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| number = ML18291B231 | | number = ML18291B231 | ||
| issue date = 10/18/2018 | | issue date = 10/18/2018 | ||
| title = | | title = NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000346/2018003 | ||
| author name = Cameron J | | author name = Cameron J | ||
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-III | | author affiliation = NRC/RGN-III | ||
| addressee name = Bezilla M | | addressee name = Bezilla M | ||
| Line 18: | Line 18: | ||
=Text= | =Text= | ||
{{#Wiki_filter: | {{#Wiki_filter:October 18, 2018 | ||
==SUBJECT:== | |||
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATIONNRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000346/2018003 | |||
==Dear Mr. Bezilla:== | |||
On September 30, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an integrated inspection at your Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. On October 3, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report. | |||
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings or violations were identified. | |||
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding. | |||
Sincerely, | |||
/RA/ | |||
Jamnes L. Cameron, Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects | |||
Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3 | |||
===Enclosure:=== | |||
Inspection Report 05000346/2018003 | |||
REGION III== | |||
Docket Number: | |||
50-346 License Number: | |||
NPF-3 Report Number: | |||
05000346/2018003 Enterprise Identifier: I-2018-003-0023 Licensee: | |||
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) | |||
Facility: | |||
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Location: | |||
Oak Harbor, OH Dates: | |||
July 1 through September 30, 2018 Inspectors: | |||
D. Mills, Senior Resident Inspector J. Harvey, Resident Inspector J. Neurauter, Reactor Inspector J. Rutkowski, Project Engineer | |||
Approved by: | |||
J. Cameron, Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects | |||
=SUMMARY= | |||
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring licensees performance by conducting an integrated quarterly inspection at Davis-Besse Power Plant in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. Findings and violations being considered in the NRCs assessment are summarized in the table below. | |||
===List of Findings and Violations=== | |||
No findings or violations were identified. | |||
===Additional Tracking Items=== | |||
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000346/2017-002-01 Auxiliary Feed Water Pump Turbine Bearing Damaged due to Improperly Marked Lubricating Oil Sight Glass 71153 Closed | |||
TABLE OF CONTENTS | |||
=PLANT STATUS= | |||
==INSPECTION SCOPES== | |||
................................................................................................................ | |||
==REACTOR SAFETY== | |||
..................................................................................................................... | |||
==OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE== | |||
.............................................................................................. | |||
==INSPECTION RESULTS== | |||
.............................................................................................................. | |||
==EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS== | |||
............................................................................................ 10 | |||
=DOCUMENTS REVIEWED= | |||
......................................................................................................... 10 | |||
PLANT STATUS | |||
The unit remained at or near full power for the entirety of the inspection period. | |||
On March 28, 2018, FirstEnergy Solutions (FES) / FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company | |||
(FENOC) verbally notified the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that they intended to shut down | |||
all four of their operating nuclear power plants. Based on that notification, the first to shut down | |||
will be Davis-Besse, by May 31, 2020. On March 31, 2018, FES, FirstEnergy Nuclear | |||
Generation (FENGEN), and FENOC filed for bankruptcy. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission | |||
continues to maintain focus on public health and safety and the protection of the environment. | |||
This will include a continuous evaluation by inspectors to determine whether the licensees | |||
financial condition is impacting safe operation of the plant. | |||
INSPECTION SCOPES | |||
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in | |||
effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with | |||
their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading- | |||
rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared | |||
complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met | |||
consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection | |||
Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in | |||
IMC 2515 Appendix D, Plant Status and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem | |||
Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, | |||
observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance | |||
with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards. | |||
REACTOR SAFETY | |||
71111.04Equipment Alignment | |||
Partial Walkdown (4 Samples) | |||
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following | |||
systems/trains: | |||
(1) Decay heat train 1 while decay heat train 2 was out of service for preventive | |||
maintenance during the week ending July 14, 2018; | |||
(2) Emergency diesel generator 1 while emergency diesel generator 2 was out of service for | |||
planned testing during the week ending August 11, 2018; | |||
(3) Containment spray train 2 while the train 1 borated water storage tank suction valve was | |||
out of service for planned testing during the week ending August 25, 2018; and | |||
(4) Component cooling water (CCW) train 1 and CCW ventilation train 1 while CCW 2 | |||
ventilation was out of service for planned maintenance during the week ending | |||
September 1, 2018. | |||
71111.05AQFire Protection Annual/Quarterly | |||
Quarterly Inspection (4 Samples) | |||
The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected | |||
areas: | |||
(1) Emergency diesel generator 1 and emergency diesel generator fuel oil tank 1 (fire | |||
area K) during the week ending July 7, 2018; | |||
(2) Low voltage switchgear room 1 and battery room A (fire area Y) during the week ending | |||
August 4, 2018; | |||
(3) Pipe tunnel and equipment and pipe chase, rooms 100 and 101 (fire area B), | |||
Emergency core cooling system (ECCS) pump room 1-1 (fire area AB), and ECCS | |||
pump room 1-2 (fire area A) during the week ending August 11, 2018; and | |||
(4) Mechanical penetration room 2 passage, room 227 (fire area G) during the week ending | |||
September 1, 2018. | |||
Annual Inspection (1 Sample) | |||
The inspectors evaluated a fire brigade drill conducted in the diesel fire pump area, room 51 | |||
(fire area BE) during the week ending September 15, 2018. | |||
71111.06Flood Protection Measures | |||
Internal Flooding (Partial Sample) | |||
The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the intake structure | |||
service water pump room beginning the week of August 26, 2018. This constituted a partial | |||
sample. | |||
71111.11Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance | |||
Operator Requalification (1 Sample) | |||
The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator requalification simulator | |||
scenario on August 22, 2018. | |||
Operator Performance (1 Sample) | |||
The inspectors observed and evaluated licensee response to a high radiation alarm from | |||
a spent fuel pool area radiation element on September 10, 2018. | |||
71111.12Maintenance Effectiveness | |||
Routine Maintenance Effectiveness (2 Samples) | |||
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated | |||
with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions: | |||
(1) Emergency ventilation system train 1 and associated damper control repair during the | |||
week ending July 28, 2018; and | |||
(2) Motor driven feedwater pump maintenance and sight glass verification during the week | |||
ending September 8, 2018. | |||
71111.13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (4 Samples) | |||
The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent | |||
work activities: | |||
(1) Station blackout diesel generator out of service for planned maintenance during the | |||
week ending July 14, 2018; | |||
(2) Steam leak from moisture separator reheater first stage reheat drain tank 2 drain to high | |||
pressure feedwater heater 2-5 check valve during the week ending July 21, 2018; | |||
(3) Emergent work associated with turbine generator voltage regulator, control room receipt | |||
of 16-2-B voltage regulator fault alarm with exciter alarms that cannot be reset during | |||
the week ending August 18, 2018; and | |||
(4) Planned maintenance on MV5095, component cooling water line 1 discharge isolation | |||
valve, during the week ending August 25, 2018. | |||
71111.15Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (5 Samples) | |||
