ML17103A312: Difference between revisions

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MAIL OE staff  
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DISTRIBUTION:
P. Holahan, OE P. Peduzzi, OE  
P. Holahan, OE P. Peduzzi, OE  



Revision as of 22:03, 7 July 2018

RN-17-012, Issuance of a Final Significance Determination, St. Lucie Plant (EA-17-013)
ML17103A312
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/13/2017
From: Peralta J D
NRC/OE
To:
Florida Power & Light Co
Jones D A
References
EA-17-013, RN-17-012
Download: ML17103A312 (2)


Text

April 13, 2017 RN-17-012 OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT NOTIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT ENFORCEMENT ACTION

Licensee: Florida Power & Light Company, Florida EA-17-013 St. Lucie Plant Docket No.: 50-335

Subject:

ISSUANCE OF A FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION This is to inform the Commission that on or about April 18, 2017, a White Significance Determination Process finding will be issued to Florida Power & Light Company (FP&L) for a performance deficiency at St. Lucie Plant, Unit 1. The finding was identified during the staff's review of Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000335/2016-003-00, "Generator Lockout Relay Actuation during Power Ascension Results in Reactor Trip." The finding involved the licensee's failure to maintain configuration control of the Unit 1 main generator inadvertent energization lockout relay circuitry, which resulted in a reactor trip and loss of offsite power. Specifically, in October 2013, while modifying the main generator automatic synchronization circuit, the licensee inadvertently removed a wire from the manual synchronization circuit that adversely affected the main generator inadvertent energization lockout relay. On August 21, 2016, during power ascension from an outage, the missing wire caused a plant trip at 38 percent power. The missing wire complicated the reactor trip because the automatic transfer of electrical power from the auxiliary transformer to the start-up transformer did not occur. As a result, the emergency diesel generators automatically started to provide power to the safety-related buses. FPL's post-trip recovery actions re-established offsite power without any further complications.

On February 2, 2017, the NRC issued a preliminary determination letter for this issue, provided FP&L the results of the inspection, and offered the opportunity for the licensee to attend a Regulatory Conference or respond in writing. The regulatory conference was held on March 21, 2017. During the regulatory conference, FP&L provided their perspective on the facts and assumptions used by the NRC to arrive at the signi ficance of the finding. After considering the additional information provided by FP&L, the NRC has concluded that the associated finding is appropriately characterized as White. The licensee has not yet been specifically informed of the enforcement action. The schedule of issuance and notification is:

Mailing of Final Significance Determination April 18, 2017 Telephone Notification of Licensee April 18, 2017

The State of Florida will be notified.

CONTACTS: David Jones, OE Juan Peralta, OE (301) 287-9525 (301) 287-9510

ELECTRONIC DISTRIBUTION: RN-17-012, April 13, 2017 OWFN OWFN TWFN Regional Offices Chairman Svinicki Comm. Burns Comm. Baran SECY OCA OPA OIP EDO DEDR DEDMRT OE OGC NRR OI OIG OCFO OIS RES ACRS NMSS NRO 3WFN NSIR OP Center

RI RII RIII RIV

MAIL OE staff DISTRIBUTION:

P. Holahan, OE P. Peduzzi, OE

D. Jones, OE

OE r/f EN Binder ADAMS Accession Number: ML17103A312 OFFICE OE/EB: ES OE/EB: BC NAME DJones JPeralta DATE 4/13/2017 4/13/2017 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY