05000237/FIN-2011003-07: Difference between revisions

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| identified by = Self-Revealing
| identified by = Self-Revealing
| Inspection procedure = IP 71153
| Inspection procedure = IP 71153
| Inspector = M Bielby, M Ring, T Go, J Draper, C Tilton, J Corujo,-Sandin M, Munir R, Winter A, Dahbur D, Melendez-Colon C, Phillips C, Moor
| Inspector = M Bielby, M Ring, T Go, J Draper, C Tilton, J Corujo-Sandin, M Munir, R Winter, A Dahbur, D Melendez-Colon, C Phillips, C Moore
| CCA = H.12
| CCA = H.12
| INPO aspect = QA.4
| INPO aspect = QA.4
| description = A finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 was self-revealed for a Nuclear Station Operator (NSO) failing to follow step G.14.a of procedure DOP 0600-06, Feedwater Regulating Valve (FWRV) Operation, Revision 39. This resulted in a reduction in Unit 2 reactor water level. The licensee took the following immediate corrective actions. The NSO placed the 2B FWRV in manual and restored reactor water level. The NSO was relieved from duty. The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding could be reasonably viewed as a precursor to a significant event. Specifically, the event could have led to a reactor scram. The inspectors concluded this finding was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone. The inspectors evaluated the finding using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Table 4a, for the Initiating Events Cornerstone. Since the finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor scram and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available, the finding screened as Green. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work practices, because the licensee did not ensure the proper use of human error prevention techniques.
| description = A finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 was self-revealed for a Nuclear Station Operator (NSO) failing to follow step G.14.a of procedure DOP 0600-06, Feedwater Regulating Valve (FWRV) Operation, Revision 39. This resulted in a reduction in Unit 2 reactor water level. The licensee took the following immediate corrective actions. The NSO placed the 2B FWRV in manual and restored reactor water level. The NSO was relieved from duty. The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding could be reasonably viewed as a precursor to a significant event. Specifically, the event could have led to a reactor scram. The inspectors concluded this finding was associated with the Initiating Events Cornerstone. The inspectors evaluated the finding using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, Attachment 0609.04, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Table 4a, for the Initiating Events Cornerstone. Since the finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor scram and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available, the finding screened as Green. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work practices, because the licensee did not ensure the proper use of human error prevention techniques.
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Latest revision as of 19:42, 20 February 2018

07
Site: Dresden Constellation icon.png
Report IR 05000237/2011003 Section 4OA3
Date counted Jun 30, 2011 (2011Q2)
Type: NCV: Green
cornerstone Initiating Events
Identified by: Self-revealing
Inspection Procedure: IP 71153
Inspectors (proximate) M Bielby
M Ring
T Go
J Draper
C Tilton
J Corujo-Sandin
M Munir
R Winter
A Dahbur
D Melendez-Colon
C Phillips
C Moore
CCA H.12, Avoid Complacency
INPO aspect QA.4
'