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{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML17223B214
| number = ML17223B101
| issue date = 06/13/1991
| issue date = 02/06/1991
| title = Forwards Closeout Summary Rept for NRC Bulletin 79-02,per NRC Request During Insps 50-335/91-02 & 50-389/91-02 Including Schedule for Completion of Remaining as-built Activities
| title = Insp Repts 50-335/91-02 & 50-389/91-02 on 910114-18.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Previous Open Items Re safety-related Piping Sys
| author name = SAGER D A
| author name = Blake J, Chou R
| author affiliation = FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
| addressee affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
| addressee affiliation =  
| docket = 05000335, 05000389
| docket = 05000335, 05000389
| license number =  
| license number =  
| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| document report number = IEB-79-02, IEB-79-2, L-91-163, NUDOCS 9106240003
| document report number = 50-335-91-02, 50-335-91-2, 50-389-91-02, 50-389-91-2, NUDOCS 9102200025
| document type = CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS, INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
| package number = ML17223B100
| page count = 4
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS
| page count = 10
}}
}}


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=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:ACCELERATED BISTRIBUTION DEMONSTPJ!!.TION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)SSION NBR: 9106240003 DOC.DATE: 91/06/13 NOTARIZED:
{{#Wiki_filter:UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
NO ACIL:50-335 St.Lucie Plant, Unit 1, Florida Power&Light Co.50-389 St.Lucie Plant, Unit 2, Florida Power&Light Co.AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION SAGER,D.A.


Florida Power&Light Co.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)SUBJECT: Forwards closeout summary rept for NRC Bulletin 79-02,per NRC request during Insps 50-335/91-02
==REGION II==
&50-389/91-02 include.ng schedule for completion of remaining as-built activities.
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.


DISTRIBUTION CODE: IEOID COPIES RECEIVED:LTR i ENCL!SIZE: TITLE: General (50 Dkt)-Insp Rept/Notice of Vi&o ation Response'NOTES DOCKET 05000335 05000389 D A RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD2-2 PD INTERNAL: ACRS AEOD/DEIIB DEDRO NRR SHANKMAN,S NRR/DOEA/OEAB NRR/DRIS/DIR NRR/PMAS/I LRB12 0&DI-G FILE 02 EXTERNAL: EG&G/BRYCE,J.H.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Wp*y4 Report NoseI 50-335/91-02 and 50-389/91-02 Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:
50-335 and 50-389 Facility Name:
St.


NSIC COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 l.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME NORRIS,J AEOD AEOD/TPAB NRR MORISSEAU,D NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 NRR/DREP/PEPB9H NRR/DST/DIR 8E2 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT OGC/HDS3 RGN2 FILE 01 NRC PDR COPIES LTTR ENCL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1'" 1 1" 1 1 D S R D S NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS:
Lucie 1 and
D D PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE iVASTE!CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM Pl-37 (EXT.20079)TO ELIMINATE YOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!TAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 24 ENCL 24 P.O.Box 128, k.Pierce, FL 34954-0128 APL JUN i 8$9l L-91-163 U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.20555 Gentlemen:
Re: St.Lucie Units Unit 1&2 Docket Nos.50-335 and 50-389 NRC Ins ection Re ort 91-02 During NRC Inspection 91-02 at St.Lucie Plant, Mr.R.C.Chou an NRC Region II Inspector asked Florida Power&Light for a closeout summary report for IE Bulletin.79-02.The requested summary is attached.This report includes a schedule for completion of the remaining as-building activities associated with the bulletin.Should there be any questions please contact us.Very truly yours, D.A.ger Vice esident St.Lu ie Plant DAS:JJB:kw Attachment cc: Stewart D.Ebneter, Regional Administrator, USNRC Region II Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, St.Lucie Plant Richard C.Chou, Engineering Branch, USNRC Region II DAS/PSL 4450i 9i06240003 9i0613 PDR ADOCK 0500033 9 PDR an FPL Group company rx Attachment to L-91-163 Page 1 of 2ST.LUCIE UNITS 1&2 NRC IE BULLETIN 79-02,"PIPE SUPPORT BASE PLATE DESIGNS USING CONCRETE EXPANSION ANCHOR BOLTS" CLOSEOUT SUMMARY NRC IE Bulletin No.79-02,"Pipe Support Base Plate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts", was issued by the NRC in March, 1979 with a revision in June, 1979, and a supplement in August, 1979, to address potential problems with industry practices associated with the design of concrete expansion anchors for safety related pipe supports.Florida Power and Light (FPL)provided responses to this bulletin via letters L-79-180, July 2, 1979 (St.Lucie Unit 82)and L-79-183, July 5, 1979 (St.Lucie Unit 81).-Additionally, the 79-02 Bulletin resolution for St.Lucie Unit 82 was documented in the original issue of the Final Safety Analys'is Report (Appendix 3.9B).In August, 1979, the NRC conducted an inspection at the St.Lucie site to review FPL's response to the 79-02 Bulletin (Report Nos.50-335/79-22 and 50-389/79-16).


