IR 05000321/2006003

IR 05000321-06-003, 05000366-06-003 - Hatch Inspection Report 2006003

ML062090010
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	07/27/2006
From:	Scott Shaeffer Division of Reactor Safety II
To:	Stinson L Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
IR-06-003
Download: ML062090010 (19)

Text

July 27, 2006

SUBJECT:

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000321/2006003 AND 05000366/2006003

Dear Mr. Stinson:

On June 30, 2006, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on July 14, 2006, with Mr. Dennis Madison and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-321, 50-366 License Nos. DPR-57 and NPF-5

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000321/2006003 and 05000366/2006003 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket Nos.:

50-321, 50-366 License Nos.:

DPR-57 and NPF-5 Report Nos.:

05000321/2006003 and 05000366/2006003 Licensee:

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Facility:

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Location:

Baxley, Georgia 31515 Dates:

April 1, 2006 - June 30, 2006 Inspectors:

D. Simpkins, Senior Resident Inspector J. Hickey, Resident Inspector C. Rapp, Senior Project Engineer R. Carrion, Project Engineer G. McCoy, Senior Resident Inspector - Vogtle Approved by:

Scott M. Shaeffer, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000321/2006-003, 05000366/2006-003; 04/01/2006-06/30/2006; Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear

Plant, Units 1 and 2; Routine Integrated Report.

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by two resident inspectors. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 completed a refueling outage on April 3 and operated at or near 100% Rated Thermal Power (RTP) until May 1 when a fire on the main generator bus duct caused a load reduction and outage until May 4. The unit remained at 100% for the remainder of the reporting period.

Unit 2 operated at or near 100% RTP except for a reactor trip on April 5. The unit was returned to full power on April 7 and remained at 100% RTP through the end of the reporting period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

==1R01 Adverse Weather

a. Inspection Scope

Seasonal Readiness Review.==

The inspectors performed a seasonal review of licensee hot weather preparations. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure DI-OPS-56-0293 Hot Weather Operation, and walked down the completed portions of the procedures. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the Technical Specifications (TS), Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) and drawings D-11001,11004, H-21033, 21039 to verify the following two systems would remain operable during hot weather.

• Plant Service Water (PSW) system

• Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) system Imminent Adverse Weather. The inspectors also reviewed licensee actions in response to a high winds on June 12. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure 34AB-Y22-002-0, Abnormal Phenomena, and walked down external plant areas to ensure debris and loose materials were controlled to limit missile hazards especially near the switchyards and safety-related equipment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

Partial Walkdowns.==

The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following three systems when the opposite trains were removed from service. The inspectors checked system valve positions, electrical breaker positions, and operating switch positions to evaluate the operability of the opposite trains or components by comparing the position listed in the system operating procedure to the actual position. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• 2C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) during 2A EDG maintenance

• 1A/1C EDGs during 1B EDG maintenance

• 2A/2C EDGs during 1B EDG maintenance Complete Walkdown. The inspectors performed a complete walkdown of the following system. The inspectors performed a detailed check of valve positions, electrical breaker positions, and operating switch positions to evaluate the operability of the redundant trains or components by comparing the required position in the system operating procedure to the actual position. The inspectors also interviewed personnel and reviewed control room logs to verify that alignment and equipment discrepancies were being identified and appropriately resolved. Documents reviewed are listed in the

.

• Unit 1 PSW System

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

Fire Area Tours.==

The inspectors toured the following 12 risk significant plant areas to verify transient combustibles were being controlled in accordance with administrative procedures and the physical condition of fire detection devices was assessed to identify damage or obstructions which could affect functionality. Water based suppression systems were inspected to verify sprinkler heads and nozzles were not obstructed by overhead equipment and major water supply valves were in the correct position. The inspectors reviewed the Fire Hazards Analysis drawings H-11846 and H-11847 to verify that the necessary fire fighting equipment, such as fire extinguishers, hose stations, ladders, and communications equipment, were in place. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• DC Switchgear Rooms

