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{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I 2100 RENAISSANCE BLVD. KING OF PRUSSIA, PA  19406-2713  
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES  
  August 30, 2016  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION I  
2100 RENAISSANCE BLVD.  
KING OF PRUSSIA, PA  19406-2713  
August 30, 2016  
   
   
Mr. Anthony J. Vitale  
Mr. Anthony J. Vitale  
Site Vice President Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Indian Point Energy Center  
Site Vice President  
 
Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.  
Indian Point Energy Center  
450 Broadway, GSB  
450 Broadway, GSB  
P.O. Box 249  
P.O. Box 249  
Buchanan, NY 10511-0249  
Buchanan, NY 10511-0249  
 
SUBJECT: INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING - INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000247/2016002 AND 05000286/2016002  
SUBJECT:  
INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING - INTEGRATED INSPECTION  
REPORT 05000247/2016002 AND 05000286/2016002  
   
   
Dear Mr. Vitale:  
Dear Mr. Vitale:  
 
On June 30, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory  
On June 30, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at  
Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Indian Point Nuclear Generating (Indian Point), Units 2 and 3.  The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on August 4, 2016, with Larry  
your Indian Point Nuclear Generating (Indian Point), Units 2 and 3.  The enclosed inspection  
report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on August 4, 2016, with Larry  
Coyle and other members of your staff.  Based on additional information provided, the  
Coyle and other members of your staff.  Based on additional information provided, the  
inspectors conducted an updated exit meeting on August 30, 2016 with John Kirkpatrick, Plant Operations General Manager and other members of your staff.   
inspectors conducted an updated exit meeting on August 30, 2016 with John Kirkpatrick, Plant  
Operations General Manager and other members of your staff.   
   
   
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.   
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and  
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.   
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed  
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed  
personnel.  
personnel.  
  This report documents three NRC-identified findings of very low safety significance (Green).  These findings involved violations of NRC requirement
   
s.  However, because of the very low safety significance, and because they are entered into your corrective action program, the NRC  
This report documents three NRC-identified findings of very low safety significance (Green).   
is treating these findings as non-cited violations, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.  If you contest any non-cited violation in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to  
These findings involved violations of NRC requirements.  However, because of the very low  
safety significance, and because they are entered into your corrective action program, the NRC  
is treating these findings as non-cited violations, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC  
Enforcement Policy.  If you contest any non-cited violation in this report, you should provide a  
response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to  
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:  Document Control Desk, Washington, DC  
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:  Document Control Desk, Washington, DC  
20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of  
20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of  
Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the  
Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the  
NRC Senior Resident Inspector at Indian Point.  In addition, if you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assigned to any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the  
NRC Senior Resident Inspector at Indian Point.  In addition, if you disagree with the  
cross-cutting aspect assigned to any finding in this report, you should provide a response within  
30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the  
Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at Indian Point.  
Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at Indian Point.  


 
A. Vitale  
A. Vitale -2-  
-2-  
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390 of the NRCs
Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be
available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the
Publicly Available Records component of the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS).  ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
   
   
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390 of the NRCs "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be
available electronically for public inspection in the NRC's Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS).  ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
      Sincerely,        /RA/
        Glenn T. Dentel, Chief      Reactor Projects Branch 2
      Division of Reactor Projects
   
   
Docket Nos. 50-247 and 50-286 License Nos. DPR-26 and DPR-64  
  Enclosure:  
Inspection Report 05000247/2016002 and 05000286/2016002  w/Attachment:  Supplementary Information  
/RA/
  cc w/encl:  Distribution via ListServ
Glenn T. Dentel, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos.  
50-247 and 50-286  
License Nos. DPR-26 and DPR-64  
   
Enclosure:  
Inspection Report 05000247/2016002 and 05000286/2016002  
   w/Attachment:  Supplementary Information  
   
cc w/encl:  Distribution via ListServ  




  ML16243A245
  ML16243A245  
  SUNSI Review
  Non-Sensitive  Sensitive
Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available
OFFICE RI/DRP RI/DRP RI/DRS RI/DRP RI/DRP
NAME BHaagensen/bh
NFloyd/nf MGray/mg GDentel/gtd MScott/dlp for DATE 8/29/16 8/24/16 8/30/16 8/30/16 8/30/16
   
   
1  Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
SUNSI Review
REGION I  Docket Nos.  50-247 and 50-286
   
   
Non-Sensitive
Sensitive
   
   
License Nos.  DPR-26 and DPR-64


  Report Nos. 05000247/2016002 and 05000286/2016002
Publicly Available
 
Non-Publicly Available
OFFICE
RI/DRP
RI/DRP
RI/DRS
RI/DRP
RI/DRP
NAME
BHaagensen/bh
   
NFloyd/nf
MGray/mg
GDentel/gtd
MScott/dlp for
DATE
8/29/16
8/24/16
8/30/16
8/30/16
8/30/16


1
Enclosure
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Docket Nos.
50-247 and 50-286
License Nos. 
DPR-26 and DPR-64
Report Nos.
05000247/2016002 and 05000286/2016002
Licensee:
Entergy Nuclear Northeast (Entergy)
Facility:
Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3
Location:
450 Broadway, GSB
Buchanan, NY 10511-0249
Dates: 
April 1, 2016, through June 30, 2016
Inspectors:
B. Haagensen, Senior Resident Inspector
G. Newman, Resident Inspector
S. Rich, Resident Inspector
S. Galbreath, Reactor Inspector
J. Furia, Senior Health Physicist
N. Floyd, Senior Project Engineer
K. Mangan, Senior Reactor Inspector
J. Poehler, Senior Materials Engineer
Approved By: 
Glenn T. Dentel, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects
   
   
   
   
Licensee:  Entergy Nuclear Northeast (Entergy)
 
Facility:  Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3


2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................... 3
REPORT DETAILS ....................................................................................................................... 5
1.
REACTOR SAFETY .............................................................................................................. 5
1R04
Equipment Alignment .................................................................................................. 5
1R05
Fire Protection ............................................................................................................. 6
1R07
Heat Sink Performance ............................................................................................... 7
1R08
Inservice Inspection Activities ..................................................................................... 7
1R11
Licensed Operator Requalification Program ............................................................... 8
1R12
Maintenance Effectiveness ....................................................................................... 10
1R13
Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control .................................. 13
1R15
Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments ..................................... 14
1R18
Plant Modifications .................................................................................................... 19
1R19
Post-Maintenance Testing ........................................................................................ 20
1R20
Refueling and Other Outage Activities ...................................................................... 21
1R22
Surveillance Testing .................................................................................................. 24
1EP6
Drill Evaluation .......................................................................................................... 25
2.
RADIATION SAFETY .......................................................................................................... 25
2RS1
Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls ........................................ 25
2RS2
Occupational As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning
and Controls .............................................................................................................. 26
2RS7
Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) ........................................ 26
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES ............................................................................................................ 27
4OA1
Performance Indicator Verification ............................................................................ 27
4OA2
Problem Identification and Resolution ....................................................................... 28
4OA3
Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion .................................... 34
4OA5
Other Activities .......................................................................................................... 37
4OA6
Meetings, Including Exit ............................................................................................ 39
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION ........................................................................................ A-1
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT .................................................................................................... A-1
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED ..................................... A-2
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED ........................................................................................ A-3
LIST OF ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................. A-12
   
   
Location:  450 Broadway, GSB    Buchanan, NY 10511-0249


3
   
   
   
   
Dates:  April 1, 2016, through June 30, 2016
SUMMARY
 
  Inspectors:  B. Haagensen, Senior Resident Inspector
  G. Newman, Resident Inspector
  S. Rich, Resident Inspector
  S. Galbreath, Reactor Inspector J. Furia, Senior Health Physicist N. Floyd, Senior Project Engineer
K. Mangan, Senior Reactor Inspector
J. Poehler, Senior Materials Engineer
   
   
Approved By:  Glenn T. Dentel, Chief    Reactor Projects Branch 2
Inspection Report 05000247/2016002 and 05000286/2016002; 04/01/2016 - 06/30/2016; Indian  
  Division of Reactor Projects
Point Nuclear Generating (Indian Point), Units 2 and 3; Operability Determinations and  
 
Functionality Assessments, Refueling and Other Outage Activities, and Follow Up of Events and  
2  TABLE OF CONTENTS SUMMARY ...............................................................................................................................
..... 3REPORT DETAILS ................................................................................................................
....... 51.REACTOR SAFETY .............................................................................................................. 51R04Equipment Alignment .................................................................................................. 51R05Fire Protection ............................................................................................................. 61R07Heat Sink Performance ............................................................................................... 71R08Inservice Inspection Activities ..................................................................................... 71R11Licensed Operator Requalification Program ............................................................... 81R12Maintenance Effectiveness ....................................................................................... 101R13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control .................................. 131R15Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments ..................................... 141R18Plant Modifications .................................................................................................... 191R19Post-Maintenance Testing ........................................................................................ 201R20Refueling and Other Outage Activities ...................................................................... 211R22Surveillance Testing .................................................................................................. 241EP6Drill Evaluation .......................................................................................................... 252.RADIATION SAFETY .......................................................................................................... 252RS1Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls ........................................ 252RS2Occupational As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls .............................................................................................................. 262RS7Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) ........................................ 264.OTHER ACTIVITIES ............................................................................................................ 2
74OA1Performance Indicator Verification ............................................................................ 274OA2Problem Identification and Resolution ....................................................................... 284OA3Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion .................................... 344OA5Other Activities .......................................................................................................... 374OA6Meetings, Including Exit ............................................................................................ 39SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION ........................................................................................ A-1KEY POINTS OF CONTACT .................................................................................................... A-1LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED ..................................... A-2LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED ........................................................................................ A-3LIST OF ACRONYMS .............................................................................................................
A-12 
3  SUMMARY  Inspection Report 05000247/2016002 and 05000286/2016002; 04/01/2016 - 06/30/2016; Indian Point Nuclear Generating (Indian Point), Units 2 and 3; Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments, Refueling and Other Outage Activities, and Follow Up of Events and  
Notices of Enforcement Discretion.  
Notices of Enforcement Discretion.  
   
   
This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced  
This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced  
inspections performed by regional inspectors.  The inspectors identified three findings of very low safety significance (Green), which were non-cited violations (NCVs).  The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red)  
inspections performed by regional inspectors.  The inspectors identified three findings of very  
and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination  
low safety significance (Green), which were non-cited violations (NCVs).  The significance of  
Process," dated April 29, 2015.  Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310,  
most findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red)  
"Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas," dated December 4, 2014.  All violations of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requ
and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination  
irements are dispositioned in accordance with  
Process, dated April 29, 2015.  Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310,  
the NRC's Enforcement Policy, dated February 4, 2015.  The NRC's program for overseeing the  
Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas, dated December 4, 2014.  All violations of  
safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 6.  
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements are dispositioned in accordance with  
 
the NRCs Enforcement Policy, dated February 4, 2015.  The NRCs program for overseeing the  
safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor  
Oversight Process, Revision 6.  
   
   
Cornerstone:  Mitigating Systems  
Cornerstone:  Mitigating Systems  
  Green.  The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," because Entergy did not adequately accomplish the actions prescribed by procedure EN-OP-104, "Operability Determination Process," for a  
Green.  The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V,  
"Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," because Entergy did not adequately accomplish  
the actions prescribed by procedure EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, for a  
degraded condition associated with the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts.  Specifically, Entergy  
degraded condition associated with the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts.  Specifically, Entergy  
incorrectly concluded that no degraded or non-conforming condition existed related to the  
incorrectly concluded that no degraded or non-conforming condition existed related to the  
Unit 3 baffle-former bolts and exited the operability determination procedure.  Entergy subsequently performed the remaining steps in the procedure and provided appropriate justification for their plans to examine the baffle-former bolts at the next Unit 3 refueling  
Unit 3 baffle-former bolts and exited the operability determination procedure.  Entergy  
outage (RFO).  Entergy's immediate corrective actions included entering the issue into its  
subsequently performed the remaining steps in the procedure and provided appropriate  
justification for their plans to examine the baffle-former bolts at the next Unit 3 refueling  
outage (RFO).  Entergys immediate corrective actions included entering the issue into its  
corrective action program (CAP) as CR-IP3-2016-01961 and documenting an operability  
corrective action program (CAP) as CR-IP3-2016-01961 and documenting an operability  
evaluation to support the basis for operability of the baffle-former bolts and the emergency core cooling system (ECCS). This performance deficiency is more than minor because it was associated with the  
evaluation to support the basis for operability of the baffle-former bolts and the emergency  
core cooling system (ECCS).
This performance deficiency is more than minor because it was associated with the  
equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the  
equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the  
cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that  
cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that  
respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage).  In accordance with IMC 0609.04, "Initial Characterization of Findings," and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power,"
respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage).  In  
accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 2 of  
IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power,  
issued June 19, 2012, the inspectors screened the finding for safety significance and  
issued June 19, 2012, the inspectors screened the finding for safety significance and  
determined it to be of very low safety significance (Green), because the finding did not represent an actual loss of system or function.  After inspector questioning, Entergy performed an operability evaluation, which provided sufficient bases to conclude the Unit 3 baffle assembly would support ECCS operability.  This finding is related to the cross-cutting  
determined it to be of very low safety significance (Green), because the finding did not  
represent an actual loss of system or function.  After inspector questioning, Entergy  
performed an operability evaluation, which provided sufficient bases to conclude the Unit 3  
baffle assembly would support ECCS operability.  This finding is related to the cross-cutting  
aspect of Problem Identification and Resolution, Operating Experience, because Entergy did  
aspect of Problem Identification and Resolution, Operating Experience, because Entergy did  
not effectively evaluate relevant internal and external operating experience.  Specifically,
Entergy did not adequately evaluate the impact of degraded baffle bolts at Unit 3 when
relevant operating experience was identified at Unit 2.  [P.5 - Operating Experience]
(Section 1R15)


not effectively evaluate relevant internal and external operating experience. Specifically, Entergy did not adequately evaluate the impact of degraded baffle bolts at Unit 3 when relevant operating experience was identified at Unit 2. [P.5 - Operating Experience] (Section 1R15)
4
 
4    Green.  The inspectors identified a Green NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1, "Procedures," for Entergy's failure to implement procedure OAP-007, "Containment Entry and Egress." Specifically, workers transiting the inner and outer crane wall sections of  
   
containment failed to maintain at least one (of two) flow channeling gate closed to ensure availability of the containment sumps to provide suction for the ECCS.  Entergy immediately coached the gate monitor and restored the gates to an acceptable position.  Entergy  
   
Green.  The inspectors identified a Green NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1,  
Procedures, for Entergys failure to implement procedure OAP-007, Containment Entry  
and Egress.  Specifically, workers transiting the inner and outer crane wall sections of  
containment failed to maintain at least one (of two) flow channeling gate closed to ensure  
availability of the containment sumps to provide suction for the ECCS.  Entergy immediately  
coached the gate monitor and restored the gates to an acceptable position.  Entergy  
generated CR-IP2-2016-04036 to address this issue.  
generated CR-IP2-2016-04036 to address this issue.  
   
   
This performance deficiency is more than minor because it was associated with the  
This performance deficiency is more than minor because it was associated with the  
configuration control (shutdown equipment lineup) attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences  
configuration control (shutdown equipment lineup) attribute of the Mitigating Systems  
cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and  
capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences  
(i.e., core damage).  A detailed risk assessment was conducted and determined that the  
(i.e., core damage).  A detailed risk assessment was conducted and determined that the  
change in core damage frequency was determined to be 7E-9, therefore, this issue  
change in core damage frequency was determined to be 7E-9, therefore, this issue  
represents a Green finding.  This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Avoid Complacency, because Entergy did not consider potential undesired consequences of actions before performing work and implement appropriate error-reduction tools.  Specifically, the work crew did not understand the requirements and potential  
represents a Green finding.  This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human  
Performance, Avoid Complacency, because Entergy did not consider potential undesired  
consequences of actions before performing work and implement appropriate error-reduction  
tools.  Specifically, the work crew did not understand the requirements and potential  
consequences prior to commencing work and the gate monitor did not enforce these  
consequences prior to commencing work and the gate monitor did not enforce these  
requirements to maintain at least one gate locked or pinned closed as required by OAP-007.  [H.12 - Avoid Complacency] (Section 1R20)  
requirements to maintain at least one gate locked or pinned closed as required by OAP-007.   
  Cornerstone:  Barrier Integrity  
[H.12 - Avoid Complacency] (Section 1R20)  
  Green.  The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(b)(1) for Entergy's failure to include a function of a safety-related system within the scope of the maintenance rule program.  Specifically, Entergy failed to include the feedwater isolation function performed  
   
by the main boiler feedwater pumps (MBF
Cornerstone:  Barrier Integrity  
Ps) discharge valves, MBFPs, and feedwater regulating valves, which are required to remain functional during and following a design basis event to mitigate the consequence of the accident within the scope of the maintenance  
Green.  The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(b)(1) for Entergys failure to  
include a function of a safety-related system within the scope of the maintenance rule  
program.  Specifically, Entergy failed to include the feedwater isolation function performed  
by the main boiler feedwater pumps (MBFPs) discharge valves, MBFPs, and feedwater  
regulating valves, which are required to remain functional during and following a design  
basis event to mitigate the consequence of the accident within the scope of the maintenance  
rule monitoring program.  Entergy initiated corrective actions to include the feedwater  
rule monitoring program.  Entergy initiated corrective actions to include the feedwater  
isolation function performed by the MBFP discharge valves, MBFPs, and feedwater  
isolation function performed by the MBFP discharge valves, MBFPs, and feedwater  
regulating valves within the maintenance rule monitoring program.  Entergy entered this issue into the CAP as CR-IP2-2016-03963.
regulating valves within the maintenance rule monitoring program.  Entergy entered this  
 
issue into the CAP as CR-IP2-2016-03963.  
This performance deficiency is more than minor because it was associated with barrier  
This performance deficiency is more than minor because it was associated with barrier  
performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the  
performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the  
cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect  
cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect  
the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events.  Specifically, the failure to properly scope the feedwater isolation function prevented Entergy from identifying that equipment reliability was no longer effectively controlled through preventive maintenance.  In accordance with IMC 0609.04, "Initial Characterization of Findings," and Exhibit 2 of IMC  
the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events.  Specifically, the failure  
0609, Appendix A, "The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power," issued  
to properly scope the feedwater isolation function prevented Entergy from identifying that  
June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment, containment isolation system, and heat removal  
equipment reliability was no longer effectively controlled through preventive maintenance.   
In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 2 of IMC  
0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, issued  
June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance  
(Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical  
integrity of reactor containment, containment isolation system, and heat removal  
components.  This finding does not have a cross-cutting aspect since the failure to scope  
components.  This finding does not have a cross-cutting aspect since the failure to scope  
this equipment into the maintenance rule program was not recognized when Entergy  
this equipment into the maintenance rule program was not recognized when Entergy  
combined the maintenance rule basis documents for Units 2 and 3 in 2012
combined the maintenance rule basis documents for Units 2 and 3 in 2012 and, as a result,  
and, as a result, is not indicative of current licensee performance.  (Section 4OA3)   
is not indicative of current licensee performance.  (Section 4OA3)  
REPORT DETAILS  
 
  Summary of Plant Status  
5
   
REPORT DETAILS  
   
Summary of Plant Status  
   
   
Unit 2 began the inspection period during RFO 2R22 which lasted 102 days.  Upon completion  
Unit 2 began the inspection period during RFO 2R22 which lasted 102 days.  Upon completion  
Line 179: Line 427:
93 percent for fuel preconditioning.  On June 23, 2016, the operators shutdown the reactor to  
93 percent for fuel preconditioning.  On June 23, 2016, the operators shutdown the reactor to  
repair a service water leak on the 21 component cooling water (CCW) heat exchanger (Hx) inlet  
repair a service water leak on the 21 component cooling water (CCW) heat exchanger (Hx) inlet  
line and replace switchyard breaker 9.  Unit 2 returned to 100 percent power on June 29, 2016.  Unit 2 remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.   
line and replace switchyard breaker 9.  Unit 2 returned to 100 percent power on June 29, 2016.   
Unit 2 remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.   
   
   
Unit 3 began the inspection period at 100 percent power.  On April 26, 2016, a failed controller  
Unit 3 began the inspection period at 100 percent power.  On April 26, 2016, a failed controller  
caused both heater drain pumps to trip; and the operators reduced power rapidly, stabilizing the  
caused both heater drain pumps to trip; and the operators reduced power rapidly, stabilizing the  
unit at 48 percent power.  Operators returned Unit 3 to 100 percent power on April 27, 2016, and remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.  
unit at 48 percent power.  Operators returned Unit 3 to 100 percent power on April 27, 2016,  
  1. REACTOR SAFETY  
and remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.  
  Cornerstones:  Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity  
   
1R04 Equipment Alignment 
1.  
REACTOR SAFETY  
Cornerstones:  Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity  
   
   
  Partial System Walkdowns (71111.04Q - 5 samples)  
1R04 Equipment Alignment  
  a. Inspection Scope  
Partial System Walkdowns (71111.04Q - 5 samples)  
   
a. Inspection Scope  
   
   
The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems:  
The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems:  
   
   
Unit 2   Spent fuel pool cooling system following core offload on May 19, 2016  Shutdown cooling system following core reload on June 6, 2016  CCW system following maintenance on June 28, 2016  
Unit 2  
  Unit 3   32 emergency diesel generator (EDG) following maintenance on May 9, 2016 (this sample was part of an in-depth review of the EDG system)  Residual heat removal pumps following CCW system testing on May 20, 2016  
  The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected.  The inspectors reviewed  
Spent fuel pool cooling system following core offload on May 19, 2016  
   
Shutdown cooling system following core reload on June 6, 2016  
   
CCW system following maintenance on June 28, 2016  
   
Unit 3  
32 emergency diesel generator (EDG) following maintenance on May 9, 2016 (this  
sample was part of an in-depth review of the EDG system)  
   
Residual heat removal pumps following CCW system testing on May 20, 2016  
   
The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the  
reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected.  The inspectors reviewed  
applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the updated final safety analysis  
applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the updated final safety analysis  
report (UFSAR), TSs, work orders (WOs), condition reports (CRs), and the impact of  
report (UFSAR), TSs, work orders (WOs), condition reports (CRs), and the impact of  
ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions.  The inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify  
ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions  
that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions.  The  
inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify  
system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable.   
system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable.   
The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed  
The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed  
operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies.  The
operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies.  The  
6   inspectors also reviewed whether Entergy had properly identified equipment issues and entered them into the CAP for resolution with the appropriate significance
 
characterization.  Documents reviewed for each section of this inspection report are listed in the Attachment. 
6  
b. Findings
   
   
  No findings were identified.  
   
 
inspectors also reviewed whether Entergy had properly identified equipment issues and
1R05 Fire Protection  
entered them into the CAP for resolution with the appropriate significance
  Resident Inspector Quarterly Walkdowns (71111.05Q - 6 samples)  
characterization.  Documents reviewed for each section of this inspection report are
  a. Inspection Scope  
listed in the Attachment. 
  The inspectors conducted tours of the areas listed below to assess the material  
b. Findings
No findings were identified.  
1R05 Fire Protection  
Resident Inspector Quarterly Walkdowns (71111.05Q - 6 samples)  
   
a. Inspection Scope  
   
The inspectors conducted tours of the areas listed below to assess the material  
condition and operational status of fire protection features.  The inspectors verified that  
condition and operational status of fire protection features.  The inspectors verified that  
Entergy controlled combustible materials and ignition sources in accordance with  
Entergy controlled combustible materials and ignition sources in accordance with  
administrative procedures.  The inspectors verified that fire protection and suppression equipment were available for use as specified in the area pre-fire plan (PFP) and passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition.  The inspectors also  
administrative procedures.  The inspectors verified that fire protection and suppression  
equipment were available for use as specified in the area pre-fire plan (PFP) and  
passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition.  The inspectors also  
verified that station personnel implemented compensatory measures for out-of-service  
verified that station personnel implemented compensatory measures for out-of-service  
(OOS), degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment, as applicable, in accordance  
(OOS), degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment, as applicable, in accordance  
with procedures.   
with procedures.   
Unit 2
Containment, 95-foot elevation, during baffle bolt repair activities with hot work in
progress (PFP-203 was reviewed) on June 2, 2016
Residual heat removal pump rooms in primary auxiliary building (PAB), 15-foot
elevation (PFP-204 was reviewed), on June 6, 2016
CCW pump room, 68-foot elevation (PFP-209 was reviewed), on June 25, 2016
PAB, 80-foot elevation, CCW heat exchanger area with hot work in progress
(PFP-211 was reviewed) on June 25, 2016
Unit 3
32 EDG room, 10-foot elevation (PFP-354 was reviewed), on May 9, 2016
480V switchgear room, 15-foot elevation (PFP-351 was reviewed), on June 30, 2016
b. Findings
No findings were identified.


  Unit 2  Containment, 95-foot elevation, during baffle bolt repair activities with hot work in progress (PFP-203 was reviewed) on June 2, 2016  Residual heat removal pump rooms in primary auxiliary building (PAB), 15-foot elevation (PFP-204 was reviewed), on June 6, 2016 CCW pump room, 68-foot elevation (PFP-209 was reviewed), on June 25, 2016 PAB, 80-foot elevation, CCW heat exchanger area with hot work in progress (PFP-211 was reviewed) on June 25, 2016
7
   
   
   
1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07A - 1 sample)  
   
   
Unit 3  32 EDG room, 10-foot elevation (PFP-354 was reviewed), on May 9, 2016  480V switchgear room, 15-foot elevation (PFP-351 was reviewed), on June 30, 2016
a. Inspection Scope  
b. Findings
   
No findings were identified.
The inspectors reviewed the 32 EDG jacket water and lube oil heat exchanger to  
 
determine its readiness and availability to perform its safety functions.  The inspectors  
7    1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07A - 1 sample)
reviewed the design basis for the component and verified Entergys commitments to  
a. Inspection Scope  
NRC Generic Letter 89-13, Service Water System Requirements Affecting  
  The inspectors reviewed the 32 EDG jacket water and lube oil heat exchanger to  
Safety-Related Equipment.  The inspectors observed the annual cleaning and  
determine its readiness and availability to perform its safety functions.  The inspectors reviewed the design basis for the component and verified Entergy's commitments to  
inspection of the heat exchangers and reviewed the results of previous inspections of  
NRC Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Water System Requirements Affecting Safety-Related Equipment." The inspectors observed the annual cleaning and inspection of the heat exchangers and
the Unit 3 EDG heat exchangers.  The inspectors discussed the results of the most  
reviewed the results of previous inspections of the Unit 3 EDG heat exchangers.  The inspectors discussed the results of the most  
recent inspection with engineering staff.  The inspectors verified that Entergy initiated  
recent inspection with engineering staff.  The inspectors verified that Entergy initiated  
appropriate corrective actions for identified deficiencies.  The inspectors also verified that the number of tubes plugged within the heat exchanger did not exceed the maximum amount allowed.  
appropriate corrective actions for identified deficiencies.  The inspectors also verified  
 
that the number of tubes plugged within the heat exchanger did not exceed the  
b. Findings  
maximum amount allowed.  
  No findings were identified.  
b. Findings  
   
No findings were identified.  
   
   
1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities  (71111.08P - 1 sample)  
1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities  (71111.08P - 1 sample)  
  a. Inspection Scope  
   
  Inspectors from the NRC Region I Office, specializing in materials and inservice examination activities, observed portions of Entergy's activities involving baffle-former bolt examinations and replacements during Unit 2 RFO 2R22.  The inspectors reviewed  
a. Inspection Scope  
   
Inspectors from the NRC Region I Office, specializing in materials and inservice  
examination activities, observed portions of Entergys activities involving baffle-former  
bolt examinations and replacements during Unit 2 RFO 2R22.  The inspectors reviewed  
work documentation and examination procedures and results, and discussed these  
work documentation and examination procedures and results, and discussed these  
activities with Entergy.  The inspectors were on-site from April 27 to April 28, 2016, and on May 23, 2016.  The inspectors verified that Entergy completed baffle-former bolt examinations in accordance with their approved procedures which implemented activities described in the Materials Reliability Program (MRP)-227-A, "Pressurized  
activities with Entergy.  The inspectors were on-site from April 27 to April 28, 2016, and  
Water Reactor Internals Inspection and Evaluation Guidelines," as they relate to this  
on May 23, 2016.  The inspectors verified that Entergy completed baffle-former bolt  
examinations in accordance with their approved procedures which implemented  
activities described in the Materials Reliability Program (MRP)-227-A, Pressurized  
Water Reactor Internals Inspection and Evaluation Guidelines, as they relate to this  
component.  Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the results of the visual and volumetric  
component.  Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the results of the visual and volumetric  
examinations of the baffle-former bolts, including capabilities, limitations, and acceptance criteria that were performed during the current RFO.  
examinations of the baffle-former bolts, including capabilities, limitations, and  
acceptance criteria that were performed during the current RFO.  
   
   
Non-Destructive Examination Activities  
Non-Destructive Examination Activities  
  The inspectors reviewed the ultrasonic testing (UT) procedure used for the examination of the Unit 2 baffle-former bolts to verify the procedure was in accordance with the applicable guidance in MRP-227-A and MRP-228.  The inspectors reviewed the UT data  
The inspectors reviewed the ultrasonic testing (UT) procedure used for the examination  
of the Unit 2 baffle-former bolts to verify the procedure was in accordance with the  
applicable guidance in MRP-227-A and MRP-228.  The inspectors reviewed the UT data  
records and the detailed UT channel analysis for a sample of baffle-former bolts to verify  
records and the detailed UT channel analysis for a sample of baffle-former bolts to verify  
the examinations and evaluations were performed in accordance with approved  
the examinations and evaluations were performed in accordance with approved  
procedures and applicable guidance.  The inspectors reviewed video recordings of the  
procedures and applicable guidance.  The inspectors reviewed video recordings of the  
visual examinations of the baffle-former bolts during the current RFO.  The inspectors also reviewed recorded video of visual examinations performed in 2006 at Unit 2, completed as part of the existing inservice inspection program for the 10-year reactor  
visual examinations of the baffle-former bolts during the current RFO.  The inspectors  
also reviewed recorded video of visual examinations performed in 2006 at Unit 2,  
completed as part of the existing inservice inspection program for the 10-year reactor  
vessel examinations, to independently assess the past conditions of the baffle-former  
vessel examinations, to independently assess the past conditions of the baffle-former  
bolts and assembly.  
bolts and assembly.
8   The inspectors reviewed certifications of the UT technicians performing the ultrasonic examinations to verify the examinations were performed by qualified individuals and to verify the results were reviewed and evaluated by certified level III non-destructive examination personnel.  
 
8  
The inspectors reviewed certifications of the UT technicians performing the ultrasonic  
examinations to verify the examinations were performed by qualified individuals and to  
verify the results were reviewed and evaluated by certified level III non-destructive  
examination personnel.  
   
   
Baffle-Former Bolt Replacement Activities  
Baffle-Former Bolt Replacement Activities  
   
   
The inspectors reviewed the baffle-former bolt replacement activities performed as part  
The inspectors reviewed the baffle-former bolt replacement activities performed as part  
of a corrective action to resolve the degraded condition identified at Unit 2.  The inspectors observed a sample of in-process bolt removal activities, which included lock bar milling and bolt hole machining.  The inspectors reviewed the documentation for  
of a corrective action to resolve the degraded condition identified at Unit 2.  The  
inspectors observed a sample of in-process bolt removal activities, which included lock  
bar milling and bolt hole machining.  The inspectors reviewed the documentation for  
in-process and completed bolt installation activities and verified that loose parts  
in-process and completed bolt installation activities and verified that loose parts  
generated as part of the bolt replacements were properly tracked.  The inspectors  
generated as part of the bolt replacements were properly tracked.  The inspectors  
verified that bolt replacement activities were performed in accordance with approved procedures.  The inspectors also reviewed the Engineering Change (EC) package associated with the new baffle-former bolt design.  This review is documented in  
verified that bolt replacement activities were performed in accordance with approved  
procedures.  The inspectors also reviewed the Engineering Change (EC) package  
associated with the new baffle-former bolt design.  This review is documented in  
Section 1R18 of this report.  After completion of the bolt replacement activities, the  
Section 1R18 of this report.  After completion of the bolt replacement activities, the  
inspectors reviewed the video of the final visual examination of the baffle assembly to  
inspectors reviewed the video of the final visual examination of the baffle assembly to  
verify that the baffle-former bolt work was accomplished as planned and that there were no visual indications of deficiencies.  
verify that the baffle-former bolt work was accomplished as planned and that there were  
  b. Findings  
no visual indications of deficiencies.  
   
b. Findings  
   
   
No findings were identified.   
No findings were identified.   
 
Update to URI 05000247/2016001-01, Baffle-Former Bolts with Identified Anomalies  
Update to URI 05000247/2016001-01, Baffle-Former Bolts with Identified Anomalies  
  This inspection was conducted to follow-up on NRC Unresolved Item (URI)  
   
This inspection was conducted to follow-up on NRC Unresolved Item (URI)  
05000247/2016001-01, Baffle-Former Bolts with Identified Anomalies, to determine  
05000247/2016001-01, Baffle-Former Bolts with Identified Anomalies, to determine  
whether there was a performance deficiency associated with the degraded baffle-former bolt condition discovered at Unit 2.  The inspectors plan to review additional technical information from Entergy as it becomes available, including any revisions to the root  
whether there was a performance deficiency associated with the degraded baffle-former  
bolt condition discovered at Unit 2.  The inspectors plan to review additional technical  
information from Entergy as it becomes available, including any revisions to the root  
cause evaluation.  The URI remains open until review of this additional information is  
cause evaluation.  The URI remains open until review of this additional information is  
completed.  (URI 05000247/2016001-01, Baffle-Former Bolts with Identified  
completed.  (URI 05000247/2016001-01, Baffle-Former Bolts with Identified  
Anomalies)  
Anomalies)  
  1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11Q - 5 samples)  
   
  Unit 2   
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11Q - 5 samples)  
.1 Quarterly Review of Unit 2 Licensed Operator Requalification Testing and Training  
   
Unit 2  
   
.1  
Quarterly Review of Unit 2 Licensed Operator Requalification Testing and Training  
(71111.11Q - 1 sample)  
(71111.11Q - 1 sample)  
  a. Inspection Scope  
   
  The inspectors observed Unit 2 licensed operator simulator training on May 24, 2016,  
a. Inspection Scope  
which included reactor coolant pump seal failure with loss of normal heat sink requiring implementation of feed and bleed cooling.  The inspectors evaluated operator performance during the simulated event and verified completion of risk significant  
   
The inspectors observed Unit 2 licensed operator simulator training on May 24, 2016,  
which included reactor coolant pump seal failure with loss of normal heat sink requiring  
implementation of feed and bleed cooling.  The inspectors evaluated operator  
performance during the simulated event and verified completion of risk significant  
operator actions, including the use of abnormal and emergency operating procedures.  
operator actions, including the use of abnormal and emergency operating procedures.  
The inspectors assessed the clarity and effectiveness of communications,
The inspectors assessed the clarity and effectiveness of communications,  
9  implementation of actions in response to alarms and degrading plant conditions, and the oversight and direction provided by the control room supervisor.  The inspectors verified the accuracy and timeliness of the emergency classification made by the shift manager and the TS action statements entered by the shift technical advisor.  Additionally, the inspectors assessed the ability of the crew and training staff to identify and document


9
implementation of actions in response to alarms and degrading plant conditions, and the
oversight and direction provided by the control room supervisor.  The inspectors verified
the accuracy and timeliness of the emergency classification made by the shift manager
and the TS action statements entered by the shift technical advisor.  Additionally, the
inspectors assessed the ability of the crew and training staff to identify and document
crew performance problems.  
crew performance problems.  
b. Findings
  No findings were identified.
   
   
.2 Quarterly Review of Unit 3 Licensed Operator Requalification Testing and Training  
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2  
Quarterly Review of Unit 3 Licensed Operator Requalification Testing and Training  
(71111.11Q - 1 sample)  
(71111.11Q - 1 sample)  
  a. Inspection Scope  
   
  The inspectors observed a Unit 3 licensed operator simulator requalification training  
a. Inspection Scope  
   
The inspectors observed a Unit 3 licensed operator simulator requalification training  
evaluated scenario on May 24, 2016, which included failure of a pressurizer pressure  
evaluated scenario on May 24, 2016, which included failure of a pressurizer pressure  
instrument, charging pump trip, loss of 480V safety bus 5A, a small break loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), and entry into FR-C.2 core cooling.  The inspectors evaluated operator performance during the simulated event and verified completion of risk significant  
instrument, charging pump trip, loss of 480V safety bus 5A, a small break loss-of-coolant  
accident (LOCA), and entry into FR-C.2 core cooling.  The inspectors evaluated operator  
performance during the simulated event and verified completion of risk significant  
operator actions, including the use of abnormal and emergency operating procedures.  
operator actions, including the use of abnormal and emergency operating procedures.  
The inspectors assessed the clarity and effectiveness of communications,  
The inspectors assessed the clarity and effectiveness of communications,  
implementation of actions in response to alarms and degrading plant conditions, and the  
implementation of actions in response to alarms and degrading plant conditions, and the  
oversight and direction provided by the control room supervisor.  The inspectors verified the accuracy and timeliness of the emergency classification made by the shift manager and the TS action statements entered by the shift technical advisor.  Additionally, the inspectors assessed the ability of the crew and training staff to identify and document  
oversight and direction provided by the control room supervisor.  The inspectors verified  
 
the accuracy and timeliness of the emergency classification made by the shift manager  
crew performance problems.  b. Findings  
and the TS action statements entered by the shift technical advisor.  Additionally, the  
  No findings were identified.  
inspectors assessed the ability of the crew and training staff to identify and document  
 
crew performance problems.  
   
b. Findings  
No findings were identified.  
.3
Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance (71111.11Q - 3 samples)
a. Inspection Scope
   
   
.3 Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance (71111.11Q - 3 samples)
The inspectors conducted a focused observation of operator performance in the main  
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted a focused observation of operator performance in the main  
control room.  The inspectors observed pre-job briefings and control room  
control room.  The inspectors observed pre-job briefings and control room  
communications to verify they met the criteria specified in Entergy's administrative procedure EN-OP-115, "Conduct of Operations." Additionally, the inspectors observed restoration activities to verify that procedure use, crew communications, and  
communications to verify they met the criteria specified in Entergys administrative  
coordination of activities between work groups similarly met established expectations and standards.   
procedure EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations.  Additionally, the inspectors observed  
restoration activities to verify that procedure use, crew communications, and  
coordination of activities between work groups similarly met established expectations  
and standards.   


   
10  
10   Unit 2  Plant startup from RFO 2R22 on June 16, 2016 including response to a turbine trip without a reactor trip and the subsequent turbine-generator synchronization and transfer of plant electrical loads from offsite power to the unit auxiliary transformer.  Reactor startup and grid synchronization conducted on June 27, 2016. 
Unit 3  Operator response to the feedwater transient which occurred on April 26, 2016
b. Findings
   
   
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12Q - 4 samples)
   
   
.1 Routine Maintenance Effectiveness  
Unit 2
  a. Inspection Scope  
  The inspectors reviewed the samples listed below to assess the effectiveness of  
maintenance activities on SSCs performance and reliability.  The inspectors reviewed
Plant startup from RFO 2R22 on June 16, 2016 including response to a turbine trip
system health reports, CAP documents, maintenance WOs, and maintenance rule basis  
without a reactor trip and the subsequent turbine-generator synchronization and
 
transfer of plant electrical loads from offsite power to the unit auxiliary transformer.
documents to ensure that Entergy was identifying and properly evaluating performance problems within the scope of the maintenance rule.  For each SSC sample selected, the inspectors verified that the SSC was properly scoped into the maintenance rule in  
Reactor startup and grid synchronization conducted on June 27, 2016. 
Unit 3
Operator response to the feedwater transient which occurred on April 26, 2016
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12Q - 4 samples)
.1  
Routine Maintenance Effectiveness  
   
a. Inspection Scope  
   
The inspectors reviewed the samples listed below to assess the effectiveness of  
maintenance activities on SSCs performance and reliability.  The inspectors reviewed  
system health reports, CAP documents, maintenance WOs, and maintenance rule basis  
documents to ensure that Entergy was identifying and properly evaluating performance  
problems within the scope of the maintenance rule.  For each SSC sample selected, the  
inspectors verified that the SSC was properly scoped into the maintenance rule in  
accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 and verified that the (a)(2) performance criteria  
accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 and verified that the (a)(2) performance criteria  
established by Entergy was reasonable.  As applicable, for SSCs classified as (a)(1), the  
established by Entergy was reasonable.  As applicable, for SSCs classified as (a)(1), the  
inspectors assessed the adequacy of goals and corrective actions to return these SSCs  
inspectors assessed the adequacy of goals and corrective actions to return these SSCs  
to (a)(2).  Additionally, the inspectors ensured that Entergy was identifying and addressing common cause failures that occurred within and across maintenance rule system boundaries.   
to (a)(2).  Additionally, the inspectors ensured that Entergy was identifying and  
addressing common cause failures that occurred within and across maintenance rule  
system boundaries.   
Unit 2 EDGs
Unit 3 EDGs (this sample was part of an in-depth review of the EDG system)
Units 2 and 3 CVCS
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
URI Opened, CVCS Goal Monitoring Under the Maintenance Rule
Introduction
The inspectors identified issues of potential concern with Entergys application of
10 CFR 50.65(a)(1), Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at
Nuclear Plants, (the maintenance rule) in regards to the reliability of the Unit 2 CVCS
system.  These concerns included the establishment of appropriate (a)(1) goals and


  Unit 2 EDGs  Unit 3 EDGs (this sample was part of an in-depth review of the EDG system)  Units 2 and 3 CVCS
11
b. Findings
   
   
No findings were identified.
   
 
whether appropriate justification was established that the corrective actions to address  
  URI Opened, CVCS Goal Monitoring Under the Maintenance Rule
identified maintenance weaknesses were effective prior to removal from (a)(1) status.   
  Introduction
Specifically, Entergy may have established restrictive goals without defensible  
The inspectors identified issues of potential concern with Entergy's application of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1), "Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Plants," (the maintenance rule) in regards to the reliability of the Unit 2 CVCS
justification and may not have demonstrated their chosen goal before ending the goal  
system.  These concerns included the establishment of appropriate (a)(1) goals and  
11  whether appropriate justification was established that the corrective actions to address identified maintenance weaknesses were effective prior to removal from (a)(1) status.   
Specifically, Entergy may have established restrictive goals without defensible justification and may not have demonstrated their chosen goal before ending the goal  
monitoring interval.  
monitoring interval.  
   