This report indicated that FPL's initial response to the bulletin had been found acceptable.
Inspection Conducted:
January 14-18 1991 Inspector:
C, Rich.C.


However, for St.Lucie Unit 1, the report requested additional information in order to address small.bore piping and also requested that all inspection records be maintained at the site.These requests were satisfied via FPL letter L-80-1, dated January 4, 1980.No additional action was requested for St.Lucie Unit 2.In October, 1987, the NRC conducted another inspection at the St.Lucie site to verify licensee compliance with'ulletin 79-02 requirements and commitments (Report Nos 50-335/87-26 and 50-389/87-25).
Ch u
Approved by:
,
iz/Slu J./ J/
1 ake, Chs ef Mkterials and Processes Section Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety License NoseI DPR-67 and NPF-16 Date 1gned Date Signed SUMMARY Scope:
This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of previous open items concerning safety-related piping systems.


Five (5)Unresolved Items (UNR's)and one (1)Inspection Followup Item (IFI)were opened as a result of, this inspection.
Results:
In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.


In October, 1988, the NRC conducted a followup inspection to the October, 1987 inspection (Report Nos.50-335/88-28 and 50-389/88-28).
Seven open items were closed.


This inspection closed four (4)of the unresolved issues from the October, 1987 inspection.
The licensee was very cooperative during the inspection.


Two (2)UNR's and'ne (1)IFI remained open and one (1)additional UNR and five (5)additional IFI's were opened.This report stated that IEB 79-02, for both Units 1&2, was considered closed, except for the specific open UNR's and IFI's.During the week of January 14, 1991, a followup inspection was conducted by the NRC in order to close out the remaining open items from the October, 1987 and October, 1988 inspections.
'000335 PDR ADOCK 05000335 G


At the entrance interview, the NRC inspector was provided with Report No.132-63.5000, Rev.2, dated January 14, 1991.This report provided FPL's final response to each of the open UNR's and IFI's.Based on the contents of FPL's report, and additionalinformation provided to the NRC inspector during the audit, the NRC inspector stated that all UNR's and IFI's would be closed.The only remaining FPL action items related to IEB 79-02 were the issuance of the as-built support drawings identified in the responses to several of the UNR's.These revised drawings have now been issued under PC/M's 229-188-(Unit 1)and 230-288 (Unit 2).The turnover of these PC/M's, and final updating of the record support drawings, is scheduled to be completed by September 6, 1991.All calculations for these supports have also been revised to reflect the as-built configurations.
REPORT DETAILS 1.


ST04.079
Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
~IC Attachment to L-91-163 Page 2 of 2This submittal represents a summary of the closeout activities associated with IEB 79-02 and related UNR's and IFI's.All FPL activities associated with this bulletin have been completed, with the exception of the final drawing asbuilding described above.Accordingly IEB 79-02 is considered closed for St.Lucie Units 1&2.References:
*G. Boissy, Plant Manager
1.NRC IE Bulletin 79-02,"Safety-Related Pipe Supports and Pipe Support Base Plate Design Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts," Revision 0, dated March 8, 1979 and Revision 2, dated November 8, 1979.2.Letter L-79-180,"Docket 50-389, IE Bulletin 79-02", from R.E.Uhrig (FPL)to J.P.O'Reilly (NRC), dated July 2, 1979.3.Letter L-79-183,"Docket 50-335, IE Bulletin 79-02", from R.E.Uhrig (FPL)to J.P.O'Reilly (NRC), dated July 5, 1979.I 4.St.Lucie Unit 2, Final Safety.Analysis Report.'.s.U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission Report Nos.50-335/79-22 and 50-389/79-16
*J. Brady, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor
-Safety-Related Pipe Supports and Pipe Support Base Plate Design Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts, dated September 12, 1979.Letter L-80-1,"Docket 50-335, IE Bulletin 79-02", from R.E.Uhrig (FPL)to J.P.O'Reilly (NRC), dated January 4, 1980.7.US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Report 50-335/87-26 and 50-389/87-25- Safety-Related Pipe Supports and Pipe Support Base Plate Design Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts, dated December 29, 1987.8.'S Nuclear Regulatory Commission Report 50-335/88-28 and 50-389/88-28- Safety-Related Pipe Supports and Pipe Support Base Plate Design Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts, dated December 21, 1988.9.Ebasco Report No.132-63.5000,"Evaluation of Pipe Support and Expansion Anchor Non-Conformance", dated January 14, 1991.10.PC/H 229-188, Rev.1,"Miscellaneous Restraint Modifications".
*J. Breen, Licensing
*J. Chapman, Nuclear Engineer
*D. Culpepper, Engineering Supervisor
*R. Dawson, Maintenance Superintendent W. Dean, Technical Support Supervisor - Electrical Maintenance
*J. Dyer, Quality Control (QC) Supervisor
*R. Englmeier, Site Quality Manager
*R. Gil, Nuclear Engineer - Juno Beach W. Haines, Production Supervisor - Mechanical
*L. McLaughlin, Licensing Supervisor
*B. Parks, QC Superintendent L. Rogers, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor P. Sarno, Planning Supervisor - Maintenance
*R. Toscano, Mechanical Maintenance Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.