• Transformer Rooms

• Low Pressure Coolant Injection Inverter Room

• Control Room

• Control Room Roof

• Unit 1 SE Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Core Spray Room

• Unit 1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Pump and Turbine Room

• Unit 1 NE RHR and Core Spray Room

• Unit 1 Control Rod Drive (CRD) and DRW Sump Room

• Unit 1 High Pressure Core Injection (HPCI) Room

• Unit 1 CRD Area

• Unit 1 Working Floor and Motor Generator Set Rooms

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R06 Flood Protection Measures

a. Inspection Scope

Internal Flooding.==

The inspectors reviewed the FSAR and the individual plant examination to determine the plant areas that were susceptible to internal flooding events. The inspectors performed a detailed walkdown of the following area to determine potential sources of internal flooding and the condition of penetrations and sumps in the rooms.

• Unit 1 Southwest Diagonal Switchgear Room

• Unit 1 RCIC Pump Room External Flooding. The inspectors reviewed the FSAR and Individual Plant Examination for plant design features that protect against external flooding and licensee procedure 10AC-MGR-013-00, Inclement Weather Policies, to verify the licensees flood mitigation plans and equipment were consistent with the design requirements and risk analysis assumptions. The inspectors reviewed the material condition of flood protection barriers and exterior walls to verify they would perform their intended function.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

Resident Quarterly Observation.==

The inspectors observed the performance of licensee simulator scenario LT-SG-50352-14 which included a loss of the Baxley Loop, forced load reduction, loss of the 2A Instrument Bus, Condensate System leak, Reactor Scram, Main Steam Isolation Valve closure, RCIC failure to auto start, and a HPCI turbine control valve malfunction. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures 10AC-MGR-019-0S, Procedure Use and Adherence, and DI-OPS-59-0896N, Operations Management Expectations, to verify formality of communication, procedure usage, alarm response, control board manipulations, group dynamics, and supervisory oversight. The inspectors attended the post-exercise critique of operator performance to assess if the licensee identified performance issues were comparable to those identified by the inspectors. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the critique results from previous training sessions to assess performance improvement.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors reviewed the following two maintenance activities associated with structures, systems, and components to assess the licensees implementation of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65) with respect to the characterization of failures and the appropriateness of the associated (a)(1) or (a)(2) classification. The inspectors also reviewed operator logs, Condition Reports (CRs), Maintenance Work Orders (MWOs)and the licensees Maintenance Rule implementing procedures to determine if equipment failures were being identified, properly assessed, and corrective actions established to return the equipment to a satisfactory condition. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Unit 2 Core Spray System

• Unit 1 Analog Trip and Transmitter System

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors reviewed the following five Plan of the Day (POD) documents listed below to verify that risk assessments were performed prior to components being removed from service. The inspectors reviewed the risk assessment and risk management controls implemented for these activities to verify they were completed in accordance with licensee procedure 90AC-OAM-002-0, Scheduling Maintenance, and 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4). For emergent work, the inspectors assessed whether any increase in risk was promptly assessed and that appropriate risk management actions were implemented.

• POD for Week of 4/15-21

• POD for Week of 4/22-28

• POD for Week of 4/29-5/5

• POD for Week of 5/20-26

• POD for Week of 6/24-30

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R14 Personnel Performance During Non-routine Plant Evolutions

a. Inspection Scope

==

For the two events described below, the inspectors observed operator actions and reviewed operator logs and computer data to verify proper operator actions were taken.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Unit 2 Scram due to MVAR recorder calibration

• Notification of Unusual Event declared for a Unit 1 Isophase Bus Duct Fire

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors reviewed the following five operability evaluations and compared the evaluations to the system requirements identified in the TSs and the FSAR to ensure that operability was adequately assessed and the system or component remained available to perform its intended function. Also, the inspectors assessed the adequacy of compensatory measures implemented as a result of the condition. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Unit 1 Local Power Range Monitor gain adjustment factors greater than acceptance criteria

• Unit 1 1F Safety Relief Valve (SRV) elevated tailpipe temperature

• 1A and 1C EDG fuel stability values less than desired

• Wear particles in the Unit 1 RCIC used oil

• Unit 1 SRV Quick Disconnect fittings not aligned per design

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

==

For the following five post-maintenance tests, the inspectors reviewed the test scope to verify the test demonstrated the work performed was completed correctly and the affected equipment was functional and operable in accordance with TS requirements.

