ML18026B110: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
 
(StriderTol Bot change)
 
(2 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown)
Line 3: Line 3:
| issue date = 01/26/2018
| issue date = 01/26/2018
| title = U.S.Nrc Regulatory Perspective on Aircraft Impact Assessments
| title = U.S.Nrc Regulatory Perspective on Aircraft Impact Assessments
| author name = Andrukat D W
| author name = Andrukat D
| author affiliation = NRC/NRO
| author affiliation = NRC/NRO
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
Line 16: Line 16:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:U.S.NRCRegulatoryPerspec tive onAircraftImpa c tAss e s smentsDennis AndrukatU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of New Reactors 2Presenta summ a ryof t heU.S.NRC asse ssments bei ng cond uctedfor the n e wreact o rdesi g ns un d er 10CFR 50.1 50 ,"AircraftImp act As sessment"(AIA)Purpose 3*Bac k g r o u nd on NRCAIAreg u l at i on a n d g u i d a n c e*Summa r y of in d u s try g u i d a nce(NEI 0 7-13)*NRC i nsp ecti o n pr oce dure*Exp e rie n c e w i th De si g n C ert i fic at i on a p p l ic antsOverview
{{#Wiki_filter:U.S. NRC Regulatory Perspective on Aircraft Impact Assessments Dennis Andrukat U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of New Reactors
*Immediately af t er9/11/01, N RC evaluatedrepre s en tati v e e xistingrea ctorsforaircraftimpact ut ilizing Na tional Labs(200 1-20 0 4)*Regulatory requirements for aircraft impact mitigation were imposed on existing reactors via NRC Orders
 
*SpentFuel P ool swere evaluated
2 Present a summary of the U.S. NRC assessments being conducted for the new reactor designs under 10 CFR 50.150, Aircraft Impact Assessment (AIA)
;In terfacedwith NAS(200 5-2 0 07)*NRC in-house preliminary e valuationsof newrea c to r design s(AP1000, A B W R , E SBWR, E PR, and A P W R)utilizing RESstaff(200 6-2008)4Assessment of Existing and New Reactors  
Purpose
*N R Camend e ditsregulationtocodify NRC O r ders to mi tigatethe ef f e cts ofloss e sof lar g eareas oftheplanttofires orexplosio n s (1 0 CFR 50.54 (hh))(2009)*ALLreactors*mitigation strategies
 
*N R Camend e ditsregulationtorequi r eappli cantsfor new nu clear po w errea ctorsto pe rform an a s s e s s m e nt ofthe ef f e cts ofthe impact of alarge,commercialair craft(10CFR 50.150)(2009)*NEWreactor designs only
3
*design features and functional capabilities 5Assessment of Existing and New Reactors 610 CFR 50.150 "Aircraft Impact Assessment
* Background on NRC AIA regulation and guidance
"*Published June 2009
* Summary of industry guidance (NEI 07-13)
*AIA rule ap pli es t o newreacto r a pp licants af t erJuly 1 3 , 2009**Impact of a l a r ge , comm erci a l a ircr aftis a b e y ond-desig n-b a sisevent*U s e r e alistic a n a l y s es*Both safety-related and nonsafety-related features can be relied upon*Reduced use of operator action is a goal*[74 FR 28146, June 12, 2009]AIA Regulation 710 CFR 50.150(a) "Aircraft Impact Assessment "Id e nt ify a n d i n c o r p o rate intothe d e s i gnth o sefe atu r es a n d f u nc t i o n a l c a p a bil ities to sh owthat:*the r e a ctorcore remai ns co o l edOR t h e c onta i nment remai n s inta c tAND*Spent fuel pool cooling OR spent fuel pool integrity is maintainedAIA Regulation 810 CFR 50.150(b) "Content of application"This section discusses the what must be documented in the DCD
* NRC inspection procedure
*Must identify & describethe credited key design features and functional capabilities from the assessment
* Experience with Design Certification applicants Overview
*Must describe howeach key design feature and functional capability meets the rule*What is its role(s)
* Immediately after 9/11/01, NRC evaluated representative existing reactors for aircraft impact utilizing National Labs (2001-2004)
*Which acceptance criterion/criteria is applicableAIA Regulation 910 CFR 50.150(c) "Control of Changes"This section discusses the change control process required for key design features credited to meet 10 CFR 50.150.
* Regulatory requirements for aircraft impact mitigation were imposed on existing reactors via NRC Orders
*Any plant design change evaluated against the AIA
* Spent Fuel Pools were evaluated; Interfaced with NAS (2005-2007)
*Change must not invalidate the AIAAIA Regulation R egulatory Guide1.217*IssuedAugust2011*Endor s esNEI 07-13,"Methodologyfor Perfor mingAirc raft I m pa c t As s e s s mentsfor NewPlantDe sign s"whichwasdeveloped byNEI andrev iewed bythe N RC staff*Con side r edinsightsgainedfrom N RC and indu stry a s s e s s ments of ope rating andnew rea ctor de signs*Provides an a c c eptable, reasonably formulatedmethodologyto a s s e ssthe ef f e cts of a large , c ommercial air craftimpact on newrea ctordesign s10NRC Regulatory Guidance NEI 07-13, Revision 8
* NRC in-house preliminary evaluations of new reactor designs (AP1000, ABWR, ESBWR, EPR, and APWR) utilizing RES staff (2006-2008) 4 Assessment of Existing and New Reactors
*IssuedApril2011*Methodologydivided intothree pa r t s:-Conta inment and s pent fuelpool evaluat i on-Heatremovalevaluat i on-Design enhan cements*Sour c es of c o n serva t i s m-Centerl i ne c onta inmentstri k es-Normalimpact withmaximumforce-Nocredit forlargeequipment in lim itingdamage 11Industry Guidance NEI 07-13, Revision 8
 