ll.PC/M 230-288, Rev.0,"Hiscellaneous Restraint Modifications".
NRC Resident Inspectors
*M. Scott, Resident Inspector
*Attended exit interview 2.


STOL.079
Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)
a.
 
(Closed)
Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 50-335,389/88-09-01, Clarification of Requirements for Post-Maintenance Test and In-service Test I
This IFI concerned inconsistencies between the front sheet of Plant Work Order (PWO)
and the forms of Appendix B of procedure QI-ll-PR/
PSL-2 for Post-Maintenance Tests (PNT)
and In-service Tests (IST).
 
The inspector discussed this matter with the licensee's engineers and reviewed five PWOs and the revised procedure QI-ll-PR/PSL-2, Rev.
 
19.
 
During review of the five PWOs, the inspector found similar inconsistencies, indicating that the licensee did not clear the confusion or inconsistencies with the revised procedure implemented in the PWO forms.
 
The inspector discovered three problems in the PWO forms and procedure and discussed them with the licensee's engineer The first problem is a confusion between PMT and IST.
 
The confusion exists because the test required marked
"yes" for IST in the front sheet of PWO, but the actual tests performed'ere marked in the non-IST (or non-ASME test)
in the forms of Appendix 8 of the procedure which was attached to the PWO.
 
This meant that the tests were performed under PNT.
 
The current definition for PMT and IST are:
PMT
-
Test required for all components under the Technical Specification or ASME Code after the maintenance and modifications were performed.
 
IST
-
Test required for all components under the ASNE Code after the maintenance or modifications were performed.
 
Therefore, the ASNE Code components are required to have PNT and IST, but actually they are same test and only one test.
 
PMT is also IST in this case.
 
To separate PNT and IST and to eliminate this problem, the licensee will revise Appendix B of procedure gI-11-PR/
PSL-2 to clearly indicate that IST is for ASME Code components only and PNT is for all non-ASME Code components but required by the Technical Specification or other special test requirements.
 
The second problem is a title clarification in the front sheet of a PWO.
 
The title in the front sheet of PWO is an ASME Code component and the actual test is in the associated component which is not ASME Code component.
 
The computer automatically printed "yes" in the IST required block since this is an ASME Code component.
 
But the actual test is in the non-ASME Code component and PNT for non-ASME Code component is marked.
 
For example, on the Work Request No. XA-901227111021, Unit 2, the title of CHG PP 2A was written and was a charging pump which is required to have IST per ASME Code.
 
The actual work or test was on the vent valve.
 
The IST required block in the front sheet of the PWO was marked
"yes" by the computer, since this is an ASNE Code component which is required to have IST.
 
The actual test sheet, the Appendix B form of procedure gI-11-PR/PSL-2, was marked on blocks shown
"Other Valve Cycle" and
"Other Valve External Leakage Bonnet and Packing" which were PNT, not IST since the actual work was performed on the vent valve, not the pump itself.
 
Therefore, IST required was marked in the front sheet of PWO, due to the charging pump, but the actual tests or work performed on the vent valve were not IST.
 
To eliminate this problem, the licensee will revise procedure and require the originator of the PWO to clearly indicate the identification of the component, such as vent valve in this case, actually involved for the test in the title block and use the nearby main component, such as charging pump, for reference only, not for title.
 
IF there is no identification for the component to be tested, the title block will be left as blank for PNT onl The third problem is the incorrect information contained in the Total Equipment Data Base (TEDB) which is used by the planners to identify the required tests and automatidally print out "yes" or "no" in the IST required block in the front page of PWO.
 
For example, Work Request No. XA901209070559, Unit 2 indicated the component tag numbers HCV-09-1A (valve) in the title block and printed
"yes" on the IST required block.
 
Actually, this valve is not an ASME Code component.
 
Therefore,
"no" should be printed out for this block instead of
"yes."
 
This is an information problem on TEDB.
 