   
Description  
Description  
   
   
The maintenance rule requires that licensees shall monitor the performance or condition  
The maintenance rule requires that licensees shall monitor the performance or condition  
of structures, systems, or components, against licensee-established goals, in a manner sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that these structures, systems, and  
of structures, systems, or components, against licensee-established goals, in a manner  
sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that these structures, systems, and  
components are capable of fulfilling their intended functions.  These goals shall be  
components are capable of fulfilling their intended functions.  These goals shall be  
established commensurate with safety and, where practical, take into account  
established commensurate with safety and, where practical, take into account  
industrywide operating experience.  When the performance or condition of a structure, system, or component does not meet established goals, appropriate corrective action shall be taken.  EN-DC-206, "Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Process," provides the  
industrywide operating experience.  When the performance or condition of a structure,  
system, or component does not meet established goals, appropriate corrective action  
shall be taken.  EN-DC-206, Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Process, provides the  
requirements and processes for managing SSCs for which (a)(2) monitoring has not  
requirements and processes for managing SSCs for which (a)(2) monitoring has not  
demonstrated effective maintenance.  EN-DC-206 specifies that (a)(1) action plans  
demonstrated effective maintenance.  EN-DC-206 specifies that (a)(1) action plans  
should not be closed until effectiveness of all corrective actions has been demonstrated by meeting performance goals through the monitoring period (or by other means specified in the action plan).   
should not be closed until effectiveness of all corrective actions has been demonstrated  
 
by meeting performance goals through the monitoring period (or by other means  
specified in the action plan).   
   
   
Since 2013, there have been several repeat functional failures of equipment in the  
Since 2013, there have been several repeat functional failures of equipment in the  
CVCS resulting in a failure to meet the performance criterion for reliability.  These  
CVCS resulting in a failure to meet the performance criterion for reliability.  These  
failures included:  
failures included:  
  A failure of the 23 charging pump on August 6, 2013, after the internal oil pump discharge tubing broke causing the pump to trip on low oil pressure and a loss of charging.  The 21 charging pump had tripped for the same reason in 2010.  A failure of the 22 charging pump on January 14, 2014, due to cracked internal check valves caused by an inadequate fill-and-vent that left air in the pump following maintenance.  The 21 charging pump had failed due to the same cause in 2013.  A failure of the Unit 2 valve FCV-110A, boric acid flow control valve, to fully open on January 5, 2015.  The valve had insufficient insulation; and as a result, boron crystalized above the valve plug and blocked its movement.  The Unit 3 FCV-110A  
had failed in the same way in 2011, with earlier failures of other valves for the same cause going back to 1997.  
A failure of the 23 charging pump on August 6, 2013, after the internal oil pump  
discharge tubing broke causing the pump to trip on low oil pressure and a loss of  
charging.  The 21 charging pump had tripped for the same reason in 2010.  
   
A failure of the 22 charging pump on January 14, 2014, due to cracked internal  
check valves caused by an inadequate fill-and-vent that left air in the pump following  
maintenance.  The 21 charging pump had failed due to the same cause in 2013.  
   
A failure of the Unit 2 valve FCV-110A, boric acid flow control valve, to fully open on  
January 5, 2015.  The valve had insufficient insulation; and as a result, boron  
crystalized above the valve plug and blocked its movement.  The Unit 3 FCV-110A  
had failed in the same way in 2011, with earlier failures of other valves for the same  
cause going back to 1997.  
   
   
In each case, the CVCS for Unit 2 was already (a)(1), so Entergy either updated the  
In each case, the CVCS for Unit 2 was already (a)(1), so Entergy either updated the  
existing (a)(1) action plan or created another one to operate in parallel with the existing  
existing (a)(1) action plan or created another one to operate in parallel with the existing  
one.  Upon reviewing the associated (a)(1) action plans, the inspectors noted that in each example Entergy's goals may not have been in accordance with EN-DC-206(a)(1) Process.  It specifies that monitoring intervals should be at least six months for normally  
one.  Upon reviewing the associated (a)(1) action plans, the inspectors noted that in  
operating SSCs, at least three surveillances for SSCs monitored by surveillance and long enough to detect recurrence of the applicable failure mechanism.  It also states that  
each example Entergys goals may not have been in accordance with EN-DC-206(a)(1)  
Process.  It specifies that monitoring intervals should be at least six months for normally  
operating SSCs, at least three surveillances for SSCs monitored by surveillance and  
long enough to detect recurrence of the applicable failure mechanism.  It also states that  
performance goals that provide reasonable assurance that the SSC is capable of  
performance goals that provide reasonable assurance that the SSC is capable of  
performing its intended functions should be monitored throughout the time the SSC is classified (a)(1).  EN-DC-206 defines an SSC as any discreet component grouping that has caused a monitoring failure, including any applicable extent of condition.  In the  
performing its intended functions should be monitored throughout the time the SSC is  
classified (a)(1).  EN-DC-206 defines an SSC as any discreet component grouping that  
has caused a monitoring failure, including any applicable extent of condition.  In the  
examples provided, NRC inspectors challenged whether Entergy either chose a shorter


examples provided, NRC inspectors challenged whether Entergy either chose a shorter  
12
12  monitoring interval or a goal that did not include the applicable extent of condition.  Specifically:  
 
   
  The (a)(1) action plan for the broken oil tubing had a goal of no noticeable decrease in 23 charging pump's running oil pressure for the next three quarterly surveillances.  The chosen monitoring interval met the procedural expectation, but Entergy limited the monitoring to the 23 charging pump without written justification, when the 21  
monitoring interval or a goal that did not include the applicable extent of condition.   
Specifically:  
The (a)(1) action plan for the broken oil tubing had a goal of no noticeable decrease  
in 23 charging pumps running oil pressure for the next three quarterly surveillances.   
The chosen monitoring interval met the procedural expectation, but Entergy limited  
the monitoring to the 23 charging pump without written justification, when the 21  
charging pump had failed previously for the same reason and the other pumps were  
charging pump had failed previously for the same reason and the other pumps were  
susceptible to the same failure mechanism.  During the monitoring interval, the 21  
susceptible to the same failure mechanism.  During the monitoring interval, the 21  
charging pump experienced low oil pressure.  When Entergy performed repairs on  
charging pump experienced low oil pressure.  When Entergy performed repairs on  
the 21 charging pump for an unrelated issue, they discovered that the oil tubing had failed in the same way the 23 charging pump oil tubing had failed, although it had not  
the 21 charging pump for an unrelated issue, they discovered that the oil tubing had  
yet caused a pump trip.  The (a)(1) action plan for the cracked check valves had a goal of no check valve  
failed in the same way the 23 charging pump oil tubing had failed, although it had not  
failure for six months for the next charging pump that underwent maintenance.  This happened to be the 22 charging pump.  Entergy chose a six-month monitoring  
yet caused a pump trip.  
 
   
interval, even though only one of the three char
The (a)(1) action plan for the cracked check valves had a goal of no check valve  
ging pumps is in service at any given time, and the 22 charging pump only ran for four out of the six months it was monitored.  Additionally, the action plan did not justify why a single successful fill-and-vent demonstrated adequate corrective actions.  On November 19, 2014, during  
failure for six months for the next charging pump that underwent maintenance.  This  
happened to be the 22 charging pump.  Entergy chose a six-month monitoring  
interval, even though only one of the three charging pumps is in service at any given  
time, and the 22 charging pump only ran for four out of the six months it was  
monitored.  Additionally, the action plan did not justify why a single successful fill-
and-vent demonstrated adequate corrective actions.  On November 19, 2014, during  
the six month monitoring interval, the 21 charging pump underwent maintenance  
the six month monitoring interval, the 21 charging pump underwent maintenance  
 
requiring a fill-and-vent, and experienced check valve failure two weeks later on  
requiring a fill-and-vent, and experienced check valve failure two weeks later on December 4.  Entergy documented this as a maintenance rule functional failure, and discussed the possibility that it could be due to an inadequate fill-and-vent, but did not change the (a)(1) action plan.  The (a)(1) action plan for FCV-110A specified a monitoring interval of six months to include the winter because the previous valve failures had all occurred during the winter months.  However, the actual monitoring interval documented in the corrective  
December 4.  Entergy documented this as a maintenance rule functional failure, and  
discussed the possibility that it could be due to an inadequate fill-and-vent, but did  
not change the (a)(1) action plan.  
   
The (a)(1) action plan for FCV-110A specified a monitoring interval of six months to  
include the winter because the previous valve failures had all occurred during the  
winter months.  However, the actual monitoring interval documented in the corrective  
action was from April to October 2015, and therefore did not cover the winter months  
action was from April to October 2015, and therefore did not cover the winter months  
as intended.  In January 2016, Entergy performed maintenance on valve CH-297 on  
as intended.  In January 2016, Entergy performed maintenance on valve CH-297 on  
Unit 3, which is a heat-traced boric acid valve, and did not properly restore the insulation. The valve function was not impacted because it does not often contain high concentrations of boric acid.   
Unit 3, which is a heat-traced boric acid valve, and did not properly restore the  
insulation. The valve function was not impacted because it does not often contain  
high concentrations of boric acid.   
   
   
The (a)(1) action plans described above were all reviewed and approved by the  
The (a)(1) action plans described above were all reviewed and approved by the  
maintenance rule expert panel.   
maintenance rule expert panel.   
  Further information regarding the performance of these SSCs is required to determine  
   
Further information regarding the performance of these SSCs is required to determine  
whether these issues of concern represent performance deficiencies and whether they  
whether these issues of concern represent performance deficiencies and whether they  
are more than minor.  (URI 05000247/2016002-01, CVCS Goal Monitoring Under the
Maintenance Rule)
.2
Quality Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the weld repair performed on the 21 CCW heat exchanger
service water inlet nozzle for Unit 2 to verify Entergy was properly applying quality
controls specified in their quality assurance program.  The inspectors reviewed CAP
documents, maintenance WOs, ECs, and engineering procedures associated with the
weld repair.  The inspectors verified Entergy specified quality control hold points in


are more than minor.  (URI 05000247/2016002-01, CVCS Goal Monitoring Under the
13
Maintenance Rule)
   
  .2 Quality Control
   
a. Inspection Scope
accordance with their procedures, properly controlled the quality of materials used  
The inspectors reviewed the weld repair performed on the 21 CCW heat exchanger service water inlet nozzle for Unit 2 to verify Entergy was properly applying quality controls specified in their quality assurance program.  The inspectors reviewed
during the repair, and adequately justified deviations from the existing design.   
  CAP documents, maintenance WOs, ECs, and engineering procedures
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the welding procedure specification qualification by  
associated with the weld repair.  The inspectors verified Entergy specified quality control hold points in  
the vendor to ensure it was in accordance with American Society of Mechanical  
13  accordance with their procedures, properly controlled the quality of materials used during the repair, and adequately justified deviations from the existing design.   
Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the welding procedure specification qualification by the vendor to ensure it was in accordance with American Society of Mechanical  
Engineers code.   
Engineers code.   
b. Findings
   
   
  No findings were identified.  
b. Findings
  1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 - 7 samples)  
  a. Inspection Scope  
   
  The inspectors reviewed station evaluation and management of plant risk for the maintenance and emergent work activities listed
No findings were identified.  
below to verify that Entergy performed the appropriate risk assessments prior to removing equipment for work.  The inspectors  
   
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 - 7 samples)  
   
a. Inspection Scope  
   
The inspectors reviewed station evaluation and management of plant risk for the  
maintenance and emergent work activities listed below to verify that Entergy performed  
the appropriate risk assessments prior to removing equipment for work.  The inspectors  
selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety  
selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety  
cornerstones.  As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that Entergy performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and that the assessments were accurate and complete.  When Entergy performed emergent work,  
cornerstones.  As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that Entergy  
performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and that the  
assessments were accurate and complete.  When Entergy performed emergent work,  
the inspectors verified that operations personnel promptly assessed and managed plant  
the inspectors verified that operations personnel promptly assessed and managed plant  
risk.  The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work and discussed the results  
risk.  The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work and discussed the results  
of the assessment with the station's probabilistic risk analyst to verify plant conditions  
of the assessment with the stations probabilistic risk analyst to verify plant conditions  
were consistent with the risk assessment.  The inspectors also reviewed the TS requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met.  
were consistent with the risk assessment.  The inspectors also reviewed the TS  
requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to  
verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met.  
Unit 2
Temporary loss of spent fuel pool cooling due to 345-kilovolt disturbance on
April 3, 2016
Equipment hatch closure plug seal demonstration for outage risk on April 5, 2016
Reduced inventory operations during vessel reassembly on June 7, 2016
21 CCW heat exchanger OOS during mode 4 on June 25, 2016
Unit 3
32 EDG OOS while Bus Tie BT 4-5 was OOS on May 4, 2016 (this sample was part
of an in-depth review of the EDG system) 
33 EDG OOS while Bus Tie BT 4-5 was OOS on June 2, 2016
31 EDG OOS while Bus Tie BT 4-5 was OOS on June 21, 2016
b. Findings
No findings were identified. 


14
   
   
Unit 2  Temporary loss of spent fuel pool cooling due to 345-kilovolt disturbance on April 3, 2016  Equipment hatch closure plug seal demonstration for outage risk on April 5, 2016  Reduced inventory operations during vessel reassembly on June 7, 2016 21 CCW heat exchanger OOS during mode 4 on June 25, 2016
   
Unit 3  32 EDG OOS while Bus Tie BT 4-5 was OOS on May 4, 2016 (this sample was part of an in-depth review of the EDG system)  33 EDG OOS while Bus Tie BT 4-5 was OOS on June 2, 2016  31 EDG OOS while Bus Tie BT 4-5 was OOS on June 21, 2016
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (71111.15 - 7 samples)  
b. Findings
   
No findings were identified. 
a. Inspection Scope  
 
   
   
The inspectors reviewed operability determinations for the following degraded or  
14  1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (71111.15 - 7 samples)  
  a. Inspection Scope  
  The inspectors reviewed operability determinations for the following degraded or  
non-conforming conditions:  
non-conforming conditions:  
   
   
Unit 2   23 EDG failure to run on March 7, 2016, and subsequent failure to pass the surveillance test on March 10, 2016, as identified in CR-IP2-2016-01260  Operability determination for N33 gamma metrics wide range nuclear instrument channel in CR-IP2-2016-03660 on June 13, 2016  Pressurizer level transmitter LT-461 reads high in CR-IP-2016-3806 on June 14, 2016  Through-wall leak in line 411, service water inlet to the 21 CCW heat exchanger, on June 15, 2016  
Unit 2  
23 EDG failure to run on March 7, 2016, and subsequent failure to pass the  
surveillance test on March 10, 2016, as identified in CR-IP2-2016-01260  
   
Operability determination for N33 gamma metrics wide range nuclear instrument  
channel in CR-IP2-2016-03660 on June 13, 2016  
   
Pressurizer level transmitter LT-461 reads high in CR-IP-2016-3806 on June 14,  
2016  
   
Through-wall leak in line 411, service water inlet to the 21 CCW heat exchanger, on  
June 15, 2016
Unit 3
Immediate operability determination of the degraded condition of the baffle-former
bolts identified from Unit 2 operating experience in CR-IP3-2016-01035 on April 1,
2016
Anomalies noted during digital metal impact monitoring system self-test in
CR-IP3-2015-03468 on April 1, 2016
Prompt operability determination of the degraded condition of the baffle-former bolts
identified from Unit 2 operating experience in CR-IP2-2016-03660 on June 30, 2016  
   
   
Unit 3  Immediate operability determination of the degraded condition of the baffle-former bolts identified from Unit 2 operating experience in CR-IP3-2016-01035 on April 1, 2016  Anomalies noted during digital metal impact monitoring system self-test in CR-IP3-2015-03468 on April 1, 2016  Prompt operability determination of the degraded condition of the baffle-former bolts identified from Unit 2 operating experience in CR-IP2-2016-03660 on June 30, 2016
The inspectors selected these issues based on the risk significance of the associated  
The inspectors selected these issues based on the risk significance of the associated  
components and systems.  The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the  
components and systems.  The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the  
operability determinations to assess whether TS operability was properly justified and  
operability determinations to assess whether TS operability was properly justified and  
the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized  
the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized  
increase in risk occurred.  The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the TSs and UFSAR to Entergy's evaluations to determine whether the components or systems were operable.   
increase in risk occurred.  The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in  
 
the appropriate sections of the TSs and UFSAR to Entergys evaluations to determine  
whether the components or systems were operable.   
   
   
The inspectors confirmed, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations  
The inspectors confirmed, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations  
associated with the evaluations.  Where compensatory measures were required to maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would function as intended and were properly controlled by Entergy.  The inspectors  
associated with the evaluations.  Where compensatory measures were required to  
maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would  
function as intended and were properly controlled by Entergy.  The inspectors  
determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the  
determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the  
evaluations.  
evaluations.  
b. Findings
   
   
Introduction.  The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," because Entergy did not  
b. Findings
Introduction.  The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,  
Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," because Entergy did not  
adequately accomplish the actions prescribed by procedure EN-OP-104 for a degraded  
adequately accomplish the actions prescribed by procedure EN-OP-104 for a degraded  
condition associated with the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts.  Specifically, Entergy incorrectly concluded that no degraded or non-conforming condition existed related to the Unit 3   
condition associated with the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts.  Specifically, Entergy incorrectly  
15  baffle-former bolts and exited the operability determination procedure.  Entergy subsequently performed the remaining steps in the procedure and provided appropriate  
concluded that no degraded or non-conforming condition existed related to the Unit 3  
 
15
   
baffle-former bolts and exited the operability determination procedure.  Entergy  
subsequently performed the remaining steps in the procedure and provided appropriate  
justification for their plans to examine the baffle-former bolts at the next Unit 3 RFO.  
justification for their plans to examine the baffle-former bolts at the next Unit 3 RFO.  
  Description.  On March 29, 2016, Entergy identified baffle-former ("baffle") bolt degradation at Indian Point Unit 2 that was determined to be unanalyzed because it did  
   
Description.  On March 29, 2016, Entergy identified baffle-former (baffle) bolt  
degradation at Indian Point Unit 2 that was determined to be unanalyzed because it did  
not meet the minimum acceptable bolt pattern analysis developed to support plant  
not meet the minimum acceptable bolt pattern analysis developed to support plant  
startup.  Entergy staff identified a total of 227 baffle bolts out of a population of 832 that  
startup.  Entergy staff identified a total of 227 baffle bolts out of a population of 832 that  
were potentially degraded (182 bolts had UT indications; 31 had visual indications of failure; and 14 were inaccessible for testing and conservatively assumed to be degraded).  Entergy staff entered this problem into the CAP as CR-IP2-2016-02081,  
were potentially degraded (182 bolts had UT indications; 31 had visual indications of  
failure; and 14 were inaccessible for testing and conservatively assumed to be  
degraded).  Entergy staff entered this problem into the CAP as CR-IP2-2016-02081,  
performed a root cause evaluation, and replaced the degraded bolts on Unit 2.  Due to  
performed a root cause evaluation, and replaced the degraded bolts on Unit 2.  Due to  
the number of baffle bolt indications discovered on Unit 2, Entergy staff initiated CR-IP3-
the number of baffle bolt indications discovered on Unit 2, Entergy staff initiated CR-IP3-
2016-01035 on April 21, 2016, and performed an immediate operability determination (IOD) in accordance with Entergy procedure EN-OP-104 Section 5.3, to evaluate the baffle bolts and baffle-former assembly structure on Unit 3.  Entergy staff planned further  
2016-01035 on April 21, 2016, and performed an immediate operability determination  
(IOD) in accordance with Entergy procedure EN-OP-104 Section 5.3, to evaluate the  
baffle bolts and baffle-former assembly structure on Unit 3.  Entergy staff planned further  
corrective actions to move up the planned Unit 3 baffle bolt ultrasonic examinations to  
corrective actions to move up the planned Unit 3 baffle bolt ultrasonic examinations to  
the next RFO in spring 2017.  
the next RFO in spring 2017.  
 
The inspectors reviewed the design basis and current licensing basis documents for Indian Point Unit 3 to identify the specific safety functions of the baffle bolts.  The baffle  
The inspectors reviewed the design basis and current licensing basis documents for  
Indian Point Unit 3 to identify the specific safety functions of the baffle bolts.  The baffle  
bolts are part of the baffle former assembly structure located in the reactor pressure  
bolts are part of the baffle former assembly structure located in the reactor pressure  
vessel.  The bolts secure a series of vertical metal plates called baffle plates, which help  
vessel.  The bolts secure a series of vertical metal plates called baffle plates, which help  
direct water up through the nuclear fuel assemblies to ensure proper cooling of the fuel.   
direct water up through the nuclear fuel assemblies to ensure proper cooling of the fuel.   
A sufficient number of baffle bolts are required to secure the plates to ensure proper core flow during normal and postulated accident conditions, and also to ensure that control rods can be inserted to shut down the reactor.   
A sufficient number of baffle bolts are required to secure the plates to ensure proper  
 
core flow during normal and postulated accident conditions, and also to ensure that  
control rods can be inserted to shut down the reactor.   
   
   
The inspectors reviewed Entergy's IOD issued on April 21, 2016, and concluded the  
The inspectors reviewed Entergys IOD issued on April 21, 2016, and concluded the  
immediate determination was completed in accordance with Section 5.3 of procedure  
immediate determination was completed in accordance with Section 5.3 of procedure  
EN-OP-104.  The IOD provided sufficient technical detail to support the initial conclusion, based on limited information, that the Unit 3 baffle bolts would retain sufficient capability  
EN-OP-104.  The IOD provided sufficient technical detail to support the initial conclusion,  
based on limited information, that the Unit 3 baffle bolts would retain sufficient capability  
to perform their intended functions.  Specifically, the IOD stated that Unit 2 baffle bolt  
to perform their intended functions.  Specifically, the IOD stated that Unit 2 baffle bolt  
failures were likely due to irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC) and that  
failures were likely due to irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC) and that  
the Unit 3 baffle bolts were also susceptible because they both utilize a baffle bolt design  
the Unit 3 baffle bolts were also susceptible because they both utilize a baffle bolt design  
with similar geometry and material to other plants with bolt failures.  The IOD concluded that Unit 3 baffle bolt degradation would likely not be as significant as Unit 2, and that the Unit 3 baffle former assembly was currently operable pending further evaluation  
with similar geometry and material to other plants with bolt failures.  The IOD concluded  
that Unit 3 baffle bolt degradation would likely not be as significant as Unit 2, and that  
the Unit 3 baffle former assembly was currently operable pending further evaluation  
because of the following differences with Unit 2: (1) less effective full power years of  
because of the following differences with Unit 2: (1) less effective full power years of  
operation; (2) less neutron fluence levels (i.e., irradiation); (3) less pressure differential  
operation; (2) less neutron fluence levels (i.e., irradiation); (3) less pressure differential  
across the baffle plates; and (4) less fatigue-induced loading cycles on the bolts over the operating life of the plant.  The inspectors concluded that there was no immediate safety  
across the baffle plates; and (4) less fatigue-induced loading cycles on the bolts over the  
operating life of the plant.  The inspectors concluded that there was no immediate safety  
concern.  
concern.  
   
   
On May 5, 2016, Entergy staff revised the operability input for CR-IP3-2016-01035 under  
On May 5, 2016, Entergy staff revised the operability input for CR-IP3-2016-01035 under  
corrective action #2.  The inspectors noted that Entergy staff concluded an operability  
corrective action #2.  The inspectors noted that Entergy staff concluded an operability  
evaluation was not needed, in part, because "the baffle-former bolts are not required by TS and are not described in the UFSAR." The inspectors noted that while the baffle bolts are not described in these documents, their failure in sufficient numbers could have  
evaluation was not needed, in part, because the baffle-former bolts are not required by  
TS and are not described in the UFSAR.  The inspectors noted that while the baffle  
bolts are not described in these documents, their failure in sufficient numbers could have  
consequential effects on the TS-controlled ECCS if the baffle plates were to become  
consequential effects on the TS-controlled ECCS if the baffle plates were to become  
detached or deformed. This was described in Entergy's bolt pattern analysis report   
detached or deformed. This was described in Entergys bolt pattern analysis report  
16  documenting an acceptable bolt pattern prior to the spring 2016 RFO.  The inspectors reviewed Unit 3 TS 3.5.2, "ECCS - Operating," which requires multiple trains of ECCS to  
 
be operable.  The inspectors concluded that since the baffle bolts support the ECCS, which is subject to TS, Entergy's decision to not perform further evaluation of the operability determination was inconsistent with EN-OP-104.  Specifically, Section 5.1(7)  
16
of Entergy's procedure EN-OP-104 requires that an operability determination be  
   
documenting an acceptable bolt pattern prior to the spring 2016 RFO.  The inspectors  
reviewed Unit 3 TS 3.5.2, ECCS - Operating, which requires multiple trains of ECCS to  
be operable.  The inspectors concluded that since the baffle bolts support the ECCS,  
which is subject to TS, Entergys decision to not perform further evaluation of the  
operability determination was inconsistent with EN-OP-104.  Specifically, Section 5.1(7)  
of Entergys procedure EN-OP-104 requires that an operability determination be  
performed whenever a condition exists in the supporting SCC that may affect the ability  
performed whenever a condition exists in the supporting SCC that may affect the ability  
of the TS-controlled SSC to perform its specified safety function.  
of the TS-controlled SSC to perform its specified safety function.  
 
Further, the inspectors noted that Entergy staff concluded a degraded condition did not exist in Unit 3, and therefore, an operability evaluation was not required as a follow-up to  
Further, the inspectors noted that Entergy staff concluded a degraded condition did not  
exist in Unit 3, and therefore, an operability evaluation was not required as a follow-up to  
the immediate determination.  The documented basis provided was the differences  
the immediate determination.  The documented basis provided was the differences  
between the two units, plant operating data, and fuel performance.  The inspectors noted  
between the two units, plant operating data, and fuel performance.  The inspectors noted  
that plant operating data and fuel performance from Unit 2 did not result in identification of the bolt degradation; therefore, the absence of indications for these problems on Unit 3 was technically insufficient to support Entergy's conclusion that there was no degraded  
that plant operating data and fuel performance from Unit 2 did not result in identification  
of the bolt degradation; therefore, the absence of indications for these problems on Unit  
3 was technically insufficient to support Entergys conclusion that there was no degraded  
condition on Unit 3.  
condition on Unit 3.  
   
   
The inspectors' review of procedure EN-OP-104, Section 3.0, identified that examples of the effects of equipment aging and operating experience can be sources of information considered to enter the operability or functionality process.  The inspectors  
The inspectors review of procedure EN-OP-104, Section 3.0, identified that examples of  
the effects of equipment aging and operating experience can be sources of information  
considered to enter the operability or functionality process.  The inspectors  
acknowledged that licensees apply judgment in these decisions.  In this particular  
acknowledged that licensees apply judgment in these decisions.  In this particular  
instance, the inspectors considered that operating experience was available that showed  
instance, the inspectors considered that operating experience was available that showed  
the Unit 3 baffle bolts were subject to IASCC and that plants of similar design (4-loop  
the Unit 3 baffle bolts were subject to IASCC and that plants of similar design (4-loop  
Westinghouse pressurized water reactors with a down-flow configuration and baffle bolts of 347 material and similar dimensions) were subject to greater amounts of bolt degradation compared to other reactor designs.  Furthermore, the inspectors noted the  
Westinghouse pressurized water reactors with a down-flow configuration and baffle bolts  
of 347 material and similar dimensions) were subject to greater amounts of bolt  
degradation compared to other reactor designs.  Furthermore, the inspectors noted the  
baffle bolts had experienced levels of neutron radiation exposure above the threshold for  
baffle bolts had experienced levels of neutron radiation exposure above the threshold for  
IASCC initiation as referenced in NUREG/CR-7027, "Degradation of LWR Core Internal  
IASCC initiation as referenced in NUREG/CR-7027, Degradation of LWR Core Internal  
Materials due to Neutron Irradiation."
Materials due to Neutron Irradiation.  
  Based on the above information available to Entergy staff, the inspectors concluded that  
   
Entergy's basis for determining that a degraded condition did not exist on Unit 3 was not  
Based on the above information available to Entergy staff, the inspectors concluded that  
Entergys basis for determining that a degraded condition did not exist on Unit 3 was not  
technically supported.  The inspectors noted that in completing an IOD in EN-OP-104,  
technically supported.  The inspectors noted that in completing an IOD in EN-OP-104,  
Step 5.3.2 states "determine if there is an ongoing degradation mechanism that may  
Step 5.3.2 states determine if there is an ongoing degradation mechanism that may  
impact future operability based on changing conditions, specifically consider the SSCs specified safety function and mission time." On May 5, 2016, Entergy's basis for concluding an operability evaluation was not required and exiting the operability  
impact future operability based on changing conditions, specifically consider the SSCs  
specified safety function and mission time.  On May 5, 2016, Entergys basis for  
concluding an operability evaluation was not required and exiting the operability  
determination procedure at Step 5.3.3 was inconsistent with this procedural requirement  
determination procedure at Step 5.3.3 was inconsistent with this procedural requirement  
because their IOD concluded Unit 3 was susceptible to baffle bolt degradation, which is  
because their IOD concluded Unit 3 was susceptible to baffle bolt degradation, which is  
time based and subject to changing conditions including fatigue inducing loading cycles and neutron fluence.  As a result, the inspectors concluded Entergy staff did not complete the additional actions prescribed by EN-OP-104 to perform an operability  
time based and subject to changing conditions including fatigue inducing loading cycles  
evaluation.  Specifically, Step 5.3.9 states in part "if an Operability Evaluation is required  
and neutron fluence.  As a result, the inspectors concluded Entergy staff did not  
then perform the following:  Proceed to Subsection 5.5, Operability Evaluation."
complete the additional actions prescribed by EN-OP-104 to perform an operability  
evaluation.  Specifically, Step 5.3.9 states in part if an Operability Evaluation is required  
then perform the following:  Proceed to Subsection 5.5, Operability Evaluation.  
On July 11, 2016, Entergy staff subsequently completed the steps in EN-OP-104 and
performed an operability evaluation, which assumed an estimated number of baffle-
former bolt failures based on the degradation found in Unit 2, and adjusted to take credit
for the small number of inaccessible bolts and a sample of bolts extracted with high
removal torque that indicated residual structural capacity.  The inspectors determined


17
   
   
On July 11, 2016, Entergy staff subsequently completed the steps in EN-OP-104 and performed an operability evaluation, which assumed an estimated number of baffle-former bolt failures based on the degradation found in Unit 2, and adjusted to take credit
this estimated number of bolt failures was conservative because the evaluation did not  
for the small number of inaccessible bolts and a sample of bolts extracted with high
credit the baffle-edge bolts or the differences in operational history between the two units  
removal torque that indicated residual structural capacity.  The inspectors determined 
such as neutron fluence levels or fatigue from thermal cycles.  The operability evaluation  
17  this estimated number of bolt failures was conservative because the evaluation did not credit the baffle-edge bolts or the differences in operational history between the two units  
concluded that the Unit 3 baffle bolts would perform as intended to secure the baffle  
such as neutron fluence levels or fatigue from thermal cycles.  The operability evaluation concluded that the Unit 3 baffle bolts would perform as intended to secure the baffle plates from being dislodged.  The inspectors concluded that Entergy's operability  
plates from being dislodged.  The inspectors concluded that Entergys operability  
evaluation provided appropriate basis to conclude that the Unit 3 baffle assembly would  
evaluation provided appropriate basis to conclude that the Unit 3 baffle assembly would  
support ECCS operability until the planned Unit 3 RFO in spring 2017.  
support ECCS operability until the planned Unit 3 RFO in spring 2017.  
   
   
Analysis.  The inspectors determined that Entergy's failure to adequately accomplish the actions prescribed in EN-OP-104 for a degraded condition and perform an operability  
Analysis.  The inspectors determined that Entergys failure to adequately accomplish the  
actions prescribed in EN-OP-104 for a degraded condition and perform an operability  
evaluation associated with the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts was a performance deficiency.   
evaluation associated with the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts was a performance deficiency.   
 
Specifically, Entergy incorrectly concluded that no degraded or non-conforming condition  
Specifically, Entergy incorrectly concluded that no degraded or non-conforming condition existed related to the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts and exited the operability determination  
existed related to the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts and exited the operability determination  
procedure.  As a result, Entergy's initial documentation did not provide sufficient basis for operability and continued operation until questioned by NRC inspectors.  
procedure.  As a result, Entergys initial documentation did not provide sufficient basis  
for operability and continued operation until questioned by NRC inspectors.  
   
   
This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance  
This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance  
attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to  
attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to  
ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage).  This issue was also similar to example 3.j of IMC 0612, Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues," because  
ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating  
events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage).  This issue was also  
similar to example 3.j of IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, because  
the condition resulted in reasonable doubt of operability of the ECCS and additional  
the condition resulted in reasonable doubt of operability of the ECCS and additional  
analysis was necessary to verify operability.  In accordance with IMC 0609.04, "Initial  
analysis was necessary to verify operability.  In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial  
Characterization of Findings," and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, "The Significance  
Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance  
Determination Process for Findings At-Power," issued June 19, 2012, the inspectors screened the finding for safety significance and determined it to be of very low safety significance (Green), since the finding did not represent an actual loss of system or  
Determination Process for Findings At-Power, issued June 19, 2012, the inspectors  
screened the finding for safety significance and determined it to be of very low safety  
significance (Green), since the finding did not represent an actual loss of system or  
function.  After inspector questioning, Entergy performed an operability evaluation, which  
function.  After inspector questioning, Entergy performed an operability evaluation, which  
provided sufficient bases to conclude the Unit 3 baffle assembly would support ECCS  
provided sufficient bases to conclude the Unit 3 baffle assembly would support ECCS  
operability.  This finding is related to the cross-cutting aspect of Problem Identification and Resolution, Operating Experience, because Entergy did not effectively evaluate  
operability.  This finding is related to the cross-cutting aspect of Problem Identification  
relevant internal and external operating ex
and Resolution, Operating Experience, because Entergy did not effectively evaluate  
perience.  Specifically, Entergy did not adequately evaluate the impact of degraded baffle bolts at Unit 3 when relevant  
relevant internal and external operating experience.  Specifically, Entergy did not  
adequately evaluate the impact of degraded baffle bolts at Unit 3 when relevant  
operating experience was identified at Unit 2. [P.5]   
operating experience was identified at Unit 2. [P.5]   
   
   
Enforcement. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," states, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by  
Enforcement. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and  
Drawings, states, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by  
documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be  
documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be  
accomplished in accordance with those procedures.  The introduction to Appendix B  
accomplished in accordance with those procedures.  The introduction to Appendix B  
states that 'quality assurance' comprises all those planned and systematic actions necessary to provide adequate confidence that a structure, system, or component (SSC) will perform satisfactorily in service.  Procedure EN-OP-104, Step 5.3[2], related to immediate operability, states "Determine if there is an ongoing degradation mechanism  
states that quality assurance comprises all those planned and systematic actions  
necessary to provide adequate confidence that a structure, system, or component (SSC)  
will perform satisfactorily in service.  Procedure EN-OP-104, Step 5.3[2], related to  
immediate operability, states Determine if there is an ongoing degradation mechanism  
that may impact future operability based on changing conditions, specifically consider  
that may impact future operability based on changing conditions, specifically consider  
the SSCs specified safety function and mission time." Step 5.3(3) follows with, in part "If  
the SSCs specified safety function and mission time.  Step 5.3(3) follows with, in part If  
no Degraded or Non-conforming Condition exists, then perform the following as the  
no Degraded or Non-conforming Condition exists, then perform the following as the  
Immediate Determination:" "Declare the SSC Operable" and "Exit this procedure."
Immediate Determination: Declare the SSC Operable and Exit this procedure.  
  Contrary to the above, from May 5, 2016 until July 11, 2016, Entergy did not adequately  
   
Contrary to the above, from May 5, 2016 until July 11, 2016, Entergy did not adequately  
accomplish actions as prescribed by EN-OP-104 for a degraded condition associated  
accomplish actions as prescribed by EN-OP-104 for a degraded condition associated  
with the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts.  Specifically, Entergy incorrectly concluded that no   
with the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts.  Specifically, Entergy incorrectly concluded that no  
18  degraded or non-conforming condition existed related to the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts and exited the operability determination procedure.  The NRC determined this is contrary  
 
to EN-OP-104 because a comparison of Unit 2 and 3 operational factors resulted in Entergy concluding that the Unit 3 baffle bolts would likely be affected due to the same degradation mechanism.  Entergy's corrective actions included entering the issue into  
18
   
degraded or non-conforming condition existed related to the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts  
and exited the operability determination procedure.  The NRC determined this is contrary  
to EN-OP-104 because a comparison of Unit 2 and 3 operational factors resulted in  
Entergy concluding that the Unit 3 baffle bolts would likely be affected due to the same  
degradation mechanism.  Entergys corrective actions included entering the issue into  
the CAP and documenting an operability evaluation to support the basis for operability of  
the CAP and documenting an operability evaluation to support the basis for operability of  
the baffle bolts and ECCS.  Because this issue is of very low safety significance (Green) and Entergy entered this into their CAP as CR-IP3-2016-01961, this finding is being  
the baffle bolts and ECCS.  Because this issue is of very low safety significance (Green)  
treated as an NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.  (NCV 05000286/2016002-02, Failure to Follow Operability Determination Procedure for  
and Entergy entered this into their CAP as CR-IP3-2016-01961, this finding is being  
treated as an NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy.  (NCV  
05000286/2016002-02, Failure to Follow Operability Determination Procedure for  
Unit 3 Baffle-Former Bolts)  
Unit 3 Baffle-Former Bolts)  
Update to URI 05000247/2016001-06, 23 Emergency Diesel Generator Automatic Voltage Regulator Failure
   
   
Introduction.  The NRC opened a URI in Inspection Report 05000247/2016001 related to two failures of the 23 EDG to run and maintain bus voltage on March 7, 2016, and to  
Update to URI 05000247/2016001-06, 23 Emergency Diesel Generator Automatic
Voltage Regulator Failure
Introduction.  The NRC opened a URI in Inspection Report 05000247/2016001 related to  
two failures of the 23 EDG to run and maintain bus voltage on March 7, 2016, and to  
provide adequate control of bus voltage on March 10, 2016.  This report provides an  
provide adequate control of bus voltage on March 10, 2016.  This report provides an  
update of the status of this URI.  
update of the status of this URI.  
  Description.  On March 7, 2016, approximately one hour after the trip of the 3A normal feed breaker, the 23 EDG tripped on overcurrent while powering the 6A 480V safety bus.   
   
Description.  On March 7, 2016, approximately one hour after the trip of the 3A normal  
feed breaker, the 23 EDG tripped on overcurrent while powering the 6A 480V safety bus.   
The 6A bus remained de-energized for approximately one hour until the crew restored  
The 6A bus remained de-energized for approximately one hour until the crew restored  
the 6A bus via off-site power.  The 23 EDG was declared inoperable.  All four 480V  
the 6A bus via off-site power.  The 23 EDG was declared inoperable.  All four 480V  
safety buses were restored to off-site power.  Entergy replaced the overcurrent relays and retested the 23 EDG satisfactorily on March 8, 2016.  However, bench testing of the overcurrent relays demonstrated that they were accurately calibrated.     
safety buses were restored to off-site power.  Entergy replaced the overcurrent relays  
 
and retested the 23 EDG satisfactorily on March 8, 2016.  However, bench testing of the  
overcurrent relays demonstrated that they were accurately calibrated.     
   
   
Subsequently, on March 10, 2016, during performance of PT-R14, "Automatic Safety  
Subsequently, on March 10, 2016, during performance of PT-R14, Automatic Safety  
Injection System Electrical Load and Blackout Test," the 23 EDG exhibited anomalous behavior during the train 'B' load sequencing.  During this test, the voltage on safety bus  
Injection System Electrical Load and Blackout Test, the 23 EDG exhibited anomalous  
6A dropped to approximately 200V when  
behavior during the train B load sequencing.  During this test, the voltage on safety bus  
the 23 auxiliary feedwater pump was sequenced onto the bus (CR-IP2-2016-01430) and the sequencer failed to complete the  
6A dropped to approximately 200V when the 23 auxiliary feedwater pump was  
sequenced onto the bus (CR-IP2-2016-01430) and the sequencer failed to complete the  
first two sequences.  The 23 EDG was again declared inoperable and the period of  
first two sequences.  The 23 EDG was again declared inoperable and the period of  
inoperability was backdated to March 7, 2016, when it originally tripped.  Further  
inoperability was backdated to March 7, 2016, when it originally tripped.  Further  
troubleshooting and additional failure modes analysis by Entergy initially determined that the cause of both events may have been a degraded resistor (R25) on the 23 EDG  
troubleshooting and additional failure modes analysis by Entergy initially determined that  
the cause of both events may have been a degraded resistor (R25) on the 23 EDG  
automatic voltage regulator (AVR) card.   
automatic voltage regulator (AVR) card.   
   
   
The 23 EDG AVR card was replaced, and the 23 EDG was again tested satisfactorily.   
The 23 EDG AVR card was replaced, and the 23 EDG was again tested satisfactorily.   
The voltage anomaly issues exhibited during the March 10, 2016, test were documented in CR-IP2-2016-01430 which was closed in CR-IP2-2016-01260 to be included in the causal assessment associated with the tripping of 23 EDG breaker on March 7, 2016.   
The voltage anomaly issues exhibited during the March 10, 2016, test were documented  
in CR-IP2-2016-01430 which was closed in CR-IP2-2016-01260 to be included in the  
causal assessment associated with the tripping of 23 EDG breaker on March 7, 2016.   
Entergy assigned a vendor to perform laboratory bench testing and failure analysis of  
Entergy assigned a vendor to perform laboratory bench testing and failure analysis of  
the 23 EDG AVR card.  The vendor report attributed the cause of the March 10, 2016,  
the 23 EDG AVR card.  The vendor report attributed the cause of the March 10, 2016,  
loss of voltage control to a degraded solder joint on the AVR card.  However, the vendor  
loss of voltage control to a degraded solder joint on the AVR card.  However, the vendor  
report explicitly did not attribute the event on March 7, 2016, to the same cause.  Entergy assigned a corrective action in CR-IP2-2016-01260 to review the cause of the   
report explicitly did not attribute the event on March 7, 2016, to the same cause.   
 
