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{{#Wiki_filter:IndianaMichiganPowerCompany500CircieD;i'eBuclanan.III491071395INDIANAMICHIGANPOWERMarch12,1997AEP:NRC:1238F10CFR2.201DocketNos.:50-31550-316U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionATTN:DocumentControlDeskWashington,D.C.20555Gentlemen:DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2NRCINSPECTIONREPORTSNOs.50-315/96013(DRS)AND50-316/96013(DRS)REPLYTONOTICEOFVIOLATIONSThisletterisinresponsetoaletterfromG.E.Grant,datedFebruary4,1997,thatforwardedanoticeofthreeviolationsandonenoticeofdeviationtoIndianaMichiganPowerCompany.Theviolationsandthedeviationwereidentifiedduringasystemoperationalperformanceinspection(SOPI)ofthecentrifugalchargingsystemportionoftheemergencycorecoolingsystemsandtheresidualheatremovalsystems.OurresponsewasduetoyouonMarch6,1997;however,werequestedabriefextensiontorecoverthetimedelayfromwhenthereportwasissuedtowhenitwasreceived.Theexten'sionwasgrantedbyRonGareerofRegionIII,onFebruary14,1997.Thethreeviolationsaddressedthe1)failuretoestablishadequateinstructions/failuretofollowproceduresasrelatedtocollectionofanoilsample,andadequateminimumthreadengagementacceptancecriteria;2)inadequatetestcontrolasrelatedtoincorporatingchargingpumpacceptancelimitsintotheISTprogram;and3)failuretoperformadequate/timelycorrectiveactions,asrelatedtodeterminingthecorrectoilsight-glassfillmarksonsafety-relatedpumpsandmotors,addressingequipmentdeficiencytaggingproblems,andlocating/reconstitutingacentrifugalchargingpumpnetpositivesuctionheadcalculation.ThedeviationwasfromactionscommittedtoinNUREG-0737specificallyinvolvingthesourcetermusedforaradiologicalevaluation.'7704080224'970403PDRADOCK050003158PDR  
{{#Wiki_filter:IndianaMichiganPowerCompany500CircieD;i'eBuclanan.III491071395
INDIANAMICHIGANPOWERMarch12,1997AEP:NRC:1238F
10CFR2.201DocketNos.:50-31550-316U.S.NuclearRegulatory
Commission
ATTN:DocumentControlDeskWashington,
D.C.20555Gentlemen:
DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2NRCINSPECTION
REPORTSNOs.50-315/96013(DRS)
AND50-316/96013
(DRS)REPLYTONOTICEOFVIOLATIONS
ThisletterisinresponsetoaletterfromG.E.Grant,datedFebruary4,1997,thatforwarded
anoticeofthreeviolations
andonenoticeofdeviation
toIndianaMichiganPowerCompany.Theviolations
andthedeviation
wereidentified
duringasystemoperational
performance
inspection
(SOPI)ofthecentrifugal
chargingsystemportionoftheemergency
corecoolingsystemsandtheresidualheatremovalsystems.OurresponsewasduetoyouonMarch6,1997;however,werequested
abriefextension
torecoverthetimedelayfromwhenthereportwasissuedtowhenitwasreceived.
Theexten'sion
wasgrantedbyRonGareerofRegionIII,onFebruary14,1997.Thethreeviolations
addressed
the1)failuretoestablish
adequateinstructions/failure
tofollowprocedures
asrelatedtocollection
ofanoilsample,andadequateminimumthreadengagement
acceptance
criteria;
2)inadequate
testcontrolasrelatedtoincorporating
chargingpumpacceptance
limitsintotheISTprogram;and3)failuretoperformadequate/timely
corrective
actions,asrelatedtodetermining
thecorrectoilsight-glass
fillmarksonsafety-relatedpumpsandmotors,addressing
equipment
deficiency
taggingproblems,
andlocating/reconstituting
acentrifugal
chargingpumpnetpositivesuctionheadcalculation.
Thedeviation
wasfromactionscommitted
toinNUREG-0737
specifically
involving
thesourcetermusedforaradiological
evaluation.
'7704080224
'970403PDRADOCK050003158PDR  
40  
40  
U.S.NuclearRegulatoryCommissionPage2AEP:NRC:1238FOurreplytotheviolationsanddeviationareprovidedintheattachmenttothisletter.Alsoincludedaretheresultsofourreviewoftechnicalspecificationclarifications,whichwecommittedtoperformattheDecember13,1996,exitmeeting.Thereplydoesnotcontainanypersonalprivacy,proprietary,orsafeguardsinformation.Sincerely,PCwp-E.E.FitpatrickVicePresidentSWORNTOANDSUBSCRIBEDBEFOREMETHs/XDAYQP)~'997NotaryPublicMyCommissionExpires:2/CrPING/vlbAttachmentJANlCEhl.BIG!<ERSNoeyPub5c,88menCcunlY,MQyQ0mmrsscpEyp;reFob,<6,2N$cc:A.A.Blind&3L"%%~8eachh'~:qMDEQ-DWRRPDNRCResidentInspectorJ.R.'adgett  
U.S.NuclearRegulatory
Commission
Page2AEP:NRC:1238FOurreplytotheviolations
anddeviation
areprovidedintheattachment
tothisletter.Alsoincludedaretheresultsofourreviewoftechnical
specification
clarifications,
whichwecommitted
toperformattheDecember13,1996,exitmeeting.Thereplydoesnotcontainanypersonalprivacy,proprietary,
orsafeguards
information.
Sincerely,
PCwp-E.E.FitpatrickVicePresident
SWORNTOANDSUBSCRIBED
BEFOREMETHs/XDAYQP)~'997NotaryPublicMyCommission
Expires:2/CrPING/vlbAttachment
JANlCEhl.BIG!<ERSNoeyPub5c,88menCcunlY,MQyQ0mmrsscpEyp;reFob,<6,2N$cc:A.A.Blind&3L"%%~8eachh'~:q
MDEQ-DWRRPDNRCResidentInspector
J.R.'adgett  
fl'  
fl'  
ATTACHMENTTOAEP:NRC:1238FREPLYTONOTICEOFVIOLATION:NRCINSPECTIONREPORTSNOs.50-315/96013(DRS)AND50-316/96013(DRS)  
ATTACHMENT
TOAEP:NRC:1238FREPLYTONOTICEOFVIOLATION:
NRCINSPECTION
REPORTSNOs.50-315/96013
(DRS)AND50-316/96013
(DRS)  
   