The licensee agreed to review and revise the procedure gI-ll-PR/PSL-2, TEDB and PWO to clear the above three problems discovered by the inspector.
 
This item is considered closed based on the licensee's commitments to solve the problems.
 
(Closed)
Unresolved Item (UNR) 50-335,389/88-28-01, Discrepancies for Base Plates, Anchor Bolts, and Pipe Supports Between Field Conditions and As-built Drawings This matter concerned deficiencies found in the pipe supports such as the wrong orientation, edge distance, quantity of material, base plate dimension, etc.
 
The inspector held discussions with the licensee's engineers and reviewed the information provided Evaluation of Pipe Support and Expansion Anchor Nonconformance, Ebasco Report No. 132-63.50, Rev.
 
2 dated January 14, 1991.
 
The solution contained in the Ebasco Report included the revisions of calculations and drawings.
 
The revised support calculations were reviewed by the inspector and determined to be acceptable.
 
The drawings which were required to be revised were contained in Plant Change/Modification PCM 229-188 and 230-288; and were reviewed by the inspector and determined to be acceptable.
 
However, the PCM is only a process or method to provide for revisions to the original drawings to agree with the as-built condition.
 
Actually, the revisions of the original drawings stated in the PCM 229-188 and 230-288 are not completed since all of the work contained in these PCM are not completed.
 
The licensee agreed to expedite the completion of the revisions of the original drawings in the next couple weeks.
 
This item is considered closed based on the licensee's completion of the revisions to the support calculations and agreement to expedite the revisions of the original drawings.
 
(Closed)
IFI 50-335,389/88-28-02, Plant Maintenance for Corrosion on Piping Systems and Structures This matter concerned the fact that Supports No. CW-16-3, CW-15-3, and CW-15-4, in the open area, had corrosion on the base plates, bolts, and nuts.
 
In addition, other civil structures were also found to have similar corrosion problems.
 
The inspector discussed this matter with the licensee's engineer and reviewed the information provide'd.
 
The licensee's engineer indicated that none of the
 
supports exhibited corrosion to the extent that structural integrity was adversely affected.
 
The Plant Maintenance Department is responsible for routinely maint'aining protective coatings for all structures and components as necessary.
 
A new plant maintenance coating specification (CN-2.27)
has been established to enhance the overall plant maintenance coating program.
 
Appendix A of General Maintenance Procedure No. I-M-0018, Revision 13, for Unit I and 2-M-0018, Revision 20, for Unit 2 have been designated especially for Intake Cooling Water (ICW)
and Component Cooling Water (CCW)
structures which are required to have surveillance quarterly.
 
The inspector also walked down the intake structure and CCW structure areas and found that the problem with the rusty components and structures had been taken care of.
 
Based on the above licensee's effort to resolve the problem, this item is considered closed.
 
(Closed)
IFI 50-335,389/88-28-03, Establishment of Standard Procedures in Tolerances for Installation, Inspection, Evaluation, and Incorporation There was no procedure providing standard tolerances for gC inspectors or engineers to follow for non-conformance evaluation or incorporation of drawings and calculations.
 
If a gC inspector found a difference in a dimension, clearance, member size, weld size, etc.,
between the field conditions and as-built drawings, he would write a defect report.
 
The engineers would review it and approve the defect if it meets the design requirements.
 
But the defect or difference would not be corrected in the drawings or calculations, since it was acceptable.
 
Therefore, the defect or difference were not reflected in the drawings or calculations.
 
To correct this problem, the'icensee was required to establish a
standard procedure for tolerances.
 
The inspector discussed the Standard No.
 
MN-3.12,
"Nuclear 'Engineering Department Discipline Standard",
Revision 0, dated January 11, 1991.
 
The discipline standard abstracted information from the nuclear industry, Nuclear Construction Industry Group NCIG-01 and 05, Welding Research Council (WRC) Bulletin No. 31-3, and other established organizations.
 
Based on the licensee's above effort, this item is considered closed.
 
(Closed)
IFI 50-335/88-28-04, Anchor Bolt Problems at South Steel Missile Protection Shield The anchor bolts'were found to have been pulled out or loose at two columns of South Steel Missile Protection Shield on North Side of Unit I Auxiliary Water Pump due to pump foundation vibration.
 
The inspector discussed this problem with the licensee's engineers and reviewed the information provided.
 
The licensee had implemented PCM 061-189D to install the new grouted anchor bolts which will resist the vibration during pump running.
 
The inspector also performed a
walkdown reinspection to check the as-built condition against the construction drawing attached to the PCM.
 
This item is considered closed based on the new installation of anchor bolt (Closed)
IFI 50-389/88-28-04, Follow-up on Bergen - Paterson Large Bore Calculations This matter concerned the fact that the factors of safety for two large bore supports, SI-4205-6440B and CC-2061-91, were between 2 and 4, after Ebasco re-evaluated
 
supports which were originally analyzed by Bergen-Paterson using the improper safety factor of 1.33 and 2.0.
 