The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality | |||
assessments: | |||
(1) High pressure injection valve leaking, CR-2018-06127, during the week ending | |||
July 21, 2018; | |||
(2) Incore detector string 5, level 1-7 self-powered neuron detectors (SPND) and | |||
background detector, and incore detector string 30, level 1 SPND non-functional, | |||
CR-2018-02927, CR-2018-06386 during the week ending July 21, 2018; | |||
(3) Emergency ventilation system train 1 post maintenance test failure, CR-2018-06706, | |||
during the week ending August 4, 2018; | |||
(4) Core spray pump 2 inboard bearing rotation, CR-2018-06812, during the week ending | |||
August 11, 2018; and | |||
(5) Component cooling water pump 1 inboard bearing leakage trending, CR-2018-07014, | |||
during the week ending August 11, 2018. | |||
71111.19Post Maintenance Testing (7 Samples) | |||
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests: | |||
(1) Station blackout diesel generator following performance of 2, 4, and 10 year preventive | |||
maintenance work during the week ending July 14, 2018; | |||
(2) Containment personnel hatch local leak rate testing following containment entry on | |||
July 17, 2018; | |||
(3) Containment spray train 2 following scheduled maintenance during the week ending | |||
August 4, 2018; | |||
(4) Containment isolation valve 5010D, containment air sample isolation valve, during the | |||
week ending August 11, 2018; | |||
(5) Component cooling water pump and heat exchanger 3 following scheduled maintenance | |||
during the week ending August 18, 2018; | |||
(6) Decay heat pump 1 following scheduled maintenance during the week ending | |||
August 25, 2018; and | |||
(7) Motor driven feedwater pump following scheduled maintenance during the week ending | |||
September 8, 2018. | |||
71111.22Surveillance Testing | |||
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests: | |||
Routine (3 Samples) | |||
(1) Remote shutdown, post-accident monitoring instrumentation monthly channel check, | |||
DB-SC-03180, during the week ending July 7, 2018; | |||
(2) Reactor coolant system leakage beginning the week ending June 30, 2018; and | |||
(3) Emergency diesel generator 2 monthly surveillance test, DB-SC-03071, during the | |||
week ending July 14, 2018. | |||
In-Service (3 Samples) | |||
(1) Service water pump 1 quarterly test, DB-PF-03071, during the week ending | |||
August 18, 2018; | |||
(2) Auxiliary feed pump 1 quarterly test during the week ending August 18, 2018; and | |||
(3) Service water pump 2 comprehensive test, DB-PF-03226, during the week ending | |||
July 14, 2018. | |||
71114.06Drill Evaluation | |||
Emergency Planning Drill (1 Sample) | |||
The inspectors evaluated a licensee Emergency Response Organization emergency | |||
preparedness drill on September 25, 2018. | |||
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE | |||
71151Performance Indicator Verification (3 Samples) | |||
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below: | |||
(1) MS08: Heat Removal Systems1 Sample (October 1, 2017 - June 30, 2018); | |||
(2) MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems1 Sample (October 1, 2017 - June 30, 2018); | |||
and | |||
(3) MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems1 Sample (October 1, 2017 - June 30, 2018). | |||
71152Problem Identification and Resolution | |||
Semiannual Trend Review (2 Samples) | |||
The inspectors reviewed the licensees documentation of repetitive or closely related issues | |||
to identify a potential adverse trend related to the following issues: | |||
(1) Service water piping damage due to microbiologically influenced corrosion (MIC) / lack | |||
of MIC monitoring program, CR-2018-00844; and | |||
(2) Switch failures due to 125V direct current (DC) relay issues. | |||
Annual Follow-Up of Selected Issues (1 Sample) | |||
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program | |||
related to the following issues: | |||
(1) DB-SC-03180 remote shutdown, post-accident monitoring instrumentation monthly | |||
channel check, CR-2012-10942, Attachment 5. | |||
71153Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion | |||
Licensee Event Reports (1 Sample) | |||
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports which can be accessed at | |||
https://lersearch.inl.gov/LERSearchCriteria.aspx: | |||
(1) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000346/2017-002-01, Auxiliary Feed Water Pump | |||
Turbine Bearing Damaged due to Improperly Marked Lubricating Oil Sight Glass. | |||
The original LER was closed in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000346/2017004 | |||
(ML18045A076). | |||
INSPECTION RESULTS | |||
71152Problem Identification and Resolution | |||
ObservationMicrobiologically Influenced | |||
Corrosion Trend | |||
71152Semiannual Trend | |||
Review | |||
By monitoring licensee corrective action reports (CRs) for 2017 and 2018, the inspectors | |||
noted an increase in piping through-wall leaks due to what appeared to be microbiologically | |||
influenced corrosion (MIC). The inspectors reviewed a sample of CRs for through-wall piping | |||
pinhole leaks where the flaw type and location indicated the possibility of microbiologically | |||
influenced corrosion, including CR-2017-03523, CR-2017-08068, CR-2018-00938, and | |||
CR-2018-00844, to determine if there was an adverse trend in piping pinhole leaks due to | |||
MIC. The inspectors also reviewed a licensee self-assessment of water chemistry control and | |||
the service water system health reports. | |||
The inspectors reviewed a licensee assessment of the MIC program (SA-NA-2018-1031) | |||
that identified a gap from June 2015 through August 2017, during a period when samples to | |||
determine presence of MIC were not taken due to lack of trained staff. The inspectors | |||
reviewed the licensees corrective actions which included training additional staff to take | |||
samples for MIC testing, and reviewed a sample of recent laboratory reports for MIC testing. | |||
The inspectors also reviewed licensees monitoring of water chemistry and addition of | |||
chemicals that mitigate formation of MIC. | |||
The inspectors discussed the increased incidence of pinhole leaks with a chemistry | |||
department specialist and the service water system engineer. Specifically, the inspectors | |||
discussed the interaction between the chemistry department and system engineering with | |||
respect to MIC identification, trending, and resulting corrective actions. Licensee staff noted | |||
that pinhole leaks can be caused by other mechanisms other than MIC, such as cavitation | |||
and galvanic corrosion. The inspectors determined that the chemistry department has | |||
procedures in place to take MIC samples for laboratory testing when piping with pinhole | |||
degradation is replaced to verify if degradation is due to MIC. | |||
The inspectors reviewed a sample of system health reports for the service water system and | |||
found that MIC-like piping degradation is noted and tracked. However, as noted above, a | |||
laboratory test is required to verify if degradation is due to MIC. The inspectors verified that | |||
the licensee is tracking corrective actions to replace degraded piping. | |||
In addition, the inspectors reviewed a sample of the licensees prompt operability | |||
determinations (POD) for identified piping through wall leaks. The inspectors verified by | |||
documentation reviews applicability and compliance to ASME code case N-513-3 | |||
(and N-513-4). The inspectors also verified that licensee corrective actions to repair the | |||
piping leaks were scheduled to be completed by the next refueling outage. | |||
The inspectors reviewed licensee trending of repair to service water strainer blowdown piping | |||
due to piping through wall leakage. In CR-2018-0764, the licensee used history of piping | |||
replacement to periodically replace the service water strainer blowdown piping prior to | |||
formation of a piping through wall pinhole leak. The inspectors noted that the CR attributed | |||
the pinhole leakage due to cavitation and not due to MIC as described in the POD as a | |||
MIC-like degradation mechanism. The CR also included industry guidance to identify | |||
degradation due to cavitation. During discussions with licensee engineering staff, the | |||
inspectors were able to visually examine a sample of removed strainer blowdown piping and | |||
noted that the piping degradation was similar to industry guidance for cavitation. | |||
Finally, the inspectors met with the licensees Supervisor of Engineering Programs, the | |||
Inservice Inspection Program Owner, and the Aging Management Coordinator. As a result, | |||
the inspectors were able to verify that the aging aspect identified pinhole piping leaks was | |||
considered in the licensees CRs. Specifically, the CR prompts for an aging management | |||
evaluation request. | |||
In conclusion, the licensee identified a period where MIC samples could not be taken and | |||
has corrected the concern. The licensee resumed sampling and has procedures to take | |||
opportunistic MIC samples, but there was not sufficient data that identified a presence of MIC | |||
to conclude an adverse trend in piping through wall leaks due to MIC. During the period | |||
