors screened the finding for safety significance and
determined it to be of very low safety significance (Green), because the finding did not
represent an actual loss of system or function. After inspector questioning, Entergy
performed an operability evaluation, which provided sufficient bases to conclude the Unit 3
baffle assembly would support ECCS operability. This finding is related to the cross-cutting
aspect of Problem Identification and Resolution, Operating Experience, because Entergy did
not effectively evaluate relevant internal and external operating experience. Specifically,
Entergy did not adequately evaluate the impact of degraded baffle bolts at Unit 3 when
relevant operating experience was identified at Unit 2. [P.5 - Operating Experience]
(Section 1R15)
4
Green. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1,
Procedures, for Entergys failure to implement procedure OAP-007, Containment Entry
and Egress. Specifically, workers transiting the inner and outer crane wall sections of
containment failed to maintain at least one (of two) flow channeling gate closed to ensure
availability of the containment sumps to provide suction for the ECCS. Entergy immediately
coached the gate monitor and restored the gates to an acceptable position. Entergy
generated CR-IP2-2016-04036 to address this issue.
This performance deficiency is more than minor because it was associated with the
configuration control (shutdown equipment lineup) attribute of the Mitigating Systems
cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and
capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences
(i.e., core damage). A detailed risk assessment was conducted and determined that the
change in core damage frequency was determined to be 7E-9, therefore, this issue
represents a Green finding. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human
Performance, Avoid Complacency, because Entergy did not consider potential undesired
consequences of actions before performing work and implement appropriate error-reduction
tools. Specifically, the work crew did not understand the requirements and potential
consequences prior to commencing work and the gate monitor did not enforce these
requirements to maintain at least one gate locked or pinned closed as required by OAP-007.
[H.12 - Avoid Complacency] (Section 1R20)
Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity
Green. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(b)(1) for Entergys failure to
include a function of a safety-related system within the scope of the maintenance rule
program. Specifically, Entergy failed to include the feedwater isolation function performed
by the main boiler feedwater pumps (MBFPs) discharge valves, MBFPs, and feedwater
regulating valves, which are required to remain functional during and following a design
basis event to mitigate the consequence of the accident within the scope of the maintenance
rule monitoring program. Entergy initiated corrective actions to include the feedwater
isolation function performed by the MBFP discharge valves, MBFPs, and feedwater
regulating valves within the maintenance rule monitoring program. Entergy entered this
issue into the CAP as CR-IP2-2016-03963.
This performance deficiency is more than minor because it was associated with barrier
performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the
cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect
the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the failure
to properly scope the feedwater isolation function prevented Entergy from identifying that
equipment reliability was no longer effectively controlled through preventive maintenance.
In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, issued
June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance
(Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical
integrity of reactor containment, containment isolation system, and heat removal
components. This finding does not have a cross-cutting aspect since the failure to scope
this equipment into the maintenance rule program was not recognized when Entergy
combined the maintenance rule basis documents for Units 2 and 3 in 2012 and, as a result,
is not indicative of current licensee performance. (Section 4OA3)
5
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 2 began the inspection period during RFO 2R22 which lasted 102 days. Upon completion
of the outage, the operators restarted Unit 2 on June 14, 2016, and increased power slowly to
93 percent for fuel preconditioning. On June 23, 2016, the operators shutdown the reactor to
repair a service water leak on the 21 component cooling water (CCW) heat exchanger (Hx) inlet
line and replace switchyard breaker 9. Unit 2 returned to 100 percent power on June 29, 2016.
Unit 2 remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.
Unit 3 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On April 26, 2016, a failed controller
caused both heater drain pumps to trip; and the operators reduced power rapidly, stabilizing the
unit at 48 percent power. Operators returned Unit 3 to 100 percent power on April 27, 2016,
and remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.
1.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R04 Equipment Alignment
Partial System Walkdowns (71111.04Q - 5 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems:
Unit 2
Spent fuel pool cooling system following core offload on May 19, 2016
Shutdown cooling system following core reload on June 6, 2016
CCW system following maintenance on June 28, 2016
Unit 3
32 emergency diesel generator (EDG) following maintenance on May 9, 2016 (this
sample was part of an in-depth review of the EDG system)
Residual heat removal pumps following CCW system testing on May 20, 2016
The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the
reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed
applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the updated final safety analysis
report (UFSAR), TSs, work orders (WOs), condition reports (CRs), and the impact of
ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions
that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The
inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify
system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable.
The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed
operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The
6
inspectors also reviewed whether Entergy had properly identified equipment issues and
entered them into the CAP for resolution with the appropriate significance
characterization. Documents reviewed for each section of this inspection report are
listed in the Attachment.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
Resident Inspector Quarterly Walkdowns (71111.05Q - 6 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted tours of the areas listed below to assess the material
condition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that
Entergy controlled combustible materials and ignition sources in accordance with
administrative procedures. The inspectors verified that fire protection and suppression
equipment were available for use as specified in the area pre-fire plan (PFP) and
passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition. The inspectors also
verified that station personnel implemented compensatory measures for out-of-service
(OOS), degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment, as applicable, in accordance
with procedures.
Unit 2
Containment, 95-foot elevation, during baffle bolt repair activities with hot work in
progress (PFP-203 was reviewed) on June 2, 2016
Residual heat removal pump rooms in primary auxiliary building (PAB), 15-foot
elevation (PFP-204 was reviewed), on June 6, 2016
CCW pump room, 68-foot elevation (PFP-209 was reviewed), on June 25, 2016
PAB, 80-foot elevation, CCW heat exchanger area with hot work in progress
(PFP-211 was reviewed) on June 25, 2016
Unit 3
32 EDG room, 10-foot elevation (PFP-354 was reviewed), on May 9, 2016
480V switchgear room, 15-foot elevation (PFP-351 was reviewed), on June 30, 2016
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
7
1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07A - 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the 32 EDG jacket water and lube oil heat exchanger to
determine its readiness and availability to perform its safety functions. The inspectors
reviewed the design basis for the component and verified Entergys commitments to
NRC Generic Letter 89-13, Service Water System Requirements Affecting
Safety-Related Equipment. The inspectors observed the annual cleaning and
inspection of the heat exchangers and reviewed the results of previous inspections of
the Unit 3 EDG heat exchangers. The inspectors discussed the results of the most
recent inspection with engineering staff. The inspectors verified that Entergy initiated
appropriate corrective actions for identified deficiencies. The inspectors also verified
that the number of tubes plugged within the heat exchanger did not exceed the
maximum amount allowed.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities (71111.08P - 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
Inspectors from the NRC Region I Office, specializing in materials and inservice
examination activities, observed portions of Entergys activities involving baffle-former
bolt examinations and replacements during Unit 2 RFO 2R22. The inspectors reviewed
work documentation and examination procedures and results, and discussed these
activities with Entergy. The inspectors were on-site from April 27 to April 28, 2016, and
on May 23, 2016. The inspectors verified that Entergy completed baffle-former bolt
examinations in accordance with their approved procedures which implemented
activities described in the Materials Reliability Program (MRP)-227-A, Pressurized
Water Reactor Internals Inspection and Evaluation Guidelines, as they relate to this
component. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the results of the visual and volumetric
examinations of the baffle-former bolts, including capabilities, limitations, and
acceptance criteria that were performed during the current RFO.
Non-Destructive Examination Activities
The inspectors reviewed the ultrasonic testing (UT) procedure used for the examination
of the Unit 2 baffle-former bolts to verify the procedure was in accordance with the
applicable guidance in MRP-227-A and MRP-228. The inspectors reviewed the UT data
records and the detailed UT channel analysis for a sample of baffle-former bolts to verify
the examinations and evaluations were performed in accordance with approved
procedures and applicable guidance. The inspectors reviewed video recordings of the
visual examinations of the baffle-former bolts during the current RFO. The inspectors
also reviewed recorded video of visual examinations performed in 2006 at Unit 2,
completed as part of the existing inservice inspection program for the 10-year reactor
vessel examinations, to independently assess the past conditions of the baffle-former
bolts and assembly.
8
The inspectors reviewed certifications of the UT technicians performing the ultrasonic
examinations to verify the examinations were performed by qualified individuals and to
verify the results were reviewed and evaluated by certified level III non-destructive
examination personnel.
Baffle-Former Bolt Replacement Activities
The inspectors reviewed the baffle-former bolt replacement activities performed as part
of a corrective action to resolve the degraded condition identified at Unit 2. The
inspectors observed a sample of in-process bolt removal activities, which included lock
bar milling and bolt hole machining. The inspectors reviewed the documentation for
in-process and completed bolt installation activities and verified that loose parts
generated as part of the bolt replacements were properly tracked. The inspectors
verified that bolt replacement activities were performed in accordance with approved
procedures. The inspectors also reviewed the Engineering Change (EC) package
associated with the new baffle-former bolt design. This review is documented in
Section 1R18 of this report. After completion of the bolt replacement activities, the
inspectors reviewed the video of the final visual examination of the baffle assembly to
verify that the baffle-former bolt work was accomplished as planned and that there were
no visual indications of deficiencies.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Update to URI 05000247/2016001-01, Baffle-Former Bolts with Identified Anomalies
This inspection was conducted to follow-up on NRC Unresolved Item (URI)05000247/2016001-01, Baffle-Former Bolts with Identified Anomalies, to determine
whether there was a performance deficiency associated with the degraded baffle-former
bolt condition discovered at Unit 2. The inspectors plan to review additional technical
information from Entergy as it becomes available, including any revisions to the root
cause evaluation. The URI remains open until review of this additional information is
completed. (URI 05000247/2016001-01, Baffle-Former Bolts with Identified
Anomalies)
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11Q - 5 samples)
Unit 2
.1
Quarterly Review of Unit 2 Licensed Operator Requalification Testing and Training
(71111.11Q - 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed Unit 2 licensed operator simulator training on May 24, 2016,
which included reactor coolant pump seal failure with loss of normal heat sink requiring
implementation of feed and bleed cooling. The inspectors evaluated operator
performance during the simulated event and verified completion of risk significant
operator actions, including the use of abnormal and emergency operating procedures.
The inspectors assessed the clarity and effectiveness of communications,
9
implementation of actions in response to alarms and degrading plant conditions, and the
oversight and direction provided by the control room supervisor. The inspectors verified
the accuracy and timeliness of the emergency classification made by the shift manager
and the TS action statements entered by the shift technical advisor. Additionally, the
inspectors assessed the ability of the crew and training staff to identify and document
crew performance problems.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2
Quarterly Review of Unit 3 Licensed Operator Requalification Testing and Training
(71111.11Q - 1 sample)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed a Unit 3 licensed operator simulator requalification training
evaluated scenario on May 24, 2016, which included failure of a pressurizer pressure
instrument, charging pump trip, loss of 480V safety bus 5A, a small break loss-of-coolant
accident (LOCA), and entry into FR-C.2 core cooling. The inspectors evaluated operator
performance during the simulated event and verified completion of risk significant
operator actions, including the use of abnormal and emergency operating procedures.
The inspectors assessed the clarity and effectiveness of communications,
implementation of actions in response to alarms and degrading plant conditions, and the
oversight and direction provided by the control room supervisor. The inspectors verified
the accuracy and timeliness of the emergency classification made by the shift manager
and the TS action statements entered by the shift technical advisor. Additionally, the
inspectors assessed the ability of the crew and training staff to identify and document
crew performance problems.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.3
Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance (71111.11Q - 3 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a focused observation of operator performance in the main
control room. The inspectors observed pre-job briefings and control room
communications to verify they met the criteria specified in Entergys administrative
procedure EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations. Additionally, the inspectors observed
restoration activities to verify that procedure use, crew communications, and
coordination of activities between work groups similarly met established expectations
and standards.
10
Unit 2
Plant startup from RFO 2R22 on June 16, 2016 including response to a turbine trip
without a reactor trip and the subsequent turbine-generator synchronization and
transfer of plant electrical loads from offsite power to the unit auxiliary transformer.
Reactor startup and grid synchronization conducted on June 27, 2016.
Unit 3
Operator response to the feedwater transient which occurred on April 26, 2016
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12Q - 4 samples)
.1
Routine Maintenance Effectiveness
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the samples listed below to assess the effectiveness of
maintenance activities on SSCs performance and reliability. The inspectors reviewed
system health reports, CAP documents, maintenance WOs, and maintenance rule basis
documents to ensure that Entergy was identifying and properly evaluating performance
problems within the scope of the maintenance rule. For each SSC sample selected, the
inspectors verified that the SSC was properly scoped into the maintenance rule in
accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 and verified that the (a)(2) performance criteria
established by Entergy was reasonable. As applicable, for SSCs classified as (a)(1), the
inspectors assessed the adequacy of goals and corrective actions to return these SSCs
to (a)(2). Additionally, the inspectors ensured that Entergy was identifying and
addressing common cause failures that occurred within and across maintenance rule
system boundaries.