The factor of safety for a long term design should be 4 or greater; the factor of safety greater than 2 is allowed for interim operation.
 
The inspector reviewed the calculations for supports SI-4205-6440B and CC-2061-191 and found them to be acceptable with the factors of sa'fety greater than 4.0.
 
However, the support CC-2061-191 required a modification due to the load change which will be implemented in the near future.
 
This item is considered closed based on the calculation completion.
 
(Closed)
IFI 50-335,389/88-28-05, Final Summary Report Review for IEB 79-02 The licensee submitted Letter No. L-79-183 for Unit I, dated July 5, 1979, to NRC to close out the requirements stated in the IEB 79-02 and incorporated the requirements'o IEB 79-02 into Appendix 3.9B, Concrete Expansion Anchor Design, Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)
before the Operating License for Unit 2 was issued.
 
The Letter No. L-79-183 stated that the anchor bolt reinspection was completed in 1977 to verify bolt size, embed length, thread engagement length, etc.,
the factors of safety were used as 4 or 5; the seismic loads and cyclic loads had been considered in design.
 
The licensee agreed to submit a brief summary report to NRC for review for each unit after the completion of the revisions of original drawings contained in the PCM 229-188 and 230-288, discussed in paragraph 2.a.
 
This item is considered closed.
 
(Closed)
Violation 50-335,389/89-29-01, Inadequate Limitorque Preventative Maintenance Procedure and Failure to Follow Procedures for Material Control for Limitorque Maintenance Florida Power and Light Company's (FPRL) letter of response, L-90-71, dated February 22, 1990, has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable by Region II.
 
The inspector discussed the violation with the licensee's engineers and reviewed the information provided.
 
Section 9.42 of Maintenance Procedure No. 0940072, Rev.
 
has provided the detail maintenance for the entire valve stem lubrication to prevent the recurrence of the valve stem failure which was the first part of the violation.
 
The Sections 9.27
"Side Mounted Handwheel Reassembly" and 9.33
"Handwheel Housing Gasket Thickness Determination" of Maintenance Procedure No. 0960067, Rev. I have provided the detail procedures to maintain and measure the handwheel gasket thickness which was the second part of violation.
 
The above detail maintenance procedures are based on the industry standards and
 
the latest vendor catalog.
 
In addition, the licensee has shifted the responsibility of the Limitorque Maintenance from Mechanical Maintenance Department to Electrical Maintenance Department per Inter-Office Correspondence MM/PSL Letter BK No.,295,
"Departmental Jurisdiction Policy", dated November 7, 1989.
 
The licensee also limits the awards of the Limitorque Maintenance to contractors to reduce inadequate maintenance, the in-house maintenances increases the quality, with help from Technical Support Group.
 
The licensee has completed the overhaul maintenances for 20 limitorque valves for Unit I and 14 limitorque valves for Unit 2.
 
Last year, the licensee hired a consultant to study the comparison of inventory and operation requirements.
 
'Based on the suggestion from this consultant, the licensee 'purchased more spare parts for valve actuators and stored them separately to accomplish the maintenance operations.
 
In addition, the gC department tightened the inspection on materials issued for modifications, maintenance, or repair.
 
Based on examination of corrective actions as stated in the letter of response and discussed with responsible licensee's engineers, the inspector concluded that FPEL had determined the full extent of the subject violations, performed the necessary survey and follow-up actions to correct the present conditions and developed the necessary corrective actions to preclude recurrence of similar circumstances.
 
The corrective actions identified in the letter of response have been implemented.
 
Therefore, this item is considered closed.
 
3.
 
Exit Interview I
The inspection scope and results were summarized on January 18, 1991, with those persons 'indicated in paragraph 1.
 
The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below.
 
Proprietary information is not contained in this report.
 
Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
 
(Closed) IFI 50-335,389/88-09-01 Closed)
UNR 50-335,389/88-28-01 Closed IFI 50-335,389/88-28-02 (Closed) IFI 50-335,389/88-28-03 (Closed)
IFI 50-335,389/88-28-04 Closed)
IFI 50-335,389/88-28-05 Closed)
VIO 50-335,389/89-29-01
 
I
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 14:13, 8 January 2025

Insp Repts 50-335/91-02 & 50-389/91-02 on 910114-18.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Previous Open Items Re safety-related Piping Sys
ML17223B101
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 02/06/1991
From: Blake J, Chou R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML17223B100 List:
References
50-335-91-02, 50-335-91-2, 50-389-91-02, 50-389-91-2, NUDOCS 9102200025
Download: ML17223B101 (10)
v • d • e


Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.

ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323 Wp*y4 Report NoseI 50-335/91-02 and 50-389/91-02 Licensee:

Florida Power and Light Company 9250 West Flagler Street Miami, FL 33102 Docket Nos.:

50-335 and 50-389 Facility Name:

St.

Lucie 1 and

Inspection Conducted:

January 14-18 1991 Inspector:

C, Rich.C.

Ch u

Approved by:

,

iz/Slu J./ J/

1 ake, Chs ef Mkterials and Processes Section Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety License NoseI DPR-67 and NPF-16 Date 1gned Date Signed SUMMARY Scope:

This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the areas of previous open items concerning safety-related piping systems.

Results:

In the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.

Seven open items were closed.

The licensee was very cooperative during the inspection.

'000335 PDR ADOCK 05000335 G

REPORT DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

  • G. Boissy, Plant Manager
  • J. Brady, Mechanical Maintenance Supervisor
  • J. Breen, Licensing
  • J. Chapman, Nuclear Engineer
  • D. Culpepper, Engineering Supervisor
  • R. Dawson, Maintenance Superintendent W. Dean, Technical Support Supervisor - Electrical Maintenance
  • J. Dyer, Quality Control (QC) Supervisor
  • R. Englmeier, Site Quality Manager
  • R. Gil, Nuclear Engineer - Juno Beach W. Haines, Production Supervisor - Mechanical
  • L. McLaughlin, Licensing Supervisor
  • B. Parks, QC Superintendent L. Rogers, Electrical Maintenance Supervisor P. Sarno, Planning Supervisor - Maintenance
  • R. Toscano, Mechanical Maintenance Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included craftsmen, engineers, operators, mechanics, security force members, technicians, and administrative personnel.

NRC Resident Inspectors

  • M. Scott, Resident Inspector
  • Attended exit interview 2.

Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)

a.

(Closed)

Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 50-335,389/88-09-01, Clarification of Requirements for Post-Maintenance Test and In-service Test I

This IFI concerned inconsistencies between the front sheet of Plant Work Order (PWO)

and the forms of Appendix B of procedure QI-ll-PR/

PSL-2 for Post-Maintenance Tests (PNT)

and In-service Tests (IST).

The inspector discussed this matter with the licensee's engineers and reviewed five PWOs and the revised procedure QI-ll-PR/PSL-2, Rev.

19.

During review of the five PWOs, the inspector found similar inconsistencies, indicating that the licensee did not clear the confusion or inconsistencies with the revised procedure implemented in the PWO forms.

The inspector discovered three problems in the PWO forms and procedure and discussed them with the licensee's engineer The first problem is a confusion between PMT and IST.

The confusion exists because the test required marked

"yes" for IST in the front sheet of PWO, but the actual tests performed'ere marked in the non-IST (or non-ASME test)

in the forms of Appendix 8 of the procedure which was attached to the PWO.

This meant that the tests were performed under PNT.

The current definition for PMT and IST are:

PMT

-

Test required for all components under the Technical Specification or ASME Code after the maintenance and modifications were performed.

IST

-

Test required for all components under the ASNE Code after the maintenance or modifications were performed.

Therefore, the ASNE Code components are required to have PNT and IST, but actually they are same test and only one test.

PMT is also IST in this case.

To separate PNT and IST and to eliminate this problem, the licensee will revise Appendix B of procedure gI-11-PR/

PSL-2 to clearly indicate that IST is for ASME Code components only and PNT is for all non-ASME Code components but required by the Technical Specification or other special test requirements.

The second problem is a title clarification in the front sheet of a PWO.

The title in the front sheet of PWO is an ASME Code component and the actual test is in the associated component which is not ASME Code component.

The computer automatically printed "yes" in the IST required block since this is an ASME Code component.

But the actual test is in the non-ASME Code component and PNT for non-ASME Code component is marked.

For example, on the Work Request No. XA-901227111021, Unit 2, the title of CHG PP 2A was written and was a charging pump which is required to have IST per ASME Code.

The actual work or test was on the vent valve.

The IST required block in the front sheet of the PWO was marked

"yes" by the computer, since this is an ASNE Code component which is required to have IST.

The actual test sheet, the Appendix B form of procedure gI-11-PR/PSL-2, was marked on blocks shown

"Other Valve Cycle" and

"Other Valve External Leakage Bonnet and Packing" which were PNT, not IST since the actual work was performed on the vent valve, not the pump itself.

Therefore, IST required was marked in the front sheet of PWO, due to the charging pump, but the actual tests or work performed on the vent valve were not IST.

To eliminate this problem, the licensee will revise procedure and require the originator of the PWO to clearly indicate the identification of the component, such as vent valve in this case, actually involved for the test in the title block and use the nearby main component, such as charging pump, for reference only, not for title.