where MIC samples were not taken, the licensee adequately evaluated the identified pinhole | |||
leaks and repaired the leaks in a timely manner. No findings or violations were identified by | |||
the inspectors. | |||
Observation125 Vdc Relay Failures | |||
71152Semi Annual Trend Review | |||
The inspectors identified a potential long-term trend related to Barton switch failures in safety | |||
and non-safety related systems. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed CR-2018-06706 | |||
CV 5000A and CV 5000B failed to operate during EVS [emergency ventilation system] train 1 | |||
monthly test. The failure was due to a faulted 125 Vdc relay internal to a pressure differential | |||
indicating switch. The inspectors noted the switch and the internal relay were classified as | |||
non-critical components and therefore not required to be replaced at a specified frequency. | |||
Additionally, the inspectors noted the vendor recommended 110 Vdc, plus or minus | |||
percent, be supplied to relay. However, the voltage measured in field identified a | |||
voltage at the coil of 133 Vdc. The licensee generated an engineering change package, | |||
18-0188-001, to add a voltage dropping resistor in the circuit to reduce the voltage at the | |||
relay coil. | |||
The inspectors broadened the time period for the condition report review and identified | |||
several additional instances in which 125 Vdc relays classified as non-critical components | |||
failed, as documented in CR-2016-06353, CR-2013-10064, and CR-2004-04088, with | |||
multiple change packages detailing the installation of a voltage dropping resistor documented | |||
in ECR 04-0299-00 and 13-0475-001. | |||
Although the inspectors did not identify a requirement for the incorporation of vendor | |||
recommendations for the operating voltage of the relays, they questioned the licensee as to | |||
whether a potential adverse trend existed. The inspectors also noted the potential for | |||
additional relay failures, as many of the relays were operating above the vendor | |||
recommended voltage and were not yet replaced because they were classified as non-critical | |||
components. | |||
The licensee generated CR-2018-07274, Adverse trend BARTON switch relay failures, | |||
in response to the inspectors observations. The licensee assessed the currently installed | |||
relays, which resulted in the determination to install an additional 12 voltage dropping | |||
resistors and replace the associated relays, as applicable. No findings or violations were | |||
identified by the inspectors. | |||
ObservationRemote Shutdown, Post Accident | |||
Monitoring Instrumentation Monthly Channel Check | |||
71152-Annual Sample Review | |||
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of DB-SC-03180; Remote Shutdown, | |||
Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation Monthly Channel Check; Revision 14; | |||
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of DB-SC-03180, Attachment 5 | |||
Evaluating CTMT [Containment] Wide Range Level Indications, which addressed | |||
CR-2012-10942, LI4595 Containment Building Wide Range Level Reads 0.000 FT. | |||
Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action to incorporate | |||
into DB-SC-03180, which provides additional guidance for performing the PAM | |||
wide range level instrumentation channel checks. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the | |||
current technical justification for the operability of the post-accident monitor wide range level | |||
indication reading 0 FT instead of the expected elevation of 538 FT in the current conditions. | |||
No findings or violations were identified by the inspectors. | |||
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS | |||
The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was controlled to protect from public | |||
disclosure. No proprietary information was documented in this report. | |||
* | * | ||
On October 3, 2018, the inspectors presented the quarterly integrated inspection results to | |||
Mr. M. Bezilla and other members of the licensee staff. | |||
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED | |||
71111.04Equipment Alignment | |||
- C-ME-016.04-041; Evaluation of Temperature Increase of CCW System; Revision 1 | |||
- C-NSA-016.04-004; CCW Pump Inspection Requirements; Revision 1 | |||
- CR-2017-08936; BACC Lower CS Pump 2 Suction Flange; 08/29/2017 | |||
- CR-2017-10246; EDG Air Receiver 1-1 was Found with High Pressure; 10/06/2017 | |||
- CR-2018-05405; Water Leaking into EDG Room 1 Through Wall; 06/10/2018 | |||
- DB-OP-06013; Containment Spray; Revision 26 | |||
- DB-OP-06262; Valve Lineup Checklist for CCW Pump 3; Revision 39 | |||
- DB-OP-06316; EDG 1; Revision 59 | |||
- DB-OP-06513; CCW Pump Room Train 1 Ventilation System Startup; Revision 28 | |||
- Drawing 0S-041A-SH-1; Emergency Diesel Generator Systems; Revision 34 | |||
- Drawing M-034; Emergency Core Cooling System Containment Spray and Core Flooding | |||
Systems; Revision 71 | |||
71111.05AQFire Protection Annual/Quarterly | |||
- DB-ME-04100; Emergency Lighting System Test; Revision 16 | |||
- DB-ME-09323; Emergency Lighting System Preventive Maintenance; Revision 4 | |||
- Drawing E-930A; Emergency Battery Pack Location and Lamp Direction; Revision 7 | |||
- Drill 3-3-09/12-18-1; DFP Room Electrical Fire; 09/12/2018 | |||
- PFP-AB-227; Passage Room 227 Fire Area G; Revision 4 | |||
- PFP-AB-429; Low Voltage Switchgear Room E-Bus Room 429 Fire Area Y; Revision 4 | |||
- PFP-AB-429B; Battery Room A, Room 429B Fire Area Y; Revision 4 | |||
- PFP-IS-51; Diesel Fire Pump Area Room 51 Fire Area BE; Revision 3 | |||
- PFP-AB-105; ECCS Pump Room 1-1 Room 105 Fire Area AB; Revision 8 | |||
- PFP-AB-318; Diesel Generator 1-1 Room, Rooms 318 and 318UL Fire Area K; Revision 7 | |||
- PFP-AB-321A; Diesel Fuel Oil Day Tank 1-1 Room, Room 321A Fire Area K; Revision 4 | |||
71111.06Flood Protection Measures | |||
- CR-2018-07867; Maintenance Rule; 09/04/2018 | |||
- CR-G201-2001-0009; Barrier Penetration Inspections; 01/03/2001 | |||
- DB-FP-04038; Ten Percent Penetration Seal Visual Inspection; Revision 9 | |||
- DBRM-DBDE-002; Penetration Seal Inspection Population; Revision 2 | |||
- DB-SC-03218; Quarterly Functional Test of RE 4598BA, Station Vent Normal Range Radiation | |||
Monitor; Revision 24 | |||
- Drawing M-16; Piping Tunnel and Intake Structure; Revision 5 | |||
- NOP-ER-3004; FENOC Maintenance Rule Program; Revision 4 | |||
- NORM-ER-3208; Penetrations and Barriers; Revision 1 | |||
- RA-EP-02880; Internal Flooding; Revision 4 | |||
71111.11Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance | |||
- DB-OP-06412; Process and Area Radiation Monitor; Revision 47 | |||
- DB-OP-06504; Emergency Ventilation System; Revision 19 | |||
- NOP-OP-1002; Conduct of Operations; Revision 12 | |||
- RA-EP-02861; Radiological Incidents; Revision 04 | |||
71111.12Maintenance Effectiveness | |||
- DBRM-PES-004; System Performance Monitoring; Revision 01 | |||
- NOBP-ER-3900; Equipment Reliability Common Definitions and Structure; Revision 10 | |||
- NOP-ER-1001; Continuous Equipment Performance Improvement; Revision 6 | |||
- NORM-ER-3302; I & C Relays; Revision 4 | |||
- WO 200684792; PM 2522 Lube Motor Driven Feedpump Motor MP241 | |||
- WO 200739963; Motor Driven Feedpump Motor Inboard Outboard Sight Glass - Intrusive | |||
- WO 200746422; Oil Leak on Motor Driven Feedpump Inboard Pump Bearing | |||
71111.13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control | |||
- 18-0180-001; Temporary Modification Leak Seal Pivot Pin Cover Gasket Leak for RD48, | |||
MSR First Stage Reheat Drain Tank 2 Drain to High Pressure Feedwater Heater 2-5 Check | |||
Valve; Revision 00 | |||
- CR-2018-07174; Control Room Receipt of 16-2-B Voltage Regulator Fault Alarm with Exciter | |||
Alarm that cannot be Reset; 08/13/2018 | |||
- DBBP-OPS-0011; Protected Equipment Posting; Revision 13 | |||
- Drawing 05-021-SH-1; Component Cooling Water System; Revision 39 | |||
- NOP-OP-1007; Risk Management; Revision 27 | |||
- NOP-OP-1014; Plant Status Control; Revision 06 | |||
- OS-014A; Moisture Separator Reheater Drains System; Revision 20 | |||
- WO 200463362; PM 10915 MV 5095 Perform Diagnostic Static Test | |||
71111.15Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments | |||
- 18-0188-001; Install Resister for PDIS5017 Relay Coil; Revision 0 | |||
- CR-2018-01417; Request Evaluation for Past Operability for Long Term Boron Precipitation | |||
Function for Emergency Core Cooling System; 02/17/2018 | |||
- CR-2018-01487; Commitment DB-A19820 Appears Not Fully Met by DB-OP-02000 | |||
Revision 29; 02/20/2018 | |||
- CR-2018-02927-1; Incore String 5, Levels 1-7 SPNDs and Background Detector and Incore | |||
String 30, Level 1 SPND Non-Functional; 03/27/2018 | |||
- CR-2018-04599; Hole in EDG #2 Air Intake Silencer; 05/17/2018 | |||
- CR-2018-04974; Critical Preventative Orders Removed From Schedule at T-O; 05/29/2018 | |||
- CR-2018-05659; As Found Oil Levels for Containment Spray Pump #1 Were Found to be | |||
Lower Than Desired; 06/19/2018 | |||
- CR-2018-06127; Received Computer Point Q479 HP Injection Valve Leaking, and P465 HP | |||
Injection Valve in Press During Stroke of HP2A; 07/06/2018 | |||
