ML17059A088

Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Safety Evaluation Summary Rept 1993.

ML17059A088
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	12/31/1993
From:	NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML17059A087	List: ML17059A086 ML17059A088
References
NMP2L-1448, NUDOCS 9311040065
Download: ML17059A088 (96)

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EnclosuretoNhiP2L1448NXNEMILEPOPtT-UVlT2SAFETYEVALUATIONSYREPORT1993DocketNo.50-410LicenseNo.NPF-6993110400hS931029PDRADOCK05000410K"PDR

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage1of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:89-015,Rev.0&1Mod.PN2Y88MX194Sections1.2,8.3,9.2,9.4,9.5,9A.3,12.3SystemsTitleofChange:Descriptionofchange:VariousCafeteriaBuildingThismodificationconstructedatwo-story,steel-framed(approximately7,500sq.ft.)cafeteriabuildingwithitsownfoundationandstructuralelementsadjacenttothewestwalloftheturbinebuildingbetweentheexisting-chillwaterbuildingandthefoamroom.Powerfeedforthenewcafeteriapanel2NJS-PNL302wasfromloadcenter2NJS-US3,locatedintheturbinebuildingatelevation277'.Toenableconstructionofthecafeteriaanditsfoundation,modificationstoexistingplantstructuresandcomponentswerenecessaryintheyardarea,foamroom,I&Cshop,passageway,turbinebuilding,andthechillwaterbuilding.Affectedsystemsincludedfireprotectionwater,domesticwater,HVAC,andlighting.The6-inchblockwallontheeastendofthecafeteriabuilding(sidefacingtheUnit2turbinebuilding)wasfilledwithconcrete,therebyprovidingradiationprotectionfromgammaradiationresultingfromhydrogeninjection.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thismodificationresulted.intheadditionofanonsafety-relatedstructure.Evaluationswereperformedtodeterminepotentialeffectsonsafety-relatedsystemsandstructures,ALARAconcerns,fireprotection,thesitefloodanalysis,andelectricalpowersupply.Theevaluationsconcludedthattherewerenoadverseeffectsresultingfromthismodification.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage2of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages!SystemsTitleofChange!90-039Mod.PN2Y89MX083Section3.7ASeismicMonitoringPermanentRelocationofAccelerographs2ERS-PAC2CandPAC2BDescriptionofChangesThismodificationrelocatedseismicmonitor2ERS-PAC2Cfromtherecirculationpumpmotortothereactorpedestal.Thismodificationalsorelocatedseismicmonitor2ERS-PAC2BtoalocationonthesameCSHlinebutclosertotheCSHpenetrationattheprimarycontainmentwall.Xthadbeendeterminedthatboth-unitsfailed,inpart,duetohighbackgroundvibration.Bothofthenewlocationswereselectedbasedonanticipatedlowbackgroundvibration.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThismodificationestablishedanewlocationforatriaxialpeakaccelerographtomaintaincompliancetoRegulatoryGuide1.12andenabledtheinstrumenttoaccuratelymonitorseismicactivity.Therelocationofthisinstrumentwillnotaffecttheoperationofanysafetysystemsorthesafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.Theplacementoftheaccelerographonthereactorpedestaldoesnotconflictwiththeoriginaldesignintent.Thenewinstrumentrequirescalibrationinaccordancewiththemanufacturer'srecommendations.Thenewlocationonthereactorpedestalallowstheinstrumenttomeasureseismicmovementsthatcanbecomparedtotheanalyticalseismicresponsewithouttheseismictracesbeingmaskedbynonseismictracesfrombackgroundvibration.AmendmentNo.39tothefacilityoperatinglicenserevisedTechnicalSpecificationTables3.3.7.2-1and4.3.7.2-1toreflecttherelocationofseismicmonitor2ERS-PAC2C.2ERS-PAC2BTherelocationofaccelerograph2ERS-PAC2BtoanewlocationonthesameprimarycontainmentCSHlineastheoriginallocationdidnotchangetheUSARorTechnicalSpecifications.Thenewlocationisexpectedtominimizetheaccelerograph'sexposuretobothbackgroundvibrationandpersonnelcontact.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage3of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary!90-039(cont'd.)(cont'd.)Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage4of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:90-076Dwg.No.001.6550-076-092,093;EDC2E00528USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Section9.1SpentFuelPoolCoolingandCleanup(SFPC)SFPCFilter/Demin.EffluentFlowSwitchSetpointChangeDescriptionofChange:Flowswitch2SFC-FAL47A/Binitiatesasystemtroublealarmandstartsfilter/demineralizerholdingpump2SFC-P4A/BautomaticallywhentheflowinSFPCfilter/demineralizerFLT1A/Bdropsbelowthelowflowsetpoint.Thischangeincreasedthelowflowsetpointfrom360gpmto700gpmtoallowforproperinstrumentcalibration.