Entergy assigned a corrective action in CR-IP2-2016-01260 to review the cause of the   
19  23 EDG overcurrent trip on March 7, 2016, in light of the vendor report. The inspectors determined that the issue of concern remains open as a URI until this causal
   
assessment has been completed by Entergy and assessed by NRC. (URI 05000247/2016001-06, 23 Emergency Diesel Generator Automatic Voltage
   


19
23 EDG overcurrent trip on March 7, 2016, in light of the vendor report.  The inspectors
determined that the issue of concern remains open as a URI until this causal
assessment has been completed by Entergy and assessed by NRC.  (URI
05000247/2016001-06, 23 Emergency Diesel Generator Automatic Voltage
Regulator Failure)  
Regulator Failure)  
1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18 - 2 samples)
   
   
  Permanent Modifications  
1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18 - 2 samples)
  .1 Control Rod Guide Tube Repairs in Location E-9   
  a. Inspection Scope  
   
  The inspectors evaluated a modification to the reactor vessel upper internals to swap damaged control rod guide tube in location E-9 with abandoned guide tube in location  
Permanent Modifications  
   
.1  
Control Rod Guide Tube Repairs in Location E-9   
   
a. Inspection Scope  
   
The inspectors evaluated a modification to the reactor vessel upper internals to swap  
damaged control rod guide tube in location E-9 with abandoned guide tube in location  
D-10.  The inspectors verified that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance  
D-10.  The inspectors verified that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance  
capability of the affected systems were not degraded by the modification.  In addition,  
capability of the affected systems were not degraded by the modification.  In addition,  
the inspectors reviewed modification documents associated with the design change, including evaluation of equivalency and core flow changes, and post-modification testing.  The inspectors also reviewed revisions to the affected drawings and interviewed  
the inspectors reviewed modification documents associated with the design change,  
including evaluation of equivalency and core flow changes, and post-modification  
testing.  The inspectors also reviewed revisions to the affected drawings and interviewed  
refueling and engineering personnel.   
refueling and engineering personnel.   
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
   
   
.2 Core Baffle-Former Bolt EC 64038  
b. Findings
  a. Inspection Scope  
  The inspectors reviewed EC 64038, "IP2 Reactor Vessel Equivalent Replacement  
No findings were identified.
Baffle-to-Former Bolt." This modification was completed during RFO 2R22 and involved  
.2  
Core Baffle-Former Bolt EC 64038  
   
a. Inspection Scope  
   
The inspectors reviewed EC 64038, IP2 Reactor Vessel Equivalent Replacement  
Baffle-to-Former Bolt.  This modification was completed during RFO 2R22 and involved  
the replacement of 278 baffle-former bolts out of a total of 832 located in the Unit 2  
the replacement of 278 baffle-former bolts out of a total of 832 located in the Unit 2  
reactor vessel.  Entergy replaced all of the bolts that were potentially degraded as  
reactor vessel.  Entergy replaced all of the bolts that were potentially degraded as  
observed by visual indications of a protruding bolt head or lock bar problem, bolts that did not pass UT, and bolts inaccessible for UT.  Entergy staff also replaced 51 additional bolts that passed ultrasonic and visual examinations to increase the structural margin of  
observed by visual indications of a protruding bolt head or lock bar problem, bolts that  
did not pass UT, and bolts inaccessible for UT.  Entergy staff also replaced 51 additional  
bolts that passed ultrasonic and visual examinations to increase the structural margin of  
the baffle-former assembly for future operating cycles.   
the baffle-former assembly for future operating cycles.   
   
   
The inspectors reviewed the equivalency evaluation completed by Entergy staff to install baffle-former bolts of a different material and configuration than the original bolts.  The inspectors reviewed the associated EC package to determine whether the replacement  
The inspectors reviewed the equivalency evaluation completed by Entergy staff to install  
bolts' form, fit, and function were maintained compared to the original bolts and whether  
baffle-former bolts of a different material and configuration than the original bolts.  The  
inspectors reviewed the associated EC package to determine whether the replacement  
bolts form, fit, and function were maintained compared to the original bolts and whether  
the change conformed to the design and licensing bases of the baffle-former assembly.   
the change conformed to the design and licensing bases of the baffle-former assembly.   
Specifically, this change involved replacing the original baffle-former bolts made of type 347 stainless steel with bolts made of type 316 stainless steel.  The baffle-former bolt head configuration was also changed from an original internal hex and slot design (secured with a welded lock bar) to an external hex configuration with an integral locking  
Specifically, this change involved replacing the original baffle-former bolts made of  
cup design.  The design change document further evaluated a more gradual fillet
type 347 stainless steel with bolts made of type 316 stainless steel.  The baffle-former  
20  geometry between the bolt head and shank intended to reduce the stress concentration at that transition and provide for improved fatigue resistance.
bolt head configuration was also changed from an original internal hex and slot design  
(secured with a welded lock bar) to an external hex configuration with an integral locking  
cup design.  The design change document further evaluated a more gradual fillet  


  b. Findings  
20
  No findings were identified.  
  1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - 8 samples)  
   
  a. Inspection Scope  
geometry between the bolt head and shank intended to reduce the stress concentration
  The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance tests for the maintenance activities listed  
at that transition and provide for improved fatigue resistance.
b. Findings  
   
No findings were identified.  
   
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - 8 samples)  
   
a. Inspection Scope  
   
The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance tests for the maintenance activities listed  
below to verify that procedures and test activities ensured system operability and  
below to verify that procedures and test activities ensured system operability and  
functional capability.  The inspectors reviewed the test procedure to verify that the procedure adequately tested the safety functions that may have been affected by the maintenance activity, that the acceptance criteria in the procedure was consistent with  
functional capability.  The inspectors reviewed the test procedure to verify that the  
procedure adequately tested the safety functions that may have been affected by the  
maintenance activity, that the acceptance criteria in the procedure was consistent with  
the information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and that  
the information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and that  
the test results were properly reviewed and accepted and problems were appropriately  
the test results were properly reviewed and accepted and problems were appropriately  
documented.  The inspectors also walked down the affected job site, observed the pre-job brief and post-job critique where possible, confirmed work site cleanliness was maintained, witnessed the test or reviewed test data to verify quality control hold points  
documented.  The inspectors also walked down the affected job site, observed the  
pre-job brief and post-job critique where possible, confirmed work site cleanliness was  
maintained, witnessed the test or reviewed test data to verify quality control hold points  
were performed and checked, and that results adequately demonstrated restoration of  
were performed and checked, and that results adequately demonstrated restoration of  
the affected safety functions.  
the affected safety functions.  
Unit 2
21 EDG fuel oil transfer pump after planned maintenance on May 5, 2016 
Replacement of pressurizer level transmitters LT-459 and LT-460 on May 25, 2016
21 CCW heat exchanger service water outlet weld repair on June 26, 2016
Flux mapping system drive repairs following motor failures on June 28, 2016
Unit 3
Maintenance on service water components associated with the 32 EDG on May 5,
2016 (this sample was part of an in-depth review of the EDG system)
Modification of the 32 EDG space heaters on May 5, 2016 (this sample was part of
an in-depth review of the EDG system)
Maintenance on the 32 EDG air start system on May 6, 2016 (this sample was part
of an in-depth review of the EDG system)
Replacement of failed bistable LC-427K, steam generator 32 low level mismatch trip
interlock, on May 18, 2016
b. Findings
No findings were identified.


21
   
   
Unit 2  21 EDG fuel oil transfer pump after planned maintenance on May 5, 2016  Replacement of pressurizer level transmitters LT-459 and LT-460 on May 25, 2016  21 CCW heat exchanger service water outlet weld repair on June 26, 2016  Flux mapping system drive repairs following motor failures on June 28, 2016
Unit 3  Maintenance on service water components associated with the 32 EDG on May 5, 2016 (this sample was part of an in-depth review of the EDG system)  Modification of the 32 EDG space heaters on May 5, 2016 (this sample was part of an in-depth review of the EDG system)  Maintenance on the 32 EDG air start system on May 6, 2016 (this sample was part of an in-depth review of the EDG system)  Replacement of failed bistable LC-427K, steam generator 32 low level mismatch trip interlock, on May 18, 2016
b. Findings
   
   
No findings were identified.
1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (71111.20 - 2 samples)  
 
   
   
.1  
21  1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (71111.20 - 2 samples)  
Unit 2 RFO 2R22  
  .1 Unit 2 RFO 2R22  
   
  a. Inspection Scope  
a. Inspection Scope  
  The inspectors reviewed the station's work schedule and outage risk plan for the Unit 2  
   
The inspectors reviewed the stations work schedule and outage risk plan for the Unit 2  
maintenance during RFO 2R22, which was conducted from March 7, 2016, to June 16,  
maintenance during RFO 2R22, which was conducted from March 7, 2016, to June 16,  
2016.  The inspectors reviewed Entergy's development and implementation of outage plans and schedules to verify that risk, industry experience, previous site-specific problems, and defense-in-depth were considered.  During the outage, the inspectors  
2016.  The inspectors reviewed Entergys development and implementation of outage  
plans and schedules to verify that risk, industry experience, previous site-specific  
problems, and defense-in-depth were considered.  During the outage, the inspectors  
observed portions of the shutdown and cooldown processes and monitored controls  
observed portions of the shutdown and cooldown processes and monitored controls  
associated with the following outage activities:  
associated with the following outage activities:  
  Configuration management, including maintenance of defense-in-depth, commensurate with the outage plan for the key safety functions and compliance with the applicable TSs when taking equipment OOS  Implementation of clearance activities and confirmation that tags were properly hung and that equipment was appropriately configured to safely support the associated  
work or testing  Installation and configuration of reactor coolant pressure, level, and temperature instruments to provide accurate indication and instrument error accounting  Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that  
TSs were met  Monitoring of decay heat removal operations  Impact of outage work on the ability of the operators to operate the spent fuel pool cooling system  Reactor water inventory controls, including flow paths, configurations, alternative means for inventory additions, and controls to prevent inventory loss  Activities that could affect reactivity  Maintenance of secondary containment as required by TSs  Refueling activities, including fuel handling and fuel receipt inspections  Fatigue management  Tracking of startup prerequisites, walkdown of the primary containment to verify that debris had not been left which could block the ECCS suction strainers, and startup and ascension to full power operation  Foreign Object Search and Retrieval for missing baffle bolts and locking tabs  Identification and resolution of problems related to RFO activities  
Configuration management, including maintenance of defense-in-depth,  
  During this outage, Entergy replaced 278 degraded baffle bolts in the Unit 2 reactor  
commensurate with the outage plan for the key safety functions and compliance with  
vessel baffle assembly.  This emergent project resulted in the extension of the outage schedule from 30 days to 102 days.  
the applicable TSs when taking equipment OOS  
  b. Findings  
   
  Introduction.  The inspectors identified a Green NCV of TS 5.4.1 for Entergy's failure to implement procedure OAP-007, "Containment Entry and Egress." Specifically, workers transiting the inner and outer crane wall sections of containment on June 11, 2016, failed  
Implementation of clearance activities and confirmation that tags were properly hung  
and that equipment was appropriately configured to safely support the associated  
work or testing  
   
Installation and configuration of reactor coolant pressure, level, and temperature  
instruments to provide accurate indication and instrument error accounting  
   
Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that  
TSs were met  
   
Monitoring of decay heat removal operations  
   
Impact of outage work on the ability of the operators to operate the spent fuel pool  
cooling system  
   
Reactor water inventory controls, including flow paths, configurations, alternative  
means for inventory additions, and controls to prevent inventory loss  
   
Activities that could affect reactivity  
   
Maintenance of secondary containment as required by TSs  
   
Refueling activities, including fuel handling and fuel receipt inspections  
   
Fatigue management  
   
Tracking of startup prerequisites, walkdown of the primary containment to verify that  
debris had not been left which could block the ECCS suction strainers, and startup  
and ascension to full power operation  
   
Foreign Object Search and Retrieval for missing baffle bolts and locking tabs  
   
Identification and resolution of problems related to RFO activities  
   
During this outage, Entergy replaced 278 degraded baffle bolts in the Unit 2 reactor  
vessel baffle assembly.  This emergent project resulted in the extension of the outage  
schedule from 30 days to 102 days.  
   
b. Findings  
   
Introduction.  The inspectors identified a Green NCV of TS 5.4.1 for Entergys failure to  
implement procedure OAP-007, Containment Entry and Egress.  Specifically, workers  
transiting the inner and outer crane wall sections of containment on June 11, 2016, failed  
to maintain at least one (of two) flow channeling gate closed to ensure availability of the  
to maintain at least one (of two) flow channeling gate closed to ensure availability of the  
containment sumps to provide suction for the ECCS.   
containment sumps to provide suction for the ECCS.  
22    Description.  On June 11, 2016, in mode 4, in preparation for reactor startup, Entergy was performing maintenance in containment required prior to mode 3, such as reactor coolant pump motor balancing and steam flow transmitter troubleshooting.  These activities required scaffolds to be temporarily erected for workers to safely perform  
 
22
   
Description.  On June 11, 2016, in mode 4, in preparation for reactor startup, Entergy  
was performing maintenance in containment required prior to mode 3, such as reactor  
coolant pump motor balancing and steam flow transmitter troubleshooting.  These  
activities required scaffolds to be temporarily erected for workers to safely perform  
maintenance.  While transiting from the inner to outer section of containment, the  
maintenance.  While transiting from the inner to outer section of containment, the  
inspectors noted that both flow channeling gates were maintained open simultaneously  
inspectors noted that both flow channeling gates were maintained open simultaneously  
as workers carried scaffold poles and hardware out of the area.   
as workers carried scaffold poles and hardware out of the area.   
 
In the event of a postulated LOCA, Unit 2 relies on two sumps to provide a suction source for the internal recirculation pumps and residual heat removal pumps,  
In the event of a postulated LOCA, Unit 2 relies on two sumps to provide a suction  
source for the internal recirculation pumps and residual heat removal pumps,  
respectively, after the injection phase of the accident.  The sumps have cylindrical  
respectively, after the injection phase of the accident.  The sumps have cylindrical  
screens with large surface area and small holes to filter small debris and maintain  
screens with large surface area and small holes to filter small debris and maintain  
adequate net positive suction head for the associated pumps.  The reactor cavity sump and large intervening barriers prevent large debris generated from the accident, such as insulation, from reaching and blocking the recirculation and containment sump screens.  
adequate net positive suction head for the associated pumps.  The reactor cavity sump  
 
and large intervening barriers prevent large debris generated from the accident, such as  
insulation, from reaching and blocking the recirculation and containment sump screens.  
   
   
Entergy procedure OAP-007, "Containment Entry and Egress," precaution and limitation  
Entergy procedure OAP-007, Containment Entry and Egress, precaution and limitation  
step 2.30.2, states, "In mode 1, 2, 3, or 4, entry inside the crane wall shall use the double gate entry point via gates 17 and 23.  One gate shall remain shut and secured at all times to maintain flow channeling and sump operability.  Securing gates requires a  
step 2.30.2, states, In mode 1, 2, 3, or 4, entry inside the crane wall shall use the  
double gate entry point via gates 17 and 23.  One gate shall remain shut and secured at  
all times to maintain flow channeling and sump operability.  Securing gates requires a  
padlock or nut and bolt closure from the outside.  This will require posting a gate monitor  
padlock or nut and bolt closure from the outside.  This will require posting a gate monitor  
to allow exit." The inspectors noted, while a gate monitor was posted, both gates were  
to allow exit.  The inspectors noted, while a gate monitor was posted, both gates were  
maintained open during passage and not secured with a padlock or nut and bolt closure.   
maintained open during passage and not secured with a padlock or nut and bolt closure.   
Upon questioning by the inspectors, Entergy immediately coached the gate monitor and restored the gates to an acceptable position.  Entergy generated CR-IP2-2016-04036 to address this issue.   
Upon questioning by the inspectors, Entergy immediately coached the gate monitor and  
 
restored the gates to an acceptable position.  Entergy generated CR-IP2-2016-04036 to  
address this issue.   
   
   
Analysis.  The inspectors determined that Energy's failure to maintain either gate 17 or gate 23 closed during passage in accordance with OAP-007 was a performance deficiency.  The performance deficiency was more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control (shutdown equipment lineup) attribute and adversely  
Analysis.  The inspectors determined that Energys failure to maintain either gate 17 or  
gate 23 closed during passage in accordance with OAP-007 was a performance  
deficiency.  The performance deficiency was more than minor because it is associated  
with the configuration control (shutdown equipment lineup) attribute and adversely  
affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability,  
affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability,  
reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent  
reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent  
undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage).  The inspectors evaluated the finding in  
undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage).  The inspectors evaluated the finding in  
accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Exhibit 3, and determined that a detailed risk evaluation was necessary because the finding represented a loss of system safety function.  A detailed risk assessm
accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Exhibit 3, and determined that a  
ent was conducted conservatively assuming complete failure of the recirculation and containment sumps due to the performance  
detailed risk evaluation was necessary because the finding represented a loss of system  
safety function.  A detailed risk assessment was conducted conservatively assuming  
complete failure of the recirculation and containment sumps due to the performance  
deficiency.  Given that Unit 2 was in mode 4, in plant operating state 1, with a late time  
deficiency.  Given that Unit 2 was in mode 4, in plant operating state 1, with a late time  
window, the at-power simplified plant analysis risk model for large-break LOCAs was determined to best model the degrade condition and plant response.  An exposure time of one day was assumed.  No credit was assumed for the decrease in energy that would  
window, the at-power simplified plant analysis risk model for large-break LOCAs was  
determined to best model the degrade condition and plant response.  An exposure time  
of one day was assumed.  No credit was assumed for the decrease in energy that would  
be anticipated in a release during a LOCA in mode 4, nor the corresponding reduction in  
be anticipated in a release during a LOCA in mode 4, nor the corresponding reduction in  
debris generation.  This was also considered conservative.  Utilizing Systems Analysis  
debris generation.  This was also considered conservative.  Utilizing Systems Analysis  
Program for Hands-On Integrated Reliability Evaluation, version 8.13, with Indian Point Unit 2 Simplified Plant Analysis Risk Model, version 8.19, for the assumed conditions, the change in core damage frequency was determined to be 7E-9.  Therefore, this issue represents a Green finding.  
Program for Hands-On Integrated Reliability Evaluation, version 8.13, with Indian Point  
Unit 2 Simplified Plant Analysis Risk Model, version 8.19, for the assumed conditions,  
the change in core damage frequency was determined to be 7E-9.  Therefore, this issue  
represents a Green finding.  


 
23
23  This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Avoid Complacency, because Entergy did not consider potential undesired consequences of  
actions before performing work and implement appropriate error-reduction tools.  Specifically, the work crew did not understand the requirements and potential consequences prior to commencing work and the gate monitor did not enforce these  
This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Avoid  
Complacency, because Entergy did not consider potential undesired consequences of  
actions before performing work and implement appropriate error-reduction tools.   
Specifically, the work crew did not understand the requirements and potential  
consequences prior to commencing work and the gate monitor did not enforce these  
requirements to maintain at least one gate locked or pinned closed as required by  
requirements to maintain at least one gate locked or pinned closed as required by  
OAP-007.  [H.12]  
OAP-007.  [H.12]  
   
   
Enforcement.  Unit 2 TS 5.4.1.a requires that the procedures listed in Attachment A to Regulatory Guide 1.33, "Quality Assurance Program Requirements," Revision 2, be  
Enforcement.  Unit 2 TS 5.4.1.a requires that the procedures listed in Attachment A to  
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements, Revision 2, be  
established and implemented.  Attachment A states that instructions should be prepared,  
established and implemented.  Attachment A states that instructions should be prepared,  
as appropriate, for access to containment and changing modes of operation of the  
as appropriate, for access to containment and changing modes of operation of the  
ECCS.  Entergy procedure OAP-007, "Containment Entry and Egress," Step 2.30.2,  
ECCS.  Entergy procedure OAP-007, Containment Entry and Egress, Step 2.30.2,  
states, "In mode 1, 2, 3, or 4, entry inside the crane wall shall use the double gate entry point via gates 17 and 23.  One gate shall remain shut and secured at all times to maintain flow channeling and sump operability.  Securing gates requires a padlock or nut  
states, In mode 1, 2, 3, or 4, entry inside the crane wall shall use the double gate entry  
and bolt closure from the outside." Contrary to the above, on June 11, 2016, Entergy did  
point via gates 17 and 23.  One gate shall remain shut and secured at all times to  
maintain flow channeling and sump operability.  Securing gates requires a padlock or nut  
and bolt closure from the outside.  Contrary to the above, on June 11, 2016, Entergy did  
not maintain one gate secured at all times with a padlock or nut and bolt closure.   
not maintain one gate secured at all times with a padlock or nut and bolt closure.   
Entergy entered this issue into the CAP as CR-IP2-2016-04036.  Because this violation was of very low safety significance (Green), and Entergy entered this performance deficiency into the CAP, the NRC is treating this as a NCV in accordance with  
Entergy entered this issue into the CAP as CR-IP2-2016-04036.  Because this violation  
Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.  (NCV 05000247/2016002-03, Failure to Maintain Flow Channeling Gates Closed in Accordance with the Containment  
was of very low safety significance (Green), and Entergy entered this performance  
Procedure)
deficiency into the CAP, the NRC is treating this as a NCV in accordance with  
 
Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.  (NCV 05000247/2016002-03, Failure  
.2 Unit 2 Forced Outage  
to Maintain Flow Channeling Gates Closed in Accordance with the Containment  
  a. Inspection Scope  
Procedure)  
  Unit 2 conducted a forced outage from June 24 to 27, 2016, in order to complete weld repairs on a through-wall leak on the service water inlet line to the 21 CCW heat  
exchanger.  These repairs required shutting down to mode 4 in order to meet the TS 3.7.7, "Component Cooling Water (CCW) System," limiting condition for operations  
.2  
Unit 2 Forced Outage  
   
a. Inspection Scope  
   
Unit 2 conducted a forced outage from June 24 to 27, 2016, in order to complete weld  
repairs on a through-wall leak on the service water inlet line to the 21 CCW heat  
exchanger.  These repairs required shutting down to mode 4 in order to meet the  
TS 3.7.7, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, limiting condition for operations  
for CCW operability.  While these repairs were being completed, the grid operator  
for CCW operability.  While these repairs were being completed, the grid operator  
completed repairs to breaker 9 in the offsite switchyard.  During the outage, the  
completed repairs to breaker 9 in the offsite switchyard.  During the outage, the  
inspectors observed portions of the shutdown and cooldown processes and monitored controls associated with the following outage activities:  
inspectors observed portions of the shutdown and cooldown processes and monitored  
  Configuration management, including maintenance of defense-in-depth, commensurate with the outage plan for the key safety functions and compliance with the applicable TSs when taking equipment OOS  Implementation of clearance activities and confirmation that tags were properly hung and that equipment was appropriately configured to safely support the associated  
controls associated with the following outage activities:  
work or testing  Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that  
TSs were met  Monitoring of decay heat removal operations  Reactor water inventory controls, including flow paths, configurations, alternative means for inventory additions, and controls to prevent inventory loss  Activities that could affect reactivity
24    Tracking of startup prerequisites
Configuration management, including maintenance of defense-in-depth,  
  Identification and resolution of problems related to RFO activities
commensurate with the outage plan for the key safety functions and compliance with  
  When all repairs had been completed, Entergy restarted Unit 2 on June 27, 2016.
the applicable TSs when taking equipment OOS  
   
Implementation of clearance activities and confirmation that tags were properly hung  
and that equipment was appropriately configured to safely support the associated  
work or testing  
   
Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that  
TSs were met  
   
Monitoring of decay heat removal operations  
   
Reactor water inventory controls, including flow paths, configurations, alternative  
means for inventory additions, and controls to prevent inventory loss  
   
Activities that could affect reactivity  


  b. Findings  
24
  No findings were identified.  
  1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22  
   
- 6 samples)  
  a. Inspection Scope  
Tracking of startup prerequisites 
  The inspectors observed performance of surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of  
Identification and resolution of problems related to RFO activities
When all repairs had been completed, Entergy restarted Unit 2 on June 27, 2016.
b. Findings  
No findings were identified.  
   
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22 - 6 samples)  
   
a. Inspection Scope  
   
The inspectors observed performance of surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of  
selected risk-significant SSCs to assess whether test results satisfied TSs, the UFSAR,  
selected risk-significant SSCs to assess whether test results satisfied TSs, the UFSAR,  
and Entergy's procedure requirements.  The inspectors verified that test acceptance criteria were clear, tests demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with design documentation, test instrumentation had current calibrations and the range and  
and Entergys procedure requirements.  The inspectors verified that test acceptance  
criteria were clear, tests demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with  
design documentation, test instrumentation had current calibrations and the range and  
accuracy for the application, tests were performed as written, and applicable test  
accuracy for the application, tests were performed as written, and applicable test  
prerequisites were satisfied.  Upon test completion, the inspectors considered whether  
prerequisites were satisfied.  Upon test completion, the inspectors considered whether  
the test results supported that equipment was capable of performing the required safety  
the test results supported that equipment was capable of performing the required safety  
functions.  The inspectors reviewed the following surveillance tests:  
functions.  The inspectors reviewed the following surveillance tests:  
  Unit 2   WO 446385, 21 EDG AVR card inspection, on May 24, 2016  2-PT-Q013 for containment isolation valve 851B (22 safety injection (SI) pump tie to 23 SI pump discharge) on June 6, 2016  2-PT-Q029B quarterly in-service surveillance test for the 22 SI pump on June 6, 2016   
   
Unit 3   3-PT-M079B 32 EDG monthly surveillance on May 30, 2016 (this sample was part of an in-depth review of the EDG system)  34 steam generator pressure instrument channel check on June 21, 2016  0-SOP-LEAKRATE-001, RCS Leakrate Surveillance, Evaluation and Leak Identification, beginning on June 28, 2016  
Unit 2  
  b. Findings  
  No findings were identified.
  Cornerstone:  Emergency Preparedness  
WO 446385, 21 EDG AVR card inspection, on May 24, 2016  
   
   
25   1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06 - 1 sample)  
2-PT-Q013 for containment isolation valve 851B (22 safety injection (SI) pump tie to  
  Training Observations  
23 SI pump discharge) on June 6, 2016  
  a. Inspection Scope  
   
  The inspectors evaluated the conduct of Entergy's ingestion pathway emergency  
2-PT-Q029B quarterly in-service surveillance test for the 22 SI pump on June 6,  
2016  
   
Unit 3  
3-PT-M079B 32 EDG monthly surveillance on May 30, 2016 (this sample was part of  
an in-depth review of the EDG system)  
   
34 steam generator pressure instrument channel check on June 21, 2016  
   
0-SOP-LEAKRATE-001, RCS Leakrate Surveillance, Evaluation and Leak  
Identification, beginning on June 28, 2016  
   
b. Findings  
No findings were identified.  
Cornerstone:  Emergency Preparedness  
 
25  
1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06 - 1 sample)  
Training Observations  
   
a. Inspection Scope  
   
The inspectors evaluated the conduct of Entergys ingestion pathway emergency  
preparedness drill on April 19, 2016, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in the  
preparedness drill on April 19, 2016, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in the  
classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development activities.  The inspectors observed emergency response  
classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development activities.   
operations in the emergency operations facility to determine whether the event classification, notifications, and protective action  
The inspectors observed emergency response operations in the emergency operations  
facility to determine whether the event classification, notifications, and protective action  
recommendations were performed in accordance with procedures.  The inspectors also  
recommendations were performed in accordance with procedures.  The inspectors also  
attended the facility drill critique to compare inspector observations with those identified  
attended the facility drill critique to compare inspector observations with those identified  
by Entergy staff in order to evaluate Entergy's critique and to verify whether the staff was properly identifying weaknesses and entering them into the CAP.  
by Entergy staff in order to evaluate Entergys critique and to verify whether the staff was  
  b. Findings  
properly identifying weaknesses and entering them into the CAP.  
  No findings were identified.  
   
  2. RADIATION SAFETY
b. Findings  
  Cornerstone:  Public Radiation Safety and Occupational Radiation Safety  
   
  2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01)  
No findings were identified.  
  a. Inspection Scope  
   
  During May 10-12 and June 13-17, 2016, the inspectors reviewed Entergy's
2.  
performance in assessing the radiological hazards and exposure control in the workplace.  The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR 20, TSs, applicable industry standards, and procedures required by TSs as criteria for determining  
RADIATION SAFETY  
Cornerstone:  Public Radiation Safety and Occupational Radiation Safety  
   
2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01)  
   
a. Inspection Scope  
   
During May 10-12 and June 13-17, 2016, the inspectors reviewed Entergys
performance in assessing the radiological hazards and exposure control in the  
workplace.  The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR 20, TSs, applicable  
industry standards, and procedures required by TSs as criteria for determining  
compliance.   
compliance.   
  Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage  
   
  The inspectors reviewed:  
Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage  
  Ambient radiological conditions during tours of the radiological controlled area, posted surveys, radiation work permits, adequacy of radiological controls, radiation protection job coverage, and contamination controls  Controls for highly activated or contaminated materials stored within spent fuel pools  Posting and physical controls for high radiation areas and very high radiation areas  
   
  b. Findings  
The inspectors reviewed:  
Ambient radiological conditions during tours of the radiological controlled area,  
posted surveys, radiation work permits, adequacy of radiological controls, radiation  
protection job coverage, and contamination controls  
   
Controls for highly activated or contaminated materials stored within spent fuel pools  
   
Posting and physical controls for high radiation areas and very high radiation areas  
   
b. Findings  
   
   
No findings were identified.   
No findings were identified.   
   
26   2RS2 Occupational As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls  
 
26  
2RS2 Occupational As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls  
(71124.02)  
(71124.02)  
  a. Inspection Scope   
   
  During May 10-12 and June 13-17, 2016, the inspectors assessed performance with  
a. Inspection Scope   
   
During May 10-12 and June 13-17, 2016, the inspectors assessed performance with  
respect to maintaining occupational individual and collective radiation exposures ALARA.   
respect to maintaining occupational individual and collective radiation exposures ALARA.   
The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR 20, TSs, applicable industry standards,  
The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR 20, TSs, applicable industry standards,  
and procedures required by TSs as criteria for determining compliance.   
and procedures required by TSs as criteria for determining compliance.   
  Radiological Work Planning  
   
  The inspectors reviewed:  
Radiological Work Planning  
 
   
  ALARA work activity evaluations, exposure estimates, and exposure mitigation  
The inspectors reviewed:  
requirements  ALARA work planning, use of dose mitigation features and dose goals  Work planning and the integration of ALARA requirements   
  b. Findings  
  No findings were identified.   
ALARA work activity evaluations, exposure estimates, and exposure mitigation  
requirements  
   
ALARA work planning, use of dose mitigation features and dose goals  
   
Work planning and the integration of ALARA requirements   
   
b. Findings  
   
No findings were identified.   
   
   
2RS7 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) (71124.07 - 3 samples)  
2RS7 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) (71124.07 - 3 samples)  
  a. Inspection Scope  
   
  The inspectors reviewed the REMP to validate the effectiveness of the radioactive  
a. Inspection Scope  
   
The inspectors reviewed the REMP to validate the effectiveness of the radioactive  
gaseous and liquid effluent release program and implementation of the groundwater  
gaseous and liquid effluent release program and implementation of the groundwater  
protection initiative (GPI).  The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR 20,  
protection initiative (GPI).  The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR 20,  
40 CFR 190, 10 CFR 50, Appendix I, TSs, offsite dose calculation manual (ODCM), Nuclear Energy Institute 07-07, and procedures required by TSs as criteria for determining compliance.  
40 CFR 190, 10 CFR 50, Appendix I, TSs, offsite dose calculation manual (ODCM),  
 
Nuclear Energy Institute 07-07, and procedures required by TSs as criteria for  
  Inspection Planning  
determining compliance.  
  The inspectors reviewed Entergy's 2014 and 2015 annual radiological environmental and effluent monitoring reports, REMP program audits, ODCM changes, land use  
Inspection Planning  
   
The inspectors reviewed Entergys 2014 and 2015 annual radiological environmental  
and effluent monitoring reports, REMP program audits, ODCM changes, land use  
census, the UFSAR, and inter-laboratory comparison program results.  
census, the UFSAR, and inter-laboratory comparison program results.  
   
   
  Site Inspection   
   
  The inspectors walked down various thermoluminescent dosimeter and air and water  
Site Inspection   
   
The inspectors walked down various thermoluminescent dosimeter and air and water  
sampling locations and reviewed associated calibration and maintenance records.  The  
sampling locations and reviewed associated calibration and maintenance records.  The  
inspectors observed the sampling of various environmental media as specified in the  
inspectors observed the sampling of various environmental media as specified in the  
ODCM and reviewed any anomalous environmental sampling events including assessment of any positive radioactivity results.  The inspectors reviewed any changes to the ODCM.  The inspectors verified the operability and calibration of the meteorological tower instruments and meteorological data readouts.  The inspectors  
ODCM and reviewed any anomalous environmental sampling events including  
assessment of any positive radioactivity results.  The inspectors reviewed any changes  
to the ODCM.  The inspectors verified the operability and calibration of the  
meteorological tower instruments and meteorological data readouts.  The inspectors  
reviewed environmental sample laboratory analysis results, laboratory instrument  
reviewed environmental sample laboratory analysis results, laboratory instrument  
measurement detection sensitivities, laboratory quality control program audit results, and   
measurement detection sensitivities, laboratory quality control program audit results, and  
27  the inter- and intra-laboratory comparison program results.  The inspectors reviewed the groundwater monitoring program as it applies to selected potential leaking SSCs.  
 
  GPI Implementation  The inspectors reviewed groundwater monitoring results, changes to the GPI program since the last inspection, anomalous results or missed groundwater samples, leakage or  
27
   
the inter- and intra-laboratory comparison program results.  The inspectors reviewed the  
groundwater monitoring program as it applies to selected potential leaking SSCs.  
   
GPI Implementation   
The inspectors reviewed groundwater monitoring results, changes to the GPI program  
since the last inspection, anomalous results or missed groundwater samples, leakage or  
spill events including entries made into the decommissioning files (10 CFR 50.75(g)),  
spill events including entries made into the decommissioning files (10 CFR 50.75(g)),  
evaluations of surface water discharges, and Entergy's evaluation of any positive  
evaluations of surface water discharges, and Entergys evaluation of any positive  
groundwater sample results including appropriate stakeholder notifications and effluent reporting requirements.   
groundwater sample results including appropriate stakeholder notifications and effluent  
  Identification and Resolution of Problems 
reporting requirements.   
The inspectors evaluated whether problems associated with the REMP were identified at
an appropriate threshold and properly addressed in Entergy's CAP. 
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4. OTHER ACTIVITIES
  4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151 - 6 samples)
   
   
  Initiating Events Performance Indicators  
   
  a. Inspection Scope  
Identification and Resolution of Problems 
  The inspectors reviewed Entergy's submittals for the following Initiating Events  
The inspectors evaluated whether problems associated with the REMP were identified at
an appropriate threshold and properly addressed in Entergys CAP. 
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151 - 6 samples)
Initiating Events Performance Indicators  
   
a.  
Inspection Scope  
   
The inspectors reviewed Entergys submittals for the following Initiating Events  
cornerstone performance indicators for the period April 1, 2015, to March 31, 2016:  
cornerstone performance indicators for the period April 1, 2015, to March 31, 2016:  
  Unit 2   Unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours (IE01)  Unplanned power changes per 7000 critical hours (IE03)  Unplanned scrams with complications (IE04)  
   
  Unit 3   Unplanned scrams (IE01)  Unplanned power changes (IE03)  Unplanned scrams with complications (IE04)  
Unit 2  
  To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those  
Unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours (IE01)  
   
Unplanned power changes per 7000 critical hours (IE03)  
   
Unplanned scrams with complications (IE04)  
   
Unit 3  
Unplanned scrams (IE01)  
   
Unplanned power changes (IE03)  
   
Unplanned scrams with complications (IE04)  
   
To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those  
periods, inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy  
periods, inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy  
Institute 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7.   
Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7.   
The inspectors reviewed Entergy's operator narrative logs, maintenance planning schedules, CRs, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports to validate the   
The inspectors reviewed Entergys operator narrative logs, maintenance planning  
28  accuracy of the submittals.  There were no unplanned power changes or scrams with complications during the review period.  
schedules, CRs, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports to validate the  
  b. Findings  
 
  No findings were identified.  
28
   
accuracy of the submittals.  There were no unplanned power changes or scrams with  
complications during the review period.  
   
b. Findings  
   
No findings were identified.  
   
   
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152 - 4 samples)  
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152 - 4 samples)  
  .1 Routine Review of Problem Identification and Resolution Activities  
   
  a. Inspection Scope  
.1  
  As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, "Problem Identification and Resolution," the  
Routine Review of Problem Identification and Resolution Activities  
inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that Entergy entered issues into the CAP at an appropriate  
   
a. Inspection Scope  
   
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, the  
inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant  
status reviews to verify that Entergy entered issues into the CAP at an appropriate  
threshold, gave adequate attention to timely corrective actions, and identified and  
threshold, gave adequate attention to timely corrective actions, and identified and  
addressed adverse trends.  In order to assist with the identification of repetitive  
addressed adverse trends.  In order to assist with the identification of repetitive  
equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the CAP and periodically attended CR screening meetings.  The inspectors also confirmed, on a sampling basis, that, as  
equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow up, the inspectors  
performed a daily screening of items entered into the CAP and periodically attended CR  
screening meetings.  The inspectors also confirmed, on a sampling basis, that, as  
applicable, for identified defects and non-conformances, Entergy performed an  
applicable, for identified defects and non-conformances, Entergy performed an  
evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR 21.  
evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR 21.  
b. Findings 
No findings were identified.
   
   
.2 Semi-Annual Trend Review  
b. Findings 
  a. Inspection Scope  
  The inspectors performed a semi-annual review of site issues, as required by Inspection  
No findings were identified.
Procedure 71152, "Problem Identification and Resolution," to identify trends that might  
.2  
Semi-Annual Trend Review  
   
a. Inspection Scope  
   
The inspectors performed a semi-annual review of site issues, as required by Inspection  
Procedure 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, to identify trends that might  
indicate the existence of more significant safety issues.  In this review, the inspectors  
indicate the existence of more significant safety issues.  In this review, the inspectors  
included repetitive or closely-related issues that may have been documented by Entergy outside of the CAP, such as trend reports, performance indicators, major equipment problem lists, system health reports, maintenance rule assessments, and maintenance or CAP backlogs.  The inspectors also reviewed Entergy's CAP database for the first  
included repetitive or closely-related issues that may have been documented by Entergy  
outside of the CAP, such as trend reports, performance indicators, major equipment  
problem lists, system health reports, maintenance rule assessments, and maintenance  
or CAP backlogs.  The inspectors also reviewed Entergys CAP database for the first  
and second quarters of 2016 to assess CRs written in various subject areas (equipment  
and second quarters of 2016 to assess CRs written in various subject areas (equipment  
problems, human performance issues, etc.), as well as individual issues identified during the NRCs daily CR review (Section 4OA2.1).  The inspectors reviewed the Entergy quarterly trend report for the first quarter of 2016 to verify that Entergy was appropriately  
problems, human performance issues, etc.), as well as individual issues identified during  
the NRCs daily CR review (Section 4OA2.1).  The inspectors reviewed the Entergy  
quarterly trend report for the first quarter of 2016 to verify that Entergy was appropriately  
evaluating and trending adverse conditions in accordance with applicable procedures.  
evaluating and trending adverse conditions in accordance with applicable procedures.  
b. Findings and Observations
No findings were identified.
The inspectors identified a trend in work being performed that was contrary to written
work instructions and procedures, and work packages had been closed out without


b. Findings and Observations
29
No findings were identified.
   
   
The inspectors identified a trend in work being performed that was contrary to written
   
work instructions and procedures, and work packages had been closed out without  
documenting the deviation from the work order.  While reviewing completed work order  
29  documenting the deviation from the work order.  While reviewing completed work order WO 447966 Task 10, Internal Coating Repair for 21 CCW HX, the inspectors found a  
WO 447966 Task 10, Internal Coating Repair for 21 CCW HX, the inspectors found a  
note in the work order stating that the internal coating repair to the pipe had not been done in accordance with the engineering change.  The engineering change had been written when the coating repair was expected to be small, but the actual area that was  
note in the work order stating that the internal coating repair to the pipe had not been  
done in accordance with the engineering change.  The engineering change had been  
written when the coating repair was expected to be small, but the actual area that was  
recoated was much larger.  A larger area of coating increases the impact on the heat  
recoated was much larger.  A larger area of coating increases the impact on the heat  
exchanger if the coating were to flake off and block the flow of service water.  The work  
exchanger if the coating were to flake off and block the flow of service water.  The work  
package was closed and no condition report was written. This performance deficiency is  
package was closed and no condition report was written. This performance deficiency is  
minor because the coating was applied with procedurally directed quality controls and the likelihood that it would flake off is very small; and is the same as the original smaller area specified in the work package.  However, the work package was closed without  
minor because the coating was applied with procedurally directed quality controls and  
 
the likelihood that it would flake off is very small; and is the same as the original smaller  
area specified in the work package.  However, the work package was closed without  
documenting the deviation and no CR was written.   
documenting the deviation and no CR was written.   
   
   
In another example, the inspectors noted that WO 412920 Task 15 to perform a surge test on 11 centrifugal air compressor (CENTAC) after overhaul was completed on December 22, 2015.  However, the completion notes and documentation for the task  
In another example, the inspectors noted that WO 412920 Task 15 to perform a surge  
test on 11 centrifugal air compressor (CENTAC) after overhaul was completed on  
December 22, 2015.  However, the completion notes and documentation for the task  
showed that the test was unable to be performed due to a test equipment problem.  The  
showed that the test was unable to be performed due to a test equipment problem.  The  
work package was closed and no CR was written.  Subsequently, after being returned to  
work package was closed and no CR was written.  Subsequently, after being returned to  
service, the compressor failed in service due to multiple surging events on January 7, 2016.  Troubleshooting under WO 433939 revealed that the motor high load limit had not been adjusted to account for the increased load due to reduced compressor clearances  
service, the compressor failed in service due to multiple surging events on January 7,  
2016.  Troubleshooting under WO 433939 revealed that the motor high load limit had not  
been adjusted to account for the increased load due to reduced compressor clearances  
introduced by the overhaul.  This performance deficiency is screened to minor because  
introduced by the overhaul.  This performance deficiency is screened to minor because  
the 11 CENTAC is not a safety-related piece of equipment and would not affect the MC  
the 11 CENTAC is not a safety-related piece of equipment and would not affect the MC  
0609 cornerstone thresholds or other generic criteria.  Unit 2 and Unit 3 have dedicated  
0609 cornerstone thresholds or other generic criteria.  Unit 2 and Unit 3 have dedicated  
instrument air compressors that are credited in the FSAR to respond to a loss of instrument air event.  If the 11 CENTAC (located in Unit 1) were to fail, the unit-specific IACs would automatically start to prevent a loss of instrument air at both Units 2 and 3.   
instrument air compressors that are credited in the FSAR to respond to a loss of  
 
instrument air event.  If the 11 CENTAC (located in Unit 1) were to fail, the unit-specific  
IACs would automatically start to prevent a loss of instrument air at both Units 2 and 3.   
   