   
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1238FPage1DuringanNRCsystemoperationalperformanceinspectionconductedNovember18throughDecember13,1996,ontheemergencycorecoolingsystemportionofthecentrifugalchargingsystemandresidualheatremovalsystemthreeviolationsandonedeviationwereidentified.Inaccordancewiththe"GeneralStatementofPolicyandProceduresforNRCEnforcementActions,"(NUREG-1600)theviolationsandtheresponsesareprovidedbelow.Additionally,wewererequestedtorespondtothedeviation,andtoprovideinformationrelatedtoacommitmentregardingtechnicalspecification(T/S)clarificationsmadeattheDecember13,1996,exitmeeting.Ourresponsetotheseitemsisalsoprovidedbelow.NRCViolationA"10CFR50,AppendixB,CriterionV,'Instructions,Procedures,andDrawings,'equires,inpart,thatactivitiesaffectingqualityshallbeprescribedbyinstructions,procedures,ordrawingsofatypeappropriatetothecircumstancesandshallbeaccomplishedinaccordancewiththeseinstructions,procedures,ordrawings.Maintenanceprocedure12MHP5021.001.009,Revision8,'TorqueSelection,'atedMarch21,1994,requiresthreadengagementofatleast80percentofnutheight.Contrarytotheabove:OnDecember4,1996,thei"spectorsidentifiedthatamaintenanceworkpackageforthe1Ecentrifugalchargingpump,anactivityaffectingquality,~failedtoincludeadequateinstructionsforlubeoilsamplecollection.OnNovember20,1996,theinspectorsidentifiedthatmaintenanceprocedureMDS-600,'GeneralErectionTolerancesforPipeandTubeSupports/Restraints,'asnotofatypeappropriatetothecircumstancessinceitfailedtocontainadequateminimumthreadengagementacceptancecriteriaforactivitiesaffectingquality.3.OnNovember21,1996,theinspectorsidentifiedthatmaintenancepersonnelfailedtoperformboltingonsafety-relatedequipmentinaccordancewithmaintenanceprocedure12MHP5021.001.009,'TorqueSelection.'saresult,nutsassociatedwithemergencycorecoolingsystemequipmentwereidentifiedwiththreadengagementlessthan80percentofnutheight.ThisaSeverityLevelIVviolation."ResonsetoNRCViolationAl1.AdmissionorDenialoftheAlleedViolationindianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolationascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.ReasonfortheViolationThereasonfortheviolationwasfailuretoremoveoilsamplinginstructionsfromapplicablerecurringtasksthatwereno'cngerneededafterimplementationofaformaloilsamplingprogram.  
Attachment
toAEP:NRC:1238F
Page1DuringanNRCsystemoperational
performance
inspection
conducted
November18throughDecember13,1996,ontheemergency
corecoolingsystemportionofthecentrifugal
chargingsystemandresidualheatremovalsystemthreeviolations
andonedeviation
wereidentified.
Inaccordance
withthe"GeneralStatement
ofPolicyandProcedures
forNRCEnforcement
Actions,"
(NUREG-1600)
theviolations
andtheresponses
areprovidedbelow.Additionally,
wewererequested
torespondtothedeviation,
andtoprovideinformation
relatedtoacommitment
regarding
technical
specification
(T/S)clarifications
madeattheDecember13,1996,exitmeeting.Ourresponsetotheseitemsisalsoprovidedbelow.NRCViolation
A"10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion
V,'Instructions,
Procedures,
andDrawings,'equires,
inpart,thatactivities
affecting
qualityshallbeprescribed
byinstructions,
procedures,
ordrawingsofatypeappropriate
tothecircumstances
andshallbeaccomplished
inaccordance
withtheseinstructions,
procedures,
ordrawings.
Maintenance
procedure
12MHP5021.001.009,
Revision8,'TorqueSelection,'ated
March21,1994,requiresthreadengagement
ofatleast80percentofnutheight.Contrarytotheabove:OnDecember4,1996,thei"spectorsidentified
thatamaintenance
workpackageforthe1Ecentrifugal
chargingpump,anactivityaffectingquality,~failedtoincludeadequateinstructions
forlubeoilsamplecollection.
OnNovember20,1996,theinspectors
identified
thatmaintenance
procedure
MDS-600,'GeneralErectionTolerances
forPipeandTubeSupports/Restraints,'as
notofatypeappropriate
tothecircumstances
sinceitfailedtocontainadequateminimumthreadengagement
acceptance
criteriaforactivities
affectingquality.3.OnNovember21,1996,theinspectors
identified
thatmaintenance
personnel
failedtoperformboltingonsafety-relatedequipment
inaccordance
withmaintenance
procedure
12MHP5021.001.009,
'TorqueSelection.'s
aresult,nutsassociated
withemergency
corecoolingsystemequipment
wereidentified
withthreadengagement
lessthan80percentofnutheight.ThisaSeverityLevelIVviolation."
ResonsetoNRCViolation
Al1.Admission
orDenialoftheAlleedViolation
indianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolation
ascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.
ReasonfortheViolation
Thereasonfortheviolation
wasfailuretoremoveoilsamplinginstructions
fromapplicable
recurring
tasksthatwereno'cngerneededafterimplementation
ofaformaloilsamplingprogram.  
,I"tl  
,I"tl  
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1238FPage2TheinstructionsfoundinthejoborderactivityassociatedwiththeworkonthelEcentrifugalchargingpumpinstructedpersonnelto:"Drainoilfromfilterintoacontainer.A.DeliveroilfromCUNOfiltertochemlabforanalysis.(Theresultswillgototheengineersforevaluationofwearinsystem)."Thejoborderactivityinstructionsweredevelopedpriortoimplementationofourformaloilanalysisprogram.Atthetimeitwasinputasarecurringtask,itwasintendedtoprovidearoughindicationofgrossmachineproblems.Subsequently,aformaloilanalysisprogramwasimplemented,withproceduralizedsamplingtechniquesbeingutilizedbychemistrypersonnel.Underthissamplingprogram,donequarterly(asopposedtofilterchange-outsthataredoneyearly),wear,particlesofconsiderablylesssizethanthosedetectedviathefilterchange-outmethodcanbedetected,thusgivingmuchearlierindicationofmachineproblems.Theinstructionsintherecurringtaskwereinadvertentlyleftinplaceaftertheformalprogramwasinstituted.Theoilcollectedviatheseinstructionsisnotanalyzedbychemistrypersonnel;anddecisionsastotheconditionoftheequipmentarenotbasedor.thesesamples.3.CorrectiveActionsTakenandResultsAchievedTheinstructionsrequiringfiltercontentevaluationwereremovedfromthechargingpumprecurringtasksonFebruary11,1997~The1EchargingpumplubeoilwassampledbychemistrypersonnelonSeptember12,1996,priortothefilterchange-outobservedonDecember4,1996,consistentwiththeformaloilanalysisprogram.4.CorrectiveActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolationsA:eviewoflubeoilchangesrelatedtoequipmentincludedintneoilanalysisprogramwasconducted.Similarwordingwasfoundinrecurringtasksforthemotor-drivenandturbine-drivenauxiliaryfeedwaterpumps.Thisredundantwordingwillberemovedpriortothenextrequireddateforfilterchange-outforthisequipment.5.DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedFullcompliancewasachievedonFebruary11,1997,whentheredundantinstructionswereremovedfromthefourchargingpump'srecurring.tasks.ResonsetoNRCViolationA26A31.AdmissionorDenialoftheAlleedViolationIndianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolationascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.  
Attachment
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1238FPage3ReasonfortheViolationThecauseoftheviolation,ascitedinA3,isacombinationofthewayworkwasdocumentedandadherencetoproceduralrequirementsthatwereinconsistent.ThereferencetoMDS-600,citedinA2,asa"maintenanceprocedure"requiresclarification.MDS-600isnotaprocedure,itisadesignstandardthatprovidestolerancesforinstallationandevaluationofas-foundconditionsforpiping/tubingsupports.MDS-600isnotanapplicablereferenceandthereisnohierarchialconnectionbetweenMDS-600and**12MHP5021.001.009.3.CorrectiveActionsTakenandResultsAchievedEightconditionreportswerewrittentodocumenttheinspectionteam'sconcerns.Operabilityreviewswereperformedbasedontheidentifieddeficiencies,andtheaffectedequipmentwasdeterminedtobeoperable.Workhistoryforeachcomponentwasreviewedtoassistindeterminingthepotentialcause(s).Ingeneral,thisreviewidentifiedageneraltimeframewhenthedeficiencywascreated,butnotaspecificworkactivity.Actionrequestswerewrittentocorrectthedeficiencywhereanactionrequestdidnotalreadyexist,orthedeficiencywasevaluatedandfoundtobeacceptableasis.4.CorrectiveActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolationsMaintenancestandingorder,MSO.009,wasissuedonFebruary3,1997.Thisdocumentestablishesanacceptancecriteriaof"flushorbetter"forthreadengagement.Further,itprovidesapolicyfordocumentingas-foundthreadengagementdeficienciessotheycanbeevaluatedandcorrected.Lastly,thepolicyprovidesforin-plantidentificationoflessthanflushthreadengagementthathasbeenevaluatedandfoundtobeacceptabl.Thisstandingorderstrengthensmanagementexpectationsforthreadengagementandestablishesamechanismforidentificationofanalyzed,acceptableconditions.Awalkdownwasperformedofarandomsampleofplantcomponentsofsufficientsizetoprovidea99%confidencelevelthatthesecomponentsareastatisticallyvalidsampleoftheplanepopulationofcomponents.Theas-foundconfigurationofthefastenersassociatedwiththesecomponentswasevaluated.Therewerenofasteneranomaliesidentifiedthataffectedcomponentfunctionalityoroperability.Plantmanagementhasreinforcedproceduraladherencetoallplantpersonnel.**12MHP5021.001.009wasenhancedbytheadditionofacceptancecriteriaofflushthreadsorbetter.  
toAEP:NRC:1238F
Page2Theinstructions
foundinthejoborderactivityassociated
withtheworkonthelEcentrifugal
chargingpumpinstructed
personnel
to:"Drainoilfromfilterintoacontainer.
A.DeliveroilfromCUNOfiltertochemlabforanalysis.
(Theresultswillgototheengineers
forevaluation
ofwearinsystem)."
Thejoborderactivityinstructions
weredeveloped
priortoimplementation
ofourformaloilanalysisprogram.Atthetimeitwasinputasarecurring
task,itwasintendedtoprovidearoughindication
ofgrossmachineproblems.
Subsequently,
aformaloilanalysisprogramwasimplemented,
withproceduralized
samplingtechniques
beingutilizedbychemistry
personnel.
Underthissamplingprogram,donequarterly
(asopposedtofilterchange-outs
thataredoneyearly),wear,particles
ofconsiderably
lesssizethanthosedetectedviathefilterchange-out
methodcanbedetected,
thusgivingmuchearlierindication
ofmachineproblems.
Theinstructions
intherecurring
taskwereinadvertently
leftinplaceaftertheformalprogramwasinstituted.
Theoilcollected
viatheseinstructions
isnotanalyzedbychemistry
personnel;
anddecisions
astothecondition
oftheequipment
arenotbasedor.thesesamples.3.Corrective
ActionsTakenandResultsAchievedTheinstructions
requiring
filtercontentevaluation
wereremovedfromthechargingpumprecurring
tasksonFebruary11,1997~The1Echargingpumplubeoilwassampledbychemistry
personnel
onSeptember
12,1996,priortothefilterchange-out
observedonDecember4,1996,consistent
withtheformaloilanalysisprogram.4.Corrective
ActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolations
A:eviewoflubeoilchangesrelatedtoequipment
includedintneoilanalysisprogramwasconducted.
Similarwordingwasfoundinrecurring
tasksforthemotor-driven
andturbine-drivenauxiliary
feedwater
pumps.Thisredundant
wordingwillberemovedpriortothenextrequireddateforfilterchange-out
forthisequipment.
5.DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedFullcompliance
wasachievedonFebruary11,1997,whentheredundant
instructions
wereremovedfromthefourchargingpump'srecurring.
tasks.ResonsetoNRCViolation
A26A31.Admission
orDenialoftheAlleedViolation
IndianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolation
ascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.  
Attachment
toAEP:NRC:1238F
Page3ReasonfortheViolation
Thecauseoftheviolation,
ascitedinA3,isacombination
ofthewayworkwasdocumented
andadherence
toprocedural
requirements
thatwereinconsistent.
Thereference
toMDS-600,citedinA2,asa"maintenance
procedure"
requiresclarification.
MDS-600isnotaprocedure,
itisadesignstandardthatprovidestolerances
forinstallation
andevaluation
ofas-foundconditions
forpiping/tubing
supports.
MDS-600isnotanapplicable
reference
andthereisnohierarchial
connection
betweenMDS-600and**12MHP5021.001.009.
3.Corrective
ActionsTakenandResultsAchievedEightcondition
reportswerewrittentodocumenttheinspection
team'sconcerns.
Operability
reviewswereperformed
basedontheidentified
deficiencies,
andtheaffectedequipment
wasdetermined
tobeoperable.
Workhistoryforeachcomponent
wasreviewedtoassistindetermining
thepotential
cause(s).
Ingeneral,thisreviewidentified
ageneraltimeframewhenthedeficiency
wascreated,butnotaspecificworkactivity.
Actionrequestswerewrittentocorrectthedeficiency
whereanactionrequestdidnotalreadyexist,orthedeficiency
wasevaluated
andfoundtobeacceptable
asis.4.Corrective
ActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolations
Maintenance
standingorder,MSO.009,wasissuedonFebruary3,1997.Thisdocumentestablishes
anacceptance
criteriaof"flushorbetter"forthreadengagement.
Further,itprovidesapolicyfordocumenting
as-foundthreadengagement
deficiencies
sotheycanbeevaluated
andcorrected.
Lastly,thepolicyprovidesforin-plantidentification
oflessthanflushthreadengagement
thathasbeenevaluated
andfoundtobeacceptabl
.Thisstandingorderstrengthens
management
expectations
forthreadengagement
andestablishes
amechanism
foridentification
ofanalyzed,
acceptable
conditions.
Awalkdownwasperformed
ofarandomsampleofplantcomponents
ofsufficient
sizetoprovidea99%confidence
levelthatthesecomponents
areastatistically
validsampleoftheplanepopulation
ofcomponents.
Theas-foundconfiguration
ofthefasteners
associated
withthesecomponents
wasevaluated.
Therewerenofasteneranomalies
identified
thataffectedcomponent
functionality
oroperability.
Plantmanagement
hasreinforced
procedural
adherence
toallplantpersonnel.
**12MHP5021.001.009wasenhancedbytheadditionofacceptance
criteriaofflushthreadsorbetter.  
I  
I  