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Raisingthelowflowsetpointfrom360gpmto700gpmdoesnotadverselyimpactnuclearsafety.Flowswitch2SFC-FSL47A/Bcontinuestoperformthealarmandstartfunctionsoftheholdingpumpinthesamemannerastheexistingdesign.Thenormalflowrateseenby2SFC-FT47A/Biseither1200gpmor2400gpm.Thedifferencebetweenthenormalflowrateandthelowflowsetpointisadequatetoavoidspuriousactuation.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage5of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:Systems"TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:90-081EDC2M00306,FDDRKG1-0866-1Sections3.9B,4.6ControlRodDrive(CRD)AdditionofControlRodDrive(CRD)Model7RDB144EG001NewCRDs(ModelNo.7RDB144EG001)werepurchasedasreplacementpartstobeinstalledinthereactor'vesselaspartoftheroutineCRDMaintenanceProgram.ThedesignofthenewCRDincorporatesthefollowingdesignchanges:Thematerialforthestrainer,innerfilter,andouterfilterwaschangedfromstainlesssteeltype304totype304LtoenhancetheirresistancetoIntergranularStressCorrosionCracking(IGSCC).2~3~Thedesignoftheuncouplingrodwaschangedfromtwopieces(uncouplingrodandtube)weldedtogether,toasinglepiecemadeofsolidbar.Asegmentoftheuncouplingrodhasatriangularcross-sectiontoassureproperinstallationinthecenterholeofthespud,therebyeliminatingthepossibilityforhumanerrorduringtheassemblyoftheCRD.Thesetscrewplugwhichcontainedasinglethrough-holecoolantpassagewasreplacedwithacoolingorificecontainingeightsideholestoreducethepossibilityofcoolantflowblockagebyforeignmaterial.Thisdesignchangeresultsinasmallincreaseofapproximately0.02gpminthecoolantflowthrougheachCRD(3.7gpmforthetotalof185CRDs).4.ThepositionindicatorprobeisnotincludedasapartofthenewCRD,butratherissuppliedseparately.Inaddition,asmallernumberofthenewdriveswillbesubjectedtothe5-yearmaintenancelifetestsduetothelowerproductionvolumeexpectedforthismodel.TheCRDsareusedforpositioningthecontrolrodsinthereactorcore.Changesdescribedinthissafetyevaluationwillnothaveanyadverseimpactoneitherthenormalorthesafety-relatedCRDfunctions,includingscramcapabilityorscramspeedoftheCRD.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage6of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary:90-081(cont!d.)CRDModel7RDB144EG001hasbeenreviewedagainst"BWRScramDischargeSystemSafetyEvaluation,"issuedbytheNRCinDecember1980,andfoundtohavenoimpactontheevaluationorconclusions.Theslightincreaseinflowcausedbythedesignchangeofthecoolingorificeiswithinhydrauliccapacityofthecontrolroddrivehydraulicsystem(RDS).PerformanceofoperatingproceduresfortheRDSwillverifychargingrequirementsaremet.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage7of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System!TitleofChange:90-099SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0006-90Sections1.2,4.6,9.3,12.3ControlRodDrive(RDS)ControlRodDriveMaintenanceRoomDescriptionofChange:ThefollowingchangesweremadeintheCRDmaintenanceroomlocatedinthesecondarycontainment.TheexistingCRDflushtankwasremovedandreplacedwithanew,shieldedflushtankthatincludesaneffluentfiltrationsystem,pump,andbottleaccumulator.Thetankwasalsorelocatedwithintheroom.2.Theexistingflushtankdrainlineandvalveswereremovedandthepipingwascapped.3.Thecontrolcabinetfortheultrasoniccleanerwaspermanentlymountedonthenorthwalloftheroom.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThesechangestotheCRDmaintenanceroomwillgreatlyimproveCRDhandling,maintenanceandstorageforrefuelingoutages,andreducethepossibility'f'creatinghighradiationareasintheCRDmaintenanceroomandonelevation261'fthesecondarycontainment.TheCRDmaintenanceroomequipmentisnotrequiredtosupportsafeshutdownoftheplant.Thechangesaddressedinthissafetyevaluationarenonsafetyrelatedanddonotadverselyaffecttheabilityofanysystemsorcomponentsimportanttosafetytoperformtheirsafetyfunction.