IF there is no identification for the component to be tested, the title block will be left as blank for PNT onl The third problem is the incorrect information contained in the Total Equipment Data Base (TEDB) which is used by the planners to identify the required tests and automatidally print out "yes" or "no" in the IST required block in the front page of PWO.

For example, Work Request No. XA901209070559, Unit 2 indicated the component tag numbers HCV-09-1A (valve) in the title block and printed

"yes" on the IST required block.

Actually, this valve is not an ASME Code component.

Therefore,

"no" should be printed out for this block instead of

"yes."

This is an information problem on TEDB.

The licensee agreed to review and revise the procedure gI-ll-PR/PSL-2, TEDB and PWO to clear the above three problems discovered by the inspector.

This item is considered closed based on the licensee's commitments to solve the problems.

(Closed)

Unresolved Item (UNR) 50-335,389/88-28-01, Discrepancies for Base Plates, Anchor Bolts, and Pipe Supports Between Field Conditions and As-built Drawings This matter concerned deficiencies found in the pipe supports such as the wrong orientation, edge distance, quantity of material, base plate dimension, etc.

The inspector held discussions with the licensee's engineers and reviewed the information provided Evaluation of Pipe Support and Expansion Anchor Nonconformance, Ebasco Report No. 132-63.50, Rev.

2 dated January 14, 1991.

The solution contained in the Ebasco Report included the revisions of calculations and drawings.

The revised support calculations were reviewed by the inspector and determined to be acceptable.

The drawings which were required to be revised were contained in Plant Change/Modification PCM 229-188 and 230-288; and were reviewed by the inspector and determined to be acceptable.

However, the PCM is only a process or method to provide for revisions to the original drawings to agree with the as-built condition.

Actually, the revisions of the original drawings stated in the PCM 229-188 and 230-288 are not completed since all of the work contained in these PCM are not completed.

The licensee agreed to expedite the completion of the revisions of the original drawings in the next couple weeks.

This item is considered closed based on the licensee's completion of the revisions to the support calculations and agreement to expedite the revisions of the original drawings.

(Closed)

IFI 50-335,389/88-28-02, Plant Maintenance for Corrosion on Piping Systems and Structures This matter concerned the fact that Supports No. CW-16-3, CW-15-3, and CW-15-4, in the open area, had corrosion on the base plates, bolts, and nuts.

In addition, other civil structures were also found to have similar corrosion problems.

The inspector discussed this matter with the licensee's engineer and reviewed the information provide'd.

The licensee's engineer indicated that none of the

supports exhibited corrosion to the extent that structural integrity was adversely affected.

The Plant Maintenance Department is responsible for routinely maint'aining protective coatings for all structures and components as necessary.

A new plant maintenance coating specification (CN-2.27)

has been established to enhance the overall plant maintenance coating program.

Appendix A of General Maintenance Procedure No. I-M-0018, Revision 13, for Unit I and 2-M-0018, Revision 20, for Unit 2 have been designated especially for Intake Cooling Water (ICW)

and Component Cooling Water (CCW)

structures which are required to have surveillance quarterly.

The inspector also walked down the intake structure and CCW structure areas and found that the problem with the rusty components and structures had been taken care of.

Based on the above licensee's effort to resolve the problem, this item is considered closed.

(Closed)

IFI 50-335,389/88-28-03, Establishment of Standard Procedures in Tolerances for Installation, Inspection, Evaluation, and Incorporation There was no procedure providing standard tolerances for gC inspectors or engineers to follow for non-conformance evaluation or incorporation of drawings and calculations.

If a gC inspector found a difference in a dimension, clearance, member size, weld size, etc.,

between the field conditions and as-built drawings, he would write a defect report.

The engineers would review it and approve the defect if it meets the design requirements.

But the defect or difference would not be corrected in the drawings or calculations, since it was acceptable.

Therefore, the defect or difference were not reflected in the drawings or calculations.

To correct this problem, the'icensee was required to establish a

standard procedure for tolerances.

The inspector discussed the Standard No.

MN-3.12,

"Nuclear 'Engineering Department Discipline Standard",

Revision 0, dated January 11, 1991.

The discipline standard abstracted information from the nuclear industry, Nuclear Construction Industry Group NCIG-01 and 05, Welding Research Council (WRC) Bulletin No. 31-3, and other established organizations.

Based on the licensee's above effort, this item is considered closed.

(Closed)

IFI 50-335/88-28-04, Anchor Bolt Problems at South Steel Missile Protection Shield The anchor bolts'were found to have been pulled out or loose at two columns of South Steel Missile Protection Shield on North Side of Unit I Auxiliary Water Pump due to pump foundation vibration.