Unit 2 EDGs
Unit 3 EDGs (this sample was part of an in-depth review of the EDG system)
Units 2 and 3 CVCS
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
URI Opened, CVCS Goal Monitoring Under the Maintenance Rule
Introduction
The inspectors identified issues of potential concern with Entergys application of
10 CFR 50.65(a)(1), Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at
Nuclear Plants, (the maintenance rule) in regards to the reliability of the Unit 2 CVCS
system. These concerns included the establishment of appropriate (a)(1) goals and
11
whether appropriate justification was established that the corrective actions to address
identified maintenance weaknesses were effective prior to removal from (a)(1) status.
Specifically, Entergy may have established restrictive goals without defensible
justification and may not have demonstrated their chosen goal before ending the goal
monitoring interval.
Description
The maintenance rule requires that licensees shall monitor the performance or condition
of structures, systems, or components, against licensee-established goals, in a manner
sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that these structures, systems, and
components are capable of fulfilling their intended functions. These goals shall be
established commensurate with safety and, where practical, take into account
industrywide operating experience. When the performance or condition of a structure,
system, or component does not meet established goals, appropriate corrective action
shall be taken. EN-DC-206, Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Process, provides the
requirements and processes for managing SSCs for which (a)(2) monitoring has not
demonstrated effective maintenance. EN-DC-206 specifies that (a)(1) action plans
should not be closed until effectiveness of all corrective actions has been demonstrated
by meeting performance goals through the monitoring period (or by other means
specified in the action plan).
Since 2013, there have been several repeat functional failures of equipment in the
CVCS resulting in a failure to meet the performance criterion for reliability. These
failures included:
A failure of the 23 charging pump on August 6, 2013, after the internal oil pump
discharge tubing broke causing the pump to trip on low oil pressure and a loss of
charging. The 21 charging pump had tripped for the same reason in 2010.
A failure of the 22 charging pump on January 14, 2014, due to cracked internal
check valves caused by an inadequate fill-and-vent that left air in the pump following
maintenance. The 21 charging pump had failed due to the same cause in 2013.
A failure of the Unit 2 valve FCV-110A, boric acid flow control valve, to fully open on
January 5, 2015. The valve had insufficient insulation; and as a result, boron
crystalized above the valve plug and blocked its movement. The Unit 3 FCV-110A
had failed in the same way in 2011, with earlier failures of other valves for the same
cause going back to 1997.
In each case, the CVCS for Unit 2 was already (a)(1), so Entergy either updated the
existing (a)(1) action plan or created another one to operate in parallel with the existing
one. Upon reviewing the associated (a)(1) action plans, the inspectors noted that in
each example Entergys goals may not have been in accordance with EN-DC-206(a)(1)
Process. It specifies that monitoring intervals should be at least six months for normally
operating SSCs, at least three surveillances for SSCs monitored by surveillance and
long enough to detect recurrence of the applicable failure mechanism. It also states that
performance goals that provide reasonable assurance that the SSC is capable of
performing its intended functions should be monitored throughout the time the SSC is
classified (a)(1). EN-DC-206 defines an SSC as any discreet component grouping that
has caused a monitoring failure, including any applicable extent of condition. In the
examples provided, NRC inspectors challenged whether Entergy either chose a shorter
12
monitoring interval or a goal that did not include the applicable extent of condition.
Specifically:
The (a)(1) action plan for the broken oil tubing had a goal of no noticeable decrease
in 23 charging pumps running oil pressure for the next three quarterly surveillances.
The chosen monitoring interval met the procedural expectation, but Entergy limited
the monitoring to the 23 charging pump without written justification, when the 21
charging pump had failed previously for the same reason and the other pumps were
susceptible to the same failure mechanism. During the monitoring interval, the 21
charging pump experienced low oil pressure. When Entergy performed repairs on
the 21 charging pump for an unrelated issue, they discovered that the oil tubing had
failed in the same way the 23 charging pump oil tubing had failed, although it had not
yet caused a pump trip.
The (a)(1) action plan for the cracked check valves had a goal of no check valve
failure for six months for the next charging pump that underwent maintenance. This
happened to be the 22 charging pump. Entergy chose a six-month monitoring
interval, even though only one of the three charging pumps is in service at any given
time, and the 22 charging pump only ran for four out of the six months it was
monitored. Additionally, the action plan did not justify why a single successful fill-
and-vent demonstrated adequate corrective actions. On November 19, 2014, during
the six month monitoring interval, the 21 charging pump underwent maintenance
requiring a fill-and-vent, and experienced check valve failure two weeks later on
December 4. Entergy documented this as a maintenance rule functional failure, and
discussed the possibility that it could be due to an inadequate fill-and-vent, but did
not change the (a)(1) action plan.
The (a)(1) action plan for FCV-110A specified a monitoring interval of six months to
include the winter because the previous valve failures had all occurred during the
winter months. However, the actual monitoring interval documented in the corrective
action was from April to October 2015, and therefore did not cover the winter months
as intended. In January 2016, Entergy performed maintenance on valve CH-297 on
Unit 3, which is a heat-traced boric acid valve, and did not properly restore the
insulation. The valve function was not impacted because it does not often contain
high concentrations of boric acid.
The (a)(1) action plans described above were all reviewed and approved by the
maintenance rule expert panel.
Further information regarding the performance of these SSCs is required to determine
whether these issues of concern represent performance deficiencies and whether they
are more than minor. (URI 05000247/2016002-01, CVCS Goal Monitoring Under the
Maintenance Rule)
.2
Quality Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the weld repair performed on the 21 CCW heat exchanger
service water inlet nozzle for Unit 2 to verify Entergy was properly applying quality
controls specified in their quality assurance program. The inspectors reviewed CAP
documents, maintenance WOs, ECs, and engineering procedures associated with the
weld repair. The inspectors verified Entergy specified quality control hold points in
13
accordance with their procedures, properly controlled the quality of materials used
during the repair, and adequately justified deviations from the existing design.
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the welding procedure specification qualification by
the vendor to ensure it was in accordance with American Society of Mechanical
Engineers code.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 - 7 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed station evaluation and management of plant risk for the
maintenance and emergent work activities listed below to verify that Entergy performed
the appropriate risk assessments prior to removing equipment for work. The inspectors
selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety
cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that Entergy
performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and that the
assessments were accurate and complete. When Entergy performed emergent work,
the inspectors verified that operations personnel promptly assessed and managed plant
risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work and discussed the results
of the assessment with the stations probabilistic risk analyst to verify plant conditions
were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the TS
requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to
verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met.
Unit 2
Temporary loss of spent fuel pool cooling due to 345-kilovolt disturbance on
April 3, 2016
Equipment hatch closure plug seal demonstration for outage risk on April 5, 2016
Reduced inventory operations during vessel reassembly on June 7, 2016
21 CCW heat exchanger OOS during mode 4 on June 25, 2016
Unit 3
32 EDG OOS while Bus Tie BT 4-5 was OOS on May 4, 2016 (this sample was part
of an in-depth review of the EDG system)
33 EDG OOS while Bus Tie BT 4-5 was OOS on June 2, 2016
31 EDG OOS while Bus Tie BT 4-5 was OOS on June 21, 2016
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
14
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (71111.15 - 7 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed operability determinations for the following degraded or
non-conforming conditions:
Unit 2
23 EDG failure to run on March 7, 2016, and subsequent failure to pass the
surveillance test on March 10, 2016, as identified in CR-IP2-2016-01260
Operability determination for N33 gamma metrics wide range nuclear instrument
channel in CR-IP2-2016-03660 on June 13, 2016
Pressurizer level transmitter LT-461 reads high in CR-IP-2016-3806 on June 14,
2016
Through-wall leak in line 411, service water inlet to the 21 CCW heat exchanger, on
June 15, 2016
Unit 3
Immediate operability determination of the degraded condition of the baffle-former
bolts identified from Unit 2 operating experience in CR-IP3-2016-01035 on April 1,
2016
Anomalies noted during digital metal impact monitoring system self-test in
CR-IP3-2015-03468 on April 1, 2016
Prompt operability determination of the degraded condition of the baffle-former bolts
identified from Unit 2 operating experience in CR-IP2-2016-03660 on June 30, 2016
The inspectors selected these issues based on the risk significance of the associated
components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the
operability determinations to assess whether TS operability was properly justified and
the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized
increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in
the appropriate sections of the TSs and UFSAR to Entergys evaluations to determine
whether the components or systems were operable.
The inspectors confirmed, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations
associated with the evaluations. Where compensatory measures were required to
maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would
function as intended and were properly controlled by Entergy. The inspectors
determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the
evaluations.
b. Findings
Introduction. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,
Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," because Entergy did not
adequately accomplish the actions prescribed by procedure EN-OP-104 for a degraded
condition associated with the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts. Specifically, Entergy incorrectly
concluded that no degraded or non-conforming condition existed related to the Unit 3
15
baffle-former bolts and exited the operability determination procedure. Entergy
subsequently performed the remaining steps in the procedure and provided appropriate
justification for their plans to examine the baffle-former bolts at the next Unit 3 RFO.
Description. On March 29, 2016, Entergy identified baffle-former (baffle) bolt
degradation at Indian Point Unit 2 that was determined to be unanalyzed because it did
not meet the minimum acceptable bolt pattern analysis developed to support plant
startup. Entergy staff identified a total of 227 baffle bolts out of a population of 832 that
were potentially degraded (182 bolts had UT indications; 31 had visual indications of
failure; and 14 were inaccessible for testing and conservatively assumed to be
degraded). Entergy staff entered this problem into the CAP as CR-IP2-2016-02081,
performed a root cause evaluation, and replaced the degraded bolts on Unit 2. Due to
the number of baffle bolt indications discovered on Unit 2, Entergy staff initiated CR-IP3-
2016-01035 on April 21, 2016, and performed an immediate operability determination
(IOD) in accordance with Entergy procedure EN-OP-104 Section 5.3, to evaluate the
baffle bolts and baffle-former assembly structure on Unit 3. Entergy staff planned further
corrective actions to move up the planned Unit 3 baffle bolt ultrasonic examinations to
the next RFO in spring 2017.
The inspectors reviewed the design basis and current licensing basis documents for
Indian Point Unit 3 to identify the specific safety functions of the baffle bolts. The baffle
bolts are part of the baffle former assembly structure located in the reactor pressure
vessel. The bolts secure a series of vertical metal plates called baffle plates, which help
direct water up through the nuclear fuel assemblies to ensure proper cooling of the fuel.
A sufficient number of baffle bolts are required to secure the plates to ensure proper
core flow during normal and postulated accident conditions, and also to ensure that
control rods can be inserted to shut down the reactor.
The inspectors reviewed Entergys IOD issued on April 21, 2016, and concluded the
immediate determination was completed in accordance with Section 5.3 of procedure
EN-OP-104. The IOD provided sufficient technical detail to support the initial conclusion,
based on limited information, that the Unit 3 baffle bolts would retain sufficient capability
to perform their intended functions. Specifically, the IOD stated that Unit 2 baffle bolt
failures were likely due to irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC) and that
the Unit 3 baffle bolts were also susceptible because they both utilize a baffle bolt design
with similar geometry and material to other plants with bolt failures. The IOD concluded
that Unit 3 baffle bolt degradation would likely not be as significant as Unit 2, and that
the Unit 3 baffle former assembly was currently operable pending further evaluation
because of the following differences with Unit 2: (1) less effective full power years of
operation; (2) less neutron fluence levels (i.e., irradiation); (3) less pressure differential
across the baffle plates; and (4) less fatigue-induced loading cycles on the bolts over the
operating life of the plant. The inspectors concluded that there was no immediate safety
concern.
On May 5, 2016, Entergy staff revised the operability input for CR-IP3-2016-01035 under
corrective action #2. The inspectors noted that Entergy staff concluded an operability
evaluation was not needed, in part, because the baffle-former bolts are not required by
TS and are not described in the UFSAR. The inspectors noted that while the baffle
bolts are not described in these documents, their failure in sufficient numbers could have
consequential effects on the TS-controlled ECCS if the baffle plates were to become
detached or deformed. This was described in Entergys bolt pattern analysis report
16
documenting an acceptable bolt pattern prior to the spring 2016 RFO. The inspectors
reviewed Unit 3 TS 3.5.2, ECCS - Operating, which requires multiple trains of ECCS to
be operable. The inspectors concluded that since the baffle bolts support the ECCS,
which is subject to TS, Entergys decision to not perform further evaluation of the
operability determination was inconsistent with EN-OP-104. Specifically, Section 5.1(7)
of Entergys procedure EN-OP-104 requires that an operability determination be
performed whenever a condition exists in the supporting SCC that may affect the ability
of the TS-controlled SSC to perform its specified safety function.