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC.:1238F5.DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedPage4FullcompliancewasachievedonMarch10,1997.Atthattimetheoriginal28NRC-identifiedthreadengagementdeficiencieswereanalyzedasnotaffectingoperability/quality;existingprocedures,policies,andstandardswereupgraded;andthefindingsofthethreadengagementrandomsampleconcludedthattherewerenofunctionality/operabilityconcernscausedbythreadengagementdeficienciesassociatedwithanyofthesampledcomponents.NRCViolationB"10CFR50,AppendixB,CriterionXZ,'TestControl,'equires,inpart,thatatestprogrambeestablishedtoassurethatalltestingrequiredtodemonstratethatstructures,systems,andcomponentswillperformsatisfactorilyinserviceisidentifiedandperformedinaccordancewithwrittentestprocedureswhichincorporatetherequirementsandacceptancelimitscontainedinapplicabledesigndocuments.TechnicalSpecification3.1.1.1,'ShutdownMargin-Tavegreaterthan200'F,'pecifiesaborationcapabilityof10gallonsperminute(gpm)of20,000partspermillion(ppm)boronsolutionorequivalent.Contrarytotheabove,onDecember11,1996,theinspectorsidentifiedthatthecorrectacceptancelimitstoassurethatthecentrifugalchargingpumpscouldperformtheirboroninjectionfunctionasspecifiedinTechnicalSpecification3.1.1.1hadnotbeenincorporatedinthelicensee'sinservicetesting(ZST)program.ThisisaSeverityLevelZVviolation."ResonsetoNRCViolationBAdmissionorDenialoftheAlleedViolationZndianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolationascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.2.Reason'fortheViolationThereasonfortheviolationwasthatareviewtodetermineapplicabilitytotheZSTprogramwasnotconductedpriortoissuanceofatechnicalspecification(T/S)clarificationonT/S3.1.1.1.T/S3.1.1.1,ShutdownMargin-T,~greaterthan2004Fprovidesshutdownmarginrequirementswhileinmodes1,2,3,or4.TheactionstatementforT/S3.1.1.1requiresimmediateandcontinuousborationatgreaterthanorequalto10gpmofasolutioncontaininggreaterthanorequalto20,000ppmboronor"equivalent".Westinghouseperformedananalysistoclarifythemeaningofthisstatementiftherefuelingwaterstoragetank(RWST)wasusedasasourceofboratedwater.Westinghousedefined"equivalence"as"xenonburnoutequivalence",whichisthecapabilitytoinjectsufficientborontoadjustaoronconcentrationtocompensateforxenonburnoutfromitspeakvalueTheiranalysisassumedaplanttripfollowedbyastepreturnto100%.power  
Attachment
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1238FPage5atpeakxenonconcentration.Znaddition,theyassumedthatthereactorwouldbemaintainedatfullpowerduringthetransient.Theresultsofthisanalysisshowedthatacentrifugalchargingpump(CCP)flowof120gpmfromtheRWSTcouldcompensateforxenonthroughoutthetransientifcertainrestrictionswereobserved.OnNovember5,1990,arevisiontoT/Sclarificationno.7wasissued,whichdefinedthe120gpmofRWSTwatercontaining2400ppmboronasanacceptablesourceofwatertosatisfyborationflowrequirementsforT/S3.1.1.1.DevelopmentandissuanceofthisT/SclarificationwasnotcoupledwithareviewofthetestprogramtoensurethetestprogramconfirmedtheabilityoftheCCPstoperformthisfunction.Thisdeficiencywasidentifiedbyourengineersduringeffortstorespondtoaninspector'squestiononthedesignfunctionsoftheCCPsduringtheinspection.CorrectiveActionsTakenandResultsAchievedFollowingidentificationofthisdeficiency,acalculationwasperformedtodeterminethemaximumdegradationtheCCPscouldtoleratewhilestill~eingabletodeliver120gpmofRWSTwatertothereactorcoolantsystem.ThiscalculationrevealedthattheCCPscouldtolerateadegradationof9.5%forUnit1and3.5%forUnit2.AreviewofZSTdataasfarbackas1990determinedthatthepumpswerecapableofperformingthisfunction.TheZSTprogramhasbeenrevisedtoincludelimitationsforallowabledegradationoftheCCPstoensurethat120gpmof2400ppmboroncouldbesuppliedfromtheRWST.Additionally,asapointofinformation,sincetheoriginalanalysisbyWestinghouse,whichdefinedthe120gpmvalueof2400ppmboronincludedaveryconservativeassumptionthatastepincreaseinpowerto100%occurredwhileatpeakxenon,areanalysiswasperformedusingamorerealisticramprateof10'k/hr,whichisalimitationcontainedinplantprocedures.ThisreanalysisindicatedthattheborationflowrequirementsofT/S3.1.1.1couldbesatisfiedbyaslittleas60.1gpmof2400ppmboron.WemayrelaxtheallowabledegradationfortheCCPsbasedonthisrevised60.1gpmflow.CorrectiveActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolations'ailuretoensurethetestprogramfortheCCPsincludedprovisionstoensuretheCCPscoulddeliver120gpmof2400ppmboronoccurredasaresultoffailuretocouplethedevelopmentandissuanceofaT/Sclarificationwithappropriatereviewsofthetestprogram.AsnotedintheSOPZreport,severalexampleswereidentifiedwhereT/Sclarificationscouldnotbejustified.Duringtheexitmeeting,wecommittedtoperformareviewofallofourT/Sclarifications.Theresultsofthisreviewarecontainedinthe"Commitment"'ectionofthisattachment.Additionally,asnoted,improvementswillbemadeintheT/Sclarificaticnreviewprocesstoensureanadequatetechnicalreviewoffutureclarifications.  
toAEP:NRC.:1238F
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1238FPage6DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedFullcompliancewasachievedonDecember18,1996,whentheISTprogramwasrevisedtoincludeappropriatelimitstoensurethateachunits'CPscansupply120gpmof2400ppmboronfromtheRWST.ViolationC"10CFR50,AppendixB,CriterionXVI,'CorrectiveActions,'equires,inpart,thatmeasuresshallbeestablishedtoassurethatconditionsadversetoquality,suchasfailures,malfunctions,deficiencies,deviations,defectivematerialandequipment,andnonconformancesarepromptlyidentifiedandcorrected.Contrarytotheabove:2.3.Correctiveactionstoaddresspotentiallyinaccuratesight-glassfillmarksforsafety-relatedpumpsandmotors,aconditionadversetoquality,werenotinitiateduntilNovember27,1996,althoughin1995joborderswerewrittentoaddresspotentiallyinaccuratesight-glassfillmarksonsafety-relatedpumpsandmotors,andonMarch6,1996,anactionrequestwaswrittentodeterminecorrectsight-glassfillmarksonsafety-related.pumpsandmotors.OnDecember5,1996,theinspectorsidentifiedthatthelicenseefailedtotakecorrectiveactionstoeitherlocateorre-constituteacentrifugalchargingpumpnetpositivesuctionhead(NPSH)calculationalthoughthecalculationhadbeenidentifiedasmissingabout18monthsearlier.OnDecember4,1996,theinspectorsdeterminedthatthelicenseefailedtotaketimelycorrectiveactionstoaddressequipmentdeficiencytaggingproblems.Althoughthelicenseehadidentifiedthatabout30percentofplantcomponentsinthework'controlsystemreviewedinathreeweekperiodwerenotproperlytaggedinthefield,correctiveactionstoairessthisconcernhadnotbeeninitiated.ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation."ResonsetoNRCViolationClAdmissionorDenialoftheAlleedViolationIndianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolationascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.2.ReasonfortheViolationThecauseoftheuntimelyresponseforguidanceonplantpump/motoroilfilllevelswasthelackofacommunicationprotocolresultinginanunrecognizedrequesttoengineeringpersonnelfromoperationspersonnelfortechnicalassistance.Therequestforassistancewasmadebymeansofanactionrequest.Requestsforengineeringdirectionaremadewithinthenuclearplantmaintenance(NPM)computersystembymeansofanevaluationrequest.Differentsearchesarerequiredtolocateactionrequestsandevaluationrequests.Engineeringpersonneldidnotsearchactionrequestsbecausetheywerenotanexpectedmeansforrequestingassistance.  
5.DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedPage4Fullcompliance
wasachievedonMarch10,1997.Atthattimetheoriginal28NRC-identified
threadengagement
deficiencies
wereanalyzedasnotaffecting
operability/quality;
existingprocedures,
policies,
andstandards
wereupgraded;
andthefindingsofthethreadengagement
randomsampleconcluded
thattherewerenofunctionality/operability
concernscausedbythreadengagement
deficiencies
associated
withanyofthesampledcomponents.
NRCViolation
B"10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion
XZ,'TestControl,'equires,
inpart,thatatestprogrambeestablished
toassurethatalltestingrequiredtodemonstrate
thatstructures,
systems,andcomponents
willperformsatisfactorily
inserviceisidentified
andperformed
inaccordance
withwrittentestprocedures
whichincorporate
therequirements
andacceptance
limitscontained
inapplicable
designdocuments.
Technical
Specification
3.1.1.1,'Shutdown
Margin-Tavegreaterthan200'F,'pecifies
aborationcapability
of10gallonsperminute(gpm)of20,000partspermillion(ppm)boronsolutionorequivalent.
Contrarytotheabove,onDecember11,1996,theinspectors
identified
thatthecorrectacceptance
limitstoassurethatthecentrifugal
chargingpumpscouldperformtheirboroninjection
functionasspecified
inTechnical
Specification
3.1.1.1hadnotbeenincorporated
inthelicensee's
inservice
testing(ZST)program.ThisisaSeverityLevelZVviolation."
ResonsetoNRCViolation
BAdmission
orDenialoftheAlleedViolation
ZndianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolation
ascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.
2.Reason'fortheViolation
Thereasonfortheviolation
wasthatareviewtodetermine
applicability
totheZSTprogramwasnotconducted
priortoissuanceofatechnical
specification
(T/S)clarification
onT/S3.1.1.1.T/S3.1.1.1,ShutdownMargin-T,~greaterthan2004Fprovidesshutdownmarginrequirements
whileinmodes1,2,3,or4.Theactionstatement
forT/S3.1.1.1requiresimmediate
andcontinuous
borationatgreaterthanorequalto10gpmofasolutioncontaining
greaterthanorequalto20,000ppmboronor"equivalent".
Westinghouse
performed
ananalysistoclarifythemeaningofthisstatement
iftherefueling
waterstoragetank(RWST)wasusedasasourceofboratedwater.Westinghouse
defined"equivalence"
as"xenonburnoutequivalence",
whichisthecapability
toinjectsufficient
borontoadjustaoronconcentration
tocompensate
forxenonburnoutfromitspeakvalueTheiranalysisassumedaplanttripfollowedbyastepreturnto100%.power  
Attachment
toAEP:NRC:1238F
Page5atpeakxenonconcentration.
Znaddition,
theyassumedthatthereactorwouldbemaintained
atfullpowerduringthetransient.
Theresultsofthisanalysisshowedthatacentrifugal
chargingpump(CCP)flowof120gpmfromtheRWSTcouldcompensate
forxenonthroughout
thetransient
ifcertainrestrictions
wereobserved.
OnNovember5,1990,arevisiontoT/Sclarification
no.7wasissued,whichdefinedthe120gpmofRWSTwatercontaining
2400ppmboronasanacceptable
sourceofwatertosatisfyborationflowrequirements
forT/S3.1.1.1.Development
andissuanceofthisT/Sclarification
wasnotcoupledwithareviewofthetestprogramtoensurethetestprogramconfirmed
theabilityoftheCCPstoperformthisfunction.
Thisdeficiency
wasidentified
byourengineers
duringeffortstorespondtoaninspector's
questiononthedesignfunctions
oftheCCPsduringtheinspection.
Corrective
ActionsTakenandResultsAchievedFollowing
identification
ofthisdeficiency,
acalculation
wasperformed
todetermine
themaximumdegradation
theCCPscouldtoleratewhilestill~eingabletodeliver120gpmofRWSTwatertothereactorcoolantsystem.Thiscalculation
revealedthattheCCPscouldtolerateadegradation
of9.5%forUnit1and3.5%forUnit2.AreviewofZSTdataasfarbackas1990determined
thatthepumpswerecapableofperforming
thisfunction.
TheZSTprogramhasbeenrevisedtoincludelimitations
forallowable
degradation
oftheCCPstoensurethat120gpmof2400ppmboroncouldbesuppliedfromtheRWST.Additionally,
asapointofinformation,
sincetheoriginalanalysisbyWestinghouse,
whichdefinedthe120gpmvalueof2400ppmboronincludedaveryconservative
assumption
thatastepincreaseinpowerto100%occurredwhileatpeakxenon,areanalysis
wasperformed
usingamorerealistic
ramprateof10'k/hr,whichisalimitation
contained
inplantprocedures.
Thisreanalysis
indicated
thattheborationflowrequirements
ofT/S3.1.1.1couldbesatisfied
byaslittleas60.1gpmof2400ppmboron.Wemayrelaxtheallowable
degradation
fortheCCPsbasedonthisrevised60.1gpmflow.Corrective
ActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolations'ailure
toensurethetestprogramfortheCCPsincludedprovisions
toensuretheCCPscoulddeliver120gpmof2400ppmboronoccurredasaresultoffailuretocouplethedevelopment
andissuanceofaT/Sclarification
withappropriate
reviewsofthetestprogram.AsnotedintheSOPZreport,severalexampleswereidentified
whereT/Sclarifications
couldnotbejustified.
Duringtheexitmeeting,wecommitted
toperformareviewofallofourT/Sclarifications.
Theresultsofthisreviewarecontained
inthe"Commitment"
'ectionofthisattachment.
Additionally,
asnoted,improvements
willbemadeintheT/Sclarificaticn
reviewprocesstoensureanadequatetechnical
reviewoffutureclarifications.  
Attachment
toAEP:NRC:1238FPage6DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedFullcompliance
wasachievedonDecember18,1996,whentheISTprogramwasrevisedtoincludeappropriate
limitstoensurethateachunits'CPs
cansupply120gpmof2400ppmboronfromtheRWST.Violation
C"10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion
XVI,'Corrective
Actions,'equires,
inpart,thatmeasuresshallbeestablished
toassurethatconditions
adversetoquality,suchasfailures,
malfunctions,
deficiencies,
deviations,
defective
materialandequipment,
andnonconformances
arepromptlyidentified
andcorrected.
Contrarytotheabove:2.3.Corrective
actionstoaddresspotentially
inaccurate
sight-glassfillmarksforsafety-related
pumpsandmotors,acondition
adversetoquality,werenotinitiated
untilNovember27,1996,althoughin1995joborderswerewrittentoaddresspotentially
inaccurate
sight-glass
fillmarksonsafety-related
pumpsandmotors,andonMarch6,1996,anactionrequestwaswrittentodetermine
correctsight-glass
fillmarksonsafety-related.
pumpsandmotors.OnDecember5,1996,theinspectors
identified
thatthelicenseefailedtotakecorrective
actionstoeitherlocateorre-constitute
acentrifugal
chargingpumpnetpositivesuctionhead(NPSH)calculation
althoughthecalculation
hadbeenidentified
asmissingabout18monthsearlier.OnDecember4,1996,theinspectors
determined
thatthelicenseefailedtotaketimelycorrective
actionstoaddressequipment
deficiency
taggingproblems.
Althoughthelicenseehadidentified
thatabout30percentofplantcomponents
inthework'control
systemreviewedinathreeweekperiodwerenotproperlytaggedinthefield,corrective
actionstoairessthisconcernhadnotbeeninitiated.
ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation."
ResonsetoNRCViolation
ClAdmission
orDenialoftheAlleedViolation
IndianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolation
ascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.
2.ReasonfortheViolation
Thecauseoftheuntimelyresponseforguidanceonplantpump/motor
oilfilllevelswasthelackofacommunication
protocolresulting
inanunrecognized
requesttoengineering
personnel
fromoperations
personnel
fortechnical
assistance.
Therequestforassistance
wasmadebymeansofanactionrequest.Requestsforengineering
direction
aremadewithinthenuclearplantmaintenance
(NPM)computersystembymeansofanevaluation
request.Different
searchesarerequiredtolocateactionrequestsandevaluation
requests.
Engineering
personnel
didnotsearchactionrequestsbecausetheywerenotanexpectedmeansforrequesting
assistance.  
   