   
A third recent example of work being performed contrary to written instructions occurred  
A third recent example of work being performed contrary to written instructions occurred  
during 2RFO22 when the inspectors identified that the workers deviated from the surveillance procedure by demonstrating the installation of the emergency containment hatch plug without properly inflating the plug seals as directed by the procedure. This  
during 2RFO22 when the inspectors identified that the workers deviated from the  
performance deficiency was previously documented in a prior inspection report as non-cited violation 05000247/05000286/2016001-02, "Failure to Adequately Implement Risk  
surveillance procedure by demonstrating the installation of the emergency containment  
Management Actions for the Containment Key Safety Function."    
hatch plug without properly inflating the plug seals as directed by the procedure. This  
 
performance deficiency was previously documented in a prior inspection report as non-
In all cases, the deviations from written work instructions were directed by Entergy supervision.  In addition, the inspectors noted that Entergy had self-identified similar  
cited violation 05000247/05000286/2016001-02, Failure to Adequately Implement Risk  
Management Actions for the Containment Key Safety Function.     
In all cases, the deviations from written work instructions were directed by Entergy  
supervision.  In addition, the inspectors noted that Entergy had self-identified similar  
observations where work packages or condition reports had been closed without fully  
observations where work packages or condition reports had been closed without fully  
completing the specified actions including CR-IP2-2015-05833, CR-IP2-2016-00103,  
completing the specified actions including CR-IP2-2015-05833, CR-IP2-2016-00103,  
CR-IP3-2015-04729, CR-IP3-2016-00072, CR-IP3-2016-00075, and CR-IP3-2015-04019.  These CRs are further examples of work orders that were closed with deviations that were not documented or resolved.  Nuclear Oversight had identified several of these  
CR-IP3-2015-04729, CR-IP3-2016-00072, CR-IP3-2016-00075, and CR-IP3-2015-
04019.  These CRs are further examples of work orders that were closed with deviations  
that were not documented or resolved.  Nuclear Oversight had identified several of these  
condition reports.  Entergy has taking immediate corrective action in response to these  
condition reports.  Entergy has taking immediate corrective action in response to these  
performance deficiencies.   
performance deficiencies.   
   
   
 
30   .3 Annual Sample:  Maintenance Rule Self-Assessment of Corrective Actions  
  a. Inspection Scope  
 
  The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Entergy's corrective actions associated  
30  
with self-assessment LO-IP3LO-2015-72, "Maintenance Rule (a)(3) Assessment." The self-assessment was performed to satisfy both the self-assessment criteria in EN-LI-104,  
"Self-Assessment and Benchmark Process," and the maintenance rule periodic  
.3  
Annual Sample:  Maintenance Rule Self-Assessment of Corrective Actions  
   
a. Inspection Scope  
   
The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Entergys corrective actions associated  
with self-assessment LO-IP3LO-2015-72, Maintenance Rule (a)(3) Assessment.  The  
self-assessment was performed to satisfy both the self-assessment criteria in EN-LI-104,  
Self-Assessment and Benchmark Process, and the maintenance rule periodic  
assessment criteria in EN-DC-207.   
assessment criteria in EN-DC-207.   
  The inspectors assessed Entergy's problem identification threshold, extent of condition  
   
The inspectors assessed Entergys problem identification threshold, extent of condition  
reviews, and the prioritization and timeliness of Entergy corrective actions to determine  
reviews, and the prioritization and timeliness of Entergy corrective actions to determine  
whether Entergy was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems  
whether Entergy was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems  
associated with this issue and whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate.  The inspectors compared the actions taken to the requirements of Entergy's CAP and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.  In addition, the inspectors interviewed  
associated with this issue and whether the planned or completed corrective actions were  
engineering personnel to assess the effe
appropriate.  The inspectors compared the actions taken to the requirements of  
ctiveness of the im
Entergys CAP and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.  In addition, the inspectors interviewed  
plemented corrective actions.   
engineering personnel to assess the effectiveness of the implemented corrective
 
actions.   
b. Findings and Observations  
  No findings were identified.   
b. Findings and Observations  
 
   
No findings were identified.   
   
   
Entergy identified three standard deficiencies during their self-assessment and wrote  
Entergy identified three standard deficiencies during their self-assessment and wrote  
CRs to document each one.  One of the standard deficiencies was that the maintenance rule basis documents were not being reviewed at least once every two years as required by procedure EN-DC-204, "Maintenance Rule Scope and Basis." The purpose of this  
CRs to document each one.  One of the standard deficiencies was that the maintenance  
rule basis documents were not being reviewed at least once every two years as required  
by procedure EN-DC-204, Maintenance Rule Scope and Basis.  The purpose of this  
review was to ensure that the documents were updated if the configuration of the system  
review was to ensure that the documents were updated if the configuration of the system  
changed or if the performance criteria needed to be adjusted.  Entergy wrote CR-IP3-
changed or if the performance criteria needed to be adjusted.  Entergy wrote CR-IP3-
2015-03628 and assigned a corrective action to create work trackers to perform the basis document reviews.  They chose to use work trackers instead of corrective actions under the CAP because the work had historically been assigned using work trackers.   
2015-03628 and assigned a corrective action to create work trackers to perform the  
basis document reviews.  They chose to use work trackers instead of corrective actions  
under the CAP because the work had historically been assigned using work trackers.   
However, because work trackers do not receive the same priority as corrective actions,  
However, because work trackers do not receive the same priority as corrective actions,  
some of the maintenance rule basis documents had still not been reviewed at the time of  
some of the maintenance rule basis documents had still not been reviewed at the time of  
this inspection, over a year after the completion of the self-assessment.  The inspectors  
this inspection, over a year after the completion of the self-assessment.  The inspectors  
determined that this was not a more than minor issue because the systems in question did not show signs of inadequate maintenance.  
determined that this was not a more than minor issue because the systems in question  
did not show signs of inadequate maintenance.  
   
   
.4 Annual Sample:  Unit 2 Reactor Trip on December 5, 2015  
.4  
  a. Inspection Scope  
Annual Sample:  Unit 2 Reactor Trip on December 5, 2015  
  The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Entergy's evaluations and corrective  
   
actions associated with
a. Inspection Scope  
CR-IP2-2015-05484
   
and the related apparent cause evaluation for the December 5, 2015, manual reactor trip in response to indications of multiple  
The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Entergys evaluations and corrective  
actions associated with CR-IP2-2015-05484 and the related apparent cause evaluation  
for the December 5, 2015, manual reactor trip in response to indications of multiple  
dropped control rods caused by the loss of control rod power due to a power supply  
dropped control rods caused by the loss of control rod power due to a power supply  
failure.  Entergy performed an apparent cause evaluation and determined the
failure.  Entergy performed an apparent cause evaluation and determined the direct
direct cause of the event was the loss of motor control center (MCC)-24 due to an internal fault at the line side leads at cubicle 2H where they connect to the bucket stab assemblies.   
cause of the event was the loss of motor control center (MCC)-24 due to an internal fault  
at the line side leads at cubicle 2H where they connect to the bucket stab assemblies.   
The apparent cause was an unanticipated loss of power to the control rod system due to  
The apparent cause was an unanticipated loss of power to the control rod system due to  
the degradation of the primary control rod power supply (PS1) which failed to function for
the degradation of the primary control rod power supply (PS1) which failed to function for  
31  more than 10 minutes when the operating alternate power supply (PS2) was deenergized. 


  The inspectors assessed Entergy's problem identification threshold, problem analysis, extent of condition reviews, compensatory actions, and the prioritization and timeliness  
31
   
more than 10 minutes when the operating alternate power supply (PS2) was
deenergized. 
The inspectors assessed Entergys problem identification threshold, problem analysis,  
extent of condition reviews, compensatory actions, and the prioritization and timeliness  
of Entergy's corrective actions to determine whether Entergy was appropriately  
of Entergy's corrective actions to determine whether Entergy was appropriately  
identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with this issue and  
identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with this issue and  
whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate.  The inspectors  
whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate.  The inspectors  
compared the actions taken to the requirements of Entergy's CAP and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action."    
compared the actions taken to the requirements of Entergy's CAP and 10 CFR 50,  
  b. Findings and Observations  
Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action.   
  No findings were identified.   
   
  The inspectors found that Entergy took appropriate actions to identify the direct and  
b. Findings and Observations  
apparent cause of the issue.  The
   
direct cause of the event was the loss of MCC-24 due to an internal fault at the line side leads at cubicle 2H where they connect to the bucket  
No findings were identified.   
stab assemblies.  The apparent cause was an unanticipated loss of power to the control rod system due to the degradation of the primary control rod PS1, which failed to function when PS2 was lost.  Entergy replaced the degraded rod control PS1; and the  
   
The inspectors found that Entergy took appropriate actions to identify the direct and  
apparent cause of the issue.  The direct cause of the event was the loss of MCC-24 due  
to an internal fault at the line side leads at cubicle 2H where they connect to the bucket  
stab assemblies.  The apparent cause was an unanticipated loss of power to the control  
rod system due to the degradation of the primary control rod PS1, which failed to  
function when PS2 was lost.  Entergy replaced the degraded rod control PS1; and the  
MCC-24 compartments were removed to facilitate inspection and testing of the MCC  
MCC-24 compartments were removed to facilitate inspection and testing of the MCC  
bus, control wires, and MCC internal.  PS2 was also restored to operation after the fault  
bus, control wires, and MCC internal.  PS2 was also restored to operation after the fault  
was cleared.   
was cleared.   
  The inspector determined that the internal electrical fault that deenergized PS2 and the prior degradation in PS1 was not within Entergy's ability to foresee and prevent.   
   
Therefore, there was no performance deficiency identified.  Entergy's overall response to  
The inspector determined that the internal electrical fault that deenergized PS2 and the  
prior degradation in PS1 was not within Entergys ability to foresee and prevent.   
Therefore, there was no performance deficiency identified.  Entergys overall response to  
the issue was commensurate with the safety significance, was timely, and the actions  
the issue was commensurate with the safety significance, was timely, and the actions  
taken and planned were reasonable to resolve the failure of the primary control rod PS1.  
taken and planned were reasonable to resolve the failure of the primary control rod PS1.  
  .5 Annual Sample:  Unexpected Number of Degraded Baffle-Former Bolts Discovered in  
   
.5  
Annual Sample:  Unexpected Number of Degraded Baffle-Former Bolts Discovered in  
the Unit 2 Reactor Pressure Vessel  
the Unit 2 Reactor Pressure Vessel  
  a. Inspection Scope  
   
  The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Entergy's root cause evaluation and corrective actions associated with CR-IP2-2016-02348 for baffle-former ("baffle") bolts  
a. Inspection Scope  
   
The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Entergys root cause evaluation and  
corrective actions associated with CR-IP2-2016-02348 for baffle-former (baffle) bolts  
found with indications of degradation during the Indian Point Unit 2 RFO 2R22.  Entergy  
found with indications of degradation during the Indian Point Unit 2 RFO 2R22.  Entergy  
performed ultrasonic examinations of the baffle bolts in accordance with their procedures  
performed ultrasonic examinations of the baffle bolts in accordance with their procedures  
as part of a planned activity.  After an unexpected number of degraded baffle bolts were discovered, Entergy staff reported the issue to the NRC as Event Notification No. 51829 on March 29, 2016, because the as-found number and location of degraded bolts  
as part of a planned activity.  After an unexpected number of degraded baffle bolts were  
discovered, Entergy staff reported the issue to the NRC as Event Notification No. 51829  
on March 29, 2016, because the as-found number and location of degraded bolts  
represented an unanalyzed condition.  Entergy staff completed corrective actions to  
represented an unanalyzed condition.  Entergy staff completed corrective actions to  
replace all of the potentially degraded baffle bolts on Unit 2.  Entergy staff further  
replace all of the potentially degraded baffle bolts on Unit 2.  Entergy staff further  
replaced a population of additional bolts that exhibited no indications of degradation and  
replaced a population of additional bolts that exhibited no indications of degradation and  
performed an evaluation to determine the potential for baffle bolt failures at Unit 3.  
performed an evaluation to determine the potential for baffle bolt failures at Unit 3.  
  The baffle-former bolts help secure vertical plates (also referred to as baffle plates)  
   
The baffle-former bolts help secure vertical plates (also referred to as baffle plates)  
inside the reactor vessel, which then forms a structure surrounding the reactor fuel  
inside the reactor vessel, which then forms a structure surrounding the reactor fuel  
assemblies to orient the fuel and to direct coolant flow through the core.  A sufficient   
assemblies to orient the fuel and to direct coolant flow through the core.  A sufficient  
32  number of baffle bolts are required to remain intact to secure the baffle plates in place so as to not affect control rod insertion or impede emergency core cooling flow during  
 
postulated accident conditions.  Bolt heads that separate and are no longer held in place by bolt lock-tabs can also become a loose parts concern.  
32
   
number of baffle bolts are required to remain intact to secure the baffle plates in place so  
as to not affect control rod insertion or impede emergency core cooling flow during  
postulated accident conditions.  Bolt heads that separate and are no longer held in place  
by bolt lock-tabs can also become a loose parts concern.  
   
   
The inspectors determined whether Entergy's acceptable baffle bolt pattern analysis for  
The inspectors determined whether Entergys acceptable baffle bolt pattern analysis for  
Unit 2 was completed in accordance with the NRC-approved methodology and provided  
Unit 2 was completed in accordance with the NRC-approved methodology and provided  
appropriate structural margin for the next cycle of operation to ensure the Unit 2 baffle  
appropriate structural margin for the next cycle of operation to ensure the Unit 2 baffle  
plates will remain in place during both normal operation and limiting postulated accident conditions.  The inspectors further determined whether Entergy's evaluations of the baffle bolts installed in Indian Point Unit 3 were technically sufficient to conclude the  
plates will remain in place during both normal operation and limiting postulated accident  
conditions.  The inspectors further determined whether Entergys evaluations of the  
baffle bolts installed in Indian Point Unit 3 were technically sufficient to conclude the  
Unit 3 baffle assembly will perform as intended until the next planned RFO, at which time  
Unit 3 baffle assembly will perform as intended until the next planned RFO, at which time  
Entergy plans to examine the bolts.  The inspectors reviewed Entergy's procedures for  
Entergy plans to examine the bolts.  The inspectors reviewed Entergys procedures for  
determining the functionality and operability of degraded SSC as they relate to Unit 3.  The inspectors further interviewed Entergy engineering personnel and contractor staff to discuss the results of Entergy's technical evaluations and to assess the effectiveness of  
determining the functionality and operability of degraded SSC as they relate to Unit 3.   
The inspectors further interviewed Entergy engineering personnel and contractor staff to  
discuss the results of Entergys technical evaluations and to assess the effectiveness of  
the implemented and planned corrective actions.  
the implemented and planned corrective actions.  
 
The inspectors assessed Entergy's problem identification threshold, cause analyses, extent of condition, compensatory actions, and the prioritization and timeliness of Entergy's corrective actions to determine whether Entergy staff were properly identifying,  
The inspectors assessed Entergys problem identification threshold, cause analyses,  
extent of condition, compensatory actions, and the prioritization and timeliness of  
Entergys corrective actions to determine whether Entergy staff were properly identifying,  
characterizing, and correcting problems associated with this issue and whether the  
characterizing, and correcting problems associated with this issue and whether the  
planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate.  The inspectors compared the  
planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate.  The inspectors compared the  
actions taken to Entergy's CAP, operability determination process, and the requirements  
actions taken to Entergys CAP, operability determination process, and the requirements  
of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.  The inspectors observed portions of baffle bolt replacement activities at Unit 2 and reviewed the final visual examination of the baffle bolts and plates once the work was completed.  
of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.  The inspectors observed portions of baffle bolt replacement  
  b. Findings and Observations  
activities at Unit 2 and reviewed the final visual examination of the baffle bolts and plates  
  One Green NCV was identified and documented in Section 1R15 of this report. The NRC responded to the initial discovery of an unexpected number of baffle bolts  
once the work was completed.  
   
b. Findings and Observations  
   
One Green NCV was identified and documented in Section 1R15 of this report.  
The NRC responded to the initial discovery of an unexpected number of baffle bolts  
found degraded at Indian Point Unit 2 by implementing a comprehensive inspection plan  
found degraded at Indian Point Unit 2 by implementing a comprehensive inspection plan  
consisting of various baseline inspection samples to assess the extent of the issue and  
consisting of various baseline inspection samples to assess the extent of the issue and  
to determine the necessary NRC actions.  A follow-up inservice inspection sample  
to determine the necessary NRC actions.  A follow-up inservice inspection sample  
(Refer to Section 1R08) was conducted to review the capability of the non-destructive examination techniques, evaluate the UT results, and observe a portion of bolt replacement activities on-site.  A permanent modification sample (Refer to Section  
(Refer to Section 1R08) was conducted to review the capability of the non-destructive  
examination techniques, evaluate the UT results, and observe a portion of bolt  
replacement activities on-site.  A permanent modification sample (Refer to Section  
1R18) was conducted to review the design change package and evaluations associated  
1R18) was conducted to review the design change package and evaluations associated  
 
with the new, replacement baffle bolts.  The NRC resident inspectors reviewed Entergys
with the new, replacement baffle bolts.  The NRC resident inspectors reviewed Entergy's
foreign material controls and loose parts analysis (Refer to Section 1R20) to address the  
foreign material controls and loose parts analysis (Refer to Section 1R20) to address the potential for missing bolt heads and concluded it would not impact safe operation of the  
potential for missing bolt heads and concluded it would not impact safe operation of the  
plant.  
plant.  
   
   
NRC Region I based inspectors accompanied by an expert from the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation completed an annual problem identification and resolution  
NRC Region I based inspectors accompanied by an expert from the NRC Office of  
inspection, documented in this section of the report, to verify that Entergy's evaluations and corrective actions to replace Unit 2 baffle bolts were completed in accordance with an NRC approved methodology to support a conclusion that the Unit 2 baffle assembly  
Nuclear Reactor Regulation completed an annual problem identification and resolution  
inspection, documented in this section of the report, to verify that Entergys evaluations  
and corrective actions to replace Unit 2 baffle bolts were completed in accordance with  
an NRC approved methodology to support a conclusion that the Unit 2 baffle assembly  
meets the plant design basis.  The inspectors also determined the adequacy of  
meets the plant design basis.  The inspectors also determined the adequacy of  
Entergy's evaluations completed to determine there is a reasonable expectation that the
Entergys evaluations completed to determine there is a reasonable expectation that the  
33  Unit 3 baffle assembly will perform as intended during the current operating cycle.  The results of this review are discussed herein and in Section 1R15 of this report.


  Entergy staff determined the cause of the degraded baffle bolts was primarily due to IASCC in combination with increased fatigue loading on the baffle plates.  This cause  
33
   
Unit 3 baffle assembly will perform as intended during the current operating cycle.  The
results of this review are discussed herein and in Section 1R15 of this report.
Entergy staff determined the cause of the degraded baffle bolts was primarily due to  
IASCC in combination with increased fatigue loading on the baffle plates.  This cause  
determination was based on industry operating experience related to baffle-former bolt  
determination was based on industry operating experience related to baffle-former bolt  
failure in both foreign and domestic plants.  IASCC is a cracking mechanism that occurs  
failure in both foreign and domestic plants.  IASCC is a cracking mechanism that occurs  
over a long period of time when susceptible metals are exposed to neutron radiation  
over a long period of time when susceptible metals are exposed to neutron radiation  
from the reactor core and stresses as part of normal design and operation.  Entergy staff concluded that failure of a critical number of bolts in a localized area subsequently imposed increased loading on adjacent bolts, which propagated failures and generated  
from the reactor core and stresses as part of normal design and operation.  Entergy staff  
concluded that failure of a critical number of bolts in a localized area subsequently  
imposed increased loading on adjacent bolts, which propagated failures and generated  
the moderate clustered pattern observed in the examination results.  No other  
the moderate clustered pattern observed in the examination results.  No other  
contributing causes were identified.   
contributing causes were identified.   
 
The inspectors reviewed Entergy's root cause evaluation and the supporting operating experience related to baffle bolt failures at other plants.  The inspectors determined that  
The inspectors reviewed Entergys root cause evaluation and the supporting operating  
experience related to baffle bolt failures at other plants.  The inspectors determined that  
there is documented evidence in the existing technical literature (including materials  
there is documented evidence in the existing technical literature (including materials  
testing of bolts from other plants) and operating experience to conclude that the likely  
testing of bolts from other plants) and operating experience to conclude that the likely  
cause is IASCC; however, the inspectors found that Entergy staff did not define the cause of the fatigue failure mechanism.  The inspectors noted that Entergy staff sent a sample of baffle bolts removed from the reactor pressure vessel to a metallurgical  
cause is IASCC; however, the inspectors found that Entergy staff did not define the  
cause of the fatigue failure mechanism.  The inspectors noted that Entergy staff sent a  
sample of baffle bolts removed from the reactor pressure vessel to a metallurgical  
laboratory for detailed failure analysis and materials property testing.  Entergy indicated  
laboratory for detailed failure analysis and materials property testing.  Entergy indicated  
their plans to use the results of the laboratory testing to confirm the likely root cause.   
their plans to use the results of the laboratory testing to confirm the likely root cause.   
The inspectors concluded that Entergy staff conducted an appropriate review to identify  
The inspectors concluded that Entergy staff conducted an appropriate review to identify  
the likely causes of the degraded baffle bolts and noted that further test results will be used to confirm these causes.   
the likely causes of the degraded baffle bolts and noted that further test results will be  
used to confirm these causes.   
   
   
Following identification of the degraded baffle bolts on Unit 2, Entergy's immediate  
Following identification of the degraded baffle bolts on Unit 2, Entergys immediate  
corrective action was to analyze the as-found condition and begin replacing bolts that  
corrective action was to analyze the as-found condition and begin replacing bolts that  
either had visual indications of bolt failure (protruding bolt head for example), did not pass UT examination, or were not accessible for UT examination.  The as-found number and pattern of these bolts exceeded the acceptance criteria in the plant's analysis that  
either had visual indications of bolt failure (protruding bolt head for example), did not  
pass UT examination, or were not accessible for UT examination.  The as-found number  
and pattern of these bolts exceeded the acceptance criteria in the plants analysis that  
was prepared in advance of the baffle bolt examinations; therefore, Entergy reported this  
was prepared in advance of the baffle bolt examinations; therefore, Entergy reported this  
discovery to the NRC as an unanalyzed condition.  Entergy staff completed corrective  
discovery to the NRC as an unanalyzed condition.  Entergy staff completed corrective  
actions to replace all of the 227 potentially degraded baffle bolts, plus an additional 51  
actions to replace all of the 227 potentially degraded baffle bolts, plus an additional 51  
bolts for increased structural integrity, for a total of 278 bolts.  The inspectors noted the 51 additional bolts were installed in strategic locations to prevent clustering of potential bolt failures during the next operating cycle.  
bolts for increased structural integrity, for a total of 278 bolts.  The inspectors noted the  
 
51 additional bolts were installed in strategic locations to prevent clustering of potential  
bolt failures during the next operating cycle.  
   
   
The inspectors determined that Entergy staff performed an acceptable bolt pattern  
The inspectors determined that Entergy staff performed an acceptable bolt pattern  
analysis that evaluated the replacement bolt pattern for Unit 2 and modeled the potential for future bolt failures.  The inspectors found the results of the analysis accounted for a conservative failure rate of bolts and provided appropriate margin for one cycle of  
analysis that evaluated the replacement bolt pattern for Unit 2 and modeled the potential  
operation.  The inspectors verified that Entergy's methodology for its acceptable bolt  
for future bolt failures.  The inspectors found the results of the analysis accounted for a  
conservative failure rate of bolts and provided appropriate margin for one cycle of  
operation.  The inspectors verified that Entergys methodology for its acceptable bolt  
pattern analyses, including its determination of margin, was consistent with the NRC-
pattern analyses, including its determination of margin, was consistent with the NRC-
approved methodology in topical report WCAP-15029-NP-A (ML15222A882).  The  
approved methodology in topical report WCAP-15029-NP-A (ML15222A882).  The  
inspectors determined that Entergy staff tracked corrective actions to re-examine the Unit 2 baffle bolts during the next planned RFO.  The inspectors noted the new baffle bolts were made of a material with improved resistance to IASCC and included an  
inspectors determined that Entergy staff tracked corrective actions to re-examine the  
Unit 2 baffle bolts during the next planned RFO.  The inspectors noted the new baffle  
bolts were made of a material with improved resistance to IASCC and included an  
improved design to reduce the stresses at the head to shank transition, both of which  
improved design to reduce the stresses at the head to shank transition, both of which  
are enhancements compared to the original bolts.   
are enhancements compared to the original bolts.  
34  As part of an extent of condition assessment, Entergy entered CR-IP3-2016-01035 in its CAP to evaluate the potential for degraded baffle bolts on Unit 3.  Entergy operators  
 
performed an IOD and concluded that the baffle assembly was operable.  Entergy staff performed a subsequent "extent of condition review" that concluded Unit 3 would experience less baffle bolt degradation than Unit 2 based on several plant factors.   
34
   
As part of an extent of condition assessment, Entergy entered CR-IP3-2016-01035 in its  
CAP to evaluate the potential for degraded baffle bolts on Unit 3.  Entergy operators  
performed an IOD and concluded that the baffle assembly was operable.  Entergy staff  
performed a subsequent extent of condition review that concluded Unit 3 would  
experience less baffle bolt degradation than Unit 2 based on several plant factors.   
Entergy also conducted sensitivity analyses to show acceptable bounding conditions in  
Entergy also conducted sensitivity analyses to show acceptable bounding conditions in  
the event of bolt failures.  The inspectors reviewed Entergy's evaluations and noted that  
the event of bolt failures.  The inspectors reviewed Entergys evaluations and noted that  
Entergy staff concluded there was not a degraded condition at Unit 3.  In consideration  
Entergy staff concluded there was not a degraded condition at Unit 3.  In consideration  
of the guidance in their operability procedure and operating experience from Unit 2 and other plants, the NRC issued an NCV in this report because Entergy did not perform an operability evaluation for Unit 3 as a follow-up to the immediate determination for the  
of the guidance in their operability procedure and operating experience from Unit 2 and  
other plants, the NRC issued an NCV in this report because Entergy did not perform an  
operability evaluation for Unit 3 as a follow-up to the immediate determination for the  
potential impact on supported systems controlled by the TS (Refer to Section 1R15).  
potential impact on supported systems controlled by the TS (Refer to Section 1R15).  
   
   
As a corrective action, Entergy staff performed an operability evaluation and demonstrated that the Unit 3 baffle former assembly remained operable.  The inspectors concluded that this supplemental evaluation provided appropriate technical justification  
As a corrective action, Entergy staff performed an operability evaluation and  
demonstrated that the Unit 3 baffle former assembly remained operable.  The inspectors  
concluded that this supplemental evaluation provided appropriate technical justification  
for the continued operation of Unit 3 until the next RFO in spring 2017, at which time  
for the continued operation of Unit 3 until the next RFO in spring 2017, at which time  
Entergy plans to examine the baffle bolts.  Entergy also implemented a corrective action  
Entergy plans to examine the baffle bolts.  Entergy also implemented a corrective action  
as part of an enhancement to plant operations to monitor the RCS for any signs of fuel leakage, which could be an indicator of baffle bolt failures.   
as part of an enhancement to plant operations to monitor the RCS for any signs of fuel  
leakage, which could be an indicator of baffle bolt failures.   
   
   
The inspectors reviewed Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter NSAL-16-1,  
The inspectors reviewed Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter NSAL-16-1,  
which discussed the results of recent baffle-former bolt inspections and provided  
which discussed the results of recent baffle-former bolt inspections and provided  
Westinghouse's recommendations on this issue.  The letter described the plants as most  
Westinghouses recommendations on this issue.  The letter described the plants as most  
susceptible (i.e. Tier 1a) to this degradation as Westinghouse 4-loop reactors limited to those with a down-flow configuration and using Type 347 stainless steel bolts.  The inspectors noted the recommendation was to complete UT volumetric examination of the  
susceptible (i.e. Tier 1a) to this degradation as Westinghouse 4-loop reactors limited to  
those with a down-flow configuration and using Type 347 stainless steel bolts.  The  
inspectors noted the recommendation was to complete UT volumetric examination of the  
baffle bolts at the next scheduled RFO, and that Entergy had already planned this action  
baffle bolts at the next scheduled RFO, and that Entergy had already planned this action  
for Unit 3.  Entergy also planned a long-term corrective action to convert Units 2 and 3  
for Unit 3.  Entergy also planned a long-term corrective action to convert Units 2 and 3  
from a "down-flow" baffle configuration to an "up-flow" configuration, which would  
from a down-flow baffle configuration to an up-flow configuration, which would  
significantly reduce the load on baffle-former bolts and provide for increased structural margin of the baffle-former assembly.  The inspectors determined Entergy's overall  
significantly reduce the load on baffle-former bolts and provide for increased structural  
margin of the baffle-former assembly.  The inspectors determined Entergys overall  
response to the issue was commensurate with the safety significance, was timely, and  
response to the issue was commensurate with the safety significance, was timely, and  
included appropriate compensatory actions.  The inspectors concluded that the actions  
included appropriate compensatory actions.  The inspectors concluded that the actions  
completed and planned were reasonable to address the ongoing aging management of  
completed and planned were reasonable to address the ongoing aging management of  
baffle bolts.  
baffle bolts.  
4OA3 Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153 - 5 samples)
   
   
.1 Plant Events  
4OA3 Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153 - 5 samples)
  a. Inspection Scope  
  For the plant events listed below, the inspectors reviewed and/or observed plant  
.1  
Plant Events  
   
a. Inspection Scope  
   
For the plant events listed below, the inspectors reviewed and/or observed plant  
parameters, reviewed personnel performance, and evaluated performance of mitigating  
parameters, reviewed personnel performance, and evaluated performance of mitigating  
systems.  The inspectors communicated the plant events to appropriate regional  
systems.  The inspectors communicated the plant events to appropriate regional  
personnel, and compared the event details with criteria contained in IMC 0309, "Reactive Inspection Decision Basis for Reactors," for consideration of potential reactive inspection activities.  As applicable, the inspectors verified that Entergy made appropriate  
personnel, and compared the event details with criteria contained in IMC 0309, Reactive  
emergency classification assessments and properly reported the event in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73.  The inspectors reviewed Entergy's follow-up actions
Inspection Decision Basis for Reactors, for consideration of potential reactive inspection  
35  related to the events to assure that Entergy implemented appropriate corrective actions commensurate with their safety significance. 
activities.  As applicable, the inspectors verified that Entergy made appropriate  
emergency classification assessments and properly reported the event in accordance  
with 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73.  The inspectors reviewed Entergys follow-up actions  


Unit 2  Turbine trip occurred while synchronizing Unit 2 to the grid on June 15, 2016  Shutdown required by TS for repairs to a leak on the 21 CCW heat exchanger  service water inlet on June 23, 2016
35
Unit 3  Rapid power reduction from 100 percent to 45 percent power in response to a loss of both heater drain pumps on May 26, 2016
   
b. Findings
  No findings were identified.
   
   
.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000247/2015-003-00:  Manual Reactor Trip Due to Indications of Multiple Dropped Control Rods Caused by Loss of Control Rod Power Due to a Power Supply Failure
related to the events to assure that Entergy implemented appropriate corrective actions
commensurate with their safety significance. 
   
   
The inspector's reviewed Entergy's actions and reportability criteria associated with LER  
Unit 2
Turbine trip occurred while synchronizing Unit 2 to the grid on June 15, 2016
Shutdown required by TS for repairs to a leak on the 21 CCW heat exchanger
service water inlet on June 23, 2016
Unit 3
Rapid power reduction from 100 percent to 45 percent power in response to a loss of
both heater drain pumps on May 26, 2016
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
.2
(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000247/2015-003-00:  Manual Reactor Trip
Due to Indications of Multiple Dropped Control Rods Caused by Loss of Control Rod
Power Due to a Power Supply Failure
The inspectors reviewed Entergys actions and reportability criteria associated with LER  
05000247/2015-003-00, which was submitted to the NRC on February 3, 2016.  On  
05000247/2015-003-00, which was submitted to the NRC on February 3, 2016.  On  
December 5, 2015, control room operators initiated a manual reactor trip after observing indications consistent with multiple dropped control rods following an alarm for the trip of MCC-24/24A.  No control rod indication was available due to MCC-24 being faulted and  
December 5, 2015, control room operators initiated a manual reactor trip after observing  
de-energized.  The
indications consistent with multiple dropped control rods following an alarm for the trip of  
direct cause of the event was the loss of MCC-24 due to an internal fault at the line sides leads at cubicle 2H where they connect to the bucket stab  
MCC-24/24A.  No control rod indication was available due to MCC-24 being faulted and  
de-energized.  The direct cause of the event was the loss of MCC-24 due to an internal  
fault at the line sides leads at cubicle 2H where they connect to the bucket stab  
assemblies.  The apparent cause was an unanticipated loss of power to the control rod  
assemblies.  The apparent cause was an unanticipated loss of power to the control rod  
system due to the degradation of the primary control rod PS1 which failed to function when the operating PS2 was lost.  The inspectors determined that both the unexpected failure of PS2 and the internal fault in PS1 was not within Entergy's ability to foresee and  
system due to the degradation of the primary control rod PS1 which failed to function  
when the operating PS2 was lost.  The inspectors determined that both the unexpected  
failure of PS2 and the internal fault in PS1 was not within Entergys ability to foresee and  
prevent and was not a performance deficiency.  The inspectors reviewed the LER, the  
prevent and was not a performance deficiency.  The inspectors reviewed the LER, the  
associated apparent cause evaluation analysis, and interviewed Entergy staff.  This LER is closed.  
associated apparent cause evaluation analysis, and interviewed Entergy staff.  This LER  
  .3 (Closed) LER 05000247/2016-003-00:  TS Prohibited Condition Due to an Inoperable 21 MBFP Discharge Valve for Greater Than the TS Allowed Outage Time  
is closed.  
 
   
.3  
(Closed) LER 05000247/2016-003-00:  TS Prohibited Condition Due to an Inoperable 21  
MBFP Discharge Valve for Greater Than the TS Allowed Outage Time  
   
   
The inspector's reviewed Entergy's actions and reportability criteria associated with LER 05000247/2016-003-00, which was submitted to the NRC on May 6, 2016.  On March 7, 2016, during the shutdown to enter 2RFO22, the control switch for the 21 MBFP was  
The inspectors reviewed Entergys actions and reportability criteria associated with LER  
05000247/2016-003-00, which was submitted to the NRC on May 6, 2016.  On March 7,  
2016, during the shutdown to enter 2RFO22, the control switch for the 21 MBFP was  
tripped from the control room but the MBFP discharge valve BFD-2-21 failed to fully  
tripped from the control room but the MBFP discharge valve BFD-2-21 failed to fully  
close as designed.  The MBFP discharge valve was declared inoperable and TS 3.7.3  
close as designed.  The MBFP discharge valve was declared inoperable and TS 3.7.3  
Condition C was entered.  The MFD-2-21 isolation valve was then manually closed.  The  
Condition C was entered.  The MFD-2-21 isolation valve was then manually closed.  The  
direct cause of the failure to close the MBFP discharge valve BFD-2-21 was the motor operated valve's (MOV's) close torque switch contact finger out of position.  The apparent cause was that the MOV preventative maintenance procedure lacked the level  
direct cause of the failure to close the MBFP discharge valve BFD-2-21 was the motor  
operated valves (MOVs) close torque switch contact finger out of position.  The  
apparent cause was that the MOV preventative maintenance procedure lacked the level  
of detail and direction due to an unrecognized susceptibility associated with the  
of detail and direction due to an unrecognized susceptibility associated with the  
orientation of the close torque switch contact finger bracket opening and spreading of
orientation of the close torque switch contact finger bracket opening and spreading of  
36   the "U" shape bracket.  The downward arrangement made it easier for the torque switch contact finger to move out with spreading of the "U" shaped contact holder.  The
 
inspectors reviewed the LER, the associated apparent cause evaluation analysis, and interviewed Entergy staff.  This LER is closed. 
36  
   
   
Introduction.  The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(b)(1) for Entergy's failure to include a function of a safety-related system within the scope of the  
the U shape bracket.  The downward arrangement made it easier for the torque switch
contact finger to move out with spreading of the U shaped contact holder.  The
inspectors reviewed the LER, the associated apparent cause evaluation analysis, and
interviewed Entergy staff.  This LER is closed. 
Introduction.  The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(b)(1) for Entergys
failure to include a function of a safety-related system within the scope of the  
maintenance rule program.  Specifically, Entergy failed to include the feedwater isolation  
maintenance rule program.  Specifically, Entergy failed to include the feedwater isolation  
function performed by the MBFP discharge valves, MBFPs, and feedwater regulating  
function performed by the MBFP discharge valves, MBFPs, and feedwater regulating  
valves and feedwater isolation valves which are required to remain functional during and following a design basis event to mitigate the consequences of an accident, within the  
valves and feedwater isolation valves which are required to remain functional during and  
following a design basis event to mitigate the consequences of an accident, within the  
scope of the maintenance rule monitoring program.   
scope of the maintenance rule monitoring program.   
  Description.  On March 7, 2016, during an RFO, the control switch for the 21 MBFP was positioned to trip and the 21 MBFP tripped as designed, but the MBFP discharge valve  
Description.  On March 7, 2016, during an RFO, the control switch for the 21 MBFP was  
positioned to trip and the 21 MBFP tripped as designed, but the MBFP discharge valve  
BFD-2-21 failed to fully close.  Entergy declared MBFP discharge valve BFD-2-21  
BFD-2-21 failed to fully close.  Entergy declared MBFP discharge valve BFD-2-21  
inoperable and entered TS 3.7.3 Condition C.  After troubleshooting, Entergy determined  
inoperable and entered TS 3.7.3 Condition C.  After troubleshooting, Entergy determined  
the MOV close torque switch contact finger was out of position within the contact holder.   
the MOV close torque switch contact finger was out of position within the contact holder.   
The misalignment allowed the contact finger to move out of the proper position causing the MOV BFD-2-21 to fail to close.  This is the same failure mechanism which caused MOV BFD-2-21 to fail to close in 2010 which is referenced in CR-IP2-2010-07013.  On  
The misalignment allowed the contact finger to move out of the proper position causing  
the MOV BFD-2-21 to fail to close.  This is the same failure mechanism which caused  
MOV BFD-2-21 to fail to close in 2010 which is referenced in CR-IP2-2010-07013.  On  
December 5, 2015, the 21 MBFP failed to trip and required closure of the steam  
December 5, 2015, the 21 MBFP failed to trip and required closure of the steam  
admission valves to secure it.  This failure occurred because of contaminated control oil  
admission valves to secure it.  This failure occurred because of contaminated control oil  
that prevented the solenoid valves from operating.   
that prevented the solenoid valves from operating.   
  The inspectors reviewed Entergy's maintenance rule basis documents and identified the feedwater isolation function was not properly included in the maintenance rule  
   
The inspectors reviewed Entergys maintenance rule basis documents and identified the  
feedwater isolation function was not properly included in the maintenance rule  
monitoring program as required by 10 CFR 50.65(b)(1).  The basis document for the  
monitoring program as required by 10 CFR 50.65(b)(1).  The basis document for the  
feedwater system did identify the need to monitor the feedwater isolation function under  
feedwater system did identify the need to monitor the feedwater isolation function under  
the maintenance rule and stated that it would be monitored as a part of the vapor containment supersystem.  However, the basis document for the vapor containment supersystem does not include the feedwater isolation components within the system boundaries.  As a result, when component failures occurred which affected the  
the maintenance rule and stated that it would be monitored as a part of the vapor  
containment supersystem.  However, the basis document for the vapor containment  
supersystem does not include the feedwater isolation components within the system  
boundaries.  As a result, when component failures occurred which affected the  
feedwater isolation function, they were not reviewed to determine if they were  
feedwater isolation function, they were not reviewed to determine if they were  
maintenance rule functional failures; and Entergy was unable to identify that the  
maintenance rule functional failures; and Entergy was unable to identify that the  
performance of the main feedwater isolation equipment was not effectively controlled through preventative maintenance.  Entergy entered this issue into the CAP as CR-IP2-2016-03963 and initiated actions to include the MBFP discharge valves into the  
performance of the main feedwater isolation equipment was not effectively controlled  
through preventative maintenance.  Entergy entered this issue into the CAP as  
CR-IP2-2016-03963 and initiated actions to include the MBFP discharge valves into the  
maintenance rule program.   
maintenance rule program.   
   
   
Analysis.  The failure to appropriately scope the safety-related feedwater isolation function within the maintenance rule program was a performance deficiency.  This  
Analysis.  The failure to appropriately scope the safety-related feedwater isolation  
function within the maintenance rule program was a performance deficiency.  This  
finding is more than minor because it is associated with the SSC and barrier  
finding is more than minor because it is associated with the SSC and barrier  
performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone  
performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone  
objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the  
objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the  
public from radionuclide releases caused by acci
public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events.  Specifically, the failure  
dents or events.  Specifically, the failure to properly scope the feedwater isolation function prevented Entergy from identifying that equipment reliability was no longer effectively controlled through preventative maintenance.  Additionally, this issue is similar to example 7.d described in IMC 0612, Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues," dated August 11, 2009.  In accordance with  
to properly scope the feedwater isolation function prevented Entergy from identifying that  
IMC 0609.04, "Initial Characterization of Findings," and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix   
equipment reliability was no longer effectively controlled through preventative  
37  A, "The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power," issued June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance  
maintenance.  Additionally, this issue is similar to example 7.d described in IMC 0612,  
(Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment, containment isolation system, and heat removal components.  There are redundant methods of feedwater isolation.  They include  
Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, dated August 11, 2009.  In accordance with  
IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix  
 
37
   
A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, issued June 19,  
2012, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance  
(Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical  
integrity of reactor containment, containment isolation system, and heat removal  
components.  There are redundant methods of feedwater isolation.  They include  
tripping the MBFPs and closing the MBFP discharge valves, closing the main feedwater  
tripping the MBFPs and closing the MBFP discharge valves, closing the main feedwater  
regulating valves and low flow bypass valves, and closing the main feedwater isolation  
regulating valves and low flow bypass valves, and closing the main feedwater isolation  
valves.  On both December 5, 2015, and March 7, 2016, the main feedwater regulating  
valves.  On both December 5, 2015, and March 7, 2016, the main feedwater regulating  
valves and isolation valves were functional; so there was no loss of the ability to isolate feedwater to mitigate accident and transient conditions.   
valves and isolation valves were functional; so there was no loss of the ability to isolate  
feedwater to mitigate accident and transient conditions.   
   