Further, the inspectors noted that Entergy staff concluded a degraded condition did not
exist in Unit 3, and therefore, an operability evaluation was not required as a follow-up to
the immediate determination. The documented basis provided was the differences
between the two units, plant operating data, and fuel performance. The inspectors noted
that plant operating data and fuel performance from Unit 2 did not result in identification
of the bolt degradation; therefore, the absence of indications for these problems on Unit
3 was technically insufficient to support Entergys conclusion that there was no degraded
condition on Unit 3.
The inspectors review of procedure EN-OP-104, Section 3.0, identified that examples of
the effects of equipment aging and operating experience can be sources of information
considered to enter the operability or functionality process. The inspectors
acknowledged that licensees apply judgment in these decisions. In this particular
instance, the inspectors considered that operating experience was available that showed
the Unit 3 baffle bolts were subject to IASCC and that plants of similar design (4-loop
Westinghouse pressurized water reactors with a down-flow configuration and baffle bolts
of 347 material and similar dimensions) were subject to greater amounts of bolt
degradation compared to other reactor designs. Furthermore, the inspectors noted the
baffle bolts had experienced levels of neutron radiation exposure above the threshold for
IASCC initiation as referenced in NUREG/CR-7027, Degradation of LWR Core Internal
Materials due to Neutron Irradiation.
Based on the above information available to Entergy staff, the inspectors concluded that
Entergys basis for determining that a degraded condition did not exist on Unit 3 was not
technically supported. The inspectors noted that in completing an IOD in EN-OP-104,
Step 5.3.2 states determine if there is an ongoing degradation mechanism that may
impact future operability based on changing conditions, specifically consider the SSCs
specified safety function and mission time. On May 5, 2016, Entergys basis for
concluding an operability evaluation was not required and exiting the operability
determination procedure at Step 5.3.3 was inconsistent with this procedural requirement
because their IOD concluded Unit 3 was susceptible to baffle bolt degradation, which is
time based and subject to changing conditions including fatigue inducing loading cycles
and neutron fluence. As a result, the inspectors concluded Entergy staff did not
complete the additional actions prescribed by EN-OP-104 to perform an operability
evaluation. Specifically, Step 5.3.9 states in part if an Operability Evaluation is required
then perform the following: Proceed to Subsection 5.5, Operability Evaluation.
On July 11, 2016, Entergy staff subsequently completed the steps in EN-OP-104 and
performed an operability evaluation, which assumed an estimated number of baffle-
former bolt failures based on the degradation found in Unit 2, and adjusted to take credit
for the small number of inaccessible bolts and a sample of bolts extracted with high
removal torque that indicated residual structural capacity. The inspectors determined
17
this estimated number of bolt failures was conservative because the evaluation did not
credit the baffle-edge bolts or the differences in operational history between the two units
such as neutron fluence levels or fatigue from thermal cycles. The operability evaluation
concluded that the Unit 3 baffle bolts would perform as intended to secure the baffle
plates from being dislodged. The inspectors concluded that Entergys operability
evaluation provided appropriate basis to conclude that the Unit 3 baffle assembly would
support ECCS operability until the planned Unit 3 RFO in spring 2017.
Analysis. The inspectors determined that Entergys failure to adequately accomplish the
actions prescribed in EN-OP-104 for a degraded condition and perform an operability
evaluation associated with the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts was a performance deficiency.
Specifically, Entergy incorrectly concluded that no degraded or non-conforming condition
existed related to the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts and exited the operability determination
procedure. As a result, Entergys initial documentation did not provide sufficient basis
for operability and continued operation until questioned by NRC inspectors.
This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance
attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to
ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating
events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). This issue was also
similar to example 3.j of IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, because
the condition resulted in reasonable doubt of operability of the ECCS and additional
analysis was necessary to verify operability. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial
Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance
Determination Process for Findings At-Power, issued June 19, 2012, the inspectors
screened the finding for safety significance and determined it to be of very low safety
significance (Green), since the finding did not represent an actual loss of system or
function. After inspector questioning, Entergy performed an operability evaluation, which
provided sufficient bases to conclude the Unit 3 baffle assembly would support ECCS
operability. This finding is related to the cross-cutting aspect of Problem Identification
and Resolution, Operating Experience, because Entergy did not effectively evaluate
relevant internal and external operating experience. Specifically, Entergy did not
adequately evaluate the impact of degraded baffle bolts at Unit 3 when relevant
operating experience was identified at Unit 2. [P.5]
Enforcement. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and
Drawings, states, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by
documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be
accomplished in accordance with those procedures. The introduction to Appendix B
states that quality assurance comprises all those planned and systematic actions
necessary to provide adequate confidence that a structure, system, or component (SSC)
will perform satisfactorily in service. Procedure EN-OP-104, Step 5.3[2], related to
immediate operability, states Determine if there is an ongoing degradation mechanism
that may impact future operability based on changing conditions, specifically consider
the SSCs specified safety function and mission time. Step 5.3(3) follows with, in part If
no Degraded or Non-conforming Condition exists, then perform the following as the
Immediate Determination: Declare the SSC Operable and Exit this procedure.
Contrary to the above, from May 5, 2016 until July 11, 2016, Entergy did not adequately
accomplish actions as prescribed by EN-OP-104 for a degraded condition associated
with the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts. Specifically, Entergy incorrectly concluded that no
18
degraded or non-conforming condition existed related to the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts
and exited the operability determination procedure. The NRC determined this is contrary
to EN-OP-104 because a comparison of Unit 2 and 3 operational factors resulted in
Entergy concluding that the Unit 3 baffle bolts would likely be affected due to the same
degradation mechanism. Entergys corrective actions included entering the issue into
the CAP and documenting an operability evaluation to support the basis for operability of
the baffle bolts and ECCS. Because this issue is of very low safety significance (Green)
and Entergy entered this into their CAP as CR-IP3-2016-01961, this finding is being
treated as an NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000286/2016002-02, Failure to Follow Operability Determination Procedure for
Unit 3 Baffle-Former Bolts)
Update to URI 05000247/2016001-06, 23 Emergency Diesel Generator Automatic
Voltage Regulator Failure
Introduction. The NRC opened a URI in Inspection Report 05000247/2016001 related to
two failures of the 23 EDG to run and maintain bus voltage on March 7, 2016, and to
provide adequate control of bus voltage on March 10, 2016. This report provides an
update of the status of this URI.
Description. On March 7, 2016, approximately one hour after the trip of the 3A normal
feed breaker, the 23 EDG tripped on overcurrent while powering the 6A 480V safety bus.
The 6A bus remained de-energized for approximately one hour until the crew restored
the 6A bus via off-site power. The 23 EDG was declared inoperable. All four 480V
safety buses were restored to off-site power. Entergy replaced the overcurrent relays
and retested the 23 EDG satisfactorily on March 8, 2016. However, bench testing of the
overcurrent relays demonstrated that they were accurately calibrated.
Subsequently, on March 10, 2016, during performance of PT-R14, Automatic Safety
Injection System Electrical Load and Blackout Test, the 23 EDG exhibited anomalous
behavior during the train B load sequencing. During this test, the voltage on safety bus
6A dropped to approximately 200V when the 23 auxiliary feedwater pump was
sequenced onto the bus (CR-IP2-2016-01430) and the sequencer failed to complete the
first two sequences. The 23 EDG was again declared inoperable and the period of
inoperability was backdated to March 7, 2016, when it originally tripped. Further
troubleshooting and additional failure modes analysis by Entergy initially determined that
the cause of both events may have been a degraded resistor (R25) on the 23 EDG
automatic voltage regulator (AVR) card.
The 23 EDG AVR card was replaced, and the 23 EDG was again tested satisfactorily.
The voltage anomaly issues exhibited during the March 10, 2016, test were documented
in CR-IP2-2016-01430 which was closed in CR-IP2-2016-01260 to be included in the
causal assessment associated with the tripping of 23 EDG breaker on March 7, 2016.
Entergy assigned a vendor to perform laboratory bench testing and failure analysis of
the 23 EDG AVR card. The vendor report attributed the cause of the March 10, 2016,
loss of voltage control to a degraded solder joint on the AVR card. However, the vendor
report explicitly did not attribute the event on March 7, 2016, to the same cause.
Entergy assigned a corrective action in CR-IP2-2016-01260 to review the cause of the
19
23 EDG overcurrent trip on March 7, 2016, in light of the vendor report. The inspectors
determined that the issue of concern remains open as a URI until this causal
assessment has been completed by Entergy and assessed by NRC. (URI 05000247/2016001-06, 23 Emergency Diesel Generator Automatic Voltage
Regulator Failure)
1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18 - 2 samples)
Permanent Modifications
.1
Control Rod Guide Tube Repairs in Location E-9
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated a modification to the reactor vessel upper internals to swap
damaged control rod guide tube in location E-9 with abandoned guide tube in location
D-10. The inspectors verified that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance
capability of the affected systems were not degraded by the modification. In addition,
the inspectors reviewed modification documents associated with the design change,
including evaluation of equivalency and core flow changes, and post-modification
testing. The inspectors also reviewed revisions to the affected drawings and interviewed
refueling and engineering personnel.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2
Core Baffle-Former Bolt EC 64038
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed EC 64038, IP2 Reactor Vessel Equivalent Replacement
Baffle-to-Former Bolt. This modification was completed during RFO 2R22 and involved
the replacement of 278 baffle-former bolts out of a total of 832 located in the Unit 2
reactor vessel. Entergy replaced all of the bolts that were potentially degraded as
observed by visual indications of a protruding bolt head or lock bar problem, bolts that
did not pass UT, and bolts inaccessible for UT. Entergy staff also replaced 51 additional
bolts that passed ultrasonic and visual examinations to increase the structural margin of
the baffle-former assembly for future operating cycles.
The inspectors reviewed the equivalency evaluation completed by Entergy staff to install
baffle-former bolts of a different material and configuration than the original bolts. The
inspectors reviewed the associated EC package to determine whether the replacement
bolts form, fit, and function were maintained compared to the original bolts and whether
the change conformed to the design and licensing bases of the baffle-former assembly.
Specifically, this change involved replacing the original baffle-former bolts made of
type 347 stainless steel with bolts made of type 316 stainless steel. The baffle-former
bolt head configuration was also changed from an original internal hex and slot design
(secured with a welded lock bar) to an external hex configuration with an integral locking
cup design. The design change document further evaluated a more gradual fillet
20
geometry between the bolt head and shank intended to reduce the stress concentration
at that transition and provide for improved fatigue resistance.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - 8 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance tests for the maintenance activities listed
below to verify that procedures and test activities ensured system operability and
functional capability. The inspectors reviewed the test procedure to verify that the
procedure adequately tested the safety functions that may have been affected by the
maintenance activity, that the acceptance criteria in the procedure was consistent with
the information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and that
the test results were properly reviewed and accepted and problems were appropriately
documented. The inspectors also walked down the affected job site, observed the
pre-job brief and post-job critique where possible, confirmed work site cleanliness was
maintained, witnessed the test or reviewed test data to verify quality control hold points
were performed and checked, and that results adequately demonstrated restoration of
the affected safety functions.