   
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1238FPage7Therequestforguidanceonplantpump/motoroilfilllevelswasbroughttoengineeringmanagement'sattentionapproximatelyfivemonthsaftertheaction-equestwasinitiated.Atthattimeengineeringpersonnelbeganworktoprovidetherequestedguidance.ThebackgroundresearchwascompletedandtheguidanceissuedonDecember5,1996.CorrectiveActionsTakenandResultsAchievedTherequestedinformationonpump/motoroilfilllevelswasprovidedonDecember5,1996.Asearchofactionrequestsassignedtoengineeringpersonnelhasbeenperformedtoensuretheresponsiblegroupsareawareofassignments.Additionally,asaninterimaction,plantpersonnelhavebeeninstructedtomakedailysearchestoensurenonewactionrequestsforengineeringassistancegounrecognized.4,CorrectiveActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolationsAnacceptablemethodforrequestingengineeringassistancewillbedevelopedbyMarch21,1997'.DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedFullcompliancewasachievedonDecember5,1996,whentherequestedtechnicalguidancewasprovided.ResonsetoNRCViolationC2AdmissionorDenialoftheAlleedViolationIndianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolationascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.2.ReasonfortheViolationInJune1995,aspartofthedesignbasisdocumentation(DBD)program,itwasidentifiedthattheNPSHcalculationfortheCCPscauldnotbelocated.ADBDactionitemwasinit'atedinaccordancewithDBDprogramprocedures.Thisitemwasclassifiedasaninstanceofa"missingreferencedocument",acategorizationwithanormalresolutiontimeof60days.EngineeringpersonnelinvolvedintheclassificationofthisitemwereawarethatanNPSHcalculationfortheCCPshadbeenperformedatonetime,.eventhoughitcouldnotbelocated.Operabilitywasnotconsideredtobeaconcernbecauseitwasknownthatthecalculationhadbeenperformedbutcouldnotbefound.Therefore,ahighprioritywasnotplaceuonreconstitutingthecalculationorresolvingtheDBDactionitem.CorrectiveActionsTakenandResultsAchievedAsnotedintheSOPIreport,anewcalculationwascompletedpriortoandapprovedduringtheSOPIinspection,whichconfirmedadequateNPSHtotheCCPs.CorrectiveActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolationsFollowingtheSOPIinspection,areviewofallopenDBDactionitemswasperformed,byJanuary15,1997,toassess  
Attachment
toAEP:NRC:1238F
Page7Therequestforguidanceonplantpump/motor
oilfilllevelswasbroughttoengineering
management's
attention
approximately
fivemonthsaftertheaction-equestwasinitiated.
Atthattimeengineering
personnel
beganworktoprovidetherequested
guidance.
Thebackground
researchwascompleted
andtheguidanceissuedonDecember5,1996.Corrective
ActionsTakenandResultsAchievedTherequested
information
onpump/motor
oilfilllevelswasprovidedonDecember5,1996.Asearchofactionrequestsassignedtoengineering
personnel
hasbeenperformed
toensuretheresponsible
groupsareawareofassignments.
Additionally,
asaninterimaction,plantpersonnel
havebeeninstructed
tomakedailysearchestoensurenonewactionrequestsforengineering
assistance
gounrecognized.
4,Corrective
ActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolations
Anacceptable
methodforrequesting
engineering
assistance
willbedeveloped
byMarch21,1997'.DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedFullcompliance
wasachievedonDecember5,1996,whentherequested
technical
guidancewasprovided.
ResonsetoNRCViolation
C2Admission
orDenialoftheAlleedViolation
IndianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolation
ascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.
2.ReasonfortheViolation
InJune1995,aspartofthedesignbasisdocumentation
(DBD)program,itwasidentified
thattheNPSHcalculation
fortheCCPscauldnotbelocated.ADBDactionitemwasinit'ated
inaccordance
withDBDprogramprocedures.
Thisitemwasclassified
asaninstanceofa"missingreference
document",
acategorization
withanormalresolution
timeof60days.Engineering
personnel
involvedintheclassification
ofthisitemwereawarethatanNPSHcalculation
fortheCCPshadbeenperformed
atonetime,.eventhoughitcouldnotbelocated.Operability
wasnotconsidered
tobeaconcernbecauseitwasknownthatthecalculation
hadbeenperformed
butcouldnotbefound.Therefore,
ahighprioritywasnotplaceuonreconstituting
thecalculation
orresolving
theDBDactionitem.Corrective
ActionsTakenandResultsAchievedAsnotedintheSOPIreport,anewcalculation
wascompleted
priortoandapprovedduringtheSOPIinspection,
whichconfirmed
adequateNPSHtotheCCPs.Corrective
ActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolations
Following
theSOPIinspection,
areviewofallopenDBDactionitemswasperformed,
byJanuary15,1997,toassess  
0  
0  
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1238FPage8theappropriatenessoftheirclassification.AseriesofadditionalDBDactionitemswereformallyenteredintothecorrectiveactionsystem(viaconditionreports)asaresultofthisreview.Thecorrectiveactionsystemincludesrequir'ementsfordeterminingoperabilityinatimelymanner.Entryintothecorrectiveactionsystemensuresareviewoftheseissuesbyourconditionassessmentgroup(CAG).Initsoversightfunction,theCAGassessestheneedandmakesassignmentsforconfirmatoryoperabilitydeterminationsorsupplemental.analysis.BeginninginJanuary1997,additionalresourceswereaddedtotheDBDprojecttoenablepromptclosureofDBDactionitems.Specifically,theDBDprojectmanagerposition,whichhadbeenvacantsinceSeptember1996,wasfilledandtwoadditionalutilitypersonnelandtwocontractpersonnelwereassignedtotheproject.Thesepersonnelareaggressivelypursuing,resolutionofopenDBD'actionitems.Thisaugmentationofpersonnelwill.continuethroughlate1997,bywhichtimeweexpecttohavemadesignificantprogressintheclosureofDBDactionitems.Additionally,wearetrainingmembersofourstaff,whohaveownershipoftheDBDs,toensuretheyunderstandtheimportanceofpromptlyresol"ingDBDactionitemsandalsotoensuretheyclearlyunderstandtheprocessforeffectingclosureoftheseitems.ThistrainingcommencedinearlyFebruary1997andwillbecompletedbyMarch15,1997.Finally,theDBDactionitemreviewprocessisbeingstrengthenedtolimitthenumberofava.'lableclassificationsforDBDactionitemsandalsotoensureamorecomprehensivereviewofactionitemsbyappropriatepersonnel.Projectinstructionsrelatedtoactionitemprocessingarebeingrevised.TheserevisionswillbecompletedbyMarch28,1997.DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedFullcompliancewasachievedonDecember2,1996,whenanewcalculationwasapprovedwhichconfirmedadequateNPSHtotheCCPs.ResonsetoNRCViolationC3AdmissionorDenialoftheAlleedViolationIndianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolationascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.2.ReasonfortheViolationTheprimaryreasonfortheviolationisthatplantpersonnelwerenotsufficientlyawareoftheguidanceregardingwhentohangdeficiencytagsforcorrectivemaintenance.Thiswasfurthercompoundedbythelackofclarityprovidedbytheadministrativerequirementsthatdefinedefi-iencytaghangingrequirements.Further,conditionreportswerenotgeneratedwhenmissingdeficiencytagswereidentifiedtopromptappropriateactionsviatheplant's,correctiveactionprogram.Whilewritten  
Attachment
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1238FPage9memorandaidentifyingthemissingdeficiencytagsweregenerated,conditionreportswerenotwrittenandtherefore,appropriateattentionandfollow-throughwerenotinstituted.Znallcasesevaluated,theworkcontrolprocesshadcapturedtheidentifieddegradedcomponent,ensuringthatthedeficientconditionwouldbecorrectedinatimelymanner.CorrectiveActionsTakenandResultsAchievedRecentplantmanagementactionshavebeentakentoimprovefocusonpromptlyidentifyingproblemsandcorrectiveactionsdealing-withconditionsadversetoplantrequirements.AconditionreportwaspromptlywrittenwhentheNRCnotedthelackoftimelycorrectiveactiontoaddresstheidentifieddeficiencytaggingissue.Theconditionreport1)proposesthatthematerialconditiongroupreplacemissingtagswhendiscovered,2)recommendschangestothegoverningdocumentNPM-02CM,and3)requestsassistancefromcomputerpersonneltomodifyexistingNPMsoftwaretobettersupporttherehangingoftags.Thepersonnelresponsibleforident'yingmissingdeficiencytagswerecoachedontheexpectationtogenerateadditionalconditionreportsinthefuture.CorrectiveActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolationsByApril1,1997,thegoverningdocument.detailingwhenandhowtotagdeficiencieswillberevisedandappropriatepersonnelwillbemadeawareof"therevisedrequirements.Also,asofApril1,1997,actionrequestsgeneratedthathavenotmetthereviseddeficiencytaggingrequirementswillbereturnedtotheoriginatingpersonnelforresolutionbeforetheactionrequestwillbeprocessedfurther.BySeptember1,1997,systemwalkdownswillhavebeenperformedtoverifythatdeficiencytagsassociatedwithexistingcorrectivemaintenanceactionrequests(thosegeneratedbeforeApril1,1997),complywiththerevisedrequirements.DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedFullcompliancewillbeachievedbyApril1,1997,whenthedeficiencytaggingrequirementshavebeenrevisedandappropriatepersonnelhavebeenmadeawareofthoserequirements.Further,conditionreportswillbewrittenasofApril1,1997,foranydeficiencytagnotincompliancewiththerevisedrequirement(regardlessofwhentheactionrequestandassociateddeficiencytagsweregenerated).  
toAEP:NRC:1238FPage8theappropriateness
oftheirclassification.
Aseriesofadditional
DBDactionitemswereformallyenteredintothecorrective
actionsystem(viacondition
reports)asaresultofthisreview.Thecorrective
actionsystemincludesrequir'ements
fordetermining
operability
inatimelymanner.Entryintothecorrective
actionsystemensuresareviewoftheseissuesbyourcondition
assessment
group(CAG).Initsoversight
function,
theCAGassessestheneedandmakesassignments
forconfirmatory
operability
determinations
orsupplemental.
analysis.
Beginning
inJanuary1997,additional
resources
wereaddedtotheDBDprojecttoenablepromptclosureofDBDactionitems.Specifically,
theDBDprojectmanagerposition,
whichhadbeenvacantsinceSeptember
1996,wasfilledandtwoadditional
utilitypersonnel
andtwocontractpersonnel
wereassignedtotheproject.Thesepersonnel
areaggressively
pursuing,
resolution
ofopenDBD'actionitems.Thisaugmentation
ofpersonnel
will.continuethroughlate1997,bywhichtimeweexpecttohavemadesignificant
progressintheclosureofDBDactionitems.Additionally,
wearetrainingmembersofourstaff,whohaveownership
oftheDBDs,toensuretheyunderstand
theimportance
ofpromptlyresol"ing
DBDactionitemsandalsotoensuretheyclearlyunderstand
theprocessforeffecting
closureoftheseitems.Thistrainingcommenced
inearlyFebruary1997andwillbecompleted
byMarch15,1997.Finally,theDBDactionitemreviewprocessisbeingstrengthened
tolimitthenumberofava.'lable
classifications
forDBDactionitemsandalsotoensureamorecomprehensive
reviewofactionitemsbyappropriate
personnel.
Projectinstructions
relatedtoactionitemprocessing
arebeingrevised.Theserevisions
willbecompleted
byMarch28,1997.DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedFullcompliance
wasachievedonDecember2,1996,whenanewcalculation
wasapprovedwhichconfirmed
adequateNPSHtotheCCPs.ResonsetoNRCViolation
C3Admission
orDenialoftheAlleedViolation
IndianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolation
ascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.
2.ReasonfortheViolation
Theprimaryreasonfortheviolation
isthatplantpersonnel
werenotsufficiently
awareoftheguidanceregarding
whentohangdeficiency
tagsforcorrective
maintenance.
Thiswasfurthercompounded
bythelackofclarityprovidedbytheadministrative
requirements
thatdefinedefi-iencytaghangingrequirements.
Further,condition
reportswerenotgenerated
whenmissingdeficiency
tagswereidentified
topromptappropriate
actionsviatheplant's,corrective
actionprogram.Whilewritten  
Attachment
toAEP:NRC:1238F
Page9memoranda
identifying
themissingdeficiency
tagsweregenerated,
condition
reportswerenotwrittenandtherefore,
appropriate
attention
andfollow-through
werenotinstituted.
Znallcasesevaluated,
theworkcontrolprocesshadcapturedtheidentified
degradedcomponent,
ensuringthatthedeficient
condition
wouldbecorrected
inatimelymanner.Corrective
ActionsTakenandResultsAchievedRecentplantmanagement
actionshavebeentakentoimprovefocusonpromptlyidentifying
problemsandcorrective
actionsdealing-withconditions
adversetoplantrequirements.
Acondition
reportwaspromptlywrittenwhentheNRCnotedthelackoftimelycorrective
actiontoaddresstheidentified
deficiency
taggingissue.Thecondition
report1)proposesthatthematerialcondition
groupreplacemissingtagswhendiscovered,
2)recommends
changestothegoverning
documentNPM-02CM,
and3)requestsassistance
fromcomputerpersonnel
tomodifyexistingNPMsoftwaretobettersupporttherehanging
oftags.Thepersonnel
responsible
forident'ying
missingdeficiency
tagswerecoachedontheexpectation
togenerateadditional
condition
reportsinthefuture.Corrective
ActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolations
ByApril1,1997,thegoverning
document.
detailing
whenandhowtotagdeficiencies
willberevisedandappropriate
personnel
willbemadeawareof"therevisedrequirements.
Also,asofApril1,1997,actionrequestsgenerated
thathavenotmetthereviseddeficiency
taggingrequirements
willbereturnedtotheoriginating
personnel
forresolution
beforetheactionrequestwillbeprocessed
further.BySeptember
1,1997,systemwalkdowns
willhavebeenperformed
toverifythatdeficiency
tagsassociated
withexistingcorrective
maintenance
actionrequests(thosegenerated
beforeApril1,1997),complywiththerevisedrequirements.
DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedFullcompliance
willbeachievedbyApril1,1997,whenthedeficiency
taggingrequirements
havebeenrevisedandappropriate
personnel
havebeenmadeawareofthoserequirements.
Further,condition
reportswillbewrittenasofApril1,1997,foranydeficiency
tagnotincompliance
withtherevisedrequirement
(regardless
ofwhentheactionrequestandassociated
deficiency
tagsweregenerated).  
)I'  
)I'  
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1238FDeviationPage10Inadditiontotheabovethreeviolations,thenoticeofviolationcontained'thefollowingnoticeofdeviation,whichisaddressedbelow.DEV50-31596013-09DRSandDEV50-31696013-09DRS'"DuringanNRCinspectionconductedNovember18throughDecember13,1996,adeviationofyouractionscommittedtoinNUREG-0737,SectionIZ.B.2wasidentified.Inaccordancewiththe'GeneralStatementofPolicyandProceduresforNRCEnforcementActions,'UREG-1600,thedeviationislistedbelow:NUREG-0737,SectionZI.B.2,'DesignReviewofPlantShieldingandEnvironmentalQualificationofEquipmentforSpaces/SystemsWhichMayBeUsedinPostaccidentOperations,'equiresthat50percentofthetotaliodineand100percentofthenoblegasesareassumedtobereleasedfromthefuel~inthedesignbasisaccidentradiologicalanalysis.Contrarytotheabove,onDecember4,1996,theinspectorsidentifiedthatthelicenseefailedtocorrectlytranslateSectionZZ.B.2ofNUREG-07~7intothecentrifugalchargingpumpemergencyleakoffvalvefailuredesignbasisaccidentradiologicalanalysis.Asaresult,onlyonepercentfueldamagewasassumedintheanalysisandresultedindoseestimateslowerthanrevisedcalculatedvalues."ResonsetoNRCDeviationReasonfortheDeviationInAugust1991,asmallbreaklossofcoolantaccidentscenariorunontheplantsimulatoridentifiedaflowpaththathadthepotentialtodivertwaterawayfromtheemergencycorecoolingsystemandcontainmentbuilding.Theflowpathwasfromthesafetyinjectionsystem(SIS)cetrifugalchargingpumpdischargethroughanemergencyleakoffvalve,throughthereactorcoolantpump(RCP)sealreturnlinesafetyvalvetothevolumecontroltank(VCT)andthroughtheVCTsafetyvalvetothechemicalandvolumecontrolsystemholduptanks.ThisconditionwasdocumentedinLER91-007-00.Areviewwasconductedtoassessthesafetyconsequenceandimplicationsofthepostulatedevent.Analysisofthepotentialdoseratefromthedivertedwatertothewholebodyatthesiteboundarywascalculatedtobeinsignificantcomparedtothe10CFR100accidentdoselimitandevenwiththe10CFR20.105doselimitsforunrestrictedareasduringnormaloperations,basedontheassumptionof1%failedfuelsLER91-007-01providedoriginalcorrectiveactionforthisscenario.ThescenarioofconcernoccursfollowingtheswitchoveroftheCCPsuctionfromtherefuelingwaterstoragetanktotherecirculationsumpviatheresidualheatremoval(RHR)pumps.WiththeRHRpumpssupplyingsuctiontotheCCPs,thepressureintheCCPemergencyleakoff(ELO)linescouldbeinexcessofthedownstreamsafetyvalvesetpressure,andthenapproximately60gpmflowwouldbedivertedfromtheECCStotheVCT.Correctiveactionsforthisscenarioincludedemergencyoperatingprocedure(EOP)  
