IR 05000528/2015004

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station - NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000528/2015004, 05000529/2015004, and 05000530/2015004

ML16039A065
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	02/08/2016
From:	Pruett T W, Sowa J R NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-D
To:	Edington R K Arizona Public Service Co
Hagar R C
References
EA-15-158 IR 2015004
Download: ML16039A065 (55)

Text

February 8, 2016

EA-15-158 Randall Executive Vice President, Nuclear/CNO Mail Station 7602 Arizona Public Service Company P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, AZ 85072-2034

SUBJECT: PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000528/2015004, 05000529/2015004, and 05000530/2015004

Dear Mr. Edington:

On December 31, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Units 1, 2, and 3. On January 7, 2015, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this inspection with Mr. R. Bement and other members of your staff. Inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report. In this report, NRC inspectors documented one licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance and one licensee-identified Severity Level IV violation. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violations or significance of these NCVs, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC resident inspector at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.

The inspectors also reviewed Licensee Event Report 05000530/2015-001-00 which reported a condition prohibited by technical specifications resulting from a leak in the reactor coolant pressure boundary on a Unit 3 reactor coolant pump 2A suction pipe instrument nozzle. The pressure boundary leakage was discovered while the unit was shut down for a refueling outage as licensee personnel performed a scheduled boric acid walk-down inspection of the Unit 3 reactor coolant system. The cause of the leak was determined to be primary water stress corrosion cracking of the alloy 600 instrument nozzle. The licensee corrected the condition by performing a half nozzle repair and obtained a relief request from the NRC for one cycle of operation. Inspectors concluded that it was not reasonable for Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station staff to foresee and correct this condition prior to the discovery of the leak, and, therefore, did not identify an associated performance deficiency. The NRC determined that this issue was of very low safety significance. Based on these facts, I have been authorized, in consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, and the Regional Administrator, Region IV to exercise enforcement discretion in accordance with NRC Enforcement Policy Section 3.5. "Violations Involving Special Circumstances," and refrain from issuing enforcement for this violation. In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC's Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,/RA Ryan Lantz Acting for/ Troy W. Pruett Director, Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50 528, 50 529, 50 530 License Nos. NPF 41, NPF 51, NPF 74

Enclosures:

Inspection Report 05000528/2015004, 05000529/2015004, 05000530/2015004 w/

Attachment:

Supplemental Information cc w/ encl: Electronic Distribution

ML16039A065 SUNSI Review By: RCH ADAMS Yes No Non-Sensitive Sensitive Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available Keyword: NRC-002 OFFICE DRP/SRI DRP/RI DRI/RI DRP/SPE C:DRS/EB1 C:DRS/EB2 C:DRS/OB NAME CPeabody DReinert DYou BHagar TFarnholtz GWerner VGaddy SIGNATURE /RA/E-mail /RA/E-mail /RA/E-mail /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ DATE 2/2/16 2/2/16 2/1/16 1/24/16 1/27/16 1/26/16 1/27/16 OFFICE C:DRS/PS1 C:DRS/PS2 TL:DRS/TS C:DRP/D TL:ACES DRP/Director NAME MHaire HGepford THipschman JSowa MHay TPruett SIGNATURE /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ /RA/E-mail /RA/ /RA/RLantz, Acting for DATE 1/27/16 2/3/16 2/1/16 2/3/16 2/2/16 2/8/16 Letter to from T. Pruett dated February 8, 2016 SUBJECT: PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000528/2015004, 05000529/2015004,AND 05000530/2015004 DISTRIBUTION: Regional Administrator (Marc.Dapas@nrc.gov) Deputy Regional Administrator (Kriss.Kennedy@nrc.gov) DRP Director (Troy.Pruett@nrc.gov) DRP Deputy Director (Ryan.Lantz@nrc.gov) DRS Director (Anton.Vegel@nrc.gov) DRS Deputy Director (Jeff.Clark@nrc.gov) Senior Resident Inspector (Charles.Peabody@nrc.gov) Resident Inspector (David.You@nrc.gov) Resident Inspector (Dustin.Reinert@nrc.gov) PV Administrative Assistant (Yvonne.Dubay@nrc.gov) Acting Branch Chief, DRP/D (Jeffrey.Sowa@nrc.gov) Senior Project Engineer, DRP/D (Bob.Hagar@nrc.gov) Project Engineer, DRP/D (Jim.Melfi@nrc.gov) Public Affairs Officer (Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov) Project Manager (Margaret.Watford@nrc.gov) Team Leader, DRS/IPAT (Thomas.Hipschman@nrc.gov) RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov) ACES (R4Enforcement.Resource@nrc.gov) Regional Counsel (Karla.Fuller@nrc.gov) Technical Support Assistant (Loretta.Williams@nrc.gov) Congressional Affairs Officer (Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov) RIV Congressional Affairs Officer (Angel.Moreno@nrc.gov) OEWEB Resource (OEWEB.Resource@nrc.gov) OEWEB Resource (Sue.Bogle@nrc.gov) RIV/ETA: OEDO (Raj.Iyengar@nrc.gov) ROPreports.Resource@nrc.gov ROPassessment.Resource@nrc.gov Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV Docket: 05000528, 05000529, 05000530 License: NPF-41, NPF-51, NPF-74 Report: 05000528/2015004, 05000529/2015004, 05000530/2015004 Licensee: Arizona Public Service Company Facility: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Location: 5801 South Wintersburg Road Tonopah, AZ 85354 Dates: October 1 through December 31, 2015 Inspectors: C. Peabody, Senior Resident Inspector D. Reinert, PhD, Resident Inspector D. You, Resident Inspector L. Carson, Senior. Health Physicist P. Elkmann, Senior Emergency Preparedness Inspector J. Kirkland, Senior Operations Engineer J. Braisted, Reactor Inspector L. Brandt, Project Engineer M. Brooks, Physical Security Inspector C. Cowdrey, Operations Engineer G. Guerra, CHP, Emergency Preparedness Inspector P. Jayroe, Reactor Inspector J. Melfi, Project Engineer N. Okonkwo, Reactor Inspector C. Smith, Reactor Inspector Approved By: Ryan E. Lantz, Acting for Troy W. Pruett, Director Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY

IR 05000528, 529, 530/2015004; 10/01/2015 - 12/31/2015; (Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station) Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion. The inspection activities described in this report were performed between October 1 and December 31, 2015, by the resident inspectors at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station and inspectors from the NRC's Region IV office and other NRC offices. NRC inspectors documented in this report one licensee-identified violation of very low safety significance and one licensee-identified Severity Level IV violation. The significance of inspection findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, or Red), which is determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process." Their cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0310, "Aspects within the Cross-Cutting Areas." Violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process."

Licensee-Identified Violations

One violation of very low safety significance (Green) and one violation of Severity Level IV were identified by the licensee and have been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensee's corrective action program. These violations and associated corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

PLANT STATUS

Unit 1 operated at full power for the duration of the inspection period. Unit 2 entered the inspection period at full power and was shutdown for refueling on October 10, 2015. Unit 2 restarted from their refueling outage on November 14, 2015, and returned to full power. On November 27-28, 2015, power was reduced to 83 percent following the failure of a heater drain pump discharge valve. Unit 2 operated at full power for the remainder of the inspection period. Unit 3 operated at full power for the duration of the inspection period.

REPORT DETAILS

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R04 Equipment Alignment

.1 Partial Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial system walk-downs of the following risk-significant systems: October 27, 2015, Unit 2 spent fuel cooling system trains A and B November 17, 2015, Unit 1 containment spray train A December 22, 2015, Unit 2 "A" emergency diesel generator during electrical breaker testing for the "B" emergency diesel generator The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and system design information to determine the correct lineup for the systems. They visually verified that critical portions of the systems were correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration.

These activities constituted three partial system walk-down samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Complete Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

On November 19, 2015, the inspectors performed a complete system walk-down inspection of the Unit 2 containment purge system. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures and system design information to determine the correct system lineup for the existing plant configuration. The inspectors also reviewed outstanding work orders, open condition reports, in-process design changes, temporary modifications, and other open items tracked by the licensee's operations and engineering departments. The inspectors then visually verified that the system was correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration. These activities constituted one complete system walk-down sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.04.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

.1 Quarterly Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's fire protection program for operational status and material condition. The inspectors focused their inspection on four plant areas important to safety: October 21, 2015, Unit 3 main control room, Fire Zone 17 November 2, 2015, Unit 1 4kV switchgear room train A, Fire Zone 5A November 17, 2015, Unit 3 auxiliary feedwater pump rooms, Fire Zone 72 and 73 November 18, 2015, Unit 2 class battery rooms train A and C, Fire Zone 8A and 9A For each area, the inspectors evaluated the fire plan against defined hazards and defense-in-depth features in the licensee's fire protection program. The inspectors evaluated control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression systems, manual firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire protection features, and compensatory measures for degraded conditions. These activities constituted four quarterly inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Annual Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

On November 17, 2015, the inspectors completed their annual evaluation of the licensee's fire brigade performance. This evaluation included observation of an unannounced fire drill for quarterly proficiency on November 16, 2015.

During these drills, the inspectors evaluated the capability of the fire brigade members, the leadership ability of the brigade leader, the brigade's use of turnout gear and fire-fighting equipment, and the effectiveness of the fire brigade's team operation. The inspectors also reviewed whether the licensee's fire brigade met NRC requirements for training, dedicated size and membership, and equipment.

