ML16053A134

M Mulligan Email to NRC Re Hope Creek

ML16053A134
Person / Time
Site:	Hope Creek
Issue date:	02/19/2016
From:	Mulligan M - No Known Affiliation
To:	Cowan G, Krohn P G Division of Reactor Safety I
BOWER, FL
Shared Package
ML16053A157	List: ML16053A134 ML16060A163
References
2016-SST-355
Download: ML16053A134 (1)

Text

From: Michael Mulligan [mailto:steamshovel2002@yahoo.com

] Sent: Friday, February 19, 2016 11:27 AM To: Cowan, Grace <Grace.Cowan@nrc.gov

>

Subject:

Hope Creek and chief Paul Krohn Mr. Krohn, I am a safety advocate. I had recent issues with H ope Creek's SRV setpoint lift inaccuracies and my issues were placed on the docket. We are watching Hope Creek very carefully. You signed off on the below IR.

Entry on my blog:

"Junk Plant Hope Creek: PSEG's Frivolous Denial Of NRC Non Sited Violation" http://steamshovel2002.blogspo t.com/2016/02/junk-plant-hope-c reek-frivolous-psegs.html My friends and I were debating this issue this morni ng. We think this issue deserves a much higher violation level.

So why wasn't Hope Creek required to ask NRC pe rmission to put all the safety related "sw pump discharge isolation valves (4 of them)" in the "intentionally reverse di rection"? Why didn't they fulfill the requirements of 50:59? Why wasn't this in the inspection report? Why wasn't the public immediately informed of this licensing deviation through a safety evaluation?

We feel if Hope Creek was requi red to ask NRC permission, they would have taken the easy way out and put in the proper quality valves for the intended duty. They would have properly fixed these leaking valves when the symptoms first was seen? It' s pretty pathetic the NRC didn't immediately flip this 2013 event up into a regular inspection report.

We think collectively Hope Creek and the NRC has syst emic "Normalization of Deviance" on steroids big time???

I believe I have spoken to you in the past and you are one of the good guys. Did we talk about the structure of the CDBIs? The public meeting? Do I remember it right, with all the nuke guys bitching about how useless the CDBIs were, and a diversion from safety?

Could we have a discussion just about this particular issue?

I never have any confidentiality or anonymity needs what-so-ever.

Mike Mulligan Hinsdale, NH Hope Creek Generating Station - Com ponent Design Bases Inspection Report 05000354/2015007 Description. 1 EAHV-2198C is the 'C' SW pump dischar ge isolation valve. The valve is a 28- inch Weir Tricentric butterfly valve wit h a SMB-1/HBC-4 (60-1) Limitorque motor operator. The valve has an active safety function in the open position to prov ide normal SW flow to the safety related safety auxiliaries cooling system (SAC S) heat exchangers (HXs) and non-1 E reactor auxiliaries cooling system (RAGS) HXs, and emergency SW flow to ot her systems. PSEG had orig inally intentionally installed all four 1 EAHV-2198 valves in the reve rse flow direction to permit the downstream header pressure to seat the valve tighter to minimize seat leakage during SW pump and strainer on-line maintenance.

From: Michael Mulligan [mailto:steamshovel2002@yahoo.com

] Sent: Friday, February 19, 2016 11:27 AM To: Cowan, Grace <Grace.Cowan@nrc.gov

>

Subject:

Hope Creek and chief Paul Krohn Mr. Krohn, I am a safety advocate. I had recent issues with H ope Creek's SRV setpoint lift inaccuracies and my issues were placed on the docket. We are watching Hope Creek very carefully. You signed off on the below IR.

Entry on my blog:

"Junk Plant Hope Creek: PSEG's Frivolous Denial Of NRC Non Sited Violation" http://steamshovel2002.blogspo t.com/2016/02/junk-plant-hope-c reek-frivolous-psegs.html My friends and I were debating this issue this morni ng. We think this issue deserves a much higher violation level.

So why wasn't Hope Creek required to ask NRC pe rmission to put all the safety related "sw pump discharge isolation valves (4 of them)" in the "intentionally reverse di rection"? Why didn't they fulfill the requirements of 50:59? Why wasn't this in the inspection report? Why wasn't the public immediately informed of this licensing deviation through a safety evaluation?

We feel if Hope Creek was requi red to ask NRC permission, they would have taken the easy way out and put in the proper quality valves for the intended duty. They would have properly fixed these leaking valves when the symptoms first was seen? It' s pretty pathetic the NRC didn't immediately flip this 2013 event up into a regular inspection report.

We think collectively Hope Creek and the NRC has syst emic "Normalization of Deviance" on steroids big time???

I believe I have spoken to you in the past and you are one of the good guys. Did we talk about the structure of the CDBIs? The public meeting? Do I remember it right, with all the nuke guys bitching about how useless the CDBIs were, and a diversion from safety?

Could we have a discussion just about this particular issue?

I never have any confidentiality or anonymity needs what-so-ever.

Mike Mulligan Hinsdale, NH Hope Creek Generating Station - Com ponent Design Bases Inspection Report 05000354/2015007 Description. 1 EAHV-2198C is the 'C' SW pump dischar ge isolation valve. The valve is a 28- inch Weir Tricentric butterfly valve wit h a SMB-1/HBC-4 (60-1) Limitorque motor operator. The valve has an active safety function in the open position to prov ide normal SW flow to the safety related safety auxiliaries cooling system (SAC S) heat exchangers (HXs) and non-1 E reactor auxiliaries cooling system (RAGS) HXs, and emergency SW flow to ot her systems. PSEG had orig inally intentionally installed all four 1 EAHV-2198 valves in the reve rse flow direction to permit the downstream header pressure to seat the valve tighter to minimize seat leakage during SW pump and strainer on-line maintenance.