- CR-2018-06706; CV 5000A and CV 5000B Failed to Operate During EVS Train 1 Monthly | |||
Test; 07/27/2018 | |||
- CR-2018-06812; Containment Spray Pump 2 Inboard Bearing Housing Rotation; 07/31/2018 | |||
- CR-2018-06386; Incore E9 (String 5) Electrical Connection as found Condition | |||
- CR-2018-07014; System Monitoring CCW Pump 1 Inboard Bearing Leakage Trending; | |||
08/07/2018 | |||
- CR-2018-07093; Containment Spray Pump #2 Outboard Bearing Constant Oil Leveler No | |||
Level; 08/10/2018 | |||
- DB-OP-02000; Attachment 22, Cross Connect LPI Pump Discharge; Revision 30 | |||
- Letter from NRC to Toledo Edison, Docket 50-346; Amendment No. 147 to Facility Operating | |||
License No. NPF-3 (TAC No. 75235); 04/13/1990 | |||
- Letter from Toledo Edison to NRC, Docket 50-346; License Amendment Application to | |||
Remove Technical Specification Table 3.-2, Containment Isolation Valves (TAC | |||
Number 75235); 12/22/1989 | |||
- Letter from Toledo Edison to NRC, Docket 50-346; Revision 11 to the Updated Safety Analysis | |||
Report; 05/31/1990 | |||
- NOBP-WM-5014-01; Rework Evaluation DB-PDIS5017; Revision 03 | |||
- NOP-OP-1009; Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments; Revision 06 | |||
71111.19Post Maintenance Testing | |||
- C-ME-04.02-00; MDFP Surveillance Test; Revision 1 | |||
- C-NSA-016-04-001; CW Allowable Pump Degradation; Revision 01 Addendum A01 | |||
- CR-2018-06208; TSH 11133 Found Out of Tolerance; 07/11/2018 | |||
- CR-2018-06211; SBODG Batteries Failed Load Test; 07/11/2018 | |||
- CR-2018-06212; Tan Delta Test for Cable from AD301 Had Higher than Expected Readings; | |||
07/11/2018 | |||
- CR-2018-06285; SBDG Ran Unloaded for Greater than 30 Minutes; 07/12/2018 | |||
- CR-2018-07188; CVS010D DB-PF-09301; 08/14/2018 | |||
- CR-2018-07467; Steps for DB-OP-06012 Not Incorporated for DH Venting Train 1 From | |||
DHS1; 08/23/2018 | |||
- Davis-Besse Unit 1 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report; Revision 30 | |||
- DB-OP-06334; Station Blackout Diesel Generator Operating Procedure; Revision 25 | |||
- DB-PF-03002; Bench Testing First Program Pressure Relief Devices; Revision 8 | |||
- DB-PF-03008; Containment Local Leakage Rate Tests; Revision 21 | |||
- DB-PF-03074; Component Cooling Water Pump 3 Test; Revision 17 | |||
- DB-PF-03272; Post Maintenance Valve Test; Revision 15 | |||
- DB-PF-03291; Containment Personnel and Emergency Airlocks Seal Leakage Test; | |||
Revision 14 | |||
- Drawing 0-021-SH-1; Operational Schematic Component Cooling Water System; Revision 39 | |||
- NEI-94-01; Nuclear Energy Institute Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based | |||
Option of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J; Revision 0 | |||
- WO 200686282; PM5594 V1429 CAL/Replace/Adjust | |||
- WO 200687245; SBODG Monthly Test FA Norm; 07/10/2018 | |||
- WO 200691035; Quarterly Test Decay Heat Train 1 Pump and Valve Test; 8/22/18 | |||
- WO 200692052; MDFP and Valve Quarterly Test; 09/05/2018 | |||
- WO 200708783; PM 0751 MV5010 Inspect CMT H2 Ln 3; 08/08/2018 | |||
- WO 200743022; R 4706 DH43 Check Valve DH Pump 1 | |||
- WO 200743543; PF3649-001 05.1 4 P-81 Personnel Airlock LLRT; 03/02/2018 | |||
- WO 200746422; Oil Leak on MFP Inboard Pump Bearing | |||
71111.22Surveillance Testing | |||
- ALARA Plan 2018-2006; Containment Entry in Modes 1 to Perform Containment Walkdown | |||
Inspections on the Following Floor Elevations 603, 585, 56, OV Room 636 and 653 East Side | |||
on Concrete; Revision 1 | |||
- CR-2018-01052; Service Water Pump P3-1 Minimum Design Curve Discrepancies; | |||
2/06/2018 | |||
- CR-2018-05854; RCS Integrated Leakage Program Tier III Standard Action Level | |||
Exceedance; 06/26/2018 | |||
- CR-2018-06057; RCDT In-Leakage Minimized by Closing SS2 and SS25; 07/03/2018 | |||
- DB-OP-01200; Reactor Coolant System Leakage Management; Revision 13 | |||
- DB-OP-03013; Containment Daily Inspection and Containment Closeout Inspection; | |||
Revision 10 | |||
- DB-PF-03017; Service Water Pump 1 Testing; Revision 23 | |||
- DB-SC-03071; EDG 2; Revision 36 | |||
- EN-DB-01171; Engineering Implementation of the RCS Integrated Leakage Program; | |||
Revision 03 | |||
- WO 200674807; PF3017-001 05.000 P3-1 SW Pump 1 Quarterly; 02/28/2018 | |||
- WO 200683205; PF3017-001 05.000 P3-1 SW Pump 1 Quarterly; 05/22/2018 | |||
- WO 200684942; REM S/D, Post ACC Change Check Fa Norm; 06/07/2018 | |||
- WO 200687262; REM S/D, Post ACC Change Check Fa Norm; 07/04/2018 | |||
- WO 200687645; EDG 2 Monthly Test; 07/13/2018 | |||
- WO 200690422; PF3017-001 05.000 P3-1 SW Pump 1 Quarterly; 02/13/2018 | |||
- WO 200738314; P3-2 Service Water Online Comprehensive Test; 07/13/2018 | |||
- WO 200759641; P3-2 Service Water Online Comprehensive Test; 07/03/2018 | |||
71114.06Drill Evaluation | |||
- CR-2018-08525; EP Drill - Contamination Control Enhancement for OSC | |||
- Drill Emergency Notification Forms | |||
- September 25 Integrated Drill Scenario | |||
71151Performance Indicator Verification | |||
- Reactor Oversight Program; Mitigating System Performance Index Basis Document, Davis- | |||
Besse Nuclear Power Station; Revision 5 | |||
- Unit Log Entries | |||
71152Problem Identification and Resolution | |||
- 18-188-001; Install Resister for PD1S50`7 Relay Coil; Revision 0 | |||
- BETA Metallurgical Laboratory M18131; Material Analysis Report: CCW Heat Exchanger #3; | |||
05/23/2018 | |||
- Chemistry System Trend Meeting Agenda/Minutes; MIC Program; 04/16/2018 | |||
- Chemistry System Trend Meeting Agenda/Minutes; MIC, Open Cooling Water & Diesel Fuel; | |||
05/03/2018 | |||
- Chemistry System Trend Meeting Agenda/Minutes; MIC, Open Cooling Water & Diesel Fuel; | |||
07/17/2018 | |||
- C-NSA-059.01-019; Calculation Computation; Revision 5 | |||
- CR-201-06353; CCW Low Flow Computer Point (792) for RCP 1-1 in Low; 05/05/2016 | |||
- CR-2012-1092; L149 Containment Building Wide Range Level Reads 0.000 FT; 07/12/2012 | |||
- CR-2013-10235; Faulted Relay in FIS 4233, RCP 1-2 CCW Flow Outlet From RCP Seal | |||
Cooler; 07/03/2013 | |||
- CR-2017-03523;Corroded Piping Upstream of SW260 | |||
- CR-2017-04069; Samples Not Collected in Accordance with NOP-OP-3602, Microbiologically | |||
Influenced Corrosion Monitoring Program | |||
- CR-2017-05701;Emergency Core Cooling System Room Cooler E42-2 Post Job Roll-up | |||
- CR-2017-06707; Turbine Plant Cooling Water Heat Exchanger #3 Piping Has Thickness | |||
Readings Below Specified Minimum Wall Requirements | |||
- CR-2017-08068; SW Pump 1 Strainer Piping Through Wall Leak | |||
- CR-2017-08573; SW Pump 2 Strainer Piping Has Below Minimum Allowable Thickness | |||
Readings | |||
- CR-2017-09881; Water Leaking from Piping/Lagging Near CT916 in SW Tunnel | |||
- CR-2017-F15-3 Service Water Pump #3 Strainer Has Pinhole Leak on Piping Just Below | |||
Discharge Elbow | |||
- CR-2018-00844; CCW Heat Exchanger 1-3 Pinhole Leak | |||
- CR-2018-00938; Additional Wall Thinning Found in SW Piping Upstream of SW260 | |||
- CR-2018-01158; POD 2017-03523, Revision 1, Elbow Wall Thinning | |||
- CR-2018-01994; Minimum Through Pipe Wall Thickness Question Piping Tee Upstream of | |||
SW260 AFP 1 SW Supply Isolation Valve | |||
- CR-2018-04549; Chemistry Not Included in Work Order Review | |||
- CR-2018-05764; SW Strainer Blowdown Piping Historical Trending | |||
- CR-2018-06237; External Oversight Question Regarding Operation of L1494 and L19 for | |||
PAMS CTMT Building Level; 07/11/2018 | |||
- CR-2018-06436; DB-SC-03221 Failed for Low RE1770A and B Sample Flow; 07/19/2018 | |||
- CR-2018-06706; CV 5000A and CV 5000B Failed to Operate During EVS Train 1 Monthly | |||
Test; 07/27/2018 | |||
- CR-2018-07274; Adverse Trend Barton Switch Relay Failures; 08/16/2018 | |||
- Drawing J-104-SH.1; Containment Vessel Water Level Wide Range (L-4595) Ch. 1; Revision 3 | |||
- ECP 13-07-001; Faulted Relay in F14233 | |||
- ECR 04-0299-00; Installation and Test Requirements; Revision 00 | |||
- NALCO Water Company Report 2356364; Analytical Report: CCW HX #3 TDP; 05/30/2018 | |||
- NALCO Water Company Report 2356365; Analytical Report: CCW HX #3 Bottom; 05/30/2018 | |||
- SA-BN-2018-1031; Assessment/Benchmarking: Davis-Besse Microbiologically Influenced | |||
Corrosion Program; 05/03/2018 | |||
- SW Chemistry Trends; Service Water Chemistry System Health Report; 2018 1st Half | |||
- System Health Report 2017-2; System-09-01-Service Water | |||
- System Health Report 2018-1; System-09-01-Service Water | |||
- WO 200686471; Containment Level Water Channel 1 Calibration FA Norm RFL; 03/08/2018 | |||
- WO 200686472; Containment Level Water Channel 2 Calibration FA Norm RFL; 03/08/2018 | |||
71153Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion | |||
- C-NSA-050.03-028; Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Minimum Performance; Revision 1 | |||
- CR-2018-07246; Loose Hand Wheel Fastener on AF2658A; 08/15/2018 | |||
- DB-SP-03151; AFP 1 Quarterly Test; Revision 27 | |||
- LER 2017-002-01; Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Bearing Damaged due to Improperly | |||
Marked Lubricating Oil Sight Glass | |||
- WO 200683237; AFP 1 Quarterly Test; 05/01/2018 | |||
- WO 200686498; AFP 1 Response Time Test Fa Norm; 03/23/2018 | |||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 10:55, 5 January 2025
