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IR 05000413-14-003, 05000414-14-003; on 4/1/2014 - 6/30/2014; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Integrated Inspection Report
	ML14213A354
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	08/01/2014
From:	McCoy G J; NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB1
To:	Henderson K; Duke Energy Corp
References
	IR-14-003
	Download: ML14213A354 (38)
	v • d • e

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II 245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE NE, SUITE 1200 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257 August 1, 2014

Mr. Kelvin Henderson Site Vice President Duke Energy Corporation Catawba Nuclear Station 4800 Concord Road York, SC 29745-9635

SUBJECT: CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000413/2014003, 05000414/2014003

Dear Mr. Henderson:

On June 30, 2014, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on July 7, 2014, with you and other members of your staff. The inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report. The inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance.

In accordance with Title 10 of the "Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding," of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Managem ent System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA/ Gerald McCoy, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-413, 50-414, 72-45 License Nos.: NPF-35, NPF-52

Enclosure:

Integrated Inspection Report 05000413/2014003, 05000414/2014003

w/Attachment:

Supplemental Information

cc Distribution via ListServ

_________________________ X SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE FORM 665 ATTACHED OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRS SIGNATURE Via email Via email Via email Via email Via email GJM /RA/ Via email NAME AHutto RCureton RWilliams MCoursey CRapp GMcCoy CDykes DATE 7/24/2014 7/24/2014 7/23/2014 7/23/2014 7/24/2014 8/1/2014 7/24/2014 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO OFFICE RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS SIGNATURE Via email Via email Via email NAME WLoo JRivera PCooper DATE 7/24/2014 7/30/2014 7/23/2014 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO Letter to from Gerald McCoy dated August 1, 2014.

SUBJECT: CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000413/2014003, 05000414/2014003

Distribution w/encl

D. Gamberoni, RII L. Douglas, RII OE Mail RIDSNRRDIRS

PUBLIC RidsNrrPMCatawba Resource

Enclosure U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II

Docket Nos.: 50-413, 50-414

License Nos.: NPF-35, NPF-52

Report Nos.: 05000413/2014003, 05000414/2014003

Licensee: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC

Facility: Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2

Location: York, SC 29745

Dates: April 1, 2014 through June 30, 2014

Inspectors: A. Hutto, Senior Resident Inspector R. Cureton, Resident Inspector R. Williams, Senior Reactor Inspector (Section 1R08) M. Coursey, Reactor Inspector (Section 1R08)

C. Dykes, Health Physicist (Sections 2RS3, 2RS4)

W. Loo, Senior Health Physicist (2RS1, 2RS2, 4OA1)

J. Rivera, Senior Health Physicist (2RS1, 2RS5) P. Cooper, Reactor Inspector (Section 4OA5.3)

Approved by: Gerald McCoy, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000413/2014-003, 05000414/2014-003; 4/1/2014 - 6/30/2014; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Integrated Inspection Report.

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by the resident inspectors and six

Region-based reactor inspectors. The NRC's pr ogram for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process" revision 5. No

NRC-Identified

or self-revealing findings were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 began the inspection period at or near 100 percent Rated Thermal Power. On May 6, 2014, the Unit was shutdown for a refueling outage. Unit 1 was restarted on June 24, 2014, and reached 100 percent Rated Thermal Power on June 30, 2014.

Unit 2 operated at or near 100 percent Rated Thermal Power for the entire inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

a. Inspection Scope

Adverse Weather Preparation: The inspectors reviewed the licensee's preparations for adverse weather associated with hot ambient temperatures including a review of procedures and work orders implemented by the licensee to ensure plant equipment is adequately protected during the hot weather season. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns to assess the material condition and operation of ventilation and cooling equipment as well as other preparations made to protect plant equipment from high seasonal temperatures. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program to assess the licensee's ability to identify and resolve deficient conditions associated with hot weather protection equipment prior to seasonal high temperatures.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Evaluation of Summer Readiness of Offsite and Alternate AC Power Systems

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and measures designed to monitor and

maintain availability and reliability of both the offsite AC power system (grid) and the onsite alternate AC power systems prior to the onset of summer weather conditions and the resulting higher load demand on the grid. This included the review of the licensee's station, nuclear division, and power delivery group procedures defining the coordination of activities that could impact the on-site and offsite AC power systems and the communication protocols established between the power delivery group and Catawba to verify that the appropriate information is exchanged when issues arise that could impact

the AC power systems. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

Partial Walkdowns: The inspectors performed three partial system walkdowns during the activities listed below to assess the operability of redundant or diverse trains and components when safety-related equipment was inoperable. The inspectors performed walkdowns to identify any discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and, therefore, potentially increased risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures and walked down system components, selected breakers, valves, and support equipment to determine if they were in the correct position to support system operation. The inspectors reviewed protected equipment sheets, maintenance plans, and system drawings to determine if the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the corrective action program.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

1B residual heat removal (ND) pump while the 1A ND pump was unavailable for planned maintenance

1B auxiliary feedwater (CA) pump while the 1A CA pump was unavailable for planned maintenance

1A diesel generator (DG) while the 1B DG was unavailable for outage maintenance activities Complete System Walkdown: The inspectors conducted one detailed walkdown/review of the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater system. The inspectors used licensee procedures and licensing and design documents to verify that the system (i.e., pump, valve, and electrical) alignment was correct; valves and pumps for diesel support systems did not exhibit leakage that would impact their function; major portions of the system and components were correctly labeled; hangers and supports were correctly installed and functional; and essential support systems were operational. In addition, pending design and equipment issues were reviewed to determine if the identified deficiencies

significantly impacted the system's functions. Items included in this review were: the operator workaround list; the temporary modification list; and outstanding maintenance work requests/work orders. A review of open Problem Investigation Program reports (PIPs) was also performed to verify that the licensee had appropriately characterized and prioritized safety-related equipment problems for resolution in the corrective action program. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

Fire Protection Walkdowns: The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the four plant areas listed below to assess the licensee's control of transient combustible material and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression capabilities, fire barriers, and any related compensatory measures. The inspectors observed the fire protection suppression and detection equipment to determine whether any conditions or deficiencies existed which could impair the operability of that equipment. The inspectors selected the areas based on a review of the licensee's safe shutdown analysis probabilistic risk assessment and sensitivity studies for fire-related core damage accident sequences. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Unit 1 mechanical penetration room 543 feet level

Unit 2 mechanical penetration room 577 feet level

Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater pump room

Unit 2 essential switchgear room (2ETB)

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Individual Plant Examination, and flood analysis documentation associated with internal plant areas to determine the effect of flooding. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's internal flood protection features for the auxiliary building 543 feet and 522 feet elevations including curbs, floor drains and sump pumps credited to protect safety related equipment on these elevations. The internal areas were selected and walked down based on the flood analysis calculations. Through observation and design review, the inspectors verified that curbs were intact, floor drains were unobstructed, and that material condition of safety related sump pumps and sump level instrumentation were good, and that the equipment was operable. The inspectors reviewed corrective action program documents to verify that the licensee was identifying issues and resolving them. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities

a. Inspection Scope

Non-Destructive Examination Activities and Welding Activities

The inspectors conducted an onsite review of the implementation of the licensee's inservice inspection (ISI) program for monitoring degradation of the reactor coolant system, emergency feedwater systems, risk-significant piping and components, and containment systems in Unit 1. The inspectors' activities included either a direct observation or a review of non-destructive examinations (NDE) to evaluate compliance with the applicable edition of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC),Section XI and Section V (Code of record: 1998 Edition with 2000 Addenda) requirements, and to verify that indications and defects (if present) were appropriately evaluated and dispositioned in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Code,Section XI, acceptance standards or an NRC-approved alternative.

Ultrasonic Testing (UT) on Weld C1.C5.11.0030, 14" Elbow-to-Pipe Weld, ASME Class 2 (direct observation)

UT on Weld C1.C5.11.0031, 14" Pipe-to-Elbow Weld, ASME Class 2 (direct observation)

UT on Weld C1.G3.1.0013, 1.5" Pipe-to-Nozzle Weld, ASME Class 1 (records review)

UT on Weld C1.G12.1.0003, 1.5" Nozzle-to-Pipe Weld, ASME Class 1 (records review)

UT on Weld C1.G3.1.0001, 1.5" Nozzle-to-Pipe Weld, ASME Class 1 (records review)

Liquid Penetrant Testing on Weld 1CA91-4, 4" Pipe-to-Component weld, ASME Class 2 (records review)

Magnetic Particle Testing on Weld 1KD15-29, 8" Pipe weld, ASME Class 3 (records review)

Direct Visual Examination of the Reactor Pressure Vessel Bottom-Mounted Instrument Penetrations, ASME Class 1 (records review)

The inspectors reviewed the welding activities referenced below and reviewed associated documents in order to evaluate compliance with procedures and the ASME Code. The inspectors reviewed the work order, repair and replacement plan, weld data sheets, welding procedures, procedure qualification records, welder performance qualification records, and NDE reports.

Weld 1KD15-29, 8" Pipe weld, ASME Class 3

Weld 1CA91-4, 4" Pipe to Component weld, ASME Class 2 During non-destructive surface and volumetric examinations performed since the previous refueling outage, the licensee did not identify any relevant indications that were

analytically evaluated and accepted for continued service. Therefore, no NRC review was completed for this inspection procedure attribute.