These activities constituted one annual inspection sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

a. Inspection Scope

On October 16, 2015, the inspectors completed an inspection of the station's ability to mitigate flooding due to internal causes. After reviewing the licensee's flooding analysis, the inspectors chose a plant area containing risk-significant structures, systems, and components that were susceptible to flooding: Units 1, 2, and 3 emergency diesel generator rooms The inspectors reviewed plant design features and licensee procedures for coping with internal flooding. The inspectors walked down the selected areas to inspect the design features, including the material condition of seals, drains, and flood barriers. The inspectors evaluated whether operator actions credited for flood mitigation could be successfully accomplished. These activities constitute completion of one flood protection measures sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.06.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee programs to verify heat exchanger performance and operability for the following heat exchangers: Unit 1 shutdown cooling heat exchanger train B Unit 1 spray pond heat sink train A Unit 2 diesel jacket water heat exchanger train A Unit 3 essential cooling water heat exchanger train A The inspectors verified whether testing, inspection, maintenance, and chemistry control programs are adequate to ensure proper heat transfer. The inspectors verified that the periodic testing and monitoring methods, as outlined in commitments to NRC Generic Letter 89-13, utilized proper industry heat exchanger guidance. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the licensee's chemistry program ensured that biological fouling was properly controlled between tests. The inspectors reviewed previous maintenance records of the heat exchangers to verify that the licensee's heat exchanger inspections adequately addressed structural integrity and cleanliness of their tubes. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment. These activities constitute completion of four triennial heat sink inspection samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.07-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities

Sections

.1 Non-destructive Examination (NDE) Activities and Welding Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed six nondestructive examination activities and reviewed 10 nondestructive examination activities that included three types of examinations. The licensee did not identify any relevant indications accepted for continued service during the nondestructive examinations. The inspectors directly observed the following nondestructive examinations: SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Safety Injection Pipe to Elbow, 2-022-014 Dye Penetrant Reactor Vessel Bottom Mounted Instrumentation Nozzles (1-61) Visual Safety Injection 2PSIEL176, Report 15-1089 Radiography Safety Injection 2PSIEL176, Report 15-1090 Radiography Steam Generator 15-MT-2013, 2-065-017 Magnetic Particle Reactor Vessel Reactor Vessel Upper Head nozzles 1 - 97 Visual The inspectors reviewed records for the following nondestructive examinations:

SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION EXAMINATION TYPE Steam Generator 15-UTE-2052, Nozzle to Vessel Ultrasonic Steam Generator 15-UTE-2053, Nozzle to Vessel Ultrasonic Steam Generator 15-UTE-2054, Nozzle to Vessel Inner Radius Ultrasonic Steam Generator 15-UTE-2055, Nozzle to Vessel Inner Radius Ultrasonic Steam Generator 15-UTE-2058, Tubesheet to Head Ultrasonic Safety Injection VE-15-003, 1A Safety Injection Phased Array Ultrasonic Safety Injection VE-15-004, 1B Safety Injection Phased Array Ultrasonic Safety Injection VE-15-005, 2A Safety Injection Phased Array Ultrasonic Safety Injection VE-15-006, 2B Safety Injection Phased Array Ultrasonic Reactor Coolant 15-1008 2A RCP Suction Instrumentation Nozzle Bare Metal Visual During the review and observation of each examination, the inspectors verified that activities were performed in accordance with the ASME Code requirements and applicable procedures. The inspectors also verified the qualifications of all nondestructive examination technicians performing the inspections were current.

The inspectors directly observed a portion of the following welding activities: SYSTEM WELD IDENTIFICATION WELD TYPE Instrument Air 4201037-1 and 4201037-2 shielded-metal arc weld Flex Mod to RCS 4418137-30 gas-tungsten arc weld The inspectors verified that the welding procedure specifications and the welders had been properly qualified in accordance with ASME Code,Section IX, requirements. The inspectors also verified that essential variables were identified, recorded in the procedure qualification record, and formed the bases for qualification of the welding procedure specifications. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities

a. Inspection Scope

No vessel upper head inspection was required during this refueling outage, however, the licensee identified boric acid on top of the reactor vessel head, dripping down from a graylock-hub connection associated with the heated junction thermocouple train B. The inspectors reviewed the results of the licensee's bare metal visual inspection of the reactor vessel upper head penetrations to determine whether the licensee identified any evidence of boric acid challenging the structural integrity of the reactor head components and attachments. The inspectors also verified that the required inspection coverage was achieved and limitations were properly recorded.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the licensee's boric acid corrosion control program for monitoring degradation of those systems that could be adversely affected by boric acid corrosion. The inspectors reviewed the documentation associated with the licensee's boric acid corrosion control walkdown as specified in Procedure 73DP-9ZC01, "Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program," Revision 7, and Procedure 70TI-9ZC01, "Boric Acid Walkdown Leak Detection," Revision 18. The inspectors verified that the visual inspections emphasized locations where boric acid leaks could cause degradation of safety significant components, and that engineering evaluation used corrosion rates applicable to the affected components and properly assessed the effects of corrosion induced wastage on structural or pressure boundary integrity. The inspectors confirmed that corrective actions taken were consistent with the ASME Code, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B requirements. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Activities

a. Inspection Scope

No eddy current inspections were required or planned for refueling outage U2R19. However, due to previous concerns with foreign objects in the steam generators, the licensee initiated Foreign Object Search and Retrieval (FOSAR) inspections on both Steam Generators. The licensee defines a classification system for foreign objects to determine where retrieval efforts should be applied if foreign material is discovered in the steam generator. Category 1 items are foreign objects that experience or analysis could be expected to cause tube wear to exceed 50 percent through wall in one or two operating cycles. The following areas were inspected: Hot and cold leg top of tubesheet annulus region (approximately 5 tube rows into the bundle were viewed from the annulus.

Hot and cold leg blowdown lanes (approximately 2 rows deep were viewed from the lane). The FOSAR inspection results for Category I items were as follows: One foreign object in Steam Generator 21, which was removed.

Two items were identified as foreign objects in Steam Generator 22, both of which were removed.

The licensee determined, due to lack of object wear marks found on either the foreign objects or on tubes in the vicinity of the removed objects, than no eddy current examinations were required. Other foreign objects identified in the steam generators are not expected to cause tube damage.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.5 Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection scope

The inspectors reviewed 18 condition reports which dealt with inservice inspection activities and found the corrective actions were appropriate. From this review the inspectors concluded that the licensee has an appropriate threshold for entering issues into the corrective action program and has procedures that direct a root cause evaluation when necessary. The inspectors also determined the licensee had an effective program for applying industry operating experience. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

.1 Review of Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

On November 23, 2015, the inspectors observed a portion of an annual requalification test for licensed operators. The inspectors assessed the performance of the operators and the evaluators' critique of their performance.

These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed operator requalification program sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Review of Licensed Operator Performance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the performance of on-shift licensed operators in the plant's main control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of heightened activity. The inspectors observed the operators' performance of the following activities: October 9, 2015, Unit 2 shutdown for planned refueling outage November 9, 2015, Unit 2 notice of unusual event for a fire alarm in containment In addition, the inspectors assessed the operators' adherence to plant procedures, including Conduct of Shift Operations and other operations department policies. These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed operator performance samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Annual Review of Requalification Examination Results

a. Inspection Scope

The inspector conducted an in-office review of the annual requalification training program to determine the results of this program.

On December 18, 2015, the licensee informed the inspector of the following Palo Verde Units 1, 2, and 3 operating test results:

21 of 21 crews passed the simulator portion of the operating test 109 of 109 licensed operators passed the simulator portion of the operating test 109 of 109 licensed operators passed the job performance measure (JPM) portion of the operating test One reactor operator and one senior reactor operator have not yet been tested due to short term disabilities and will be tested separately prior to returning to licensed duties No remediation was performed for any operating examination. The inspector completed one inspection sample of the annual licensed operator requalification program.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

===.4 Biennial Review of Requalification Program

a. Inspection Scope

Every year, either an annual review or a biennial review is performed on the licensed operator requalification program. For this year, an annual review was completed and the biennial review was not performed. See the Annual Review Section for details on the licensed operator requalification program.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

=

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed two instances of degraded performance or condition of safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs): December 11, 2015, Unit 2 containment airlock, extended a(1) monitoring due to additional test failures December 10, 2015, Non-class 1E 480V, a(2) routine monitoring The inspectors reviewed the extent of condition of possible common cause SSC failures and evaluated the adequacy of the licensee's corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's work practices to evaluate whether these may have played a role in the degradation of the SSCs. The inspectors assessed the licensee's characterization of the degradation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule), and verified that the licensee was appropriately tracking degraded performance and conditions in accordance with the Maintenance Rule. These activities constituted completion of two maintenance effectiveness samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed three risk assessments performed by the licensee prior to changes in plant configuration and the risk management actions taken by the licensee in response to elevated risk: October 16, 2015, Unit 2 night shift shutdown safety function assessment yellow risk management action levels for reactivity control and spent fuel pool decay heat removal October 19, 2015, Unit 3 online weekly risk assessment October 28, 2015, Unit 2 day shift shutdown safety function assessment for the reactor vessel head removed and reactor coolant system above reactor vessel flange The inspectors verified that these risk assessments were performed timely and in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and plant procedures. The inspectors reviewed the accuracy and completeness of the licensee's risk assessments and verified that the licensee implemented appropriate risk management actions based on the result of the assessments. These activities constitute completion of three maintenance risk assessment inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed seven operability determinations that the licensee performed for degraded or nonconforming structures, systems, or components (SSCs): October 15, 2015, Unit 2 operability determination of vital electrical busses during essential ventilation outage October 21, 2015, Unit 3 operability determination of containment sump water level (wide range) train A following a change in water level trends November 13, 2015, Unit 3 operator work around for spent fuel pool local temperature alarm failure November 23, 2015, Unit 2 operator work around for two low pressurizer pressure setpoint reset switch not lowering pressure when operated December 9, 2015, Unit 3 operability determination of safety injection tank 2A fill and drain valve failure to meet stroke time criteria December 10, 2015, Unit 1, 2, and 3 operability determination of reactor coolant system piping loads due to updated analysis in support of next generation fuel December 22, 2015, Unit 2 operability determination for containment spray pump motor space heater failing to energize The inspectors reviewed the timeliness and technical adequacy of the licensee's evaluations. Where the licensee determined the degraded SSC to be operable the inspectors verified that the licensee's compensatory measures were appropriate to provide reasonable assurance of operability. The inspectors verified that the licensee had considered the effect of other degraded conditions on the operability of the degraded SSC. The inspectors reviewed operator actions taken or planned to compensate for degraded or nonconforming conditions. The inspectors verified that the licensee effectively managed these operator workarounds to prevent adverse effects on the function of mitigating systems and to minimize their impact on the operators' ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures. These activities constitute completion of seven operability and functionality review samples, which included two operator work-around samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.15

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

On October 31, 2015, the inspectors reviewed a temporary modification to the Unit 2 refueling machine to support removal of a damaged fuel assembly. The inspectors verified that the licensee had installed and removed this temporary modification in accordance with technically adequate design documents. The inspectors verified that this modification did not adversely impact the operability or availability of affected SSCs. The inspectors reviewed design documentation and plant procedures affected by the modification to verify the licensee maintained configuration control.

These activities constitute completion of one sample of temporary modifications, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.18.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed four post-maintenance testing activities that affected risk-significant structures, systems, or components (SSCs): October 20, 2015, Unit 2 essential spray pond train B pump post maintenance test following cable replacement October 24, 2015, Unit 2 containment sump isolation train B valve SIB-UV-675 post maintenance test following valve actuator refurbishment November 23, 2015, Unit 2 channel C log power post maintenance test following repair and troubleshooting of the channel failing low December 10, 2015, Station blackout generator 1 post maintenance test after planned maintenance The inspectors reviewed licensing- and design-basis documents for the SSCs and the maintenance and post-maintenance test procedures. The inspectors observed the performance of the post-maintenance tests to verify that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with approved procedures, satisfied the established acceptance criteria, and restored the operability of the affected SSCs. These activities constitute completion of four post-maintenance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

During the Unit 2 refueling outage that concluded on November 14, 2015, the inspectors evaluated the licensee's outage activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee considered risk in developing and implementing the outage plan, appropriately managed personnel fatigue, and developed mitigation strategies for losses of key safety functions. This verification included the following:

Review of the licensee's outage plan prior to the outage Review and verification of the licensee's fatigue management activities Monitoring of shut-down and cool-down activities Verification that the licensee maintained defense-in-depth during outage activities Observation and review of reduced-inventory and mid-loop activities Observation and review of fuel handling activities Monitoring of heat-up and startup activities These activities constitute completion of one refueling outage sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.20

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed three risk-significant surveillance tests and reviewed test results to verify that these tests adequately demonstrated that the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) were capable of performing their safety functions: Containment isolation valve surveillance tests: October 26, 2015, Unit 2 containment penetration 9 leak test November 10, 2011, Unit 2 containment integrated leak rate test Other surveillance tests: December 11, 2015, Unit 2 control element assembly operability test The inspectors verified that these tests met technical specification requirements, that the licensee performed the tests in accordance with their procedures, and that the results of the test satisfied appropriate acceptance criteria. The inspectors verified that the licensee restored the operability of the affected SSCs following testing.

These activities constitute completion of three surveillance testing inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Cornerstone:

Emergency Preparedness

1EP4 Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed in-office reviews of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Emergency Plan, Revision 55, and Procedure EP-0905, "Protective Actions," Revision 7; and an on-site review of changes to Procedure EP-0900, "Emergency Response Organization Position Checklists," Revision 12. These revisions: deleted a shelter-in-place protective action recommendation within a two mile radius of the plant at a site area emergency classification; provided additional details about conducting sweeps in the owner-controlled-area as part of the evacuation of non-essential personnel from site; specified the liaisons dispatched to an Incident Command Post when one is established; provided additional details about how to call out the emergency response organization to alternate emergency response facilities; provided guidance to contact the Buckeye, Arizona, police department to provide security at the Emergency Operations Facility/Joint Information Center; and made other administrative changes. These revisions were compared to their previous revisions, to the criteria of NUREG-0654, "Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants," Revision 1, and to the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b) to determine if the revision adequately implemented the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q)(3) and 50.54(q)(4). The inspectors verified that the revisions did not reduce the effectiveness of the emergency plan. This review was not documented in a safety evaluation report and did not constitute approval of licensee-generated changes; therefore, these revisions are subject to future inspection. These activities constitute completion of three emergency action level and emergency plan change samples as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.04.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP7 Exercise Evaluation - Hostile Action Event

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the September 16, 2015, biennial emergency plan exercise to verify the exercise acceptably tested the major elements of the emergency plan, provided opportunities for the emergency response organization to demonstrate key skills and functions, and demonstrated the licensee's ability to coordinate with offsite emergency responders. The scenario simulated: an explosion at the security owner controller access checkpoint; an armed land-based attack against the protected area; explosives placed at the station blackout generators; a complete loss of offsite power to the station; a Unit 1 diesel generator failure; and injured and deceased plant employees.

The simulations were performed to demonstrate the licensee's capability to implement its emergency plan under conditions of uncertain physical security. During the exercise the inspectors observed activities in the Control Room Simulator and the following emergency response facilities: Alternate Technical Support Center Alternate Operations Support Center Emergency Operations Facility Central Alarm Station Incident Command Post Joint Information Center The inspectors focused their evaluation of the licensee's performance on event classification, offsite notification, recognition of offsite dose consequences, development of protective action recommendations, staffing of alternate emergency response facilities, and the coordination between the licensee and offsite agencies to ensure reactor safety under conditions of uncertain physical security. The inspectors also assessed recognition of, and response to, abnormal and emergency plant conditions, the transfer of decision-making authority and emergency function responsibilities between facilities, onsite and offsite communications, protection of plant employees and emergency workers in an uncertain physical security environment, emergency repair evaluation and capability, and the overall implementation of the emergency plan to protect public health and safety and the environment. The inspectors reviewed the current revision of the facility emergency plan, emergency plan implementing procedures associated with operation of the licensee's primary and alternate emergency response facilities, and procedures for the performance of associated emergency and security functions.

The inspectors attended the post-exercise critiques in each emergency response facility to evaluate the initial licensee self-assessment of exercise performance. The inspectors also attended a subsequent formal presentation of critique items to plant management. The specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

The inspectors reviewed the scenarios of the 2011 and 2013 biennial exercises and the scenarios of licensee drills conducted between January 2013 and August 2015 to determine whether the September 16, 2015, exercise was independent and avoided participant preconditioning, in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.F(2)(g). The inspectors also compared observed exercise performance with corrective action program entries and after-action reports for drills and exercises conducted January 2013 and August 2015 to determine whether identified weaknesses had been corrected in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), and 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.F. These activities constituted completion of one exercise evaluation sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.07.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1EP8 Exercise Evaluation - Scenario Review

a. Inspection Scope

The licensee submitted the preliminary exercise scenario for the September 16, 2015, biennial exercise to the NRC on December 18, 2014, in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, IV.F(2)(b). The biennial exercise had been rescheduled from March 4, 2015. The inspectors performed an in-office review of the proposed scenario to determine whether it would acceptably test the major elements of the licensee's emergency plan and provide opportunities for the emergency response organization to demonstrate key skills and functions.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstones: Public Radiation Safety and Occupational Radiation Safety

2RS5 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and operability of the radiation monitoring equipment used by the licensee: (1) to monitor areas, materials, and workers to ensure a radiologically safe work environment, and (2) to detect and quantify radioactive process streams and effluent releases. The inspectors interviewed licensee personnel, walked down various portions of the plant, and reviewed licensee performance in the following areas:

Selected plant configurations and alignments of process, postaccident, and effluent monitors with descriptions in the Final Safety Analysis Report and the offsite dose calculation manual Selected instrumentation, including effluent monitoring instrument, portable survey instruments, area radiation monitors, continuous air monitors, personnel contamination monitors, portal monitors, and small article monitors to examine their configurations and source checks Calibration and testing of process and effluent monitors, laboratory instrumentation, whole body counters, postaccident monitoring instrumentation, portal monitors, personnel contamination monitors, small article monitors, portable survey instruments, area radiation monitors, electronic dosimetry, air samplers, and continuous air monitors Audits, self-assessments, and corrective action documents related to radiation monitoring instrumentation since the last inspection These activities constitute completion of one sample of radiation monitoring instrumentation as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and Security

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

.1 Mitigating Systems Performance Index: Heat Removal Systems (MS08)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's mitigating system performance index data for the period of October 1, 2014 through September 30, 2015, to verify the accuracy and completeness of the reported data. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data.

These activities constituted verification of the mitigating system performance index for heat removal systems for Units 1, 2, and 3, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Mitigating Systems Performance Index: Residual Heat Removal Systems (MS09)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's mitigating system performance index data for the period of October 1, 2014 through September 30, 2015 to verify the accuracy and completeness of the reported data. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data. These activities constituted verification of the mitigating system performance index for residual heat removal systems for Units 1, 2, and 3, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Mitigating Systems Performance Index: Cooling Water Support Systems (MS10)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's mitigating system performance index data for the period of October 1, 2014, through September 30, 2015, to verify the accuracy and completeness of the reported data. The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the reported data. These activities constituted verification of the mitigating system performance index for cooling water support systems Units 1, 2, and 3, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Drill/Exercise Performance (EP01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's evaluated exercises and selected drill and training evolutions that occurred between January 2014 and June 2015, to verify the accuracy of the licensee's data for classification, notification, and protective action recommendation (PAR) opportunities. The inspectors reviewed a sample of the licensee's completed classifications, notifications, and PARs to verify their timeliness and accuracy. The inspectors used Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported. The specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report.

These activities constituted verification of the drill/exercise performance indicator as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.5 Emergency Response Organization Drill Participation (EP02)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's records for participation in drill and training evolutions between January 2014 and June 2015 to verify the accuracy of the licensee's data for drill participation opportunities. The inspectors verified that all members of the licensee's emergency response organization (ERO) in the identified key positions had been counted in the reported performance indicator data. The inspectors reviewed the licensee's basis for reporting the percentage of ERO members who participated in a drill. The inspectors reviewed drill attendance records and verified a sample of those reported as participating. The inspectors used Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported. The specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report. These activities constituted verification of the emergency response organization drill participation performance indicator as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.6 Alert and Notification System Reliability (EP03)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's records of alert and notification system tests conducted between January 2014 and June 2015 to verify the accuracy of the licensee's data for siren system testing opportunities. The inspectors reviewed procedural guidance on assessing alert and notification system opportunities and the results of periodic alert and notification system operability tests. The inspectors used Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of the data reported. The specific documents reviewed are described in the attachment to this report. These activities constituted verification of the alert and notification system reliability performance indicator as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

.1 Routine Review

a. Inspection Scope

Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors performed daily reviews of items entered into the licensee's corrective action program and periodically attended the licensee's condition report screening meetings. The inspectors verified that licensee personnel were identifying problems at an appropriate threshold and entering these problems into the corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors verified that the licensee developed and implemented corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the problems identified. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's problem identification and resolution activities during the performance of the other inspection activities documented in this report.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Semiannual Trend Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's corrective action program, performance indicators, system health reports, and other documentation to identify trends that might indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. To verify that the licensee was taking corrective actions to address identified adverse trends that might indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue, the inspectors reviewed corrective action program documentation associated with the following licensee-identified trend: From mid-2013 to mid-2015, the licensee experienced an increase in inadequate maintenance activities requiring rework. Inadequate work practices have resulted in exceeding Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) durations and have challenged equipment reliability [CR 15-09661-004].

These activities constitute completion of one semiannual trend review sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152. b. Observations and Assessments For the declining trend involving inadequate maintenance requiring rework, the licensee performed a high level review of data over a two year period to determine if a common cause beyond those identified in the event-specific causal analyses could be identified. The evaluation examined 21 maintenance related events occurring during the past two years. Fifteen of the events were attributed to procedures or instructions that were either unclear or not technically accurate. The corrective actions for six of the events required additional steps to be added to the maintenance instructions. The licensee's evaluation concluded that the increase in the level of detail required in work instructions indicates a change in the knowledge and experience level of their maintenance work force. The licensee's data also indicated that human performance error rates tend to decrease and performance improves when front line supervisors spend time in the field with workers. However, the licensee also noted that their maintenance department currently has a large population of front line supervisors with limited leadership experience.

The licensee recognized the need to ensure that the level of detail in work instructions is regularly monitored and re-evaluated as the experience level within the maintenance shops changes. The licensee has issued action items to ensure that a post-job critique is conducted when work is performed on safety-related equipment, and to update the station rework procedure to provide clear guidance for when and how to conduct a human performance evaluation for maintenance requiring rework. The licensee also revised their maintenance department procedure addressing front line supervisor observation and mentoring activities to ensure that front line supervisors take into consideration individual worker capabilities such as a lack of proficiency or experience when determining which tasks to observe. The licensee will also update this procedure to require maintenance leadership to identify potential high-consequence activities during the work planning process and to name an observer to be present for those targeted high-consequence maintenance activities. The inspectors considered that in response to this trend, the licensee had completed an appropriate evaluation and had developed appropriate corrective actions.

c. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues

a. Inspection Scope

On October 13, 2015, the inspectors selected for follow-up the issue of the reliablility of continuously energized ARD relays. The inspectors assessed the licensee's problem identification threshold, cause analyses, extent of condition reviews and compensatory actions. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately prioritized the planned corrective actions and that these actions were adequate to ensure that discrepancies in the manufacturing process will not adversely affect the performance of safety related equipment. This activity constitutes completion of one annual follow-up sample as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA3 Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

These activities constitute completion of four event follow-up samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71153.

.1 NRC Event Number 51522:

Notice of Unusual Event Due to Containment Fire Alarm On November 9, 2015, at 5:33 a.m. Mountain Standard Time (MST), Palo Verde Unit 2 received a containment fire alarm in Fire Zone 63B (Steam Generator 2) while pressurizing containment for integrated leak rate testing (ILRT) in Mode 5. Control room operators noted that containment temperature and pressure were 72 degrees Farenheit and 13 psig, respectively. Personnel were unable to enter containment to validate the fire alarm since containment pressure was greater than 0.5 psig. As a result the station declared an Unusual Event (HU2.1) at 5:47 a.m. MST for a fire in containment which was unable to be validated within 15 minutes of receipt. No safety functions were impacted due to the fire alarm. No automatic or manual RPS or ESF actuations occurred and none were required. Containment was entered at 8:17 a.m. MST following depressurization. Licensee inspection of containment and Fire Zone 63B identified no indication of fire or smoke. The fire alarm was determined to be invalid. The Unusual Event was terminated on November 9, 2015, at 9:01 a.m. MST. The inspectors responded to the control room to verify that the information provided by the Emergency Notification System (ENS) communicator was complete and accurate and no further Agency response was warranted. When licensee personnel entered containment after depressurization, no evidence of combustion was identified. Further reviews of the Technical Requirements Manual revealed a note indicating that the fire alarms inside containment should be bypassed during ILRT sequences, because the higher pressure, more dense air inside containment can disrupt the detector's monitoring stream in a manner similar to smoke particulates. The ILRT was reperformed satisfactorily with the fire alarms in bypass.

.2 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 05000530/2015-001-00, "Leakage From Reactor Coolant Pump 2A Suction Pipe Instrument Nozzle" (Closed) Unresolved Item (URI)05000530/2015002-04, TAC Number MF6276 - NOED Number 15-4-01. Notice of Enforcement Discretion of Technical Specification 3.5.3 Emergency Core Cooling System - Operating Conditions B and C On April 7, 2015, during the Unit 3 Refueling Outage 18, the licensee discovered reactor coolant system pressure boundary leakage at instrument nozzle 18 on the 2A reactor coolant pump suction piping.

The leakage was discovered during a planned visual inspection of Unit 3 hot and cold leg nozzles. Isotopic analysis of the leak deposits indicated that the leak had occurred between 6 and 10 months prior to discovery. The leak was not detectable while the unit was operating either by the licensee's reactor coolant system leak rate determination procedure or by containment atmospheric radiation monitor trend reviews. The leak was not detectable visually during the previous refueling outage. Visual evidence of the leakage was consistent with a small leak of short duration with no "popcorn" buildup of boric acid at the leakage site. The licensee determined that the cause of the leakage was primary water stress corrosion cracking of the alloy 600 instrument nozzle. The licensee corrected the leakage using a half nozzle repair method and installed a new alloy 690 nozzle with alloy 52M weld material. After completing the repair, the licensee submitted a relief request to allow operation with uncharacterized flaws in the remnant j-groove weld and nozzle left in place after the half nozzle repair. The relief request was for operation through the end of refueling cycle 3R19. The inspectors reviewed the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the leak, observed portions of the repair activity during the refueling outage, and reviewed the licensee's apparent cause evaluation of the leak. The inspectors determined that reactor coolant system boundary leakage is a Severity Level IV violation of Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) 3.4.14.a which requires that reactor coolant system operational leakage shall be limited to no pressure boundary leakage. If pressure boundary leakage exists, required action 3.4.14.B requires the licensee to place the unit in operational Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and within operational Mode 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. Based on a review of the event, the inspectors concluded that the leakage existed for a period that began on an unknown date that was more than 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> before April 4, 2015, and ended when the reactor shut down on April 4, 2015. The reactor coolant system operational leakage was not limited to no pressure boundary leakage, and the licensee did not place the unit in operational Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and within operational Mode 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The issue was evaluated using the traditional enforcement process because no performance deficiency was associated with the violation of NRC requirements. Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Section 0612-09, states, in part, that such violations are dispositioned using traditional enforcement and may warrant enforcement discretion. The inspectors reviewed NRC Enforcement Policy, Section 6.1 ("Reactor Operations") to evaluate the significance of this violation. This violation was more-than-minor and best characterized as Severity Level IV (very low safety significance) because it is similar to the example in the NRC Enforcement Policy, Section 6.1.d.1. Additionally, a qualitative assessment of the observed reactor coolant system leakage condition concluded the risk was of very low safety significance (Green). The basis for this qualitative risk determination was that the leakage rate was very small with little boron residue accumulation and no appreciable accumulation on nearby components. Any leakage was within the capability of reactor coolant system makeup systems. The NRC is exercising enforcement discretion in accordance with Section 3.5 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and not issuing an enforcement action for the violation of Technical Specification 3.4.14.a (EA-15-158) for the following reasons: this issue is of very low safety significance (Green); the NRC determined that this issue was not within the licensee's ability to foresee and correct; the licensee's actions did not contribute to the degraded condition, and; the actions taken were reasonable to identify and address this matter. Further, because the licensee's actions did not contribute to this violation, it will not be considered in the assessment process or the NRC's Action Matrix. Specific documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

Licensee Event Report 05000530/2015-001-00 is closed. Unresolved item 05000530/2015002-04 is closed.

.3 (Closed) Licensee Event Report 05000530/2015-002-00, "Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification 3.0.4 Due to an Inoperable Atmospheric Dump Valve (ADV)" On May 2, 2015, following completion of refueling activities, Unit 3 commenced testing of atmospheric dump valves (ADVs).

Testing determined that ADV 178 would not stroke more than 13 percent open. Operators declared ADV 178 inoperable and entered LCO 3.7.4 Condition A. The licensee determined that ADV 178 had been inoperable when Unit 3 entered Mode 4 and continued to Mode 3, and issued the licensee event report to report a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.

The licensee determined that internal piston rings were improperly re-assembled during maintenance performed during the refueling outage. The licensee concluded the apparent cause of the incorrect piston ring installation was human error by maintenance personnel and inadequate procedure instructions. To prevent recurrence, the licensee initiated actions to provide detailed guidance on the proper orientation of the piston rings and to require verifications of proper re-assembly. The inspectors reviewed the licensee event report and documented a licensee-identified violation in Section

4OA7 of this report. Licensee event report 05000530/2015-002-00 is closed.

.4 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000530/2015-003-00, Damaged High Pressure Safety Injection Pump Motor Journal Bearing On May 30, 2015, emergent maintenance on the Unit 3 train A high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump motor outboard journal bearing performed under Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved Notice Of Enforcement Discretion 15-4-01 exceeded the Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) completion time for LCO 3.5.3, "Emergency Core Cooling Systems - Operating, Condition C.1."

The high pressure safety inspection (HPSI) pump A had been removed from service on May 27, 2015, at 6:28 a.m., for planned routine maintenance. During maintenance, it was discovered that the motor outboard journal bearing was damaged. The bearing was replaced and the pump was declared operable on May 30, 2015, at 5:10 p.m. The root cause was work instruction weaknesses which resulted in improper reassembly of the HPSI pump motor during planned maintenance in the Unit 3 spring 2015 refueling outage. Immediate corrective actions replaced the damaged outboard motor bearing and properly reassembled the pump and motor. To prevent recurrence, the licensee plans to revise maintenance procedures to provide enhanced guidance for pump and motor reassembly. The licensee notified the inspectors about the issue shortly after the condition was discovered. The inspectors visually examined the failed journal bearing and interviewed maintenance personnel and a vendor representative regarding the physical configuration and sequence of events that led to damage and how the replacement bearing when properly installed would have adequate clearances to function as designed. When the licensee was preparing to request a NOED, the inspectors walked down the risk-management actions associated with the corresponding risk assessment, which included pre-staging certain diverse and flexible (FLEX) mitigating equipment that are capable of performing the safety-injection function in the event of a primary LOCA. The NRC granted the NOED, and while the NOED was in effect the inspectors regularly monitored the progress of the repairs through interactions with the control room and work control center staff. The inspectors reviewed the post-maintenance testing documentation that returned the pump to service. Following the event, the inspectors reviewed the cause evaluations and other corrective action documentation, including the vendor's post-mortem evaluation of the failed journal bearing. No findings or violations of NRC requirements were identified. Licensee event report 05000530/2015-003-00 is closed.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit Exit Meeting Summary On February 6, 2015, the inspectors discussed the in-office review of the preliminary scenario for the March 4, 2015, biennial exercise, submitted December 18, 2014, with Mr. J. Fearn, Manager, Emergency Preparedness, and other members of the licensee staff.

The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The March 4, 2015, biennial exercise was subsequently rescheduled to September 16, 2015. On October 2, 2015, the inspectors presented the results of the onsite and in-office inspection of the biennial emergency preparedness exercise conducted September 16, 2015, including the results of the in-office inspection of changes to the licensee's emergency plan and implementing procedures, to Mr. R. Edington, Chief Nuclear Officer, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.

On October 23, 2015, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. R. Bement, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed. On October 30, 2015, the inspector presented the radiation safety inspection results to Mr. G. Andrews, Director, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.

On November 19, 2015, the inspectors presented the final inspection results to Mr. J. Cadogan, Vice President of Nuclear Engineering, Ms. M. Lacal, Vice President of Regulatory Oversight, Mr. M. McLaughlin, General Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

On December 22, 2015, the inspector briefed Mr. G. Andrews and other members of the licensee's staff of the results of the licensed operator requalification program inspection. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

On January 7, 2016, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. R. Bement and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations Listed below is one violation of very low safety significance (Green) and one violation of Severity Level IV that were identified by the licensee and are violations of NRC requirements which meet the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy for being dispositioned as non-cited violations.

Technical Specification 3.0.4 requires, in part, that when an LCO is not met, entry into a mode or other specified condition in the applicability shall only be made when the associated actions in the mode permit continued operation; a risk assessment is performed and accepted for the inoperable components; or when an allowance is stated. Technical Specification 3.7.4, "Atmospheric Dump Valves," requires that four ADV lines shall be operable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 when the steam generator is relied upon for heat removal. Contrary to the above, on May 1, 2015, Unit 3 operators entered a mode with an LCO not met. Specifically, one atmospheric dump valve line was not operable as required by Technical Specification 3.7.4 prior to entering Mode 3.

The licensee's investigation concluded that the valve failure was a result of inadequate reassembly following maintenance. The licensee reported this condition in Licensee Event Report 05000530/2015-002-00 as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications due to entering a mode in the applicability of LCO 3.7.4 while the LCO was not met.

The inspectors concluded that the finding is of very low safety-significance (Green) because it was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not result in a loss of safety function, did not result in a loss of function of a train of safety equipment out greater than its allowed outage time, or a loss of function of high importance maintenance rule equipment greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The licensee has entered the issue in the corrective action program as CRDR 4654422.

Title 10 CFR 55.49, "Integrity of examinations and tests," requires, in part, that facility licensees shall not engage in any activity that compromises the integrity of any application, test, or examination required by this part. Contrary to the above, during the week of November 9, 2015, the licensee caused a compromise of examination integrity when two licensed operators, who had previously validated portions of the 2015 annual operating test and had signed the examination security agreement, administered emergency preparedness (EP) job performance measures (JPMs) to a total of three licensed operators who had not yet taken their annual operating test. Specifically, the two licensed operators validated and/or approved simulator scenarios and EP JPMs for the annual operating test and then subsequently administered JPMs to three other licensed operators for the purpose of supporting EP program indicators. If not for detection, this activity could have affected the equitable and consistent administration of the annual operating examination.

The failure to meet 10 CFR 55.49 was evaluated through the traditional enforcement process because it impacted the ability of the NRC to perform its regulatory oversight function. This resulted in assignment of a Severity Level IV violation because it involved a nonwillful compromise of examination integrity and is consistent with Section 6.4.d of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The associated performance deficiency was screened as Green because it had no actual effect on the equitable and consistent administration of any examination required by 10 CFR 55.59, "Requalification." The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 15-10910.

A-1 Attachment

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

N. AaronsCooke, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs

J. Allison, Examination and Simulator Group Section Leader

G. Andrews, Director, Nuclear Regulatory Assurance

R. Bement, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Operations

D. Bence, Manager, Operations

R. Black, Engineer, RMS Systems

B. Bolf, Section Leader, Engineering

P. Bury, Director, Nuclear Training

J. Cadogan, Vice President, Engineering

R. Carbunneau, Department Leader, Nuclear Assurance

C. Coles, Department Leader, Security

R. Davis, Director, Emergency Preparedness

E. Dutton, Director, Nuclear Assurance

R. Eddington, Chief Nuclear Officer

M. Fallon, Director, Communications

J. Fearn, Manager, Emergency Preparedness

Z. Goldwasser, Operations Training Manager (Acting)

T. Gray, Superintendent, Radiation Protection Technical Support

K. Graham, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations

R. Harley, Program Engineer, Heat Exchangers

D. Heckman, Senior Compliance Consultant, Regulatory Affairs

J. Jenkins, System Engineer, Spray Pond and Essential Cooling Water

G. Jones, Supervisor, Radiation Protection

M. Karbassian, Director, Engineering

C. Kharrl, General Plant Manager, Operations

M. Lacal, Vice President, Operations Support

S. Lantz, Dosimetry Section Leader, Radiation Protection

T. Marco, Director, Human Relations

M. McGhee, Department Leader, Nuclear Regulatory Assurance

M. McLaughlin, General Plant Manager, Operations Support

M. Meyer, Design Engineer, Civil

D. Mims, Senior Vice President, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs and Oversight

C. Moeller, Director, Technical Support (Acting)

R. O'Neal, Senior Technician, Radiation Protection

F. Oreshac, Consultant, Regulatory Affairs

R. Quick, Examination Developer

R. Routollo, Manager, Radiation Protection (Acting)

G. Sowers, Leader, RMS Systems

B. Thiele, Department Leader, Engineering

R. Vega, Design Engineer, Mechanical

J. Waid, Director, Executive Projects

T. Weber, Department Leader, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs

NRC Personnel

C. Peabody, Sr. Resident Inspector

D. Reinert, Resident Inspector

D. You, Resident Inspector

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Closed

05000530/LER-2015-001-00 LER Leakage From Reactor Pump 2A Suction Pipe Instrument Nozzle (Section 4OA3.2)

05000530/LER-2015-002-00 LER Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification 3.0.4 Due to an Inoperable Atmospheric Dump Valve (ADV) (Section 4OA3.3)

05000530/LER-2015-003-00 LER Damaged High Pressure Safety Injection Pump Motor Journal Bearing (Section 4OA3.4)

05000530/FIN-2015002-04 URI Notice of Enforcement Discretion of Technical Specification 3.5.3 Emergency Core Cooling System - Operating Conditions B and C (Section 4OA3.2)

Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment

Procedures

Number Title Revision 40OP-9PC01 Fuel Pool Cooling 13 40ST-9SI13 LPSI and CS System Alignment Verification 33 40OP-9DG01 Emergency Diesel Generator A 74 73ST-9XI15 CP (Power Access Purge) Valves - Inservice Test 9 73ST-9CL06 Containment Purge Supply Leak Test (42") - Penetration 56 21

Condition Reports

(CRs) 15-11026

Drawings

Number Title Revision 01-M-SIP-001 P & I Diagram Safety Injection and Shutdown Cooling System 54 01-M-SIP-002 P & I Diagram Safety Injection and Shutdown Cooling System 41 01-M-SIP-003 P & I Diagram Safety Injection and Shutdown Cooling System 11 02-M-PCP-001 P & I Diagram Fuel Pool Cooling & Cleanup System 30 02-P-PCF-501 Fuel Building Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Isometric 3 02-P-PCF-502 Fuel Building Isometric Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Clean-up System 1 02-P-PCF-503 Fuel Building Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Isometric 0 02-P-PCF-504 Fuel Building Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System Isometric 0 01-M-CPP-0001 P & I Diagram Containment Purge System 23

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision

PVNGS Updated FSAR 17

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Design Basis Manual - CP System 8

Palo Verde Action Requests (PVARs)

3551524

3553875

3553877

3561786

2711167

3240449 4058036

Section 1R05: Fire Protection Procedures Number Title Revision 40DP-9ZZ19 Operational Cosiderations due to Plant Fire 29 40OP-9HJ02 Control Building

HVAC (Smoke Removal) 5

Miscellaneous

Title Revision

Pre-Fire Strategies Manual 25

PVNGS Updated Final Safety Analysis Report 18

Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision 13-MC-DG-0204 Diesel Generator Building Flooding Analysis 6

Pre-Fire Strategies 25

Condition Reports

(CRs) 15-09026

Section 1R07: Heat Sink Performance Calculations Number Title Revision 13-CC-SP-0015 Essential Spray Pond Concrete Wall & Slab Design 9 13-MC-DG-0411

DG Heat Exchanger Minimum Flow Rate vs. Inlet SP Water Temperature 4 13-MC-PC-0217 Spent Fuel Cooling System - Shutdown Cooling and Pool Cooling Heat Transfer Evaluation 5 13-MC-SP-0307 SP/EW System Thermal Performance Design Bases Analysis 9 N001-0901-00012 Shutdown Cooling System Performance 2

Drawings

Number Title Revision 02-M-DGP-001, Sht. 4 P & I Diagram Jacket Water Diesel Generator System 56 02-M-DGP-001, Sht. 5 P & I Diagram Cooling Water Diesel Generator System 56 MN950-A00001 EW Heat Exchanger Replacement - B&W Essential Cooling Water HX Outline Drawing 1 MN950-A00051 EW Heat Exchanger Replacement - B&W Essential Cooling Water HX Outline Drawing 1

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision/Date

2A DG Jacket Water Heat Exchanger Visual Inspection June 2, 2014

2A DG Jacket Water Heat Exchanger Visual Inspection October 1, 2015

2B EW Heat Exchanger Visual Inspection October 16, 2015

3A EW Heat Exchanger Visual Inspection April 9, 2015

Diesel Generator System Health Report Q3-2015

Essential Cooling Water System Health Report Q3-2015

Essential Spray Pond Chemistry Control Strategy 5

Essential Spray Ponds System Health Report Q3-2015 74DP-9CY04 Systems Chemistry Specifications 88 13-CN-0389 Installation Specification for Control of Tornado Borne Missiles in Outside Areas 3

Modifications Number Title Revision

SP-1592 Spray Pond Wall Refurbishment 3

SP-1338 Spray Pond Bypass Line 1

SP-1076 Spray Pond Install Spray Pond Continuous Blowdown Piping 2

Procedures

Number Title Revision 13-MS-B061 Essential Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Test Protocol 0 13-MS-B062 Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Test Protocol 0 40OP-9SI01 Shutdown Cooling Initiation 55 70TI-9EW03 EW Heat Exchanger Improved Test Performance 2 73DP-0ZZ04 Service Water Reliability Program 9 73DP-9ZZ10 Guidelines for Heat Exchanger Thermal Performance Analysis 8 73DP-9ZZ11 Heat Exchanger Program 13 73DP-9ZZ21 Heat Exchanger Visual Inspection 21 01DP-0XX01 Control and Monitoring of Potential Tornado Borne Missiles 3

Thermal Performance Analyses Number Title Date

Essential Cooling Water Heat Exchanger (3MEWAE01) Thermal Performance Test Report October 6, 2013 255-01145 Essential Cooling Water Heat Exchanger (3MEWAE01) Thermal Performance Test Report April 4, 2009 513-00018 Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger (1MSIBE01) Thermal Performance Test Report October 10, 2011

Vendor Documents Number Title Revision/Date

Diesel Generator Jacket Water Cooler Specification Sheet September 15, 1977

Essential Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Specification Sheet January 14, 1976

Shutdown Heat Exchanger Specification Sheet April 15, 1976

VTD-E270-00001 Engineers & Fabricators Co. (EFCO) Technical Manual for Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers (Pub.# 12446) 3

Condition Reports

15-11180 15-11182 15-11210 14-00705 14-01140 12-01186 15-11278 15-11336 15-11331 15-11279

Condition Report

Action Items

4479651

Condition Report

Disposition Requests

4281157

Palo Verde Action Requests

4461014

4528726

4614440

4614384

3490856

3773970

Work Orders

4098391

Section 1R08: Inservice Inspection Activities

Procedures

Number Title Revision/ Date 70TI-9ZC01

Boric Acid Walkdown Leak Detection 18 73DP-9ZC01 Boric Acid Corrosion Control Program 7 73TI-0ZZ13 Radiographic Examination 18 73TI-9ZZ05 Dry Magnetic Particle Examination 16 73TI-9ZZ07 Liquid Penetrant Examination 16 73TI-9ZZ10 Ultrasonic Examination of Welds in Ferritic Components 14 73TI-9ZZ14 Ultrasonic Examination of Bolting 13 73TI-9ZZ17 Visual Examination of Welds, Bolting, and Components 12 73TI-9ZZ18 Visual Examination of Component Supports 13 73TI-9ZZ19 Visual Examination of Pump and Valve Internal Surfaces 15 73TI-9ZZ22 Visual Examination For Leakage - Interval 3 8 73TI-9ZZ23 Ultrasonic Examination of Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheels 8

PDI-UT-1 Generic EPRI Procedure for the Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic Pipe Welds E

PDI-UT-2 Generic EPRI Procedure for the Ultrasonic Examination of Austenitic Pipe Welds F 73TO-9RC10 Bare Metal Visual Examination of Reactor Vessel Bottom Head 4 MN725-00866 Palo Verde Steam Generator Visual Examination 4

Boric Acid Walkdown Condition Reports

2-2015-08204

2-2015-08210

2-2015-08211

2-2015-08213

2-2015-08214

2-2015-08369

2-2015-08511

2-2015-08513

2-2015-08514

2-2015-08515

2-2015-08770

2-2015-08773

2-2015-08775

2-2015-08924

2-2015-08925

2-2015-09163

2-2015-09624

Condition Reports

4528936

4533568

4539283

4545911

4593988

4604012

4606352

4609663

4615318

4615322

4617363

4617862

4637192

4645001

4645318

4646325

4654567

Reviewed Examinations Number Location Type 15-UTE-2058 SG Tubesheet to Head, 2-004-107 Phased Array Ultrasonic 15-UTE-2055 Nozzle to Vessel Inner Radius Weld

2-004-102-IR Phased Array Ultrasonic 15-UTE-2054 Nozzle to Vessel Inner Radius Weld 2-004-101-IR Phased Array Ultrasonic

Miscellaneous

Document Number Title Revision/Date Generic Letter 88-05 Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary Components in PWR Plants March 17, 1988 PV Letter to Westinghouse U2R19 Steam Generator Inspection Outage Scope August 12, 2015 MN725-A02009 Palo Verde Steam Generator Visual Examination 4

EWR 4708562 Engineering Evaluation on Apparent Rust Residue on the Reactor Closure Head October 22, 2015 Report 15-1000 BMI Bare Metal Visual Examination October 12, 2015 DIPC 4418137-6

Fabricate the FLEX Alternate RCS Discharge Tie-In piping per

EDC 2013-00541 drawings October 23, 2015

Level 3 Evaluation Report 15-09624-002 November 6, 2015

Ultrasonic Calibration Report Number 15-UT-2020 October 30, 2015

Ultrasonic Calibration Report Number 15-UT-2024 October 30, 2015

Ultrasonic Calibration Report Number 15-UT-2027 October 30, 2015

Palo Verde 2R19 BMI Pictures, by Remote Digital Video Inspection

Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance Procedures Number Title Revision 40DP-9OP02 Conduct of Shift Operations 66

EP-0901 Classifications 9

EP-0906 Termination and Recovery 2

Condition Reports

(CRs) 15-10819

15-10823 15-10825 15-10910

Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Date 51522 NRC:

Event Notification Report for November 10, 2015

15DP-0OT04 Appendix I, LOCT Exam Summary December 18, 2015

Licensee analysis of exam security issue

December 9, 2015

Comparison of E-Plan JPMs Administered to Annual Operating Exam JPMs December 9, 2015

Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness Miscellaneous Documents Number Title Revision/Date

Performance Criteria Formulation Bases, Systems:

CL - Containment Integrity 6

Maintenance Rule Expert Panel Action Record May 8, 2014

PVAR 4530043 Maintenance Rule (a)(1) Issue Tracking Form 3

Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Procedures

Number Title Revision 70DP-0RA01 Shutdown Risk Assessments 49 40AO-9ZZ23 Loss of SFP Level or Cooling 27

Miscellaneous

Number Title Date

Daily Plant Status Package October 28, 2015

Appendix B Protected Equipment Scheme October 16, 2015

Daily Plant Status Package October 19, 2015

Miscellaneous

Number Title Date

Unit 2 Archived Operator Log 10/27/15- 10/29/15 October 29, 2015

2R19 Outage Control Center Turnover October 28, 2015 6:00AM SSFA Sheets Shutdown Safety Function Assessment, Reactor Vessel Head Off, RCS above RV Flange October 28, 2015 3:00AM SSFA Sheets Shutdown Safety Function Assessment, Reactor Vessel Head Off, RCS above RV Flange October 16, 2015 3:00PM

Section 1R15: Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments Procedures Number Title Revision 40ST-9ZZ10 Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Channel Checks 30 40AO-9ZZ23 Loss of

SFP level or Cooling 27 40DP-9OP26 Operations Condition Reporting Process and Operability Determination/Functinoal Assessment 42 40AO-9ZZ20 Loss of HVAC 8

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision/Date

Operator Work Around/ Operator Burden Log

POD:

Analysis of Record uses an Incorrect Time Step for Reactor Vessel Internal Blowdown Load Sampling Rate

Unit 3 Containment RAS Sump Water Level Data

2014/2015

Unit 3 Containment Recirc-A Sump Level 10/18-10/21, 2015 Wednesday October 21, 2015 12:46

PM 4716046 Engineering Evaluation November 12, 2015

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report 18

Condition Reports

(CRs) 15-07886

PVAR 4539469 14-01272 15-10791 15-10131 15-09553 15-06289 15-07486 15-11627 15-09007

Engineering Work Order (ENG)

4540274

4721319

4709044

Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing Procedures Number Title Revision 36ST-9SA04

ESFAS Train B Subgroup Relay Shutdown Functional Test 25 73ST-9XI43 Containment Recirculation Sump Isolation Valve Leak Test 3 73ST-9XI04 SI Train B Valves - Inservice Test 35 39MT-9ZZ06 Disassembly/Assembly of Limitorque Type SMB/SB-00 Actuators 16 36ST-9SE02 Exore Linear Monthly Calibration 82 40ST-9GT04 Station Blackout Generator 1 Quarterly Test 6

Surveillance Test Work Order (STWO)

4555509

4555249

4555283

Work Order (WO)

4274282

4538355

4719850

4629390

4681852

4569410

4707719

4707566

4707566

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision/Date

Unit 2: 3-Day Critical Path October 22, 2015 October 22, 2015

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision/Date

Material Usage Sheet for WO #4274282 October 22, 2015

Machine Shop Work Activity Sheet for WO #4274282 October 10, 2015

Valve Services Work Order Continuation Sheet for WO #4274282 Day Shift October 22, 2015

Valve Services Work Order Continuation Sheet for WO #4274282 Night Shift October 22, 2015

Valve Services Work Order Continuation Sheet for WO #4274282 Day Shift October 23, 2015

M&TE Functional Test Usage Log October 22, 2015

QSS Installation Log for WO#4538355 October 22, 2015

Foreign Material Exclusion Risk Evaluation for WO#4538355 October 22, 2015

Non-Permit Required Confined Space Work Authorization Form October 24, 2015 at 0630 October 24, 2015

Non-Permit Required Confined Space Work Authorization Form October 24, 2015 at 1040 October 24, 2015

Valve Services Work Order Continuation Sheet for WO #4538355 Day Shift October 24, 2015

Valve Services Work Order Continuation Sheet for WO #4538355 Night Shift October 23, 2015

Valve Services Work Order Continuation Sheet for WO #4538355 Night Shift 1 October 21, 2015

Valve Services Work Order Continuation Sheet for WO #4538355 Night Shift 2 October 21, 2015

MOV Post-Test Data Review Worksheets for WO #4538355

October 24, 2015 PL1827473 Pick List for WO#4538355

TEP-3-013 Teledyne Instruments: Test Services 11

Condition Reports

(CRs) 15-11433 15-09284 15-09711

Section 1R20: Refueling and Other Outage Activities Procedures Number Title Revision 40DP-9OP02 Conduct of Shift Operations 66

Condition Reports

(CRs) 15-08758

Miscellaneous

Title Revision

Specific Manuever Plan:

EOC Shutdown 99.6% to 40% 0

Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing Procedures Number Title Revision 73ST-9CL01 Containment Leakage Type B and C Testing 44 73TI-9ZZ37 Pre-ILRT Local Leak Rate Tests 7 40ST-9SF01

CEA Operability Checks 35 73ST-9CL02 Integrated Leak Rate Test 13

Condition Reports

(CRs) 15-09879

Work Orders

(WO)

4553110

4553111 3473801

Section 1EP4: Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes Condition Reports (CRs)

CR 4560294

CRAI 4508029

CRAI 4585373

CRAI 4580375

CRDR 4498529

CRDR 4507479

CRDR 4508028

CRDR 4580252

CRDR 4580302

PCR 4506411 SWCR 4580294

Section 1EP7: Exercise Evaluation - Hostile Action Based Procedures and Documents Number Title Revision/Date

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Emergency Plan 55

After Action Report/Improvement Plan March 6, 2013

After Action Report/Improvement Plan March 12, 2015

EP-0901 Classifications 9

EP-0902 Notifications 7

EP-0903 Accident Assessment 3

EP-0904

ERO-ERF Activation and Operation 4

EP-0905 Protective Actions 7 40AO-9ZZ24 Deliberate Acts Against PVNGS 27 40DP-0OP02 Conduct of Shift Operations 68 40EP-9EO01 Standard Post-Trip Actions 19 40EP-9EO07 Loss of Offsite Power/Loss of Forced Circulation 26 40EP-9EO09 Functional Recovery 49 40EP-9EO10 Standard Appendices 89 16DP-0EP23 Emergency Preparedness Drill-Exercise Administration 9 16DP-0EP34 Emergency Response Organization 2 16EP-0BD02 Alternate Facility Activation and Guidance 0

4552939 Self-Assessment: Emergency Preparedness November 21, 2014

4628454 Self-Assessment: NRC Evaluated HAB Exercise February 27, 2015 14-04015-003 Self-Assessment Title July 24, 2015 090-05067 January 2013 - EP Augmentation Drill Report January 29, 2013 090-05069 2013 February 6 EP Full Scale Exercise Report February 14, 2013 090-05070 February 2013 - EP Augmentation Drill Report February 20, 2013 090-05071 2013 First Quarter ERO Table Top Drill Report March 1, 2013 090-05073 2013 March 6 NRC Evaluated Exercise Report March 19, 2013 090-05074 March 2013 - EP Augmentation Drill Report March 27, 2013 090-05075 2013 Contaminated Injury/HP Drill Report May 9, 2013

Procedures

and Documents Number Title Revision/Date 090-05076 2013 Environs Drill Report May 10, 2013 090-05077 May 2013 - EP Augmentation Drill Report May 17, 2013 090-05078 June 2013 - EP Augmentation Drill Report June 12, 2013 090-05079 2013 Second Quarter ERO Table Top Drill Report June 28, 2013 090-05081 July 2013 - EP Augmentation Drill Report August 19, 2013 090-05083 2013 Third Quarter ERO Table Top Drill Report September 20, 2013 090-05084 September 2013 - EP Augmentation Drill Report September 20, 2013 090-05087 September 2013 - EP Make-Up Augmentation Drill Report October 3, 2013 090-05088 2013 Health Physics Drill Report (NOV) November 27, 2013 090-05090 November 2013 - EP Augmentation Drill Report December 6, 2013 090-05092 August 2013 - EP Augmentation Drill Report January 29, 2014 090-05093 December 2013 - EP Augmentation Drill Report

090-05097 January 2014 - EP Augmentation Drill Report February 12, 2014 090-05099 July 2, 2013 PVNGS Unit 1 Unusual Event February 27, 2014 090-05100 September 2, 2013 Unit 2 Unusual Event February 27, 2014 090-05102 2013 Fourth Quarter ERO Table Top Drill Report February 21, 2014 090-05103 2014 March 5 EP Full Scale Exercise Report June 25, 2014 090-05104 2014 Environs Drill Report April 10, 2014 090-05105 2014 Onsite Contaminated Injury/HP Drill Report March 14, 2014 240-02753 2014 Assembly/Accountability/Search & Rescue Drill Report May 15, 2014 240-02759 2014 3rd Quarter ERO Tabletop Drill Report September 4, 2014 240-02760 September 2014 - EP Off Hours Augmentation Drive-In Drill Report September 26, 2014 240-02761 2014 4th Quarter EP Augmentation Drill Report November 13, 2014 240-02764 2014 Health Physics Drill Report (NOV) December 9, 2014 240-02768 2015 1st Quarter - EP Augmentation Drill Report February 27, 2015 240-02770 1513 Mini Drill - ERO RED Team (July 2015) August 7, 2015