Unit 2
21 EDG fuel oil transfer pump after planned maintenance on May 5, 2016
Replacement of pressurizer level transmitters LT-459 and LT-460 on May 25, 2016
21 CCW heat exchanger service water outlet weld repair on June 26, 2016
Flux mapping system drive repairs following motor failures on June 28, 2016
Unit 3
Maintenance on service water components associated with the 32 EDG on May 5,
2016 (this sample was part of an in-depth review of the EDG system)
Modification of the 32 EDG space heaters on May 5, 2016 (this sample was part of
an in-depth review of the EDG system)
Maintenance on the 32 EDG air start system on May 6, 2016 (this sample was part
of an in-depth review of the EDG system)
Replacement of failed bistable LC-427K, steam generator 32 low level mismatch trip
interlock, on May 18, 2016
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
21
1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (71111.20 - 2 samples)
.1
Unit 2 RFO 2R22
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the stations work schedule and outage risk plan for the Unit 2
maintenance during RFO 2R22, which was conducted from March 7, 2016, to June 16,
2016. The inspectors reviewed Entergys development and implementation of outage
plans and schedules to verify that risk, industry experience, previous site-specific
problems, and defense-in-depth were considered. During the outage, the inspectors
observed portions of the shutdown and cooldown processes and monitored controls
associated with the following outage activities:
Configuration management, including maintenance of defense-in-depth,
commensurate with the outage plan for the key safety functions and compliance with
the applicable TSs when taking equipment OOS
Implementation of clearance activities and confirmation that tags were properly hung
and that equipment was appropriately configured to safely support the associated
work or testing
Installation and configuration of reactor coolant pressure, level, and temperature
instruments to provide accurate indication and instrument error accounting
Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that
TSs were met
Monitoring of decay heat removal operations
Impact of outage work on the ability of the operators to operate the spent fuel pool
cooling system
Reactor water inventory controls, including flow paths, configurations, alternative
means for inventory additions, and controls to prevent inventory loss
Activities that could affect reactivity
Maintenance of secondary containment as required by TSs
Refueling activities, including fuel handling and fuel receipt inspections
Fatigue management
Tracking of startup prerequisites, walkdown of the primary containment to verify that
debris had not been left which could block the ECCS suction strainers, and startup
and ascension to full power operation
Foreign Object Search and Retrieval for missing baffle bolts and locking tabs
Identification and resolution of problems related to RFO activities
During this outage, Entergy replaced 278 degraded baffle bolts in the Unit 2 reactor
vessel baffle assembly. This emergent project resulted in the extension of the outage
schedule from 30 days to 102 days.
b. Findings
Introduction. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of TS 5.4.1 for Entergys failure to
implement procedure OAP-007, Containment Entry and Egress. Specifically, workers
transiting the inner and outer crane wall sections of containment on June 11, 2016, failed
to maintain at least one (of two) flow channeling gate closed to ensure availability of the
containment sumps to provide suction for the ECCS.
22
Description. On June 11, 2016, in mode 4, in preparation for reactor startup, Entergy
was performing maintenance in containment required prior to mode 3, such as reactor
coolant pump motor balancing and steam flow transmitter troubleshooting. These
activities required scaffolds to be temporarily erected for workers to safely perform
maintenance. While transiting from the inner to outer section of containment, the
inspectors noted that both flow channeling gates were maintained open simultaneously
as workers carried scaffold poles and hardware out of the area.
In the event of a postulated LOCA, Unit 2 relies on two sumps to provide a suction
source for the internal recirculation pumps and residual heat removal pumps,
respectively, after the injection phase of the accident. The sumps have cylindrical
screens with large surface area and small holes to filter small debris and maintain
adequate net positive suction head for the associated pumps. The reactor cavity sump
and large intervening barriers prevent large debris generated from the accident, such as
insulation, from reaching and blocking the recirculation and containment sump screens.
Entergy procedure OAP-007, Containment Entry and Egress, precaution and limitation
step 2.30.2, states, In mode 1, 2, 3, or 4, entry inside the crane wall shall use the
double gate entry point via gates 17 and 23. One gate shall remain shut and secured at
all times to maintain flow channeling and sump operability. Securing gates requires a
padlock or nut and bolt closure from the outside. This will require posting a gate monitor
to allow exit. The inspectors noted, while a gate monitor was posted, both gates were
maintained open during passage and not secured with a padlock or nut and bolt closure.
Upon questioning by the inspectors, Entergy immediately coached the gate monitor and
restored the gates to an acceptable position. Entergy generated CR-IP2-2016-04036 to
address this issue.
Analysis. The inspectors determined that Energys failure to maintain either gate 17 or
gate 23 closed during passage in accordance with OAP-007 was a performance
deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it is associated
with the configuration control (shutdown equipment lineup) attribute and adversely
affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability,
reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent
undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors evaluated the finding in
accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Exhibit 3, and determined that a
detailed risk evaluation was necessary because the finding represented a loss of system
safety function. A detailed risk assessment was conducted conservatively assuming
complete failure of the recirculation and containment sumps due to the performance
deficiency. Given that Unit 2 was in mode 4, in plant operating state 1, with a late time
window, the at-power simplified plant analysis risk model for large-break LOCAs was
determined to best model the degrade condition and plant response. An exposure time
of one day was assumed. No credit was assumed for the decrease in energy that would
be anticipated in a release during a LOCA in mode 4, nor the corresponding reduction in
debris generation. This was also considered conservative. Utilizing Systems Analysis
Program for Hands-On Integrated Reliability Evaluation, version 8.13, with Indian Point
Unit 2 Simplified Plant Analysis Risk Model, version 8.19, for the assumed conditions,
the change in core damage frequency was determined to be 7E-9. Therefore, this issue
represents a Green finding.
23
This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Avoid
Complacency, because Entergy did not consider potential undesired consequences of
actions before performing work and implement appropriate error-reduction tools.
Specifically, the work crew did not understand the requirements and potential
consequences prior to commencing work and the gate monitor did not enforce these
requirements to maintain at least one gate locked or pinned closed as required by
OAP-007. [H.12]
Enforcement. Unit 2 TS 5.4.1.a requires that the procedures listed in Attachment A to
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements, Revision 2, be
established and implemented. Attachment A states that instructions should be prepared,
as appropriate, for access to containment and changing modes of operation of the
ECCS. Entergy procedure OAP-007, Containment Entry and Egress, Step 2.30.2,
states, In mode 1, 2, 3, or 4, entry inside the crane wall shall use the double gate entry
point via gates 17 and 23. One gate shall remain shut and secured at all times to
maintain flow channeling and sump operability. Securing gates requires a padlock or nut
and bolt closure from the outside. Contrary to the above, on June 11, 2016, Entergy did
not maintain one gate secured at all times with a padlock or nut and bolt closure.
Entergy entered this issue into the CAP as CR-IP2-2016-04036. Because this violation
was of very low safety significance (Green), and Entergy entered this performance
deficiency into the CAP, the NRC is treating this as a NCV in accordance with
Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000247/2016002-03, Failure
to Maintain Flow Channeling Gates Closed in Accordance with the Containment
Procedure)
.2
Unit 2 Forced Outage
a. Inspection Scope
Unit 2 conducted a forced outage from June 24 to 27, 2016, in order to complete weld
repairs on a through-wall leak on the service water inlet line to the 21 CCW heat
exchanger. These repairs required shutting down to mode 4 in order to meet the
TS 3.7.7, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, limiting condition for operations
for CCW operability. While these repairs were being completed, the grid operator
completed repairs to breaker 9 in the offsite switchyard. During the outage, the
inspectors observed portions of the shutdown and cooldown processes and monitored
controls associated with the following outage activities:
Configuration management, including maintenance of defense-in-depth,
commensurate with the outage plan for the key safety functions and compliance with
the applicable TSs when taking equipment OOS
Implementation of clearance activities and confirmation that tags were properly hung
and that equipment was appropriately configured to safely support the associated
work or testing
Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that
TSs were met
Monitoring of decay heat removal operations
Reactor water inventory controls, including flow paths, configurations, alternative
means for inventory additions, and controls to prevent inventory loss
Activities that could affect reactivity
24
Tracking of startup prerequisites
Identification and resolution of problems related to RFO activities
When all repairs had been completed, Entergy restarted Unit 2 on June 27, 2016.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22 - 6 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed performance of surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of
selected risk-significant SSCs to assess whether test results satisfied TSs, the UFSAR,
and Entergys procedure requirements. The inspectors verified that test acceptance
criteria were clear, tests demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with
design documentation, test instrumentation had current calibrations and the range and
accuracy for the application, tests were performed as written, and applicable test
prerequisites were satisfied. Upon test completion, the inspectors considered whether
the test results supported that equipment was capable of performing the required safety
functions. The inspectors reviewed the following surveillance tests:
Unit 2
WO 446385, 21 EDG AVR card inspection, on May 24, 2016
2-PT-Q013 for containment isolation valve 851B (22 safety injection (SI) pump tie to
23 SI pump discharge) on June 6, 2016
2-PT-Q029B quarterly in-service surveillance test for the 22 SI pump on June 6,
2016
Unit 3
3-PT-M079B 32 EDG monthly surveillance on May 30, 2016 (this sample was part of
an in-depth review of the EDG system)
34 steam generator pressure instrument channel check on June 21, 2016
0-SOP-LEAKRATE-001, RCS Leakrate Surveillance, Evaluation and Leak
Identification, beginning on June 28, 2016
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
25
1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06 - 1 sample)
Training Observations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the conduct of Entergys ingestion pathway emergency
preparedness drill on April 19, 2016, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in the
classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development activities.
The inspectors observed emergency response operations in the emergency operations
facility to determine whether the event classification, notifications, and protective action
recommendations were performed in accordance with procedures. The inspectors also
attended the facility drill critique to compare inspector observations with those identified
by Entergy staff in order to evaluate Entergys critique and to verify whether the staff was
properly identifying weaknesses and entering them into the CAP.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
2.
RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety and Occupational Radiation Safety
2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01)
a. Inspection Scope
During May 10-12 and June 13-17, 2016, the inspectors reviewed Entergys
performance in assessing the radiological hazards and exposure control in the
workplace. The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR 20, TSs, applicable
industry standards, and procedures required by TSs as criteria for determining
compliance.
Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage
The inspectors reviewed:
Ambient radiological conditions during tours of the radiological controlled area,
posted surveys, radiation work permits, adequacy of radiological controls, radiation
protection job coverage, and contamination controls
Controls for highly activated or contaminated materials stored within spent fuel pools
Posting and physical controls for high radiation areas and very high radiation areas
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
26
2RS2 Occupational As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls
(71124.02)
a. Inspection Scope
During May 10-12 and June 13-17, 2016, the inspectors assessed performance with
respect to maintaining occupational individual and collective radiation exposures ALARA.
The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR 20, TSs, applicable industry standards,
and procedures required by TSs as criteria for determining compliance.
Radiological Work Planning
The inspectors reviewed:
ALARA work activity evaluations, exposure estimates, and exposure mitigation
requirements
ALARA work planning, use of dose mitigation features and dose goals
Work planning and the integration of ALARA requirements
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
2RS7 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) (71124.07 - 3 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the REMP to validate the effectiveness of the radioactive
gaseous and liquid effluent release program and implementation of the groundwater
protection initiative (GPI). The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR 20,
40 CFR 190, 10 CFR 50, Appendix I, TSs, offsite dose calculation manual (ODCM),
Nuclear Energy Institute 07-07, and procedures required by TSs as criteria for
determining compliance.
Inspection Planning
The inspectors reviewed Entergys 2014 and 2015 annual radiological environmental
and effluent monitoring reports, REMP program audits, ODCM changes, land use
census, the UFSAR, and inter-laboratory comparison program results.
Site Inspection
The inspectors walked down various thermoluminescent dosimeter and air and water
sampling locations and reviewed associated calibration and maintenance records. The
inspectors observed the sampling of various environmental media as specified in the
ODCM and reviewed any anomalous environmental sampling events including
assessment of any positive radioactivity results. The inspectors reviewed any changes
to the ODCM. The inspectors verified the operability and calibration of the
meteorological tower instruments and meteorological data readouts. The inspectors
reviewed environmental sample laboratory analysis results, laboratory instrument
measurement detection sensitivities, laboratory quality control program audit results, and
27
the inter- and intra-laboratory comparison program results. The inspectors reviewed the
groundwater monitoring program as it applies to selected potential leaking SSCs.
GPI Implementation
The inspectors reviewed groundwater monitoring results, changes to the GPI program
since the last inspection, anomalous results or missed groundwater samples, leakage or
spill events including entries made into the decommissioning files (10 CFR 50.75(g)),
evaluations of surface water discharges, and Entergys evaluation of any positive
groundwater sample results including appropriate stakeholder notifications and effluent
reporting requirements.
Identification and Resolution of Problems
The inspectors evaluated whether problems associated with the REMP were identified at
an appropriate threshold and properly addressed in Entergys CAP.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151 - 6 samples)
Initiating Events Performance Indicators
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed Entergys submittals for the following Initiating Events
cornerstone performance indicators for the period April 1, 2015, to March 31, 2016:
Unit 2
Unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours (IE01)
Unplanned power changes per 7000 critical hours (IE03)
Unplanned scrams with complications (IE04)
Unit 3
Unplanned scrams (IE01)
Unplanned power changes (IE03)
Unplanned scrams with complications (IE04)
To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those
periods, inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy
Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7.