Pressurized Water Reactor Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities: For the Unit 1 vessel head, a bare metal visual examination (BMV) was required this outage pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a. The inspectors reviewed portions of the Unit 1 BMV examination and reviewed NDE reports for vessel upper head penetrations to determine if the activities, including the disposition of indications and defects, were conducted in accordance with the requirements of ASME Code Case N-729-1 and 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D). In particular, the inspectors evaluated if the required visual examination scope/coverage was achieved and limitations (if applicable) were recorded in accordance with the licensee procedures. Additionally, the inspectors evaluated if the licensee's criteria for visual examination quality and instructions for resolving interference and masking issues were consistent with 10 CFR 50.55a.

The licensee did not identify any relevant indications that were accepted for continued service during the BMV exam. Additionally, the licensee did not perform any welding repairs to the vessel head penetrations since the beginning of the last Unit 1 refueling outage; therefore, no NRC review was completed for these inspection procedure attributes.

Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities: The inspectors reviewed the licensee's boric acid corrosion control (BACC) program activities to ensure implementation with commitments made in response to NRC Generic Letter 88-05, "Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary," and applicable industry guidance documents. Specifically, the inspectors performed an onsite record review of procedures, and the results of the licensee's containment walkdown inspections performed during the current spring refueling outage. The inspectors also interviewed the BACC program owner, conducted an independent walkdown of containment to evaluate compliance with licensee's BACC program requirements, and verified that degraded or non-conforming conditions, such as boric acid leaks, were properly identified and corrected in accordance with the licensee's BACC and corrective action programs (CAP).

The inspectors reviewed the following condition reports and associated corrective actions related to evidence of boric acid leakage to evaluate if the corrective actions completed were consistent with the requirements of the ASME Code Section XI and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.

WR 1076998 - Minor boric acid leak

WR 1062569 - Boric acid packing leak

WR 1102665 - Boric acid leak from pump seal The inspectors reviewed the following engineering evaluations completed for evidence of boric acid leakage to determine if degraded components were documented in the CAP.

The inspectors also evaluated correctiv e actions for any degraded components to determine if they met the ASME Section XI Code.

C-13-05494 - Active boric acid leak from valve 1-NM-VA-0083

C-13-00248 - Active boric acid leak from pipe cap of 1-NS-VA-5

C-14-00843 - Brown boric acid found on 1-NS-FE-5020 flange Steam Generator Tube Inspection Activities: The inspectors observed the following activities and/or reviewed the following documentation and evaluated them against the licensee's technical specifications, commitments made to the NRC, ASME Section XI, and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 97-06 (Steam Generator Program Guidelines):

Reviewed the licensee's in-situ steam generator (SG) tube pressure testing screening criteria. In particular, the inspectors assessed whether assumed NDE flaw sizing accuracy was consistent with data from the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) examination technique specification sheets (ETSS) or other applicable

performance demonstrations

Compared the numbers and sizes of SG tube flaws/degradation identified against the licensee's previous outage Operational Assessment

Reviewed the SG tube eddy current testing (ET) examination scope and expansion criteria

Evaluated if the licensee's SG tube ET examination scope included potential areas of tube degradation identified in prior outage SG tube inspections, and/or as identified in NRC generic industry operating experience applicable to the licensee's SG tubes

Reviewed the licensee's implementation of their extent-of-condition inspection scope and repairs for new SG tube degradation mechanisms. No new degradation mechanisms were identified during the ET examinations

Reviewed the licensee's repair criteria and processes

Verified that primary-to-secondary leakage (e.g., SG tube leakage) was below 3 gallons per day, or the detection threshold, during the previous operating cycle according to licensee procedures

Evaluated if the ET equipment and techniques used by the licensee to acquire data from the SG tubes were qualified or validated, to detect the known/expected types of SG tube degradation in accordance with Appendix H, Performance Demonstration for Eddy Current Examination, of EPRI Pressurized Water Reactor Steam Generator Examination Guidelines, Revision 7

Reviewed the licensee's secondary side SG Foreign Object Search and Retrieval activities

Reviewed ET personnel qualifications Identification and Resolution of Problems

The inspectors reviewed a sample of ISI-related problems that were identified by the licensee and entered into the CAP as problem identification program (PIP) reports. The inspectors reviewed the PIPs to confirm the licensee had appropriately described the scope of the problem, and had initiated corrective actions. The review also included the licensee's consideration and assessment of operating experience events applicable to the plant. The inspectors performed this review to ensure compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," requirements. Documents reviewed are listed in the

.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification (LOR) Program and Licensed Operator Performance

a. Inspection Scope

Quarterly Resident Inspector Licensed Operator Performance Review: The inspectors observed operators in the main control room and assessed their performance during a makeup to the Unit 1A containment penetration valve injection surge tank, a valve stroke of 1SV-26B (steam generator 'C' block valve) in preparation of an inservice test of 1SV-7 (steam generator 'C' PORV). The inspectors also observed Unit 1 shutdown and startup activities for refueling outage. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the two activities listed below for items such as: 1) appropriate work practices; 2) identifying and addressing common cause failures; 3) scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b) of the Maintenance Rule; 4) characterizing reliability issues for performance; 5) trending key parameters for condition monitoring; 6) charging unavailability for performance; 7) classification and reclassification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2); and 8) appropriateness of performance criteria for structures, systems, and components (SSCs)/functions cl assified as (a)(2) and/or appropriateness and adequacy of goals and corrective actions for SSCs/functions classified as (a)(1). For each item selected, the inspectors performed a detailed review of the problem history and surrounding circumstances, evaluated the extent of condition reviews as required, and reviewed the generic implications of the equipment and/or work practice problem. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

PIP C-14-2353, C-14-2590, 1A and 1B diesel generator bearing rotations

PIP C-14-5614, Unit 1 containment penetration super system is being declared Maintenance Rule A(1) due to exceeding the performance criteria for low safety significance

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following five activities to determine if the appropriate risk assessments were performed prior to removing equipment for work. When emergent work was performed, the inspectors reviewed the risk assessment to determine that the plant risk was promptly reassessed and managed. The inspectors reviewed the use of the licensee's risk assessment tool and risk categories in accordance with Nuclear System Directive (NSD) 415, Operational Risk Management (Modes 1-3), to verify there was appropriate guidance to comply with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Equipment protection plan for Unit 1 standby makeup pump out of service for emergent maintenance

Outage Risk Review Report

Critical Plan for 2A DG Bearing Position Inspection (Orange Risk Condition)

91-01 Plan for draining below the reactor vessel flange for head removal

Complex Activity Plan for work activities and mitigation strategies necessary to conduct 1EDE and 1ETA maintenance

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the six operability evaluations or functionality assessments listed below to determine if Technical Specification (TS) operability was properly justified and the subject components and systems remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors reviewed the operability determinations to verify that they were made as specified by NSD 203, Operability. The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR to determine that the systems and components remained available to perform their intended function. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

PIP C-14-03654, 2B DG AC kilowatt meter fluctuating excessively

PIP C-14-3427, 1SA-144 valve stem made from defective raw material

PIP C-14-3857, During bench testing of a Limitourque actuator for 1NV-312A, a vapor corrosion inhibitor was installed in the actuator limit switch compartment. A caution tag with installation recommendations was also located in the limit switch compartment that states, "For nuclear actuators, the vapor corrosion inhibitors must be removed to maintain actuator qualification"

PIP C-14-5014, 1A DG bearing #6 was found out of position

PIP C-14-6558, Non-conservative error in critical heat flux correlation factors

PIP C-14-6687, 2B service water strainer has approximate 6 gpm leak

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following permanent plant modification to verify the adequacy of the modification package, and to evaluate the modification for adverse affects on system availability, reliability and functional capability. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

EC 113174, Add LD Manual Valve to 1A Diesel Engine

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the five post-maintenance tests listed below to determine if procedures and test activities ensured system operability and functional capability. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's test procedures to determine if the procedures adequately tested the safety function(s) that may have been affected by the maintenance activities, that the acceptance criteria in the procedures were consistent with information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and that the procedures had been properly reviewed and approved. The inspectors also witnessed the tests and/or reviewed the test data to determine if test results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety function(s). Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump #2 performance test following preventive maintenance

1A diesel generator operating procedures and performance test following outage maintenance

B train nuclear service water flow balance following outage maintenance

1B diesel generator operating procedures and performance test following outage maintenance

Unit 1 zero power physics testing following core re-load

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted reviews and observations for selected outage activities to ensure that: 1) the licensee considered risk in developing the outage plan; 2) the licensee adhered to the outage plan to control plant configuration based on risk; 3) that mitigation strategies were in place for losses of key safety functions; and 4) the licensee adhered to operating license and TS requirements. Between May 6, 2014, and June 24, 2014, the following activities related to the refueling outage were reviewed for conformance to applicable procedures and selected activities associated with each

evaluation were witnessed:

Outage risk management plan/assessment

Clearance activities

Reactor coolant system instrumentation

Plant cool down

Mode changes from Mode 1 (power operation) to No Mode (defueled)

Shutdown decay heat removal and inventory control

Containment closure

Refueling activities

Plant heatup/mode changes from No Mode to Mode 1

Core physics testing

Power escalation

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

For the seven tests listed below, the inspectors witnessed testing and/or reviewed the test data to determine if the SSCs involved in these tests satisfied the requirements described in the Technical Specifications, the UFSAR, and applicable licensee procedures, and that the tests demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their intended safety functions.