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage8of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:Systeme~TitleofChanges90-103Mod.PN2Y86MX085Section9.3InstrumentNitrogen(GSN)ControlRoomNuisanceAlarmsCEC601505,CEC601506DescriptionofChange:Thenitrogensystemtroublealarm(annunciatorwindow601506)andtheprimarycontainmentpurgetemperaturelowalarm(annunciatorwindow601505)activateunderlowprocesstemperaturestoindicateaproblemwiththetrimheatersand/orelectricvaporizers.Nuisancealarmswerebeinggeneratedwhentherewasnoorlownitrogenflowbecausethesourceofthesignalforannunciationislocatedoutside(subjecttolowambientairtemperature),whereheatwasbeinglostfromnoninsulatedprocesspiping.Toeliminatethesenuisancealarms,electricheattracing/insulationwasaddedonthenitrogeninertingsystempipingfromthetrimheaters/electricvaporizers,intheyard(nitrogentank)area,toapointpriortoadjoiningthecontainmentpurgesystem,inthestandbygasbuilding.SafetyEvaluationSummary!Thischangeeliminatesnuisancealarmsbymaintainingnitrogenlinetemperatureandreducingheattransferlossesfromtheprocess.Thealarmlogicasdesignedstillprovidesthefunctionalcapabilityofalarmingiftheheatersareinoperable.Theabilitytomaintainthenitrogentemperatureabovetheminimumdesirabletemperatureisalsoenhancedbythischange.Basedontheevaluationperformed',itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage9of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-112,Rev.3&4N/AN/AVariousOfficeandStorageFacilitiesinSupportofOutagesattheNineMilePoint.SiteDescriptionofChange:AsreportedinletterNMP2L1324,datedOctober30,1991,underSafety"Evaluation90-112,Rev.1and2,temporaryofficeandstoragefacilitieswereinstalledforusebythecontractorstaffduringUnit2refuelingoutages.Revision3toSafetyEvaluation90-112includedanadditionaltemporaryfacility,adieseltankstorageberm.Thisstoragebermprovidesenvironmentalprotectionagainstspillageofdieselfuelfromthreefuelstoragetankerslocatedwithintheboundariesoftheberm.Revision4toSafetyEvaluation90-112includedanewly-proposeddesignforapermanentaccesscontrolbuildingforreplacementoftheexistingtemporaryradiationprotectionportalfacility.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theseconstructionactivitiesandtemporary,sitechangesdonotadverselyimpactthesitefloodinganalysis(probablemaximumprecipitation).Electricalpowerforthesouthauxiliarybayexitportalistakenfromtheconstructionpowerloopandwillnotadverselyaffectpermanentplantpowersystems.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage10of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:91-029,Rev.1&2SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0205-91USARAffectedPages!S'stemeTitleofChange:Sections9.3,11.3Offgas(OFG)OffgasFreeze-OutDryerBypassandDrainLineReroute.DescriptionofChange:Thisdesignchangewastwofold.First,topreventthepossibilityoforganicmaterialfromenteringthecondenser,andthusthereactor,throughthecondensatesystem(intheevent.offreeze-outdryerrefrigeranttubeleaks),thefreeze-outdryerdrainwasreroutedtoradwastedraintank2DFT-TK1B.Thisinvolvedtheadditionofanewdrainline,andisolationoftheexistingdrainlinebyclosingvalve2OFG-V43atcondensernozzle135A,andbyclosinganewsecondisolationvalve,20FG-V300.Secondly,foreachfreeze-outdryer(20FG-DRYlA,1Band1C)inletprocessline,abypassdrainlinewasaddedtocontinuouslyremoveentrappedmoisture.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thischangewillnotimpacttheoperationofanysafety-relatedsystemsoraffectthesafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant,andwillnotimpactanyequipmentassociatedwiththeoffgasprocess.Hydrogendetonationdesigncriteriaarenotimpacted.Offgasdrainfluidwillbeanalyzed,andanyfreonand/oroil,ifdetected,willbeprocessedbyanenvironmentallyandradiologicallyapprovedmethod.Newpipeinstalledmeetstheoriginaldesign,specificationsandmaterialrequirements.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage11of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:91-034'Mod.PN2Y86MX085Sections7.3,9.3ReactorWaterCleanup,ReactorPlantSamplingControlRodNuisanceAlarmWindows602315,602317,602318DescriptionofChange:Wheneverthereactorwatercleanup(RWCU)filter/demineralizersareoutofservice,conductivitygoeshighduetoprocessfluidstagnation.Thiscausesnuisancealarmssincecontrol'roomoperatorsareonlyconcernedwithhigh/lowconductivitylevelswhentheassociateddemineralizertrainisinoperation.Toeliminatethesenuisancealarms,theRWCUfilterdemineralizereffluentconductivityhigh/lowalarminputwasinterlockedwiththeassociatedfilterdemineralizeroperationlogicsuchthatthealarmisinhibitedwhenthedemineralizerisnotinservice.Inaddition,theredundanthighconductivityalarminput,totheassociatedfilterdemineralizer"trouble"annunciatorwindowwasdeletedbyreprogrammingtheprogrammablecontrollerassociatedwitheachfilterdemineralizertrainandconnectingitsoutputtotheexisting"high/low"annunciatorwindow.