The inspectors reviewed Entergys operator narrative logs, maintenance planning
schedules, CRs, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports to validate the
28
accuracy of the submittals. There were no unplanned power changes or scrams with
complications during the review period.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152 - 4 samples)
.1
Routine Review of Problem Identification and Resolution Activities
a. Inspection Scope
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, the
inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant
status reviews to verify that Entergy entered issues into the CAP at an appropriate
threshold, gave adequate attention to timely corrective actions, and identified and
addressed adverse trends. In order to assist with the identification of repetitive
equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow up, the inspectors
performed a daily screening of items entered into the CAP and periodically attended CR
screening meetings. The inspectors also confirmed, on a sampling basis, that, as
applicable, for identified defects and non-conformances, Entergy performed an
evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR 21.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2
Semi-Annual Trend Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed a semi-annual review of site issues, as required by Inspection
Procedure 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, to identify trends that might
indicate the existence of more significant safety issues. In this review, the inspectors
included repetitive or closely-related issues that may have been documented by Entergy
outside of the CAP, such as trend reports, performance indicators, major equipment
problem lists, system health reports, maintenance rule assessments, and maintenance
or CAP backlogs. The inspectors also reviewed Entergys CAP database for the first
and second quarters of 2016 to assess CRs written in various subject areas (equipment
problems, human performance issues, etc.), as well as individual issues identified during
the NRCs daily CR review (Section 4OA2.1). The inspectors reviewed the Entergy
quarterly trend report for the first quarter of 2016 to verify that Entergy was appropriately
evaluating and trending adverse conditions in accordance with applicable procedures.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified.
The inspectors identified a trend in work being performed that was contrary to written
work instructions and procedures, and work packages had been closed out without
29
documenting the deviation from the work order. While reviewing completed work order
WO 447966 Task 10, Internal Coating Repair for 21 CCW HX, the inspectors found a
note in the work order stating that the internal coating repair to the pipe had not been
done in accordance with the engineering change. The engineering change had been
written when the coating repair was expected to be small, but the actual area that was
recoated was much larger. A larger area of coating increases the impact on the heat
exchanger if the coating were to flake off and block the flow of service water. The work
package was closed and no condition report was written. This performance deficiency is
minor because the coating was applied with procedurally directed quality controls and
the likelihood that it would flake off is very small; and is the same as the original smaller
area specified in the work package. However, the work package was closed without
documenting the deviation and no CR was written.
In another example, the inspectors noted that WO 412920 Task 15 to perform a surge
test on 11 centrifugal air compressor (CENTAC) after overhaul was completed on
December 22, 2015. However, the completion notes and documentation for the task
showed that the test was unable to be performed due to a test equipment problem. The
work package was closed and no CR was written. Subsequently, after being returned to
service, the compressor failed in service due to multiple surging events on January 7,
2016. Troubleshooting under WO 433939 revealed that the motor high load limit had not
been adjusted to account for the increased load due to reduced compressor clearances
introduced by the overhaul. This performance deficiency is screened to minor because
the 11 CENTAC is not a safety-related piece of equipment and would not affect the MC 0609 cornerstone thresholds or other generic criteria. Unit 2 and Unit 3 have dedicated
instrument air compressors that are credited in the FSAR to respond to a loss of
instrument air event. If the 11 CENTAC (located in Unit 1) were to fail, the unit-specific
IACs would automatically start to prevent a loss of instrument air at both Units 2 and 3.
A third recent example of work being performed contrary to written instructions occurred
during 2RFO22 when the inspectors identified that the workers deviated from the
surveillance procedure by demonstrating the installation of the emergency containment
hatch plug without properly inflating the plug seals as directed by the procedure. This
performance deficiency was previously documented in a prior inspection report as non-
cited violation 05000247/05000286/2016001-02, Failure to Adequately Implement Risk
Management Actions for the Containment Key Safety Function.
In all cases, the deviations from written work instructions were directed by Entergy
supervision. In addition, the inspectors noted that Entergy had self-identified similar
observations where work packages or condition reports had been closed without fully
completing the specified actions including CR-IP2-2015-05833, CR-IP2-2016-00103,
CR-IP3-2015-04729, CR-IP3-2016-00072, CR-IP3-2016-00075, and CR-IP3-2015-
04019. These CRs are further examples of work orders that were closed with deviations
that were not documented or resolved. Nuclear Oversight had identified several of these
condition reports. Entergy has taking immediate corrective action in response to these
performance deficiencies.
30
.3
Annual Sample: Maintenance Rule Self-Assessment of Corrective Actions
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Entergys corrective actions associated
with self-assessment LO-IP3LO-2015-72, Maintenance Rule (a)(3) Assessment. The
self-assessment was performed to satisfy both the self-assessment criteria in EN-LI-104,
Self-Assessment and Benchmark Process, and the maintenance rule periodic
assessment criteria in EN-DC-207.
The inspectors assessed Entergys problem identification threshold, extent of condition
reviews, and the prioritization and timeliness of Entergy corrective actions to determine
whether Entergy was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems
associated with this issue and whether the planned or completed corrective actions were
appropriate. The inspectors compared the actions taken to the requirements of
Entergys CAP and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. In addition, the inspectors interviewed
engineering personnel to assess the effectiveness of the implemented corrective
actions.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified.
Entergy identified three standard deficiencies during their self-assessment and wrote
CRs to document each one. One of the standard deficiencies was that the maintenance
rule basis documents were not being reviewed at least once every two years as required
by procedure EN-DC-204, Maintenance Rule Scope and Basis. The purpose of this
review was to ensure that the documents were updated if the configuration of the system
changed or if the performance criteria needed to be adjusted. Entergy wrote CR-IP3-
2015-03628 and assigned a corrective action to create work trackers to perform the
basis document reviews. They chose to use work trackers instead of corrective actions
under the CAP because the work had historically been assigned using work trackers.
However, because work trackers do not receive the same priority as corrective actions,
some of the maintenance rule basis documents had still not been reviewed at the time of
this inspection, over a year after the completion of the self-assessment. The inspectors
determined that this was not a more than minor issue because the systems in question
did not show signs of inadequate maintenance.
.4
Annual Sample: Unit 2 Reactor Trip on December 5, 2015
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Entergys evaluations and corrective
actions associated with CR-IP2-2015-05484 and the related apparent cause evaluation
for the December 5, 2015, manual reactor trip in response to indications of multiple
dropped control rods caused by the loss of control rod power due to a power supply
failure. Entergy performed an apparent cause evaluation and determined the direct
cause of the event was the loss of motor control center (MCC)-24 due to an internal fault
at the line side leads at cubicle 2H where they connect to the bucket stab assemblies.
The apparent cause was an unanticipated loss of power to the control rod system due to
the degradation of the primary control rod power supply (PS1) which failed to function for
31
more than 10 minutes when the operating alternate power supply (PS2) was
deenergized.
The inspectors assessed Entergys problem identification threshold, problem analysis,
extent of condition reviews, compensatory actions, and the prioritization and timeliness
of Entergy's corrective actions to determine whether Entergy was appropriately
identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with this issue and
whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate. The inspectors
compared the actions taken to the requirements of Entergy's CAP and 10 CFR 50,
Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action.
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified.
The inspectors found that Entergy took appropriate actions to identify the direct and
apparent cause of the issue. The direct cause of the event was the loss of MCC-24 due
to an internal fault at the line side leads at cubicle 2H where they connect to the bucket
stab assemblies. The apparent cause was an unanticipated loss of power to the control
rod system due to the degradation of the primary control rod PS1, which failed to
function when PS2 was lost. Entergy replaced the degraded rod control PS1; and the
MCC-24 compartments were removed to facilitate inspection and testing of the MCC
bus, control wires, and MCC internal. PS2 was also restored to operation after the fault
was cleared.
The inspector determined that the internal electrical fault that deenergized PS2 and the
prior degradation in PS1 was not within Entergys ability to foresee and prevent.
Therefore, there was no performance deficiency identified. Entergys overall response to
the issue was commensurate with the safety significance, was timely, and the actions
taken and planned were reasonable to resolve the failure of the primary control rod PS1.
.5
Annual Sample: Unexpected Number of Degraded Baffle-Former Bolts Discovered in
the Unit 2 Reactor Pressure Vessel
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Entergys root cause evaluation and
corrective actions associated with CR-IP2-2016-02348 for baffle-former (baffle) bolts
found with indications of degradation during the Indian Point Unit 2 RFO 2R22. Entergy
performed ultrasonic examinations of the baffle bolts in accordance with their procedures
as part of a planned activity. After an unexpected number of degraded baffle bolts were
discovered, Entergy staff reported the issue to the NRC as Event Notification 51829
on March 29, 2016, because the as-found number and location of degraded bolts
represented an unanalyzed condition. Entergy staff completed corrective actions to
replace all of the potentially degraded baffle bolts on Unit 2. Entergy staff further
replaced a population of additional bolts that exhibited no indications of degradation and
performed an evaluation to determine the potential for baffle bolt failures at Unit 3.
The baffle-former bolts help secure vertical plates (also referred to as baffle plates)
inside the reactor vessel, which then forms a structure surrounding the reactor fuel
assemblies to orient the fuel and to direct coolant flow through the core. A sufficient
32
number of baffle bolts are required to remain intact to secure the baffle plates in place so
as to not affect control rod insertion or impede emergency core cooling flow during
postulated accident conditions. Bolt heads that separate and are no longer held in place
by bolt lock-tabs can also become a loose parts concern.
The inspectors determined whether Entergys acceptable baffle bolt pattern analysis for
Unit 2 was completed in accordance with the NRC-approved methodology and provided
appropriate structural margin for the next cycle of operation to ensure the Unit 2 baffle
plates will remain in place during both normal operation and limiting postulated accident
conditions. The inspectors further determined whether Entergys evaluations of the
baffle bolts installed in Indian Point Unit 3 were technically sufficient to conclude the
Unit 3 baffle assembly will perform as intended until the next planned RFO, at which time
Entergy plans to examine the bolts. The inspectors reviewed Entergys procedures for
determining the functionality and operability of degraded SSC as they relate to Unit 3.
The inspectors further interviewed Entergy engineering personnel and contractor staff to
discuss the results of Entergys technical evaluations and to assess the effectiveness of
the implemented and planned corrective actions.
The inspectors assessed Entergys problem identification threshold, cause analyses,
extent of condition, compensatory actions, and the prioritization and timeliness of
Entergys corrective actions to determine whether Entergy staff were properly identifying,
characterizing, and correcting problems associated with this issue and whether the
planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate. The inspectors compared the
actions taken to Entergys CAP, operability determination process, and the requirements
of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. The inspectors observed portions of baffle bolt replacement
activities at Unit 2 and reviewed the final visual examination of the baffle bolts and plates
once the work was completed.
b. Findings and Observations
One Green NCV was identified and documented in Section 1R15 of this report.
The NRC responded to the initial discovery of an unexpected number of baffle bolts
found degraded at Indian Point Unit 2 by implementing a comprehensive inspection plan
consisting of various baseline inspection samples to assess the extent of the issue and
to determine the necessary NRC actions. A follow-up inservice inspection sample
(Refer to Section 1R08) was conducted to review the capability of the non-destructive
examination techniques, evaluate the UT results, and observe a portion of bolt
replacement activities on-site. A permanent modification sample (Refer to Section
1R18) was conducted to review the design change package and evaluations associated
with the new, replacement baffle bolts. The NRC resident inspectors reviewed Entergys
foreign material controls and loose parts analysis (Refer to Section 1R20) to address the
potential for missing bolt heads and concluded it would not impact safe operation of the
plant.
NRC Region I based inspectors accompanied by an expert from the NRC Office of
Nuclear Reactor Regulation completed an annual problem identification and resolution
inspection, documented in this section of the report, to verify that Entergys evaluations
and corrective actions to replace Unit 2 baffle bolts were completed in accordance with
an NRC approved methodology to support a conclusion that the Unit 2 baffle assembly
meets the plant design basis. The inspectors also determined the adequacy of
Entergys evaluations completed to determine there is a reasonable expectation that the
33
Unit 3 baffle assembly will perform as intended during the current operating cycle. The
results of this review are discussed herein and in Section 1R15 of this report.
Entergy staff determined the cause of the degraded baffle bolts was primarily due to
IASCC in combination with increased fatigue loading on the baffle plates. This cause
determination was based on industry operating experience related to baffle-former bolt
failure in both foreign and domestic plants. IASCC is a cracking mechanism that occurs
over a long period of time when susceptible metals are exposed to neutron radiation
from the reactor core and stresses as part of normal design and operation. Entergy staff
concluded that failure of a critical number of bolts in a localized area subsequently
imposed increased loading on adjacent bolts, which propagated failures and generated
the moderate clustered pattern observed in the examination results. No other
contributing causes were identified.