Surveillance Tests

PT/2/A/4350/002 B, Diesel Generator 2B Operability Test

IP/2/A/3200/001 A, Solid State Protection System (SSPS) Train A Periodic Test

PT/1/A/4200/009, Engineered Safety Features Actuation Periodic Test

MP/0/A/7150/006, Ice Condenser Lower inlet Doors Inspection and Testing In-Service Tests

PT/1/A/4200/031, SV Valve Inservice Test; Enclosure 13.3 1SV-7 Train A (1SVSV0072) Inservice Test & Enclosure 13.4 1SV-7 Train B (1SVSV0073) Inservice Test

PT/0/A/4400/022A, Nuclear Service Water Pump Train A Performance Test; Enclosure 13.2, Train A IST/Comprehensive Test without the RN Trains Isolated

Containment Isolation Valve Tests

PT/1/A/4200/001 I, As Found Containment Isolation Leak Rate Test (penetrations M372 and 373)

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

RADIATION SAFETY

2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

a. Inspection Scope

Hazard Assessment and Instructions to workers: During facility tours, the inspectors observed labeled radioactive material, postings for radiation areas, high radiation areas (HRAs), and locked high radiation areas (LHRAs) in the radiologically controlled area (RCA), independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI), Unit 1 Containment, and other storage locations. The inspectors reviewed survey records for several plant areas including surveys for alpha emitters, hot particles, airborne radioactivity, gamma surveys within areas of high dose rate gradients, and pre-job surveys for upcoming tasks. Inspectors independently surveyed areas in the plant and compared results to radiological conditions and postings. The inspectors also reviewed air sample records and evaluated locations of continuous air monitors (CAMs).

The inspectors discussed changes to plant operations that could contribute to changing radiological conditions since the last inspection. Inspectors attended pre-job briefings for selected Unit 1 refueling outage tasks and reviewed radiation work permits (RWP) details to assess communication of radiological control requirements and current radiological conditions to workers to include radiography, steam generator, and core barrel move activities. RWPs for work in airborne areas were also reviewed to assess airborne radioactive controls and monitoring to include Unit 1 steam generator work activities and core barrel movement.

Hazard Control and. Work Practices: The inspectors evaluated access barrier effectiveness including key control for selected Unit 1 and Unit 2 locked HRAs (LHRA), and very HRAs (VHRA) locations. Changes to procedural guidance for LHRA and VHRA controls were discussed with radiation protection (RP) supervisors. Controls and their implementation for storage of irradiated material within the spent fuel pool (SFP)were reviewed and discussed the SFP Reactor Engineer. Controls for areas where dose rates could change significantly as a result of plant shutdown and refueling operations were also discussed. The inspectors observed activities in potential airborne areas associated with SG work activities for removal of manways and diaphragms and installation of nozzle dams; radiography of condensate feed line; core barrel move; and reactor head set.

Occupational workers' adherence to selected RWPs and RP technician (RPT)proficiency in providing job coverage were evaluated through direct observations and interviews with licensee staff of selected refueling outage activities. Electronic dosimeter (ED) alarm set points and worker stay times were evaluated against area radiation survey results for jobs in upper and lower containment, and the Auxiliary and Turbine Buildings. ED alarm logs were reviewed and worker response to dose and dose rate alarms for selected work activities was evaluated. RPT coverage and actions at the U1 lower and upper containment single point of accesses (SPAs) were reviewed and discussed in detail.

Control of Radioactive Material: The inspectors observed surveys of potentially contaminated materials and personnel being released from the RCA and SPAs using small article monitors, personnel contamination monitors, and portal monitor instruments. The inspectors discussed equipment sensitivity, alarm setpoints, and release program guidance with licensee staff. In addition, the inspectors reviewed controls for hand surveying large tools and equipment for release from the RCA and SPAs. The inspectors compared recent 10 CFR Part 61 results for the Dry Active Waste radwaste stream with radionuclides used in calibration sources to evaluate the appropriateness and accuracy of release survey instrumentation. The inspectors also reviewed source inventory and discussed leak tests for selected sealed sources and discussed nationally tracked source transactions with RP staff.

Problem Identification and Resolution: The inspectors reviewed selected corrective action program (CAP) reports associated with radiological hazard assessment and control. The reviewed items included selected CAP reports, self-assessments, and quality assurance audit documents. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's ability to identify and resolve the issues in accordance with procedure NSD-208, Problem Investigation Program (PIP), Revision (Rev.) 41.

RP activities were evaluated against the requirements of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Chapter 12; Technical Specifications (TS) Section 5.7; 10 CFR Parts 19 and 20; and approved licensee procedures. Licensee programs for monitoring materials and personnel released from the RCA and SPA were evaluated against 10 CFR Part 20, and IE Circular 81-07, Control of Radioactively Contaminated Material. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS2 Occupational ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) Planning and Controls

a. Inspection Scope

Work Planning and Exposure Tracking The inspectors reviewed exposure estimate planning for selected refueling outage work activities. ALARA planning packages were reviewed for the following high collective exposure tasks: SG primary side work; reactor

head disassembly and re-assembly; radiography of condensate feed line; and shielding installation and removal. For the selected tasks, the inspectors reviewed established dose goals and discussed assumptions regarding the bases for the current estimates with responsible ALARA planners. The inspectors evaluated the incorporation of exposure reduction initiatives and operating experience, including historical post-job reviews, into RWP requirements. Day-to-day collective dose data for the selected tasks were compared with established dose estimates and evaluated against procedural criteria (trigger points) for additional ALARA review. Where applicable, changes to established estimates were discussed with ALARA planners and evaluated against work scope changes or unanticipated elevated dose rates. The inspectors also reviewed and discussed the minutes from ALARA Committee meetings held in 2013 and 2014.

Source Term Reduction and Control: The inspectors reviewed the collective exposure three-year rolling average from 2011 - 2013. The inspectors reviewed historical dose rate trends for reactor coolant system piping and compared them to current refueling outage data. Source term reduction initiatives such as crudburst/cleanup, zinc injection, fuel cleaning, and the use of temporary shielding were reviewed and discussed with Chemistry and RP staff.

Radiation Worker Performance: The inspectors observed radiation worker performance via remote monitoring during primary side SG activities including manway and diaphragm removal and nozzle dam installation; core barrel move; radiography of condensate feed line; and reactor head set. Radiation worker and RPT performance was also observed and evaluated as part of Inspection Procedure (IP) 71124.01 and documented in section 2RS1.

Problem Identification and Resolution: The inspectors reviewed and discussed selected CAP documents associated with ALARA program implementation. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's ability to identify and resolve the issues in accordance with licensee procedure NSD 208, Problem Investigation Program (PIP), Rev. 41. The inspectors also evaluated the scope and frequency of the licensee's self-assessment program and reviewed recent assessment results.

ALARA program activities were evaluated against the requirements of UFSAR Section 12, TS Section 5.4, 10 CFR Parts 19 and 20, and approved licensee procedures. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS3 In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation

a. Inspection Scope

Engineering Controls: The inspectors reviewed the use of temporary and permanent engineering controls to mitigate airborne radioactivity. In addition, during observations of jobs in-progress, for the refueling outage, and containment walk-downs, inspectors observed the placement and use of high efficiency particulate (HEPA) negative pressure units, vacuums and air sampling equipment. The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of continuous air monitors and air samplers placed in selected work areas of the plant to provide indication of increasing airborne levels.

Respiratory Protection Equipment: Inspectors reviewed the use of respiratory protection devices to limit the intake of radioactive material, including devices used for routine tasks and devices stored for use in emergency situations. Inspectors observed the physical condition of Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) units, powered air purifying respirators, and device components staged for routine and emergency use throughout the plant. SCBA bottle air pressure, hydrostatic testing, the number of units, and the number of spare masks and air bottles available were also evaluated by inspectors. The inspectors reviewed maintenance records for selected SCBA units for the past year and evaluated SCBA and Negative Pressure Respirator (NPR) compliance with National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health certification requirements. The inspectors also reviewed records of Grade D (or better) air quality testing for supplied-air devices and SCBA bottles. In addition, the inspectors walked-down the compressor used for filling SCBA bottles. Control room operators and health physics personnel were interviewed on the use of the devices including SCBA bottle change-out and use of corrective lens inserts. Respirator qualification records and medical fitness cards were reviewed for selected emergency responder personnel. In addition, qualifications for individuals responsible for testing and repairing SCBA vital components were evaluated through review of training records. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's program for airborne monitoring, including the presence of alpha emitters, as part of IP 71124.01. Records of monthly and quarterly inventory and inspection of the equipment were also reviewed by the inspectors. The inspectors discussed the process for issuing respirators, and reviewed training, fit-test, and medical evaluation completion for selected individuals qualified for respirator and/or SCBA use.

Problem Identification and Resolution: CAP documents associated with airborne radioactivity mitigation and respiratory protection were reviewed and assessed. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's ability to identify and resolve the issues in accordance with procedure NSD-208, Problem Investigation Program (PIP), Rev. 41.

Licensee activities associated with the use of engineering controls and respiratory protection equipment was reviewed against 10 CFR Part 20; UFSAR Chapter 12; Regulatory Guide 8.15, Acceptable Programs for Respiratory Protection; and applicable licensee procedures. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

a. Inspection Scope

External Dosimetry: The inspectors reviewed National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program certification data and discussed program guidance for storage, processing, and evaluation of results for active and passive personnel dosimeters currently in use. Comparisons between ED and thermoluminescent dosimeter data were discussed. The inspectors reviewed ED alarm logs and reviewed licensee's dosimeter incident reports and assessment actions for selected alarm events.