*Unc ertainties-Definition ofthreat and l oa d-time fun ction-Fire-indu c edspuriousactuat i on-10 C F R 50.5 4 (hh)(2),"Loss ofLargeArea s"of theplant due tofire or e xplosionprov i de amea sure of defen s e-i n-depth12Industry Guidance 13*Metho d ol o gy in N E I 0 7-13is acombin ation of a n a l ys i s a n drulesets-S tructu r alanalysisfor a s s e s sing c ontainment&s pent fuel poolintegrity(lo c al andglobal e ffects)-Rule setsfor a s s e s singfire and s h o c k ef f e cts-Rule setsfor a s s e s singphysi c aldamagetobuildings otherthan c ontainment and s p entfuel poolstr uctures-U s e offini te elementanalysiswhererule s ets donot apply-Based uponexperiments,analysisrepo rts, andexpert judgementAIA Methodology 14AIA Analysis Process 15 T hr e e p o te ntialsta ges o f l ocal l o a d i n g*M i ss ile penetrati o n i nto the t a r ge t (dep th o f entry of themiss ile i nto thetar get) -N R DC Emp iric a lFormu l a*S p a l l i ng a n d sca b b i ngof the t ar get (e jecti o nof tar get mater i alfrom t he tar get fro n tface -sp a l l i n g a nd from the b a ck face -sca b b i n g)-R e d uced C h a n g Emp iric a lFormu l a*M i ss ile perfor a ti o nthr oug hthe t a r ge t-Miss i leful ly p e n etratesthe t ar g et-P erforati o n ve l oc i tyis themissi l e ve l oc i ty j u stsuffici e nt toful l y p e n etrate with o ut e xiti n g-R e si d u a l ve l oc i tyis the e x it ve l oc i tyof a miss i le with i niti a l ve l oc ity gr e at e r th a n perf orati o n ve l oc i ty-CE A-EDF Empir icalFormu l a-Prev enti o nof p erforati o n-R e d uced D e g e n Emp iric a lFormu l aLocal Structural Assessment Riera Fun c t i on Te s ts*Eng ine Tests-G E-J7 9engine-481mph(705 f t/s)-2'-5.25'thicktargets*F-4Test-8'dia meter-481mph(705 f t/s)-12'thicktarget16See ADAMS Accession No. ML112690136 for more publically
NRC amended its regulation to codify NRC Orders to mitigate the effects of losses of large areas of the plant to fires or explosions (10 CFR 50.54(hh)) (2009)
-available informationAIA Experiments Wa t erSlug(WS) TestsNote: WStestswereNOTintendedtosimulate a ctualmis silesor targets*Testsdemonstra t eddamagepoten tial of"s of t"missile*Te stsprovided s o meinsightrega rdingfluiddispe r s a lis s ues*U s edto ben chmark c o des17AIA Experiments 18 T w o Alt e rn ative A n a l ysisMet h o d s*Force T im e-H istory A n a l ysisMet h od-R ieraFu nctio n:Imp a ctforce time-h istoryis d etermi n edfrom aircr a ft mass d istrib utio n ,crus h i n gstre ngthinf ormati o n a n d im p u lse co nserv ation pr i nc i p les,ass u mi n g th at t he tar get is rig i d-Prov i d e sforce t im e-h istory with sp ecific ch aract eristics-Pr e scr ibe dto de si g ne rs by U S N R C(SGI i nform a ti on)*Miss i l e-T ar get Int eracti o n A n a l ysisMet h od-C o mb i n e d d y n amic a n a l ysis mo d elof b oth missi l e a n dtar g et-R e q u ir e s d e mo nstrati o n th a t:*Inte grat e dforc e-time h istory (im p u lse)matc hes o r e x ce eds pr e scri b ed R iera fu nctionimp ulse*R i g i d w a l l im pact re p ro d uc e s ch aract eristicsof pr e scri b ed R iera fu nction ch aract eristics(res p o n sefilter e d at 50 to 1 0 0Hz)Global StructuralAssessm e nt 19 Te c hni c alSuppo r t andDetailsProvidedinNEI 0 7-13,Appendix B Material S trengthPrope rties Ta k e In t o Ac c ount:*S trainrate ef f e cts*Dynamicincrea s efactors*Con creteagingstrengthinc reaseMaterialFailure C riteria*Cast and S tainle s s S teel platestr ainlimi t s*Reinfor cing S teel strainlimi t s*Reinfor c ed andPre stre ssedCon cretefailuremodelingMaterial Characterization and Failure Criteria 20ContainmentAnal y s e s*Air craft andengineimpactperpendiculartostru ctu r ecenterline
ALL reactors mitigation strategies NRC amended its regulation to require applicants for new nuclear power reactors to perform an assessment of the effects of the impact of a large, commercial aircraft (10 CFR 50.150) (2009)
*Po tential c ontainmentdomeimpa c tis aplan t-s p e cif i c c o n side ration*Fre e-sta ndingsteel c ontainmentsmayrequi r eairframemodel*Newplantdesignsmayconta i ndesignfea turesforwhi c hpastexperienceislacking,withpotentialfailuremodesoutsidetheexistingexperience ba s e*Regions ofthe c ontainmentwith poten tiallycritical pen etrations requi r e s p e cial c o n side rationStructural Assessment:Major Assumptions 21SpentFuel Pool Analyses*Engine andair craftfuselageimpact at mi d-height and mi d-s p an ofthe poolwall*Otherlocationswithgreaterdamagepotential s hould be a s s e s s e d*Engine andair craftfuselageimpactperpendiculartothewall s urfa c e*If c reditistaken of poolwaterinven tory, c a re s hould be exer cisedin as suringthatthe add e dmass ofthewateris modeled c o n serva t i vely*Po tentialdamagefromwallmotion onfuel a s s emblies adja c enttothewalls s hould beevaluatedStructural Assessment:Major Assumptions 22 C ontai nmentIntact*Thecontainmentremai n s i ntact if structural an alys e s performed showthatperforationof a steel conta inmentor c oncrete conta inment w ith steel l iner do e s notoccur on impactAND t hattheconta inment ultimate pressurecap a bi lity,giv e n a core damage ev ent, w o uld n o t be e x ce e d e d b efore ef fecti v e mitigati o n st rateg ies canbe impl emented*Effectivemitigati o n st rateg ies are those that,foran i ndefi niteperi o dof time,providesufficie n tcoo l i n gto the d amag e dcore or co ntai nmentto l imit temperature a n dpressure chal l en g es be l owthe ultimate pressurecap a bi lityof theconta inmentas defi n edin D CD/F S AR C hapter 19.Structural Assessment:Sufficiency Criteria 23 S pent Fuel P o olIntegrity*Loc a l izedcrushing and c racki n gof theconcrete wall of the po o lis acce ptableprovid e dthatno l eaka ge through the spe n tfuel po o l l i nercompromisesthe requ iredminimumwater l evelof the po o l*Ifthefuel po o l l i ner do es nothavea l eaka g epath b e l o wthemin imum w ater l e ve l ,thefuelis protected andthere w ou l d be no unacc eptab l erele a seof radi o nuc l i d esto the env ironment*Anaircraft impact at anelev ation be l owthespe n tfuel p o ol w iththe p otenti a lfor ca u si n g su b se q u ent co l l apse ofthe spent fuel po o lsup porting st ructure must be eva luated,as appropri ateStructural Assessment:Sufficiency Criteria 24*S tructu r al orphysi c aldamagedetermined u singrule s etsin NEI 07-13*Thephysi c aldamagerule s etsidenti fied we r e de r i v ed ba s ed on studies ofstr uctu r e swith typical reinfor c ed c o n cretewalls rep resen t ativ e of e xistingplantdesign s:-24inch ex teriorwalls, 18inchinteriorwalls*Some newplantsemploystr ucturessimilartothose of c u r rent plants,othershavestr ucturesthataresignificantlymorerobu st.*Ifthe a ctualstr ucturetobe analyzedvariessignificantl y, "Mis sil e-Targ e tIn tera c t i on A nal ysis Method"should be employedtodeterminethenumber ofreinfor c ed c o n cretewalls ne c e s s a r ytostopfurther pe rforationintothestr uctu r e on a de sign-s peci fic ba sis.Structural Assessment:Buildings Other than Containment and Spent Fuel Pool 25*T hefre q u ency sp ectrum ass o ci ated with anaircr aftimp a ctis co n si d er a b l y h i g h erth an the sp ectrum ass o ci ated with e arth q u akes.*All e q u i pm e nt with i nthe sh ock d a ma g efo otpri n tis ass umedto fa il at the timeof im pact.*R ulesets inNEI 0 7-13are us e dto d efinethe sh o ckaffectsfor six cat e g o ri e sof e q u i pm e nt b ased on f ra g i lit y.*T he sh ock d a ma g e d ista ncesare me asur e dfrom t he ce nter of i niti al im pact a n dth e n a l o nga structur al p ath w a yto theaffect e d e q u i p me nt (i.e., sh o ckis tra nsmitted t hr o u g h w a lls,flo ors a n d ce i l i n g s b u t n ot acr oss o p en a i r sp ace).*NSSS ve n d o rs h a vethe o ption of us i ngtheval u esfor SD1 t hr o u gh S D 6 co ntaine dinNEI 0 7-1 3 or d e v e l o p i n gth eir o w n dist an c e s ba s ed onacc e l erati o n va l u e sfilter e dat 2 00 Hz for sp ecificim pact l ocati ons.Shock DamageAssessm e nt 26*Fire s preadrule s etsprovidedin NEI 0 7-13*Rule setsare ba s ed onpreviousres earchrepo rts and experiments
NEW reactor designs only design features and functional capabilities 5
*Fire damage footprint starts where physical damage ends -interface boundary
Assessment of Existing and New Reactors
*Rule set consists of either the 1
 