| ML18291B231 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Davis Besse |
| Issue date: | 10/18/2018 |
| From: | Jamnes Cameron NRC/RGN-III |
| To: | Bezilla M FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co |
| References | |
| IR 2018003 | |
| Download: ML18291B231 (17) | |
Text
October 18, 2018
SUBJECT:
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATIONNRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000346/2018003
Dear Mr. Bezilla:
On September 30, 2018, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an integrated inspection at your Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. On October 3, 2018, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
Based on the results of this inspection, no findings or violations were identified.
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Jamnes L. Cameron, Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 50-346 License No. NPF-3
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 05000346/2018003
REGION III==
Docket Number:
50-346 License Number:
NPF-3 Report Number:
05000346/2018003 Enterprise Identifier: I-2018-003-0023 Licensee:
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC)
Facility:
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Location:
Oak Harbor, OH Dates:
July 1 through September 30, 2018 Inspectors:
D. Mills, Senior Resident Inspector J. Harvey, Resident Inspector J. Neurauter, Reactor Inspector J. Rutkowski, Project Engineer
Approved by:
J. Cameron, Chief Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring licensees performance by conducting an integrated quarterly inspection at Davis-Besse Power Plant in accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. Findings and violations being considered in the NRCs assessment are summarized in the table below.
List of Findings and Violations
No findings or violations were identified.
Additional Tracking Items
Type Issue Number Title Report Section Status LER 05000346/2017-002-01 Auxiliary Feed Water Pump Turbine Bearing Damaged due to Improperly Marked Lubricating Oil Sight Glass 71153 Closed
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PLANT STATUS
INSPECTION SCOPES
................................................................................................................
REACTOR SAFETY
.....................................................................................................................
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
..............................................................................................
INSPECTION RESULTS
..............................................................................................................
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
............................................................................................ 10
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
......................................................................................................... 10
PLANT STATUS
The unit remained at or near full power for the entirety of the inspection period.
On March 28, 2018, FirstEnergy Solutions (FES) / FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company
(FENOC) verbally notified the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that they intended to shut down
all four of their operating nuclear power plants. Based on that notification, the first to shut down
will be Davis-Besse, by May 31, 2020. On March 31, 2018, FES, FirstEnergy Nuclear
Generation (FENGEN), and FENOC filed for bankruptcy. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
continues to maintain focus on public health and safety and the protection of the environment.
This will include a continuous evaluation by inspectors to determine whether the licensees
financial condition is impacting safe operation of the plant.
INSPECTION SCOPES
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in
effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved IPs with
their attached revision histories are located on the public website at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-
rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. Samples were declared
complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection activity were met
consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor Inspection
Program - Operations Phase. The inspectors performed plant status activities described in
IMC 2515 Appendix D, Plant Status and conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem
Identification and Resolution. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records,
observed activities, and interviewed personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance
with Commission rules and regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following
systems/trains:
(1) Decay heat train 1 while decay heat train 2 was out of service for preventive
maintenance during the week ending July 14, 2018;
(2) Emergency diesel generator 1 while emergency diesel generator 2 was out of service for
planned testing during the week ending August 11, 2018;
(3) Containment spray train 2 while the train 1 borated water storage tank suction valve was
out of service for planned testing during the week ending August 25, 2018; and
(4) Component cooling water (CCW) train 1 and CCW ventilation train 1 while CCW 2
ventilation was out of service for planned maintenance during the week ending
September 1, 2018.
71111.05AQFire Protection Annual/Quarterly
Quarterly Inspection (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated fire protection program implementation in the following selected
areas:
(1) Emergency diesel generator 1 and emergency diesel generator fuel oil tank 1 (fire
area K) during the week ending July 7, 2018;
(2) Low voltage switchgear room 1 and battery room A (fire area Y) during the week ending
August 4, 2018;
(3) Pipe tunnel and equipment and pipe chase, rooms 100 and 101 (fire area B),
Emergency core cooling system (ECCS) pump room 1-1 (fire area AB), and ECCS
pump room 1-2 (fire area A) during the week ending August 11, 2018; and
(4) Mechanical penetration room 2 passage, room 227 (fire area G) during the week ending
September 1, 2018.
Annual Inspection (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated a fire brigade drill conducted in the diesel fire pump area, room 51
(fire area BE) during the week ending September 15, 2018.
71111.06Flood Protection Measures
Internal Flooding (Partial Sample)
The inspectors evaluated internal flooding mitigation protections in the intake structure
service water pump room beginning the week of August 26, 2018. This constituted a partial
sample.
71111.11Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Operator Requalification (1 Sample)
The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator requalification simulator
scenario on August 22, 2018.
Operator Performance (1 Sample)
The inspectors observed and evaluated licensee response to a high radiation alarm from
a spent fuel pool area radiation element on September 10, 2018.
71111.12Maintenance Effectiveness
Routine Maintenance Effectiveness (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of routine maintenance activities associated
with the following equipment and/or safety significant functions:
(1) Emergency ventilation system train 1 and associated damper control repair during the
week ending July 28, 2018; and
(2) Motor driven feedwater pump maintenance and sight glass verification during the week
ending September 8, 2018.
71111.13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (4 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the risk assessments for the following planned and emergent
work activities:
(1) Station blackout diesel generator out of service for planned maintenance during the
week ending July 14, 2018;
(2) Steam leak from moisture separator reheater first stage reheat drain tank 2 drain to high
pressure feedwater heater 2-5 check valve during the week ending July 21, 2018;
(3) Emergent work associated with turbine generator voltage regulator, control room receipt
of 16-2-B voltage regulator fault alarm with exciter alarms that cannot be reset during
the week ending August 18, 2018; and
(4) Planned maintenance on MV5095, component cooling water line 1 discharge isolation
valve, during the week ending August 25, 2018.
71111.15Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (5 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following operability determinations and functionality
assessments:
(1) High pressure injection valve leaking, CR-2018-06127, during the week ending
July 21, 2018;
(2) Incore detector string 5, level 1-7 self-powered neuron detectors (SPND) and
background detector, and incore detector string 30, level 1 SPND non-functional,
CR-2018-02927, CR-2018-06386 during the week ending July 21, 2018;
(3) Emergency ventilation system train 1 post maintenance test failure, CR-2018-06706,
during the week ending August 4, 2018;
(4) Core spray pump 2 inboard bearing rotation, CR-2018-06812, during the week ending
August 11, 2018; and
(5) Component cooling water pump 1 inboard bearing leakage trending, CR-2018-07014,
during the week ending August 11, 2018.