Internal Dosimetry: Program guidance and assessment results for internally deposited radionuclides were reviewed. Program guidance, instrument detection capabilities, and select results for internally deposited radionuclides were reviewed. The inspectors reviewed selected Whole Body Count (in vivo) analyses that occurred during 2014. Capabilities for collection and analysis of special bioassay samples were discussed with licensee staff, there were no dose assessments based on biological samples to review.

Special Dosimetric Situations: The inspectors reviewed records of monitoring for declared pregnant workers from January 2012 to year-to-date for Calendar Year (CY) 2014 and discussed monitoring guidance with dosimetry staff. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's use of multi-badging, extremity dosimetry, and dosimeter relocation within

non-uniform dose rate fields and reviewed a ssessments performed during the previous outage. Neutron monitoring guidance and impl ementation for 'at power' containment entries and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) activities were reviewed and discussed. In addition, the adequacy of dosimetry program guidance and its implementation for shallow dose assessments and supporting calculations for personnel involved in selected contamination events were evaluated.

Problem Identification and Resolution: The inspectors reviewed and discussed selected CAP documents associated with occupational dose assessment. The reviewed items included PIP, self-assessments, and quality assurance audit documents. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's ability to identify, characterize, prioritize, and resolve the identified issues in accordance with lic ensee NSD 208, Problem Investigation Program (PIP), Rev. 41.

RP program occupational dose assessment guidance and activities were evaluated against the requirements of UFSAR Section 12; TS Sections 5.4, Procedures, and 5.7, High Radiation Area; 10 CFR Parts 19 and 20; and approved licensee procedures.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS5 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation

a. Inspection Scope

Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation: During tours of the auxiliary building and radiation control area exit point, the inspectors observed installed radiation detection equipment including area radiation monitors (ARM)s, continuous air samplers (CAMs), liquid and gaseous effluent monitors, personnel contami nation monitors (PCMs), small article monitors (SAMs), and portal monitors (PMs). The inspectors observed the physical location of the components, noted the material condition, and compared sensitivity ranges with UFSAR requirements.

In addition to equipment walk-downs, the inspectors observed response checks of various portable and fixed detection instruments, including ion chambers, telepoles, and high-purity germanium detectors. For the portable instruments, the inspectors observed the use of a high-range calibrator and discussed periodic output value testing with an RPT. The inspectors reviewed the last two calibration records and evaluated alarm setpoint values for selected ARMs, PCMs, PMs, SAMs, effluent monitors, and a whole body counter. This included instruments used for post-accident monitoring such as containment high-range ARMs. Radioactive sources used to calibrate selected ARMs and effluent monitors were evaluated for traceability to national standards. Calibration stickers on portable survey instruments and air samplers were noted during inspection of storage areas for ready-to-use equipment. The most recent 10 CFR Part 61 analysis for dry active waste was reviewed to determine if calibration and check sources are representative of the plant source term. The inspectors also reviewed countroom quality assurance records for gamma ray spectrometry equipment and liquid scintillation detectors.

Effectiveness and reliability of selected radiation detection instruments were reviewed against details documented in the following: 10 CFR Part 20; NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements; TS Sections 3.3 and 5.4; UFSAR Chapters 11 and 12; and applicable licensee procedures.

Problem Identification and Resolution: The inspectors reviewed selected CAP documents in the area of radiological instrumentation. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's ability to identify and resolve the issues in accordance with procedure NSD-208, Problem Investigation Program (PIP), Rev. 41. Documents reviewed are listed in

the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee data to confirm the accuracy of reported PI data for the eight indicators during periods listed below. To determine the accuracy of the reported PI elements, the reviewed data was assessed against PI definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Rev. 6. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Cornerstone:

Mitigating Systems

Emergency AC Power, Unit 1 & 2

High Pressure Safety Injection, Unit 1 & 2

Auxiliary Feedwater, Unit 1 & 2 The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and methods for compiling and reporting the PIs including the Reactor Oversight Program Mitigating Systems Performance Indicator Basis Document for Catawba. The inspectors reviewed the raw data for the PIs listed above for the period of April 1, 2013, through March 31, 2014.

The inspectors also independently screened TS Action Item Logs, selected control room logs, work orders and surveillance procedures, and maintenance rule failure determinations to determine if unavailability/unreliability hours were properly reported. The inspectors compared the licensee's raw data against the graphical representations and specific values contained on the NRC's public web page for 2013-2014. The inspectors also reviewed the past history of PIPs for systems affecting the Mitigating Systems Performance Indicators listed above for any that might have affected the reported values. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Cornerstone:

Occupational Radiation Safety

Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness For the assessment period from January 2013 through May, 2014, the inspectors reviewed ED alarm logs and selected PIPs related to controls for exposure significant areas. The inspectors also reviewed licensee procedural guidance for collecting and

documenting PI data.

Cornerstone:

Public Radiation Safety

Radiological Control Effluent Release Occurrences For the assessment period January 2013 through May 2014, the inspectors reviewed cumulative and projected doses to the public contained in liquid and gaseous release permits and PIPs related to Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) issues. The inspectors also reviewed licensee procedural guidance for collecting and documenting PI data.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

.1 Daily Review

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed screening of items entered into the licensee's corrective action program. This was accomplished by reviewing copies of PIPs, attending selected daily Site Direction and PIP screening meetings, and accessing the licensee's computerized database.

.2 Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed an in-depth review of the following issue within the mitigating systems cornerstone entered into the licensee's corrective action program.

PIP C-14-01434, 2KC-C37A failed to fully close after securing 2A2 KC Pump during IWP The inspectors reviewed the actions taken to determine if the licensee had adequately addressed the following attributes:

Complete, accurate and timely identification of the problem

Evaluation and disposition of operability and reportability issues

Consideration of previous failures, extent of condition, generic or common cause implications

Prioritization and resolution of the issue commensurate with safety significance

Identification of the root cause and contributing causes of the problem

Identification and implementation of corrective actions commensurate with the safety significance of the issue

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Semiannual Trend Review

a. Inspection Scope

As required by IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, the inspectors performed a review of the licensee's Corrective Action Program (CAP) and associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors review was focused on repetitive equipment issues, but also considered the results of daily inspector CAP item screenings discussed in Section 4OA2.1 above, licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance results. The inspectors' review nominally considered the six month period of January 2014 through June 2014, although some examples expanded beyond those dates when the scope of the trend warranted. The review also included issues documented outside the normal CAP in major equipment problem lists, plant health team vulnerability lists, focus area reports, system health reports, self-assessment reports, maintenance rule reports, and Safety Review Group Monthly Reports. The inspectors compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in the licensee's latest quarterly trend reports. Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensee's trend report were reviewed for adequacy.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. In general, the licensee has identified appropriately addressed trends within their CAP and no new trends were identified.

4OA3 Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (NOED)

(Discussed) Unresolved item (URI)05000413/2014002-01, NOED to allow bearing replacement and testing of the 1A diesel generator This URI was initiated for the inspectors to review the licensee's root cause and corrective actions for the rotation of the 1A diesel generator (DG) connecting rod bearing

7. During inspection on the 1B DG on the following week, the #1 connecting rod bearing was also found to be rotated.

As the licensee was finalizing the root cause analysis for the above bearing rotations, a third bearing rotation was discovered on the 1A DG while performing inspections during the May 2014 Unit 1 outage. The #6 connecting rod bearing was discovered to have rotated approximately 80 degrees since the bearing was last inspected in March. As a result of the latest discovery, the licensee has extended the root cause analysis and implemented a number of corrective actions on the Unit 1 DGs to address potential parameters that could reduce margin to bearing movement. The 1A DG #6 connecting rod was replaced as the original connecting rod was found to be slightly over-bore by 0.001 -0.002 inches. The lube oil systems on both Unit 1 DGs were modified to allow warm up of the entire lube oil system prior to planned engine starts and high point vents were installed. Four additional bearings on the 1A DG and three additional bearings on the 1B DG were replaced due to having a similar operating history and the same manufacturer as the bearings that had rotated. Lube oil was changed from a 40/50 weight blend to a straight 40 weight as recommended by the manufacturer to reduce viscosity at lower starting temperatures. To provide added assurance that the corrective actions are effective, the licensee plans to perform additional interim bearing inspections for the next refueling cycle.

The inspectors have reviewed the licensee's prompt determination of operability after the repair of the 1A EDG #7 bearing rotation which concluded that the unit 1 DGs were operable and no issues were identified.