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThismodificationcorrectsthenuisancealarmswithoutadverselyaffectingtheRWCUsystemorthereactorsamplingsystem,andwillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage12of93SafetyEvaluationNo.cImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffeotedPages!System!TitleofChanges91-038EDC2E10345Section10.4LowPressureHeaterDrains(HDL)LevelIndicatingControllerIDChangeoutDescriptionofChange:Thischangereidentifiedthe.fourthpointheaterwaterlevelcontrollersfrom2HDL-LIC4A,B,&Cto2HDL-LIK4A,B&Ctocorrectlyidentifytheirformandfunction.TheLICtoLIKdesignationchangecorrectlyidentifiesthatthecontrollersarecapableofprovidingthelevelsetpointautomaticallyormanuallywithoperatorcontrolasoriginallyspecified.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thischangedoesnotaffectthedesignorfunctionofthefourthpointheaterwaterlevelcontrollers.Thecontrollerswerereidentifiedtoproperlyindicatethattheypossesstheauto/manualtransfercapabilityasoriginallyspecifiedandpurchased.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage13of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:91-042,Rev.2,3&5Mod.PN2Y89MX078Sections1.2,5.2,10.1,10.4OxygenFeedwaterInjection(OFI)InstallationoftheOxygenFeedwaterInjectionSystemDescriptionofChange:Thismodificationaddedtheoxygenfeedwaterinjection(OFI)system.ThepurposeoftheOFIsystemistomaintain20to50ppbofoxygeninthecondensate/feedwatersystems.Theinjectionofoxygeninthesuctionsideofthecondensatepumpswillminimizecorrosionandcorrosionproductsreleasedfromthecondensate/feedwatersystemmaterials.TheOFIsystemconsistsoftwoparts.ThefirstpartistheOFIsupplywhichconsistsofsixoxygencylinders,anoxygencontrolmanifold,excessflowcheckvalveandreliefvalve.Thesecondpartistheinjectionportion,whichisoperatedinamanualormanualbypassmodeandiscomposedofisolationandbypassvalves,flowcontroller,solenoidandcheckvalves,backpressureregulator,andoxygenandcondensateflowindicators.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheOFIsystemdoesnotperformanysafety-relatedfunctions.Failureofthesystemtoperformitsintendedfunctionwillnothaveanadverseimpactonthecondensateandfeedwatersystems,norwillithaveanyimpactontheperformance,availabilityandreliabilityofanyothersafety-relatedsystem.Theadditionofoxygeninthecondensate/feedwatersystemswillreducetherateofcorrosionandcorrosionproductsreleasedfromthesystem'scarbonsteelandstainlesssteelcomponents,andwillassisttheNMP2designinmeetingALARArequirements.Theaddedoxygenwillnotaffectthechlorideconcentration,conductivity,pH,orspecificactivityintheprimarycoolant.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage14of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange!91-043,Rev.1&2MajorOrderNo.0546Sections1.2,2.4N/ANewYorkTelephoneSwitchBuildingatNineMilePointUnit2DescriptionofChange:Theoriginaltelephonesystemonsitewasinadecjuatetomeettheneedsofsitepersonnel.AnewsingleswitchreplacedthetwoswitchespreviouslyinuseatUnits1and2.Thenewsystemishousedinanewbuildingoutsidetheprotectedarea,westoftheeastfloodcontrolbermatUnit2.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thenewsingleswitchfacilitatestheentiresitetelephonesystemaswell.asmeetingthefutureofdatacommunication.Thenewbuildingisnotwithinthedirectflowpathoffloodwaters,andthuswillhavenoadverseimpactontheprobablemaximumprecipitation(PMP)floodstudy.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReport,Page15of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:91-052Mod.PN2Y86MX085Figure9.2-2Sh.5ServiceWater(SWP)ControlRoomNuisanceAlarmWindows601134,601222WhenpowertooneoftheSWPstrainers(2SWP*STR4A,B,C,D,E,F)isdisconnected,amotoroverloadsignalissenttothecontrolroomannunciatorwindows601134and601222causingfalseandunwantednuisancealarms.Thismodificationeliminatedthenuisancealarmsbyinterlockingthemotoroverloadcircuitswiththeloss-of-powercircuitsforeachofthestrainerssothatthemotoroverloadalarmissenttothecontrolroomannunciatorsonlywhenpowerisonandthemotorisactuallyoverloaded.TheeffectsofSafetyEvaluation91-052wereincorporatedinFigure9.2-2Sh.5,USARRevision4.