-barrier option or two
6 10 CFR 50.150 Aircraft Impact Assessment Published June 2009 AIA rule applies to new reactor applicants after July 13, 2009*
-barrier option
Impact of a large, commercial aircraft is a beyond-design-basis event Use realistic analyses Both safety-related and nonsafety-related features can be relied upon Reduced use of operator action is a goal
*1-barrier utilizes 5 psid, 3-hour fire rated barriers
*[74 FR 28146, June 12, 2009]
*2-barrier utilize 3-hour fire rated barriers*Firedamage sp r eadis as s es s edinall 3dimensionsFi re DamageAssessm ent 27*Firedamage c a n ex t endwellbeyondthephysi callydamag e d area duetotheoverp r e s su r e ef f e ctsfromtheinitial fireball and the s pread offuelthrough openpathw a yswithin t hestr uctu r e.*Ventilatio n duct w o r kinth e physical d a ma g efootp rintis expectedto beseverely c rush e d ,torn, and/orsevered.*Eachfiredamagefoo tprintisfullyencap sulatedwith 3-hourfirerated ba rrie r s (walls,floor s , c eilings).Encaps ulationisintendedto c ontain:-Fire/The rmal ef f e cts-Fuel Spread-Overp ress u refromdeflagr ationFi re DamageAssessm ent Fi re DamageAssessm ent28*Allcabling a n delect rical equip me ntwithin damage footprints:
AIA Regulation
*infire damage footprint  
 
-available for five minutes only*in physical damage footprint  
7 10 CFR 50.150(a) Aircraft Impact Assessment Identify and incorporate into the design those features and functional capabilities to show that:
-lost upon impact
the reactor core remains cooled OR the containment remains intact AND Spent fuel pool cooling OR spent fuel pool integrity is maintained AIA Regulation
*A ventilation controlled internal fire will burn for several hours, thus preventing operations personnel from being able to take manual actions in these areas for several hours.*Additional considerations:
 
*Evaluate st ructu r alsteel n otencasedinconcrete*Smoke/Heat at air intakes C o m positeDamage F ootprint29*The c ompo sitedamagefoo tprintfor ea c himpa c tlocation s c ena riois developed byenvelopingtheto tal damagefrom str uctural,fire, and s h o c kdamage*As eachimpa c tlocation s c ena riois evaluated,thesystemicand funct i onal ef fectsthatarepre cludingprotection ofthefuel (reactor vessel and spent fuel pool) s hould be identi fiedFire DamageShock DamagePhysical Damage C o m positeDamage F ootprint30*U singplantinformation s u ch asfireanalyses,firePRAs,internal floodingstudie s , andplantdrawing s ,therule s ets and methodologywillthendeterminewhich s p e cif i cequipment, including c able s ,is a s s umedto bedamag e d*Thecombinedlist ofdamagedcables and SS Cs de finesthe threattomaintaining c ooling offuelin t heves s el and s p entfuel pool*As eachimpa c tlocation s c ena riois evaluated,thesystemic and funct i onal ef fectsthatarepre cludingprotection ofthefuel (reactor vessel and spent fuel pool) s houldbe identi fied 31Des ign Enh anc ementsPlant Design, Rev X+1Assess perNEI 07-13Identify existing/new featuresIncorporate into Design
8 10 CFR 50.150(b) Content of application This section discusses the what must be documented in the DCD Must identify & describe the credited key design features and functional capabilities from the assessment Must describe how each key design feature and functional capability meets the rule What is its role(s)
*Ruleacceptancecriteria must be met forall postu latedimpact l ocationscen arios*10 CFR 5 0.150requ ires ap p l icantsto i de ntify andincorporate des i gnfeatures andfunctional cap a bi liti e sto meet theacceptance criteria*A p p lic ants sh o u l d d ocume n tthe ratio n a l eforthe se lected ap proach(s) 32*Three categoriesof e nh ancements-Prevent i ngIn ternalDamage*S trengthening ex ternalwalls orrelocatingintervening str uctures-MinimizingIn ternalDamage*Relocateequipment,str engtheninternalwalls, add and/or upg r adefire doo r s-Desig n-Specific S ystemEnhan cements*I mplementsystem enh a n ceme ntstofacilita t emaintaini n g fuel c oolingDes ign Enh ancements
Which acceptance criterion/criteria is applicable AIA Regulation
*Appli c a n tsare not re q ui r ed to s u bmit t h e a c t ual as s e s sm e nt of t h e a i r craftimpact*As s e s s m e n t s will be s u bj e ct to in s pectio n*NRC m aytak e a p p r o pr i a t e e nf o r ceme nt a c ti o n f o r a ny v i o l a t i o n s , in cl u d i ng t h epreparat io n o f a n i nadequat eassessment orfailu re to p r e p a r e an a ss e s s m ent33Inspection Activities NRC Inspection Manual InspectionPro c edu r e 378 0 4*Mo s t-r e ce n t r evisi o n(Fe b r uary 2 0 1 2)*Verify t hat ap plic a ntide n t i f ied and in c o r p o r a t e din t othe d esignall t he n ec e s sary d esignfeatures a n dfun ctional c a p a bili tiesthat p rovide a ddition a lin h e r e nt p rote ctionto withstand ai rc r aftimp ac t*Verify re alismin a ss e s s m e nt of stru ctu ral, fire, s hock , a n d pl a nt s p ecif i clo s s ef f e cts*Verify AIA do c um entationisbeing mai ntained c o ns i stent withthe r e q uir e me nts oftherule34Inspection Procedure 35*Westi n g h o u se AP1 0 00*Gen eral El ectric Hi tachiESBWR*AREVA EPR*Tosh i baABWR (So u thTexas)*GEH Renewal ABWR
 