4OA5 Other Activities

.1 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Radiological Controls

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and observed operations associated with storing spent fuel in the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) in accordance with Inspection Procedure 60855.1. The inspectors observed the condition of ISFSI storage cask vents and temperature monitoring equipment to verify that the vents were free of obstructions and the the monitoring equipment were operating correctly. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/189, Inspection to Determine Compliance of Dynamic Restraint (Snubber) Program with 10 CFR 50.55a Regulatory Requirements for Inservice Examination and Testing of Snubbers

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a review of the implementation of the licensee's snubber program to verify compliance with the requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.55a, as discussed in Regulatory Information Summary (RIS) 2010-06, "Inservice Inspection and Testing of Dynamic Restraints (Snubbers)." The inspectors reviewed the licensee's actions taken as a result of RIS 2010-06, which included a NRC relief request for its third 10-year Inservice Inspection (ISI) interval for the examination and testing requirements of snubbers. The inspectors interviewed the snubber program owner and conducted an independent walkdown to evaluate compliance with licensee's program requirements. The inspectors reviewed the methodology for snubber population selection and selected 16 snubbers, listed in the Attachment, based on risk-informed insights to review performance history, plant conditions, snubber classification, and accessibility to verify the visual examination of the selected snubbers was performed during every refueling outage of the current 10-year interval. For the selected snubbers, the inspectors reviewed the functional test records during the current 10-year ISI interval to verify these activities were in accordance with the previously approved relief request. The inspectors also observed in-process calibration and bench testing of one of the selected snubbers and verified that the test parameters met the acceptance criteria specified in the procedure. The inspectors reviewed the process for snubber service life monitoring and determined that the selected snubbers were being monitored and maintained. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the current and a sample of past degraded or non-conforming conditions were properly identified and corrected in accordance with the licensee's corrective action program. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

On July 7, 2014, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Kelvin Henderson and other members of licensee management. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

T. Arlow, Emergency Planning Manager

D. Barker, Operations Manager

J. Batton, Steam Generator Maintenance

E. Benfield, Radiation Protection Supervisor

D. Cantrell, Chemistry Manager

C. Cauthen, Steam Generator Maintenance

T. Hamilton, General Manager, Nuclear Engineering

R. Hart, Regulatory Affairs Manager

K. Henderson, Site Vice-President

G. Houser, NDE Supervisor

R. Hudson, ISI Coordinator

T. Jenkins, Maintenance Manager

C. Kamilaris, Organizational Effectiveness Director

B. Leonard, Nuclear Training Manager

B. Mitchell, Boric Acid Program Manager

T. Pasour, Regulatory Affairs

K. Phillips, Work Management Manager

M. Shutt, Lead Engineer Snubber Program.

P. Simbrat, Regulatory Affairs

T. Simril, Plant Manager

J. Smith, Radiation Protection Manager

W. Suslick, Director, Nuclear Engineering

S. West, Director, Nuclear Plant Security

LIST OF REPORT ITEMS

Closed TI 2515/189 TI NRC Temporary Instruction, Dynamic Restraint Program (Section 4OA5.2)

Discussed

05000413/2014002-01 URI NOED 14-2-001 to allow bearing replacement and testing of the 1A diesel generator (Section 4OA3)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection

OP/0/B/6700/015, Weather Related Activities PT/0/B/4700/039, Hot Weather Protection

AP/1(2)/A/5500/037, Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances

CNC-1381.06-00-0062, Degraded Grid Voltage Alarm Setpoints for Real Time Contingency Analysis Initiation Duke Energy Nuclear Switchyard Interface Agreement Duke Energy response to

GL 2006-02 dated March 30, 2006

Catawba Action Register for Hot Weather Protection

PIP C-14-2455, Update for 2014 Degraded Grid Voltage alarm values

PIP C-14-4619, YN cooling towers cycling excessively

Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment

OP/1(2)/A/6250/002, Auxiliary Feedwater System Auxiliary Feedwater System Health Report

PIP C-14-01080, 1A CA Pump required to be shutdown due to erratic indication os 1A CA pump recirculation flow PIP C-14-3738, Unnecessary CA system planned unavailability

PIP C-14-6467, 1CA-116A failed to stroke within a time of 17.2 seconds

CN-1561-01.01, Unit 1 Flow Diagram of Residual Heat Removal System (ND)

OP/1/A/6350/002, Diesel Generator Operation; Enclosure 4.6, DG 1A Checklist for ES Actuation

Section 1R05: Fire Protection

Station Fire Impairment Log

NSD-313, Control of Combustible and Flammable Material Fire Strategy Fire Area 1, Unit 1 543' level mechanical penetration room Fire Strategy Fire Area 49, Unit 1 577' level mechanical penetration room Fire Strategy Fire Area 2, Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater pump room Fire Strategy Fire Area 14, 2B emergency switchgear room

Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures

UFSAR Section 3.6.1, Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems Inside and Outside Containment

CNS-1465.00-00-0020, Design Basis Specification for Flooding from Internal Sources

CNS-1565.WL-00-0001, Design Basis Specification for the Liquid Waste (WL) System Section1R08:

Inservice Inspection Activities

Procedures

CFR80 Steam Generator Site Technique Validation for Catawba Nuclear Station Unit 1 McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 & 2, Rev. 10

DCP-001-114, 0.560" X-Probe Array/Bobbin @ 24"/sec, Rev. 1

DCP-002-114, 0.540" X-Probe Array @ 24"/sec, Rev. 0

DCP-003-114, 0.560" Bobbin 48 IPS, Rev. 0

DCP-004-114, 0.540" Bobbin 48 IPS, Rev. 0

DCP-005-114, 0.560" Bobbin 24 IPS, Rev. 0

DCP-006-114, 0.540" Bobbin 24 IPS, Rev. 0

DCP-007-114, 3 Coil +PT, Non-Mag, Rev. 0

Attachment

DCP-008-114, 1 Coil +PT, Non-Mag, Rev. 0

DCP-009-114, 1 Coil +PT, Mag Bias, Rev. 0

DCP-010-114, 3 Coil +PT, Mag Bias, Rev. 0

DCP-A-114, Bobbin Analysis, Rev. 0

DCP-B-114, 0.560" Array X-Probe w/ Bobbin Coil, Rev. 0

DCP-C-114, 3-coil +PT, Rev. 0

DCP-D-114, 1 Coil +PT, Rev. 0

DCP-E-114, Ghent 3/4, Rev. 0

DCP-F-114, 0.540" Array No Bobbin, Rev. 0

MP/0/A/7650/040, Inspection, Assessment and Cleanup of Boric Acid on Plant Materials, Rev. 21

NDEMAN-NDE-69, Visual Examination of Reactor Pressure Vessel Bottom Mounted Instrument Penetration, Rev. 1

NDEMAN-NDE-70, Visual Examination of Reactor Pressure Vessel Upper Head Penetrations, Rev. 1

NDEMAN-NDE-995, Ultrasonic Examination of Small Diameter Piping Butt Welds and Base Material for Thermal Fatigue Damage, Rev. 6

NDEMAN-PDI-UT-2-FC 13-06, Generic Procedure fo

r the Ultrasonic Examination of Austenitic Pipe Welds Field Change 13-06, Rev. 0

PDI-ISI-254-SE-NB, Remote Inservice Examination of Reactor Vessel Nozzle to Safe End, Nozzle to Pipe and Safe End to Pipe Welds Using the Nozzle Scanner, Rev. 2 PT/1/A/4150/001H, Inside Containment Boric Acid Check, Rev. 14

SSG 426, Issue and Control of Welding Material, Rev. 9

WDI-STD-088, Underwater Remote Visual Examination of Reactor Vessel Internals, Rev. 10

Calculations

CNC-1201.01-00-0022, Determination of Periodic Inspection Requirements for the Reactor Vessel Head and Reactor Vessel Head Inspection Documentation, Rev. 20

Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification

OP/1/A/6100/003, Controlling Procedure for Unit Operation

Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness

EDM 210, Engineering Responsibilities for the Maintenance Rule Containment Penetration System Health Report

PIPs C-13-10910, C-13-00796, C-14-2353

Diesel Generator Maintenance Rule Summary Report

Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

NSD 213, Risk Management Process SOMP 02-02 Operations Roles in Risk Management

Section 1R15: Operability Evaluations

NSD 203, Operability/Functionality

NSD 122, Temporary Configuration Changes

CNC-1223.59-04-0006, VG Capability

Section 1R18: Plant Modifications

NSD 209, 10

CFR 50.59 Process

EC 112118, Rescale 2B

THOT-Average Signal Due to Loss of 2NCRD5461

CNC-1552.08-00-0023, Protection and Safeguards Instrument Uncertainties

CNC-1399.03-00-0033, Unit 2 Scaling Calculation for Loop B Thot-Avg Summing Amp EC-

2118

Attachment

Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing

PT/2/A/4250/003 C, Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump #2 Performance Test

PT/1/A/4350/002 A, Diesel Generator 1A Operability Test

PT/1/A/4350/002 B, Diesel Generator 1B Operability Test

OP/1/A/6350/002, Diesel Generator Operation

OP/0/A/6400/006 C, Nuclear Service Water System

PT/0/A/4150/001 J, Zeor Power Physic Testing

Section 2RS1: Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Procedures

and Guidance Documents

IRSM Policy I-01, "Administration of Industrial Radiography Safety Manual", Rev. No. 008

NSD 208, "Problem Investigation Program (PIP)", Rev. 41 RA/0/1100/001, "Radiation Protection Routines", Rev. No. 018 RA/1/1100/001, "Unit 1 Outage Upper Containment Controls and Surveillance", Rev. 15

Routines Log (Template)

RP Policy

VII-01, "Control of Radiography", Rev. No. 005

SH/0/B/2000/004, "Taking, Counting and Recording Surveys", Rev. 11 SH/0/B/2000/005, "Posting of Radiation Control Zones", Rev. 009 SH/0/B/2000/006, "Control of Radioactive Material and Use of Radioactive Material Tags", Rev. 006

SH/0/B/2000/012, "Access Controls for High, Locked High, and Very High Radiation Areas", Rev.15 SH/0/B/2000/013, "Removal of Items From RCA/RCZs", Rev. 002 SQ/0/B/2000/009, "Control and Notification of Radiography Operations", Rev. No. 006 Surveillance and Control Routines Log 2014 (Template)

TE-RP-ALL-2000, "Preparation of Radiation Work Permit", Rev. 0

Records and Data Reviewed

ED Log, No.