Procedures

and Documents Number Title Revision/Date 240-02773 2015 Contaminated Injury/HP Drill Report July 24, 2015 9631-02755 June 2014 - EP Augmentation Drill Report June 24, 2014 9631-02757 2014 2nd Quarter ERO Tabletop Drill Report July 18, 2014

Corrective Action Program (Palo Verde Action Requests, Condition Report Documentation Request, PVAR/CRDR)

4362602

4362605

4362619

4411110

4424157

4439743

4444149

4451729

4451768

4485584

4485657

4520627

4532907

4547646

4556451

4556831

4556854

4558724

4599995

4566834

4576705

4577413

4577421

4577426

4593539

4605303

4617849

4619820

4619962

4620061

4620142

4620194

4620252

4620500

4628329

Corrective Action Program (Condition Reports, CRs) 15-00264-001 15-04164 15-05693 15-07536 15-07577 15-07579 15-07581 15-07858 15-07862 15-07865 15-07867 15-07894 15-07900 15-07908 15-07912 15-07919 15-07943 15-07951 15-08025 15-08026 15-08028 15-08050 15-08065 15-08113 15-08118 15-08171 15-08172 15-08174 15-08177 15-08187 15-08191

1EP8 Exercise Evaluation - Scenario Review Procedure and Document

Title Date

Preliminary Exercise Scenario for the March 4, 2015, Biennial Emergency Preparedness Exercise December 18, 2014

Section 2RS5: Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation Audits, Self-Assessments and Surveillance Number Title Date

NAD Audit 2014-007 PVNGS Nuclear Assurance Department

Audit Plan and Report October 3, 2014

Calibration Records Number Title Date Unit 1

RU-143 Plant Vent Radiation Monitor - Normal October 12, 2012 Unit 2

RU-143 Plant Vent Radiation Monitor - Normal October 12, 2012 Unit 3

RU-143 Plant Vent Radiation Monitor - Normal October 12, 2012 Unit 1

RU-4 Steam Generator Blowdown Monitor June 22, 2015 Unit 2

RU-4 Steam Generator Blowdown Monitor May 23, 2015 Unit 3

RU-4 Steam Generator Blowdown Monitor April 28, 2015 Unit 2

RU-31 A-Train Control Room Vent Intake Radiation Monitor August 20, 2015 Unit 1

RU-141 Condenser Vacuum Pump Gland Exhaust October 24, 2014 Unit 2

RU-141 Condenser Vacuum Pump Gland Exhaust March 29, 2014 Unit 3

RU-141 Condenser Vacuum Pump Gland Exhaust April 4, 2015 Unit 1

RU-1 Containment Building

Atmosphere

October 21, 2014 Unit 2

RU-1 Containment Building

Atmosphere

April 16, 2014 Unit 3

RU-1 Containment Building

Atmosphere

April 16, 2015 Unit 3

RU-148 In Containment Area

Radiation Monitor April 4, 2015 Unit 1

RU-148 In Containment Area

Radiation Monitor October 24, 2014 Fastscan 1 Whole Body Counter February 2015 Fastscan 2 Whole Body Counter January 2015 1214 Thermo Fisher

PM-12 July 24, 2015 1214 Thermo Fisher

PM-12 October 25, 2015 515

BC-4 Instrument Calibration August 5, 2015 1190 Thermo Eberline Model

FH 40 GL August 21, 2015 1245 Thermo Eberline Model

FH 40 GL July 1, 2015 1674

AMS-4 August 28, 2015 11390

AMS-4 August 26, 2015 12022 iPCM-12 July 23, 2015

Calibration Records Number Title Date 12024 iPCM-12 July 16, 2015 12028 iPCM-12 July 9, 2015 667

SAM-12 August 14,

2015 668

SAM-12 September 30, 2015 1399

RM-20 Count Rate Meter July 10, 2015

Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Revision/Date

PVNGS Multi-Channel Analyzer Calibrations 2015

PVNGS Liquid Scintillator Calibrations 2015

PVNGS Units 1,2, and 3 Offsite Dose Calculation Manual September 30, 2011

PVNGS Technical Requirements Manual - Units 1,2,3 November 17, 2011

System Health Report: SQ - Radiation Monitoring February 1, 2014 - July 31, 2014

System Health Report: SQ - Radiation Monitoring August 1, 2014, January 31, 2015

PVNGS Units 1,2, and 3 Technical Specifications Amendment 165

RMS Maintenance Rule List October 2015 2013 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report April 24, 2014 2014 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report April 25, 2015

Procedures

Number Title Revision 74AL-9SQ01 Radiation Monitoring System Alarm Validation & Response 0 74RM-9EF42 Radiation Monitor Alarm Setpoint Determination 28 74RM-9EF43 Actions for Inoperable Radiation Monitors 15 75RP-9EQ19 Operation of a Shephard 89 Calibrator 9 75RP-9EQ13 Canberra Whole Body Counting System Calibration 5 75RP-9EQ20 Calibration of Counter Scalers 5

Procedures

Number Title Revision 74AL-9SQ01 Radiation Monitoring System Alarm Validation & Response 0 75RP-9EQ26 Operation and Verification of the Merlin Gerin Model

CDM-21 Calibrator 9 75RP-9EQ31 Calibration, Response Check and Operation of the

SAM-12 Small Article Monitor 2 75RP-9EQ45 Calibration of the Thermo Eberline Model

FH 40 GL 1 75RP-9EQ46 Calibration of the

AMS-4 2 75RP-9EQ66 Calibration of the Thermo Scientific Model

RO-20 Ion Chamber Survey Meter 0 75RP-9EQ64 Calibration and Response Check of the Thermo Fisher Scientific Contamination Monitor Type iPCM-12 2 75RP-9EQ65 Calibration and Response Check of the Thermo Fisher Scientific Contamination Monitor Type PM12 3 74ST-9SQ10 Train "A" Radiation Monitoring Quarterly Functional Test Procedure 0 74ST-9SQ20 Radiation Monitoring Calibration Test for

RU-1 17 74ST-9SQ23 Radiation Monitoring Calibration Test For New Scope Area Monitors 14 74ST-9SQ26 Radiation Monitoring Calibration Test for

RU-143 15 74ST-9SQ27 Radiation Monitoring Calibration Test for

RU-144 15a 74ST-9SQ28 Radiation Monitoring Calibration Test for

RU-145 14 74ST-9SQ29 Radiation Monitoring Calibration Test for

RU-146 13a NRY26-C-0001 RMS Overview Continuing Training 5

Condition Reports

14-02224 14-02360

4321142

4389560

4397640

4433018

4433066

4439809

4447801

4449240

4577013

4571078

4578499

4566479

4566480

4280849

4451966

4452722

4455326

4464175

4465756

4468598

4469194

4472344

4473847

4476298

4499100

4499788

4499849

4504912

4637988

4639459

4641898

4649441 4656126

Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification Procedures Number Title Revision 13-NS-C075

MSPI Basis Document 9 16DP-0EP19 Performance Indicator Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone 16, 17 16DP-0EP37 Prompt Notification System 5 70DP-0PI01 Performance Index Data Mitigating Systems Cornerstone 8 71DP-0AP01 Mitigating Systems Performance Index Program 3 93DP-0LC09 Data Collection and Submittal using INPO's Consolidated Data Entry System 11

EP-0901 Classifications 8, 9

EP-0902 Notifications 6,7

EP-0905 Protective Actions 5, 6, 7

Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Revision/Date

Siren Operating Manual December 2013

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Alert and Notification System FEMA 350 Report July 2014

System Health Report - AF September 30, 2015

NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline 7

Condition Reports

(CRs) 15-071118 14-02805

Corrective Action Program (Condition Report Documentation Request, CRDRs)

4362033

4373436

4462026

4481968

4553485

4576281

4593539

4619962 4611986

Section 4OA2: Problem Identification and Resolution Condition Reports (CRs)

PVAR 4630922

PVAR 4567339

PVAR 4599826 15-01058 15-09661-004 15-04924

Miscellaneous

Number Title Revision/Date

ODMI:

Enchanced Monitoring Guidance for ARD660 relays April 30, 2015

Prompt Operability Determination:

Continuously Energized ARD Relay Reliability 0

ODMI

4228815 ARD Relay Test Plan

CRDR 4036719 Failure of Three ARD660UR Relays 1

Section 4OA3: Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Procedures

Number Title Revision 40DP-9OP02 Conduct of Shift Operations 66 40DP-9OP26 Operations Condition Reporting Process and Operability Determination/Functional Assessment, Appendix K 41

EP-0901 Classifications 9 Miscellaneous

Number Title Date

Engineering Damage Evaluation for:

Palo Verde Nuclear Plant June 22, 2015

Notice of Enforcement Discretion for Arizona Public Service (TAC Number MF6276, NOED Number 15-4-01 June 4, 2015

Primary Area Operator Logs, Modes 5 and 6 June 24, 2015 102-07056-DCM/DCE Request for Notice of Enforcement Discretion for Technical Specification 3.5.3, ECCS - Operating June 2, 2015 15-09661-002 Level 3 CR Evaluation

4661345 CRAI Maintenance Rule Functional Failure Evaluation - U3 High Pressure Safety Injection Motor Bearing Damaged

51522 NRC:

Event Notification Report for November 10, 2015

Procedures

Number Title Revision

EP-0906 Termination and Recovery 2 70DP-0MR01 Maintenance Rule 40 70DP-0RA05 Management o Risk in Modes 1 & 2 22 02DP-9RS01 Opearational Risk Management 1

Condition Reports

(CRs) 15-03934 15-10819 15-10823 15-10825

Corrective Action Program (Condition Report Documentation Request, CRDRs)

4661343 4654422