*Mi tsubishi US-APWR*KHNP APR1400Experience with Design Certification Applicants 36*Appl ying Fire DamageRule Se t s*5psidfire ba rrie r sversus 5p s idfire doors*Clo s earrange m ent of ba rrie r s und e r tw o-ba rrieroption*Ph y si cal andFirefoo tprintinterface a s s umptions and requi rements*Fireintru sion v i a ex ternalwall impacts*Use of Intervening Structures
9 10 CFR 50.150(c) Control of Changes This section discusses the change control process required for key design features credited to meet 10 CFR 50.150.
*Gantry C r anes to beevaluated*Mesh Size AnalysisLessons Learned 37*Documentation
Any plant design change evaluated against the AIA Change must not invalidate the AIA AIA Regulation
*Identi f y i ngALL c redited k e y de signfea tures*Everything credited in assessment must be identified in DC application
 
*Needed support equipment must be included*Balancinglevel ofdetailrequi r edin DCDwithoutinclusionof unn e c e s s ar y SUNSI orSGIinformationLessons Learned 38*AIArule ap p l i esto n ewreactor a pp l ic antsafter Ju ly 13, 20 0 9**I mpactof alargecommercial aircraft is a beyo n d des i gn bas i seve n t*A p pl icantsto use real istic an alys e sto i de ntifyimp o rta n t d e si g nfeatures*N R C en dorsed N E I 0 7-13 as an acceptab l e method f ormeetingthe rule*Metho ds andresults are inspected
Regulatory Guide 1.217 Issued August 2011 Endorses NEI 07-13, Methodology for Performing Aircraft Impact Assessments for New Plant Designs which was developed by NEI and reviewed by the NRC staff Considered insights gained from NRC and industry assessments of operating and new reactor designs Provides an acceptable, reasonably formulated methodology to assess the effects of a large, commercial aircraft impact on new reactor designs 10 NRC Regulatory Guidance
*Lesso n s l earnedused inupdatingregu latory gu i da n ce andinsp ectionproceduresConclusion 39 Aircraft Impact Assessment rule:
 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR
NEI 07-13, Revision 8 Issued April 2011 Methodology divided into three parts:
-2009-06-12/pdf/E9-13582.pdfAircraft Impact Assessment Inspection s: https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new
Containment and spent fuel pool evaluation Heat removal evaluation Design enhancements Sources of conservatism Centerline containment strikes Normal impact with maximum force No credit for large equipment in limiting damage 11 Industry Guidance
-reactors/oversight/aia
 
-inspections.html#insrptRG 1.217: ML092900004NEI 07-13, Revision 8P: ML111440006Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses' Response of Reinforced Concrete Structures to Aircraft Crash Impact: ML112690136Links 40ABWRAdvanced Boiling
NEI 07-13, Revision 8 Uncertainties Definition of threat and load-time function Fire-induced spurious actuation 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2), Loss of Large Areas of the plant due to fire or explosion provide a measure of defense-in-depth 12 Industry Guidance
-Water ReactorAIAaircraft impact assessmentAP1000Advanced Passive 1000APR1400Advanced Power Reactor 1400APWRAdvanced Pressurized
 
-Water ReactorCEA-EDFFrench Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission
13
-Électricité de FranceCOLcombined license CFRCode of Federal RegisterDIFdynamic increase factors DCdesign certification DCDdesign certification document EPREvolutionary Pressurized
* Methodology in NEI 07-13 is a combination of analysis and rule sets
-Water ReactorESBWREconomic Simplified Boiling
- Structural analysis for assessing containment & spent fuel pool integrity (local and global effects)
-Water ReactorFSARfinal safety analysis report GEGeneral Electric GEH GE-HitachiKHNPKorea Hydro & Nuclear PowerNASNational Academy of Sciences NRDCNatural Resources Defense CouncilNEINuclear Energy Institute NRCNuclear Regulatory CommissionPSIDpressure per square inch differentialPRAprobabilistic risk assessmentRESOffice of Research (NRC)
- Rule sets for assessing fire and shock effects
RGregulatory guideSFPspend fuel pool SGIsafeguards informationSNLSandia National LaboratoriesSUNSIsensitive unclassified non
- Rule sets for assessing physical damage to buildings other than containment and spent fuel pool structures
-safeguards information WSwater slugAcronyms Than k you.Questions??41}}
- Use of finite element analysis where rule sets do not apply
- Based upon experiments, analysis reports, and expert judgement AIA Methodology
 