Attachment
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1238FPage11modificationstoclosethechargingpumpELOvalvesaspartoftheswitchoverfrominjectiontorecirculationphasewheretheECCSpumpstakesuctionfromtherecirculationsump.InJune1995,aspartofourDBDprogram,itwasidentifiedthattheEOPsnotedabovecanbeimplemented,butwerenotsinglefailureproof.TheDBDprogramincludesaprocesstoidentify,classify(withrespecttosafetysignificance),andresolveactionitemsidentifiedduringthedevelopmentofDBDs.ADBDaction'temwascreatedtodocumentthatintheeventthesinglefailureisanELOvalvethat'cannotbeisolated,theleakagepathtotheVCTwouldstillpersist.WithintheDBDprogram,thisissuewasclassifiedasadiscrepancythatwasnotsafetysignificant,basedontheanalysisdescribed,aboveanddocumentedinLER91-007.TherelianceontheprioranalysisinLER91-007,whichprovidedapracticalassessmentofsafetysignificanceper10CFR50.73,toclassifytheDBDactionitemasanon-significantdiscrepancywasincorrectbecauseitdidnotconsiderdesignbasisassumptionsforsourcetermperNUREG-0737.ThemisclassificationoftheDBDactionitemwasmadebyengineeringpersonn1whoincorrectlyassumedthattheanalysispresentedinLER91-007wasalsoanadequatebasisforclassificationofthDBDactionitem.2.CorrectiveActionsTakenandResultsAchievedTheEOPshavebeenmodifiedtoinstucttheoperatortoturnoffaCCPforwhichtheELOvalvecannotbeclosed.Flowthroughtheidlepumpofupto5.2gpmmaystillexist;therefore,instructionshavebeenaddedtoisolatethevalvemanually.(The5.2gpmiswithinthe10gpmvalueforoutsidecontainmentleakagepreviouslyevaluatedanddeterminedacceptableregardingoffsiteandcontrolroomdoses.)Themaximumdose'topersonnelexpectedtoisolatethevalveis0.28rem24hoursaftertheaccidentoccurs.3.CorrectireAction'sTakentoAvoidFurtherDeviationsFollowingtheSOPIinspection,areviewofallopenDBDactionitemswascompletedonJanuary15,1997,toassesstheappropriatenessoftheirpreviousclassification.AseriesofadditionalDBDactionitemswereformallyenteredintothecorrectiveactionsystemasaresultofthisreview.EntryintothecorrectiveactionsystemensuresathoroughscreeningoftheseissuesbytheCAGforassignmenttotheappropriateorganizationforresolution.Thecorrectiveactionsystemincludesrequirementsfordeterminingoperabilityinatimelymanner.Initsoversightfunction,theCAGasse'ssestheneedandmakesassignmentsforconfirmatoryoperabilitydeterminationsorsupplementalanalysis.TheDBDactionitemreviewprocessisbeingstrengthenedtolimitthenumberofavailableclassificationsforDBDactionitemsandalsotoensureamorecomprehensivereviewofactionitemsbyappropriatepersonnel.Projectinstructionsrelatedtoactionitemprocessingarebeingrevised.TheserevisionswillbecompletedbyMarch28,1997.  
toAEP:NRC:1238F
Deviation
Page10Inadditiontotheabovethreeviolations,
thenoticeofviolation
contained
'thefollowing
noticeofdeviation,
whichisaddressed
below.DEV50-31596013-09DRSandDEV50-31696013-09DRS'"DuringanNRCinspection
conducted
November18throughDecember13,1996,adeviation
ofyouractionscommitted
toinNUREG-0737,
SectionIZ.B.2wasidentified.
Inaccordance
withthe'GeneralStatement
ofPolicyandProcedures
forNRCEnforcement
Actions,'UREG-1600,
thedeviation
islistedbelow:NUREG-0737,
SectionZI.B.2,'DesignReviewofPlantShielding
andEnvironmental
Qualification
ofEquipment
forSpaces/Systems
WhichMayBeUsedinPostaccident
Operations,'equires
that50percentofthetotaliodineand100percentofthenoblegasesareassumedtobereleasedfromthefuel~inthedesignbasisaccidentradiological
analysis.
Contrarytotheabove,onDecember4,1996,theinspectors
identified
thatthelicenseefailedtocorrectly
translate
SectionZZ.B.2ofNUREG-07~7
intothecentrifugal
chargingpumpemergency
leakoffvalvefailuredesignbasisaccidentradiological
analysis.
Asaresult,onlyonepercentfueldamagewasassumedintheanalysisandresultedindoseestimates
lowerthanrevisedcalculated
values."ResonsetoNRCDeviation
ReasonfortheDeviation
InAugust1991,asmallbreaklossofcoolantaccidentscenariorunontheplantsimulator
identified
aflowpaththathadthepotential
todivertwaterawayfromtheemergency
corecoolingsystemandcontainment
building.
Theflowpathwasfromthesafetyinjection
system(SIS)cetrifugalchargingpumpdischarge
throughanemergency
leakoffvalve,throughthereactorcoolantpump(RCP)sealreturnlinesafetyvalvetothevolumecontroltank(VCT)andthroughtheVCTsafetyvalvetothechemicalandvolumecontrolsystemholduptanks.Thiscondition
wasdocumented
inLER91-007-00.
Areviewwasconducted
toassessthesafetyconsequence
andimplications
ofthepostulated
event.Analysisofthepotential
doseratefromthedivertedwatertothewholebodyatthesiteboundarywascalculated
tobeinsignificant
comparedtothe10CFR100accidentdoselimitandevenwiththe10CFR20.105doselimitsforunrestricted
areasduringnormaloperations,
basedontheassumption
of1%failedfuelsLER91-007-01
providedoriginalcorrective
actionforthisscenario.
Thescenarioofconcernoccursfollowing
theswitchover
oftheCCPsuctionfromtherefueling
waterstoragetanktotherecirculation
sumpviatheresidualheatremoval(RHR)pumps.WiththeRHRpumpssupplying
suctiontotheCCPs,thepressureintheCCPemergency
leakoff(ELO)linescouldbeinexcessofthedownstream
safetyvalvesetpressure,
andthenapproximately
60gpmflowwouldbedivertedfromtheECCStotheVCT.Corrective
actionsforthisscenarioincludedemergency
operating
procedure
(EOP)  
Attachment
toAEP:NRC:1238F
Page11modifications
toclosethechargingpumpELOvalvesaspartoftheswitchover
frominjection
torecirculation
phasewheretheECCSpumpstakesuctionfromtherecirculation
sump.InJune1995,aspartofourDBDprogram,itwasidentified
thattheEOPsnotedabovecanbeimplemented,
butwerenotsinglefailureproof.TheDBDprogramincludesaprocesstoidentify,
classify(withrespecttosafetysignificance),
andresolveactionitemsidentified
duringthedevelopment
ofDBDs.ADBDaction'tem
wascreatedtodocumentthatintheeventthesinglefailureisanELOvalvethat'cannotbeisolated,
theleakagepathtotheVCTwouldstillpersist.WithintheDBDprogram,thisissuewasclassified
asadiscrepancy
thatwasnotsafetysignificant,
basedontheanalysisdescribed,
aboveanddocumented
inLER91-007.TherelianceontheprioranalysisinLER91-007,whichprovidedapractical
assessment
ofsafetysignificance
per10CFR50.73,toclassifytheDBDactionitemasanon-significant
discrepancy
wasincorrect
becauseitdidnotconsiderdesignbasisassumptions
forsourcetermperNUREG-0737.
Themisclassification
oftheDBDactionitemwasmadebyengineering
personn1whoincorrectly
assumedthattheanalysispresented
inLER91-007wasalsoanadequatebasisforclassification
ofthDBDactionitem.2.Corrective
ActionsTakenandResultsAchievedTheEOPshavebeenmodifiedtoinstucttheoperatortoturnoffaCCPforwhichtheELOvalvecannotbeclosed.Flowthroughtheidlepumpofupto5.2gpmmaystillexist;therefore,
instructions
havebeenaddedtoisolatethevalvemanually.
(The5.2gpmiswithinthe10gpmvalueforoutsidecontainment
leakagepreviously
evaluated
anddetermined
acceptable
regarding
offsiteandcontrolroomdoses.)Themaximumdose'topersonnel
expectedtoisolatethevalveis0.28rem24hoursaftertheaccidentoccurs.3.CorrectireAction'sTakentoAvoidFurtherDeviations
Following
theSOPIinspection,
areviewofallopenDBDactionitemswascompleted
onJanuary15,1997,toassesstheappropriateness
oftheirpreviousclassification.
Aseriesofadditional
DBDactionitemswereformallyenteredintothecorrective
actionsystemasaresultofthisreview.Entryintothecorrective
actionsystemensuresathoroughscreening
oftheseissuesbytheCAGforassignment
totheappropriate
organization
forresolution.
Thecorrective
actionsystemincludesrequirements
fordetermining
operability
inatimelymanner.Initsoversight
function,
theCAGasse'sses
theneedandmakesassignments
forconfirmatory
operability
determinations
orsupplemental
analysis.
TheDBDactionitemreviewprocessisbeingstrengthened
tolimitthenumberofavailable
classifications
forDBDactionitemsandalsotoensureamorecomprehensive
reviewofactionitemsbyappropriate
personnel.
Projectinstructions
relatedtoactionitemprocessing
arebeingrevised.Theserevisions
willbecompleted
byMarch28,1997.  
0  
0  
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1238F4.DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedPage12CorrectiveactionwascompletedonDecember13,1996,whenchanges"eremadetotheEOPstoinstructtheoperatortoturnoffaCCPforwhichtheELOvalvecannotbeclosed.  
Attachment
toAEP:NRC:1238F
4.DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedPage12Corrective
actionwascompleted
onDecember13,1996,whenchanges"eremadetotheEOPstoinstructtheoperatortoturnoffaCCPforwhichtheELOvalvecannotbeclosed.  
LI  
LI  
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1238FPage13CommitmentTheinspectionreportrequestedwerespondinwritingregardingourreviewofT/Sclarifications.Thenoticeofviolationcontainedthefollowingdiscussion."Thelicenseehad37technicalspecificationclarifications(TSCs)ineffect.TheinspectorsreviewedtheTSCslistedbelowandquestionedwhetherthelicenseecouldprovidetechnicaljustificationtosupporttheTSCs.Subsequently,thelicenseedeterminedthatthefollowingclarificationscouldnotbetechnicallyjustifiedandshouldbecanceled:TSC&#xb9;14TSC&#xb9;l5TSC&#xb9;48AirborneRadioactivityMonitorOperabilityDieselGeneratorSurveillanceRuns-Paralleled.GridTechnicalspecification(TS)4.8.1.1.2.F.2LeakTestingofADandCDFuelOilTanksandAssociatedPipingTheinspectorsdidnotidentifyanypastuseoftheaboveTSCsthatresultedinexceedingtheactionrequirementsoftheassociatedtechnicalspecification.TheinspectorsconcludedthatthesafetysignificanceoftheTSCerrorswereminimal.Theinspectorsconcludedthatthelicensee'sapprovalofTSCswithoutappropriatetechnicaljustificationwasaweakness.Attheend,oftheinspection,thelicenseecommittedtoreviewallremainingTSCstoensuretheywerestillnecessaryandcouldbejustified."ReviewScoeTheNRCinspectionreportindicatedthat37TSCswereineffectatthetimeoftheinspection.AreviewoftheactiveTSCsfromthe,TSCindexindicatedthattherewereactually35activeTSCs.ThethreeTSCsdiscussedintheinspectionreportwerecanceled.ThescopeoftheTSCreviewwasoftheremaining32activeTSCs.ObservationandFindinsNineTSCswerecanceledTheyareasfollowsTSC&#xb9;5TSC&#xb9;12TSC&#xb9;26TSC&#xb9;37TSC&#xb9;38TSC&#xb9;45TSC&#xb9;47TSC&#xb9;60TSC&#xb9;61Operable-OperabilityDefinition-AttendantXnstrumentationD.C.Distribution-OperatingSteamGeneratorStopValveOperabilityDefinitionofMaintenanceonEmergencyCoreCoolingSystemValvesTurbineDrivenAuxiliaryFeedwaterPumpOperabilitySnubberFunctional'estRetestResults10CFR50AppendixREquipmentOperabilityAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystemandEssentialServiceWaterSystemAuxiliaryFeedwaterSystemSurveillanceRequirementsOfthisgroup,twoTSCs(&#xb9;5and&#xb9;12),werecanceledduetoinsufficienttechnicalbasestosupporttheimpliedoperabilityprovidedbytheTSC.ThreeTSCs(&#xb9;37,&#xb9;60and&#xb9;61)werecanceled  
Attachment
toAEP:NRC:1238F
Page13Commitment
Theinspection
reportrequested
werespondinwritingregarding
ourreviewofT/Sclarifications.
Thenoticeofviolation
contained
thefollowing
discussion.
"Thelicenseehad37technical
specification
clarifications
(TSCs)ineffect.Theinspectors
reviewedtheTSCslistedbelowandquestioned
whetherthelicenseecouldprovidetechnical
justification
tosupporttheTSCs.Subsequently,
thelicenseedetermined
thatthefollowing
clarifications
couldnotbetechnically
justified
andshouldbecanceled:
TSC&#xb9;14TSC&#xb9;l5TSC&#xb9;48AirborneRadioactivity
MonitorOperability
DieselGenerator
Surveillance
Runs-Paralleled.
GridTechnical
specification
(TS)4.8.1.1.2.F.2
LeakTestingofADandCDFuelOilTanksandAssociated
PipingTheinspectors
didnotidentifyanypastuseoftheaboveTSCsthatresultedinexceeding
theactionrequirements
oftheassociated
technical
specification.
Theinspectors
concluded
thatthesafetysignificance
oftheTSCerrorswereminimal.Theinspectors
concluded
thatthelicensee's
approvalofTSCswithoutappropriate
technical
justification
wasaweakness.
Attheend,oftheinspection,
thelicenseecommitted
toreviewallremaining
TSCstoensuretheywerestillnecessary
andcouldbejustified."
ReviewScoeTheNRCinspection
reportindicated
that37TSCswereineffectatthetimeoftheinspection.
AreviewoftheactiveTSCsfromthe,TSCindexindicated
thattherewereactually35activeTSCs.ThethreeTSCsdiscussed
intheinspection
reportwerecanceled.
ThescopeoftheTSCreviewwasoftheremaining
32activeTSCs.Observation
andFindinsNineTSCswerecanceledTheyareasfollowsTSC&#xb9;5TSC&#xb9;12TSC&#xb9;26TSC&#xb9;37TSC&#xb9;38TSC&#xb9;45TSC&#xb9;47TSC&#xb9;60TSC&#xb9;61Operable-Operability
Definition
-Attendant
Xnstrumentation
D.C.Distribution
-Operating
SteamGenerator
StopValveOperability
Definition
ofMaintenance
onEmergency
CoreCoolingSystemValvesTurbineDrivenAuxiliary
Feedwater
PumpOperability
SnubberFunctional'est
RetestResults10CFR50AppendixREquipment
Operability
Auxiliary
Feedwater
SystemandEssential
ServiceWaterSystemAuxiliary
Feedwater
SystemSurveillance
Requirements
Ofthisgroup,twoTSCs(&#xb9;5and&#xb9;12),werecanceledduetoinsufficient
technical
basestosupporttheimpliedoperability
providedbytheTSC.ThreeTSCs(&#xb9;37,&#xb9;60and&#xb9;61)werecanceled  
0  
0  
AttachmenttoAEP:NRC:1238FPage14astheywereimplementedinamannerinconsistentwithcurrentexpectations.FourTSCs(&#xb9;26,&#xb9;38,&#xb9;45and&#xb9;47)weredeterminedtobeunnecessary.OneTSC(&#xb9;65),boricacidtransferpumpoperability,wasrevisedtoproperlyreflectitstechnicalbases(refertosection08.1oftheNRCinspectionreport).Theremaining22TSCsremainactive.ConclusionBasedonthereviewoftheexistingTSCs,itfollowsthattheTSCswerenotwelldefinedandwereimplementedinamannerinconsistentwithcurrentexpectations.The,programwasutilizedtocapturemanyeventdrivendecisionsthatwouldmoreappropriatelyfitanoperabilityprogram,orshouldbetranslatedintoapprovedproceduralcontrols.AnimprovedTSCprogramwillbedevelopedbyJune27,1997.Thisprogramwillprovideareviewofproposednewclarificationstoensureadequatetechnicaljustificationispresentpriortoapproval,andthataclarificationdoesnotchangeoraltertherequirementofthespecificationbeingclarified.Additionally,thenewprogramwillreg'uireplantimpactreviewsaspartoftheimplementationprocess.Theimpactreviewswillensureappropriatereviewandincorporationofclarificationinformationintoplantproceduresandprograms'heimpactreviewprocessisbeingincorporatedintotheimplementationprocesstoaddressaSOPIconcerninvolvingintegrationofTSC&#xb9;7intotheplant'sISTprogram.
Attachment
toAEP:NRC:1238F
Page14astheywereimplemented
inamannerinconsistent
withcurrentexpectations.
FourTSCs(&#xb9;26,&#xb9;38,&#xb9;45and&#xb9;47)weredetermined
tobeunnecessary.
OneTSC(&#xb9;65),boricacidtransferpumpoperability,
wasrevisedtoproperlyreflectitstechnical
bases(refertosection08.1oftheNRCinspection
report).Theremaining
22TSCsremainactive.Conclusion
BasedonthereviewoftheexistingTSCs,itfollowsthattheTSCswerenotwelldefinedandwereimplemented
inamannerinconsistent
withcurrentexpectations.
The,programwasutilizedtocapturemanyeventdrivendecisions
thatwouldmoreappropriately
fitanoperability
program,orshouldbetranslated
intoapprovedprocedural
controls.
AnimprovedTSCprogramwillbedeveloped
byJune27,1997.Thisprogramwillprovideareviewofproposednewclarifications
toensureadequatetechnical
justification
ispresentpriortoapproval,
andthataclarification
doesnotchangeoraltertherequirement
ofthespecification
beingclarified.
Additionally,
thenewprogramwillreg'uireplantimpactreviewsaspartoftheimplementation
process.Theimpactreviewswillensureappropriate
reviewandincorporation
ofclarification
information
intoplantprocedures
andprograms'he
impactreviewprocessisbeingincorporated
intotheimplementation
processtoaddressaSOPIconcerninvolving
integration
ofTSC&#xb9;7intotheplant'sISTprogram.
}}
}}