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThedesignchangeassociatedwiththeSWPstrainermotorcontrolcircuitwillnotcompromisethedesignfortheexistingbypass/inoperablestatusindicationandannunciationforthesecircuits.Theelectricalseparationbetweendivisionalandnondivisionalcircuitswillbemaintained,andthedesignassociatedwiththeSWPstrainermotorcontrolcircuitchangewillbe"fail-safe"suchthatasinglefailurewillnotcompromisetheSWPsystem'sabilitytoperformit'sprotectivefunction.TheSWPstrainers'perationandfunctionwillnotchange.Thismodificationcorrected'henuisancealarmswithoutadverselyaffectingtheSWPsystemandwillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage16of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:Zmplementatfi.onDooumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange!.91-054,Rev.1Mod.PN2Y86MX085Section9.2ServiceWater(SWP)ControlRoomNuisanceAlarmWindows601115,601218DescriptionofChange:Eachoftheservicewaterpumps,2SWP*P1A,1B,1C,1D,1E,1F,havealowsuctionpressurealarmtonotifytheoperatorsofalowsuctionpressurecondition.Whenapumpistakenoutofserviceatthepresenttimeformaintenance,thepressureswitchsensesalowsuctionpressureandsendsasignaltothecontrolroomannunciatorwindows601115or601218,causingfalseandunwantednuisancealarms.Toeliminatethesenuisancealarms,theservicewaterpumplowsuctionpressurecircuitswereinterlockedwiththeassociatedservicewaterpumpcontrolswitchcircuitstoinhibitthealarminputwhentheswitchisinthePULL-TO-LOCKorSTOPpositions.TheswitchactsasapermissivetoallowthealarmtoperformasrequiredwhenplacedintheSTART,NORMAL-AFTER-START,orNORMAL-AFTER-STOPpositions.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theoperatorsareconcernedwiththeservicewaterpumplowsuctionpressureonlywhentheassociatedpumpisinoperationorinthestandbymode.Thischangeeliminatestheactuationofthisnuisancealarmwhenamaintenanceactivityisperformedonaservicewaterpumptrainresultinginthiscondition.Theservicewaterpumps'perationandfunctiondonotchange.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.F SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage17of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:91-055EDC2F00342ProceduresN2-0P-48,N2CSPQ620gN2CSPD621gN2-CSP-W622USARAffectedPages:System!Section9.5AuxiliaryBoilerChemicalFeed(ABH)TitleofChange:AuxiliaryBoilerChemicalFeedSystemDescriptionofChange:Thischangerevisedthedescriptionoftheauxiliaryboilerchemicalfeedsystemtoaccuratelyreflecttheexistingplantoperationalandconfigurationstatus.Thepreviousdescriptionstatedthatthesystemutilizedsodiumsulfiteintank2ABH-TK1andsodiumhydroxideintank2ABH-TK2.Thischangerevisedthedescriptiontoreflectthattank2ABH-TK1containssodiumphosphateandtank2ABH-TK2containssodiumsulfite.Thecorrespondingpumpsforthesetankshavealsobeencorrectlydescribedconsistentwiththetankcontents.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theauxiliaryelectricboilersystemisnonsafetyrelatedandisnotrequiredtosupportsafeshutdownofthereactorortoperformintheoperationofreactorsafetyfeatures.Thisdocumentationchangereflectstheactualoperationalconfigurationoftheauxiliaryboilerchemicalfeedsystemandisconsistentwithindustrystandardsandvendorrecommendations.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage18of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:91-062TemporaryMod.91-056N/AFireProtectionWater(FPW)TemporaryClosureofValve2FPW-V215DescriptionofChange:Thistemporarychangeallowedtheextendedclosureoffireprotectionwatersupplyvalve2FPW-V215andjumperedoutthetroubleindication,computeralarm,andnuisancealarmsignalinitiatedfromthisvalve'spositionswitch(2FPW-ZS415).Valve2FPW-V215supplieswatertothesprinklerpipingonmaintransformer2MTX-XM1B(firezone502SW).It'sclosurewasrequiredforthedisassemblyofthesprinklerpipingtoallowremovalofthetransformerforrepair/replacement.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thistemporarychangedoesnotaffectthesafeoperationorsafeshutdowncapabilitiesoftheplant.Valve2FPW-V215supplieswatertoonlyonefirezone(502SW);andtransformer2MTX-XM1Bistheonlycomponentinfirezone502SW.Theremainingmaintransformers(2MTX-XM1A/C/D)eachhavetheirindividualfirezonesandwaterdelugesystemscontrolledbytheirindividualwatersupplyvalves.Themaintransformersareseparatedfromeachotherbyconcretefirewalls.Theclosureofthewatersupplytofirezone502SW,therefore,willnotplaceatriskanyothercomponentsinfirezone502SWorinanyadjoiningfirezones.