ML14079A028

Part 21 - Allen Bradley Type 700RTC Relay Spuriously De-Energizing

ML14079A028
Person / Time
Site:	Waterford, FitzPatrick
Issue date:	03/13/2014
From:	Jarrell J Entergy Operations
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
49911
Download: ML14079A028 (5)

Text

073113120114 Pll !T p03/13/2014 I~US'. Nucehar Rt'pulaonrv Commission flnerations.

Centler Event Rpnnrt Pagop 1 -.--------

J-. -r-----Part 21 (PAR) Event# 49911Rep Org: WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION Notification Date I Time: 03/13/2014 14:46 (EDT)Supplier:

QUALTECH NP Event Date I Time: 03/12/2014 16:00 (CDT)Last Modification:

03/13/2014 Region: 4 Docket #:City: KILONA Agreement State: YesCounty: License #:State: LANRC Notified by: JOHN JARRELL Notifications:

MARC FERDAS R1DOHQ Ops Officer:

DONG HWA PARK KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE R2DOEmergency Class: NON EMERGENCY DAVE PASSEHL R3DO10 CFR Section:

THOMAS FARNHOLTZ R4DO21.21(d)(3)(i)

DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE PART 21 GROUP EMAILPART 21 -ALLEN BRADLEY TYPE 700RTC RELAY SPURIOUSLY DE-ENERGIZING "This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3 required under 10 CFR PART 21 concerning an apparentdeviation from dedicated manufacturing specifications.

"On 10/17/2013, it was determined that there have been multiple inadvertent actuations of Engineered SafetyFeatures Actuation Signal (ESFAS) equipment over the previous seven months. These equipment inadvertent actuations are occurring due to Allen Bradley type 700RTC relays spuriously de-energizing.

The failure modecauses the relays to intermittently de-energize causing the associated equipment to perform its ESFAS function, not adversely impacting steady state plant operations.

"The failed relays have been sent to the qualifying vendor and two other failure analysis laboratories for testing.The results were reviewed by Waterford 3 engineers and although the failure mode could not be repeated in thelaboratory, the laboratories identified less than adequate solder joints on the relay control circuit and a failedcapacitor.

The cause of the failed capacitor was identified as less than adequate installation practices duringmanufacturing.

Engineering has determined that effects of these deviations, combined with installation in anapplication near the qualifying vendor's maximum specified environmental conditions, relevant to elevated voltageand ambient temperatures, has resulted in accelerated aging effects on the sub-components of the relays. Thefailures have been observed on relays that have been in-service greater than three years."Entergy concluded that for the applications for which the failure mode has been observed, and for otherapplications where these relays have been installed for more than 3 years, the failures did not result in asubstantial safety hazard. However, on 3/12/2014, Entergy completed an evaluation concluding that, had this relaytype been installed in other safety related normally energized applications for greater than 3 years, it could haveresulted in a substantial safety hazard. Compensatory measures to preclude the malfunction of these relays, until 03/13/2014 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Page 2long-term corrective actions are completed, have been implemented.

As an interim measure the installed time forthese relays is limited to 3 years or less, The Waterford 3 Site VP was informed the same day, 3/12/2014.

"Waterford 3 has determined that the only other Entergy nuclear facility utilizing these Allen Bradley relay types,possibly in a safety related application, is at James A. Fitzpatrick, to which this condition has been communicated."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

03/11/2014 19:54 5647396678 VP: OFFICE PAGE 61PAGE 1 OF 2NRC FORM 381 REACTOR PLANT U.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (12-2000)

OPERATIONS CENTEREVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET EN #NRC OPERATION TELEPHONE NUMBER: PRIMARY -301-816-5100 or 800-532-346r, BACKUPS -[1st] 301-g51-0550 or 800-449-3694*.

r2ndi 301-415-0550 and [3rdl 301-415-0553

• Licensees who maintain their own ETS ara provided these telephone numbers,NOTIFICATION TIME FACILITY OR ORGANIZATION UNIT NAME OF CALLER CALL BACK #Waterford 3 John Jarrell 504-739-6685 EVENT TIME & ZONE EVENT DATE POWER/MODE BEFORE POWER/MODE AFTER1600 CDT 03/12/2014 100% / MODE 1 100% / MODE 1EVENT CLASSIFICATIONS I-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR S0.72(h)(1)

(v)(A)_ Safe S/I Capability AINAGENERAL1EMERGENCY GEN/AAEC ED TS DeMelatoii AOEV U lv(B) RHR Cpab~llfty AINELU SITE AREA EMERGENCY SIT/AAEC 4-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) v C) Cornrol of Rad Releas. AJNCALERT, ALEIAAEC ED (1) TS ReqWred So/ ASHU (v)(O) Accident Mitgatin AINDF UNUSUAL EVENT UNU/AEC Ilfv)(A)

ECCS DlachO7ge to RCS ACCOS (xII) Ofmslte Medical AMED.i 50,72 NON-EMERGENCY (see next columnns)

[] (ivXB) RPS Atuti.on (scram) ARPS (xii) L.e Comn/'At/Re.p ACOM[ PHYSICAL SECURITY (73.71) DODD 0i (xi) Offltle Notificbaon APRE 50-Day Optional I1 CFR 50.73(a)(1)