   
This finding does not have a cross-cutting aspect, since the failure to scope this  
This finding does not have a cross-cutting aspect, since the failure to scope this  
equipment into the maintenance rule program was not recognized when Entergy  
equipment into the maintenance rule program was not recognized when Entergy  
combined the maintenance rule basis documents for Units 2 and 3 in 2012 and as a result, is not indicative of current licensee performance.   
combined the maintenance rule basis documents for Units 2 and 3 in 2012 and as a  
result, is not indicative of current licensee performance.   
   
   
Enforcement.
Enforcement. 10 CFR 50.65(b)(1) requires, in part, that the holders of an operating  
  10 CFR 50.65(b)(1) requires, in part, that the holders of an operating license shall include within the scope of the monitoring program, specified in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1), SSCs that are relied upon to remain functional during and following  
license shall include within the scope of the monitoring program, specified in  
design basis events.  Contrary to the  
10 CFR 50.65(a)(1), SSCs that are relied upon to remain functional during and following  
above, since the combined maintenance rule scoping for Units 2 and 3 in 2012, Entergy failed to include within the scope of the  
design basis events.  Contrary to the above, since the combined maintenance rule  
scoping for Units 2 and 3 in 2012, Entergy failed to include within the scope of the  
monitoring program specified in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1), the safety-related MBFP discharge  
monitoring program specified in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1), the safety-related MBFP discharge  
valves.  These SSCs are relied upon during and after design basis events to mitigate the  
valves.  These SSCs are relied upon during and after design basis events to mitigate the  
consequences of a feedwater line break accident inside containment.  Entergy's
consequences of a feedwater line break accident inside containment.  Entergys
corrective action included entering this issue into the corrective action program.  Because the violation was of very low safety significance (Green) and Entergy entered this issue into their CAP as CR-IP2-2016-03963, this violation is being treated as an  
corrective action included entering this issue into the corrective action program.   
NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.  (NCV 05000247/2016002-04, Failure to Scope Safety-Related Main Boiler Feedwater Pump Discharge Valves into the Maintenance Rule Program)
Because the violation was of very low safety significance (Green) and Entergy entered  
  4OA5 Other Activities  
this issue into their CAP as CR-IP2-2016-03963, this violation is being treated as an  
NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.   
(NCV 05000247/2016002-04, Failure to Scope Safety-Related Main Boiler Feedwater  
Pump Discharge Valves into the Maintenance Rule Program)  
4OA5 Other Activities  
.1
Groundwater Contamination
a. Inspection Scope
   
   
.1 Groundwater Contamination
On February 5, 2016, Entergy notified the NRC of a significant increase in groundwater  
a. Inspection Scope
tritium levels measured at three monitoring wells (MWs) (MW-30, MW-31, and MW-32)  
On February 5, 2016, Entergy notified the NRC of a significant increase in groundwater  
located near the Unit 2 fuel storage building.  These samples were drawn on  
 
January 26 to 27, 2016, and analyzed and confirmed on February 2 to 4, 2016.  The  
tritium levels measured at three monitoring wells (MWs) (MW-30, MW-31, and MW-32) located near the Unit 2 fuel storage building.  These samples were drawn on  
highest concentration was detected at MW-32, which increased from 12,000 pCi/l on  
January 26 to 27, 2016, and analyzed and confirmed on February 2 to 4, 2016.  The highest concentration was detected at MW-32, which increased from 12,000 pCi/l on January 11, 2016, to 8,100,000 pCi/l on January 26, 2016, and subsequently up to  
January 11, 2016, to 8,100,000 pCi/l on January 26, 2016, and subsequently up to  
14,800,000 pCi/l on February 4, 2016.  This increased tritium concentration event was  
14,800,000 pCi/l on February 4, 2016.  This increased tritium concentration event was  
documented by Entergy in CR-IP2-2016-00564 which documents its investigation of this  
documented by Entergy in CR-IP2-2016-00564 which documents its investigation of this  
event including a root cause evaluation.  The inspectors reviewed Entergy's root cause evaluation for this event during this inspection period as well as recent groundwater monitoring results.  
event including a root cause evaluation.  The inspectors reviewed Entergys root cause  
   
evaluation for this event during this inspection period as well as recent groundwater  
38   b. Findings and Observations  
monitoring results.  
  No findings were identified.  
  Update to URI 05000247/2016001-07, January 2016 Groundwater Contamination  
  Entergy continues to conduct weekly, biweekly, and monthly groundwater sampling of  
 
38  
b. Findings and Observations  
No findings were identified.  
   
Update to URI 05000247/2016001-07, January 2016 Groundwater Contamination  
   
Entergy continues to conduct weekly, biweekly, and monthly groundwater sampling of  
MWs at the initial site of groundwater contamination and at downstream wells towards  
MWs at the initial site of groundwater contamination and at downstream wells towards  
the Hudson River.  For the initial three MWs (MW-30, MW-31, and MW-32), the general trend in tritium activity has been downward, with periodic increases seen in some weekly samples.  The downstream MWs located in the Unit 2 switchyard (especially MW-55)  
the Hudson River.  For the initial three MWs (MW-30, MW-31, and MW-32), the general  
trend in tritium activity has been downward, with periodic increases seen in some weekly  
samples.  The downstream MWs located in the Unit 2 switchyard (especially MW-55)  
showed an initial increase in activity up to 117,000 pCi/l, but the activity at that location  
showed an initial increase in activity up to 117,000 pCi/l, but the activity at that location  
has plateaued at the end of the reporting period.  
has plateaued at the end of the reporting period.  
  Entergy documented its investigation of this event as root cause evaluation for CR-IP2-2016-00564.  The inspectors reviewed Entergy's root cause evaluation for this  
   
event.  Entergy concluded that the source of the groundwater contamination was from the reject water of a temporary reverse osmosis unit used to process water from the  
Entergy documented its investigation of this event as root cause evaluation for  
refueling water storage tank at Unit 2 in preparation for RFO 2R22.  Although this analysis documents a number of issues identified during the operation of the contractor reverse osmosis unit, which is believed to be the source of the groundwater  
CR-IP2-2016-00564.  The inspectors reviewed Entergys root cause evaluation for this  
event.  Entergy concluded that the source of the groundwater contamination was from  
the reject water of a temporary reverse osmosis unit used to process water from the  
refueling water storage tank at Unit 2 in preparation for RFO 2R22.  Although this  
analysis documents a number of issues identified during the operation of the contractor  
reverse osmosis unit, which is believed to be the source of the groundwater  
contamination, one of two leakage paths to groundwater have still not been established.   
contamination, one of two leakage paths to groundwater have still not been established.   
The established pathway involves leakage from two cut drain lines located above the floor on the 35-foot elevation of the PAB.  Further investigation by Entergy following the  
The established pathway involves leakage from two cut drain lines located above the  
floor on the 35-foot elevation of the PAB.  Further investigation by Entergy following the  
conclusion of the Unit 2 RFO 2R22 must be conducted to verify the second pathway to  
conclusion of the Unit 2 RFO 2R22 must be conducted to verify the second pathway to  
groundwater via the floor of the fuel storage building truck bay.  
groundwater via the floor of the fuel storage building truck bay.  
  Entergy's long-term corrective action for reducing tritium levels in the groundwater is the  
   
Entergys long-term corrective action for reducing tritium levels in the groundwater is the  
same as previously identified for the March 2014 tritium spike (CR-IP2-2015-03806), the  
same as previously identified for the March 2014 tritium spike (CR-IP2-2015-03806), the  
start-up and operation of recovery well (RW)-1.  Following installation of equipment and system testing, full operation of the RW system is expected later this year.  This system will allow for the collection of tritiated groundwater in the vicinity of Unit 2 to be returned  
start-up and operation of recovery well (RW)-1.  Following installation of equipment and  
system testing, full operation of the RW system is expected later this year.  This system  
will allow for the collection of tritiated groundwater in the vicinity of Unit 2 to be returned  
inside the Unit 2 PAB for processing.  The NRC will be conducting an inspection in  
inside the Unit 2 PAB for processing.  The NRC will be conducting an inspection in  
August 2016 to review the testing plan and results of the RW-1 tests.  This inspection  
August 2016 to review the testing plan and results of the RW-1 tests.  This inspection  
will include a specialist region-based inspector, and a staff hydrogeologist.  
will include a specialist region-based inspector, and a staff hydrogeologist.  
 
The NRC's continuing assessment of the safety  
The NRCs continuing assessment of the safety significance of this event focused on  
significance of this event focused on validating the safety impact of dose to the public from the release of tritium to the site  
validating the safety impact of dose to the public from the release of tritium to the site  
groundwater, and ultimately to the Hudson River.  The NRC verified that Entergy's
groundwater, and ultimately to the Hudson River.  The NRC verified that Entergys
bounding public dose calculations on the groundwater contamination leak was  
bounding public dose calculations on the groundwater contamination leak was  
sufficiently conservative and a maximum worst case scenario would result in a dose of  
sufficiently conservative and a maximum worst case scenario would result in a dose of  
0.000112 millirem per year, which represents a very small fraction of the allowable dose (liquid effluent dose objective of 3 millirem per year).  This low value is due to  
0.000112 millirem per year, which represents a very small fraction of the allowable dose  
(liquid effluent dose objective of 3 millirem per year).  This low value is due to  
groundwater at Indian Point not being a source of any drinking water.  There are no  
groundwater at Indian Point not being a source of any drinking water.  There are no  
drinking water wells on the Indian Point site, groundwater flow from the site is to the  
drinking water wells on the Indian Point site, groundwater flow from the site is to the  
Hudson River and not to any near site drinking water wells, and the Hudson River has  
Hudson River and not to any near site drinking water wells, and the Hudson River has  
no downstream drinking water intakes as it is brackish water.  Pathways to the public are therefore limited to the consumption of fish and river invertebrates.  The inspection determined that there is no safety impact to the public as a result of this groundwater  
no downstream drinking water intakes as it is brackish water.  Pathways to the public are  
therefore limited to the consumption of fish and river invertebrates.  The inspection  
determined that there is no safety impact to the public as a result of this groundwater  
contamination event.  (URI 05000247/2016001-07, January 2016 Groundwater
Contamination)


contamination event. (URI 05000247/2016001-07, January 2016 Groundwater
39
Contamination)
   
 
39    .2 Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Report Review  
  a. Inspection Scope  
.2  
  The inspectors also reviewed the final report for the INPO equipment reliability scram  
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Report Review  
   
a. Inspection Scope  
   
The inspectors also reviewed the final report for the INPO equipment reliability scram  
review visit that was conducted to review the scrams that occurred over the past two  
review visit that was conducted to review the scrams that occurred over the past two  
years, conducted in June 2016.  The inspectors reviewed the report to ensure that any  
years, conducted in June 2016.  The inspectors reviewed the report to ensure that any  
issues identified were consistent with NRC perspectives of Entergy performance and to determine if INPO identified any significant safety issues that required further NRC  
issues identified were consistent with NRC perspectives of Entergy performance and to  
determine if INPO identified any significant safety issues that required further NRC  
follow-up.  
follow-up.  
 
b. Findings  
b. Findings  
  No findings were identified.  
   
  4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit  
No findings were identified.  
  On August 4, 2016, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Larry Coyle, Site Vice President, and other members of Entergy.  Based on additional information provided, the inspectors conducted an updated exit meeting on August 30, 2016 with  
   
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit  
   
On August 4, 2016, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Larry Coyle,  
Site Vice President, and other members of Entergy.  Based on additional information  
provided, the inspectors conducted an updated exit meeting on August 30, 2016 with  
John Kirkpatrick, Plant Operations General Manager and other members of Entergy.   
John Kirkpatrick, Plant Operations General Manager and other members of Entergy.   
The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or  
The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or  
documented in this report.  
documented in this report.  
  ATTACHMENT:  SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
 
A-1  Attachment SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION  
ATTACHMENT:  SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION  
  KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
  Entergy Personnel  
 
A-1  
   
Attachment  
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION  
   
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT  
Entergy Personnel  
A. Vitale, Site Vice President  
A. Vitale, Site Vice President  
J. Kirkpatrick, Plant Operations General Manager  
J. Kirkpatrick, Plant Operations General Manager  
R. Alexander, Unit 2 Shift Manager  
R. Alexander, Unit 2 Shift Manager  
R. Andersen, Maintenance Instrumentation and Controls Superintendent N. Azevedo, Engineering Supervisor   
R. Andersen, Maintenance Instrumentation and Controls Superintendent  
N. Azevedo, Engineering Supervisor   
J. Baker, Shift Manager  
J. Baker, Shift Manager  
S. Bianco, Operations Fire Marshal  
S. Bianco, Operations Fire Marshal  
K. Brooks, Assistant Operations Manager  
K. Brooks, Assistant Operations Manager  
R. Burroni, Engineering Director  T. Chan, Engineering Supervisor C. Chapin, Training Superintendent  
R. Burroni, Engineering Director   
T. Chan, Engineering Supervisor  
C. Chapin, Training Superintendent  
D. Dewey, Assistant Operations Manager  
D. Dewey, Assistant Operations Manager  
J. Dignam, Unit 3 Control Room Supervisor  
J. Dignam, Unit 3 Control Room Supervisor  
R. Dolansky, Inservice Inspection Program Manager W. Durr, Outage Control Center Manager R. Drake, Engineering Supervisor  
R. Dolansky, Inservice Inspection Program Manager  
W. Durr, Outage Control Center Manager  
R. Drake, Engineering Supervisor  
K. Elliott, Fire Protection Engineer   
K. Elliott, Fire Protection Engineer   
J. Ferrick, Regulatory and Performance Improvement Director  
J. Ferrick, Regulatory and Performance Improvement Director  
L. Frink, Radiation Protection Supervisor  
L. Frink, Radiation Protection Supervisor  
D. Gagnon, Security Manager L. Glander, Emergency Preparedness Manager D. Gray, Radiological Environmental Manager  
D. Gagnon, Security Manager  
L. Glander, Emergency Preparedness Manager  
D. Gray, Radiological Environmental Manager  
J. Johnson, Unit 2 Control Room Supervisor  
J. Johnson, Unit 2 Control Room Supervisor  
M. Johnson, Unit 3 Shift Manager   
M. Johnson, Unit 3 Shift Manager   
M. Khadabux, Instrumentation and Controls Supervisor F. Kich, Performance Improvement Manager M. Lewis, Unit 3 Assistant Operations Manager  
M. Khadabux, Instrumentation and Controls Supervisor  
F. Kich, Performance Improvement Manager  
M. Lewis, Unit 3 Assistant Operations Manager  
N. Lizzo, Training Manager  
N. Lizzo, Training Manager  
S. McAllister, Baffle Bolt Replacement Project Manager  
S. McAllister, Baffle Bolt Replacement Project Manager  
M. McCarthy, Unit 3 Control Room Supervisor  
M. McCarthy, Unit 3 Control Room Supervisor  
 
B. McCarthy, Operations Manager  
B. McCarthy, Operations Manager F. Mitchell, Radiation Protection Manager E. Mullek, Maintenance Manager  
F. Mitchell, Radiation Protection Manager  
E. Mullek, Maintenance Manager  
S. Stevens, Radiation Protection Operations Superintendent  
S. Stevens, Radiation Protection Operations Superintendent  
B. Sullivan, Training Superintendent  
B. Sullivan, Training Superintendent  
J. Taylor, Unit 3 Shift Manager  
J. Taylor, Unit 3 Shift Manager  
M. Tesoriero, Outage Control Center Manager M. Troy, Nuclear Oversight Manager  
M. Tesoriero, Outage Control Center Manager  
M. Troy, Nuclear Oversight Manager  
R. Walpole, Regulatory Assurance Manager  
R. Walpole, Regulatory Assurance Manager  
A. Zastrow, Assistant Operations Manager  
A. Zastrow, Assistant Operations Manager  


 
A-2  
A-2   LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED
  Opened   
05000247/2016002-01 URI  CVCS Goal Monitoring Under the Maintenance  
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED  
      Rule (Section 1R12)  
 
Opened  
   
05000247/2016002-01  
URI  
   
CVCS Goal Monitoring Under the Maintenance  
Rule (Section 1R12)  
   
   
Opened/Closed  
Opened/Closed  
  05000286/2016002-02 NCV  Failure to Follow Operability Determination  
   
05000286/2016002-02  
NCV  
   
Failure to Follow Operability Determination  
Procedure for Unit 3 Baffle-Former Bolts  
Procedure for Unit 3 Baffle-Former Bolts  
(Section 1R15)  
(Section 1R15)  
   
   
05000247/2016002-03 NCV Failure to Maintain Flow Channeling Gates Closed in Accordance with the Containment Procedure (Section 1R20)
05000247/2016002-03  
NCV  
   
   
05000247/2016002-04 NCV  Failure to Scope Safety-Related Main Boiler  
Failure to Maintain Flow Channeling Gates Closed
      Feedwater Pump Discharge Valves into the  
in Accordance with the Containment Procedure
(Section 1R20)
05000247/2016002-04  
NCV  
   
Failure to Scope Safety-Related Main Boiler  
Feedwater Pump Discharge Valves into the  
Maintenance Rule Program (Section 4OA3)  
Maintenance Rule Program (Section 4OA3)  
   
   
Closed   
Closed  
05000247/2015-003-00 LER  Manual Reactor Trip due to Indications of Multiple  
   
      Dropped Control Rods Caused by Loss of Control      Rod Power Due to a Power Supply Failure (Section 4OA3)
05000247/2015-003-00  
LER  
   
Manual Reactor Trip due to Indications of Multiple  
   
   
05000247/2016-003-00 LER  Technical Specification Prohibited Condition Due to an Inoperable 21 Main Boiler Feedwater  
Dropped Control Rods Caused by Loss of Control
Rod Power Due to a Power Supply Failure
(Section 4OA3)
05000247/2016-003-00  
LER  
   
Technical Specification Prohibited Condition  
Due to an Inoperable 21 Main Boiler Feedwater  
Pump Discharge Valve for Greater Than the TS  
Pump Discharge Valve for Greater Than the TS  
Allowed Outage Time (Section 4OA3)  
Allowed Outage Time (Section 4OA3)  
Line 1,293: Line 2,553:
Discussed  
Discussed  
   
   
05000247/2016001-01 URI Baffle-Former Bolts with Identified Anomalies   (Section 1R08)  
05000247/2016001-01  
URI  
Baffle-Former Bolts with Identified Anomalies  
(Section 1R08)  
   
   
05000247/2016001-06 URI Emergency Diesel Generator Automatic Voltage  
05000247/2016001-06  
URI  
Emergency Diesel Generator Automatic Voltage  
Regulator Failure (Section 1R15)  
Regulator Failure (Section 1R15)  
  05000247/2016001-07 URI  January 2016 Groundwater Contamination       Section (Section 4OA5)
   
 
05000247/2016001-07  
A-3  LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
URI  
   
January 2016 Groundwater Contamination  
    
    
Common Documents Used Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, UFSARs  
Section (Section 4OA5)
 
A-3
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Common Documents Used  
Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, UFSARs  
Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, Individual Plant Examinations  
Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, Individual Plant Examinations  
Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, Individual Plant Examination of External Events  
Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, Individual Plant Examination of External Events  
Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, TSs and Bases  
Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, TSs and Bases  
Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, Technical Requirements Manuals  
Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, Technical Requirements Manuals  
Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, Control Room Narrative Logs Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, Plans of the Day  
Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, Control Room Narrative Logs  
  Section 1R04:  Equipment Alignment
Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, Plans of the Day  
  Procedures 2-COL-4.2.1, Residual Heat Removal System, Revision 30  
   
Section 1R04:  Equipment Alignment  
Procedures  
2-COL-4.2.1, Residual Heat Removal System, Revision 30  
2-COL-4.3.1, Spent Fuel Pit Cooling, Revision 10  
2-COL-4.3.1, Spent Fuel Pit Cooling, Revision 10  
2-COL-24.1.1, Service Water System, Revision 50  
2-COL-24.1.1, Service Water System, Revision 50  
3-COL-EL-005, Diesel Generators, Revision 37  
3-COL-EL-005, Diesel Generators, Revision 37  
OAP-019, Component Verification and System Status Control, Revision 7 OAP-044, Plant Labeling Program, Revision 3  
OAP-019, Component Verification and System Status Control, Revision 7  
OAP-044, Plant Labeling Program, Revision 3  
   
   
Condition Reports (CR-IP2)  
Condition Reports (CR-IP2)  
2016-01311 2016-01505 2016-01761 2016-02330 2016-02428 2016-02470  
2016-01311  
 
2016-01505  
2016-01761  
2016-02330  
2016-02428  
2016-02470  
   
   
Condition Reports (CR-IP3)  
Condition Reports (CR-IP3)  
2016-01382 2016-01810  
2016-01382  
 
2016-01810  
Drawings
209762, Flow Diagram Service Water System Nuclear Steam Supply Plant, Revision 75
227781, Flow Diagram Auxiliary Coolant System, Revision 22
9321-2720, Auxiliary Coolant System, Sheet 2, Revision 22
Miscellaneous
IP3-DBD-308, CCW System, Revision 3
   
   
Drawings 209762, Flow Diagram Service Water System Nuclear Steam Supply Plant, Revision 75
Section 1R05:  Fire Protection
227781, Flow Diagram Auxiliary Coolant System, Revision 22 9321-2720, Auxiliary Coolant System, Sheet 2, Revision 22
   
   
Miscellaneous IP3-DBD-308, CCW System, Revision 3
Procedures
 
EN-MA-133, Control of Scaffolding, Revision 12  
Section 1R05:  Fire Protection
  Procedures EN-MA-133, Control of Scaffolding, Revision 12  
 
   
   
Condition Reports (CR-IP2)  
Condition Reports (CR-IP2)  
2016-04148  
2016-04148  
   
   
Condition Reports (CR-IP3)  
Condition Reports (CR-IP3)  
2016-01272  
2016-01272  
   
   
Miscellaneous PFP-203, Containment Building, 95-Foot Elevation (Fire Zone 86A), Revision 15  
Miscellaneous  
PFP-203, Containment Building, 95-Foot Elevation (Fire Zone 86A), Revision 15  
PFP-204, General Floor Plan, PAB, 15-Foot Elevation, Revision 0  
PFP-204, General Floor Plan, PAB, 15-Foot Elevation, Revision 0  
PFP-209, Component Cooling Pump Room, PAB, 68-Foot Elevation, Revision 0  
PFP-209, Component Cooling Pump Room, PAB, 68-Foot Elevation, Revision 0  
PFP-211, General Floor Plan, PAB, 80-Foot Elevation, Revision 14  
PFP-211, General Floor Plan, PAB, 80-Foot Elevation, Revision 14  
PFP-351, 480V Switchgear Room, Revision 15  
PFP-351, 480V Switchgear Room, Revision 15  
 
   
A-4  Section 1R07: Heat Sink Performance
Procedures 0-HTX-405-EDG, EDG Lube Oil and Jacket Water Heat Exchanger Maintenance, Revision 4


A-4
Section 1R07:  Heat Sink Performance
Procedures
0-HTX-405-EDG, EDG Lube Oil and Jacket Water Heat Exchanger Maintenance, Revision 4
   
   
Condition Reports (CR-IP3)  
Condition Reports (CR-IP3)  
2010-02900 2011-03594 2011-03596 2011-03961 2012-02071 2012-03912  
2010-02900  
 
2011-03594  
2013-02338 2013-02695 2013-03009 2014-00957 2014-01239 2014-03158  
2011-03596  
 
2011-03961  
2014-03175 2015-00031 2015-00599 2015-02848 2015-05209 2015-05526  
2012-02071  
2016-00886 2016-00895 2016-00899  
2012-03912  
2013-02338  
2013-02695  
2013-03009  
2014-00957  
2014-01239  
2014-03158  
2014-03175  
2015-00031  
2015-00599  
2015-02848  
2015-05209  
2015-05526  
2016-00886  
2016-00895  
2016-00899  
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders
WO 52489888 
WO 52626563
   
   
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders WO 52489888  WO 52626563
Miscellaneous
 
SEP-SW-IPC-001, Indian Point Energy Center NRC Generic Letter 89-13 Service Water  
Miscellaneous SEP-SW-IPC-001, Indian Point Energy Center NRC Generic Letter 89-13 Service Water  
Program, Revision 0  
Program, Revision 0  
  Section 1R08:  Inservice Inspection Activities  
   
  Procedures GBRA-104-659, Collection of Protocols for Baffle Bolt Replacement, Revision C  
Section 1R08:  Inservice Inspection Activities  
   
Procedures  
GBRA-104-659, Collection of Protocols for Baffle Bolt Replacement, Revision C  
GBRA-175-115, Field Service Procedure for Baffle Bolt Replacement, Revision 3  
GBRA-175-115, Field Service Procedure for Baffle Bolt Replacement, Revision 3  
WDI-STD-088, Underwater Remote Visual Examination of Reactor Vessel Internals, Revision 13 WDI-STD-1073, Ultrasonic Test Procedure for the Inspection of Internal Hex Head Baffle-Former Bolts with Welded Lock Bars, Revision 4  
WDI-STD-088, Underwater Remote Visual Examination of Reactor Vessel Internals,  
Revision 13  
WDI-STD-1073, Ultrasonic Test Procedure for the Inspection of Internal Hex Head  
Baffle-Former Bolts with Welded Lock Bars, Revision 4  
   
   
Condition Reports (CR-IP2)  
Condition Reports (CR-IP2)  
2016-02081  
2016-02081  
  Maintenance Orders/Work Orders  
   
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders  
442412-13  
442412-13  
   
   
Miscellaneous Indian Point Unit 2 Baffle Bolt Ultrasonic Examination Expanded Analysis Report, dated April 28, 2016 IP2 Reactor Vessel Visual Examination Report, dated May 2006  
Miscellaneous  
Indian Point Unit 2 Baffle Bolt Ultrasonic Examination Expanded Analysis Report, dated  
April 28, 2016  
IP2 Reactor Vessel Visual Examination Report, dated May 2006  
Loose Parts Inventory Log for Baffle Bolt Replacements, dated May 24, 2016  
Loose Parts Inventory Log for Baffle Bolt Replacements, dated May 24, 2016  
MRP-227-A, Materials Reliability Program:  Pressurized Water Reactor Internals Inspection and Evaluation Guidelines (ML120170453) MRP-228, Materials Reliability Program:  Inspection Standard for PWR Internals - 2012 Update, Revision 1 SEP-ISI-IP2-001, IP2 Fourth Ten-Year Interval Inservice Inspection (ISI)/Containment Inservice Inspection (CISI) Program Plan, Revision 2 WDI-PJF-1315504-EPP-001, Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant MRP-227-A Reactor Vessel Internals Examination Program Plan, Revision 0 WDI-PJF-1315505-FSR-001, Indian Point Unit 2 2R22 MRP-227-A Baffle-Former Bolt Ultrasonic Inspections Field Service Report, dated March 29, 2016 WDI-TJ-1100, Technical Justification for the Ultrasonic Inspection of Baffle-Former Bolts for Indian Point Units 2 and 3, Revision 1  
MRP-227-A, Materials Reliability Program:  Pressurized Water Reactor Internals Inspection and  
Evaluation Guidelines (ML120170453)  
MRP-228, Materials Reliability Program:  Inspection Standard for PWR Internals - 2012 Update,  
Revision 1  
SEP-ISI-IP2-001, IP2 Fourth Ten-Year Interval Inservice Inspection (ISI)/Containment Inservice  
Inspection (CISI) Program Plan, Revision 2  
WDI-PJF-1315504-EPP-001, Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant MRP-227-A Reactor Vessel  
Internals Examination Program Plan, Revision 0  
WDI-PJF-1315505-FSR-001, Indian Point Unit 2 2R22 MRP-227-A Baffle-Former Bolt  
Ultrasonic Inspections Field Service Report, dated March 29, 2016  
WDI-TJ-1100, Technical Justification for the Ultrasonic Inspection of Baffle-Former Bolts for  
Indian Point Units 2 and 3, Revision 1  
   
   
 
A-5  Section 1R11:  Licensed Operator Requalification Program
Procedures 2-AOP-480V-1, Loss of Normal Power to Any 480V Vital Bus, Revision 8


A-5
Section 1R11:  Licensed Operator Requalification Program
Procedures
2-AOP-480V-1, Loss of Normal Power to Any 480V Vital Bus, Revision 8
2-AOP-RCP-1, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction, Revision 14   
2-AOP-RCP-1, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction, Revision 14   
2-AOP-TURB-1, Main Turbine Trip without a Reactor Trip, Revision 5  
2-AOP-TURB-1, Main Turbine Trip without a Reactor Trip, Revision 5  
2-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Revision 7  
2-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Revision 7  
2-FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, Revision 11  
2-FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, Revision 11  
2-POP-1.2, Reactor Startup, Revision 59 2-SOP-26.4, Turbine Generator Startup, Synchronizing, Voltage Control and Shutdown, Revision 62 3-AOP-480V-1, Loss of Normal Power to Any Safeguards Bus, Revision 7  
2-POP-1.2, Reactor Startup, Revision 59  
2-SOP-26.4, Turbine Generator Startup, Synchronizing, Voltage Control and Shutdown,  
Revision 62  
3-AOP-480V-1, Loss of Normal Power to Any Safeguards Bus, Revision 7  
3-AOP-CVCS-1, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, Revision 8  
3-AOP-CVCS-1, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, Revision 8  
3-AOP-FW-1, Loss of Feedwater, Revision 8 3-AOP-INST-1, Instrument/Controller Failures, Revision 11  
3-AOP-FW-1, Loss of Feedwater, Revision 8  
3-AOP-INST-1, Instrument/Controller Failures, Revision 11  
3-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Revision 6  
3-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Revision 6  
3-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Revision 4  
3-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Revision 4  
3-FR-C.2, Response to Degraded Core Cooling, Revision 3  
3-FR-C.2, Response to Degraded Core Cooling, Revision 3  
 
Condition Reports (CR-IP2)  
Condition Reports (CR-IP2)  
2016-03946 2016-04162 2016-04164 2016-04165 2016-04169 2016-04178  
2016-03946  
2016-04162  
2016-04164  
2016-04165  
2016-04169  
2016-04178  
Condition Reports (CR-IP3)
2016-01087
2016-01092
2016-01098
2016-01336
Miscellaneous
13SX-LOR-SES026, Licensed Operator Requalification Program Scenario
Emergency Action Level Table, Revision 15.2
LRQ-SES-04, IPEC Simulator Evaluated Scenario, Revision 6
Section 1R12:  Maintenance Effectiveness
Procedures
CEP-NDE-0640, Non-Section XI Liquid Penetrant Examination, Revision 9
CEP-WP-WIIR-1, Attachment 5.1, Inprocess Inspections for Installation and Replacement
Welds Located Inside the ASME Section XI Boundary, Revision 3
EN-DC-206, Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Process, Revision 3
Condition Reports (CR-IP2)
2010-00864
2013-03130
2014-00162
2014-00185
2014-01144
2014-02184 
2015-00278
2016-01260
2016-01430
2016-01500
   
   
Condition Reports (CR-IP3)  
Condition Reports (CR-IP3)  
2016-01087 2016-01092 2016-01098 2016-01336
2012-03836
2013-04758
2015-01396
2015-03404
2015-03653
2015-04053
2015-04162
2015-04184
2015-04539
2015-05316
2015-05384
2015-05729


  Miscellaneous 13SX-LOR-SES026, Licensed Operator Requalification Program Scenario Emergency Action Level Table, Revision 15.2
A-6
LRQ-SES-04, IPEC Simulator Evaluated Scenario, Revision 6
  Section 1R12:  Maintenance Effectiveness
   
  Procedures CEP-NDE-0640, Non-Section XI Liquid Penetrant Examination, Revision 9
2016-00098
CEP-WP-WIIR-1, Attachment 5.1, Inprocess Inspections for Installation and Replacement Welds Located Inside the ASME Section XI Boundary, Revision 3 EN-DC-206, Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Process, Revision 3
2016-00653
2016-00723
2016-01189
2016-01227
2016-01274
2016-01313
2016-01531
2016-01536
2016-01543
2016-02432
   
   
Condition Reports (CR-IP2) 2010-00864 2013-03130 2014-00162 2014-00185 2014-01144 2014-02184 
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders  
 
WO 00397793   
2015-00278 2016-01260 2016-01430 2016-01500
WO 00408019   
Condition Reports (CR-IP3)
WO 00414886   
2012-03836 2013-04758 2015-01396 2015-03404 2015-03653 2015-04053
WO 00416091  
 
WO 00421841   
2015-04162 2015-04184 2015-04539 2015-05316 2015-05384 2015-05729
WO 00429532   
 
WO 00429532   
 
WO 00431497  
A-6  2016-00098 2016-00653 2016-00723 2016-01189 2016-01227 2016-01274
WO 00446165   
2016-01313 2016-01531 2016-01536 2016-01543 2016-02432 
WO 00447042   
 
WO 00447966   
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders WO 00397793  WO 00408019  WO 00414886  WO 00416091 WO 00421841  WO 00429532  WO 00429532  WO 00431497  
WO 52602429  
WO 00446165  WO 00447042  WO 00447966  WO 52602429  
 
WO 52621178  
WO 52621178  
 
Miscellaneous EC 65389, 21 CCW HX Leak Repair: Service Water Inlet Nozzle - Elbow Weld Configuration  
Miscellaneous  
Change IPEC Maintenance Rule Basis Document - Chemical and Volume Control System, Revision 0  
EC 65389, 21 CCW HX Leak Repair: Service Water Inlet Nozzle - Elbow Weld Configuration  
PQR 913, 134 F42 MN-GTAW ASME IX Welding Procedure Qualification Record, Revision 0 System Health Report, Unit 3, EDG, Q1-2016  
Change  
IPEC Maintenance Rule Basis Document - Chemical and Volume Control System, Revision 0  
PQR 913, 134 F42 MN-GTAW ASME IX Welding Procedure Qualification Record, Revision 0  
System Health Report, Unit 3, EDG, Q1-2016  
Weld Map Number 447966-20-01, Revision 0  
Weld Map Number 447966-20-01, Revision 0  
WPS 134 F42, MN-GTAW, ASME Section IX Welding Procedure Specification, Revision 0  
WPS 134 F42, MN-GTAW, ASME Section IX Welding Procedure Specification, Revision 0  
 
Section 1R13:  Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Section 1R13:  Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control  
  Procedures  
Procedures  
EN-OP-119, Protected Equipment, Revision 8  
EN-OP-119, Protected Equipment, Revision 8  
 
IP-SMM-OU-104, Attachment 9.1, Shiftly Outage Shutdown Safety Assessments, Revision 15  
IP-SMM-OU-104, Attachment 9.1, Shiftly Ou
IP-SMM-OU-104, Attachment 9.2, Shiftly Outage Shutdown Safety Assessment Guidelines,  
tage Shutdown Safety Assessments, Revision 15  
Revision 15  
IP-SMM-OU-104, Attachment 9.2, Shiftly Ou
   
tage Shutdown Safety Assessment Guidelines, Revision 15  
Condition Reports (CR-IP2)  
  Condition Reports (CR-IP2)  
2016-04141  
2016-04141  
   
   
Condition Reports (CR-IP3)  
Condition Reports (CR-IP3)  
2016-01545  
2016-01545  
   
   
Miscellaneous EOOS Risk Assessment Software Tool  
Miscellaneous  
  Section 1R15:  Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
EOOS Risk Assessment Software Tool  
  Procedures 2-PC-R3-1, Pressurizer Level Transmitters, Revision 10  
   
Section 1R15:  Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments  
Procedures  
2-PC-R3-1, Pressurizer Level Transmitters, Revision 10  
3-ARP-010, Metal Impact Monitoring System, Page 10, Revision 32  
3-ARP-010, Metal Impact Monitoring System, Page 10, Revision 32  
3-SOP-RCS-016, Operation of the Metal Impact Monitoring System, Revision 8 EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, Revision 10   
3-SOP-RCS-016, Operation of the Metal Impact Monitoring System, Revision 8  
EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, Revision 10
Condition Reports (CR-IP2)
2016-2221
2016-2356
2016-2961
2016-3345
2016-3418
2016-3660 
2016-3636
2016-3784
2016-3806
2016-3818
2016-4085
Condition Reports (CR-IP3)
2014-01670
2015-03468
   
   
   
Condition Reports (CR-IP2) 2016-2221 2016-2356 2016-2961 2016-3345 2016-3418 2016-3660 


2016-3636 2016-3784 2016-3806 2016-3818 2016-4085
A-7
 
  Condition Reports (CR-IP3)
   
2014-01670 2015-03468
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders  
 
WO 00327574   
A-7  Maintenance Orders/Work Orders WO 00327574  WO 00425980  WO 52571030  
WO 00425980   
  Miscellaneous  
WO 52571030  
EN-LI-100, Attachment 9.1, Change Channel Check Comparison Criteria/2-PT-M100, 2-PT-D001, Revision 0  
   
  Section 1R18:  Plant Modifications  
Miscellaneous  
  Drawings 10073E87-001, Indian Point Unit 2 Baffle Bolt Replacement - Core Barrel and Baffle Assembly  
EN-LI-100, Attachment 9.1, Change Channel Check Comparison Criteria/2-PT-M100,  
Elevation, Revision 0 10111D06, Indian Point Unit 2 Baffle Bolt Replacement - Replacement Baffle Bolt .625  
2-PT-D001, Revision 0  
   
Section 1R18:  Plant Modifications  
   
Drawings  
10073E87-001, Indian Point Unit 2 Baffle Bolt Replacement - Core Barrel and Baffle Assembly  
Elevation, Revision 0  
10111D06, Indian Point Unit 2 Baffle Bolt Replacement - Replacement Baffle Bolt .625  
and .750, Revision 0  
and .750, Revision 0  
  Miscellaneous EC 64308, IP2 Reactor Vessel Equivalent Replacement Baffle-to-Former Bolt, Revision 0  
   
Miscellaneous  
EC 64308, IP2 Reactor Vessel Equivalent Replacement Baffle-to-Former Bolt, Revision 0  
Process Applicability Determination Form for EC 64308, dated April 21, 2016  
Process Applicability Determination Form for EC 64308, dated April 21, 2016  
WCAP-18136-P, Replacement Type 316 Cold-Worked Baffle-Former Bolt Qualification for Indian Point Unit 2, Revision 0  
WCAP-18136-P, Replacement Type 316 Cold-Worked Baffle-Former Bolt Qualification for  
  Section 1R19:  Post-Maintenance Testing
Indian Point Unit 2, Revision 0  
  Procedures 3-PT-M079B, 32 EDG Functional Test, Revision 52 2-PC-Q109-4, Recalibration of NIS and OT/OP Delta-T Parameters - Channel IV, Revision 44  
   
Section 1R19:  Post-Maintenance Testing  
Procedures  
3-PT-M079B, 32 EDG Functional Test, Revision 52  
2-PC-Q109-4, Recalibration of NIS and OT/OP Delta-T Parameters - Channel IV, Revision 44  
   
   
Condition Reports (CR-IP2)  
Condition Reports (CR-IP2)  
2016-03961 2016-04266  
2016-03961  
 
2016-04266  
Condition Reports (CR-IP3)  
2016-01189 2016-01199 2016-01218  
Condition Reports (CR-IP3)  
2016-01189  
2016-01199  
2016-01218  
   
   
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders WO 00414886  WO 00420649  WO 00446094  WO 00447966  
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders  
WO 52545181  WO 52626563  WO 52626564  WO 52630619 WO 52630620  WO 52658943  WO 00236158  WO 00277374  
WO 00414886   
WO 00420649   
WO 00446094   
WO 00447966  
WO 52545181   
WO 52626563   
WO 52626564   
WO 52630619  
WO 52630620   
WO 52658943   
WO 00236158   
WO 00277374  
WO 52571030  
WO 52571030  
Drawings
5651D72, Logic Diagrams Steam Generator Trip Signals, Revision 7
Miscellaneous
EC 64545, Emergency Temporary Modification to Disconnect 32 EDG Generator Space Heater
Adjacent to End Plate on Outboard End of Generator
FIX00091, Pressurizer Level Uncertainty - Indication, Trip Setpoints, and Annunciation 
Setpoints, Revision 1
E-mail from J. Michetti to G. Newman, dated July 19, 2016, Subject:  Westinghouse Report
on E9


A-8
   
   
Drawings 5651D72, Logic Diagrams Steam Generator Trip Signals, Revision 7
   
Miscellaneous EC 64545, Emergency Temporary Modification to Disconnect 32 EDG Generator Space Heater Adjacent to End Plate on Outboard End of Generator FIX00091, Pressurizer Level Uncertainty - Indication, Trip Setpoints, and Annunciation 
Section 1R20:  Refueling and Other Outage Activities  
Setpoints, Revision 1 E-mail from J. Michetti to G. Newman, dated July 19, 2016, Subject: Westinghouse Report
   
on E9   
Procedures  
A-8  Section 1R20:  Refueling and Other Outage Activities  
2-POP-1.1, Plant Heatup from Cold Shutdown, Revision 90  
  Procedures 2-POP-1.1, Plant Heatup from Cold Shutdown, Revision 90  
2-POP-1.2, Reactor Startup, Revision 59  
2-POP-1.2, Reactor Startup, Revision 59  
2-POP-1.3, Plant Startup from Zero to 45 Percent Power, Revision 89  
2-POP-1.3, Plant Startup from Zero to 45 Percent Power, Revision 89  
2-POP-3.1, Plant Shutdown from 45 Percent Power, Revision 58  
2-POP-3.1, Plant Shutdown from 45 Percent Power, Revision 58  
2-POP-3.3, Plant Cooldown, Hot to Cold Shutdown, Revision 81  
2-POP-3.3, Plant Cooldown, Hot to Cold Shutdown, Revision 81  
2-POP-3.4, Secondary Plant Shutdown, Revision 10 2-POP-4.1, Operation at Cold Shutdown, Revision 5 2-POP-4.2, Operation Below 20 Percent Pressurizer Level with Fuel in the Reactor, Revision 8  
2-POP-3.4, Secondary Plant Shutdown, Revision 10  
2-POP-4.1, Operation at Cold Shutdown, Revision 5  
2-POP-4.2, Operation Below 20 Percent Pressurizer Level with Fuel in the Reactor, Revision 8  
2-POP-4.3, Operation without Fuel in the Reactor, Revision 1  
2-POP-4.3, Operation without Fuel in the Reactor, Revision 1  
   