Revision as of 06:49, 29 June 2018

Responds to NRC 970204 Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-315/96-13 & 50-316/96-13.Corrective Actions:Instructions Requiring Filter Content Evaluation Removed from Charging Pump Recurring Tasks on 970211
ML17333A842
Person / Time
Site: Cook  American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 03/12/1997
From: FITZPATRICK E
AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO., INC.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML17333A841 List:
References
NUDOCS 9704080224
Download: ML17333A842 (29)
v • d • e


See also: IR 05000315/1996013

Text

IndianaMichiganPowerCompany500CircieD;i'eBuclanan.III491071395

INDIANAMICHIGANPOWERMarch12,1997AEP:NRC:1238F

10CFR2.201DocketNos.:50-31550-316U.S.NuclearRegulatory

Commission

ATTN:DocumentControlDeskWashington,

D.C.20555Gentlemen:

DonaldC.CookNuclearPlantUnits1and2NRCINSPECTION

REPORTSNOs.50-315/96013(DRS)

AND50-316/96013

(DRS)REPLYTONOTICEOFVIOLATIONS

ThisletterisinresponsetoaletterfromG.E.Grant,datedFebruary4,1997,thatforwarded

anoticeofthreeviolations

andonenoticeofdeviation

toIndianaMichiganPowerCompany.Theviolations

andthedeviation

wereidentified

duringasystemoperational

performance

inspection

(SOPI)ofthecentrifugal

chargingsystemportionoftheemergency

corecoolingsystemsandtheresidualheatremovalsystems.OurresponsewasduetoyouonMarch6,1997;however,werequested

abriefextension

torecoverthetimedelayfromwhenthereportwasissuedtowhenitwasreceived.

Theexten'sion

wasgrantedbyRonGareerofRegionIII,onFebruary14,1997.Thethreeviolations

addressed

the1)failuretoestablish

adequateinstructions/failure

tofollowprocedures

asrelatedtocollection

ofanoilsample,andadequateminimumthreadengagement

acceptance

criteria;

2)inadequate

testcontrolasrelatedtoincorporating

chargingpumpacceptance

limitsintotheISTprogram;and3)failuretoperformadequate/timely

corrective

actions,asrelatedtodetermining

thecorrectoilsight-glass

fillmarksonsafety-relatedpumpsandmotors,addressing

equipment

deficiency

taggingproblems,

andlocating/reconstituting

acentrifugal

chargingpumpnetpositivesuctionheadcalculation.

Thedeviation

wasfromactionscommitted

toinNUREG-0737

specifically

involving

thesourcetermusedforaradiological

evaluation.

'7704080224

'970403PDRADOCK050003158PDR

40

U.S.NuclearRegulatory

Commission

Page2AEP:NRC:1238FOurreplytotheviolations

anddeviation

areprovidedintheattachment

tothisletter.Alsoincludedaretheresultsofourreviewoftechnical

specification

clarifications,

whichwecommitted

toperformattheDecember13,1996,exitmeeting.Thereplydoesnotcontainanypersonalprivacy,proprietary,

orsafeguards

information.

Sincerely,

PCwp-E.E.FitpatrickVicePresident

SWORNTOANDSUBSCRIBED

BEFOREMETHs/XDAYQP)~'997NotaryPublicMyCommission

Expires:2/CrPING/vlbAttachment

JANlCEhl.BIG!<ERSNoeyPub5c,88menCcunlY,MQyQ0mmrsscpEyp;reFob,<6,2N$cc:A.A.Blind&3L"%%~8eachh'~:q

MDEQ-DWRRPDNRCResidentInspector

J.R.'adgett

fl'

ATTACHMENT

TOAEP:NRC:1238FREPLYTONOTICEOFVIOLATION:

NRCINSPECTION

REPORTSNOs.50-315/96013

(DRS)AND50-316/96013

(DRS)

Attachment

toAEP:NRC:1238F

Page1DuringanNRCsystemoperational

performance

inspection

conducted

November18throughDecember13,1996,ontheemergency

corecoolingsystemportionofthecentrifugal

chargingsystemandresidualheatremovalsystemthreeviolations

andonedeviation

wereidentified.

Inaccordance

withthe"GeneralStatement

ofPolicyandProcedures

forNRCEnforcement

Actions,"

(NUREG-1600)

theviolations

andtheresponses

areprovidedbelow.Additionally,

wewererequested

torespondtothedeviation,

andtoprovideinformation

relatedtoacommitment

regarding

technical

specification

(T/S)clarifications

madeattheDecember13,1996,exitmeeting.Ourresponsetotheseitemsisalsoprovidedbelow.NRCViolation

A"10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion

V,'Instructions,

Procedures,

andDrawings,'equires,

inpart,thatactivities

affecting

qualityshallbeprescribed

byinstructions,

procedures,

ordrawingsofatypeappropriate

tothecircumstances

andshallbeaccomplished

inaccordance

withtheseinstructions,

procedures,

ordrawings.

Maintenance

procedure

12MHP5021.001.009,

Revision8,'TorqueSelection,'ated

March21,1994,requiresthreadengagement

ofatleast80percentofnutheight.Contrarytotheabove:OnDecember4,1996,thei"spectorsidentified

thatamaintenance

workpackageforthe1Ecentrifugal

chargingpump,anactivityaffectingquality,~failedtoincludeadequateinstructions

forlubeoilsamplecollection.

OnNovember20,1996,theinspectors

identified

thatmaintenance

procedure

MDS-600,'GeneralErectionTolerances

forPipeandTubeSupports/Restraints,'as

notofatypeappropriate

tothecircumstances

sinceitfailedtocontainadequateminimumthreadengagement

acceptance

criteriaforactivities

affectingquality.3.OnNovember21,1996,theinspectors

identified

thatmaintenance

personnel

failedtoperformboltingonsafety-relatedequipment

inaccordance

withmaintenance

procedure

12MHP5021.001.009,

'TorqueSelection.'s

aresult,nutsassociated

withemergency

corecoolingsystemequipment

wereidentified

withthreadengagement

lessthan80percentofnutheight.ThisaSeverityLevelIVviolation."

ResonsetoNRCViolation

Al1.Admission

orDenialoftheAlleedViolation

indianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolation

ascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.

ReasonfortheViolation

Thereasonfortheviolation

wasfailuretoremoveoilsamplinginstructions

fromapplicable

recurring

tasksthatwereno'cngerneededafterimplementation

ofaformaloilsamplingprogram.

,I"tl

Attachment

toAEP:NRC:1238F

Page2Theinstructions

foundinthejoborderactivityassociated

withtheworkonthelEcentrifugal

chargingpumpinstructed

personnel

to:"Drainoilfromfilterintoacontainer.

A.DeliveroilfromCUNOfiltertochemlabforanalysis.

(Theresultswillgototheengineers

forevaluation

ofwearinsystem)."

Thejoborderactivityinstructions

weredeveloped

priortoimplementation

ofourformaloilanalysisprogram.Atthetimeitwasinputasarecurring

task,itwasintendedtoprovidearoughindication

ofgrossmachineproblems.

Subsequently,

aformaloilanalysisprogramwasimplemented,

withproceduralized

samplingtechniques

beingutilizedbychemistry

personnel.

Underthissamplingprogram,donequarterly

(asopposedtofilterchange-outs

thataredoneyearly),wear,particles

ofconsiderably

lesssizethanthosedetectedviathefilterchange-out

methodcanbedetected,

thusgivingmuchearlierindication

ofmachineproblems.

Theinstructions

intherecurring

taskwereinadvertently

leftinplaceaftertheformalprogramwasinstituted.

Theoilcollected

viatheseinstructions

isnotanalyzedbychemistry

personnel;

anddecisions

astothecondition

oftheequipment

arenotbasedor.thesesamples.3.Corrective

ActionsTakenandResultsAchievedTheinstructions

requiring

filtercontentevaluation

wereremovedfromthechargingpumprecurring

tasksonFebruary11,1997~The1Echargingpumplubeoilwassampledbychemistry

personnel

onSeptember

12,1996,priortothefilterchange-out

observedonDecember4,1996,consistent

withtheformaloilanalysisprogram.4.Corrective

ActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolations

A:eviewoflubeoilchangesrelatedtoequipment

includedintneoilanalysisprogramwasconducted.

Similarwordingwasfoundinrecurring

tasksforthemotor-driven

andturbine-drivenauxiliary

feedwater

pumps.Thisredundant

wordingwillberemovedpriortothenextrequireddateforfilterchange-out

forthisequipment.

5.DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedFullcompliance

wasachievedonFebruary11,1997,whentheredundant

instructions

wereremovedfromthefourchargingpump'srecurring.

tasks.ResonsetoNRCViolation

A26A31.Admission

orDenialoftheAlleedViolation

IndianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolation

ascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.

Attachment

toAEP:NRC:1238F

Page3ReasonfortheViolation

Thecauseoftheviolation,

ascitedinA3,isacombination

ofthewayworkwasdocumented

andadherence

toprocedural

requirements

thatwereinconsistent.

Thereference

toMDS-600,citedinA2,asa"maintenance

procedure"

requiresclarification.

MDS-600isnotaprocedure,

itisadesignstandardthatprovidestolerances

forinstallation

andevaluation

ofas-foundconditions

forpiping/tubing

supports.

MDS-600isnotanapplicable

reference

andthereisnohierarchial

connection

betweenMDS-600and**12MHP5021.001.009.

3.Corrective

ActionsTakenandResultsAchievedEightcondition

reportswerewrittentodocumenttheinspection

team'sconcerns.

Operability

reviewswereperformed

basedontheidentified

deficiencies,

andtheaffectedequipment

wasdetermined

tobeoperable.

Workhistoryforeachcomponent

wasreviewedtoassistindetermining

thepotential

cause(s).

Ingeneral,thisreviewidentified

ageneraltimeframewhenthedeficiency

wascreated,butnotaspecificworkactivity.