839472, 5/20/14 Gamma Spectrum Analysis, Sample IDs:

CN14052000017, U1 B SG Manway Removal,

05/20/14; CN14052000018, U1 A SG Manway Removal, 05/20/14; CN14052000019, U1 C SG

Manway Removal, 05/20/14; CN14052000020, U1 C SG Manway Removal, 05/20/14;

CN14052100059, 1EOC21 C Diaphragm Removal, 05/20/14CN14052100010, SG B Remove Diaphragm, 05/20/14; CN14052100011, SG A & D G/A Remove Diaphragm, 05/20/14; CN14052100012, SG B & C G/A Remove Diaphragm, 05/20/14; CN14052100013, SG D Remove Diaphragm, 05/20/14; CN14052100015, SG A Remove Diaphragm, 05/20/14;

CN14052100021, A SG Manways Install Nozzle Dams, 05/21/14; CN14052100027, SG A Hot Leg Nozzle Dams, 05/21/14; CN14052100029, D SG Hot Leg Bowl, 05/21/14; CN14052100030,

A SG Cold Leg Install Nozzle Dam, 05/21/14; CN14052100031, D SG Install Nozzle Dam, 05/21/14; CN14052100032, D SG Platform Back Up, 05/21/14; CN14052100034, A SG Platform Back Up, 05/21/14; CN14052100036, D SG Cold Leg Back Up Nozzle Dam Bowl,

05/21/14; CN14052100040, C SG Install Nozzle Dams, 05/21/14; CN14052100041, C SG Hot Leg Nozzle Dam Installation, 05/21/14; CN14052100043, B SG Install Nozzle Dam, 05/21/14

NSTS Confirmation Form 2014 Annual Inventory Reconciliation Radiation Work Permit (RWP) Number (No.) 34, Radiography Operations Inside of the Nuclear Station Owner Control Fence, Rev. 27 Room 403 High Level Dry Active Waste (Trash) Storage Sheet, 8/9/13 through 6/6/14

RWP No. 1405, Reactor Head Activities, Rev. 18

Attachment RWP No. 1441, Core Barrel Removal and Replacement (1EOC21 U/C), Rev. 03 RWP No. 1600, General Entry (1EOC21 A/B), Rev. 25 RWP No. 1806, SG Remove/Install Man Ways and Diaphragms/Bowl Pumping (1EOC21 LC), Rev. 20 RWP No. 1808, SG Install/Remove Nozzle Dams (1EOC21 LC), Rev. 21

RWP No. 1834, SG - RP Activities (1EOC21 LC/UC/AUX/OS), Rev. 10

Semi-Annual Source Inventories, November 2013 and May 2014 Summary of Spent Fuel Pool Inventory, 12/31/13 VSDS Standard Map Survey Report, Catawba Nuclear Station, Surveys:

M-20140110-1, Room 403 DAW and Storage Area, 01/10/14; M-20140519-9, U2 Rx Bldg\U-2 Lower Cont (1EOC21

SG Manway Removal), 05/20/14; M-20140519-11, U2

Rx Bldg\U-2 Lower Cont (1EOC21 SG Manway Removal), 05/20/14; M-20140519-12, U2 Rx Bldg\U-2 Lower Cont (1EOC21 SG Diaphragm Removal/Verify No LHRA Conditions Exist), 05/20/14; M-20140519-17, U2 Rx Bldg\U-2 Lower Cont ("D" SG H/L Leg Diaphragm), 05/20/14; M-20140519-18, U2 Rx Bldg\U-2

Lower Cont ("D" SG C/L Leg Diaphragm), 05/20/14; M-20140519-21, U2 Rx Bldg\U-2 Lower

Cont ("C" SG H/L Leg Diaphragm), 05/20/14; M-

20140519-22, U2 Rx Bldg\U-2 Lower Cont ("C" SG C/L Leg Diaphragm), 05/20/14; M-20140519-23, U2 Rx Bldg\U-2 Lower Cont (U-1 "A" SG Bowl Survey),

05/20/14; M-20140519-25, U2 Rx Bldg\U-2 Lower Cont (U-1 "B" SG Bowl Survey), 05/20/14; M-20140519-26, U2 Rx Bldg\U-2 Lower Cont (U-1 "C" SG Bowl Survey),

05/20/14; M-20140519-24, U2 Rx Bldg\U-2 Lower Cont (U-1 "D" SG Bowl Survey), 05/20/14; M-

20140521-2, U2 Rx Bldg\U-2 Lower Cont (1EOC21 "A" & "D" SG Platform), 05/21/14; M-

20140521-7, Room 403 DAW and Storage Area, 05/21/14; M-20140521-8, Room 403 DAW and Storage Area, 05/21/14; M-20140522-10, U1 Rx Bldg\U1 UC Polar Crane (Core Barrel Removal), 05/22/14; M-20140604-16, Turbine & Service Bldg\U-1

TB Mezzanine RT, 05/21/14; M-20140605-9, U1 Rx Bldg\Shallow End, 06/05/14; M-20140605-11, U1 Rx Bldg\U1 Upper Containment No Missile Shields, 06/05/14; M-20140606-24, Room 403 DAW and Storage Area,

06/06/14.

PIPs C-14-04979, C-12-02817, C-13-07582, C-13-09215, C-13-09781, C-13-10076,

C-14-00484, C-14-01759, C-14-01873, C-14-02166, C-14-02658, C-14 05194, C-14-05320,

C-14-05351,C-14-05361, C-14-05925, C-14-06083

Self-Assessment Report Form, Assessment No. C-RPS-SA-13-01, NRC Prep Audit 71124.01

Radiological Hazard Assessment & Exposure Controls

Section 2RS2: Occupational

ALARA Planning and Controls

Procedures

and Guidance Documents

AD-RP-ALL-9000, ALARA Program, Rev. 0

Duke Energy Fleet ALARA Manual, Rev. 16

IRSM Policy I-02, "The ALARA Program for Industrial Radiography Operations", Rev. No. 004

NSD 208, "Problem Investigation Program (PIP)", Rev. 41

TE-RP-ALL-2000, "Preparation of Radiation Work Permit", Rev. 0

Records and Data Reviewed

ALARA Planning Worksheet (APW), 1EOC21 Steam Generator I/R Nozzle Dams, 05/21/14

APW, 1EOC21 Steam Generator Primary Activities (Manways, Diaphragms, Eddy Current, and Plugging), 05/01/14

APW, 1EOC21 Steam Generator Secondary Side Activities (Sludge Lancing, FOSAR, and

Closure), 05/01/14

Attachment Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS), Special ALARA Committee Meeting Minutes, File:

CN-750.20,

05/13/14,

PIP-C-14-05561 CNS, ALARA Committee Meeting Minutes, File:

CN-750.20, October 2013 - May 2014

CNS ALARA Reports, January - December 2013, File #:

CN-750.20

CBCU ND Dose Rate Comparison (1EOC19 thru 1EOC21)

CNS 1EOC21 Crudburst Graph

CNS 1EOC21, Exposure Performance, 06/06/14 CNS Group Dose Performance Update, 1EOC21, 06/06/14 CNS Hot Spot History (Dec 2009 thru April 2014)

CNS Hot Spot Log, 04/18/14

CNS Source Term Reduction Meeting Minutes, Subcommittee Meeting, 03/27/14, File:

CN-750.20 CNS Unit 2

EOC 19 Refueling and Maintenance Outage, Summary of Personnel Radiation Exposures, File No.:

CN-750.20, 01/17/14 RWP No. 34, Radiography Operations Inside of the Nuclear Station Owner Control Fence, Rev. 27 RWP No. 1405, Reactor Head Activities, Rev. 18 RWP No. 1441, Core Barrel Removal and Replacement (1EOC21 U/C), Rev. 03 RWP No. 1806, SG Remove/Install Man Ways and Diaphragms/Bowl Pumping (1EOC21 LC), Rev. 20 RWP No. 1808, SG Install/Remove Nozzle Dams (1EOC21 LC), Rev. 21

RWP No. 1834, SG - RP Activities (1EOC21 LC/UC/AUX/OS), Rev. 10

Unit 1 ND Dose Rate Comparison (1EOC19 thru 1EOC21) Unit 1 NC Loop Comparison (1EOC16 thru 1EOC21) VSDS Standard Map Survey Report, Catawba Nuclear Station, Surveys:

M-20140519-9, U2 Rx Bldg\U-2 Lower Cont (1EOC21 SG Manway Removal), 05/20/14; M-20140519-11, U2 Rx Bldg\U-2 Lower Cont (1EOC21 SG Manway Removal), 05/20/14; M-20140519-12, U2 Rx Bldg\U-2 Lower Cont (1EOC21 SG Diaphragm Removal/Verify No LHRA Conditions Exist), 05/20/14; M-20140519-17, U2 Rx Bldg\U-2 Lower Cont ("D" SG H/L Leg Diaphragm), 05/20/14; M-20140519-18, U2 Rx Bldg\U-2 Lower Cont ("D" SG C/L Leg Diaphragm), 05/20/14; M-