The inspector discussed this problem with the licensee's engineers and reviewed the information provided.

The licensee had implemented PCM 061-189D to install the new grouted anchor bolts which will resist the vibration during pump running.

The inspector also performed a

walkdown reinspection to check the as-built condition against the construction drawing attached to the PCM.

This item is considered closed based on the new installation of anchor bolt (Closed)

IFI 50-389/88-28-04, Follow-up on Bergen - Paterson Large Bore Calculations This matter concerned the fact that the factors of safety for two large bore supports, SI-4205-6440B and CC-2061-91, were between 2 and 4, after Ebasco re-evaluated

supports which were originally analyzed by Bergen-Paterson using the improper safety factor of 1.33 and 2.0.

The factor of safety for a long term design should be 4 or greater; the factor of safety greater than 2 is allowed for interim operation.

The inspector reviewed the calculations for supports SI-4205-6440B and CC-2061-191 and found them to be acceptable with the factors of sa'fety greater than 4.0.

However, the support CC-2061-191 required a modification due to the load change which will be implemented in the near future.

This item is considered closed based on the calculation completion.

(Closed)

IFI 50-335,389/88-28-05, Final Summary Report Review for IEB 79-02 The licensee submitted Letter No. L-79-183 for Unit I, dated July 5, 1979, to NRC to close out the requirements stated in the IEB 79-02 and incorporated the requirements'o IEB 79-02 into Appendix 3.9B, Concrete Expansion Anchor Design, Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)

before the Operating License for Unit 2 was issued.

The Letter No. L-79-183 stated that the anchor bolt reinspection was completed in 1977 to verify bolt size, embed length, thread engagement length, etc.,

the factors of safety were used as 4 or 5; the seismic loads and cyclic loads had been considered in design.

The licensee agreed to submit a brief summary report to NRC for review for each unit after the completion of the revisions of original drawings contained in the PCM 229-188 and 230-288, discussed in paragraph 2.a.

This item is considered closed.

(Closed)

Violation 50-335,389/89-29-01, Inadequate Limitorque Preventative Maintenance Procedure and Failure to Follow Procedures for Material Control for Limitorque Maintenance Florida Power and Light Company's (FPRL) letter of response, L-90-71, dated February 22, 1990, has been reviewed and determined to be acceptable by Region II.

The inspector discussed the violation with the licensee's engineers and reviewed the information provided.

Section 9.42 of Maintenance Procedure No. 0940072, Rev.

has provided the detail maintenance for the entire valve stem lubrication to prevent the recurrence of the valve stem failure which was the first part of the violation.

The Sections 9.27

"Side Mounted Handwheel Reassembly" and 9.33

"Handwheel Housing Gasket Thickness Determination" of Maintenance Procedure No. 0960067, Rev. I have provided the detail procedures to maintain and measure the handwheel gasket thickness which was the second part of violation.

The above detail maintenance procedures are based on the industry standards and

the latest vendor catalog.

In addition, the licensee has shifted the responsibility of the Limitorque Maintenance from Mechanical Maintenance Department to Electrical Maintenance Department per Inter-Office Correspondence MM/PSL Letter BK No.,295,

"Departmental Jurisdiction Policy", dated November 7, 1989.

The licensee also limits the awards of the Limitorque Maintenance to contractors to reduce inadequate maintenance, the in-house maintenances increases the quality, with help from Technical Support Group.

The licensee has completed the overhaul maintenances for 20 limitorque valves for Unit I and 14 limitorque valves for Unit 2.

Last year, the licensee hired a consultant to study the comparison of inventory and operation requirements.

'Based on the suggestion from this consultant, the licensee 'purchased more spare parts for valve actuators and stored them separately to accomplish the maintenance operations.

In addition, the gC department tightened the inspection on materials issued for modifications, maintenance, or repair.

Based on examination of corrective actions as stated in the letter of response and discussed with responsible licensee's engineers, the inspector concluded that FPEL had determined the full extent of the subject violations, performed the necessary survey and follow-up actions to correct the present conditions and developed the necessary corrective actions to preclude recurrence of similar circumstances.

The corrective actions identified in the letter of response have been implemented.

Therefore, this item is considered closed.

3.

Exit Interview I

The inspection scope and results were summarized on January 18, 1991, with those persons 'indicated in paragraph 1.

The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below.

Proprietary information is not contained in this report.

Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.

(Closed) IFI 50-335,389/88-09-01 Closed)

UNR 50-335,389/88-28-01 Closed IFI 50-335,389/88-28-02 (Closed) IFI 50-335,389/88-28-03 (Closed)

IFI 50-335,389/88-28-04 Closed)

IFI 50-335,389/88-28-05 Closed)

VIO 50-335,389/89-29-01

I

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