Actionrequestswerewrittentocorrectthedeficiency

whereanactionrequestdidnotalreadyexist,orthedeficiency

wasevaluated

andfoundtobeacceptable

asis.4.Corrective

ActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolations

Maintenance

standingorder,MSO.009,wasissuedonFebruary3,1997.Thisdocumentestablishes

anacceptance

criteriaof"flushorbetter"forthreadengagement.

Further,itprovidesapolicyfordocumenting

as-foundthreadengagement

deficiencies

sotheycanbeevaluated

andcorrected.

Lastly,thepolicyprovidesforin-plantidentification

oflessthanflushthreadengagement

thathasbeenevaluated

andfoundtobeacceptabl

.Thisstandingorderstrengthens

management

expectations

forthreadengagement

andestablishes

amechanism

foridentification

ofanalyzed,

acceptable

conditions.

Awalkdownwasperformed

ofarandomsampleofplantcomponents

ofsufficient

sizetoprovidea99%confidence

levelthatthesecomponents

areastatistically

validsampleoftheplanepopulation

ofcomponents.

Theas-foundconfiguration

ofthefasteners

associated

withthesecomponents

wasevaluated.

Therewerenofasteneranomalies

identified

thataffectedcomponent

functionality

oroperability.

Plantmanagement

hasreinforced

procedural

adherence

toallplantpersonnel.

    • 12MHP5021.001.009wasenhancedbytheadditionofacceptance

criteriaofflushthreadsorbetter.

I

Attachment

toAEP:NRC.:1238F

5.DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedPage4Fullcompliance

wasachievedonMarch10,1997.Atthattimetheoriginal28NRC-identified

threadengagement

deficiencies

wereanalyzedasnotaffecting

operability/quality;

existingprocedures,

policies,

andstandards

wereupgraded;

andthefindingsofthethreadengagement

randomsampleconcluded

thattherewerenofunctionality/operability

concernscausedbythreadengagement

deficiencies

associated

withanyofthesampledcomponents.

NRCViolation

B"10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion

XZ,'TestControl,'equires,

inpart,thatatestprogrambeestablished

toassurethatalltestingrequiredtodemonstrate

thatstructures,

systems,andcomponents

willperformsatisfactorily

inserviceisidentified

andperformed

inaccordance

withwrittentestprocedures

whichincorporate

therequirements

andacceptance

limitscontained

inapplicable

designdocuments.

Technical Specification 3.1.1.1,'Shutdown

Margin-Tavegreaterthan200'F,'pecifies

aborationcapability

of10gallonsperminute(gpm)of20,000partspermillion(ppm)boronsolutionorequivalent.

Contrarytotheabove,onDecember11,1996,theinspectors

identified

thatthecorrectacceptance

limitstoassurethatthecentrifugal

chargingpumpscouldperformtheirboroninjection

functionasspecified

inTechnical

Specification

3.1.1.1hadnotbeenincorporated

inthelicensee's

inservice

testing(ZST)program.ThisisaSeverityLevelZVviolation."

ResonsetoNRCViolation

BAdmission

orDenialoftheAlleedViolation

ZndianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolation

ascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.

2.Reason'fortheViolation

Thereasonfortheviolation

wasthatareviewtodetermine

applicability

totheZSTprogramwasnotconducted

priortoissuanceofatechnical

specification

(T/S)clarification

onT/S3.1.1.1.T/S3.1.1.1,ShutdownMargin-T,~greaterthan2004Fprovidesshutdownmarginrequirements

whileinmodes1,2,3,or4.Theactionstatement

forT/S3.1.1.1requiresimmediate

andcontinuous

borationatgreaterthanorequalto10gpmofasolutioncontaining

greaterthanorequalto20,000ppmboronor"equivalent".

Westinghouse

performed

ananalysistoclarifythemeaningofthisstatement

iftherefueling

waterstoragetank(RWST)wasusedasasourceofboratedwater.Westinghouse

defined"equivalence"

as"xenonburnoutequivalence",

whichisthecapability

toinjectsufficient

borontoadjustaoronconcentration

tocompensate

forxenonburnoutfromitspeakvalueTheiranalysisassumedaplanttripfollowedbyastepreturnto100%.power

Attachment

toAEP:NRC:1238F

Page5atpeakxenonconcentration.

Znaddition,

theyassumedthatthereactorwouldbemaintained

atfullpowerduringthetransient.

Theresultsofthisanalysisshowedthatacentrifugal

chargingpump(CCP)flowof120gpmfromtheRWSTcouldcompensate

forxenonthroughout

thetransient

ifcertainrestrictions

wereobserved.

OnNovember5,1990,arevisiontoT/Sclarification

no.7wasissued,whichdefinedthe120gpmofRWSTwatercontaining

2400ppmboronasanacceptable

sourceofwatertosatisfyborationflowrequirements

forT/S3.1.1.1.Development

andissuanceofthisT/Sclarification

wasnotcoupledwithareviewofthetestprogramtoensurethetestprogramconfirmed

theabilityoftheCCPstoperformthisfunction.

Thisdeficiency

wasidentified

byourengineers

duringeffortstorespondtoaninspector's

questiononthedesignfunctions

oftheCCPsduringtheinspection.

Corrective

ActionsTakenandResultsAchievedFollowing

identification

ofthisdeficiency,

acalculation

wasperformed

todetermine

themaximumdegradation

theCCPscouldtoleratewhilestill~eingabletodeliver120gpmofRWSTwatertothereactorcoolantsystem.Thiscalculation

revealedthattheCCPscouldtolerateadegradation

of9.5%forUnit1and3.5%forUnit2.AreviewofZSTdataasfarbackas1990determined

thatthepumpswerecapableofperforming

thisfunction.

TheZSTprogramhasbeenrevisedtoincludelimitations

forallowable

degradation

oftheCCPstoensurethat120gpmof2400ppmboroncouldbesuppliedfromtheRWST.Additionally,

asapointofinformation,

sincetheoriginalanalysisbyWestinghouse,

whichdefinedthe120gpmvalueof2400ppmboronincludedaveryconservative

assumption

thatastepincreaseinpowerto100%occurredwhileatpeakxenon,areanalysis

wasperformed

usingamorerealistic

ramprateof10'k/hr,whichisalimitation

contained

inplantprocedures.

Thisreanalysis

indicated

thattheborationflowrequirements

ofT/S3.1.1.1couldbesatisfied

byaslittleas60.1gpmof2400ppmboron.Wemayrelaxtheallowable

degradation

fortheCCPsbasedonthisrevised60.1gpmflow.Corrective

ActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolations'ailure

toensurethetestprogramfortheCCPsincludedprovisions

toensuretheCCPscoulddeliver120gpmof2400ppmboronoccurredasaresultoffailuretocouplethedevelopment

andissuanceofaT/Sclarification

withappropriate

reviewsofthetestprogram.AsnotedintheSOPZreport,severalexampleswereidentified

whereT/Sclarifications

couldnotbejustified.

Duringtheexitmeeting,wecommitted

toperformareviewofallofourT/Sclarifications.

Theresultsofthisreviewarecontained

inthe"Commitment"

'ectionofthisattachment.

Additionally,

asnoted,improvements

willbemadeintheT/Sclarificaticn

reviewprocesstoensureanadequatetechnical

reviewoffutureclarifications.

Attachment

toAEP:NRC:1238FPage6DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedFullcompliance

wasachievedonDecember18,1996,whentheISTprogramwasrevisedtoincludeappropriate

limitstoensurethateachunits'CPs

cansupply120gpmof2400ppmboronfromtheRWST.Violation

C"10CFR50,AppendixB,Criterion

XVI,'Corrective

Actions,'equires,

inpart,thatmeasuresshallbeestablished

toassurethatconditions

adversetoquality,suchasfailures,

malfunctions,

deficiencies,

deviations,

defective

materialandequipment,

andnonconformances

arepromptlyidentified

andcorrected.

Contrarytotheabove:2.3.Corrective

actionstoaddresspotentially

inaccurate

sight-glassfillmarksforsafety-related

pumpsandmotors,acondition

adversetoquality,werenotinitiated

untilNovember27,1996,althoughin1995joborderswerewrittentoaddresspotentially

inaccurate

sight-glass

fillmarksonsafety-related

pumpsandmotors,andonMarch6,1996,anactionrequestwaswrittentodetermine

correctsight-glass

fillmarksonsafety-related.

pumpsandmotors.OnDecember5,1996,theinspectors

identified

thatthelicenseefailedtotakecorrective

actionstoeitherlocateorre-constitute

acentrifugal

chargingpumpnetpositivesuctionhead(NPSH)calculation

althoughthecalculation

hadbeenidentified

asmissingabout18monthsearlier.OnDecember4,1996,theinspectors

determined

thatthelicenseefailedtotaketimelycorrective

actionstoaddressequipment

deficiency

taggingproblems.

Althoughthelicenseehadidentified

thatabout30percentofplantcomponents

inthework'control

systemreviewedinathreeweekperiodwerenotproperlytaggedinthefield,corrective

actionstoairessthisconcernhadnotbeeninitiated.

ThisisaSeverityLevelIVviolation."

ResonsetoNRCViolation

ClAdmission

orDenialoftheAlleedViolation

IndianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolation

ascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.

2.ReasonfortheViolation

Thecauseoftheuntimelyresponseforguidanceonplantpump/motor

oilfilllevelswasthelackofacommunication

protocolresulting

inanunrecognized

requesttoengineering

personnel

fromoperations

personnel

fortechnical

assistance.

Therequestforassistance

wasmadebymeansofanactionrequest.Requestsforengineering

direction

aremadewithinthenuclearplantmaintenance

(NPM)computersystembymeansofanevaluation

request.Different

searchesarerequiredtolocateactionrequestsandevaluation

requests.

Engineering

personnel

didnotsearchactionrequestsbecausetheywerenotanexpectedmeansforrequesting

assistance.

Attachment

toAEP:NRC:1238F

Page7Therequestforguidanceonplantpump/motor

oilfilllevelswasbroughttoengineering

management's

attention

approximately

fivemonthsaftertheaction-equestwasinitiated.

Atthattimeengineering

personnel

beganworktoprovidetherequested

guidance.

Thebackground

researchwascompleted

andtheguidanceissuedonDecember5,1996.Corrective

ActionsTakenandResultsAchievedTherequested

information

onpump/motor

oilfilllevelswasprovidedonDecember5,1996.Asearchofactionrequestsassignedtoengineering

personnel

hasbeenperformed

toensuretheresponsible

groupsareawareofassignments.

Additionally,

asaninterimaction,plantpersonnel

havebeeninstructed

tomakedailysearchestoensurenonewactionrequestsforengineering

assistance

gounrecognized.

4,Corrective

ActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolations

Anacceptable

methodforrequesting

engineering

assistance

willbedeveloped

byMarch21,1997'.DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedFullcompliance

wasachievedonDecember5,1996,whentherequested

technical

guidancewasprovided.

ResonsetoNRCViolation

C2Admission

orDenialoftheAlleedViolation

IndianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolation

ascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.

2.ReasonfortheViolation

InJune1995,aspartofthedesignbasisdocumentation

(DBD)program,itwasidentified

thattheNPSHcalculation

fortheCCPscauldnotbelocated.ADBDactionitemwasinit'ated

inaccordance

withDBDprogramprocedures.

Thisitemwasclassified

asaninstanceofa"missingreference

document",

acategorization

withanormalresolution

timeof60days.Engineering

personnel

involvedintheclassification

ofthisitemwereawarethatanNPSHcalculation

fortheCCPshadbeenperformed

atonetime,.eventhoughitcouldnotbelocated.Operability

wasnotconsidered

tobeaconcernbecauseitwasknownthatthecalculation

hadbeenperformed

butcouldnotbefound.Therefore,

ahighprioritywasnotplaceuonreconstituting

thecalculation

orresolving

theDBDactionitem.Corrective

ActionsTakenandResultsAchievedAsnotedintheSOPIreport,anewcalculation

wascompleted

priortoandapprovedduringtheSOPIinspection,

whichconfirmed

adequateNPSHtotheCCPs.Corrective

ActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolations

Following

theSOPIinspection,

areviewofallopenDBDactionitemswasperformed,

byJanuary15,1997,toassess

0

Attachment

toAEP:NRC:1238FPage8theappropriateness

oftheirclassification.

Aseriesofadditional

DBDactionitemswereformallyenteredintothecorrective

actionsystem(viacondition

reports)asaresultofthisreview.Thecorrective

actionsystemincludesrequir'ements

fordetermining

operability

inatimelymanner.Entryintothecorrective

actionsystemensuresareviewoftheseissuesbyourcondition

assessment

group(CAG).Initsoversight

function,

theCAGassessestheneedandmakesassignments

forconfirmatory

operability

determinations

orsupplemental.

analysis.

Beginning

inJanuary1997,additional

resources

wereaddedtotheDBDprojecttoenablepromptclosureofDBDactionitems.Specifically,

theDBDprojectmanagerposition,

whichhadbeenvacantsinceSeptember

1996,wasfilledandtwoadditional

utilitypersonnel

andtwocontractpersonnel

wereassignedtotheproject.Thesepersonnel

areaggressively

pursuing,

resolution

ofopenDBD'actionitems.Thisaugmentation

ofpersonnel

will.continuethroughlate1997,bywhichtimeweexpecttohavemadesignificant

progressintheclosureofDBDactionitems.Additionally,

wearetrainingmembersofourstaff,whohaveownership

oftheDBDs,toensuretheyunderstand

theimportance

ofpromptlyresol"ing

DBDactionitemsandalsotoensuretheyclearlyunderstand

theprocessforeffecting

closureoftheseitems.Thistrainingcommenced

inearlyFebruary1997andwillbecompleted

byMarch15,1997.Finally,theDBDactionitemreviewprocessisbeingstrengthened

tolimitthenumberofava.'lable

classifications

forDBDactionitemsandalsotoensureamorecomprehensive

reviewofactionitemsbyappropriate

personnel.