71111.19Post Maintenance Testing (7 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance tests:
(1) Station blackout diesel generator following performance of 2, 4, and 10 year preventive
maintenance work during the week ending July 14, 2018;
(2) Containment personnel hatch local leak rate testing following containment entry on
July 17, 2018;
(3) Containment spray train 2 following scheduled maintenance during the week ending
August 4, 2018;
(4) Containment isolation valve 5010D, containment air sample isolation valve, during the
week ending August 11, 2018;
(5) Component cooling water pump and heat exchanger 3 following scheduled maintenance
during the week ending August 18, 2018;
(6) Decay heat pump 1 following scheduled maintenance during the week ending
August 25, 2018; and
(7) Motor driven feedwater pump following scheduled maintenance during the week ending
September 8, 2018.
71111.22Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Routine (3 Samples)
(1) Remote shutdown, post-accident monitoring instrumentation monthly channel check,
DB-SC-03180, during the week ending July 7, 2018;
(2) Reactor coolant system leakage beginning the week ending June 30, 2018; and
(3) Emergency diesel generator 2 monthly surveillance test, DB-SC-03071, during the
week ending July 14, 2018.
In-Service (3 Samples)
(1) Service water pump 1 quarterly test, DB-PF-03071, during the week ending
August 18, 2018;
(2) Auxiliary feed pump 1 quarterly test during the week ending August 18, 2018; and
(3) Service water pump 2 comprehensive test, DB-PF-03226, during the week ending
July 14, 2018.
71114.06Drill Evaluation
Emergency Planning Drill (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated a licensee Emergency Response Organization emergency
preparedness drill on September 25, 2018.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71151Performance Indicator Verification (3 Samples)
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
(1) MS08: Heat Removal Systems1 Sample (October 1, 2017 - June 30, 2018);
(2) MS09: Residual Heat Removal Systems1 Sample (October 1, 2017 - June 30, 2018);
and
(3) MS10: Cooling Water Support Systems1 Sample (October 1, 2017 - June 30, 2018).
71152Problem Identification and Resolution
Semiannual Trend Review (2 Samples)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees documentation of repetitive or closely related issues
to identify a potential adverse trend related to the following issues:
(1) Service water piping damage due to microbiologically influenced corrosion (MIC) / lack
of MIC monitoring program, CR-2018-00844; and
(2) Switch failures due to 125V direct current (DC) relay issues.
Annual Follow-Up of Selected Issues (1 Sample)
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of its corrective action program
related to the following issues:
(1) DB-SC-03180 remote shutdown, post-accident monitoring instrumentation monthly
channel check, CR-2012-10942, Attachment 5.
71153Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Licensee Event Reports (1 Sample)
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports which can be accessed at
https://lersearch.inl.gov/LERSearchCriteria.aspx:
(1) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000346/2017-002-01, Auxiliary Feed Water Pump
Turbine Bearing Damaged due to Improperly Marked Lubricating Oil Sight Glass.
The original LER was closed in NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000346/2017004
(ML18045A076).
INSPECTION RESULTS
71152Problem Identification and Resolution
ObservationMicrobiologically Influenced
Corrosion Trend
71152Semiannual Trend
Review
By monitoring licensee corrective action reports (CRs) for 2017 and 2018, the inspectors
noted an increase in piping through-wall leaks due to what appeared to be microbiologically
influenced corrosion (MIC). The inspectors reviewed a sample of CRs for through-wall piping
pinhole leaks where the flaw type and location indicated the possibility of microbiologically
influenced corrosion, including CR-2017-03523, CR-2017-08068, CR-2018-00938, and
CR-2018-00844, to determine if there was an adverse trend in piping pinhole leaks due to
MIC. The inspectors also reviewed a licensee self-assessment of water chemistry control and
the service water system health reports.
The inspectors reviewed a licensee assessment of the MIC program (SA-NA-2018-1031)
that identified a gap from June 2015 through August 2017, during a period when samples to
determine presence of MIC were not taken due to lack of trained staff. The inspectors
reviewed the licensees corrective actions which included training additional staff to take
samples for MIC testing, and reviewed a sample of recent laboratory reports for MIC testing.
The inspectors also reviewed licensees monitoring of water chemistry and addition of
chemicals that mitigate formation of MIC.
The inspectors discussed the increased incidence of pinhole leaks with a chemistry
department specialist and the service water system engineer. Specifically, the inspectors
discussed the interaction between the chemistry department and system engineering with
respect to MIC identification, trending, and resulting corrective actions. Licensee staff noted
that pinhole leaks can be caused by other mechanisms other than MIC, such as cavitation
and galvanic corrosion. The inspectors determined that the chemistry department has
procedures in place to take MIC samples for laboratory testing when piping with pinhole
degradation is replaced to verify if degradation is due to MIC.
The inspectors reviewed a sample of system health reports for the service water system and
found that MIC-like piping degradation is noted and tracked. However, as noted above, a
laboratory test is required to verify if degradation is due to MIC. The inspectors verified that
the licensee is tracking corrective actions to replace degraded piping.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed a sample of the licensees prompt operability
determinations (POD) for identified piping through wall leaks. The inspectors verified by
documentation reviews applicability and compliance to ASME code case N-513-3
(and N-513-4). The inspectors also verified that licensee corrective actions to repair the
piping leaks were scheduled to be completed by the next refueling outage.
The inspectors reviewed licensee trending of repair to service water strainer blowdown piping
due to piping through wall leakage. In CR-2018-0764, the licensee used history of piping
replacement to periodically replace the service water strainer blowdown piping prior to
formation of a piping through wall pinhole leak. The inspectors noted that the CR attributed
the pinhole leakage due to cavitation and not due to MIC as described in the POD as a
MIC-like degradation mechanism. The CR also included industry guidance to identify
degradation due to cavitation. During discussions with licensee engineering staff, the
inspectors were able to visually examine a sample of removed strainer blowdown piping and
noted that the piping degradation was similar to industry guidance for cavitation.
Finally, the inspectors met with the licensees Supervisor of Engineering Programs, the
Inservice Inspection Program Owner, and the Aging Management Coordinator. As a result,
the inspectors were able to verify that the aging aspect identified pinhole piping leaks was
considered in the licensees CRs. Specifically, the CR prompts for an aging management
evaluation request.
In conclusion, the licensee identified a period where MIC samples could not be taken and
has corrected the concern. The licensee resumed sampling and has procedures to take
opportunistic MIC samples, but there was not sufficient data that identified a presence of MIC
to conclude an adverse trend in piping through wall leaks due to MIC. During the period
where MIC samples were not taken, the licensee adequately evaluated the identified pinhole
leaks and repaired the leaks in a timely manner. No findings or violations were identified by
the inspectors.
Observation125 Vdc Relay Failures
71152Semi Annual Trend Review
The inspectors identified a potential long-term trend related to Barton switch failures in safety
and non-safety related systems. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed CR-2018-06706
CV 5000A and CV 5000B failed to operate during EVS [emergency ventilation system] train 1
monthly test. The failure was due to a faulted 125 Vdc relay internal to a pressure differential
indicating switch. The inspectors noted the switch and the internal relay were classified as
non-critical components and therefore not required to be replaced at a specified frequency.
Additionally, the inspectors noted the vendor recommended 110 Vdc, plus or minus
percent, be supplied to relay. However, the voltage measured in field identified a
voltage at the coil of 133 Vdc. The licensee generated an engineering change package,
18-0188-001, to add a voltage dropping resistor in the circuit to reduce the voltage at the
relay coil.
The inspectors broadened the time period for the condition report review and identified
several additional instances in which 125 Vdc relays classified as non-critical components
failed, as documented in CR-2016-06353, CR-2013-10064, and CR-2004-04088, with
multiple change packages detailing the installation of a voltage dropping resistor documented
in ECR 04-0299-00 and 13-0475-001.
Although the inspectors did not identify a requirement for the incorporation of vendor
recommendations for the operating voltage of the relays, they questioned the licensee as to
whether a potential adverse trend existed. The inspectors also noted the potential for
additional relay failures, as many of the relays were operating above the vendor
recommended voltage and were not yet replaced because they were classified as non-critical
components.
The licensee generated CR-2018-07274, Adverse trend BARTON switch relay failures,
in response to the inspectors observations. The licensee assessed the currently installed
relays, which resulted in the determination to install an additional 12 voltage dropping
resistors and replace the associated relays, as applicable. No findings or violations were
identified by the inspectors.