   
Condition Reports (CR-IP2-)  
Condition Reports (CR-IP2-)  
2016-04118 2016-04119 2016-04123 2016-03124 2016-04126 2016-04129  
2016-04118  
2016-04130 2016-04131 2016-04132 2016-04139 2016-04141* 2016-04142*  
2016-04119  
2016-04144 2016-04145 2016-04146 2016-04148* 2016-04151 2016-04152  
2016-04123  
 
2016-03124  
2016-04155 2016-04161 2016-04162 2016-04165 2016-04169  
2016-04126  
 
2016-04129  
*NRC identified  
2016-04130  
2016-04131  
2016-04132  
2016-04139  
2016-04141* 2016-04142*  
2016-04144  
2016-04145  
2016-04146  
2016-04148* 2016-04151  
2016-04152  
2016-04155  
2016-04161  
2016-04162  
2016-04165  
2016-04169  
*NRC identified  
   
   
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders  
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders  
52681465  
52681465  
   
   
Miscellaneous 2R22 Performance Indicator Curves Daily from March 7 to June 14, 2016  
Miscellaneous  
2R22 Performance Indicator Curves Daily from March 7 to June 14, 2016  
Outage Schedules and Plans of the Day from March 7 to June 14, 2016  
Outage Schedules and Plans of the Day from March 7 to June 14, 2016  
Westinghouse LTR-PL-16-16, Operability Assessment for Primary Side Loose Parts at Indian  
Westinghouse LTR-PL-16-16, Operability Assessment for Primary Side Loose Parts at Indian  
Point Unit 2, Revision 0, dated March 27, 2016  
Point Unit 2, Revision 0, dated March 27, 2016  
   
   
Section 1R22:  Surveillance Testing
Section 1R22:  Surveillance Testing  
  Procedures 0-SOP-LEAKRATE-001, RCS Leakrate Surveillance Evaluation and Leak Identification, Revision 6 2-PT-D001, Control Room Operations Surveillance Requirements, Revision 16 2-PT-M029B, 22 Safety Injection Pump, Revision 20 2-PT-Q013, Inservice Valve Tests, Revision 51  
Procedures  
0-SOP-LEAKRATE-001, RCS Leakrate Surveillance Evaluation and Leak Identification,  
Revision 6  
2-PT-D001, Control Room Operations Surveillance Requirements, Revision 16  
2-PT-M029B, 22 Safety Injection Pump, Revision 20  
2-PT-Q013, Inservice Valve Tests, Revision 51  
2-PT-Q013-DS040, Valve 887B Inservice Test Data Sheet, Revision 22  
2-PT-Q013-DS040, Valve 887B Inservice Test Data Sheet, Revision 22  
3-PT-M079B, 32 EDG Functional Test, Revision 52  
3-PT-M079B, 32 EDG Functional Test, Revision 52  
 
Condition Reports (CR-IP2)  
Condition Reports (CR-IP2)  
2016-03360 2016-03363  
2016-03360  
2016-03363  
   
   
Condition Reports (CR-IP3)  
Condition Reports (CR-IP3)  
2016-01716 2016-01752  
2016-01716  
 
2016-01752  
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders WO 00443040  WO 00446385  WO 00446867  WO 52681652-01  
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders  
WO 00443040   
WO 00446385   
WO 00446867   
WO 52681652-01  
WO 52681646-01  
WO 52681646-01  


A-9
   
   
 
A-9  Miscellaneous EC 64855, EC Reply to Provide Input Regarding MPR Maintenance Bulletin MB-2007-01 for Auto Voltage Regulator Solder Joints MB-2007-01, Potential for Solder Joint Cracks on Basler SBSR Auto Voltage Regulator Cards and Technical Manual Addendum TM-2007-01, November 5, 2007 Unit 3 RCS Routine Activity Sample, 28-June-16-10006  
Miscellaneous  
  Section 1EP6:  Drill Evaluation  
EC 64855, EC Reply to Provide Input Regarding MPR Maintenance Bulletin MB-2007-01 for  
  Procedures IP-EP-120, Emergency Classification, Revision 10 IP-EP-410, Protective Action Recommendations, Revision 11  
Auto Voltage Regulator Solder Joints  
 
MB-2007-01, Potential for Solder Joint Cracks on Basler SBSR Auto Voltage Regulator Cards  
Section 2RS7:  Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program  
and Technical Manual Addendum TM-2007-01, November 5, 2007  
  Procedures  
Unit 3 RCS Routine Activity Sample, 28-June-16-10006  
   
Section 1EP6:  Drill Evaluation  
   
Procedures  
IP-EP-120, Emergency Classification, Revision 10  
IP-EP-410, Protective Action Recommendations, Revision 11  
Section 2RS7:  Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program  
   
Procedures  
0-CY-1920, REMP Land Use Census, Revision 1  
0-CY-1920, REMP Land Use Census, Revision 1  
0-CY-1980, Preparation, Placement and Collection of Site Environmental Thermoluminescent  
0-CY-1980, Preparation, Placement and Collection of Site Environmental Thermoluminescent  
Dosimeters, Revision 2  
Dosimeters, Revision 2  
  Condition Reports (CR-IP2)  
   
2014-05319 2015-00948 2015-01300 2015-02687 2015-02800 2015-02987  
Condition Reports (CR-IP2)  
 
2014-05319  
2015-03271 2015-03396 2016-02313  
2015-00948  
 
2015-01300  
2015-02687  
2015-02800  
2015-02987  
2015-03271  
2015-03396  
2016-02313  
   
   
Condition Reports (CR-IP3)  
Condition Reports (CR-IP3)  
2016-00514  
2016-00514  
   
   
Miscellaneous 2014 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report, Indian Point Nos. 1, 2, and 3  
Miscellaneous  
2015 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report, Indian Point Nos. 1, 2, and 3 Environmental Dosimetry Company, Annual Quality Assurance Status Report, January to December 2015 Indian Point Energy Center ODCM, Revision 4  
2014 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report, Indian Point Nos. 1, 2, and 3  
2015 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report, Indian Point Nos. 1, 2, and 3  
Environmental Dosimetry Company, Annual Quality Assurance Status Report,  
January to December 2015  
Indian Point Energy Center ODCM, Revision 4  
June 2015 to May 2016 Meteorological Data Recovery  
June 2015 to May 2016 Meteorological Data Recovery  
Met One Instruments, Inc. Certificates of Calibration for Temperature, Wind Direction, and Wind  
Met One Instruments, Inc. Certificates of Calibration for Temperature, Wind Direction, and Wind  
Speed Teledyne Brown Engineering Environmental Serv
Speed  
ices Annual 2015 Quality Assurance Report  
Teledyne Brown Engineering Environmental Services Annual 2015 Quality Assurance Report  
   
   
Exelon PowerLabs Certificates of Calibration for Gas Meters  
Exelon PowerLabs Certificates of Calibration for Gas Meters  
3471875 3482909 3471871 3471867 3482920 3471873  
3471875  
3482909  
3471871  
3471867  
3482920  
3471873  
3482910
3482916
3471877
3482914
3482918
3482921
3471881
3471879
3471872
3471869
3471880
3482908
Quality Assurance
Quality Assurance Audit Report QA-2-6-2015-IP-1, Chemistry, Effluents, and Environmental
Monitoring Snapshot Self-Assessment, LO-IP3LO-2015-00126, Chemistry-REMP
Section 4OA2:  Problem Identification and Resolution
Procedures
EN-DC-204, Maintenance Rule Scope and Basis, Revision 3
EN-DC-204, Maintenance Rule Scope and Basis, Revision 3
EN-DC-207, Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment, Revision 3


3482910 3482916 3471877 3482914 3482918 3482921
A-10
3471881 3471879 3471872 3471869 3471880 3482908
   
   
Quality Assurance
Quality Assurance Audit Report QA-2-6-2015-IP-1, Chemistry, Effluents, and Environmental Monitoring Snapshot Self-Assessment, LO-IP3LO-2015-00126, Chemistry-REMP
   
   
Section 4OA2:  Problem Identification and Resolution
EN-LI-102, Corrective Action Program, Revision 26  
  Procedures EN-DC-204, Maintenance Rule Scope and Basis, Revision 3
EN-LI-104, Self-Assessment and Benchmark Process, Revision 11  
EN-DC-204, Maintenance Rule Scope and Basis, Revision 3 EN-DC-207, Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment, Revision 3 
A-10  EN-LI-102, Corrective Action Program, Revision 26 EN-LI-104, Self-Assessment and Benchmark Process, Revision 11  
EN-LI-110-01, Equipment Failure Evaluation, Revision 0  
EN-LI-110-01, Equipment Failure Evaluation, Revision 0  
EN-LI-119, Apparent Cause Evaluation Process, Revision 11 EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, Revision 10  
EN-LI-119, Apparent Cause Evaluation Process, Revision 11  
 
EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, Revision 10  
   
   
Condition Reports (CR-IP2)  
Condition Reports (CR-IP2)  
2010-07013 2015-04574 2015-05458 2015-05460 2015-05461 2015-05464  
2010-07013  
 
2015-04574  
2015-05466 2015-05467 2016-01374 2016-02348  
2015-05458  
  Condition Reports (CR-IP3) 2015-3628 2016-01035 2016-01961  
2015-05460  
 
2015-05461  
2015-05464  
2015-05466  
2015-05467  
2016-01374  
2016-02348  
   
Condition Reports (CR-IP3)  
2015-3628  
2016-01035  
2016-01961  
   
   
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders  
Maintenance Orders/Work Orders  
WO 00442412  
WO 00442412  
   
   
Apparent Cause Evaluations  
Apparent Cause Evaluations  
IP2-2015-05458  
IP2-2015-05458  
 
Drawings 504405, Sheet 1 of 2, Replacement Baffle Bolt Location Matrix, Revision 0  
Drawings  
504405, Sheet 1 of 2, Replacement Baffle Bolt Location Matrix, Revision 0  
504405, Sheet 2 of 2, Replacement Baffle Bolt Location Matrix, Revision 0  
504405, Sheet 2 of 2, Replacement Baffle Bolt Location Matrix, Revision 0  
Miscellaneous
61265, Temporary Modification Control Form-Install Additional Temporary Spare Power Supply
Inside Rod Control Cabinet 2BD to Restore Margin, Revision 0
Appendix A to Facility Operating License DPR-64, Technical Specifications and Basis For The
Indian Point 3 Nuclear Generating Station Unit No.3, Through Amendment 260
CN-RIDA-15-43, Indian Point Units 2 and 3 Acceptable Baffle-Former Bolting LOCA and
Seismic Analysis, Revision 2
Engineering Change 63938,  As-left condition of the baffle-former plate assembly following the
replacement of degraded bolts, Revision 0
EPRI TR-112209, Analysis of Baffle Former Bolt Cracking in EDF CPO Plants (PWRMRP-03),
dated June 1999
Indian Point Entergy Center (IPEC) Unit 3, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, dated May
2013
IP-RPT-16-00025, Evaluation of Indian Point Unit 3 Reactor Core Baffle Bolting Following MRP-
227-A Inspection Findings at Indian Point Unit 2 during 2R22, Revision 0
LO-IP3LO-2015-72
LTR-PL-16-21, Transmittal of Indian Point Unit 3 Final Engineering Evaluations Supporting
Extent of Condition Review, Revision 0
LTR-RIDA-16-103, Indian Point Unit 2 Baffle Bolting Anti-Clustering Pattern and Margin
Assessment, Revision 0
LTR-RIDA-16-152, Indian Point Unit 3 Baffle Bolt Leak Before Break Operability Assessment,
Revision 0
LTR-RIDA-16-60, Indian Point Unit 2 Baffle Bolting One Cycle Replacement Pattern Summary
Letter, Revision 0
MRP-227-A, Materials Reliability Program: Pressurized Water Reactor Internals Inspection and
Evaluation Guidelines (ML120170453)
Operation Decision Making Issue Action Plan for IP3 Baffle Bolt Monitoring, dated May 19, 2016
WCAP-15029-NP-A, Westinghouse Methodology for Evaluating the Acceptability of Baffle-
Former-Barrel Bolting Distributions Under Faulted Load Conditions, Revision 0
(ML15222A882)


A-11
   
   
Miscellaneous 61265, Temporary Modification Control Form-Install Additional Temporary Spare Power Supply Inside Rod Control Cabinet 2BD to Restore Margin, Revision 0 Appendix A to Facility Operating License DPR-64, Technical Specifications and Basis For The Indian Point 3 Nuclear Generating Station Unit No.3, Through Amendment 260 CN-RIDA-15-43, Indian Point Units 2 and 3 Acceptable Baffle-Former Bolting LOCA and
   
Seismic Analysis, Revision 2 Engineering Change 63938,  As-left condition of the baffle-former plate assembly following the replacement of degraded bolts, Revision 0 EPRI TR-112209, Analysis of Baffle Former Bolt Cracking in EDF CPO Plants (PWRMRP-03), dated June 1999 Indian Point Entergy Center (IPEC) Unit 3, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, dated May
WCAP-17949-P, Background and Technical Basis Supporting Engineering Flaw Acceptance  
2013 IP-RPT-16-00025, Evaluation of Indian Point Unit 3 Reactor Core Baffle Bolting Following MRP-227-A Inspection Findings at Indian Point Unit 2 during 2R22, Revision 0 LO-IP3LO-2015-72
Criteria for Indian Point Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Internals MRP-227-A Primary and  
LTR-PL-16-21, Transmittal of Indian Point Unit 3 Final Engineering Evaluations Supporting Extent of Condition Review, Revision 0 LTR-RIDA-16-103, Indian Point Unit 2 Baffle Bolting Anti-Clustering Pattern and Margin Assessment, Revision 0 LTR-RIDA-16-152, Indian Point Unit 3 Baffle Bolt Leak Before Break Operability Assessment, Revision 0 LTR-RIDA-16-60, Indian Point Unit 2 Baffle Bolting One Cycle Replacement Pattern Summary Letter, Revision 0 MRP-227-A, Materials Reliability Program: Pressurized Water Reactor Internals Inspection and Evaluation Guidelines (ML120170453) Operation Decision Making Issue Action Plan for IP3 Baffle Bolt Monitoring, dated May 19, 2016
Expansion Components, Revision 1  
WCAP-15029-NP-A, Westinghouse Methodology for Evaluating the Acceptability of Baffle-Former-Barrel Bolting Distributions Under Faulted Load Conditions, Revision 0 (ML15222A882)  
WCAP-18048-P, Determination of Acceptable Baffle-Former Bolting for Indian Point Units 2 and  
A-11  WCAP-17949-P, Background and Technical Basis Supporting Engineering Flaw Acceptance Criteria for Indian Point Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Internals MRP-227-A Primary and  
Expansion Components, Revision 1 WCAP-18048-P, Determination of Acceptable Baffle-Former Bolting for Indian Point Units 2 and  
3, Revision 0  
3, Revision 0  
  Section 4OA5:  Other Activities  
   
Section 4OA5:  Other Activities  
   
   
Miscellaneous  
Miscellaneous  
INPO Letter, INPO Equipment Reliabilit
INPO Letter, INPO Equipment Reliability Scram Review Visit, May 31, 2016   
y Scram Review Visit, May 31, 2016  Root Cause Evaluation for CR-IP2-2016-00564
Root Cause Evaluation for CR-IP2-2016-00564  
A-12   LIST OF ACRONYMS
 
  10 CFR Title 10 of the  
A-12  
Code of Federal Regulations ADAMS Agencywide Document Access and Management System ALARA as low as is reasonably achievable  
AVR automatic voltage regulator  
CAP corrective action program  
LIST OF ACRONYMS  
CCW component cooling water  
CR condition report
10 CFR  
CVCS chemical and volume control system EC engineering change  
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations  
ECCS emergency core cooling system  
ADAMS  
EDG emergency diesel generator  
Agencywide Document Access and Management System  
GPI groundwater protection initiative IASCC irradiation-assisted stress-corrosion cracking IMC Inspection Manual Chapter  
ALARA  
INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operations  
as low as is reasonably achievable  
LER licensee event report  
AVR  
LOCA loss-of-coolant accident MBFP main boiler feedwater pump MCC motor control center  
automatic voltage regulator  
MOV motor operated valve  
CAP  
MRP materials reliability program  
corrective action program  
MW monitoring well  
CCW  
NCV non-cited violation NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S. ODCM offsite dose calculation manual  
component cooling water  
OOS out of service  
CR  
PAB primary auxiliary building  
condition report  
PFP pre-fire plan RCS reactor coolant system REMP radiological environmental monitoring program  
CVCS  
RFO refueling outage  
chemical and volume control system  
RW recovery well  
EC  
SI safety injection  
engineering change  
SSC structure, system, and component TS technical specification UFSAR updated final safety evaluation report  
ECCS  
URI unresolved item  
emergency core cooling system  
UT ultrasonic testing  
EDG  
WO work order
emergency diesel generator  
GPI  
groundwater protection initiative  
IASCC  
irradiation-assisted stress-corrosion cracking  
IMC  
Inspection Manual Chapter  
INPO  
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations  
LER  
licensee event report  
LOCA  
loss-of-coolant accident  
MBFP  
main boiler feedwater pump  
MCC  
motor control center  
MOV  
motor operated valve  
MRP  
materials reliability program  
MW  
monitoring well  
NCV  
non-cited violation  
NRC  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S.  
ODCM  
offsite dose calculation manual  
OOS  
out of service  
PAB  
primary auxiliary building  
PFP  
pre-fire plan  
RCS  
reactor coolant system  
REMP  
radiological environmental monitoring program  
RFO  
refueling outage  
RW  
recovery well  
SI  
safety injection  
SSC  
structure, system, and component  
TS  
technical specification  
UFSAR  
updated final safety evaluation report  
URI  
unresolved item  
UT  
ultrasonic testing  
WO  
work order
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 20:40, 9 January 2025

Integrated Inspection Report 05000247/2016002 and 05000286/2016002, April 1, 2016, Through June 30, 2016
ML16243A245
Person / Time
Site: Indian Point  Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 08/30/2016
From: Glenn Dentel
Reactor Projects Branch 2
To: Vitale A
Entergy Nuclear Operations
References
IR 2016002
Download: ML16243A245 (54)


See also: IR 05000247/2016002

Text

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

2100 RENAISSANCE BLVD.

KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-2713

August 30, 2016

Mr. Anthony J. Vitale

Site Vice President

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

Indian Point Energy Center

450 Broadway, GSB

P.O. Box 249

Buchanan, NY 10511-0249

SUBJECT:

INDIAN POINT NUCLEAR GENERATING - INTEGRATED INSPECTION

REPORT 05000247/2016002 AND 05000286/2016002

Dear Mr. Vitale:

On June 30, 2016, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at

your Indian Point Nuclear Generating (Indian Point), Units 2 and 3. The enclosed inspection

report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on August 4, 2016, with Larry

Coyle and other members of your staff. Based on additional information provided, the

inspectors conducted an updated exit meeting on August 30, 2016 with John Kirkpatrick, Plant

Operations General Manager and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and

compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed

personnel.

This report documents three NRC-identified findings of very low safety significance (Green).

These findings involved violations of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low

safety significance, and because they are entered into your corrective action program, the NRC

is treating these findings as non-cited violations, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC

Enforcement Policy. If you contest any non-cited violation in this report, you should provide a

response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to

the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC

20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region I; the Director, Office of

Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the

NRC Senior Resident Inspector at Indian Point. In addition, if you disagree with the

cross-cutting aspect assigned to any finding in this report, you should provide a response within

30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the

Regional Administrator, Region I, and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector at Indian Point.

A. Vitale

-2-

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390 of the NRCs

Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be

available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the

Publicly Available Records component of the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and

Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC website at

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Glenn T. Dentel, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 2

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.

50-247 and 50-286

License Nos. DPR-26 and DPR-64

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000247/2016002 and 05000286/2016002

w/Attachment: Supplementary Information

cc w/encl: Distribution via ListServ

ML16243A245

SUNSI Review

Non-Sensitive

Sensitive

Publicly Available

Non-Publicly Available

OFFICE

RI/DRP

RI/DRP

RI/DRS

RI/DRP

RI/DRP

NAME

BHaagensen/bh

NFloyd/nf

MGray/mg

GDentel/gtd

MScott/dlp for

DATE

8/29/16

8/24/16

8/30/16

8/30/16

8/30/16

1

Enclosure

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Docket Nos.

50-247 and 50-286

License Nos.

DPR-26 and DPR-64

Report Nos.

05000247/2016002 and 05000286/2016002

Licensee:

Entergy Nuclear Northeast (Entergy)

Facility:

Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3

Location:

450 Broadway, GSB

Buchanan, NY 10511-0249

Dates:

April 1, 2016, through June 30, 2016

Inspectors:

B. Haagensen, Senior Resident Inspector

G. Newman, Resident Inspector

S. Rich, Resident Inspector

S. Galbreath, Reactor Inspector

J. Furia, Senior Health Physicist

N. Floyd, Senior Project Engineer

K. Mangan, Senior Reactor Inspector

J. Poehler, Senior Materials Engineer

Approved By:

Glenn T. Dentel, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 2

Division of Reactor Projects

2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................... 3

REPORT DETAILS ....................................................................................................................... 5

1.

REACTOR SAFETY .............................................................................................................. 5

1R04

Equipment Alignment .................................................................................................. 5

1R05

Fire Protection ............................................................................................................. 6

1R07

Heat Sink Performance ............................................................................................... 7

1R08

Inservice Inspection Activities ..................................................................................... 7

1R11

Licensed Operator Requalification Program ............................................................... 8

1R12

Maintenance Effectiveness ....................................................................................... 10

1R13

Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control .................................. 13

1R15

Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments ..................................... 14

1R18

Plant Modifications .................................................................................................... 19

1R19

Post-Maintenance Testing ........................................................................................ 20

1R20

Refueling and Other Outage Activities ...................................................................... 21

1R22

Surveillance Testing .................................................................................................. 24

1EP6

Drill Evaluation .......................................................................................................... 25

2.

RADIATION SAFETY .......................................................................................................... 25

2RS1

Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls ........................................ 25

2RS2

Occupational As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning

and Controls .............................................................................................................. 26

2RS7

Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) ........................................ 26

4.

OTHER ACTIVITIES ............................................................................................................ 27

4OA1

Performance Indicator Verification ............................................................................ 27

4OA2

Problem Identification and Resolution ....................................................................... 28

4OA3

Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion .................................... 34

4OA5

Other Activities .......................................................................................................... 37

4OA6

Meetings, Including Exit ............................................................................................ 39

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION ........................................................................................ A-1

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT .................................................................................................... A-1

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED ..................................... A-2

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED ........................................................................................ A-3

LIST OF ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................. A-12

3

SUMMARY

Inspection Report 05000247/2016002 and 05000286/2016002; 04/01/2016 - 06/30/2016; Indian

Point Nuclear Generating (Indian Point), Units 2 and 3; Operability Determinations and

Functionality Assessments, Refueling and Other Outage Activities, and Follow Up of Events and

Notices of Enforcement Discretion.

This report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced

inspections performed by regional inspectors. The inspectors identified three findings of very

low safety significance (Green), which were non-cited violations (NCVs). The significance of

most findings is indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow, Red)

and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination

Process, dated April 29, 2015. Cross-cutting aspects are determined using IMC 0310,

Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas, dated December 4, 2014. All violations of

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements are dispositioned in accordance with

the NRCs Enforcement Policy, dated February 4, 2015. The NRCs program for overseeing the

safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor

Oversight Process, Revision 6.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V,

"Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," because Entergy did not adequately accomplish

the actions prescribed by procedure EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, for a

degraded condition associated with the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts. Specifically, Entergy

incorrectly concluded that no degraded or non-conforming condition existed related to the

Unit 3 baffle-former bolts and exited the operability determination procedure. Entergy

subsequently performed the remaining steps in the procedure and provided appropriate

justification for their plans to examine the baffle-former bolts at the next Unit 3 refueling

outage (RFO). Entergys immediate corrective actions included entering the issue into its

corrective action program (CAP) as CR-IP3-2016-01961 and documenting an operability

evaluation to support the basis for operability of the baffle-former bolts and the emergency

core cooling system (ECCS).

This performance deficiency is more than minor because it was associated with the

equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the

cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that

respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). In

accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 2 of

IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power,

issued June 19, 2012, the inspectors screened the finding for safety significance and

determined it to be of very low safety significance (Green), because the finding did not

represent an actual loss of system or function. After inspector questioning, Entergy

performed an operability evaluation, which provided sufficient bases to conclude the Unit 3

baffle assembly would support ECCS operability. This finding is related to the cross-cutting

aspect of Problem Identification and Resolution, Operating Experience, because Entergy did

not effectively evaluate relevant internal and external operating experience. Specifically,

Entergy did not adequately evaluate the impact of degraded baffle bolts at Unit 3 when

relevant operating experience was identified at Unit 2. [P.5 - Operating Experience]

(Section 1R15)

4

Green. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1,

Procedures, for Entergys failure to implement procedure OAP-007, Containment Entry

and Egress. Specifically, workers transiting the inner and outer crane wall sections of

containment failed to maintain at least one (of two) flow channeling gate closed to ensure

availability of the containment sumps to provide suction for the ECCS. Entergy immediately

coached the gate monitor and restored the gates to an acceptable position. Entergy

generated CR-IP2-2016-04036 to address this issue.

This performance deficiency is more than minor because it was associated with the

configuration control (shutdown equipment lineup) attribute of the Mitigating Systems

cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and

capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences

(i.e., core damage). A detailed risk assessment was conducted and determined that the

change in core damage frequency was determined to be 7E-9, therefore, this issue

represents a Green finding. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human

Performance, Avoid Complacency, because Entergy did not consider potential undesired

consequences of actions before performing work and implement appropriate error-reduction

tools. Specifically, the work crew did not understand the requirements and potential

consequences prior to commencing work and the gate monitor did not enforce these

requirements to maintain at least one gate locked or pinned closed as required by OAP-007.

[H.12 - Avoid Complacency] (Section 1R20)

Cornerstone: Barrier Integrity

Green. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(b)(1) for Entergys failure to

include a function of a safety-related system within the scope of the maintenance rule

program. Specifically, Entergy failed to include the feedwater isolation function performed

by the main boiler feedwater pumps (MBFPs) discharge valves, MBFPs, and feedwater

regulating valves, which are required to remain functional during and following a design

basis event to mitigate the consequence of the accident within the scope of the maintenance

rule monitoring program. Entergy initiated corrective actions to include the feedwater

isolation function performed by the MBFP discharge valves, MBFPs, and feedwater

regulating valves within the maintenance rule monitoring program. Entergy entered this

issue into the CAP as CR-IP2-2016-03963.

This performance deficiency is more than minor because it was associated with barrier

performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the

cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect

the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the failure

to properly scope the feedwater isolation function prevented Entergy from identifying that

equipment reliability was no longer effectively controlled through preventive maintenance.

In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, issued

June 19, 2012, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance

(Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical

integrity of reactor containment, containment isolation system, and heat removal

components. This finding does not have a cross-cutting aspect since the failure to scope

this equipment into the maintenance rule program was not recognized when Entergy

combined the maintenance rule basis documents for Units 2 and 3 in 2012 and, as a result,

is not indicative of current licensee performance. (Section 4OA3)

5

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 2 began the inspection period during RFO 2R22 which lasted 102 days. Upon completion

of the outage, the operators restarted Unit 2 on June 14, 2016, and increased power slowly to

93 percent for fuel preconditioning. On June 23, 2016, the operators shutdown the reactor to

repair a service water leak on the 21 component cooling water (CCW) heat exchanger (Hx) inlet

line and replace switchyard breaker 9. Unit 2 returned to 100 percent power on June 29, 2016.

Unit 2 remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.

Unit 3 began the inspection period at 100 percent power. On April 26, 2016, a failed controller

caused both heater drain pumps to trip; and the operators reduced power rapidly, stabilizing the

unit at 48 percent power. Operators returned Unit 3 to 100 percent power on April 27, 2016,

and remained at or near 100 percent power for the remainder of the inspection period.

1.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R04 Equipment Alignment

Partial System Walkdowns (71111.04Q - 5 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems:

Unit 2

Spent fuel pool cooling system following core offload on May 19, 2016

Shutdown cooling system following core reload on June 6, 2016

CCW system following maintenance on June 28, 2016

Unit 3

32 emergency diesel generator (EDG) following maintenance on May 9, 2016 (this

sample was part of an in-depth review of the EDG system)

Residual heat removal pumps following CCW system testing on May 20, 2016

The inspectors selected these systems based on their risk-significance relative to the

reactor safety cornerstones at the time they were inspected. The inspectors reviewed

applicable operating procedures, system diagrams, the updated final safety analysis

report (UFSAR), TSs, work orders (WOs), condition reports (CRs), and the impact of

ongoing work activities on redundant trains of equipment in order to identify conditions

that could have impacted system performance of their intended safety functions. The

inspectors also performed field walkdowns of accessible portions of the systems to verify

system components and support equipment were aligned correctly and were operable.

The inspectors examined the material condition of the components and observed

operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no deficiencies. The

6

inspectors also reviewed whether Entergy had properly identified equipment issues and

entered them into the CAP for resolution with the appropriate significance

characterization. Documents reviewed for each section of this inspection report are

listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

Resident Inspector Quarterly Walkdowns (71111.05Q - 6 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted tours of the areas listed below to assess the material

condition and operational status of fire protection features. The inspectors verified that

Entergy controlled combustible materials and ignition sources in accordance with

administrative procedures. The inspectors verified that fire protection and suppression

equipment were available for use as specified in the area pre-fire plan (PFP) and

passive fire barriers were maintained in good material condition. The inspectors also

verified that station personnel implemented compensatory measures for out-of-service

(OOS), degraded, or inoperable fire protection equipment, as applicable, in accordance

with procedures.

Unit 2

Containment, 95-foot elevation, during baffle bolt repair activities with hot work in

progress (PFP-203 was reviewed) on June 2, 2016

Residual heat removal pump rooms in primary auxiliary building (PAB), 15-foot

elevation (PFP-204 was reviewed), on June 6, 2016

CCW pump room, 68-foot elevation (PFP-209 was reviewed), on June 25, 2016

PAB, 80-foot elevation, CCW heat exchanger area with hot work in progress

(PFP-211 was reviewed) on June 25, 2016

Unit 3

32 EDG room, 10-foot elevation (PFP-354 was reviewed), on May 9, 2016

480V switchgear room, 15-foot elevation (PFP-351 was reviewed), on June 30, 2016

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

7

1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07A - 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the 32 EDG jacket water and lube oil heat exchanger to

determine its readiness and availability to perform its safety functions. The inspectors

reviewed the design basis for the component and verified Entergys commitments to

NRC Generic Letter 89-13, Service Water System Requirements Affecting

Safety-Related Equipment. The inspectors observed the annual cleaning and

inspection of the heat exchangers and reviewed the results of previous inspections of

the Unit 3 EDG heat exchangers. The inspectors discussed the results of the most

recent inspection with engineering staff. The inspectors verified that Entergy initiated

appropriate corrective actions for identified deficiencies. The inspectors also verified

that the number of tubes plugged within the heat exchanger did not exceed the

maximum amount allowed.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities (71111.08P - 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

Inspectors from the NRC Region I Office, specializing in materials and inservice

examination activities, observed portions of Entergys activities involving baffle-former

bolt examinations and replacements during Unit 2 RFO 2R22. The inspectors reviewed

work documentation and examination procedures and results, and discussed these

activities with Entergy. The inspectors were on-site from April 27 to April 28, 2016, and

on May 23, 2016. The inspectors verified that Entergy completed baffle-former bolt

examinations in accordance with their approved procedures which implemented

activities described in the Materials Reliability Program (MRP)-227-A, Pressurized

Water Reactor Internals Inspection and Evaluation Guidelines, as they relate to this

component. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the results of the visual and volumetric

examinations of the baffle-former bolts, including capabilities, limitations, and

acceptance criteria that were performed during the current RFO.

Non-Destructive Examination Activities

The inspectors reviewed the ultrasonic testing (UT) procedure used for the examination

of the Unit 2 baffle-former bolts to verify the procedure was in accordance with the

applicable guidance in MRP-227-A and MRP-228. The inspectors reviewed the UT data

records and the detailed UT channel analysis for a sample of baffle-former bolts to verify

the examinations and evaluations were performed in accordance with approved

procedures and applicable guidance. The inspectors reviewed video recordings of the

visual examinations of the baffle-former bolts during the current RFO. The inspectors

also reviewed recorded video of visual examinations performed in 2006 at Unit 2,

completed as part of the existing inservice inspection program for the 10-year reactor

vessel examinations, to independently assess the past conditions of the baffle-former

bolts and assembly.

8

The inspectors reviewed certifications of the UT technicians performing the ultrasonic

examinations to verify the examinations were performed by qualified individuals and to

verify the results were reviewed and evaluated by certified level III non-destructive

examination personnel.

Baffle-Former Bolt Replacement Activities

The inspectors reviewed the baffle-former bolt replacement activities performed as part

of a corrective action to resolve the degraded condition identified at Unit 2. The

inspectors observed a sample of in-process bolt removal activities, which included lock

bar milling and bolt hole machining. The inspectors reviewed the documentation for

in-process and completed bolt installation activities and verified that loose parts

generated as part of the bolt replacements were properly tracked. The inspectors

verified that bolt replacement activities were performed in accordance with approved

procedures. The inspectors also reviewed the Engineering Change (EC) package

associated with the new baffle-former bolt design. This review is documented in

Section 1R18 of this report. After completion of the bolt replacement activities, the

inspectors reviewed the video of the final visual examination of the baffle assembly to

verify that the baffle-former bolt work was accomplished as planned and that there were

no visual indications of deficiencies.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Update to URI 05000247/2016001-01, Baffle-Former Bolts with Identified Anomalies

This inspection was conducted to follow-up on NRC Unresolved Item (URI)05000247/2016001-01, Baffle-Former Bolts with Identified Anomalies, to determine

whether there was a performance deficiency associated with the degraded baffle-former

bolt condition discovered at Unit 2. The inspectors plan to review additional technical

information from Entergy as it becomes available, including any revisions to the root

cause evaluation. The URI remains open until review of this additional information is

completed. (URI 05000247/2016001-01, Baffle-Former Bolts with Identified

Anomalies)

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11Q - 5 samples)

Unit 2

.1

Quarterly Review of Unit 2 Licensed Operator Requalification Testing and Training

(71111.11Q - 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed Unit 2 licensed operator simulator training on May 24, 2016,

which included reactor coolant pump seal failure with loss of normal heat sink requiring

implementation of feed and bleed cooling. The inspectors evaluated operator

performance during the simulated event and verified completion of risk significant

operator actions, including the use of abnormal and emergency operating procedures.

The inspectors assessed the clarity and effectiveness of communications,

9

implementation of actions in response to alarms and degrading plant conditions, and the

oversight and direction provided by the control room supervisor. The inspectors verified

the accuracy and timeliness of the emergency classification made by the shift manager

and the TS action statements entered by the shift technical advisor. Additionally, the

inspectors assessed the ability of the crew and training staff to identify and document

crew performance problems.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2

Quarterly Review of Unit 3 Licensed Operator Requalification Testing and Training

(71111.11Q - 1 sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed a Unit 3 licensed operator simulator requalification training

evaluated scenario on May 24, 2016, which included failure of a pressurizer pressure

instrument, charging pump trip, loss of 480V safety bus 5A, a small break loss-of-coolant

accident (LOCA), and entry into FR-C.2 core cooling. The inspectors evaluated operator

performance during the simulated event and verified completion of risk significant

operator actions, including the use of abnormal and emergency operating procedures.

The inspectors assessed the clarity and effectiveness of communications,

implementation of actions in response to alarms and degrading plant conditions, and the

oversight and direction provided by the control room supervisor. The inspectors verified

the accuracy and timeliness of the emergency classification made by the shift manager

and the TS action statements entered by the shift technical advisor. Additionally, the

inspectors assessed the ability of the crew and training staff to identify and document

crew performance problems.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3

Quarterly Review of Licensed Operator Performance (71111.11Q - 3 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a focused observation of operator performance in the main

control room. The inspectors observed pre-job briefings and control room

communications to verify they met the criteria specified in Entergys administrative

procedure EN-OP-115, Conduct of Operations. Additionally, the inspectors observed

restoration activities to verify that procedure use, crew communications, and

coordination of activities between work groups similarly met established expectations

and standards.

10

Unit 2

Plant startup from RFO 2R22 on June 16, 2016 including response to a turbine trip

without a reactor trip and the subsequent turbine-generator synchronization and

transfer of plant electrical loads from offsite power to the unit auxiliary transformer.

Reactor startup and grid synchronization conducted on June 27, 2016.

Unit 3

Operator response to the feedwater transient which occurred on April 26, 2016

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12Q - 4 samples)

.1

Routine Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the samples listed below to assess the effectiveness of

maintenance activities on SSCs performance and reliability. The inspectors reviewed

system health reports, CAP documents, maintenance WOs, and maintenance rule basis

documents to ensure that Entergy was identifying and properly evaluating performance

problems within the scope of the maintenance rule. For each SSC sample selected, the

inspectors verified that the SSC was properly scoped into the maintenance rule in

accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 and verified that the (a)(2) performance criteria

established by Entergy was reasonable. As applicable, for SSCs classified as (a)(1), the

inspectors assessed the adequacy of goals and corrective actions to return these SSCs

to (a)(2). Additionally, the inspectors ensured that Entergy was identifying and

addressing common cause failures that occurred within and across maintenance rule

system boundaries.

Unit 2 EDGs

Unit 3 EDGs (this sample was part of an in-depth review of the EDG system)

Units 2 and 3 CVCS

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

URI Opened, CVCS Goal Monitoring Under the Maintenance Rule

Introduction

The inspectors identified issues of potential concern with Entergys application of

10 CFR 50.65(a)(1), Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at

Nuclear Plants, (the maintenance rule) in regards to the reliability of the Unit 2 CVCS

system. These concerns included the establishment of appropriate (a)(1) goals and

11

whether appropriate justification was established that the corrective actions to address

identified maintenance weaknesses were effective prior to removal from (a)(1) status.

Specifically, Entergy may have established restrictive goals without defensible

justification and may not have demonstrated their chosen goal before ending the goal

monitoring interval.

Description

The maintenance rule requires that licensees shall monitor the performance or condition

of structures, systems, or components, against licensee-established goals, in a manner

sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that these structures, systems, and

components are capable of fulfilling their intended functions. These goals shall be

established commensurate with safety and, where practical, take into account

industrywide operating experience. When the performance or condition of a structure,

system, or component does not meet established goals, appropriate corrective action

shall be taken. EN-DC-206, Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Process, provides the

requirements and processes for managing SSCs for which (a)(2) monitoring has not

demonstrated effective maintenance. EN-DC-206 specifies that (a)(1) action plans

should not be closed until effectiveness of all corrective actions has been demonstrated

by meeting performance goals through the monitoring period (or by other means

specified in the action plan).

Since 2013, there have been several repeat functional failures of equipment in the

CVCS resulting in a failure to meet the performance criterion for reliability. These

failures included:

A failure of the 23 charging pump on August 6, 2013, after the internal oil pump

discharge tubing broke causing the pump to trip on low oil pressure and a loss of

charging. The 21 charging pump had tripped for the same reason in 2010.

A failure of the 22 charging pump on January 14, 2014, due to cracked internal

check valves caused by an inadequate fill-and-vent that left air in the pump following

maintenance. The 21 charging pump had failed due to the same cause in 2013.

A failure of the Unit 2 valve FCV-110A, boric acid flow control valve, to fully open on

January 5, 2015. The valve had insufficient insulation; and as a result, boron

crystalized above the valve plug and blocked its movement. The Unit 3 FCV-110A

had failed in the same way in 2011, with earlier failures of other valves for the same

cause going back to 1997.

In each case, the CVCS for Unit 2 was already (a)(1), so Entergy either updated the

existing (a)(1) action plan or created another one to operate in parallel with the existing

one. Upon reviewing the associated (a)(1) action plans, the inspectors noted that in

each example Entergys goals may not have been in accordance with EN-DC-206(a)(1)

Process. It specifies that monitoring intervals should be at least six months for normally

operating SSCs, at least three surveillances for SSCs monitored by surveillance and

long enough to detect recurrence of the applicable failure mechanism. It also states that

performance goals that provide reasonable assurance that the SSC is capable of

performing its intended functions should be monitored throughout the time the SSC is

classified (a)(1). EN-DC-206 defines an SSC as any discreet component grouping that

has caused a monitoring failure, including any applicable extent of condition. In the

examples provided, NRC inspectors challenged whether Entergy either chose a shorter

12

monitoring interval or a goal that did not include the applicable extent of condition.

Specifically:

The (a)(1) action plan for the broken oil tubing had a goal of no noticeable decrease

in 23 charging pumps running oil pressure for the next three quarterly surveillances.

The chosen monitoring interval met the procedural expectation, but Entergy limited

the monitoring to the 23 charging pump without written justification, when the 21

charging pump had failed previously for the same reason and the other pumps were

susceptible to the same failure mechanism. During the monitoring interval, the 21

charging pump experienced low oil pressure. When Entergy performed repairs on

the 21 charging pump for an unrelated issue, they discovered that the oil tubing had

failed in the same way the 23 charging pump oil tubing had failed, although it had not

yet caused a pump trip.

The (a)(1) action plan for the cracked check valves had a goal of no check valve

failure for six months for the next charging pump that underwent maintenance. This

happened to be the 22 charging pump. Entergy chose a six-month monitoring

interval, even though only one of the three charging pumps is in service at any given

time, and the 22 charging pump only ran for four out of the six months it was

monitored. Additionally, the action plan did not justify why a single successful fill-

and-vent demonstrated adequate corrective actions. On November 19, 2014, during

the six month monitoring interval, the 21 charging pump underwent maintenance

requiring a fill-and-vent, and experienced check valve failure two weeks later on

December 4. Entergy documented this as a maintenance rule functional failure, and

discussed the possibility that it could be due to an inadequate fill-and-vent, but did

not change the (a)(1) action plan.