Projectinstructions

relatedtoactionitemprocessing

arebeingrevised.Theserevisions

willbecompleted

byMarch28,1997.DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedFullcompliance

wasachievedonDecember2,1996,whenanewcalculation

wasapprovedwhichconfirmed

adequateNPSHtotheCCPs.ResonsetoNRCViolation

C3Admission

orDenialoftheAlleedViolation

IndianaMichiganPowerCompanyadmitstotheviolation

ascitedintheNRCnoticeofviolation.

2.ReasonfortheViolation

Theprimaryreasonfortheviolation

isthatplantpersonnel

werenotsufficiently

awareoftheguidanceregarding

whentohangdeficiency

tagsforcorrective

maintenance.

Thiswasfurthercompounded

bythelackofclarityprovidedbytheadministrative

requirements

thatdefinedefi-iencytaghangingrequirements.

Further,condition

reportswerenotgenerated

whenmissingdeficiency

tagswereidentified

topromptappropriate

actionsviatheplant's,corrective

actionprogram.Whilewritten

Attachment

toAEP:NRC:1238F

Page9memoranda

identifying

themissingdeficiency

tagsweregenerated,

condition

reportswerenotwrittenandtherefore,

appropriate

attention

andfollow-through

werenotinstituted.

Znallcasesevaluated,

theworkcontrolprocesshadcapturedtheidentified

degradedcomponent,

ensuringthatthedeficient

condition

wouldbecorrected

inatimelymanner.Corrective

ActionsTakenandResultsAchievedRecentplantmanagement

actionshavebeentakentoimprovefocusonpromptlyidentifying

problemsandcorrective

actionsdealing-withconditions

adversetoplantrequirements.

Acondition

reportwaspromptlywrittenwhentheNRCnotedthelackoftimelycorrective

actiontoaddresstheidentified

deficiency

taggingissue.Thecondition

report1)proposesthatthematerialcondition

groupreplacemissingtagswhendiscovered,

2)recommends

changestothegoverning

documentNPM-02CM,

and3)requestsassistance

fromcomputerpersonnel

tomodifyexistingNPMsoftwaretobettersupporttherehanging

oftags.Thepersonnel

responsible

forident'ying

missingdeficiency

tagswerecoachedontheexpectation

togenerateadditional

condition

reportsinthefuture.Corrective

ActionsTakentoAvoidFurtherViolations

ByApril1,1997,thegoverning

document.

detailing

whenandhowtotagdeficiencies

willberevisedandappropriate

personnel

willbemadeawareof"therevisedrequirements.

Also,asofApril1,1997,actionrequestsgenerated

thathavenotmetthereviseddeficiency

taggingrequirements

willbereturnedtotheoriginating

personnel

forresolution

beforetheactionrequestwillbeprocessed

further.BySeptember

1,1997,systemwalkdowns

willhavebeenperformed

toverifythatdeficiency

tagsassociated

withexistingcorrective

maintenance

actionrequests(thosegenerated

beforeApril1,1997),complywiththerevisedrequirements.

DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedFullcompliance

willbeachievedbyApril1,1997,whenthedeficiency

taggingrequirements

havebeenrevisedandappropriate

personnel

havebeenmadeawareofthoserequirements.

Further,condition

reportswillbewrittenasofApril1,1997,foranydeficiency

tagnotincompliance

withtherevisedrequirement

(regardless

ofwhentheactionrequestandassociated

deficiency

tagsweregenerated).

)I'

Attachment

toAEP:NRC:1238F

Deviation

Page10Inadditiontotheabovethreeviolations,

thenoticeofviolation

contained

'thefollowing

noticeofdeviation,

whichisaddressed

below.DEV50-31596013-09DRSandDEV50-31696013-09DRS'"DuringanNRCinspection

conducted

November18throughDecember13,1996,adeviation

ofyouractionscommitted

toinNUREG-0737,

SectionIZ.B.2wasidentified.

Inaccordance

withthe'GeneralStatement

ofPolicyandProcedures

forNRCEnforcement

Actions,'UREG-1600,

thedeviation

islistedbelow:NUREG-0737,

SectionZI.B.2,'DesignReviewofPlantShielding

andEnvironmental

Qualification

ofEquipment

forSpaces/Systems

WhichMayBeUsedinPostaccident

Operations,'equires

that50percentofthetotaliodineand100percentofthenoblegasesareassumedtobereleasedfromthefuel~inthedesignbasisaccidentradiological

analysis.

Contrarytotheabove,onDecember4,1996,theinspectors

identified

thatthelicenseefailedtocorrectly

translate

SectionZZ.B.2ofNUREG-07~7

intothecentrifugal

chargingpumpemergency

leakoffvalvefailuredesignbasisaccidentradiological

analysis.

Asaresult,onlyonepercentfueldamagewasassumedintheanalysisandresultedindoseestimates

lowerthanrevisedcalculated

values."ResonsetoNRCDeviation

ReasonfortheDeviation

InAugust1991,asmallbreaklossofcoolantaccidentscenariorunontheplantsimulator

identified

aflowpaththathadthepotential

todivertwaterawayfromtheemergency

corecoolingsystemandcontainment

building.

Theflowpathwasfromthesafetyinjection

system(SIS)cetrifugalchargingpumpdischarge

throughanemergency

leakoffvalve,throughthereactorcoolantpump(RCP)sealreturnlinesafetyvalvetothevolumecontroltank(VCT)andthroughtheVCTsafetyvalvetothechemicalandvolumecontrolsystemholduptanks.Thiscondition

wasdocumented

inLER91-007-00.

Areviewwasconducted

toassessthesafetyconsequence

andimplications

ofthepostulated

event.Analysisofthepotential

doseratefromthedivertedwatertothewholebodyatthesiteboundarywascalculated

tobeinsignificant

comparedtothe10CFR100accidentdoselimitandevenwiththe10CFR20.105doselimitsforunrestricted

areasduringnormaloperations,

basedontheassumption

of1%failedfuelsLER91-007-01

providedoriginalcorrective

actionforthisscenario.

Thescenarioofconcernoccursfollowing

theswitchover

oftheCCPsuctionfromtherefueling

waterstoragetanktotherecirculation

sumpviatheresidualheatremoval(RHR)pumps.WiththeRHRpumpssupplying

suctiontotheCCPs,thepressureintheCCPemergency

leakoff(ELO)linescouldbeinexcessofthedownstream

safetyvalvesetpressure,

andthenapproximately

60gpmflowwouldbedivertedfromtheECCStotheVCT.Corrective

actionsforthisscenarioincludedemergency

operating

procedure

(EOP)

Attachment

toAEP:NRC:1238F

Page11modifications

toclosethechargingpumpELOvalvesaspartoftheswitchover

frominjection

torecirculation

phasewheretheECCSpumpstakesuctionfromtherecirculation

sump.InJune1995,aspartofourDBDprogram,itwasidentified

thattheEOPsnotedabovecanbeimplemented,

butwerenotsinglefailureproof.TheDBDprogramincludesaprocesstoidentify,

classify(withrespecttosafetysignificance),

andresolveactionitemsidentified

duringthedevelopment

ofDBDs.ADBDaction'tem

wascreatedtodocumentthatintheeventthesinglefailureisanELOvalvethat'cannotbeisolated,

theleakagepathtotheVCTwouldstillpersist.WithintheDBDprogram,thisissuewasclassified

asadiscrepancy

thatwasnotsafetysignificant,

basedontheanalysisdescribed,

aboveanddocumented

inLER91-007.TherelianceontheprioranalysisinLER91-007,whichprovidedapractical

assessment

ofsafetysignificance

per10CFR50.73,toclassifytheDBDactionitemasanon-significant

discrepancy

wasincorrect

becauseitdidnotconsiderdesignbasisassumptions

forsourcetermperNUREG-0737.

Themisclassification

oftheDBDactionitemwasmadebyengineering

personn1whoincorrectly

assumedthattheanalysispresented

inLER91-007wasalsoanadequatebasisforclassification

ofthDBDactionitem.2.Corrective

ActionsTakenandResultsAchievedTheEOPshavebeenmodifiedtoinstucttheoperatortoturnoffaCCPforwhichtheELOvalvecannotbeclosed.Flowthroughtheidlepumpofupto5.2gpmmaystillexist;therefore,

instructions

havebeenaddedtoisolatethevalvemanually.

(The5.2gpmiswithinthe10gpmvalueforoutsidecontainment

leakagepreviously

evaluated

anddetermined

acceptable

regarding

offsiteandcontrolroomdoses.)Themaximumdose'topersonnel

expectedtoisolatethevalveis0.28rem24hoursaftertheaccidentoccurs.3.CorrectireAction'sTakentoAvoidFurtherDeviations

Following

theSOPIinspection,

areviewofallopenDBDactionitemswascompleted

onJanuary15,1997,toassesstheappropriateness

oftheirpreviousclassification.

Aseriesofadditional

DBDactionitemswereformallyenteredintothecorrective

actionsystemasaresultofthisreview.Entryintothecorrective

actionsystemensuresathoroughscreening

oftheseissuesbytheCAGforassignment

totheappropriate

organization

forresolution.

Thecorrective

actionsystemincludesrequirements

fordetermining

operability

inatimelymanner.Initsoversight

function,

theCAGasse'sses

theneedandmakesassignments

forconfirmatory

operability

determinations

orsupplemental

analysis.

TheDBDactionitemreviewprocessisbeingstrengthened

tolimitthenumberofavailable

classifications

forDBDactionitemsandalsotoensureamorecomprehensive

reviewofactionitemsbyappropriate

personnel.

Projectinstructions

relatedtoactionitemprocessing

arebeingrevised.Theserevisions

willbecompleted

byMarch28,1997.

0

Attachment

toAEP:NRC:1238F

4.DateWhenFullComlianceWillBeAchievedPage12Corrective

actionwascompleted

onDecember13,1996,whenchanges"eremadetotheEOPstoinstructtheoperatortoturnoffaCCPforwhichtheELOvalvecannotbeclosed.

LI

Attachment

toAEP:NRC:1238F

Page13Commitment

Theinspection

reportrequested

werespondinwritingregarding

ourreviewofT/Sclarifications.

Thenoticeofviolation

contained

thefollowing

discussion.

"Thelicenseehad37technical

specification

clarifications

(TSCs)ineffect.Theinspectors

reviewedtheTSCslistedbelowandquestioned

whetherthelicenseecouldprovidetechnical

justification

tosupporttheTSCs.Subsequently,

thelicenseedetermined

thatthefollowing

clarifications

couldnotbetechnically

justified

andshouldbecanceled:

TSC¹14TSC¹l5TSC¹48AirborneRadioactivity

MonitorOperability

DieselGenerator

Surveillance

Runs-Paralleled.

GridTechnical

specification

(TS)4.8.1.1.2.F.2

LeakTestingofADandCDFuelOilTanksandAssociated

PipingTheinspectors

didnotidentifyanypastuseoftheaboveTSCsthatresultedinexceeding

theactionrequirements

oftheassociated

technical

specification.

Theinspectors

concluded

thatthesafetysignificance

oftheTSCerrorswereminimal.Theinspectors

concluded

thatthelicensee's

approvalofTSCswithoutappropriate

technical

justification

wasaweakness.

Attheend,oftheinspection,

thelicenseecommitted

toreviewallremaining

TSCstoensuretheywerestillnecessary

andcouldbejustified."

ReviewScoeTheNRCinspection

reportindicated

that37TSCswereineffectatthetimeoftheinspection.

AreviewoftheactiveTSCsfromthe,TSCindexindicated

thattherewereactually35activeTSCs.ThethreeTSCsdiscussed

intheinspection

reportwerecanceled.

ThescopeoftheTSCreviewwasoftheremaining

32activeTSCs.Observation

andFindinsNineTSCswerecanceledTheyareasfollowsTSC¹5TSC¹12TSC¹26TSC¹37TSC¹38TSC¹45TSC¹47TSC¹60TSC¹61Operable-Operability

Definition

-Attendant

Xnstrumentation

D.C.Distribution

-Operating

SteamGenerator

StopValveOperability

Definition

ofMaintenance

onEmergency

CoreCoolingSystemValvesTurbineDrivenAuxiliary

Feedwater

PumpOperability

SnubberFunctional'est

RetestResults10CFR50AppendixREquipment

Operability

Auxiliary

Feedwater

SystemandEssential

ServiceWaterSystemAuxiliary

Feedwater

SystemSurveillance

Requirements

Ofthisgroup,twoTSCs(¹5and¹12),werecanceledduetoinsufficient

technical

basestosupporttheimpliedoperability

providedbytheTSC.ThreeTSCs(¹37,¹60and¹61)werecanceled

0

Attachment

toAEP:NRC:1238F

Page14astheywereimplemented

inamannerinconsistent

withcurrentexpectations.

FourTSCs(¹26,¹38,¹45and¹47)weredetermined

tobeunnecessary.

OneTSC(¹65),boricacidtransferpumpoperability,

wasrevisedtoproperlyreflectitstechnical

bases(refertosection08.1oftheNRCinspection

report).Theremaining

22TSCsremainactive.Conclusion

BasedonthereviewoftheexistingTSCs,itfollowsthattheTSCswerenotwelldefinedandwereimplemented

inamannerinconsistent

withcurrentexpectations.

The,programwasutilizedtocapturemanyeventdrivendecisions

thatwouldmoreappropriately

fitanoperability

program,orshouldbetranslated

intoapprovedprocedural

controls.

AnimprovedTSCprogramwillbedeveloped

byJune27,1997.Thisprogramwillprovideareviewofproposednewclarifications

toensureadequatetechnical

justification

ispresentpriortoapproval,

andthataclarification

doesnotchangeoraltertherequirement

ofthespecification

beingclarified.

Additionally,

thenewprogramwillreg'uireplantimpactreviewsaspartoftheimplementation

process.Theimpactreviewswillensureappropriate

reviewandincorporation

ofclarification

information

intoplantprocedures

andprograms'he

impactreviewprocessisbeingincorporated

intotheimplementation

processtoaddressaSOPIconcerninvolving

integration

ofTSC¹7intotheplant'sISTprogram.

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