14 AIA Analysis Process
 
15 Three potential stages of local loading Missile penetration into the target (depth of entry of the missile into the target) - NRDC Empirical Formula Spalling and scabbing of the target (ejection of target material from the target front face - spalling and from the back face - scabbing) -
Reduced Chang Empirical Formula Missile perforation through the target
- Missile fully penetrates the target
- Perforation velocity is the missile velocity just sufficient to fully penetrate without exiting
- Residual velocity is the exit velocity of a missile with initial velocity greater than perforation velocity - CEA-EDF Empirical Formula
- Prevention of perforation - Reduced Degen Empirical Formula Local Structural Assessment
 
Riera Function Tests Engine Tests
- GE-J79 engine
- 481 mph (705 ft/s) 5.25 thick targets F-4 Test
- 8 diameter
- 481 mph (705 ft/s)
- 12 thick target 16 See ADAMS Accession No. ML112690136 for more publically-available information AIA Experiments
 
Water Slug (WS) Tests Note: WS tests were NOT intended to simulate actual missiles or targets Tests demonstrated damage potential of soft missile Tests provided some insight regarding fluid dispersal issues Used to benchmark codes 17 AIA Experiments
 
18 Two Alternative Analysis Methods Force Time-History Analysis Method
- Riera Function: Impact force time-history is determined from aircraft mass distribution, crushing strength information and impulse conservation principles, assuming that the target is rigid
- Provides force time-history with specific characteristics
- Prescribed to designers by USNRC (SGI information)
Missile-Target Interaction Analysis Method
- Combined dynamic analysis model of both missile and target
- Requires demonstration that:
* Integrated force-time history (impulse) matches or exceeds prescribed Riera function impulse
* Rigid wall impact reproduces characteristics of prescribed Riera function characteristics (response filtered at 50 to 100 Hz)
Global Structural Assessment
 
19 Technical Support and Details Provided in NEI 07-13, Appendix B Material Strength Properties Take Into Account:
Strain rate effects Dynamic increase factors Concrete aging strength increase Material Failure Criteria Cast and Stainless Steel plate strain limits Reinforcing Steel strain limits Reinforced and Prestressed Concrete failure modeling Material Characterization and Failure Criteria
 
20 Containment Analyses Aircraft and engine impact perpendicular to structure centerline Potential containment dome impact is a plant-specific consideration Free-standing steel containments may require airframe model New plant designs may contain design features for which past experience is lacking, with potential failure modes outside the existing experience base Regions of the containment with potentially critical penetrations require special consideration Structural Assessment:
Major Assumptions
 
21 Spent Fuel Pool Analyses Engine and aircraft fuselage impact at mid-height and mid-span of the pool wall Other locations with greater damage potential should be assessed Engine and aircraft fuselage impact perpendicular to the wall surface If credit is taken of pool water inventory, care should be exercised in assuring that the added mass of the water is modeled conservatively Potential damage from wall motion on fuel assemblies adjacent to the walls should be evaluated Structural Assessment:
Major Assumptions
 
22 Containment Intact The containment remains intact if structural analyses performed show that perforation of a steel containment or concrete containment with steel liner does not occur on impact AND that the containment ultimate pressure capability, given a core damage event, would not be exceeded before effective mitigation strategies can be implemented Effective mitigation strategies are those that, for an indefinite period of time, provide sufficient cooling to the damaged core or containment to limit temperature and pressure challenges below the ultimate pressure capability of the containment as defined in DCD/FSAR Chapter 19.
Structural Assessment:
Sufficiency Criteria
 
23 Spent Fuel Pool Integrity Localized crushing and cracking of the concrete wall of the pool is acceptable provided that no leakage through the spent fuel pool liner compromises the required minimum water level of the pool If the fuel pool liner does not have a leakage path below the minimum water level, the fuel is protected and there would be no unacceptable release of radionuclides to the environment An aircraft impact at an elevation below the spent fuel pool with the potential for causing subsequent collapse of the spent fuel pool supporting structure must be evaluated, as appropriate Structural Assessment:
Sufficiency Criteria
 
24 Structural or physical damage determined using rule sets in NEI 07-13 The physical damage rule sets identified were derived based on studies of structures with typical reinforced concrete walls representative of existing plant designs:
- 24 inch exterior walls, 18 inch interior walls Some new plants employ structures similar to those of current plants, others have structures that are significantly more robust.
If the actual structure to be analyzed varies significantly, Missile-Target Interaction Analysis Method should be employed to determine the number of reinforced concrete walls necessary to stop further perforation into the structure on a design-specific basis.
Structural Assessment:
Buildings Other than Containment and Spent Fuel Pool
 
25 The frequency spectrum associated with an aircraft impact is considerably higher than the spectrum associated with earthquakes.
All equipment within the shock damage footprint is assumed to fail at the time of impact.
Rule sets in NEI 07-13 are used to define the shock affects for six categories of equipment based on fragility.
The shock damage distances are measured from the center of initial impact and then along a structural pathway to the affected equipment (i.e., shock is transmitted through walls, floors and ceilings but not across open air space).
NSSS vendors have the option of using the values for SD1 through SD6 contained in NEI 07-13 or developing their own distances based on acceleration values filtered at 200 Hz for specific impact locations.
Shock Damage Assessment
 
26 Fire spread rule sets provided in NEI 07-13 Rule sets are based on previous research reports and experiments Fire damage footprint starts where physical damage ends - interface boundary Rule set consists of either the 1-barrier option or two-barrier option 1-barrier utilizes 5 psid, 3-hour fire rated barriers 2-barrier utilize 3-hour fire rated barriers Fire damage spread is assessed in all 3 dimensions Fire Damage Assessment
 
27 Fire damage can extend well beyond the physically damaged area due to the overpressure effects from the initial fireball and the spread of fuel through open pathways within the structure.
Ventilation ductwork in the physical damage footprint is expected to be severely crushed, torn, and/or severed.
Each fire damage footprint is fully encapsulated with 3-hour fire rated barriers (walls, floors, ceilings). Encapsulation is intended to contain:
- Fire/Thermal effects
- Fuel Spread
- Overpressure from deflagration Fire Damage Assessment
 
Fire Damage Assessment 28 All cabling and electrical equipment within damage footprints:
in fire damage footprint - available for five minutes only in physical damage footprint - lost upon impact A ventilation controlled internal fire will burn for several hours, thus preventing operations personnel from being able to take manual actions in these areas for several hours.
Additional considerations:
Evaluate structural steel not encased in concrete Smoke/Heat at air intakes
 
Composite Damage Footprint 29 The composite damage footprint for each impact location scenario is developed by enveloping the total damage from structural, fire, and shock damage As each impact location scenario is evaluated, the systemic and functional effects that are precluding protection of the fuel (reactor vessel and spent fuel pool) should be identified Fire Damage Shock Damage Physical Damage
 