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthistemporarychangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed,safetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage19of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPagess91-069MajorOrderNo.0545Sections1.2,2.4System!TitleofChange:N/ANineMilePointUnit2SitePavingandDrainageDescriptionofChange:Thischangeregradedandpavedtheparkinglotsouthofthe"P>>building(anareaofapproximately16,000sq.yds.).Drainageoftheswalesouthoftheparkingarea,runningtotheeastandthentothenorth,wasalsoimprovedbyliningwithgeotexalfabricandcobblestone,andtheexistingculvertundertheeastserviceroadwasabandoned.A12'-0"'pavedturninglanewasalsoaddedtoLakeRoadbetweenthewarehouseroadandtheeastserviceroad.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thischangetotheparkinglotsaswellasturninglaneintotheeastserviceroadimprovestheflowoftrafficintoandoutoftheplant.Improvingtheconditionoftheparkinglotseliminatesthepossibilityofpersonnelinjuryduetolooserocksandstandingwaterconditions.Areviewofthefloodstudycalculationsdeterminedthatthischangeimprovessitedrainageandhasnoadverseeffectontheprobablemaximumprecipitation(PMP)floodelevation.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage20of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange!91-072,Rev.1Mod.PN2Y86MX085Section7.4ReactorCoreIsolationCooling(RCIC)ControlRoomNuisanceAlarmWindow601320DescriptionofChange:TheRCICturbineexhaustheaderdrainpotisequippedwithalevelswitch(2ICS*LS206)thatactivatescontrolroomannunciator601320,andprovidesasignaltoopenair-operatedvalve(AOV)2ICS*AOV110onhighwaterlevelsimultaneously.Withvalve2ICS*AOV110open,waterdrainsfromthedrainpottothereactorbuildingfloordrainsthroughAOVs2ICS*AOV109and2ICS*AOV110.Presentlywhenvalve2ICS*AOV110opens,thewaterlevelquicklydrops,theswitchresets,thealarmclears,andthevalvecloses.Thisoccursfrequentlyandmakesannunciatorwindow601320anuisancealarmthatcontinuouslyalarmsandresetsinresponsetonormalevents.Thismodificationaddedtwotimedelayrelaystolevelswitch2ICS*LS206.Thefirsttimedelayrelaykeepsvalve2ICS*AOV110openforadesignedperiodoftime.Thesecondtimedelayrelaywasconnectedinthecircuitthatactuatesannunciatorwindow601320.Itallowstheactuationofannunciatorwindow601320onhighdrainpotlevelonlyafterthedesignatedperiodoftimehaspassedandthelevelswitchhasnotreset.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThismodificationcorrectsanuisancealarmwithoutadverselyaffectingtheoperationorfunctionoftheRCICsystem.Therevisedalarmcircuitwillalerttheoperatortotheabnormalconditionthatthewaterlevelinthedrainpothasnotdecreasedsufficientlyoncethedrainvalvehasbeensignalledtoopenduetodrainpothighlevel.Thecurrentlogicwhichcloses2ICS*AOV110uponopeningofsteamsupplyvalve2ICS*MOV120remainsintactandisnotbeingchanged.Thiswillassurethat2ICS*AOV110willbecloseduponsteamsupplythrough2ICS*MOV120.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnot,involveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage21of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:'91-074,Rev.1,2&3Mod.PN2Y88MX059Sections4.6,5.4ReactorWaterCleanup(RWCU),ControlRodDrive(CRD)TitleofChange:CRDtoRWCUPumpsPipingInstallationDescriptionofChange:ThismodificationinstalledasupplyofsealinjectionwaterfromtheCRDsystemtothe,sealinjectionpipingoftheRWCUpumps.ThisresultsindemineralizedqualitywaterbeingutilizedforRWCUpumpsealinjection,whichisamuchbetterqualitywaterthanpresentlyused.Recommendationtoinstallthismodification,knownas"sealpurge,"wasprovidedtoutilitiesinGeneralElectric(GE)ServiceInformationLetter(SIL)Number258,Supplement1.Inaddition,a3/4-inchbypassvalvewasinstalledforeachRWCUpumpdischargecheckvalveasrecommendedinGESILNumber258,Supplement2.Thebypassvalvecanbeusedforwarmupofanidlepumpusingbleedbackflowfromanoperatingpump.Theexistingsealinjectionsystemwasnotdisabled,butwasvalvedoutfornormaloperation.ThisallowsRWCUpumpoperationwiththepresentlyexistingsealinjectionsystem(aftervalverealignment)shouldtheCRDsystembeunavailableforanyreason(e.g.,duringoutages).ThischangealsopermanentlyremovedaRWCUsystemthermalreliefvalve,2WCS-RV143,whichhadpreviouslybeentemporarilyremovedunderTemporaryModification92-007(SafetyEvaluation92-004).SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThenewRWCUpumpsealinjectionsystemisexpectedtoincreaseseallife.andimprovesystemoperability.Radiationexposureofoperationsandmaintenancepersonnelshouldbereducedduetolongerseallifeandimprovedpumpwarmupprocedures.CRDsystemdesignandperformancerequirementsarenotimpactedandRWCUsystemdesignrequirementsremainfulfilledbythismodification.PipinginstalledistoASMEandANSICoderequirementsandisseismicallysupportedsoasnottoimpacttheoperationofanyequipmentconsideredimportanttosafety.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage22of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:91-074,Rev.1,2&3(cont'd.)SafetyEvaluationSummary:(cont'd.)Thismodificationresultsinthediversionofupto16gpmofCRDflowtotheRWCUpumpseals.ThisadditionaldemandwillreducesystempressuresbutpressureswillstillbesufficienttomaintaintheminimumscramaccumulatorpressurewithoutrequiringanyCRDsystemadjustments.TheanalyticallimitforthedifferentialRWCUflowTechnicalSpecificationsetpointwasincreasedtoallowfortheadditionalunmonitoredinletflowintroducedbythismodification.Adequatemarginexistsinthebasisforthesetpointsuchthattheanalyticalvaluecanbeincreasedby20gpmwithoutimpactingtheallowablevalueorsetpoint.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage23of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDooumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:91-077,Rev.',2,&3Mod.PN2Y89MX042Sections1.2,8.3,9.5,9A.3,9B.10System:UninterruptiblePowerSupply(UPS)TitleofChange:Replace2VBB-UPS1Cand2VBB-UPS1DDescriptionofChange:ThepurposeofthischangewastoeliminatetheoverloadedconditionsonnormalUPSs2VBB-UPSlCand1Dinordertomaximizethereliability,maintainability,andperformanceoftheseunits(referenceLER89-014).Thescopeofthismodificationwasto:1.Replace2VBB-UPS1Cand1Dwithnewequipmenttoimprovereliabilityandmaintainability.2.Shedloadstoremoveoverloadedconditionofthisequipmentby:a.Reducingwattageofessentiallightingfixturesinturbineandscreenwellbuildings.b.Powerthoseessentiallightingfixtureslocatedadjacentto8-hourbattery-packlightsfromnormallighting.c.Changereceptaclepowerfeedsfromessentialtonormalpower.USARdescriptionsofthelightingsystemshavealsobeenrevisedtomoreclearlyindicatethoselightingsystemsthatareavailabletosafelyshutdowntheplantduringabnormalorfireevents.Theplantemergencyand8-hourbattery-packlightingsystemsarerequiredforsafeshutdownoftheplantintheeventofanemergencyconditionevaluatedintheUSAR.Thismodificationdoesnotalterthepresentconfigurationsoftheemergencyor8-hourbattery-packlightingsystemsthatarerequiredforsafeshutdownoftheplant.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage24of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:91-077,Rev.1,2,&3(cont'd.)SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theessentiallightingsystemprovidespartialilluminationforcertaincriticalareasoftheplantsuchascontrolroom,relayandcomputerroom,standbydieselgeneratorrooms,emergencyswitchgearrooms,servicewaterpumprooms,andtoandfromareaswheresafety-relatedequipmentislocated.Thechangestotheplantessentiallightingsystemarestillwithinthedesignbasisoftheplantbecause:1.Theminimumrequiredilluminationof0.5foot-candleforallexitpathsismaintained.2~Wherevertheessentiallightingisconvertedtonormallighting,theemergencyand/or8-hourbattery-packlightingisstillavailableforsafeshutdownoftheplantintheeventofafireinanyfireareaoftheplantorintheeventofanaccidentortransientdescribedintheUSAR.3.Thesafeshutdowncapabilityoftheplanteitherfromcontrolroomorotherareasoftheplant(suchasremoteshutdownroom)isnotcompromised.