ObservationRemote Shutdown, Post Accident
Monitoring Instrumentation Monthly Channel Check
71152-Annual Sample Review
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of DB-SC-03180; Remote Shutdown,
Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation Monthly Channel Check; Revision 14;
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of DB-SC-03180, Attachment 5
Evaluating CTMT [Containment] Wide Range Level Indications, which addressed
CR-2012-10942, LI4595 Containment Building Wide Range Level Reads 0.000 FT.
Specifically, the inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action to incorporate
into DB-SC-03180, which provides additional guidance for performing the PAM
wide range level instrumentation channel checks. Additionally, the inspectors reviewed the
current technical justification for the operability of the post-accident monitor wide range level
indication reading 0 FT instead of the expected elevation of 538 FT in the current conditions.
No findings or violations were identified by the inspectors.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was controlled to protect from public
disclosure. No proprietary information was documented in this report.
On October 3, 2018, the inspectors presented the quarterly integrated inspection results to
Mr. M. Bezilla and other members of the licensee staff.
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
71111.04Equipment Alignment
- C-ME-016.04-041; Evaluation of Temperature Increase of CCW System; Revision 1
- C-NSA-016.04-004; CCW Pump Inspection Requirements; Revision 1
- CR-2017-08936; BACC Lower CS Pump 2 Suction Flange; 08/29/2017
- CR-2017-10246; EDG Air Receiver 1-1 was Found with High Pressure; 10/06/2017
- CR-2018-05405; Water Leaking into EDG Room 1 Through Wall; 06/10/2018
- DB-OP-06013; Containment Spray; Revision 26
- DB-OP-06262; Valve Lineup Checklist for CCW Pump 3; Revision 39
- DB-OP-06316; EDG 1; Revision 59
- DB-OP-06513; CCW Pump Room Train 1 Ventilation System Startup; Revision 28
- Drawing 0S-041A-SH-1; Emergency Diesel Generator Systems; Revision 34
- Drawing M-034; Emergency Core Cooling System Containment Spray and Core Flooding
Systems; Revision 71
71111.05AQFire Protection Annual/Quarterly
- DB-ME-04100; Emergency Lighting System Test; Revision 16
- DB-ME-09323; Emergency Lighting System Preventive Maintenance; Revision 4
- Drawing E-930A; Emergency Battery Pack Location and Lamp Direction; Revision 7
- Drill 3-3-09/12-18-1; DFP Room Electrical Fire; 09/12/2018
- PFP-AB-227; Passage Room 227 Fire Area G; Revision 4
- PFP-AB-429; Low Voltage Switchgear Room E-Bus Room 429 Fire Area Y; Revision 4
- PFP-AB-429B; Battery Room A, Room 429B Fire Area Y; Revision 4
- PFP-IS-51; Diesel Fire Pump Area Room 51 Fire Area BE; Revision 3
- PFP-AB-105; ECCS Pump Room 1-1 Room 105 Fire Area AB; Revision 8
- PFP-AB-318; Diesel Generator 1-1 Room, Rooms 318 and 318UL Fire Area K; Revision 7
- PFP-AB-321A; Diesel Fuel Oil Day Tank 1-1 Room, Room 321A Fire Area K; Revision 4
71111.06Flood Protection Measures
- CR-2018-07867; Maintenance Rule; 09/04/2018
- CR-G201-2001-0009; Barrier Penetration Inspections; 01/03/2001
- DB-FP-04038; Ten Percent Penetration Seal Visual Inspection; Revision 9
- DBRM-DBDE-002; Penetration Seal Inspection Population; Revision 2
- DB-SC-03218; Quarterly Functional Test of RE 4598BA, Station Vent Normal Range Radiation
Monitor; Revision 24
- Drawing M-16; Piping Tunnel and Intake Structure; Revision 5
- NOP-ER-3004; FENOC Maintenance Rule Program; Revision 4
- NORM-ER-3208; Penetrations and Barriers; Revision 1
- RA-EP-02880; Internal Flooding; Revision 4
71111.11Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
- DB-OP-06412; Process and Area Radiation Monitor; Revision 47
- DB-OP-06504; Emergency Ventilation System; Revision 19
- NOP-OP-1002; Conduct of Operations; Revision 12
- RA-EP-02861; Radiological Incidents; Revision 04
71111.12Maintenance Effectiveness
- DBRM-PES-004; System Performance Monitoring; Revision 01
- NOBP-ER-3900; Equipment Reliability Common Definitions and Structure; Revision 10
- NOP-ER-1001; Continuous Equipment Performance Improvement; Revision 6
- NORM-ER-3302; I & C Relays; Revision 4
- WO 200684792; PM 2522 Lube Motor Driven Feedpump Motor MP241
- WO 200739963; Motor Driven Feedpump Motor Inboard Outboard Sight Glass - Intrusive
- WO 200746422; Oil Leak on Motor Driven Feedpump Inboard Pump Bearing
71111.13Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
- 18-0180-001; Temporary Modification Leak Seal Pivot Pin Cover Gasket Leak for RD48,
MSR First Stage Reheat Drain Tank 2 Drain to High Pressure Feedwater Heater 2-5 Check
Valve; Revision 00
- CR-2018-07174; Control Room Receipt of 16-2-B Voltage Regulator Fault Alarm with Exciter
Alarm that cannot be Reset; 08/13/2018
- DBBP-OPS-0011; Protected Equipment Posting; Revision 13
- Drawing 05-021-SH-1; Component Cooling Water System; Revision 39
- NOP-OP-1007; Risk Management; Revision 27
- NOP-OP-1014; Plant Status Control; Revision 06
- OS-014A; Moisture Separator Reheater Drains System; Revision 20
- WO 200463362; PM 10915 MV 5095 Perform Diagnostic Static Test
71111.15Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
- 18-0188-001; Install Resister for PDIS5017 Relay Coil; Revision 0
- CR-2018-01417; Request Evaluation for Past Operability for Long Term Boron Precipitation
Function for Emergency Core Cooling System; 02/17/2018
- CR-2018-01487; Commitment DB-A19820 Appears Not Fully Met by DB-OP-02000
Revision 29; 02/20/2018
- CR-2018-02927-1; Incore String 5, Levels 1-7 SPNDs and Background Detector and Incore
String 30, Level 1 SPND Non-Functional; 03/27/2018
- CR-2018-04599; Hole in EDG #2 Air Intake Silencer; 05/17/2018
- CR-2018-04974; Critical Preventative Orders Removed From Schedule at T-O; 05/29/2018
- CR-2018-05659; As Found Oil Levels for Containment Spray Pump #1 Were Found to be
Lower Than Desired; 06/19/2018
- CR-2018-06127; Received Computer Point Q479 HP Injection Valve Leaking, and P465 HP
Injection Valve in Press During Stroke of HP2A; 07/06/2018
- CR-2018-06706; CV 5000A and CV 5000B Failed to Operate During EVS Train 1 Monthly
Test; 07/27/2018
- CR-2018-06812; Containment Spray Pump 2 Inboard Bearing Housing Rotation; 07/31/2018
- CR-2018-06386; Incore E9 (String 5) Electrical Connection as found Condition
- CR-2018-07014; System Monitoring CCW Pump 1 Inboard Bearing Leakage Trending;
08/07/2018
- CR-2018-07093; Containment Spray Pump #2 Outboard Bearing Constant Oil Leveler No
Level; 08/10/2018
- DB-OP-02000; Attachment 22, Cross Connect LPI Pump Discharge; Revision 30
- Letter from NRC to Toledo Edison, Docket 50-346; Amendment No. 147 to Facility Operating
License No. NPF-3 (TAC No. 75235); 04/13/1990
- Letter from Toledo Edison to NRC, Docket 50-346; License Amendment Application to
Remove Technical Specification Table 3.-2, Containment Isolation Valves (TAC
Number 75235); 12/22/1989
- Letter from Toledo Edison to NRC, Docket 50-346; Revision 11 to the Updated Safety Analysis
Report; 05/31/1990
- NOBP-WM-5014-01; Rework Evaluation DB-PDIS5017; Revision 03
- NOP-OP-1009; Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments; Revision 06
71111.19Post Maintenance Testing
- C-ME-04.02-00; MDFP Surveillance Test; Revision 1