20140519-21, U2 Rx Bldg\U-2 Lower Cont ("C" SG H/L Leg Diaphragm), 05/20/14; M-

20140519-22, U2 Rx Bldg\U-2 Lower Cont ("C" SG C/L Leg Diaphragm), 05/20/14; M-

20140519-23, U2 Rx Bldg\U-2 Lower Cont (U-1 "A" SG Bowl Survey), 05/20/14; M-20140519-

25, U2 Rx Bldg\U-2 Lower Cont (U-1 "B" SG Bowl Survey), 05/20/14; M-20140519-26, U2 Rx Bldg\U-2 Lower Cont (U-1 "C" SG Bowl Survey), 05/20/14; M-20140519-24, U2 Rx Bldg\U-2 Lower Cont (U-1 "D" SG Bowl Survey), 05/20/14; M-20140521-2, U2 Rx Bldg\U-2 Lower Cont

(1EOC21 "A" & "D" SG Platform), 05/21/14; M-20140522-10, U1 Rx Bldg\U1 UC Polar Crane

(Core Barrel Removal), 05/22/14; M-20140605-9, U1 Rx Bldg\Shallow End, 06/05/14; M-

20140605-11, U1 Rx Bldg\U1 Upper Containment No Missile Shields, 06/05/14 Temporary Shielding Request Nos.:

14-122, Delay Coil Curtain;14-142, CF RT Floor Penetration Shield; 14-144A, Rm 456 NC Filter Housing

PIPs C-14-04979, C-14-05403, C-14-05404, C-14-05714, C-14-05715, C-14-05789,

C-14-05809, C-14-05823

Self Assessment Report No. G-RPS-SA-12-07, 2012 Catawba Nuclear Station Radiation Protection Source Term Data Review

Attachment 2RS3:

In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation

Procedures

and Guidance Documents

RA/0/1600/004, Recharging Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus, Rev. 002

SH/0/B/2003/002, Inspections of Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) and Associated Equipment, Rev. 0 Auxillary Building Ventilation Lesson Plan, CNOC88-N, Rev. 100

RESPP-N, Lesson Plan and Presentation, 03/04/2013, Rev. 04B

HS0113, Advanced Basic Respiratory Initial- Lesson Plan and Presentation, 07/13/2009, Revision 0

AD-RP-ALL-6000, Respiratory Protective Equipment Approval and Issue, 09/20/2013, Rev. 1

Records and Data Reviewed

1EMF-PFM Flow and CH Cal 1EMF42, 4/25/2013 2EMF-EMF Perform flow Inst Cal & Chnl, 1/30/2013

0EMF- Calibrate 0EMF43B, 1/17/2014

0EMF- Channel Calibrate 0EMF 43A, 08/22/2011

0EMF: PFM CH CAL on 0EMF-58 RA/1/1100/001 - Unit 1 Reactor Head Removal During No Mode, Signed 05/31/14 EnRad Laboratories Central Calibration Facility Flow Test Certification, S/N 04126;

SCBA-M7, 02/05/2014

Certificate of Calibration, Firehawk M7- AMAA297181 S/N 04126, 02/17/2014

Flow Test Certification, S/N 04199;

SCBA-INDUS, 09/12/2012

Certificate of Calibration, Firehawk Industrial- S/N 04199, 03/17/2014 Flow Test Certification, S/N 04244;

SCBA-INDUS, 08/13/2012 Certificate of Calibration, Firehawk Industrial- S/N 04244, 08/13/2014

Flow Test Certification, S/N 04326;

SCBA-M7, 05/02/2012

Certificate of Calibration, Firehawk M7- S/N 04326, 07/11/2013

Respiratory Qualification Report, location all, 06/02/2014 SH/0/B/2003/002, Enclosure 5.2 Respirator Inspection and Maintenance Record, 3/3-3/17/2014 7 pages, 4/21-4/24/2014 7 pages & 5/20-5/30/2014 7 pages

VB Test Data for 2013

PIP C-13-07320, C-14-06096, C-14-03599

Section 2RS04:

Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures

and Guidance Documents

TE-RP-ALL-4005, Investigation of Unusual Dosimetry Occurrence or Possible Overexposure, Rev. 0

TE-RP-ALL-4003, Placement of Personnel Dosimetry for Non-Uniform Radiation Fields, Rev. 0

TE-RP-ALL-4004, Multiple Dosimetry, Rev 0 SH/0/B/2001/001, Internal Dose Assessment, Rev. 006 RP Policy

III-14, Alpha Program, Rev. 003

RP Policy

II-09, Internal Dose Assessment, Rev. 008

Records and Data Reviewed

DPW records between 01/01/2011 and 06/03/2014

TLD-ED correlations for 2013 Dosimetry Technical Report: 14-01, Evaluation of Increasing Delta between TLD and ED Values Since Introduction of DMC2000S Version 4 EDs, March 14, 2014

Attachment 2012 Battelle and NTS Crosschecks 3rd Quarter SH/0/B/2001/001, Internal Dose Assessment, performed 5/31-06/01/2014 SH/0/B/2001/001, Internal Dose Assessment, performed 5/31-06/01/2014

TLD-ED Correlations for 2nd Semi-Annual 2013 CNS

TE-RP-ALL-4004, Multipack Form for RWPs/date of work, 2842-9/25/13, 2808- 9/24/13, 2455-

09/22/13

G-RPS-SA-12-12, TLD Lab On-Site NVLAP Assessment, 10/25/2012 G-RPS-SA-13-01, 2nd Biannual 2012 TLD Data Review, 03/28/2013 NVLAP Accreditation, 4/1/14 - 3/31/15

PIPs C-12-01481

C-12-04548

C-12-10794

C-13-05096

C-14-03467

C-14-03599

C-13-08743

2RS5:

Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation

Procedures

and Guidance Documents

CG 3.4.12, Accident Contingency Sampling Plan, Rev. 9

ENRAD-PROC-829, Calibration of

SAM-12 Small Articles Monitor, Rev. 0

ENRAD-PROC-831, Calibration of

AMS-4, Rev. 1

ENRAD-PROC-841, Calibration of Ludlum Model 3 (MR/HR), Rev. 0

ENRAD-PROC-835, Calibration of the MGPI Telepole, Rev. 6

ENRAD-PROC-839, Calibration of Canberra

GEM-5 Portal Monitor, Rev. 1

ENRAD-PROC-842, Calibration of Ludlum Model 3 (CPM), Rev. 0

ENRAD-PROC-857, Calibration and Quality Assurance of Canberra Cronos-4 Small Article Monitor, Rev. 0 HP/0/B/1001/018, RP Compliance Sampling, Rev. 37

HP/0/B/1000/010, Determination of Radiation Monitor Setpoints, Rev. 61

HP/0/B/1001/031, Operation and Calibration of Canberra Autoscan Whole Body Counter, Rev. 3

NSD-208, Problem Investigation Program (PIP), Rev. 41

Catawba ODCM, Rev. 57 RA/0/1300/002, Setup, Calibration and Quality Control of Canberra Series 5 Automatic Planchet Counting System (APC), Rev. 1

RA/0/1300/003, Calibration of Apex Gamma Spectroscopy System, Rev. 0 RA/0/1300/012, Count Room Trending Program, Rev. 2

RA/0/1300/013, Quality Control and Calibration of Apex InVivo Whole Body Counting System, Rev. 0 RA/0/1300/005, Quality Control Check of Count Room Equipment, Rev. 3

RA/0/1300/011, Calibration of PerkinElmer TriCarb 2900TR Series Liquid Scintillation Counters, Rev. 2 RA/0/1400/006, Radiation Protection Fixed Instruments Response Check, Rev. 026

RA/0/1400/014, Radiation Protection Portable Instruments Response Check, Rev. 0 SH/0/B/2008/001, Calibration and Quality Assurance of Canberra Argos-4AB Contamination Monitors, Rev. 2 SH/0/B/2008/003, Operation of Radiation Protection Portable Survey Instruments, Rev. 4

Attachment Records and Data Reviewed

2012 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report Calibration Certificate, Electronic Dosimeter, EnRad

ID 898681, 2/27/12 and 4/20/14

Calibration Certificate, Electronic Dosimeter, EnRad

ID 838826, 6/30/11 and 4/23/14

Calibration of the J.L. Shepherd Model 89 Shielded Calibration Range Irradiator, EnRad No. 1999, 8/15/12 and 8/14/13 Catawba Nuclear Station Fastscan Calibration, 2/26/14 EnRad Certificate of Calibration,

AMS-4, EnRad

ID 02380, 7/18/13 and 3/17/14 EnRad Certificate of Calibration, Argos-4AB, EnRad

ID 01946, 2/13/13 and 2/3/14

EnRad Certificate of Calibration,

GEM-5, EnRad

ID 02724, 9/11/12 and 9/5/13

EnRad Certificate of Calibration, Ludlum Model 3, EnRad

ID 02486, 11/7/12, 9/25/13 and

3/26/14 EnRad Certificate of Calibration, Ludlum Model 12-4 (Remball), EnRad

ID 02844, 7/18/13 EnRad Certificate of Calibration,

SAM-9, EnRad

ID 01975, 12/17/12 and 12/12/13

EnRad Certificate of Calibration, Telepole, EnRad

ID 02096, 9/23/13 and 4/6/14

FASTSCAN1 Apex-InVivo (WBC) Functional Check, 5/20/14

Operation and Calibration of Canberra Autoscan Whole Body Counter (Lung), 9/5/13

Operation and Calibration of Canberra Autosca

n Whole Body Counter (Thyroid), 9/5/13

Standards Laboratory Instrument Test Report for SNTSG10016 (J.L. Shepherd Irradiator Model 89), 5/3/13