Following the maintenance activities, the inspectors reviewed equipment status and alignment to verify the system or component was available to perform the required safety function. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• 1E41F036, HPCI Steam Trap Inlet Isolation Valve repack

• 1P41D106A, RHRSW Pump A cooling water flow indicator replacement

• 2E41F005, HPCI Discharge Check Valve Bonnet Seal leak

• 1B EDG Air, Water, Lube Oil Heat Exchanger replacement

• 1E51F017, RCIC Suction Relief Valve removal/test/install

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors witnessed the Unit 1 and Unit 2 plant start up. The inspectors reviewed plant configurations, technical specifications, license conditions and administrative procedure prerequisites for pending mode changes. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors reviewed licensee surveillance test procedures and either witnessed the test or reviewed test records for the following six surveillances to determine if the scope of the test adequately demonstrated the affected equipment was operable. The inspectors reviewed these activities to assess for preconditioning of equipment, procedure adherence, and equipment alignment following completion of the surveillance. The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure AG-MGR-21-0386N, Evolution and Pre-and Post-Job Brief Guidance, and attended selected briefings to determine if procedure requirements were met. Documents reviewed are listed in the

.

Surveillance Tests

• 34SV-R43-011-2, Diesel Generator 2A 24 Month Operability Test

• 34SV-R43-006-2, Diesel Generator 2C Sem-Annual Test

• 34SV-C71-004-2, Manual Scram Functional Test

• 42IT-TET-020-0, Control Room Inleakage Tracer Gas Test In-Service Test

• 34SV-E41-001-1, RCIC Operability Unit Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leakage Detection

• 34SV-SUV-019-1, Surveillance Checks

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors reviewed the following temporary modification (TMM) and assessed the evaluation using criteria defined in licensee procedure 40AC-ENG-018-0S, Temporary Modification Control. In addition, the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was assessed using the design basis information provided in the FSAR to verify the modification did not affect the safety functions of this system. The inspectors also verified the modification was installed in accordance with the TMM requirements.

• TMM 2-06-015, Bypassing of one Unit 2 Turbine Building leak detector (Temperature Sensor)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the following two emergency plan evolutions. The inspectors observed licensee activities in the simulator, Technical Support Center and Operations Support Center to verify implementation of licensee procedure 10AC-MGR-006-0, Hatch Emergency Plan. The inspectors reviewed the classification of the simulated events and the development of protective action recommendations to verify these activities were conducted in accordance with licensee procedure 73EP-EIP-001-0, Emergency Classification and Initial Actions. The inspectors also reviewed licensee procedure 73EP-EIP-073-0, Onsite Emergency Notification, to verify the proper offsite notifications were made. The inspectors attended the post-exercise critique to assess the licensees effectiveness in identifying areas of improvement. Documents reviewed are listed in the

.

• Emergency Plan Drill conducted on May 17

• Simulator Education Drill on June 14

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of the licensee submittals for the performance indicators (PIs) listed below to verify the accuracy of the data reported. The PI definitions and the guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Rev. 2 and licensee procedure 00AC-REG-005-0S, preparation and reporting of NRC PI Data, were used to verify procedure and reporting requirements were met.

Initiating Events Cornerstone

• Unit 1 and 2 Reactor Coolant System Leakage

• Unit 1 and 2 Reactor Coolant System Activity The inspectors reviewed raw PI data collected from July 2004 through March 2006 for the RCS leakage indicators and from June 2004 through March 2006 for the RCS activity indicators and compared graphical and tabular representations from the most recent PI report to the raw data to verify that the data was included in the report. The inspectors also examined a sampling of operations logs and procedures to verify the PI data was appropriately captured for inclusion into the PI report, and the individual PIs were calculated correctly. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

.1 Daily Screening of Corrective Action Items

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees corrective action program. This review was accomplished by either attending daily screening meetings that briefly discussed major CRs, or accessing the licensees computerized corrective action database and reviewing each CR that was initiated.