The inspectors reviewed Entergys root cause evaluation and the supporting operating
experience related to baffle bolt failures at other plants. The inspectors determined that
there is documented evidence in the existing technical literature (including materials
testing of bolts from other plants) and operating experience to conclude that the likely
cause is IASCC; however, the inspectors found that Entergy staff did not define the
cause of the fatigue failure mechanism. The inspectors noted that Entergy staff sent a
sample of baffle bolts removed from the reactor pressure vessel to a metallurgical
laboratory for detailed failure analysis and materials property testing. Entergy indicated
their plans to use the results of the laboratory testing to confirm the likely root cause.
The inspectors concluded that Entergy staff conducted an appropriate review to identify
the likely causes of the degraded baffle bolts and noted that further test results will be
used to confirm these causes.
Following identification of the degraded baffle bolts on Unit 2, Entergys immediate
corrective action was to analyze the as-found condition and begin replacing bolts that
either had visual indications of bolt failure (protruding bolt head for example), did not
pass UT examination, or were not accessible for UT examination. The as-found number
and pattern of these bolts exceeded the acceptance criteria in the plants analysis that
was prepared in advance of the baffle bolt examinations; therefore, Entergy reported this
discovery to the NRC as an unanalyzed condition. Entergy staff completed corrective
actions to replace all of the 227 potentially degraded baffle bolts, plus an additional 51
bolts for increased structural integrity, for a total of 278 bolts. The inspectors noted the
51 additional bolts were installed in strategic locations to prevent clustering of potential
bolt failures during the next operating cycle.
The inspectors determined that Entergy staff performed an acceptable bolt pattern
analysis that evaluated the replacement bolt pattern for Unit 2 and modeled the potential
for future bolt failures. The inspectors found the results of the analysis accounted for a
conservative failure rate of bolts and provided appropriate margin for one cycle of
operation. The inspectors verified that Entergys methodology for its acceptable bolt
pattern analyses, including its determination of margin, was consistent with the NRC-
approved methodology in topical report WCAP-15029-NP-A (ML15222A882). The
inspectors determined that Entergy staff tracked corrective actions to re-examine the
Unit 2 baffle bolts during the next planned RFO. The inspectors noted the new baffle
bolts were made of a material with improved resistance to IASCC and included an
improved design to reduce the stresses at the head to shank transition, both of which
are enhancements compared to the original bolts.
34
As part of an extent of condition assessment, Entergy entered CR-IP3-2016-01035 in its
CAP to evaluate the potential for degraded baffle bolts on Unit 3. Entergy operators
performed an IOD and concluded that the baffle assembly was operable. Entergy staff
performed a subsequent extent of condition review that concluded Unit 3 would
experience less baffle bolt degradation than Unit 2 based on several plant factors.
Entergy also conducted sensitivity analyses to show acceptable bounding conditions in
the event of bolt failures. The inspectors reviewed Entergys evaluations and noted that
Entergy staff concluded there was not a degraded condition at Unit 3. In consideration
of the guidance in their operability procedure and operating experience from Unit 2 and
other plants, the NRC issued an NCV in this report because Entergy did not perform an
operability evaluation for Unit 3 as a follow-up to the immediate determination for the
potential impact on supported systems controlled by the TS (Refer to Section 1R15).
As a corrective action, Entergy staff performed an operability evaluation and
demonstrated that the Unit 3 baffle former assembly remained operable. The inspectors
concluded that this supplemental evaluation provided appropriate technical justification
for the continued operation of Unit 3 until the next RFO in spring 2017, at which time
Entergy plans to examine the baffle bolts. Entergy also implemented a corrective action
as part of an enhancement to plant operations to monitor the RCS for any signs of fuel
leakage, which could be an indicator of baffle bolt failures.
The inspectors reviewed Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter NSAL-16-1,
which discussed the results of recent baffle-former bolt inspections and provided
Westinghouses recommendations on this issue. The letter described the plants as most
susceptible (i.e. Tier 1a) to this degradation as Westinghouse 4-loop reactors limited to
those with a down-flow configuration and using Type 347 stainless steel bolts. The
inspectors noted the recommendation was to complete UT volumetric examination of the
baffle bolts at the next scheduled RFO, and that Entergy had already planned this action
for Unit 3. Entergy also planned a long-term corrective action to convert Units 2 and 3
from a down-flow baffle configuration to an up-flow configuration, which would
significantly reduce the load on baffle-former bolts and provide for increased structural
margin of the baffle-former assembly. The inspectors determined Entergys overall
response to the issue was commensurate with the safety significance, was timely, and
included appropriate compensatory actions. The inspectors concluded that the actions
completed and planned were reasonable to address the ongoing aging management of
4OA3 Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153 - 5 samples)
.1
Plant Events
a. Inspection Scope
For the plant events listed below, the inspectors reviewed and/or observed plant
parameters, reviewed personnel performance, and evaluated performance of mitigating
systems. The inspectors communicated the plant events to appropriate regional
personnel, and compared the event details with criteria contained in IMC 0309, Reactive
Inspection Decision Basis for Reactors, for consideration of potential reactive inspection
activities. As applicable, the inspectors verified that Entergy made appropriate
emergency classification assessments and properly reported the event in accordance
with 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73. The inspectors reviewed Entergys follow-up actions
35
related to the events to assure that Entergy implemented appropriate corrective actions
commensurate with their safety significance.
Unit 2
Turbine trip occurred while synchronizing Unit 2 to the grid on June 15, 2016
Shutdown required by TS for repairs to a leak on the 21 CCW heat exchanger
service water inlet on June 23, 2016
Unit 3
Rapid power reduction from 100 percent to 45 percent power in response to a loss of
both heater drain pumps on May 26, 2016
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2
(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000247/2015-003-00: Manual Reactor Trip
Due to Indications of Multiple Dropped Control Rods Caused by Loss of Control Rod
Power Due to a Power Supply Failure
The inspectors reviewed Entergys actions and reportability criteria associated with LER 05000247/2015-003-00, which was submitted to the NRC on February 3, 2016. On
December 5, 2015, control room operators initiated a manual reactor trip after observing
indications consistent with multiple dropped control rods following an alarm for the trip of
MCC-24/24A. No control rod indication was available due to MCC-24 being faulted and
de-energized. The direct cause of the event was the loss of MCC-24 due to an internal
fault at the line sides leads at cubicle 2H where they connect to the bucket stab
assemblies. The apparent cause was an unanticipated loss of power to the control rod
system due to the degradation of the primary control rod PS1 which failed to function
when the operating PS2 was lost. The inspectors determined that both the unexpected
failure of PS2 and the internal fault in PS1 was not within Entergys ability to foresee and
prevent and was not a performance deficiency. The inspectors reviewed the LER, the
associated apparent cause evaluation analysis, and interviewed Entergy staff. This LER
is closed.
.3
(Closed) LER 05000247/2016-003-00: TS Prohibited Condition Due to an Inoperable 21
MBFP Discharge Valve for Greater Than the TS Allowed Outage Time
The inspectors reviewed Entergys actions and reportability criteria associated with LER 05000247/2016-003-00, which was submitted to the NRC on May 6, 2016. On March 7,
2016, during the shutdown to enter 2RFO22, the control switch for the 21 MBFP was
tripped from the control room but the MBFP discharge valve BFD-2-21 failed to fully
close as designed. The MBFP discharge valve was declared inoperable and TS 3.7.3
Condition C was entered. The MFD-2-21 isolation valve was then manually closed. The
direct cause of the failure to close the MBFP discharge valve BFD-2-21 was the motor
operated valves (MOVs) close torque switch contact finger out of position. The
apparent cause was that the MOV preventative maintenance procedure lacked the level
of detail and direction due to an unrecognized susceptibility associated with the
orientation of the close torque switch contact finger bracket opening and spreading of
36
the U shape bracket. The downward arrangement made it easier for the torque switch
contact finger to move out with spreading of the U shaped contact holder. The
inspectors reviewed the LER, the associated apparent cause evaluation analysis, and
interviewed Entergy staff. This LER is closed.
Introduction. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(b)(1) for Entergys
failure to include a function of a safety-related system within the scope of the
maintenance rule program. Specifically, Entergy failed to include the feedwater isolation
function performed by the MBFP discharge valves, MBFPs, and feedwater regulating
valves and feedwater isolation valves which are required to remain functional during and
following a design basis event to mitigate the consequences of an accident, within the
scope of the maintenance rule monitoring program.
Description. On March 7, 2016, during an RFO, the control switch for the 21 MBFP was
positioned to trip and the 21 MBFP tripped as designed, but the MBFP discharge valve
BFD-2-21 failed to fully close. Entergy declared MBFP discharge valve BFD-2-21
inoperable and entered TS 3.7.3 Condition C. After troubleshooting, Entergy determined
the MOV close torque switch contact finger was out of position within the contact holder.
The misalignment allowed the contact finger to move out of the proper position causing
the MOV BFD-2-21 to fail to close. This is the same failure mechanism which caused
MOV BFD-2-21 to fail to close in 2010 which is referenced in CR-IP2-2010-07013. On
December 5, 2015, the 21 MBFP failed to trip and required closure of the steam
admission valves to secure it. This failure occurred because of contaminated control oil
that prevented the solenoid valves from operating.
The inspectors reviewed Entergys maintenance rule basis documents and identified the
feedwater isolation function was not properly included in the maintenance rule
monitoring program as required by 10 CFR 50.65(b)(1). The basis document for the
feedwater system did identify the need to monitor the feedwater isolation function under
the maintenance rule and stated that it would be monitored as a part of the vapor
containment supersystem. However, the basis document for the vapor containment
supersystem does not include the feedwater isolation components within the system
boundaries. As a result, when component failures occurred which affected the
feedwater isolation function, they were not reviewed to determine if they were
maintenance rule functional failures; and Entergy was unable to identify that the
performance of the main feedwater isolation equipment was not effectively controlled
through preventative maintenance. Entergy entered this issue into the CAP as
CR-IP2-2016-03963 and initiated actions to include the MBFP discharge valves into the
Analysis. The failure to appropriately scope the safety-related feedwater isolation
function within the maintenance rule program was a performance deficiency. This
finding is more than minor because it is associated with the SSC and barrier
performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone
objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the
public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the failure
to properly scope the feedwater isolation function prevented Entergy from identifying that
equipment reliability was no longer effectively controlled through preventative
maintenance. Additionally, this issue is similar to example 7.d described in IMC 0612,
Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, dated August 11, 2009. In accordance with
IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix
37
A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, issued June 19,
2012, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance
(Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical
integrity of reactor containment, containment isolation system, and heat removal
components. There are redundant methods of feedwater isolation. They include
tripping the MBFPs and closing the MBFP discharge valves, closing the main feedwater
regulating valves and low flow bypass valves, and closing the main feedwater isolation
valves. On both December 5, 2015, and March 7, 2016, the main feedwater regulating
valves and isolation valves were functional; so there was no loss of the ability to isolate
feedwater to mitigate accident and transient conditions.
This finding does not have a cross-cutting aspect, since the failure to scope this
equipment into the maintenance rule program was not recognized when Entergy
combined the maintenance rule basis documents for Units 2 and 3 in 2012 and as a
result, is not indicative of current licensee performance.
Enforcement. 10 CFR 50.65(b)(1) requires, in part, that the holders of an operating
license shall include within the scope of the monitoring program, specified in
10 CFR 50.65(a)(1), SSCs that are relied upon to remain functional during and following
design basis events. Contrary to the above, since the combined maintenance rule
scoping for Units 2 and 3 in 2012, Entergy failed to include within the scope of the
monitoring program specified in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1), the safety-related MBFP discharge
valves. These SSCs are relied upon during and after design basis events to mitigate the
consequences of a feedwater line break accident inside containment. Entergys
corrective action included entering this issue into the corrective action program.
Because the violation was of very low safety significance (Green) and Entergy entered
this issue into their CAP as CR-IP2-2016-03963, this violation is being treated as an
NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
(NCV 05000247/2016002-04, Failure to Scope Safety-Related Main Boiler Feedwater
Pump Discharge Valves into the Maintenance Rule Program)
4OA5 Other Activities
.1
Groundwater Contamination
a. Inspection Scope
On February 5, 2016, Entergy notified the NRC of a significant increase in groundwater
tritium levels measured at three monitoring wells (MWs) (MW-30, MW-31, and MW-32)
located near the Unit 2 fuel storage building. These samples were drawn on
January 26 to 27, 2016, and analyzed and confirmed on February 2 to 4, 2016. The
highest concentration was detected at MW-32, which increased from 12,000 pCi/l on
January 11, 2016, to 8,100,000 pCi/l on January 26, 2016, and subsequently up to
14,800,000 pCi/l on February 4, 2016. This increased tritium concentration event was
documented by Entergy in CR-IP2-2016-00564 which documents its investigation of this
event including a root cause evaluation. The inspectors reviewed Entergys root cause
evaluation for this event during this inspection period as well as recent groundwater
monitoring results.