Ul MATERIAL/EXPOSURE B??? 8-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50,72(b)(3)

U Invalid Specified System Actuation AINVQ FITNESS FOR DUTY HFIT U (OiXA) Degraded CondItion ADEG Other Unspecified Requirement (Identffy)

OTHER UNSPECIFIED REOMT. (see last olurnn) Ii (jl)(B) Unanalyzed Condition AUNA Z 10 CFR 21.21(dX3Xi)

Defect NONRINFORMATION ONLY NNF 1 (ivXA) Specified Semrn Actuation AESF UQ NONRDESCRIPTION This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3 required under 10 CFR PART 21 concerning an apparentdeviation from dedicated manufacturing specifications.

On 10117/2013, it was determined that there have been multiple inadvertent actuations of Engineered SafetyFeatures Actuation Signal (ESFAS) equipment over the previous seven months, These equipment inadvertent actuations are occurring due to Allen Bradley type 700RTC relays spuriously de-energizing.

The failure modecauses the relays to intermittently de-energize causing the associated equipment to perform its ESFAS function, not adversely impacting steady state plant operations.

The failed relays have been sent to the qualifying vendor and two other failure analysis laboratories for testing.

Theresults were reviewed by Waterford 3 engineers and although the failure mode could not be repeated in thelaboratory, the laboratories identified less than adequate solder joints on the relay control circuit and a failedcapacitor.

The cause of the failed Capacitor was identified as less than adequate installation practices duringmanufacturing.

Engineering has determined that effects of these deviations, combined with installation in anapplication near the qualifying vendors maximum specified environmental conditions, relevant to elevated voltageand ambient temperatures, has resulted in accelerated aging effects on the sub-components of the relays. Thefailures have been observed on relays that have been in-service greater than three years.Entergy concluded that for the applications for which the failure mode has been observed, and for otherapplications where these relays have been installed for more than 3 years, the failures did not result in a substantial safety hazard. However, on 3/12/2014, Entergy completed an evaluation concluding that, had this relay type beeninstalled in other safety related normally energized applications for greater than 3 years, it could have resulted in asubstantial safety hazard. Compensatory measures to preclude the maffunction of these relays, until long-term corrective actions are completed, have been implemented.

As an interim measure the installed time for theserelays is limited to 3 years or less. The Waterford 3 Site VP was informed the same day, 3/12/2014.

Waterford 3 has determined that the only other Entergy nuclear facility utilizing these Allen Bradley relay types,possibly in a safety related application, is at James A. Fitzpatrick, to which this condition has been communicated.

NOTIFICATIONS YES NO WILL BE ANYTHING UNUSUAL OR El YES (Explain above) [ NONRC RESIDENT El U U NOT UNDERSTOOD?

YESSTAT " ; U D ALL SYSTEMS ES NO (Explain above)LOC L FUNCTION AS REQUIRED?

03/11/2014 19:54 5847396676 VP: OFFICE PAGE 02ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PAGE 2 OF 2I DAflifl nemm-AL FE CAOi C flfl- UV flD FIL IN Iii AnAl 3 ira PTU Wu An.a .W~~A..#

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[7 MONITORED

[]UNMONITORED

[] OFFSITE RELEASE [] T. S. EXCEEDED

[] RM ALARMS [3 AREAS EVACUATED

[3PERSONNEL EXPOSED OR CONTAMINATED

[] OFFSITE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS RECOMMENDED

-slate release path in dewepdfon Release Rate (Ci/sec)

% T. S, UMIT HOD GUIDE Total Activity CI) % T. S. LIMIT HOO GUIDENoble Gas 0.1 Cilsec 1000 C0Iodine 10 uClc _ _ 0.01 CiParticulate I uCi/sec I mCiLiquid (excluding

&M num anddissolved noble gases) 10 uCimin 0.I ClLiquid (trifium) 0.2 Ci/min ,, S CiTotal Activity

, ,_._JPLANT STACK CONDENSERIAIR EJECTOR MAIN STEAM UNE SG SLOWDOWN OTHERRAO MONITOR READINGSALARM SETPOINTS

% T. S. UMIT (7f avlcahle)

RCS OR SG TUBE LEAKS: CHECK OR FILL IN APPLICABLE ITEMS: (spec/fi de&aiWL/expwanatons should be covered in event descpilpion)

LOCATION OF THE LEAK fe,g.. So 4t valve, pi, etc.)LEAK RATE UNITS: gpm/gpd T. S. LIMITS SUDDEN OR LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT LEAK START DATE TIME COOLANT ACTIVITY PRIMARY SECONDARY AND UNITS:LIST OF SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT NOT OPERATIONAL EVENT DESCRIPTION (Contned from front) 03/11/2014 19:545047396678 VP: OFFICEPAGE 63OTHER SOV AGENCIES El 0Z 0] MODE OF OPERATION ESTIMATED ADDITIONAL INFO ON BACKMEDINPFRESS RELEASE ]UNTIL CORRECTED:

N/A RESTART DATE. N/ IES ONONRC FORM 361 (1 2-2000)