.2 Semi-Annual Trend Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a review of the licensees Corrective Action Program and associated documents to identify trends which could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The review was focused on repetitive equipment issues, but also considered the results of inspector daily CR screening, licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance results. The review nominally considered the six month period of January 2006 through June 2006 although some examples extended beyond those dates when the scope of the trend warranted. The inspectors also reviewed several CRs associated with operability determinations which occurred during the period. The inspectors compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in the licensees two latest quarterly trend reports. Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensees trend reports were reviewed for adequacy. The inspectors also evaluated the trend reports against the requirements of the licensees corrective action program as specified in licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings of significance were identified. The inspectors compared the licensee Quarterly Trend Report with the results of the inspectors daily CR screening and did not identify any discrepancies or potential trends in the data that the licensee had failed to identify.

4OA3 Event Followup

.1 (Closed) LER 05000321/2004-001, Residual Heat Removal Service Water Pump Inoperable

for Failure to meet NPSH Requirements On February 3, 2004, an evaluation revealed that the Net Positive Suction Head requirements for the 1C RHRSW Pump were not met when river level fell below 65.9 feet from September 14, 2003 through November 17, 2003. On December 12, 2003 the 1C RHRSW Pump was replaced and successfully tested. This condition was documented in CR 2003112330. No findings of significance were identified.

.2 (Closed) LER 05000321/2004-005, Degraded Motor Generator Set Results in Reactor

Protection System Bus Trip On April 15, 2004, the B Reactor Protection System Motor Generator Set tripped. As a result, several primary containment isolation valves repositioned to the fail-safe position of closed due to a loss of power. The degraded motor was replaced with a new motor. This condition was documented in CR 2004104570. No findings of significance were identified.

.3 (Closed) LER 05000366/2004-003, Failure to Restore Caution Tag on Service Air System

Resulted in Primary Containment Inoperability On October 3, 2004, primary containment was declared inoperable because both penetration 22 manual isolation valves were open. One of the affected valves was subsequently closed, which restored primary containment to operable status. A Caution Tag clearance had not been properly restored prior to changing modes. This condition was documented in CR 2004109710. No findings of significance were identified.

4OA5 Other

.1 (Closed) NRC Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/165:

Operational Readiness of Offsite Power and Impact on Plant Risk The inspectors reviewed licensee procedures and controls and interviewed operations and maintenance personnel to verify these documents contained specific attributes delineated in the TI to ensure the operational readiness of offsite power systems in accordance with plant Technical Specifications; the design requirements provided in 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 17, Electric Power Systems; and the impact of maintenance on plant risk in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants. Appropriate documentation of the results of this inspection was provided to NRC headquarters staff for further analysis, as required by the TI. This completes the Region II inspection TI requirements for the Hatch Nuclear Plant.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

.1 Exit Meeting

On July 14, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Dennis Madison and other members of his staff who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors confirmed that all proprietary information examined during the inspection was controlled in accordance with appropriate guidelines.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

M. Ajluni, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support

J. Dixon, Health Physics Manager

S. Douglas, Assistant General Manager - Plant Operations

M. Googe, Maintenance Manager

J. Hammonds, Operations Manager

J. Lewis, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager

D. Madison, General Manager - Nuclear Plant

J. Thompson, Nuclear Security Manager

R. Varnadore, Engineering Manager

NRC personnel

S. Shaeffer, Chief, Region II Reactor Project Branch 2

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Closed

05000321/2004-001 LER Residual Heat Removal Service Water Pump Inoperable for Failure to meet NPSH Requirements (Section 4OA3.1)

05000321/2004-005 LER Degraded Motor Generator Set Results in Reactor Protection System Bus Trip (Section 4OA3.2)

05000366/2004-003 LER Failure to Restore Caution Tag on Service Air System Resulted in Primary Containment Inoperability (Section 4OA3.3)

2515/165 TI Operational Readiness of Offsite Power and Impact on Plant Risk (Section 4OA5)