Composite Damage Footprint 30 Using plant information such as fire analyses, fire PRAs, internal flooding studies, and plant drawings, the rule sets and methodology will then determine which specific equipment, including cables, is assumed to be damaged The combined list of damaged cables and SSCs defines the threat to maintaining cooling of fuel in the vessel and spent fuel pool As each impact location scenario is evaluated, the systemic and functional effects that are precluding protection of the fuel (reactor vessel and spent fuel pool) should be identified
 
31 Design Enhancements Plant Design, Rev X+1 Assess per NEI 07-13 Identify existing/new features Incorporate into Design Rule acceptance criteria must be met for all postulated impact location scenarios 10 CFR 50.150 requires applicants to identify and incorporate design features and functional capabilities to meet the acceptance criteria Applicants should document the rationale for the selected approach(s)
 
32
* Three categories of enhancements
- Preventing Internal Damage
* Strengthening external walls or relocating intervening structures
- Minimizing Internal Damage
* Relocate equipment, strengthen internal walls, add and/or upgrade fire doors
- Design-Specific System Enhancements
* Implement system enhancements to facilitate maintaining fuel cooling Design Enhancements
* Applicants are not required to submit the actual assessment of the aircraft impact
* Assessments will be subject to inspection
* NRC may take appropriate enforcement action for any violations, including the preparation of an inadequate assessment or failure to prepare an assessment 33 Inspection Activities
 
NRC Inspection Manual Inspection Procedure 37804 Most-recent revision (February 2012)
Verify that applicant identified and incorporated into the design all the necessary design features and functional capabilities that provide additional inherent protection to withstand aircraft impact Verify realism in assessment of structural, fire, shock, and plant specific loss effects Verify AIA documentation is being maintained consistent with the requirements of the rule 34 Inspection Procedure
 
35
* Westinghouse AP1000
* General Electric Hitachi ESBWR
* AREVA EPR
* Toshiba ABWR (South Texas)
* GEH Renewal ABWR
* Mitsubishi US-APWR
* KHNP APR1400 Experience with Design Certification Applicants
 
36
* Applying Fire Damage Rule Sets
* 5psid fire barriers versus 5psid fire doors
* Close arrangement of barriers under two-barrier option
* Physical and Fire footprint interface assumptions and requirements
* Fire intrusion via external wall impacts
* Use of Intervening Structures
* Gantry Cranes to be evaluated
* Mesh Size Analysis Lessons Learned
 
37
* Documentation
* Identifying ALL credited key design features
* Everything credited in assessment must be identified in DC application
* Needed support equipment must be included
* Balancing level of detail required in DCD without inclusion of unnecessary SUNSI or SGI information Lessons Learned
 
38
* AIA rule applies to new reactor applicants after July 13, 2009*
* Impact of a large commercial aircraft is a beyond design basis event
* Applicants to use realistic analyses to identify important design features
* NRC endorsed NEI 07-13 as an acceptable method for meeting the rule
* Methods and results are inspected
* Lessons learned used in updating regulatory guidance and inspection procedures Conclusion
 
39 Aircraft Impact Assessment rule:
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-06-12/pdf/E9-13582.pdf Aircraft Impact Assessment Inspections:
https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/oversight/aia-inspections.html#insrpt RG 1.217:
ML092900004 NEI 07-13, Revision 8P:
ML111440006 Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses Response of Reinforced Concrete Structures to Aircraft Crash Impact:
ML112690136 Links
 
40 ABWR Advanced Boiling-Water Reactor AIA aircraft impact assessment AP1000 Advanced Passive 1000 APR1400 Advanced Power Reactor 1400 APWR Advanced Pressurized-Water Reactor CEA-EDF French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission-Électricité de France COL combined license CFR Code of Federal Register DIF dynamic increase factors DC design certification DCD design certification document EPR Evolutionary Pressurized-Water Reactor ESBWR Economic Simplified Boiling-Water Reactor FSAR final safety analysis report GE General Electric GEH GE-Hitachi KHNP Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power NAS National Academy of Sciences NRDC Natural Resources Defense Council NEI Nuclear Energy Institute NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PSID pressure per square inch differential PRA probabilistic risk assessment RES Office of Research (NRC)
RG regulatory guide SFP spend fuel pool SGI safeguards information SNL Sandia National Laboratories SUNSI sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information WS water slug Acronyms
 
Thank you.
Questions??
41}}

Latest revision as of 03:37, 7 January 2025

U.S.Nrc Regulatory Perspective on Aircraft Impact Assessments
ML18026B110
Person / Time
Issue date: 01/26/2018
From: Dennis Andrukat
Office of New Reactors
To:
Dennis Andrukat
Shared Package
ML18026B126 List:
References
Download: ML18026B110 (41)


Text

U.S. NRC Regulatory Perspective on Aircraft Impact Assessments Dennis Andrukat U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of New Reactors

2 Present a summary of the U.S. NRC assessments being conducted for the new reactor designs under 10 CFR 50.150, Aircraft Impact Assessment (AIA)

Purpose

3

  • Background on NRC AIA regulation and guidance
  • NRC inspection procedure
  • Experience with Design Certification applicants Overview
  • Immediately after 9/11/01, NRC evaluated representative existing reactors for aircraft impact utilizing National Labs (2001-2004)
  • Regulatory requirements for aircraft impact mitigation were imposed on existing reactors via NRC Orders
  • Spent Fuel Pools were evaluated; Interfaced with NAS (2005-2007)
  • NRC in-house preliminary evaluations of new reactor designs (AP1000, ABWR, ESBWR, EPR, and APWR) utilizing RES staff (2006-2008) 4 Assessment of Existing and New Reactors

NRC amended its regulation to codify NRC Orders to mitigate the effects of losses of large areas of the plant to fires or explosions (10 CFR 50.54(hh)) (2009)

ALL reactors mitigation strategies NRC amended its regulation to require applicants for new nuclear power reactors to perform an assessment of the effects of the impact of a large, commercial aircraft (10 CFR 50.150) (2009)

NEW reactor designs only design features and functional capabilities 5

Assessment of Existing and New Reactors

6 10 CFR 50.150 Aircraft Impact Assessment Published June 2009 AIA rule applies to new reactor applicants after July 13, 2009*

Impact of a large, commercial aircraft is a beyond-design-basis event Use realistic analyses Both safety-related and nonsafety-related features can be relied upon Reduced use of operator action is a goal

  • [74 FR 28146, June 12, 2009]

AIA Regulation

7 10 CFR 50.150(a) Aircraft Impact Assessment Identify and incorporate into the design those features and functional capabilities to show that:

the reactor core remains cooled OR the containment remains intact AND Spent fuel pool cooling OR spent fuel pool integrity is maintained AIA Regulation

8 10 CFR 50.150(b) Content of application This section discusses the what must be documented in the DCD Must identify & describe the credited key design features and functional capabilities from the assessment Must describe how each key design feature and functional capability meets the rule What is its role(s)

Which acceptance criterion/criteria is applicable AIA Regulation

9 10 CFR 50.150(c) Control of Changes This section discusses the change control process required for key design features credited to meet 10 CFR 50.150.