38
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified.
Update to URI 05000247/2016001-07, January 2016 Groundwater Contamination
Entergy continues to conduct weekly, biweekly, and monthly groundwater sampling of
MWs at the initial site of groundwater contamination and at downstream wells towards
the Hudson River. For the initial three MWs (MW-30, MW-31, and MW-32), the general
trend in tritium activity has been downward, with periodic increases seen in some weekly
samples. The downstream MWs located in the Unit 2 switchyard (especially MW-55)
showed an initial increase in activity up to 117,000 pCi/l, but the activity at that location
has plateaued at the end of the reporting period.
Entergy documented its investigation of this event as root cause evaluation for
CR-IP2-2016-00564. The inspectors reviewed Entergys root cause evaluation for this
event. Entergy concluded that the source of the groundwater contamination was from
the reject water of a temporary reverse osmosis unit used to process water from the
refueling water storage tank at Unit 2 in preparation for RFO 2R22. Although this
analysis documents a number of issues identified during the operation of the contractor
reverse osmosis unit, which is believed to be the source of the groundwater
contamination, one of two leakage paths to groundwater have still not been established.
The established pathway involves leakage from two cut drain lines located above the
floor on the 35-foot elevation of the PAB. Further investigation by Entergy following the
conclusion of the Unit 2 RFO 2R22 must be conducted to verify the second pathway to
groundwater via the floor of the fuel storage building truck bay.
Entergys long-term corrective action for reducing tritium levels in the groundwater is the
same as previously identified for the March 2014 tritium spike (CR-IP2-2015-03806), the
start-up and operation of recovery well (RW)-1. Following installation of equipment and
system testing, full operation of the RW system is expected later this year. This system
will allow for the collection of tritiated groundwater in the vicinity of Unit 2 to be returned
inside the Unit 2 PAB for processing. The NRC will be conducting an inspection in
August 2016 to review the testing plan and results of the RW-1 tests. This inspection
will include a specialist region-based inspector, and a staff hydrogeologist.
The NRCs continuing assessment of the safety significance of this event focused on
validating the safety impact of dose to the public from the release of tritium to the site
groundwater, and ultimately to the Hudson River. The NRC verified that Entergys
bounding public dose calculations on the groundwater contamination leak was
sufficiently conservative and a maximum worst case scenario would result in a dose of
0.000112 millirem per year, which represents a very small fraction of the allowable dose
(liquid effluent dose objective of 3 millirem per year). This low value is due to
groundwater at Indian Point not being a source of any drinking water. There are no
drinking water wells on the Indian Point site, groundwater flow from the site is to the
Hudson River and not to any near site drinking water wells, and the Hudson River has
no downstream drinking water intakes as it is brackish water. Pathways to the public are
therefore limited to the consumption of fish and river invertebrates. The inspection
determined that there is no safety impact to the public as a result of this groundwater
contamination event. (URI 05000247/2016001-07, January 2016 Groundwater
Contamination)
39
.2
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Report Review
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors also reviewed the final report for the INPO equipment reliability scram
review visit that was conducted to review the scrams that occurred over the past two
years, conducted in June 2016. The inspectors reviewed the report to ensure that any
issues identified were consistent with NRC perspectives of Entergy performance and to
determine if INPO identified any significant safety issues that required further NRC
follow-up.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
On August 4, 2016, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Larry Coyle,
Site Vice President, and other members of Entergy. Based on additional information
provided, the inspectors conducted an updated exit meeting on August 30, 2016 with
John Kirkpatrick, Plant Operations General Manager and other members of Entergy.
The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or
documented in this report.
ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
A-1
Attachment
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Entergy Personnel
A. Vitale, Site Vice President
J. Kirkpatrick, Plant Operations General Manager
R. Alexander, Unit 2 Shift Manager
R. Andersen, Maintenance Instrumentation and Controls Superintendent
N. Azevedo, Engineering Supervisor
J. Baker, Shift Manager
S. Bianco, Operations Fire Marshal
K. Brooks, Assistant Operations Manager
R. Burroni, Engineering Director
T. Chan, Engineering Supervisor
C. Chapin, Training Superintendent
D. Dewey, Assistant Operations Manager
J. Dignam, Unit 3 Control Room Supervisor
R. Dolansky, Inservice Inspection Program Manager
W. Durr, Outage Control Center Manager
R. Drake, Engineering Supervisor
K. Elliott, Fire Protection Engineer
J. Ferrick, Regulatory and Performance Improvement Director
L. Frink, Radiation Protection Supervisor
D. Gagnon, Security Manager
L. Glander, Emergency Preparedness Manager
D. Gray, Radiological Environmental Manager
J. Johnson, Unit 2 Control Room Supervisor
M. Johnson, Unit 3 Shift Manager
M. Khadabux, Instrumentation and Controls Supervisor
F. Kich, Performance Improvement Manager
M. Lewis, Unit 3 Assistant Operations Manager
N. Lizzo, Training Manager
S. McAllister, Baffle Bolt Replacement Project Manager
M. McCarthy, Unit 3 Control Room Supervisor
B. McCarthy, Operations Manager
F. Mitchell, Radiation Protection Manager
E. Mullek, Maintenance Manager
S. Stevens, Radiation Protection Operations Superintendent
B. Sullivan, Training Superintendent
J. Taylor, Unit 3 Shift Manager
M. Tesoriero, Outage Control Center Manager
M. Troy, Nuclear Oversight Manager
R. Walpole, Regulatory Assurance Manager
A. Zastrow, Assistant Operations Manager
A-2
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED
Opened 05000247/2016002-01
CVCS Goal Monitoring Under the Maintenance
Rule (Section 1R12)
Opened/Closed 05000286/2016002-02
Failure to Follow Operability Determination
Procedure for Unit 3 Baffle-Former Bolts
(Section 1R15)05000247/2016002-03
Failure to Maintain Flow Channeling Gates Closed
in Accordance with the Containment Procedure
(Section 1R20)05000247/2016002-04
Failure to Scope Safety-Related Main Boiler
Feedwater Pump Discharge Valves into the
Maintenance Rule Program (Section 4OA3)
Closed
05000247/2015-003-00
LER
Manual Reactor Trip due to Indications of Multiple
Dropped Control Rods Caused by Loss of Control
Rod Power Due to a Power Supply Failure
(Section 4OA3)
05000247/2016-003-00
LER
Technical Specification Prohibited Condition
Due to an Inoperable 21 Main Boiler Feedwater
Pump Discharge Valve for Greater Than the TS
Allowed Outage Time (Section 4OA3)
Discussed 05000247/2016001-01
Baffle-Former Bolts with Identified Anomalies
(Section 1R08)05000247/2016001-06
Emergency Diesel Generator Automatic Voltage
Regulator Failure (Section 1R15)05000247/2016001-07
January 2016 Groundwater Contamination
Section (Section 4OA5)
A-3
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Common Documents Used
Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, UFSARs
Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, Individual Plant Examinations
Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, Individual Plant Examination of External Events
Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, TSs and Bases
Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, Technical Requirements Manuals
Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, Control Room Narrative Logs
Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, Plans of the Day
Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment
Procedures
2-COL-4.2.1, Residual Heat Removal System, Revision 30
2-COL-4.3.1, Spent Fuel Pit Cooling, Revision 10
2-COL-24.1.1, Service Water System, Revision 50
3-COL-EL-005, Diesel Generators, Revision 37
OAP-019, Component Verification and System Status Control, Revision 7
OAP-044, Plant Labeling Program, Revision 3
Condition Reports (CR-IP2)
2016-01311
2016-01505
2016-01761
2016-02330
2016-02428
2016-02470
Condition Reports (CR-IP3)
2016-01382
2016-01810
Drawings
209762, Flow Diagram Service Water System Nuclear Steam Supply Plant, Revision 75
227781, Flow Diagram Auxiliary Coolant System, Revision 22
9321-2720, Auxiliary Coolant System, Sheet 2, Revision 22
Miscellaneous
IP3-DBD-308, CCW System, Revision 3
Section 1R05: Fire Protection
Procedures
EN-MA-133, Control of Scaffolding, Revision 12
Condition Reports (CR-IP2)
2016-04148
Condition Reports (CR-IP3)
2016-01272
Miscellaneous
PFP-203, Containment Building, 95-Foot Elevation (Fire Zone 86A), Revision 15
PFP-204, General Floor Plan, PAB, 15-Foot Elevation, Revision 0
PFP-209, Component Cooling Pump Room, PAB, 68-Foot Elevation, Revision 0
PFP-211, General Floor Plan, PAB, 80-Foot Elevation, Revision 14
PFP-351, 480V Switchgear Room, Revision 15
A-4
Section 1R07: Heat Sink Performance
Procedures
0-HTX-405-EDG, EDG Lube Oil and Jacket Water Heat Exchanger Maintenance, Revision 4
Condition Reports (CR-IP3)
2010-02900
2011-03594
2011-03596
2011-03961
2012-02071
2012-03912
2013-02338
2013-02695
2013-03009
2014-00957
2014-01239
2014-03158
2014-03175
2015-00031
2015-00599
2015-02848
2015-05209
2015-05526
2016-00886
2016-00895
2016-00899
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
Miscellaneous
SEP-SW-IPC-001, Indian Point Energy Center NRC Generic Letter 89-13 Service Water
Program, Revision 0
Section 1R08: Inservice Inspection Activities
Procedures
GBRA-104-659, Collection of Protocols for Baffle Bolt Replacement, Revision C
GBRA-175-115, Field Service Procedure for Baffle Bolt Replacement, Revision 3
WDI-STD-088, Underwater Remote Visual Examination of Reactor Vessel Internals,
Revision 13
WDI-STD-1073, Ultrasonic Test Procedure for the Inspection of Internal Hex Head
Baffle-Former Bolts with Welded Lock Bars, Revision 4
Condition Reports (CR-IP2)
2016-02081
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
442412-13
Miscellaneous
Indian Point Unit 2 Baffle Bolt Ultrasonic Examination Expanded Analysis Report, dated
April 28, 2016
IP2 Reactor Vessel Visual Examination Report, dated May 2006
Loose Parts Inventory Log for Baffle Bolt Replacements, dated May 24, 2016
MRP-227-A, Materials Reliability Program: Pressurized Water Reactor Internals Inspection and
Evaluation Guidelines (ML120170453)
MRP-228, Materials Reliability Program: Inspection Standard for PWR Internals - 2012 Update,
Revision 1
SEP-ISI-IP2-001, IP2 Fourth Ten-Year Interval Inservice Inspection (ISI)/Containment Inservice
Inspection (CISI) Program Plan, Revision 2
WDI-PJF-1315504-EPP-001, Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant MRP-227-A Reactor Vessel
Internals Examination Program Plan, Revision 0
WDI-PJF-1315505-FSR-001, Indian Point Unit 2 2R22 MRP-227-A Baffle-Former Bolt
Ultrasonic Inspections Field Service Report, dated March 29, 2016
WDI-TJ-1100, Technical Justification for the Ultrasonic Inspection of Baffle-Former Bolts for
Indian Point Units 2 and 3, Revision 1
A-5
Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program
Procedures
2-AOP-480V-1, Loss of Normal Power to Any 480V Vital Bus, Revision 8
2-AOP-RCP-1, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction, Revision 14
2-AOP-TURB-1, Main Turbine Trip without a Reactor Trip, Revision 5
2-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Revision 7
2-FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, Revision 11
2-POP-1.2, Reactor Startup, Revision 59
2-SOP-26.4, Turbine Generator Startup, Synchronizing, Voltage Control and Shutdown,
Revision 62
3-AOP-480V-1, Loss of Normal Power to Any Safeguards Bus, Revision 7
3-AOP-CVCS-1, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, Revision 8
3-AOP-FW-1, Loss of Feedwater, Revision 8