WO 01892508-01, 1EMF-54 Unit Vent High Range Monitor Calibration, 5/29/12

WO 01900995-01, Perform Channel Calibration on 2EMF-54, 6/7/12

WO 01987406-01, 2EMF-53A Containment High Range Monitor Calibration, 3/9/12

WO 01987407-01, 2EMF-53B Containment High Range Monitor Calibration, 3/21/12

WO 01994167-01, 0EMF-49 Waste Liquid Discharge Monitor Calibration, 5/29/12

WO 01996396-01, 2EMF-36 Unit Vent Gas Monitor Calibration, 4/24/12

WO 02000710-01, 0EMF-43B Control Room Intake Calibration, 7/5/12

WO 02000922-01, 2EMF-39 Containment Gas Dual Range Monitor Calibration, 7/12/12

WO 02010304-01, 1EMF-39 Containment Gas Dual Range Monitor Calibration, 7/30/12

WO 02019338-01, 0EMF-57 Monitor Tank Building Process Monitor Calibration, 11/12/12

WO 02020871-01, 1EMF-53A Containment High Range Monitor Calibration, 11/30/12

WO 02020872-01, 1EMF-53B Containment High Range Monitor Calibration, 11/30/12

WO 02034990-01, 0EMF-43A Control Room Intake Calibration, 5/21/12

WO 02036921-01, 2EMF-38 Containment Particulate Monitor Calibration, 3/13/13

WO 02065542-01, 1EMF-38 Containment Particulate Monitor Calibration, 10/4/13

WO 02065542-02, 1EMF-38 Containment Particulate Monitor (Flow) Calibration, 10/4/13

WO 02069115-01, 1EMF-36 Unit Vent Gas Monitor Calibration, 6/11/13

WO 02072509-01, 2EMF-53A Containment High Range Monitor Calibration, 9/28/13

WO 02072510-01, 2EMF-53B Containment High Range Monitor Calibration, 9/28/13

WO 02093397-01, 2EMF-36 Unit Vent Gas Monitor Calibration Calibration, 1/28/14

WO 02098350-01, 0EMF-49 Waste Liquid Discharge Monitor Calibration, 1/30/14

WO 02105149-01, 0EMF43B Control Room Intake Calibration, 1/7/14

WO 02106928-01, 2EMF-39 Containment Gas Dual Range Monitor Calibration, 1/24/14

WO 02109318-01, 1EMF-39 Containment Gas Dual Range Monitor Calibration, 1/21/14

PIPs: C-12-09500, C-12-09675, C-12-09904, C-13-02813, C-13-03585, C-13-08344,

C-13-08869, C-14-01352, C-14-01596, C-14-02555, C-14-03007, C-14-03668, G-12-01119

Attachment

Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification

NSD 225, NRC Performance Indicators

NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline Catawba Master File CN: 854.02-1, MSPI Emergency AC Power Catawba Master File CN: 854.02-4, MSPI Safety Injection Catawba Master File CN: 854.02-3, MSPI Heat Removal

SRPMP 10-1, "NRC Performance Indicator Data Collection, Validation, Review and Approval", Rev. No. 006

Dose Commitment Data Sheet, Dose Estimate for Calendar Year from January 2013 - March

2014 Effluent Dose Calculations for December 2012

Monthly PI Reports, January 2013 - April 2014 Unexpected Dose Rate Alarms, CNS, (01/01/13 - 06/05/14)

PIPs C-13-09350, C-13-09799, C-13-09800

Section 4OA2: Problem Identification and Resolution

NSD 208, Problem Investigation Program

NSD 500, Red Tags/Configuration Control Tags SOMP 02-01, Safety Tagging and Configuration Control

PT/2/A/4400/003 A, Component Cooling Train 2A Performance Test

Section 4OA5: Other Activities

Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation

PT/0/A/4550/015 A, Inventory of Fuel Special Nuclear Material

CNEI-0400-257, Dry Storage Certification Load No: 2-11(25)

CNEI-0400-258, Dry Storage Certification Load No: 2-11(26)

TI-189 Procedures

MP/0/A/7650/131, Operation of Barker/ Diacon S-2000 Snubber Test Machine, Rev 11

MP/0/A/7650/095, Periodic Inspection of Piping and Support/Restraint, Rev 14

MP/0/A/7650/085, Visual Inspection of Snubbers, Rev 16

STB-1 Diacon Corporation, Snubber Test Bench Calibration Procedure, Rev 4

Work Orders

WO#02119012, 2-R-HR-2083, Replace Snubbers, 10/12/13 WO#01024963, Perform Visual Inspections of Inaccessible Snubbers, 4/29/02

WO#01089231, Perform Visual Inspections of Inaccessible Snubbers, 5/12/05

WO#01770926, Perform Visual Inspections of Inaccessible Snubbers, 5/4/08

WO#01939042, Perform Visual Inspections of Inaccessible Snubbers, 4/28/11 WO#01853519, Perform Visual Inspection of Non-train Accessible Snubbers, 1/4/11 WO#01853532, Perform Visual Inspections of "A" Train Accessible Snubbers, 2/7/11

WO#01853542, Perform Visual Inspections of "B" Train Accessible Snubbers, 1/18/11

WO#01722414, 1-R-ND-0226, Perform FOM Snubber Test

WO#02072100, Misc. Snubber Inspection to Perform FOM Test, 9/16/13

@@ Line 368: / Line 368: @@
 External Dosimetry:  The inspectors reviewed National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program certification data and discussed program guidance for storage, processing, and evaluation of results for active and passive personnel dosimeters currently in use. Comparisons between ED and thermoluminescent dosimeter data were discussed. The inspectors reviewed ED alarm logs and reviewed licensee's dosimeter incident reports and assessment actions for selected alarm events.
-Internal Dosimetry:  Program guidance and assessment results for internally deposited radionuclides were reviewed. Program guidance, instrument detection capabilities, and select results for internally deposited radionuclides were reviewed. The inspectors reviewed selected Whole Body Count (
+Internal Dosimetry:  Program guidance and assessment results for internally deposited radionuclides were reviewed. Program guidance, instrument detection capabilities, and select results for internally deposited radionuclides were reviewed. The inspectors reviewed selected Whole Body Count (in vivo) analyses that occurred during 2014. Capabilities for collection and analysis of special bioassay samples were discussed with licensee staff, there were no dose assessments based on biological samples to review.
-in vivo) analyses that occurred during 2014. Capabilities for collection and analysis of special bioassay samples were discussed with licensee staff, there were no dose assessments based on biological samples to review.
 Special Dosimetric Situations:  The inspectors reviewed records of monitoring for declared pregnant workers from January 2012 to year-to-date for Calendar Year (CY) 2014 and discussed monitoring guidance with dosimetry staff. The inspectors evaluated the licensee's use of multi-badging, extremity dosimetry, and dosimeter relocation within
@@ Line 531: / Line 530: @@
 ==LIST OF REPORT ITEMS==
-Closed TI 2515/189 TI NRC Temporary Instruction, Dynamic Restraint Program
+Closed TI 2515/189 TI NRC Temporary Instruction, Dynamic Restraint Program (Section 4OA5.2)
-(Section 4OA5.2)
 ===Discussed===
@@ Line 750: / Line 748: @@
 : CNS 1EOC21, Exposure Performance, 06/06/14 CNS Group Dose Performance Update, 1EOC21, 06/06/14 CNS Hot Spot History (Dec 2009 thru April 2014)
 : CNS Hot Spot Log, 04/18/14
-: CNS Source Term Reduction Meeting Minutes, Subcommittee Meeting, 03/27/14,
+: CNS Source Term Reduction Meeting Minutes, Subcommittee Meeting, 03/27/14, File:
-: File:
 : CN-750.20 CNS Unit 2
 : EOC 19 Refueling and Maintenance Outage, Summary of Personnel Radiation Exposures, File No.:

v t e Inspection Report - Catawba - 2014003
80 \| 81 \| 82 \| 83 \| 84 \| 85 \| 86 \| 87 \| 88 \| 89 \| 90 \| 91 \| 92 \| 93 \| 94 \| 95 \| 96 \| 97 \| 98 \| 99 00 \| 01 \| 02 \| 03 \| 04 \| 05 \| 06 \| 07 \| 08 \| 09 \| 10 \| 11 \| 12 \| 13 \| 14 \| 15 \| 16 \| 17 \| 18 \| 19 \| 20 \| 21 \| 22 \| 23 \| 24 \| 25 \|
2014 Quarterly Integrated 1Q (1) 2Q (0) 3Q (3) 4Q (1) Assessments Mid Cycle End of Cycle 7(0) 8(0) 9(2) Security 403(0) 404(0) Operator Exams 301(0) Emergency Planning 502(0) Other

IR 05000413/2014003: Difference between revisions

Revision as of 13:07, 9 July 2018

Text

Dear Mr. Henderson:

Enclosure:

w/Attachment:

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

NRC-Identified

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

REACTOR SAFETY

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification (LOR) Program and Licensed Operator Performance

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R18 Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

RADIATION SAFETY

2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

2RS2 Occupational ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) Planning and Controls

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

2RS3 In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

2RS5 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

a. Inspection Scope

Cornerstone:

Cornerstone:

Cornerstone:

b. Findings

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

.1 Daily Review

.2 Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues

a. Inspection Scope

b. Findings

.3 Semiannual Trend Review

a. Inspection Scope