The (a)(1) action plan for FCV-110A specified a monitoring interval of six months to

include the winter because the previous valve failures had all occurred during the

winter months. However, the actual monitoring interval documented in the corrective

action was from April to October 2015, and therefore did not cover the winter months

as intended. In January 2016, Entergy performed maintenance on valve CH-297 on

Unit 3, which is a heat-traced boric acid valve, and did not properly restore the

insulation. The valve function was not impacted because it does not often contain

high concentrations of boric acid.

The (a)(1) action plans described above were all reviewed and approved by the

maintenance rule expert panel.

Further information regarding the performance of these SSCs is required to determine

whether these issues of concern represent performance deficiencies and whether they

are more than minor. (URI 05000247/2016002-01, CVCS Goal Monitoring Under the

Maintenance Rule)

.2

Quality Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the weld repair performed on the 21 CCW heat exchanger

service water inlet nozzle for Unit 2 to verify Entergy was properly applying quality

controls specified in their quality assurance program. The inspectors reviewed CAP

documents, maintenance WOs, ECs, and engineering procedures associated with the

weld repair. The inspectors verified Entergy specified quality control hold points in

13

accordance with their procedures, properly controlled the quality of materials used

during the repair, and adequately justified deviations from the existing design.

Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the welding procedure specification qualification by

the vendor to ensure it was in accordance with American Society of Mechanical

Engineers code.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 - 7 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed station evaluation and management of plant risk for the

maintenance and emergent work activities listed below to verify that Entergy performed

the appropriate risk assessments prior to removing equipment for work. The inspectors

selected these activities based on potential risk significance relative to the reactor safety

cornerstones. As applicable for each activity, the inspectors verified that Entergy

performed risk assessments as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) and that the

assessments were accurate and complete. When Entergy performed emergent work,

the inspectors verified that operations personnel promptly assessed and managed plant

risk. The inspectors reviewed the scope of maintenance work and discussed the results

of the assessment with the stations probabilistic risk analyst to verify plant conditions

were consistent with the risk assessment. The inspectors also reviewed the TS

requirements and inspected portions of redundant safety systems, when applicable, to

verify risk analysis assumptions were valid and applicable requirements were met.

Unit 2

Temporary loss of spent fuel pool cooling due to 345-kilovolt disturbance on

April 3, 2016

Equipment hatch closure plug seal demonstration for outage risk on April 5, 2016

Reduced inventory operations during vessel reassembly on June 7, 2016

21 CCW heat exchanger OOS during mode 4 on June 25, 2016

Unit 3

32 EDG OOS while Bus Tie BT 4-5 was OOS on May 4, 2016 (this sample was part

of an in-depth review of the EDG system)

33 EDG OOS while Bus Tie BT 4-5 was OOS on June 2, 2016

31 EDG OOS while Bus Tie BT 4-5 was OOS on June 21, 2016

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

14

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (71111.15 - 7 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed operability determinations for the following degraded or

non-conforming conditions:

Unit 2

23 EDG failure to run on March 7, 2016, and subsequent failure to pass the

surveillance test on March 10, 2016, as identified in CR-IP2-2016-01260

Operability determination for N33 gamma metrics wide range nuclear instrument

channel in CR-IP2-2016-03660 on June 13, 2016

Pressurizer level transmitter LT-461 reads high in CR-IP-2016-3806 on June 14,

2016

Through-wall leak in line 411, service water inlet to the 21 CCW heat exchanger, on

June 15, 2016

Unit 3

Immediate operability determination of the degraded condition of the baffle-former

bolts identified from Unit 2 operating experience in CR-IP3-2016-01035 on April 1,

2016

Anomalies noted during digital metal impact monitoring system self-test in

CR-IP3-2015-03468 on April 1, 2016

Prompt operability determination of the degraded condition of the baffle-former bolts

identified from Unit 2 operating experience in CR-IP2-2016-03660 on June 30, 2016

The inspectors selected these issues based on the risk significance of the associated

components and systems. The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the

operability determinations to assess whether TS operability was properly justified and

the subject component or system remained available such that no unrecognized

increase in risk occurred. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in

the appropriate sections of the TSs and UFSAR to Entergys evaluations to determine

whether the components or systems were operable.

The inspectors confirmed, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations

associated with the evaluations. Where compensatory measures were required to

maintain operability, the inspectors determined whether the measures in place would

function as intended and were properly controlled by Entergy. The inspectors

determined, where appropriate, compliance with bounding limitations associated with the

evaluations.

b. Findings

Introduction. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,

Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," because Entergy did not

adequately accomplish the actions prescribed by procedure EN-OP-104 for a degraded

condition associated with the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts. Specifically, Entergy incorrectly

concluded that no degraded or non-conforming condition existed related to the Unit 3

15

baffle-former bolts and exited the operability determination procedure. Entergy

subsequently performed the remaining steps in the procedure and provided appropriate

justification for their plans to examine the baffle-former bolts at the next Unit 3 RFO.

Description. On March 29, 2016, Entergy identified baffle-former (baffle) bolt

degradation at Indian Point Unit 2 that was determined to be unanalyzed because it did

not meet the minimum acceptable bolt pattern analysis developed to support plant

startup. Entergy staff identified a total of 227 baffle bolts out of a population of 832 that

were potentially degraded (182 bolts had UT indications; 31 had visual indications of

failure; and 14 were inaccessible for testing and conservatively assumed to be

degraded). Entergy staff entered this problem into the CAP as CR-IP2-2016-02081,

performed a root cause evaluation, and replaced the degraded bolts on Unit 2. Due to

the number of baffle bolt indications discovered on Unit 2, Entergy staff initiated CR-IP3-

2016-01035 on April 21, 2016, and performed an immediate operability determination

(IOD) in accordance with Entergy procedure EN-OP-104 Section 5.3, to evaluate the

baffle bolts and baffle-former assembly structure on Unit 3. Entergy staff planned further

corrective actions to move up the planned Unit 3 baffle bolt ultrasonic examinations to

the next RFO in spring 2017.

The inspectors reviewed the design basis and current licensing basis documents for

Indian Point Unit 3 to identify the specific safety functions of the baffle bolts. The baffle

bolts are part of the baffle former assembly structure located in the reactor pressure

vessel. The bolts secure a series of vertical metal plates called baffle plates, which help

direct water up through the nuclear fuel assemblies to ensure proper cooling of the fuel.

A sufficient number of baffle bolts are required to secure the plates to ensure proper

core flow during normal and postulated accident conditions, and also to ensure that

control rods can be inserted to shut down the reactor.

The inspectors reviewed Entergys IOD issued on April 21, 2016, and concluded the

immediate determination was completed in accordance with Section 5.3 of procedure

EN-OP-104. The IOD provided sufficient technical detail to support the initial conclusion,

based on limited information, that the Unit 3 baffle bolts would retain sufficient capability

to perform their intended functions. Specifically, the IOD stated that Unit 2 baffle bolt

failures were likely due to irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC) and that

the Unit 3 baffle bolts were also susceptible because they both utilize a baffle bolt design

with similar geometry and material to other plants with bolt failures. The IOD concluded

that Unit 3 baffle bolt degradation would likely not be as significant as Unit 2, and that

the Unit 3 baffle former assembly was currently operable pending further evaluation

because of the following differences with Unit 2: (1) less effective full power years of

operation; (2) less neutron fluence levels (i.e., irradiation); (3) less pressure differential

across the baffle plates; and (4) less fatigue-induced loading cycles on the bolts over the

operating life of the plant. The inspectors concluded that there was no immediate safety

concern.

On May 5, 2016, Entergy staff revised the operability input for CR-IP3-2016-01035 under

corrective action #2. The inspectors noted that Entergy staff concluded an operability

evaluation was not needed, in part, because the baffle-former bolts are not required by

TS and are not described in the UFSAR. The inspectors noted that while the baffle

bolts are not described in these documents, their failure in sufficient numbers could have

consequential effects on the TS-controlled ECCS if the baffle plates were to become

detached or deformed. This was described in Entergys bolt pattern analysis report

16

documenting an acceptable bolt pattern prior to the spring 2016 RFO. The inspectors

reviewed Unit 3 TS 3.5.2, ECCS - Operating, which requires multiple trains of ECCS to

be operable. The inspectors concluded that since the baffle bolts support the ECCS,

which is subject to TS, Entergys decision to not perform further evaluation of the

operability determination was inconsistent with EN-OP-104. Specifically, Section 5.1(7)

of Entergys procedure EN-OP-104 requires that an operability determination be

performed whenever a condition exists in the supporting SCC that may affect the ability

of the TS-controlled SSC to perform its specified safety function.

Further, the inspectors noted that Entergy staff concluded a degraded condition did not

exist in Unit 3, and therefore, an operability evaluation was not required as a follow-up to

the immediate determination. The documented basis provided was the differences

between the two units, plant operating data, and fuel performance. The inspectors noted

that plant operating data and fuel performance from Unit 2 did not result in identification

of the bolt degradation; therefore, the absence of indications for these problems on Unit

3 was technically insufficient to support Entergys conclusion that there was no degraded

condition on Unit 3.

The inspectors review of procedure EN-OP-104, Section 3.0, identified that examples of

the effects of equipment aging and operating experience can be sources of information

considered to enter the operability or functionality process. The inspectors

acknowledged that licensees apply judgment in these decisions. In this particular

instance, the inspectors considered that operating experience was available that showed

the Unit 3 baffle bolts were subject to IASCC and that plants of similar design (4-loop

Westinghouse pressurized water reactors with a down-flow configuration and baffle bolts

of 347 material and similar dimensions) were subject to greater amounts of bolt

degradation compared to other reactor designs. Furthermore, the inspectors noted the

baffle bolts had experienced levels of neutron radiation exposure above the threshold for

IASCC initiation as referenced in NUREG/CR-7027, Degradation of LWR Core Internal

Materials due to Neutron Irradiation.

Based on the above information available to Entergy staff, the inspectors concluded that

Entergys basis for determining that a degraded condition did not exist on Unit 3 was not

technically supported. The inspectors noted that in completing an IOD in EN-OP-104,

Step 5.3.2 states determine if there is an ongoing degradation mechanism that may

impact future operability based on changing conditions, specifically consider the SSCs

specified safety function and mission time. On May 5, 2016, Entergys basis for

concluding an operability evaluation was not required and exiting the operability

determination procedure at Step 5.3.3 was inconsistent with this procedural requirement

because their IOD concluded Unit 3 was susceptible to baffle bolt degradation, which is

time based and subject to changing conditions including fatigue inducing loading cycles

and neutron fluence. As a result, the inspectors concluded Entergy staff did not

complete the additional actions prescribed by EN-OP-104 to perform an operability

evaluation. Specifically, Step 5.3.9 states in part if an Operability Evaluation is required

then perform the following: Proceed to Subsection 5.5, Operability Evaluation.

On July 11, 2016, Entergy staff subsequently completed the steps in EN-OP-104 and

performed an operability evaluation, which assumed an estimated number of baffle-

former bolt failures based on the degradation found in Unit 2, and adjusted to take credit

for the small number of inaccessible bolts and a sample of bolts extracted with high

removal torque that indicated residual structural capacity. The inspectors determined

17

this estimated number of bolt failures was conservative because the evaluation did not

credit the baffle-edge bolts or the differences in operational history between the two units

such as neutron fluence levels or fatigue from thermal cycles. The operability evaluation

concluded that the Unit 3 baffle bolts would perform as intended to secure the baffle

plates from being dislodged. The inspectors concluded that Entergys operability

evaluation provided appropriate basis to conclude that the Unit 3 baffle assembly would

support ECCS operability until the planned Unit 3 RFO in spring 2017.

Analysis. The inspectors determined that Entergys failure to adequately accomplish the

actions prescribed in EN-OP-104 for a degraded condition and perform an operability

evaluation associated with the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts was a performance deficiency.

Specifically, Entergy incorrectly concluded that no degraded or non-conforming condition

existed related to the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts and exited the operability determination

procedure. As a result, Entergys initial documentation did not provide sufficient basis

for operability and continued operation until questioned by NRC inspectors.

This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance

attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to

ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating

events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). This issue was also

similar to example 3.j of IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, because

the condition resulted in reasonable doubt of operability of the ECCS and additional

analysis was necessary to verify operability. In accordance with IMC 0609.04, Initial

Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance

Determination Process for Findings At-Power, issued June 19, 2012, the inspectors

screened the finding for safety significance and determined it to be of very low safety

significance (Green), since the finding did not represent an actual loss of system or

function. After inspector questioning, Entergy performed an operability evaluation, which

provided sufficient bases to conclude the Unit 3 baffle assembly would support ECCS

operability. This finding is related to the cross-cutting aspect of Problem Identification

and Resolution, Operating Experience, because Entergy did not effectively evaluate

relevant internal and external operating experience. Specifically, Entergy did not

adequately evaluate the impact of degraded baffle bolts at Unit 3 when relevant

operating experience was identified at Unit 2. [P.5]

Enforcement. 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and

Drawings, states, in part, that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by

documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be

accomplished in accordance with those procedures. The introduction to Appendix B

states that quality assurance comprises all those planned and systematic actions

necessary to provide adequate confidence that a structure, system, or component (SSC)

will perform satisfactorily in service. Procedure EN-OP-104, Step 5.3[2], related to

immediate operability, states Determine if there is an ongoing degradation mechanism

that may impact future operability based on changing conditions, specifically consider

the SSCs specified safety function and mission time. Step 5.3(3) follows with, in part If

no Degraded or Non-conforming Condition exists, then perform the following as the

Immediate Determination: Declare the SSC Operable and Exit this procedure.

Contrary to the above, from May 5, 2016 until July 11, 2016, Entergy did not adequately

accomplish actions as prescribed by EN-OP-104 for a degraded condition associated

with the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts. Specifically, Entergy incorrectly concluded that no

18

degraded or non-conforming condition existed related to the Unit 3 baffle-former bolts

and exited the operability determination procedure. The NRC determined this is contrary

to EN-OP-104 because a comparison of Unit 2 and 3 operational factors resulted in

Entergy concluding that the Unit 3 baffle bolts would likely be affected due to the same

degradation mechanism. Entergys corrective actions included entering the issue into

the CAP and documenting an operability evaluation to support the basis for operability of

the baffle bolts and ECCS. Because this issue is of very low safety significance (Green)

and Entergy entered this into their CAP as CR-IP3-2016-01961, this finding is being

treated as an NCV consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000286/2016002-02, Failure to Follow Operability Determination Procedure for

Unit 3 Baffle-Former Bolts)

Update to URI 05000247/2016001-06, 23 Emergency Diesel Generator Automatic

Voltage Regulator Failure

Introduction. The NRC opened a URI in Inspection Report 05000247/2016001 related to

two failures of the 23 EDG to run and maintain bus voltage on March 7, 2016, and to

provide adequate control of bus voltage on March 10, 2016. This report provides an

update of the status of this URI.

Description. On March 7, 2016, approximately one hour after the trip of the 3A normal

feed breaker, the 23 EDG tripped on overcurrent while powering the 6A 480V safety bus.

The 6A bus remained de-energized for approximately one hour until the crew restored

the 6A bus via off-site power. The 23 EDG was declared inoperable. All four 480V

safety buses were restored to off-site power. Entergy replaced the overcurrent relays

and retested the 23 EDG satisfactorily on March 8, 2016. However, bench testing of the

overcurrent relays demonstrated that they were accurately calibrated.

Subsequently, on March 10, 2016, during performance of PT-R14, Automatic Safety

Injection System Electrical Load and Blackout Test, the 23 EDG exhibited anomalous

behavior during the train B load sequencing. During this test, the voltage on safety bus

6A dropped to approximately 200V when the 23 auxiliary feedwater pump was

sequenced onto the bus (CR-IP2-2016-01430) and the sequencer failed to complete the

first two sequences. The 23 EDG was again declared inoperable and the period of

inoperability was backdated to March 7, 2016, when it originally tripped. Further

troubleshooting and additional failure modes analysis by Entergy initially determined that

the cause of both events may have been a degraded resistor (R25) on the 23 EDG

automatic voltage regulator (AVR) card.

The 23 EDG AVR card was replaced, and the 23 EDG was again tested satisfactorily.

The voltage anomaly issues exhibited during the March 10, 2016, test were documented

in CR-IP2-2016-01430 which was closed in CR-IP2-2016-01260 to be included in the

causal assessment associated with the tripping of 23 EDG breaker on March 7, 2016.

Entergy assigned a vendor to perform laboratory bench testing and failure analysis of

the 23 EDG AVR card. The vendor report attributed the cause of the March 10, 2016,

loss of voltage control to a degraded solder joint on the AVR card. However, the vendor

report explicitly did not attribute the event on March 7, 2016, to the same cause.

Entergy assigned a corrective action in CR-IP2-2016-01260 to review the cause of the

19

23 EDG overcurrent trip on March 7, 2016, in light of the vendor report. The inspectors

determined that the issue of concern remains open as a URI until this causal

assessment has been completed by Entergy and assessed by NRC. (URI 05000247/2016001-06, 23 Emergency Diesel Generator Automatic Voltage

Regulator Failure)

1R18 Plant Modifications (71111.18 - 2 samples)

Permanent Modifications

.1

Control Rod Guide Tube Repairs in Location E-9

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated a modification to the reactor vessel upper internals to swap

damaged control rod guide tube in location E-9 with abandoned guide tube in location

D-10. The inspectors verified that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance

capability of the affected systems were not degraded by the modification. In addition,

the inspectors reviewed modification documents associated with the design change,

including evaluation of equivalency and core flow changes, and post-modification

testing. The inspectors also reviewed revisions to the affected drawings and interviewed

refueling and engineering personnel.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2

Core Baffle-Former Bolt EC 64038

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed EC 64038, IP2 Reactor Vessel Equivalent Replacement

Baffle-to-Former Bolt. This modification was completed during RFO 2R22 and involved

the replacement of 278 baffle-former bolts out of a total of 832 located in the Unit 2

reactor vessel. Entergy replaced all of the bolts that were potentially degraded as

observed by visual indications of a protruding bolt head or lock bar problem, bolts that

did not pass UT, and bolts inaccessible for UT. Entergy staff also replaced 51 additional

bolts that passed ultrasonic and visual examinations to increase the structural margin of

the baffle-former assembly for future operating cycles.

The inspectors reviewed the equivalency evaluation completed by Entergy staff to install

baffle-former bolts of a different material and configuration than the original bolts. The

inspectors reviewed the associated EC package to determine whether the replacement

bolts form, fit, and function were maintained compared to the original bolts and whether

the change conformed to the design and licensing bases of the baffle-former assembly.

Specifically, this change involved replacing the original baffle-former bolts made of

type 347 stainless steel with bolts made of type 316 stainless steel. The baffle-former

bolt head configuration was also changed from an original internal hex and slot design

(secured with a welded lock bar) to an external hex configuration with an integral locking

cup design. The design change document further evaluated a more gradual fillet

20

geometry between the bolt head and shank intended to reduce the stress concentration

at that transition and provide for improved fatigue resistance.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - 8 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance tests for the maintenance activities listed

below to verify that procedures and test activities ensured system operability and

functional capability. The inspectors reviewed the test procedure to verify that the

procedure adequately tested the safety functions that may have been affected by the

maintenance activity, that the acceptance criteria in the procedure was consistent with

the information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and that

the test results were properly reviewed and accepted and problems were appropriately

documented. The inspectors also walked down the affected job site, observed the

pre-job brief and post-job critique where possible, confirmed work site cleanliness was

maintained, witnessed the test or reviewed test data to verify quality control hold points

were performed and checked, and that results adequately demonstrated restoration of

the affected safety functions.

Unit 2

21 EDG fuel oil transfer pump after planned maintenance on May 5, 2016

Replacement of pressurizer level transmitters LT-459 and LT-460 on May 25, 2016

21 CCW heat exchanger service water outlet weld repair on June 26, 2016

Flux mapping system drive repairs following motor failures on June 28, 2016

Unit 3

Maintenance on service water components associated with the 32 EDG on May 5,

2016 (this sample was part of an in-depth review of the EDG system)

Modification of the 32 EDG space heaters on May 5, 2016 (this sample was part of

an in-depth review of the EDG system)

Maintenance on the 32 EDG air start system on May 6, 2016 (this sample was part

of an in-depth review of the EDG system)

Replacement of failed bistable LC-427K, steam generator 32 low level mismatch trip

interlock, on May 18, 2016

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

21

1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (71111.20 - 2 samples)

.1

Unit 2 RFO 2R22

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the stations work schedule and outage risk plan for the Unit 2

maintenance during RFO 2R22, which was conducted from March 7, 2016, to June 16,

2016. The inspectors reviewed Entergys development and implementation of outage

plans and schedules to verify that risk, industry experience, previous site-specific

problems, and defense-in-depth were considered. During the outage, the inspectors

observed portions of the shutdown and cooldown processes and monitored controls

associated with the following outage activities:

Configuration management, including maintenance of defense-in-depth,

commensurate with the outage plan for the key safety functions and compliance with

the applicable TSs when taking equipment OOS

Implementation of clearance activities and confirmation that tags were properly hung

and that equipment was appropriately configured to safely support the associated

work or testing

Installation and configuration of reactor coolant pressure, level, and temperature

instruments to provide accurate indication and instrument error accounting

Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that

TSs were met

Monitoring of decay heat removal operations

Impact of outage work on the ability of the operators to operate the spent fuel pool

cooling system

Reactor water inventory controls, including flow paths, configurations, alternative

means for inventory additions, and controls to prevent inventory loss

Activities that could affect reactivity

Maintenance of secondary containment as required by TSs

Refueling activities, including fuel handling and fuel receipt inspections

Fatigue management

Tracking of startup prerequisites, walkdown of the primary containment to verify that

debris had not been left which could block the ECCS suction strainers, and startup

and ascension to full power operation

Foreign Object Search and Retrieval for missing baffle bolts and locking tabs

Identification and resolution of problems related to RFO activities

During this outage, Entergy replaced 278 degraded baffle bolts in the Unit 2 reactor

vessel baffle assembly. This emergent project resulted in the extension of the outage

schedule from 30 days to 102 days.

b. Findings

Introduction. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of TS 5.4.1 for Entergys failure to

implement procedure OAP-007, Containment Entry and Egress. Specifically, workers

transiting the inner and outer crane wall sections of containment on June 11, 2016, failed

to maintain at least one (of two) flow channeling gate closed to ensure availability of the

containment sumps to provide suction for the ECCS.

22

Description. On June 11, 2016, in mode 4, in preparation for reactor startup, Entergy

was performing maintenance in containment required prior to mode 3, such as reactor

coolant pump motor balancing and steam flow transmitter troubleshooting. These

activities required scaffolds to be temporarily erected for workers to safely perform

maintenance. While transiting from the inner to outer section of containment, the

inspectors noted that both flow channeling gates were maintained open simultaneously

as workers carried scaffold poles and hardware out of the area.

In the event of a postulated LOCA, Unit 2 relies on two sumps to provide a suction

source for the internal recirculation pumps and residual heat removal pumps,

respectively, after the injection phase of the accident. The sumps have cylindrical

screens with large surface area and small holes to filter small debris and maintain

adequate net positive suction head for the associated pumps. The reactor cavity sump

and large intervening barriers prevent large debris generated from the accident, such as

insulation, from reaching and blocking the recirculation and containment sump screens.

Entergy procedure OAP-007, Containment Entry and Egress, precaution and limitation

step 2.30.2, states, In mode 1, 2, 3, or 4, entry inside the crane wall shall use the

double gate entry point via gates 17 and 23. One gate shall remain shut and secured at

all times to maintain flow channeling and sump operability. Securing gates requires a

padlock or nut and bolt closure from the outside. This will require posting a gate monitor

to allow exit. The inspectors noted, while a gate monitor was posted, both gates were

maintained open during passage and not secured with a padlock or nut and bolt closure.

Upon questioning by the inspectors, Entergy immediately coached the gate monitor and

restored the gates to an acceptable position. Entergy generated CR-IP2-2016-04036 to

address this issue.

Analysis. The inspectors determined that Energys failure to maintain either gate 17 or

gate 23 closed during passage in accordance with OAP-007 was a performance

deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it is associated

with the configuration control (shutdown equipment lineup) attribute and adversely

affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability,

reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent

undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The inspectors evaluated the finding in

accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Exhibit 3, and determined that a

detailed risk evaluation was necessary because the finding represented a loss of system

safety function. A detailed risk assessment was conducted conservatively assuming

complete failure of the recirculation and containment sumps due to the performance

deficiency. Given that Unit 2 was in mode 4, in plant operating state 1, with a late time

window, the at-power simplified plant analysis risk model for large-break LOCAs was

determined to best model the degrade condition and plant response. An exposure time

of one day was assumed. No credit was assumed for the decrease in energy that would

be anticipated in a release during a LOCA in mode 4, nor the corresponding reduction in

debris generation. This was also considered conservative. Utilizing Systems Analysis

Program for Hands-On Integrated Reliability Evaluation, version 8.13, with Indian Point

Unit 2 Simplified Plant Analysis Risk Model, version 8.19, for the assumed conditions,

the change in core damage frequency was determined to be 7E-9. Therefore, this issue

represents a Green finding.

23

This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Avoid

Complacency, because Entergy did not consider potential undesired consequences of

actions before performing work and implement appropriate error-reduction tools.

Specifically, the work crew did not understand the requirements and potential

consequences prior to commencing work and the gate monitor did not enforce these

requirements to maintain at least one gate locked or pinned closed as required by

OAP-007. [H.12]

Enforcement. Unit 2 TS 5.4.1.a requires that the procedures listed in Attachment A to

Regulatory Guide 1.33, Quality Assurance Program Requirements, Revision 2, be

established and implemented. Attachment A states that instructions should be prepared,

as appropriate, for access to containment and changing modes of operation of the

ECCS. Entergy procedure OAP-007, Containment Entry and Egress, Step 2.30.2,

states, In mode 1, 2, 3, or 4, entry inside the crane wall shall use the double gate entry

point via gates 17 and 23. One gate shall remain shut and secured at all times to

maintain flow channeling and sump operability. Securing gates requires a padlock or nut

and bolt closure from the outside. Contrary to the above, on June 11, 2016, Entergy did

not maintain one gate secured at all times with a padlock or nut and bolt closure.

Entergy entered this issue into the CAP as CR-IP2-2016-04036. Because this violation

was of very low safety significance (Green), and Entergy entered this performance

deficiency into the CAP, the NRC is treating this as a NCV in accordance with

Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy. (NCV 05000247/2016002-03, Failure

to Maintain Flow Channeling Gates Closed in Accordance with the Containment

Procedure)

.2

Unit 2 Forced Outage

a. Inspection Scope

Unit 2 conducted a forced outage from June 24 to 27, 2016, in order to complete weld

repairs on a through-wall leak on the service water inlet line to the 21 CCW heat

exchanger. These repairs required shutting down to mode 4 in order to meet the

TS 3.7.7, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, limiting condition for operations

for CCW operability. While these repairs were being completed, the grid operator

completed repairs to breaker 9 in the offsite switchyard. During the outage, the

inspectors observed portions of the shutdown and cooldown processes and monitored

controls associated with the following outage activities:

Configuration management, including maintenance of defense-in-depth,

commensurate with the outage plan for the key safety functions and compliance with

the applicable TSs when taking equipment OOS

Implementation of clearance activities and confirmation that tags were properly hung

and that equipment was appropriately configured to safely support the associated

work or testing

Status and configuration of electrical systems and switchyard activities to ensure that

TSs were met

Monitoring of decay heat removal operations

Reactor water inventory controls, including flow paths, configurations, alternative

means for inventory additions, and controls to prevent inventory loss

Activities that could affect reactivity

24

Tracking of startup prerequisites

Identification and resolution of problems related to RFO activities

When all repairs had been completed, Entergy restarted Unit 2 on June 27, 2016.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22 - 6 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed performance of surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data of

selected risk-significant SSCs to assess whether test results satisfied TSs, the UFSAR,

and Entergys procedure requirements. The inspectors verified that test acceptance

criteria were clear, tests demonstrated operational readiness and were consistent with

design documentation, test instrumentation had current calibrations and the range and

accuracy for the application, tests were performed as written, and applicable test

prerequisites were satisfied. Upon test completion, the inspectors considered whether

the test results supported that equipment was capable of performing the required safety

functions. The inspectors reviewed the following surveillance tests:

Unit 2

WO 446385, 21 EDG AVR card inspection, on May 24, 2016

2-PT-Q013 for containment isolation valve 851B (22 safety injection (SI) pump tie to

23 SI pump discharge) on June 6, 2016

2-PT-Q029B quarterly in-service surveillance test for the 22 SI pump on June 6,

2016

Unit 3

3-PT-M079B 32 EDG monthly surveillance on May 30, 2016 (this sample was part of

an in-depth review of the EDG system)

34 steam generator pressure instrument channel check on June 21, 2016

0-SOP-LEAKRATE-001, RCS Leakrate Surveillance, Evaluation and Leak

Identification, beginning on June 28, 2016

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

25

1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06 - 1 sample)

Training Observations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the conduct of Entergys ingestion pathway emergency

preparedness drill on April 19, 2016, to identify any weaknesses and deficiencies in the

classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development activities.

The inspectors observed emergency response operations in the emergency operations

facility to determine whether the event classification, notifications, and protective action

recommendations were performed in accordance with procedures. The inspectors also

attended the facility drill critique to compare inspector observations with those identified

by Entergy staff in order to evaluate Entergys critique and to verify whether the staff was

properly identifying weaknesses and entering them into the CAP.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2.

RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety and Occupational Radiation Safety

2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01)

a. Inspection Scope

During May 10-12 and June 13-17, 2016, the inspectors reviewed Entergys

performance in assessing the radiological hazards and exposure control in the

workplace. The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR 20, TSs, applicable

industry standards, and procedures required by TSs as criteria for determining

compliance.

Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage

The inspectors reviewed:

Ambient radiological conditions during tours of the radiological controlled area,

posted surveys, radiation work permits, adequacy of radiological controls, radiation

protection job coverage, and contamination controls

Controls for highly activated or contaminated materials stored within spent fuel pools

Posting and physical controls for high radiation areas and very high radiation areas

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

26

2RS2 Occupational As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) Planning and Controls

(71124.02)

a. Inspection Scope

During May 10-12 and June 13-17, 2016, the inspectors assessed performance with

respect to maintaining occupational individual and collective radiation exposures ALARA.

The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR 20, TSs, applicable industry standards,

and procedures required by TSs as criteria for determining compliance.

Radiological Work Planning

The inspectors reviewed:

ALARA work activity evaluations, exposure estimates, and exposure mitigation

requirements

ALARA work planning, use of dose mitigation features and dose goals

Work planning and the integration of ALARA requirements

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS7 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP) (71124.07 - 3 samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the REMP to validate the effectiveness of the radioactive

gaseous and liquid effluent release program and implementation of the groundwater

protection initiative (GPI). The inspectors used the requirements in 10 CFR 20,

40 CFR 190, 10 CFR 50, Appendix I, TSs, offsite dose calculation manual (ODCM),

Nuclear Energy Institute 07-07, and procedures required by TSs as criteria for

determining compliance.

Inspection Planning

The inspectors reviewed Entergys 2014 and 2015 annual radiological environmental

and effluent monitoring reports, REMP program audits, ODCM changes, land use

census, the UFSAR, and inter-laboratory comparison program results.

Site Inspection

The inspectors walked down various thermoluminescent dosimeter and air and water

sampling locations and reviewed associated calibration and maintenance records. The

inspectors observed the sampling of various environmental media as specified in the

ODCM and reviewed any anomalous environmental sampling events including

assessment of any positive radioactivity results. The inspectors reviewed any changes

to the ODCM. The inspectors verified the operability and calibration of the

meteorological tower instruments and meteorological data readouts. The inspectors

reviewed environmental sample laboratory analysis results, laboratory instrument

measurement detection sensitivities, laboratory quality control program audit results, and

27

the inter- and intra-laboratory comparison program results. The inspectors reviewed the

groundwater monitoring program as it applies to selected potential leaking SSCs.

GPI Implementation

The inspectors reviewed groundwater monitoring results, changes to the GPI program

since the last inspection, anomalous results or missed groundwater samples, leakage or

spill events including entries made into the decommissioning files (10 CFR 50.75(g)),

evaluations of surface water discharges, and Entergys evaluation of any positive

groundwater sample results including appropriate stakeholder notifications and effluent

reporting requirements.

Identification and Resolution of Problems

The inspectors evaluated whether problems associated with the REMP were identified at

an appropriate threshold and properly addressed in Entergys CAP.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151 - 6 samples)

Initiating Events Performance Indicators

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed Entergys submittals for the following Initiating Events

cornerstone performance indicators for the period April 1, 2015, to March 31, 2016:

Unit 2

Unplanned scrams per 7000 critical hours (IE01)

Unplanned power changes per 7000 critical hours (IE03)

Unplanned scrams with complications (IE04)

Unit 3

Unplanned scrams (IE01)

Unplanned power changes (IE03)

Unplanned scrams with complications (IE04)

To determine the accuracy of the performance indicator data reported during those

periods, inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy

Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7.

The inspectors reviewed Entergys operator narrative logs, maintenance planning

schedules, CRs, event reports, and NRC integrated inspection reports to validate the

28

accuracy of the submittals. There were no unplanned power changes or scrams with

complications during the review period.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152 - 4 samples)

.1

Routine Review of Problem Identification and Resolution Activities

a. Inspection Scope

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, the

inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant

status reviews to verify that Entergy entered issues into the CAP at an appropriate

threshold, gave adequate attention to timely corrective actions, and identified and

addressed adverse trends. In order to assist with the identification of repetitive

equipment failures and specific human performance issues for follow up, the inspectors

performed a daily screening of items entered into the CAP and periodically attended CR

screening meetings. The inspectors also confirmed, on a sampling basis, that, as

applicable, for identified defects and non-conformances, Entergy performed an

evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR 21.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2

Semi-Annual Trend Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a semi-annual review of site issues, as required by Inspection

Procedure 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, to identify trends that might

indicate the existence of more significant safety issues. In this review, the inspectors

included repetitive or closely-related issues that may have been documented by Entergy

outside of the CAP, such as trend reports, performance indicators, major equipment

problem lists, system health reports, maintenance rule assessments, and maintenance

or CAP backlogs. The inspectors also reviewed Entergys CAP database for the first

and second quarters of 2016 to assess CRs written in various subject areas (equipment

problems, human performance issues, etc.), as well as individual issues identified during

the NRCs daily CR review (Section 4OA2.1). The inspectors reviewed the Entergy

quarterly trend report for the first quarter of 2016 to verify that Entergy was appropriately

evaluating and trending adverse conditions in accordance with applicable procedures.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified.

The inspectors identified a trend in work being performed that was contrary to written

work instructions and procedures, and work packages had been closed out without

29

documenting the deviation from the work order. While reviewing completed work order

WO 447966 Task 10, Internal Coating Repair for 21 CCW HX, the inspectors found a

note in the work order stating that the internal coating repair to the pipe had not been

done in accordance with the engineering change. The engineering change had been

written when the coating repair was expected to be small, but the actual area that was

recoated was much larger. A larger area of coating increases the impact on the heat

exchanger if the coating were to flake off and block the flow of service water. The work

package was closed and no condition report was written. This performance deficiency is

minor because the coating was applied with procedurally directed quality controls and

the likelihood that it would flake off is very small; and is the same as the original smaller

area specified in the work package. However, the work package was closed without

documenting the deviation and no CR was written.

In another example, the inspectors noted that WO 412920 Task 15 to perform a surge

test on 11 centrifugal air compressor (CENTAC) after overhaul was completed on

December 22, 2015. However, the completion notes and documentation for the task

showed that the test was unable to be performed due to a test equipment problem. The

work package was closed and no CR was written. Subsequently, after being returned to

service, the compressor failed in service due to multiple surging events on January 7,

2016. Troubleshooting under WO 433939 revealed that the motor high load limit had not

been adjusted to account for the increased load due to reduced compressor clearances

introduced by the overhaul. This performance deficiency is screened to minor because

the 11 CENTAC is not a safety-related piece of equipment and would not affect the MC 0609 cornerstone thresholds or other generic criteria. Unit 2 and Unit 3 have dedicated

instrument air compressors that are credited in the FSAR to respond to a loss of

instrument air event. If the 11 CENTAC (located in Unit 1) were to fail, the unit-specific

IACs would automatically start to prevent a loss of instrument air at both Units 2 and 3.

A third recent example of work being performed contrary to written instructions occurred

during 2RFO22 when the inspectors identified that the workers deviated from the

surveillance procedure by demonstrating the installation of the emergency containment

hatch plug without properly inflating the plug seals as directed by the procedure. This

performance deficiency was previously documented in a prior inspection report as non-

cited violation 05000247/05000286/2016001-02, Failure to Adequately Implement Risk

Management Actions for the Containment Key Safety Function.

In all cases, the deviations from written work instructions were directed by Entergy

supervision. In addition, the inspectors noted that Entergy had self-identified similar

observations where work packages or condition reports had been closed without fully

completing the specified actions including CR-IP2-2015-05833, CR-IP2-2016-00103,

CR-IP3-2015-04729, CR-IP3-2016-00072, CR-IP3-2016-00075, and CR-IP3-2015-

04019. These CRs are further examples of work orders that were closed with deviations

that were not documented or resolved. Nuclear Oversight had identified several of these

condition reports. Entergy has taking immediate corrective action in response to these

performance deficiencies.

30

.3

Annual Sample: Maintenance Rule Self-Assessment of Corrective Actions

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Entergys corrective actions associated

with self-assessment LO-IP3LO-2015-72, Maintenance Rule (a)(3) Assessment. The

self-assessment was performed to satisfy both the self-assessment criteria in EN-LI-104,

Self-Assessment and Benchmark Process, and the maintenance rule periodic

assessment criteria in EN-DC-207.

The inspectors assessed Entergys problem identification threshold, extent of condition

reviews, and the prioritization and timeliness of Entergy corrective actions to determine

whether Entergy was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems

associated with this issue and whether the planned or completed corrective actions were

appropriate. The inspectors compared the actions taken to the requirements of

Entergys CAP and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. In addition, the inspectors interviewed

engineering personnel to assess the effectiveness of the implemented corrective

actions.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified.

Entergy identified three standard deficiencies during their self-assessment and wrote

CRs to document each one. One of the standard deficiencies was that the maintenance

rule basis documents were not being reviewed at least once every two years as required

by procedure EN-DC-204, Maintenance Rule Scope and Basis. The purpose of this

review was to ensure that the documents were updated if the configuration of the system

changed or if the performance criteria needed to be adjusted. Entergy wrote CR-IP3-

2015-03628 and assigned a corrective action to create work trackers to perform the

basis document reviews. They chose to use work trackers instead of corrective actions

under the CAP because the work had historically been assigned using work trackers.

However, because work trackers do not receive the same priority as corrective actions,

some of the maintenance rule basis documents had still not been reviewed at the time of

this inspection, over a year after the completion of the self-assessment. The inspectors

determined that this was not a more than minor issue because the systems in question

did not show signs of inadequate maintenance.

.4

Annual Sample: Unit 2 Reactor Trip on December 5, 2015

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Entergys evaluations and corrective

actions associated with CR-IP2-2015-05484 and the related apparent cause evaluation

for the December 5, 2015, manual reactor trip in response to indications of multiple

dropped control rods caused by the loss of control rod power due to a power supply

failure. Entergy performed an apparent cause evaluation and determined the direct

cause of the event was the loss of motor control center (MCC)-24 due to an internal fault

at the line side leads at cubicle 2H where they connect to the bucket stab assemblies.

The apparent cause was an unanticipated loss of power to the control rod system due to

the degradation of the primary control rod power supply (PS1) which failed to function for

31

more than 10 minutes when the operating alternate power supply (PS2) was

deenergized.

The inspectors assessed Entergys problem identification threshold, problem analysis,

extent of condition reviews, compensatory actions, and the prioritization and timeliness

of Entergy's corrective actions to determine whether Entergy was appropriately

identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems associated with this issue and

whether the planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate. The inspectors

compared the actions taken to the requirements of Entergy's CAP and 10 CFR 50,

Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified.

The inspectors found that Entergy took appropriate actions to identify the direct and

apparent cause of the issue. The direct cause of the event was the loss of MCC-24 due

to an internal fault at the line side leads at cubicle 2H where they connect to the bucket

stab assemblies. The apparent cause was an unanticipated loss of power to the control

rod system due to the degradation of the primary control rod PS1, which failed to

function when PS2 was lost. Entergy replaced the degraded rod control PS1; and the

MCC-24 compartments were removed to facilitate inspection and testing of the MCC

bus, control wires, and MCC internal. PS2 was also restored to operation after the fault

was cleared.

The inspector determined that the internal electrical fault that deenergized PS2 and the

prior degradation in PS1 was not within Entergys ability to foresee and prevent.

Therefore, there was no performance deficiency identified. Entergys overall response to

the issue was commensurate with the safety significance, was timely, and the actions

taken and planned were reasonable to resolve the failure of the primary control rod PS1.

.5

Annual Sample: Unexpected Number of Degraded Baffle-Former Bolts Discovered in

the Unit 2 Reactor Pressure Vessel

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed an in-depth review of Entergys root cause evaluation and

corrective actions associated with CR-IP2-2016-02348 for baffle-former (baffle) bolts

found with indications of degradation during the Indian Point Unit 2 RFO 2R22. Entergy

performed ultrasonic examinations of the baffle bolts in accordance with their procedures

as part of a planned activity. After an unexpected number of degraded baffle bolts were

discovered, Entergy staff reported the issue to the NRC as Event Notification 51829

on March 29, 2016, because the as-found number and location of degraded bolts

represented an unanalyzed condition. Entergy staff completed corrective actions to

replace all of the potentially degraded baffle bolts on Unit 2. Entergy staff further

replaced a population of additional bolts that exhibited no indications of degradation and

performed an evaluation to determine the potential for baffle bolt failures at Unit 3.

The baffle-former bolts help secure vertical plates (also referred to as baffle plates)

inside the reactor vessel, which then forms a structure surrounding the reactor fuel

assemblies to orient the fuel and to direct coolant flow through the core. A sufficient

32

number of baffle bolts are required to remain intact to secure the baffle plates in place so

as to not affect control rod insertion or impede emergency core cooling flow during

postulated accident conditions. Bolt heads that separate and are no longer held in place

by bolt lock-tabs can also become a loose parts concern.