3-AOP-INST-1, Instrument/Controller Failures, Revision 11
3-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Revision 6
3-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Revision 4
3-FR-C.2, Response to Degraded Core Cooling, Revision 3
Condition Reports (CR-IP2)
2016-03946
2016-04162
2016-04164
2016-04165
2016-04169
2016-04178
Condition Reports (CR-IP3)
2016-01087
2016-01092
2016-01098
2016-01336
Miscellaneous
13SX-LOR-SES026, Licensed Operator Requalification Program Scenario
Emergency Action Level Table, Revision 15.2
LRQ-SES-04, IPEC Simulator Evaluated Scenario, Revision 6
Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness
Procedures
CEP-NDE-0640, Non-Section XI Liquid Penetrant Examination, Revision 9
CEP-WP-WIIR-1, Attachment 5.1, Inprocess Inspections for Installation and Replacement
Welds Located Inside the ASME Section XI Boundary, Revision 3
EN-DC-206, Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Process, Revision 3
Condition Reports (CR-IP2)
2010-00864
2013-03130
2014-00162
2014-00185
2014-01144
2014-02184
2015-00278
2016-01260
2016-01430
2016-01500
Condition Reports (CR-IP3)
2012-03836
2013-04758
2015-01396
2015-03404
2015-03653
2015-04053
2015-04162
2015-04184
2015-04539
2015-05316
2015-05384
2015-05729
A-6
2016-00098
2016-00653
2016-00723
2016-01189
2016-01227
2016-01274
2016-01313
2016-01531
2016-01536
2016-01543
2016-02432
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
Miscellaneous
EC 65389, 21 CCW HX Leak Repair: Service Water Inlet Nozzle - Elbow Weld Configuration
Change
IPEC Maintenance Rule Basis Document - Chemical and Volume Control System, Revision 0
PQR 913, 134 F42 MN-GTAW ASME IX Welding Procedure Qualification Record, Revision 0
System Health Report, Unit 3, EDG, Q1-2016
Weld Map Number 447966-20-01, Revision 0
WPS 134 F42, MN-GTAW, ASME Section IX Welding Procedure Specification, Revision 0
Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Procedures
EN-OP-119, Protected Equipment, Revision 8
IP-SMM-OU-104, Attachment 9.1, Shiftly Outage Shutdown Safety Assessments, Revision 15
IP-SMM-OU-104, Attachment 9.2, Shiftly Outage Shutdown Safety Assessment Guidelines,
Revision 15
Condition Reports (CR-IP2)
2016-04141
Condition Reports (CR-IP3)
2016-01545
Miscellaneous
EOOS Risk Assessment Software Tool
Section 1R15: Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Procedures
2-PC-R3-1, Pressurizer Level Transmitters, Revision 10
3-ARP-010, Metal Impact Monitoring System, Page 10, Revision 32
3-SOP-RCS-016, Operation of the Metal Impact Monitoring System, Revision 8
EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, Revision 10
Condition Reports (CR-IP2)
2016-2221
2016-2356
2016-2961
2016-3345
2016-3418
2016-3660
2016-3636
2016-3784
2016-3806
2016-3818
2016-4085
Condition Reports (CR-IP3)
2014-01670
2015-03468
A-7
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
Miscellaneous
EN-LI-100, Attachment 9.1, Change Channel Check Comparison Criteria/2-PT-M100,
2-PT-D001, Revision 0
Section 1R18: Plant Modifications
Drawings
10073E87-001, Indian Point Unit 2 Baffle Bolt Replacement - Core Barrel and Baffle Assembly
Elevation, Revision 0
10111D06, Indian Point Unit 2 Baffle Bolt Replacement - Replacement Baffle Bolt .625
and .750, Revision 0
Miscellaneous
EC 64308, IP2 Reactor Vessel Equivalent Replacement Baffle-to-Former Bolt, Revision 0
Process Applicability Determination Form for EC 64308, dated April 21, 2016
WCAP-18136-P, Replacement Type 316 Cold-Worked Baffle-Former Bolt Qualification for
Indian Point Unit 2, Revision 0
Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing
Procedures
3-PT-M079B, 32 EDG Functional Test, Revision 52
2-PC-Q109-4, Recalibration of NIS and OT/OP Delta-T Parameters - Channel IV, Revision 44
Condition Reports (CR-IP2)
2016-03961
2016-04266
Condition Reports (CR-IP3)
2016-01189
2016-01199
2016-01218
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
Drawings
5651D72, Logic Diagrams Steam Generator Trip Signals, Revision 7
Miscellaneous
EC 64545, Emergency Temporary Modification to Disconnect 32 EDG Generator Space Heater
Adjacent to End Plate on Outboard End of Generator
FIX00091, Pressurizer Level Uncertainty - Indication, Trip Setpoints, and Annunciation
Setpoints, Revision 1
E-mail from J. Michetti to G. Newman, dated July 19, 2016, Subject: Westinghouse Report
on E9
A-8
Section 1R20: Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Procedures
2-POP-1.1, Plant Heatup from Cold Shutdown, Revision 90
2-POP-1.2, Reactor Startup, Revision 59
2-POP-1.3, Plant Startup from Zero to 45 Percent Power, Revision 89
2-POP-3.1, Plant Shutdown from 45 Percent Power, Revision 58
2-POP-3.3, Plant Cooldown, Hot to Cold Shutdown, Revision 81
2-POP-3.4, Secondary Plant Shutdown, Revision 10
2-POP-4.1, Operation at Cold Shutdown, Revision 5
2-POP-4.2, Operation Below 20 Percent Pressurizer Level with Fuel in the Reactor, Revision 8
2-POP-4.3, Operation without Fuel in the Reactor, Revision 1
Condition Reports (CR-IP2-)
2016-04118
2016-04119
2016-04123
2016-03124
2016-04126
2016-04129
2016-04130
2016-04131
2016-04132
2016-04139
2016-04141* 2016-04142*
2016-04144
2016-04145
2016-04146
2016-04148* 2016-04151
2016-04152
2016-04155
2016-04161
2016-04162
2016-04165
2016-04169
- NRC identified
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
52681465
Miscellaneous
2R22 Performance Indicator Curves Daily from March 7 to June 14, 2016
Outage Schedules and Plans of the Day from March 7 to June 14, 2016
Westinghouse LTR-PL-16-16, Operability Assessment for Primary Side Loose Parts at Indian
Point Unit 2, Revision 0, dated March 27, 2016
Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing
Procedures
0-SOP-LEAKRATE-001, RCS Leakrate Surveillance Evaluation and Leak Identification,
Revision 6
2-PT-D001, Control Room Operations Surveillance Requirements, Revision 16
2-PT-M029B, 22 Safety Injection Pump, Revision 20
2-PT-Q013, Inservice Valve Tests, Revision 51
2-PT-Q013-DS040, Valve 887B Inservice Test Data Sheet, Revision 22
3-PT-M079B, 32 EDG Functional Test, Revision 52
Condition Reports (CR-IP2)
2016-03360
2016-03363
Condition Reports (CR-IP3)
2016-01716
2016-01752
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
A-9
Miscellaneous
EC 64855, EC Reply to Provide Input Regarding MPR Maintenance Bulletin MB-2007-01 for
Auto Voltage Regulator Solder Joints
MB-2007-01, Potential for Solder Joint Cracks on Basler SBSR Auto Voltage Regulator Cards
and Technical Manual Addendum TM-2007-01, November 5, 2007
Unit 3 RCS Routine Activity Sample, 28-June-16-10006
Section 1EP6: Drill Evaluation
Procedures
IP-EP-120, Emergency Classification, Revision 10
IP-EP-410, Protective Action Recommendations, Revision 11
Section 2RS7: Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
Procedures
0-CY-1920, REMP Land Use Census, Revision 1
0-CY-1980, Preparation, Placement and Collection of Site Environmental Thermoluminescent
Dosimeters, Revision 2
Condition Reports (CR-IP2)
2014-05319
2015-00948
2015-01300
2015-02687
2015-02800
2015-02987
2015-03271
2015-03396
2016-02313
Condition Reports (CR-IP3)
2016-00514
Miscellaneous
2014 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report, Indian Point Nos. 1, 2, and 3
2015 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report, Indian Point Nos. 1, 2, and 3
Environmental Dosimetry Company, Annual Quality Assurance Status Report,
January to December 2015
Indian Point Energy Center ODCM, Revision 4
June 2015 to May 2016 Meteorological Data Recovery
Met One Instruments, Inc. Certificates of Calibration for Temperature, Wind Direction, and Wind
Speed
Teledyne Brown Engineering Environmental Services Annual 2015 Quality Assurance Report
Exelon PowerLabs Certificates of Calibration for Gas Meters
3471875
3482909
3471871
3471867
3482920
3471873
3482910
3482916
3471877
3482914
3482918
3482921
3471881
3471879
3471872
3471869
3471880
3482908
Quality Assurance
Quality Assurance Audit Report QA-2-6-2015-IP-1, Chemistry, Effluents, and Environmental
Monitoring Snapshot Self-Assessment, LO-IP3LO-2015-00126, Chemistry-REMP
Section 4OA2: Problem Identification and Resolution
Procedures
EN-DC-204, Maintenance Rule Scope and Basis, Revision 3
EN-DC-204, Maintenance Rule Scope and Basis, Revision 3
EN-DC-207, Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment, Revision 3
A-10
EN-LI-102, Corrective Action Program, Revision 26
EN-LI-104, Self-Assessment and Benchmark Process, Revision 11
EN-LI-110-01, Equipment Failure Evaluation, Revision 0
EN-LI-119, Apparent Cause Evaluation Process, Revision 11
EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, Revision 10
Condition Reports (CR-IP2)
2010-07013
2015-04574
2015-05458
2015-05460
2015-05461
2015-05464
2015-05466
2015-05467
2016-01374
2016-02348
Condition Reports (CR-IP3)
2015-3628
2016-01035
2016-01961
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
Apparent Cause Evaluations
Drawings
504405, Sheet 1 of 2, Replacement Baffle Bolt Location Matrix, Revision 0
504405, Sheet 2 of 2, Replacement Baffle Bolt Location Matrix, Revision 0
Miscellaneous
61265, Temporary Modification Control Form-Install Additional Temporary Spare Power Supply
Inside Rod Control Cabinet 2BD to Restore Margin, Revision 0
Appendix A to Facility Operating License DPR-64, Technical Specifications and Basis For The
Indian Point 3 Nuclear Generating Station Unit No.3, Through Amendment 260
CN-RIDA-15-43, Indian Point Units 2 and 3 Acceptable Baffle-Former Bolting LOCA and
Seismic Analysis, Revision 2
Engineering Change 63938, As-left condition of the baffle-former plate assembly following the
replacement of degraded bolts, Revision 0
EPRI TR-112209, Analysis of Baffle Former Bolt Cracking in EDF CPO Plants (PWRMRP-03),
dated June 1999
Indian Point Entergy Center (IPEC) Unit 3, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, dated May
2013
IP-RPT-16-00025, Evaluation of Indian Point Unit 3 Reactor Core Baffle Bolting Following MRP-
227-A Inspection Findings at Indian Point Unit 2 during 2R22, Revision 0
LTR-PL-16-21, Transmittal of Indian Point Unit 3 Final Engineering Evaluations Supporting
Extent of Condition Review, Revision 0
LTR-RIDA-16-103, Indian Point Unit 2 Baffle Bolting Anti-Clustering Pattern and Margin
Assessment, Revision 0
LTR-RIDA-16-152, Indian Point Unit 3 Baffle Bolt Leak Before Break Operability Assessment,
Revision 0
LTR-RIDA-16-60, Indian Point Unit 2 Baffle Bolting One Cycle Replacement Pattern Summary
Letter, Revision 0
MRP-227-A, Materials Reliability Program: Pressurized Water Reactor Internals Inspection and
Evaluation Guidelines (ML120170453)
Operation Decision Making Issue Action Plan for IP3 Baffle Bolt Monitoring, dated May 19, 2016
WCAP-15029-NP-A, Westinghouse Methodology for Evaluating the Acceptability of Baffle-
Former-Barrel Bolting Distributions Under Faulted Load Conditions, Revision 0
A-11
WCAP-17949-P, Background and Technical Basis Supporting Engineering Flaw Acceptance
Criteria for Indian Point Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Internals MRP-227-A Primary and
Expansion Components, Revision 1
WCAP-18048-P, Determination of Acceptable Baffle-Former Bolting for Indian Point Units 2 and
3, Revision 0
Section 4OA5: Other Activities
Miscellaneous
INPO Letter, INPO Equipment Reliability Scram Review Visit, May 31, 2016
Root Cause Evaluation for CR-IP2-2016-00564
A-12
LIST OF ACRONYMS
10 CFR
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
Agencywide Document Access and Management System
as low as is reasonably achievable
corrective action program
component cooling water
CR
condition report
chemical and volume control system
EC
engineering change
groundwater protection initiative
irradiation-assisted stress-corrosion cracking
IMC
Inspection Manual Chapter
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
LER
licensee event report
loss-of-coolant accident
main boiler feedwater pump
motor control center
motor operated valve
materials reliability program
monitoring well
non-cited violation
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S.
offsite dose calculation manual
out of service
PAB
primary auxiliary building
pre-fire plan
radiological environmental monitoring program
refueling outage
recovery well
safety injection
structure, system, and component
TS
technical specification
updated final safety evaluation report
unresolved item
ultrasonic testing
work order