- C-NSA-016-04-001; CW Allowable Pump Degradation; Revision 01 Addendum A01
- CR-2018-06208; TSH 11133 Found Out of Tolerance; 07/11/2018
- CR-2018-06211; SBODG Batteries Failed Load Test; 07/11/2018
- CR-2018-06212; Tan Delta Test for Cable from AD301 Had Higher than Expected Readings;
07/11/2018
- CR-2018-06285; SBDG Ran Unloaded for Greater than 30 Minutes; 07/12/2018
- CR-2018-07188; CVS010D DB-PF-09301; 08/14/2018
- CR-2018-07467; Steps for DB-OP-06012 Not Incorporated for DH Venting Train 1 From
DHS1; 08/23/2018
- Davis-Besse Unit 1 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report; Revision 30
- DB-OP-06334; Station Blackout Diesel Generator Operating Procedure; Revision 25
- DB-PF-03002; Bench Testing First Program Pressure Relief Devices; Revision 8
- DB-PF-03008; Containment Local Leakage Rate Tests; Revision 21
- DB-PF-03074; Component Cooling Water Pump 3 Test; Revision 17
- DB-PF-03272; Post Maintenance Valve Test; Revision 15
- DB-PF-03291; Containment Personnel and Emergency Airlocks Seal Leakage Test;
Revision 14
- Drawing 0-021-SH-1; Operational Schematic Component Cooling Water System; Revision 39
- NEI-94-01; Nuclear Energy Institute Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based
Option of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J; Revision 0
- WO 200686282; PM5594 V1429 CAL/Replace/Adjust
- WO 200687245; SBODG Monthly Test FA Norm; 07/10/2018
- WO 200691035; Quarterly Test Decay Heat Train 1 Pump and Valve Test; 8/22/18
- WO 200692052; MDFP and Valve Quarterly Test; 09/05/2018
- WO 200708783; PM 0751 MV5010 Inspect CMT H2 Ln 3; 08/08/2018
- WO 200743022; R 4706 DH43 Check Valve DH Pump 1
- WO 200743543; PF3649-001 05.1 4 P-81 Personnel Airlock LLRT; 03/02/2018
- WO 200746422; Oil Leak on MFP Inboard Pump Bearing
71111.22Surveillance Testing
- ALARA Plan 2018-2006; Containment Entry in Modes 1 to Perform Containment Walkdown
Inspections on the Following Floor Elevations 603, 585, 56, OV Room 636 and 653 East Side
on Concrete; Revision 1
- CR-2018-01052; Service Water Pump P3-1 Minimum Design Curve Discrepancies;
2/06/2018
- CR-2018-05854; RCS Integrated Leakage Program Tier III Standard Action Level
Exceedance; 06/26/2018
- CR-2018-06057; RCDT In-Leakage Minimized by Closing SS2 and SS25; 07/03/2018
- DB-OP-01200; Reactor Coolant System Leakage Management; Revision 13
- DB-OP-03013; Containment Daily Inspection and Containment Closeout Inspection;
Revision 10
- DB-PF-03017; Service Water Pump 1 Testing; Revision 23
- DB-SC-03071; EDG 2; Revision 36
- EN-DB-01171; Engineering Implementation of the RCS Integrated Leakage Program;
Revision 03
- WO 200674807; PF3017-001 05.000 P3-1 SW Pump 1 Quarterly; 02/28/2018
- WO 200683205; PF3017-001 05.000 P3-1 SW Pump 1 Quarterly; 05/22/2018
- WO 200684942; REM S/D, Post ACC Change Check Fa Norm; 06/07/2018
- WO 200687262; REM S/D, Post ACC Change Check Fa Norm; 07/04/2018
- WO 200687645; EDG 2 Monthly Test; 07/13/2018
- WO 200690422; PF3017-001 05.000 P3-1 SW Pump 1 Quarterly; 02/13/2018
- WO 200738314; P3-2 Service Water Online Comprehensive Test; 07/13/2018
- WO 200759641; P3-2 Service Water Online Comprehensive Test; 07/03/2018
71114.06Drill Evaluation
- CR-2018-08525; EP Drill - Contamination Control Enhancement for OSC
- Drill Emergency Notification Forms
- September 25 Integrated Drill Scenario
71151Performance Indicator Verification
- Reactor Oversight Program; Mitigating System Performance Index Basis Document, Davis-
Besse Nuclear Power Station; Revision 5
- Unit Log Entries
71152Problem Identification and Resolution
- 18-188-001; Install Resister for PD1S50`7 Relay Coil; Revision 0
- BETA Metallurgical Laboratory M18131; Material Analysis Report: CCW Heat Exchanger #3;
05/23/2018
- Chemistry System Trend Meeting Agenda/Minutes; MIC Program; 04/16/2018
- Chemistry System Trend Meeting Agenda/Minutes; MIC, Open Cooling Water & Diesel Fuel;
05/03/2018
- Chemistry System Trend Meeting Agenda/Minutes; MIC, Open Cooling Water & Diesel Fuel;
07/17/2018
- C-NSA-059.01-019; Calculation Computation; Revision 5
- CR-201-06353; CCW Low Flow Computer Point (792) for RCP 1-1 in Low; 05/05/2016
- CR-2012-1092; L149 Containment Building Wide Range Level Reads 0.000 FT; 07/12/2012
- CR-2013-10235; Faulted Relay in FIS 4233, RCP 1-2 CCW Flow Outlet From RCP Seal
Cooler; 07/03/2013
- CR-2017-03523;Corroded Piping Upstream of SW260
- CR-2017-04069; Samples Not Collected in Accordance with NOP-OP-3602, Microbiologically
Influenced Corrosion Monitoring Program
- CR-2017-05701;Emergency Core Cooling System Room Cooler E42-2 Post Job Roll-up
- CR-2017-06707; Turbine Plant Cooling Water Heat Exchanger #3 Piping Has Thickness
Readings Below Specified Minimum Wall Requirements
- CR-2017-08068; SW Pump 1 Strainer Piping Through Wall Leak
- CR-2017-08573; SW Pump 2 Strainer Piping Has Below Minimum Allowable Thickness
Readings
- CR-2017-09881; Water Leaking from Piping/Lagging Near CT916 in SW Tunnel
- CR-2017-F15-3 Service Water Pump #3 Strainer Has Pinhole Leak on Piping Just Below
Discharge Elbow
- CR-2018-00844; CCW Heat Exchanger 1-3 Pinhole Leak
- CR-2018-00938; Additional Wall Thinning Found in SW Piping Upstream of SW260
- CR-2018-01158; POD 2017-03523, Revision 1, Elbow Wall Thinning
- CR-2018-01994; Minimum Through Pipe Wall Thickness Question Piping Tee Upstream of
SW260 AFP 1 SW Supply Isolation Valve
- CR-2018-04549; Chemistry Not Included in Work Order Review
- CR-2018-05764; SW Strainer Blowdown Piping Historical Trending
- CR-2018-06237; External Oversight Question Regarding Operation of L1494 and L19 for
PAMS CTMT Building Level; 07/11/2018
- CR-2018-06436; DB-SC-03221 Failed for Low RE1770A and B Sample Flow; 07/19/2018
- CR-2018-06706; CV 5000A and CV 5000B Failed to Operate During EVS Train 1 Monthly
Test; 07/27/2018
- CR-2018-07274; Adverse Trend Barton Switch Relay Failures; 08/16/2018
- Drawing J-104-SH.1; Containment Vessel Water Level Wide Range (L-4595) Ch. 1; Revision 3
- ECP 13-07-001; Faulted Relay in F14233
- ECR 04-0299-00; Installation and Test Requirements; Revision 00
- NALCO Water Company Report 2356364; Analytical Report: CCW HX #3 TDP; 05/30/2018
- NALCO Water Company Report 2356365; Analytical Report: CCW HX #3 Bottom; 05/30/2018
- SA-BN-2018-1031; Assessment/Benchmarking: Davis-Besse Microbiologically Influenced
Corrosion Program; 05/03/2018
- SW Chemistry Trends; Service Water Chemistry System Health Report; 2018 1st Half
- System Health Report 2017-2; System-09-01-Service Water
- System Health Report 2018-1; System-09-01-Service Water
- WO 200686471; Containment Level Water Channel 1 Calibration FA Norm RFL; 03/08/2018
- WO 200686472; Containment Level Water Channel 2 Calibration FA Norm RFL; 03/08/2018
71153Follow-Up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
- C-NSA-050.03-028; Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Minimum Performance; Revision 1
- CR-2018-07246; Loose Hand Wheel Fastener on AF2658A; 08/15/2018
- DB-SP-03151; AFP 1 Quarterly Test; Revision 27
- LER 2017-002-01; Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Turbine Bearing Damaged due to Improperly
Marked Lubricating Oil Sight Glass
- WO 200683237; AFP 1 Quarterly Test; 05/01/2018
- WO 200686498; AFP 1 Response Time Test Fa Norm; 03/23/2018