The inspectors determined whether Entergys acceptable baffle bolt pattern analysis for

Unit 2 was completed in accordance with the NRC-approved methodology and provided

appropriate structural margin for the next cycle of operation to ensure the Unit 2 baffle

plates will remain in place during both normal operation and limiting postulated accident

conditions. The inspectors further determined whether Entergys evaluations of the

baffle bolts installed in Indian Point Unit 3 were technically sufficient to conclude the

Unit 3 baffle assembly will perform as intended until the next planned RFO, at which time

Entergy plans to examine the bolts. The inspectors reviewed Entergys procedures for

determining the functionality and operability of degraded SSC as they relate to Unit 3.

The inspectors further interviewed Entergy engineering personnel and contractor staff to

discuss the results of Entergys technical evaluations and to assess the effectiveness of

the implemented and planned corrective actions.

The inspectors assessed Entergys problem identification threshold, cause analyses,

extent of condition, compensatory actions, and the prioritization and timeliness of

Entergys corrective actions to determine whether Entergy staff were properly identifying,

characterizing, and correcting problems associated with this issue and whether the

planned or completed corrective actions were appropriate. The inspectors compared the

actions taken to Entergys CAP, operability determination process, and the requirements

of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. The inspectors observed portions of baffle bolt replacement

activities at Unit 2 and reviewed the final visual examination of the baffle bolts and plates

once the work was completed.

b. Findings and Observations

One Green NCV was identified and documented in Section 1R15 of this report.

The NRC responded to the initial discovery of an unexpected number of baffle bolts

found degraded at Indian Point Unit 2 by implementing a comprehensive inspection plan

consisting of various baseline inspection samples to assess the extent of the issue and

to determine the necessary NRC actions. A follow-up inservice inspection sample

(Refer to Section 1R08) was conducted to review the capability of the non-destructive

examination techniques, evaluate the UT results, and observe a portion of bolt

replacement activities on-site. A permanent modification sample (Refer to Section

1R18) was conducted to review the design change package and evaluations associated

with the new, replacement baffle bolts. The NRC resident inspectors reviewed Entergys

foreign material controls and loose parts analysis (Refer to Section 1R20) to address the

potential for missing bolt heads and concluded it would not impact safe operation of the

plant.

NRC Region I based inspectors accompanied by an expert from the NRC Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation completed an annual problem identification and resolution

inspection, documented in this section of the report, to verify that Entergys evaluations

and corrective actions to replace Unit 2 baffle bolts were completed in accordance with

an NRC approved methodology to support a conclusion that the Unit 2 baffle assembly

meets the plant design basis. The inspectors also determined the adequacy of

Entergys evaluations completed to determine there is a reasonable expectation that the

33

Unit 3 baffle assembly will perform as intended during the current operating cycle. The

results of this review are discussed herein and in Section 1R15 of this report.

Entergy staff determined the cause of the degraded baffle bolts was primarily due to

IASCC in combination with increased fatigue loading on the baffle plates. This cause

determination was based on industry operating experience related to baffle-former bolt

failure in both foreign and domestic plants. IASCC is a cracking mechanism that occurs

over a long period of time when susceptible metals are exposed to neutron radiation

from the reactor core and stresses as part of normal design and operation. Entergy staff

concluded that failure of a critical number of bolts in a localized area subsequently

imposed increased loading on adjacent bolts, which propagated failures and generated

the moderate clustered pattern observed in the examination results. No other

contributing causes were identified.

The inspectors reviewed Entergys root cause evaluation and the supporting operating

experience related to baffle bolt failures at other plants. The inspectors determined that

there is documented evidence in the existing technical literature (including materials

testing of bolts from other plants) and operating experience to conclude that the likely

cause is IASCC; however, the inspectors found that Entergy staff did not define the

cause of the fatigue failure mechanism. The inspectors noted that Entergy staff sent a

sample of baffle bolts removed from the reactor pressure vessel to a metallurgical

laboratory for detailed failure analysis and materials property testing. Entergy indicated

their plans to use the results of the laboratory testing to confirm the likely root cause.

The inspectors concluded that Entergy staff conducted an appropriate review to identify

the likely causes of the degraded baffle bolts and noted that further test results will be

used to confirm these causes.

Following identification of the degraded baffle bolts on Unit 2, Entergys immediate

corrective action was to analyze the as-found condition and begin replacing bolts that

either had visual indications of bolt failure (protruding bolt head for example), did not

pass UT examination, or were not accessible for UT examination. The as-found number

and pattern of these bolts exceeded the acceptance criteria in the plants analysis that

was prepared in advance of the baffle bolt examinations; therefore, Entergy reported this

discovery to the NRC as an unanalyzed condition. Entergy staff completed corrective

actions to replace all of the 227 potentially degraded baffle bolts, plus an additional 51

bolts for increased structural integrity, for a total of 278 bolts. The inspectors noted the

51 additional bolts were installed in strategic locations to prevent clustering of potential

bolt failures during the next operating cycle.

The inspectors determined that Entergy staff performed an acceptable bolt pattern

analysis that evaluated the replacement bolt pattern for Unit 2 and modeled the potential

for future bolt failures. The inspectors found the results of the analysis accounted for a

conservative failure rate of bolts and provided appropriate margin for one cycle of

operation. The inspectors verified that Entergys methodology for its acceptable bolt

pattern analyses, including its determination of margin, was consistent with the NRC-

approved methodology in topical report WCAP-15029-NP-A (ML15222A882). The

inspectors determined that Entergy staff tracked corrective actions to re-examine the

Unit 2 baffle bolts during the next planned RFO. The inspectors noted the new baffle

bolts were made of a material with improved resistance to IASCC and included an

improved design to reduce the stresses at the head to shank transition, both of which

are enhancements compared to the original bolts.

34

As part of an extent of condition assessment, Entergy entered CR-IP3-2016-01035 in its

CAP to evaluate the potential for degraded baffle bolts on Unit 3. Entergy operators

performed an IOD and concluded that the baffle assembly was operable. Entergy staff

performed a subsequent extent of condition review that concluded Unit 3 would

experience less baffle bolt degradation than Unit 2 based on several plant factors.

Entergy also conducted sensitivity analyses to show acceptable bounding conditions in

the event of bolt failures. The inspectors reviewed Entergys evaluations and noted that

Entergy staff concluded there was not a degraded condition at Unit 3. In consideration

of the guidance in their operability procedure and operating experience from Unit 2 and

other plants, the NRC issued an NCV in this report because Entergy did not perform an

operability evaluation for Unit 3 as a follow-up to the immediate determination for the

potential impact on supported systems controlled by the TS (Refer to Section 1R15).

As a corrective action, Entergy staff performed an operability evaluation and

demonstrated that the Unit 3 baffle former assembly remained operable. The inspectors

concluded that this supplemental evaluation provided appropriate technical justification

for the continued operation of Unit 3 until the next RFO in spring 2017, at which time

Entergy plans to examine the baffle bolts. Entergy also implemented a corrective action

as part of an enhancement to plant operations to monitor the RCS for any signs of fuel

leakage, which could be an indicator of baffle bolt failures.

The inspectors reviewed Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter NSAL-16-1,

which discussed the results of recent baffle-former bolt inspections and provided

Westinghouses recommendations on this issue. The letter described the plants as most

susceptible (i.e. Tier 1a) to this degradation as Westinghouse 4-loop reactors limited to

those with a down-flow configuration and using Type 347 stainless steel bolts. The

inspectors noted the recommendation was to complete UT volumetric examination of the

baffle bolts at the next scheduled RFO, and that Entergy had already planned this action

for Unit 3. Entergy also planned a long-term corrective action to convert Units 2 and 3

from a down-flow baffle configuration to an up-flow configuration, which would

significantly reduce the load on baffle-former bolts and provide for increased structural

margin of the baffle-former assembly. The inspectors determined Entergys overall

response to the issue was commensurate with the safety significance, was timely, and

included appropriate compensatory actions. The inspectors concluded that the actions

completed and planned were reasonable to address the ongoing aging management of

baffle bolts.

4OA3 Follow Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153 - 5 samples)

.1

Plant Events

a. Inspection Scope

For the plant events listed below, the inspectors reviewed and/or observed plant

parameters, reviewed personnel performance, and evaluated performance of mitigating

systems. The inspectors communicated the plant events to appropriate regional

personnel, and compared the event details with criteria contained in IMC 0309, Reactive

Inspection Decision Basis for Reactors, for consideration of potential reactive inspection

activities. As applicable, the inspectors verified that Entergy made appropriate

emergency classification assessments and properly reported the event in accordance

with 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73. The inspectors reviewed Entergys follow-up actions

35

related to the events to assure that Entergy implemented appropriate corrective actions

commensurate with their safety significance.

Unit 2

Turbine trip occurred while synchronizing Unit 2 to the grid on June 15, 2016

Shutdown required by TS for repairs to a leak on the 21 CCW heat exchanger

service water inlet on June 23, 2016

Unit 3

Rapid power reduction from 100 percent to 45 percent power in response to a loss of

both heater drain pumps on May 26, 2016

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2

(Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000247/2015-003-00: Manual Reactor Trip

Due to Indications of Multiple Dropped Control Rods Caused by Loss of Control Rod

Power Due to a Power Supply Failure

The inspectors reviewed Entergys actions and reportability criteria associated with LER 05000247/2015-003-00, which was submitted to the NRC on February 3, 2016. On

December 5, 2015, control room operators initiated a manual reactor trip after observing

indications consistent with multiple dropped control rods following an alarm for the trip of

MCC-24/24A. No control rod indication was available due to MCC-24 being faulted and

de-energized. The direct cause of the event was the loss of MCC-24 due to an internal

fault at the line sides leads at cubicle 2H where they connect to the bucket stab

assemblies. The apparent cause was an unanticipated loss of power to the control rod

system due to the degradation of the primary control rod PS1 which failed to function

when the operating PS2 was lost. The inspectors determined that both the unexpected

failure of PS2 and the internal fault in PS1 was not within Entergys ability to foresee and

prevent and was not a performance deficiency. The inspectors reviewed the LER, the

associated apparent cause evaluation analysis, and interviewed Entergy staff. This LER

is closed.

.3

(Closed) LER 05000247/2016-003-00: TS Prohibited Condition Due to an Inoperable 21

MBFP Discharge Valve for Greater Than the TS Allowed Outage Time

The inspectors reviewed Entergys actions and reportability criteria associated with LER 05000247/2016-003-00, which was submitted to the NRC on May 6, 2016. On March 7,

2016, during the shutdown to enter 2RFO22, the control switch for the 21 MBFP was

tripped from the control room but the MBFP discharge valve BFD-2-21 failed to fully

close as designed. The MBFP discharge valve was declared inoperable and TS 3.7.3

Condition C was entered. The MFD-2-21 isolation valve was then manually closed. The

direct cause of the failure to close the MBFP discharge valve BFD-2-21 was the motor

operated valves (MOVs) close torque switch contact finger out of position. The

apparent cause was that the MOV preventative maintenance procedure lacked the level

of detail and direction due to an unrecognized susceptibility associated with the

orientation of the close torque switch contact finger bracket opening and spreading of

36

the U shape bracket. The downward arrangement made it easier for the torque switch

contact finger to move out with spreading of the U shaped contact holder. The

inspectors reviewed the LER, the associated apparent cause evaluation analysis, and

interviewed Entergy staff. This LER is closed.

Introduction. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(b)(1) for Entergys

failure to include a function of a safety-related system within the scope of the

maintenance rule program. Specifically, Entergy failed to include the feedwater isolation

function performed by the MBFP discharge valves, MBFPs, and feedwater regulating

valves and feedwater isolation valves which are required to remain functional during and

following a design basis event to mitigate the consequences of an accident, within the

scope of the maintenance rule monitoring program.

Description. On March 7, 2016, during an RFO, the control switch for the 21 MBFP was

positioned to trip and the 21 MBFP tripped as designed, but the MBFP discharge valve

BFD-2-21 failed to fully close. Entergy declared MBFP discharge valve BFD-2-21

inoperable and entered TS 3.7.3 Condition C. After troubleshooting, Entergy determined

the MOV close torque switch contact finger was out of position within the contact holder.

The misalignment allowed the contact finger to move out of the proper position causing

the MOV BFD-2-21 to fail to close. This is the same failure mechanism which caused

MOV BFD-2-21 to fail to close in 2010 which is referenced in CR-IP2-2010-07013. On

December 5, 2015, the 21 MBFP failed to trip and required closure of the steam

admission valves to secure it. This failure occurred because of contaminated control oil

that prevented the solenoid valves from operating.

The inspectors reviewed Entergys maintenance rule basis documents and identified the

feedwater isolation function was not properly included in the maintenance rule

monitoring program as required by 10 CFR 50.65(b)(1). The basis document for the

feedwater system did identify the need to monitor the feedwater isolation function under

the maintenance rule and stated that it would be monitored as a part of the vapor

containment supersystem. However, the basis document for the vapor containment

supersystem does not include the feedwater isolation components within the system

boundaries. As a result, when component failures occurred which affected the

feedwater isolation function, they were not reviewed to determine if they were

maintenance rule functional failures; and Entergy was unable to identify that the

performance of the main feedwater isolation equipment was not effectively controlled

through preventative maintenance. Entergy entered this issue into the CAP as

CR-IP2-2016-03963 and initiated actions to include the MBFP discharge valves into the

maintenance rule program.

Analysis. The failure to appropriately scope the safety-related feedwater isolation

function within the maintenance rule program was a performance deficiency. This

finding is more than minor because it is associated with the SSC and barrier

performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and affected the cornerstone

objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the

public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the failure

to properly scope the feedwater isolation function prevented Entergy from identifying that

equipment reliability was no longer effectively controlled through preventative

maintenance. Additionally, this issue is similar to example 7.d described in IMC 0612,

Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, dated August 11, 2009. In accordance with

IMC 0609.04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Exhibit 2 of IMC 0609, Appendix

37

A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, issued June 19,

2012, the inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance

(Green) because the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical

integrity of reactor containment, containment isolation system, and heat removal

components. There are redundant methods of feedwater isolation. They include

tripping the MBFPs and closing the MBFP discharge valves, closing the main feedwater

regulating valves and low flow bypass valves, and closing the main feedwater isolation

valves. On both December 5, 2015, and March 7, 2016, the main feedwater regulating

valves and isolation valves were functional; so there was no loss of the ability to isolate

feedwater to mitigate accident and transient conditions.

This finding does not have a cross-cutting aspect, since the failure to scope this

equipment into the maintenance rule program was not recognized when Entergy

combined the maintenance rule basis documents for Units 2 and 3 in 2012 and as a

result, is not indicative of current licensee performance.

Enforcement. 10 CFR 50.65(b)(1) requires, in part, that the holders of an operating

license shall include within the scope of the monitoring program, specified in

10 CFR 50.65(a)(1), SSCs that are relied upon to remain functional during and following

design basis events. Contrary to the above, since the combined maintenance rule

scoping for Units 2 and 3 in 2012, Entergy failed to include within the scope of the

monitoring program specified in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1), the safety-related MBFP discharge

valves. These SSCs are relied upon during and after design basis events to mitigate the

consequences of a feedwater line break accident inside containment. Entergys

corrective action included entering this issue into the corrective action program.

Because the violation was of very low safety significance (Green) and Entergy entered

this issue into their CAP as CR-IP2-2016-03963, this violation is being treated as an

NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

(NCV 05000247/2016002-04, Failure to Scope Safety-Related Main Boiler Feedwater

Pump Discharge Valves into the Maintenance Rule Program)

4OA5 Other Activities

.1

Groundwater Contamination

a. Inspection Scope

On February 5, 2016, Entergy notified the NRC of a significant increase in groundwater

tritium levels measured at three monitoring wells (MWs) (MW-30, MW-31, and MW-32)

located near the Unit 2 fuel storage building. These samples were drawn on

January 26 to 27, 2016, and analyzed and confirmed on February 2 to 4, 2016. The

highest concentration was detected at MW-32, which increased from 12,000 pCi/l on

January 11, 2016, to 8,100,000 pCi/l on January 26, 2016, and subsequently up to

14,800,000 pCi/l on February 4, 2016. This increased tritium concentration event was

documented by Entergy in CR-IP2-2016-00564 which documents its investigation of this

event including a root cause evaluation. The inspectors reviewed Entergys root cause

evaluation for this event during this inspection period as well as recent groundwater

monitoring results.

38

b. Findings and Observations

No findings were identified.

Update to URI 05000247/2016001-07, January 2016 Groundwater Contamination

Entergy continues to conduct weekly, biweekly, and monthly groundwater sampling of

MWs at the initial site of groundwater contamination and at downstream wells towards

the Hudson River. For the initial three MWs (MW-30, MW-31, and MW-32), the general

trend in tritium activity has been downward, with periodic increases seen in some weekly

samples. The downstream MWs located in the Unit 2 switchyard (especially MW-55)

showed an initial increase in activity up to 117,000 pCi/l, but the activity at that location

has plateaued at the end of the reporting period.

Entergy documented its investigation of this event as root cause evaluation for

CR-IP2-2016-00564. The inspectors reviewed Entergys root cause evaluation for this

event. Entergy concluded that the source of the groundwater contamination was from

the reject water of a temporary reverse osmosis unit used to process water from the

refueling water storage tank at Unit 2 in preparation for RFO 2R22. Although this

analysis documents a number of issues identified during the operation of the contractor

reverse osmosis unit, which is believed to be the source of the groundwater

contamination, one of two leakage paths to groundwater have still not been established.

The established pathway involves leakage from two cut drain lines located above the

floor on the 35-foot elevation of the PAB. Further investigation by Entergy following the

conclusion of the Unit 2 RFO 2R22 must be conducted to verify the second pathway to

groundwater via the floor of the fuel storage building truck bay.

Entergys long-term corrective action for reducing tritium levels in the groundwater is the

same as previously identified for the March 2014 tritium spike (CR-IP2-2015-03806), the

start-up and operation of recovery well (RW)-1. Following installation of equipment and

system testing, full operation of the RW system is expected later this year. This system

will allow for the collection of tritiated groundwater in the vicinity of Unit 2 to be returned

inside the Unit 2 PAB for processing. The NRC will be conducting an inspection in

August 2016 to review the testing plan and results of the RW-1 tests. This inspection

will include a specialist region-based inspector, and a staff hydrogeologist.

The NRCs continuing assessment of the safety significance of this event focused on

validating the safety impact of dose to the public from the release of tritium to the site

groundwater, and ultimately to the Hudson River. The NRC verified that Entergys

bounding public dose calculations on the groundwater contamination leak was

sufficiently conservative and a maximum worst case scenario would result in a dose of

0.000112 millirem per year, which represents a very small fraction of the allowable dose

(liquid effluent dose objective of 3 millirem per year). This low value is due to

groundwater at Indian Point not being a source of any drinking water. There are no

drinking water wells on the Indian Point site, groundwater flow from the site is to the

Hudson River and not to any near site drinking water wells, and the Hudson River has

no downstream drinking water intakes as it is brackish water. Pathways to the public are

therefore limited to the consumption of fish and river invertebrates. The inspection

determined that there is no safety impact to the public as a result of this groundwater

contamination event. (URI 05000247/2016001-07, January 2016 Groundwater

Contamination)

39

.2

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Report Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors also reviewed the final report for the INPO equipment reliability scram

review visit that was conducted to review the scrams that occurred over the past two

years, conducted in June 2016. The inspectors reviewed the report to ensure that any

issues identified were consistent with NRC perspectives of Entergy performance and to

determine if INPO identified any significant safety issues that required further NRC

follow-up.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On August 4, 2016, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Larry Coyle,

Site Vice President, and other members of Entergy. Based on additional information

provided, the inspectors conducted an updated exit meeting on August 30, 2016 with

John Kirkpatrick, Plant Operations General Manager and other members of Entergy.

The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or

documented in this report.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

A-1

Attachment

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Entergy Personnel

A. Vitale, Site Vice President

J. Kirkpatrick, Plant Operations General Manager

R. Alexander, Unit 2 Shift Manager

R. Andersen, Maintenance Instrumentation and Controls Superintendent

N. Azevedo, Engineering Supervisor

J. Baker, Shift Manager

S. Bianco, Operations Fire Marshal

K. Brooks, Assistant Operations Manager

R. Burroni, Engineering Director

T. Chan, Engineering Supervisor

C. Chapin, Training Superintendent

D. Dewey, Assistant Operations Manager

J. Dignam, Unit 3 Control Room Supervisor

R. Dolansky, Inservice Inspection Program Manager

W. Durr, Outage Control Center Manager

R. Drake, Engineering Supervisor

K. Elliott, Fire Protection Engineer

J. Ferrick, Regulatory and Performance Improvement Director

L. Frink, Radiation Protection Supervisor

D. Gagnon, Security Manager

L. Glander, Emergency Preparedness Manager

D. Gray, Radiological Environmental Manager

J. Johnson, Unit 2 Control Room Supervisor

M. Johnson, Unit 3 Shift Manager

M. Khadabux, Instrumentation and Controls Supervisor

F. Kich, Performance Improvement Manager

M. Lewis, Unit 3 Assistant Operations Manager

N. Lizzo, Training Manager

S. McAllister, Baffle Bolt Replacement Project Manager

M. McCarthy, Unit 3 Control Room Supervisor

B. McCarthy, Operations Manager

F. Mitchell, Radiation Protection Manager

E. Mullek, Maintenance Manager

S. Stevens, Radiation Protection Operations Superintendent

B. Sullivan, Training Superintendent

J. Taylor, Unit 3 Shift Manager

M. Tesoriero, Outage Control Center Manager

M. Troy, Nuclear Oversight Manager

R. Walpole, Regulatory Assurance Manager

A. Zastrow, Assistant Operations Manager

A-2

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, DISCUSSED, AND UPDATED

Opened 05000247/2016002-01

URI

CVCS Goal Monitoring Under the Maintenance

Rule (Section 1R12)

Opened/Closed 05000286/2016002-02

NCV

Failure to Follow Operability Determination

Procedure for Unit 3 Baffle-Former Bolts

(Section 1R15)05000247/2016002-03

NCV

Failure to Maintain Flow Channeling Gates Closed

in Accordance with the Containment Procedure

(Section 1R20)05000247/2016002-04

NCV

Failure to Scope Safety-Related Main Boiler

Feedwater Pump Discharge Valves into the

Maintenance Rule Program (Section 4OA3)

Closed

05000247/2015-003-00

LER

Manual Reactor Trip due to Indications of Multiple

Dropped Control Rods Caused by Loss of Control

Rod Power Due to a Power Supply Failure

(Section 4OA3)

05000247/2016-003-00

LER

Technical Specification Prohibited Condition

Due to an Inoperable 21 Main Boiler Feedwater

Pump Discharge Valve for Greater Than the TS

Allowed Outage Time (Section 4OA3)

Discussed 05000247/2016001-01

URI

Baffle-Former Bolts with Identified Anomalies

(Section 1R08)05000247/2016001-06

URI

Emergency Diesel Generator Automatic Voltage

Regulator Failure (Section 1R15)05000247/2016001-07

URI

January 2016 Groundwater Contamination

Section (Section 4OA5)

A-3

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Common Documents Used

Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, UFSARs

Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, Individual Plant Examinations

Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, Individual Plant Examination of External Events

Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, TSs and Bases

Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, Technical Requirements Manuals

Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, Control Room Narrative Logs

Indian Point Unit 2 and Unit 3, Plans of the Day

Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment

Procedures

2-COL-4.2.1, Residual Heat Removal System, Revision 30

2-COL-4.3.1, Spent Fuel Pit Cooling, Revision 10

2-COL-24.1.1, Service Water System, Revision 50

3-COL-EL-005, Diesel Generators, Revision 37

OAP-019, Component Verification and System Status Control, Revision 7

OAP-044, Plant Labeling Program, Revision 3

Condition Reports (CR-IP2)

2016-01311

2016-01505

2016-01761

2016-02330

2016-02428

2016-02470

Condition Reports (CR-IP3)

2016-01382

2016-01810

Drawings

209762, Flow Diagram Service Water System Nuclear Steam Supply Plant, Revision 75

227781, Flow Diagram Auxiliary Coolant System, Revision 22

9321-2720, Auxiliary Coolant System, Sheet 2, Revision 22

Miscellaneous

IP3-DBD-308, CCW System, Revision 3

Section 1R05: Fire Protection

Procedures

EN-MA-133, Control of Scaffolding, Revision 12

Condition Reports (CR-IP2)

2016-04148

Condition Reports (CR-IP3)

2016-01272

Miscellaneous

PFP-203, Containment Building, 95-Foot Elevation (Fire Zone 86A), Revision 15

PFP-204, General Floor Plan, PAB, 15-Foot Elevation, Revision 0

PFP-209, Component Cooling Pump Room, PAB, 68-Foot Elevation, Revision 0

PFP-211, General Floor Plan, PAB, 80-Foot Elevation, Revision 14

PFP-351, 480V Switchgear Room, Revision 15

A-4

Section 1R07: Heat Sink Performance

Procedures

0-HTX-405-EDG, EDG Lube Oil and Jacket Water Heat Exchanger Maintenance, Revision 4

Condition Reports (CR-IP3)

2010-02900

2011-03594

2011-03596

2011-03961

2012-02071

2012-03912

2013-02338

2013-02695

2013-03009

2014-00957

2014-01239

2014-03158

2014-03175

2015-00031

2015-00599

2015-02848

2015-05209

2015-05526

2016-00886

2016-00895

2016-00899

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

WO 52489888

WO 52626563

Miscellaneous

SEP-SW-IPC-001, Indian Point Energy Center NRC Generic Letter 89-13 Service Water

Program, Revision 0

Section 1R08: Inservice Inspection Activities

Procedures

GBRA-104-659, Collection of Protocols for Baffle Bolt Replacement, Revision C

GBRA-175-115, Field Service Procedure for Baffle Bolt Replacement, Revision 3

WDI-STD-088, Underwater Remote Visual Examination of Reactor Vessel Internals,

Revision 13

WDI-STD-1073, Ultrasonic Test Procedure for the Inspection of Internal Hex Head

Baffle-Former Bolts with Welded Lock Bars, Revision 4

Condition Reports (CR-IP2)

2016-02081

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

442412-13

Miscellaneous

Indian Point Unit 2 Baffle Bolt Ultrasonic Examination Expanded Analysis Report, dated

April 28, 2016

IP2 Reactor Vessel Visual Examination Report, dated May 2006

Loose Parts Inventory Log for Baffle Bolt Replacements, dated May 24, 2016

MRP-227-A, Materials Reliability Program: Pressurized Water Reactor Internals Inspection and

Evaluation Guidelines (ML120170453)

MRP-228, Materials Reliability Program: Inspection Standard for PWR Internals - 2012 Update,

Revision 1

SEP-ISI-IP2-001, IP2 Fourth Ten-Year Interval Inservice Inspection (ISI)/Containment Inservice

Inspection (CISI) Program Plan, Revision 2

WDI-PJF-1315504-EPP-001, Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant MRP-227-A Reactor Vessel

Internals Examination Program Plan, Revision 0

WDI-PJF-1315505-FSR-001, Indian Point Unit 2 2R22 MRP-227-A Baffle-Former Bolt

Ultrasonic Inspections Field Service Report, dated March 29, 2016

WDI-TJ-1100, Technical Justification for the Ultrasonic Inspection of Baffle-Former Bolts for

Indian Point Units 2 and 3, Revision 1

A-5

Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program

Procedures

2-AOP-480V-1, Loss of Normal Power to Any 480V Vital Bus, Revision 8

2-AOP-RCP-1, Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunction, Revision 14

2-AOP-TURB-1, Main Turbine Trip without a Reactor Trip, Revision 5

2-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Revision 7

2-FR-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink, Revision 11

2-POP-1.2, Reactor Startup, Revision 59

2-SOP-26.4, Turbine Generator Startup, Synchronizing, Voltage Control and Shutdown,

Revision 62

3-AOP-480V-1, Loss of Normal Power to Any Safeguards Bus, Revision 7

3-AOP-CVCS-1, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, Revision 8

3-AOP-FW-1, Loss of Feedwater, Revision 8

3-AOP-INST-1, Instrument/Controller Failures, Revision 11

3-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Revision 6

3-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Revision 4

3-FR-C.2, Response to Degraded Core Cooling, Revision 3

Condition Reports (CR-IP2)

2016-03946

2016-04162

2016-04164

2016-04165

2016-04169

2016-04178

Condition Reports (CR-IP3)

2016-01087

2016-01092

2016-01098

2016-01336

Miscellaneous

13SX-LOR-SES026, Licensed Operator Requalification Program Scenario

Emergency Action Level Table, Revision 15.2

LRQ-SES-04, IPEC Simulator Evaluated Scenario, Revision 6

Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness

Procedures

CEP-NDE-0640, Non-Section XI Liquid Penetrant Examination, Revision 9

CEP-WP-WIIR-1, Attachment 5.1, Inprocess Inspections for Installation and Replacement

Welds Located Inside the ASME Section XI Boundary, Revision 3

EN-DC-206, Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Process, Revision 3

Condition Reports (CR-IP2)

2010-00864

2013-03130

2014-00162

2014-00185

2014-01144

2014-02184

2015-00278

2016-01260

2016-01430

2016-01500

Condition Reports (CR-IP3)

2012-03836

2013-04758

2015-01396

2015-03404

2015-03653

2015-04053

2015-04162

2015-04184

2015-04539

2015-05316

2015-05384

2015-05729

A-6

2016-00098

2016-00653

2016-00723

2016-01189

2016-01227

2016-01274

2016-01313

2016-01531

2016-01536

2016-01543

2016-02432

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

WO 00397793

WO 00408019

WO 00414886

WO 00416091

WO 00421841

WO 00429532

WO 00429532

WO 00431497

WO 00446165

WO 00447042

WO 00447966

WO 52602429

WO 52621178

Miscellaneous

EC 65389, 21 CCW HX Leak Repair: Service Water Inlet Nozzle - Elbow Weld Configuration

Change

IPEC Maintenance Rule Basis Document - Chemical and Volume Control System, Revision 0

PQR 913, 134 F42 MN-GTAW ASME IX Welding Procedure Qualification Record, Revision 0

System Health Report, Unit 3, EDG, Q1-2016

Weld Map Number 447966-20-01, Revision 0

WPS 134 F42, MN-GTAW, ASME Section IX Welding Procedure Specification, Revision 0

Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Procedures

EN-OP-119, Protected Equipment, Revision 8

IP-SMM-OU-104, Attachment 9.1, Shiftly Outage Shutdown Safety Assessments, Revision 15

IP-SMM-OU-104, Attachment 9.2, Shiftly Outage Shutdown Safety Assessment Guidelines,

Revision 15

Condition Reports (CR-IP2)

2016-04141

Condition Reports (CR-IP3)

2016-01545

Miscellaneous

EOOS Risk Assessment Software Tool

Section 1R15: Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Procedures

2-PC-R3-1, Pressurizer Level Transmitters, Revision 10

3-ARP-010, Metal Impact Monitoring System, Page 10, Revision 32

3-SOP-RCS-016, Operation of the Metal Impact Monitoring System, Revision 8

EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, Revision 10

Condition Reports (CR-IP2)

2016-2221

2016-2356

2016-2961

2016-3345

2016-3418

2016-3660

2016-3636

2016-3784

2016-3806

2016-3818

2016-4085

Condition Reports (CR-IP3)

2014-01670

2015-03468

A-7

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

WO 00327574

WO 00425980

WO 52571030

Miscellaneous

EN-LI-100, Attachment 9.1, Change Channel Check Comparison Criteria/2-PT-M100,

2-PT-D001, Revision 0

Section 1R18: Plant Modifications

Drawings

10073E87-001, Indian Point Unit 2 Baffle Bolt Replacement - Core Barrel and Baffle Assembly

Elevation, Revision 0

10111D06, Indian Point Unit 2 Baffle Bolt Replacement - Replacement Baffle Bolt .625

and .750, Revision 0

Miscellaneous

EC 64308, IP2 Reactor Vessel Equivalent Replacement Baffle-to-Former Bolt, Revision 0

Process Applicability Determination Form for EC 64308, dated April 21, 2016

WCAP-18136-P, Replacement Type 316 Cold-Worked Baffle-Former Bolt Qualification for

Indian Point Unit 2, Revision 0

Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures

3-PT-M079B, 32 EDG Functional Test, Revision 52

2-PC-Q109-4, Recalibration of NIS and OT/OP Delta-T Parameters - Channel IV, Revision 44

Condition Reports (CR-IP2)

2016-03961

2016-04266

Condition Reports (CR-IP3)

2016-01189

2016-01199

2016-01218

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

WO 00414886

WO 00420649

WO 00446094

WO 00447966

WO 52545181

WO 52626563

WO 52626564

WO 52630619

WO 52630620

WO 52658943

WO 00236158

WO 00277374

WO 52571030

Drawings

5651D72, Logic Diagrams Steam Generator Trip Signals, Revision 7

Miscellaneous

EC 64545, Emergency Temporary Modification to Disconnect 32 EDG Generator Space Heater

Adjacent to End Plate on Outboard End of Generator

FIX00091, Pressurizer Level Uncertainty - Indication, Trip Setpoints, and Annunciation

Setpoints, Revision 1

E-mail from J. Michetti to G. Newman, dated July 19, 2016, Subject: Westinghouse Report

on E9

A-8

Section 1R20: Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Procedures

2-POP-1.1, Plant Heatup from Cold Shutdown, Revision 90

2-POP-1.2, Reactor Startup, Revision 59

2-POP-1.3, Plant Startup from Zero to 45 Percent Power, Revision 89

2-POP-3.1, Plant Shutdown from 45 Percent Power, Revision 58

2-POP-3.3, Plant Cooldown, Hot to Cold Shutdown, Revision 81

2-POP-3.4, Secondary Plant Shutdown, Revision 10

2-POP-4.1, Operation at Cold Shutdown, Revision 5

2-POP-4.2, Operation Below 20 Percent Pressurizer Level with Fuel in the Reactor, Revision 8

2-POP-4.3, Operation without Fuel in the Reactor, Revision 1

Condition Reports (CR-IP2-)

2016-04118

2016-04119

2016-04123

2016-03124

2016-04126

2016-04129

2016-04130

2016-04131

2016-04132

2016-04139

2016-04141* 2016-04142*

2016-04144

2016-04145

2016-04146

2016-04148* 2016-04151

2016-04152

2016-04155

2016-04161

2016-04162

2016-04165

2016-04169

  • NRC identified

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

52681465

Miscellaneous

2R22 Performance Indicator Curves Daily from March 7 to June 14, 2016

Outage Schedules and Plans of the Day from March 7 to June 14, 2016

Westinghouse LTR-PL-16-16, Operability Assessment for Primary Side Loose Parts at Indian

Point Unit 2, Revision 0, dated March 27, 2016

Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing

Procedures

0-SOP-LEAKRATE-001, RCS Leakrate Surveillance Evaluation and Leak Identification,

Revision 6

2-PT-D001, Control Room Operations Surveillance Requirements, Revision 16

2-PT-M029B, 22 Safety Injection Pump, Revision 20

2-PT-Q013, Inservice Valve Tests, Revision 51

2-PT-Q013-DS040, Valve 887B Inservice Test Data Sheet, Revision 22

3-PT-M079B, 32 EDG Functional Test, Revision 52

Condition Reports (CR-IP2)

2016-03360

2016-03363

Condition Reports (CR-IP3)

2016-01716

2016-01752

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

WO 00443040

WO 00446385

WO 00446867

WO 52681652-01

WO 52681646-01

A-9

Miscellaneous

EC 64855, EC Reply to Provide Input Regarding MPR Maintenance Bulletin MB-2007-01 for

Auto Voltage Regulator Solder Joints

MB-2007-01, Potential for Solder Joint Cracks on Basler SBSR Auto Voltage Regulator Cards

and Technical Manual Addendum TM-2007-01, November 5, 2007

Unit 3 RCS Routine Activity Sample, 28-June-16-10006

Section 1EP6: Drill Evaluation

Procedures

IP-EP-120, Emergency Classification, Revision 10

IP-EP-410, Protective Action Recommendations, Revision 11

Section 2RS7: Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program

Procedures

0-CY-1920, REMP Land Use Census, Revision 1

0-CY-1980, Preparation, Placement and Collection of Site Environmental Thermoluminescent

Dosimeters, Revision 2

Condition Reports (CR-IP2)

2014-05319

2015-00948

2015-01300

2015-02687

2015-02800

2015-02987

2015-03271

2015-03396

2016-02313

Condition Reports (CR-IP3)

2016-00514

Miscellaneous

2014 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report, Indian Point Nos. 1, 2, and 3

2015 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report, Indian Point Nos. 1, 2, and 3

Environmental Dosimetry Company, Annual Quality Assurance Status Report,

January to December 2015

Indian Point Energy Center ODCM, Revision 4

June 2015 to May 2016 Meteorological Data Recovery

Met One Instruments, Inc. Certificates of Calibration for Temperature, Wind Direction, and Wind

Speed

Teledyne Brown Engineering Environmental Services Annual 2015 Quality Assurance Report

Exelon PowerLabs Certificates of Calibration for Gas Meters

3471875

3482909

3471871

3471867

3482920

3471873

3482910

3482916

3471877

3482914

3482918

3482921

3471881

3471879

3471872

3471869

3471880

3482908

Quality Assurance

Quality Assurance Audit Report QA-2-6-2015-IP-1, Chemistry, Effluents, and Environmental

Monitoring Snapshot Self-Assessment, LO-IP3LO-2015-00126, Chemistry-REMP

Section 4OA2: Problem Identification and Resolution

Procedures

EN-DC-204, Maintenance Rule Scope and Basis, Revision 3

EN-DC-204, Maintenance Rule Scope and Basis, Revision 3

EN-DC-207, Maintenance Rule Periodic Assessment, Revision 3

A-10

EN-LI-102, Corrective Action Program, Revision 26

EN-LI-104, Self-Assessment and Benchmark Process, Revision 11

EN-LI-110-01, Equipment Failure Evaluation, Revision 0

EN-LI-119, Apparent Cause Evaluation Process, Revision 11

EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process, Revision 10

Condition Reports (CR-IP2)

2010-07013

2015-04574

2015-05458

2015-05460

2015-05461

2015-05464

2015-05466

2015-05467

2016-01374

2016-02348

Condition Reports (CR-IP3)

2015-3628

2016-01035

2016-01961

Maintenance Orders/Work Orders

WO 00442412

Apparent Cause Evaluations

IP2-2015-05458

Drawings

504405, Sheet 1 of 2, Replacement Baffle Bolt Location Matrix, Revision 0

504405, Sheet 2 of 2, Replacement Baffle Bolt Location Matrix, Revision 0

Miscellaneous

61265, Temporary Modification Control Form-Install Additional Temporary Spare Power Supply

Inside Rod Control Cabinet 2BD to Restore Margin, Revision 0

Appendix A to Facility Operating License DPR-64, Technical Specifications and Basis For The

Indian Point 3 Nuclear Generating Station Unit No.3, Through Amendment 260

CN-RIDA-15-43, Indian Point Units 2 and 3 Acceptable Baffle-Former Bolting LOCA and

Seismic Analysis, Revision 2

Engineering Change 63938, As-left condition of the baffle-former plate assembly following the

replacement of degraded bolts, Revision 0

EPRI TR-112209, Analysis of Baffle Former Bolt Cracking in EDF CPO Plants (PWRMRP-03),

dated June 1999

Indian Point Entergy Center (IPEC) Unit 3, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, dated May

2013

IP-RPT-16-00025, Evaluation of Indian Point Unit 3 Reactor Core Baffle Bolting Following MRP-

227-A Inspection Findings at Indian Point Unit 2 during 2R22, Revision 0

LO-IP3LO-2015-72

LTR-PL-16-21, Transmittal of Indian Point Unit 3 Final Engineering Evaluations Supporting

Extent of Condition Review, Revision 0

LTR-RIDA-16-103, Indian Point Unit 2 Baffle Bolting Anti-Clustering Pattern and Margin

Assessment, Revision 0

LTR-RIDA-16-152, Indian Point Unit 3 Baffle Bolt Leak Before Break Operability Assessment,

Revision 0

LTR-RIDA-16-60, Indian Point Unit 2 Baffle Bolting One Cycle Replacement Pattern Summary

Letter, Revision 0

MRP-227-A, Materials Reliability Program: Pressurized Water Reactor Internals Inspection and

Evaluation Guidelines (ML120170453)

Operation Decision Making Issue Action Plan for IP3 Baffle Bolt Monitoring, dated May 19, 2016

WCAP-15029-NP-A, Westinghouse Methodology for Evaluating the Acceptability of Baffle-

Former-Barrel Bolting Distributions Under Faulted Load Conditions, Revision 0

(ML15222A882)

A-11

WCAP-17949-P, Background and Technical Basis Supporting Engineering Flaw Acceptance

Criteria for Indian Point Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Internals MRP-227-A Primary and

Expansion Components, Revision 1

WCAP-18048-P, Determination of Acceptable Baffle-Former Bolting for Indian Point Units 2 and

3, Revision 0

Section 4OA5: Other Activities

Miscellaneous

INPO Letter, INPO Equipment Reliability Scram Review Visit, May 31, 2016

Root Cause Evaluation for CR-IP2-2016-00564

A-12

LIST OF ACRONYMS

10 CFR

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations

ADAMS

Agencywide Document Access and Management System

ALARA

as low as is reasonably achievable

AVR

automatic voltage regulator

CAP

corrective action program

CCW

component cooling water

CR

condition report

CVCS

chemical and volume control system

EC

engineering change

ECCS

emergency core cooling system

EDG

emergency diesel generator

GPI

groundwater protection initiative

IASCC

irradiation-assisted stress-corrosion cracking

IMC

Inspection Manual Chapter

INPO

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations

LER

licensee event report

LOCA

loss-of-coolant accident

MBFP

main boiler feedwater pump

MCC

motor control center

MOV

motor operated valve

MRP

materials reliability program

MW

monitoring well

NCV

non-cited violation

NRC

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, U.S.

ODCM

offsite dose calculation manual

OOS

out of service

PAB

primary auxiliary building

PFP

pre-fire plan

RCS

reactor coolant system

REMP

radiological environmental monitoring program

RFO

refueling outage

RW

recovery well

SI

safety injection

SSC

structure, system, and component

TS

technical specification

UFSAR

updated final safety evaluation report

URI

unresolved item

UT

ultrasonic testing

WO

work order