Any plant design change evaluated against the AIA Change must not invalidate the AIA AIA Regulation

Regulatory Guide 1.217 Issued August 2011 Endorses NEI 07-13, Methodology for Performing Aircraft Impact Assessments for New Plant Designs which was developed by NEI and reviewed by the NRC staff Considered insights gained from NRC and industry assessments of operating and new reactor designs Provides an acceptable, reasonably formulated methodology to assess the effects of a large, commercial aircraft impact on new reactor designs 10 NRC Regulatory Guidance

NEI 07-13, Revision 8 Issued April 2011 Methodology divided into three parts:

Containment and spent fuel pool evaluation Heat removal evaluation Design enhancements Sources of conservatism Centerline containment strikes Normal impact with maximum force No credit for large equipment in limiting damage 11 Industry Guidance

NEI 07-13, Revision 8 Uncertainties Definition of threat and load-time function Fire-induced spurious actuation 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2), Loss of Large Areas of the plant due to fire or explosion provide a measure of defense-in-depth 12 Industry Guidance

13

  • Methodology in NEI 07-13 is a combination of analysis and rule sets

- Structural analysis for assessing containment & spent fuel pool integrity (local and global effects)

- Rule sets for assessing fire and shock effects

- Rule sets for assessing physical damage to buildings other than containment and spent fuel pool structures

- Use of finite element analysis where rule sets do not apply

- Based upon experiments, analysis reports, and expert judgement AIA Methodology

14 AIA Analysis Process

15 Three potential stages of local loading Missile penetration into the target (depth of entry of the missile into the target) - NRDC Empirical Formula Spalling and scabbing of the target (ejection of target material from the target front face - spalling and from the back face - scabbing) -

Reduced Chang Empirical Formula Missile perforation through the target

- Missile fully penetrates the target

- Perforation velocity is the missile velocity just sufficient to fully penetrate without exiting

- Residual velocity is the exit velocity of a missile with initial velocity greater than perforation velocity - CEA-EDF Empirical Formula

- Prevention of perforation - Reduced Degen Empirical Formula Local Structural Assessment

Riera Function Tests Engine Tests

- GE-J79 engine

- 481 mph (705 ft/s) 5.25 thick targets F-4 Test

- 8 diameter

- 481 mph (705 ft/s)

- 12 thick target 16 See ADAMS Accession No. ML112690136 for more publically-available information AIA Experiments

Water Slug (WS) Tests Note: WS tests were NOT intended to simulate actual missiles or targets Tests demonstrated damage potential of soft missile Tests provided some insight regarding fluid dispersal issues Used to benchmark codes 17 AIA Experiments

18 Two Alternative Analysis Methods Force Time-History Analysis Method

- Riera Function: Impact force time-history is determined from aircraft mass distribution, crushing strength information and impulse conservation principles, assuming that the target is rigid

- Provides force time-history with specific characteristics

- Prescribed to designers by USNRC (SGI information)

Missile-Target Interaction Analysis Method

- Combined dynamic analysis model of both missile and target

- Requires demonstration that:

  • Integrated force-time history (impulse) matches or exceeds prescribed Riera function impulse
  • Rigid wall impact reproduces characteristics of prescribed Riera function characteristics (response filtered at 50 to 100 Hz)

Global Structural Assessment

19 Technical Support and Details Provided in NEI 07-13, Appendix B Material Strength Properties Take Into Account:

Strain rate effects Dynamic increase factors Concrete aging strength increase Material Failure Criteria Cast and Stainless Steel plate strain limits Reinforcing Steel strain limits Reinforced and Prestressed Concrete failure modeling Material Characterization and Failure Criteria

20 Containment Analyses Aircraft and engine impact perpendicular to structure centerline Potential containment dome impact is a plant-specific consideration Free-standing steel containments may require airframe model New plant designs may contain design features for which past experience is lacking, with potential failure modes outside the existing experience base Regions of the containment with potentially critical penetrations require special consideration Structural Assessment:

Major Assumptions

21 Spent Fuel Pool Analyses Engine and aircraft fuselage impact at mid-height and mid-span of the pool wall Other locations with greater damage potential should be assessed Engine and aircraft fuselage impact perpendicular to the wall surface If credit is taken of pool water inventory, care should be exercised in assuring that the added mass of the water is modeled conservatively Potential damage from wall motion on fuel assemblies adjacent to the walls should be evaluated Structural Assessment:

Major Assumptions

22 Containment Intact The containment remains intact if structural analyses performed show that perforation of a steel containment or concrete containment with steel liner does not occur on impact AND that the containment ultimate pressure capability, given a core damage event, would not be exceeded before effective mitigation strategies can be implemented Effective mitigation strategies are those that, for an indefinite period of time, provide sufficient cooling to the damaged core or containment to limit temperature and pressure challenges below the ultimate pressure capability of the containment as defined in DCD/FSAR Chapter 19.

Structural Assessment:

Sufficiency Criteria

23 Spent Fuel Pool Integrity Localized crushing and cracking of the concrete wall of the pool is acceptable provided that no leakage through the spent fuel pool liner compromises the required minimum water level of the pool If the fuel pool liner does not have a leakage path below the minimum water level, the fuel is protected and there would be no unacceptable release of radionuclides to the environment An aircraft impact at an elevation below the spent fuel pool with the potential for causing subsequent collapse of the spent fuel pool supporting structure must be evaluated, as appropriate Structural Assessment:

Sufficiency Criteria

24 Structural or physical damage determined using rule sets in NEI 07-13 The physical damage rule sets identified were derived based on studies of structures with typical reinforced concrete walls representative of existing plant designs:

- 24 inch exterior walls, 18 inch interior walls Some new plants employ structures similar to those of current plants, others have structures that are significantly more robust.

If the actual structure to be analyzed varies significantly, Missile-Target Interaction Analysis Method should be employed to determine the number of reinforced concrete walls necessary to stop further perforation into the structure on a design-specific basis.

Structural Assessment:

Buildings Other than Containment and Spent Fuel Pool

25 The frequency spectrum associated with an aircraft impact is considerably higher than the spectrum associated with earthquakes.

All equipment within the shock damage footprint is assumed to fail at the time of impact.

Rule sets in NEI 07-13 are used to define the shock affects for six categories of equipment based on fragility.

The shock damage distances are measured from the center of initial impact and then along a structural pathway to the affected equipment (i.e., shock is transmitted through walls, floors and ceilings but not across open air space).

NSSS vendors have the option of using the values for SD1 through SD6 contained in NEI 07-13 or developing their own distances based on acceleration values filtered at 200 Hz for specific impact locations.

Shock Damage Assessment

26 Fire spread rule sets provided in NEI 07-13 Rule sets are based on previous research reports and experiments Fire damage footprint starts where physical damage ends - interface boundary Rule set consists of either the 1-barrier option or two-barrier option 1-barrier utilizes 5 psid, 3-hour fire rated barriers 2-barrier utilize 3-hour fire rated barriers Fire damage spread is assessed in all 3 dimensions Fire Damage Assessment

27 Fire damage can extend well beyond the physically damaged area due to the overpressure effects from the initial fireball and the spread of fuel through open pathways within the structure.

Ventilation ductwork in the physical damage footprint is expected to be severely crushed, torn, and/or severed.

Each fire damage footprint is fully encapsulated with 3-hour fire rated barriers (walls, floors, ceilings). Encapsulation is intended to contain:

- Fire/Thermal effects

- Fuel Spread

- Overpressure from deflagration Fire Damage Assessment

Fire Damage Assessment 28 All cabling and electrical equipment within damage footprints:

in fire damage footprint - available for five minutes only in physical damage footprint - lost upon impact A ventilation controlled internal fire will burn for several hours, thus preventing operations personnel from being able to take manual actions in these areas for several hours.

Additional considerations:

Evaluate structural steel not encased in concrete Smoke/Heat at air intakes

Composite Damage Footprint 29 The composite damage footprint for each impact location scenario is developed by enveloping the total damage from structural, fire, and shock damage As each impact location scenario is evaluated, the systemic and functional effects that are precluding protection of the fuel (reactor vessel and spent fuel pool) should be identified Fire Damage Shock Damage Physical Damage

Composite Damage Footprint 30 Using plant information such as fire analyses, fire PRAs, internal flooding studies, and plant drawings, the rule sets and methodology will then determine which specific equipment, including cables, is assumed to be damaged The combined list of damaged cables and SSCs defines the threat to maintaining cooling of fuel in the vessel and spent fuel pool As each impact location scenario is evaluated, the systemic and functional effects that are precluding protection of the fuel (reactor vessel and spent fuel pool) should be identified

31 Design Enhancements Plant Design, Rev X+1 Assess per NEI 07-13 Identify existing/new features Incorporate into Design Rule acceptance criteria must be met for all postulated impact location scenarios 10 CFR 50.150 requires applicants to identify and incorporate design features and functional capabilities to meet the acceptance criteria Applicants should document the rationale for the selected approach(s)

32

  • Three categories of enhancements

- Preventing Internal Damage

  • Strengthening external walls or relocating intervening structures

- Minimizing Internal Damage

  • Relocate equipment, strengthen internal walls, add and/or upgrade fire doors

- Design-Specific System Enhancements

  • Implement system enhancements to facilitate maintaining fuel cooling Design Enhancements
  • Applicants are not required to submit the actual assessment of the aircraft impact
  • Assessments will be subject to inspection
  • NRC may take appropriate enforcement action for any violations, including the preparation of an inadequate assessment or failure to prepare an assessment 33 Inspection Activities

NRC Inspection Manual Inspection Procedure 37804 Most-recent revision (February 2012)

Verify that applicant identified and incorporated into the design all the necessary design features and functional capabilities that provide additional inherent protection to withstand aircraft impact Verify realism in assessment of structural, fire, shock, and plant specific loss effects Verify AIA documentation is being maintained consistent with the requirements of the rule 34 Inspection Procedure

35

  • Mitsubishi US-APWR
  • KHNP APR1400 Experience with Design Certification Applicants

36

  • Applying Fire Damage Rule Sets
  • Close arrangement of barriers under two-barrier option
  • Physical and Fire footprint interface assumptions and requirements
  • Fire intrusion via external wall impacts
  • Use of Intervening Structures
  • Gantry Cranes to be evaluated
  • Mesh Size Analysis Lessons Learned

37

  • Documentation
  • Identifying ALL credited key design features
  • Everything credited in assessment must be identified in DC application
  • Needed support equipment must be included
  • Balancing level of detail required in DCD without inclusion of unnecessary SUNSI or SGI information Lessons Learned

38

  • AIA rule applies to new reactor applicants after July 13, 2009*
  • Impact of a large commercial aircraft is a beyond design basis event
  • Applicants to use realistic analyses to identify important design features
  • NRC endorsed NEI 07-13 as an acceptable method for meeting the rule
  • Methods and results are inspected
  • Lessons learned used in updating regulatory guidance and inspection procedures Conclusion

39 Aircraft Impact Assessment rule:

https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-06-12/pdf/E9-13582.pdf Aircraft Impact Assessment Inspections:

https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/oversight/aia-inspections.html#insrpt RG 1.217:

ML092900004 NEI 07-13, Revision 8P:

ML111440006 Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses Response of Reinforced Concrete Structures to Aircraft Crash Impact:

ML112690136 Links

40 ABWR Advanced Boiling-Water Reactor AIA aircraft impact assessment AP1000 Advanced Passive 1000 APR1400 Advanced Power Reactor 1400 APWR Advanced Pressurized-Water Reactor CEA-EDF French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission-Électricité de France COL combined license CFR Code of Federal Register DIF dynamic increase factors DC design certification DCD design certification document EPR Evolutionary Pressurized-Water Reactor ESBWR Economic Simplified Boiling-Water Reactor FSAR final safety analysis report GE General Electric GEH GE-Hitachi KHNP Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power NAS National Academy of Sciences NRDC Natural Resources Defense Council NEI Nuclear Energy Institute NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PSID pressure per square inch differential PRA probabilistic risk assessment RES Office of Research (NRC)

RG regulatory guide SFP spend fuel pool SGI safeguards information SNL Sandia National Laboratories SUNSI sensitive unclassified non-safeguards information WS water slug Acronyms

Thank you.

Questions??

41