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage25of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.!91-078SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0141-90,EDC2F00418USARAffectedPages:SystemoTitleofChange:Section10.4CirculatingWater(CWS)CirculatingWaterSystemConductivityEquipmentDescriptionofChange:Equipmentexistedatthedischargeflumewithinthecoolingtowerscreenhousetomeasurecirculatingwaterconductivity.Theconductivityelement(2CWS-CE103)andassociated'quipment(2CWS-CIT103)wereno.longerusedtocalculateblowdownrequirementsbymeansofaconductivitymeasurement.Thischangeremovedtheconductivityelement(2CWS-CE103)andretiredinplacethetransmitter(2CWS-CIT103).SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thecirculatingwatersystemisnotrequiredtoeffectorsupportsafeshutdownofthereactorortoperformintheoperationofreactorsafetyfeatures.EliminationoftheconductivityanalysisequipmentwillnotimpactthefunctionortheperformanceoftheCWSsystem.ThedesignbasiswaterqualityoftheCWSsystemismadeupofvariousconcentrationsofdifferentconstituents.Actualoperatingconstituentconcentrationsintheclosedlooparemaintainedatlessthantwotimestheactuallakewaterconcentrationsasaresultoftheconstantmakeupandacontrolledblowdownflow.CirculatingwateranalysisisprocedurallycontrolledbytheChemistryDepartmentonaregularbasis.TheChemistryDepartmenthasstrictproceduralcontrolsinrelationtoblowdownrequirements.Copperdischargelimitsarenowthecontrollingfactorindeterminingblowdownrequirements.ConductivitycanbedeterminedbytheChemistryDepartmentbymeansofgrabsamplewhennecessary.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage26of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:SystemsTitleofChange:91-084Mod.PN2Y89MX094Sections3.9A,6.2ContainmentAtmosphereMonitoring(CMS)Eliminationof2CMS*SOV25A,B,C,DDescriptionofChange:Thedesignofthehydrogen/oxygenmonitoringsystemprovidesforbothmanualandautomaticsamplingofprimarycontainmentbytwofullyindependenthydrogen/oxygenanalyzertrains.Thismonitoringcanbeaccomplishedbymanuallyselectingasamplefromfivedifferentareas(perdivision);threefromthedrywell,andtwofromthesuppressionchamber.Thesamplingpointcouldalsooriginallybeautomaticallyselectedandsequencedbyacycletimeropeningandclosingselectorvalvesforthefivedifferentareas,alternatingbetweendrywellandthesuppressionchamber.Thismodificationremovedthevalveinternalsfromthesuppressionchamberselectorvalves,2CMS*SOV25A,B,C,D,functionallyeliminatingthesevalvesfromthesamplepath.Thischangeeliminatedthecapabilityforautomaticallyselectingandsequencingofsample'ocation,alternatingbetweendrywellandsuppressionchamber.Thecapabilityforautomaticallyselectingandsequencingbetweendrywellareasremains.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theeliminationoftheselectorvalvesinthesuppressionchamberdoesnotaffectthesafety-relatedfunctionofthehydrogen/oxygenmonitoringsystem.Thecapabilitystillexiststosamplethedrywellandsuppressionchamber,arepresentativesampleisstillbeingtaken,andthetransportandaccuracyofthesampleisnotaffected.Valves2CMS*SOV25A,B,C,Ddidnotperformacontainmentisolationfunction.TheisolationfunctionbetweensuppressionchamberanddrywellsamplingthatwaspreviouslyperformedbythesevalvescanbeprovidedbytheassociatedCMSsystemcontainmentisolationvalves.Basedon'heevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage27of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ZmplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:91-087,Rev.1&2Mod.PN2Y88MX058Sections3.6A,5.4,8.3,10.1,10.4System:TitleofChange:ReactorWaterCleanup(WCS)FeedwaterStratification-ReductionofLong-TermEffectsDescriptionofChange:Thismodificationconsistedofaddingan8-inchmotor-operatedglobevalvetoeachWCSlinebeforeitjoinsthefeedwater(FWS)lineatthethermaltee,andimplementationofanewoperatingproceduretopermitdirectionofallWCSflowthroughonefeedwaterlinewithfeedwaterflowthroughtwofeedwaterlinesatreactorpowerlevelsunder204.ThiscapabilitywillreducethemaximumdifferentialtemperaturewithincreasedWCSflow,resultinginanincreaseintheallowablecyclesandcorrespondinglifeofthepipe.Asaminimum,theshiftingoftheWCSflowtoeitherofthetwofeedwaterlineswilldoubletheexistingpredictedlifeofthepipeasitrelatestoWCSinjection.Twenty-twothermocoupleswerealsoprovided,twoontheWCSsystemandtwentyontheFWSsystem,tomonitorthealarmstratificationinthefeedwaterpipingthermalteeregion.SafetyEvaluationSummary:'TheWCSsystemisnotsafetyrelatedandisnotrequiredforsafeshutdown.Thenewvalveoperatorsandallcontrolsarealsononsafetyrelated.Allnonsafety-relatedequipmentin.safety-relatedareasareseismicallysupported.Theadditionofthevalvestolines2-WCS-008-89-1and2-WCS-008-250-1createsanegligibleincreaseinpressuredropinthesystemwhenthevalvesarefullopen.Whenthesevalvesareatotherthanfullopen,theWCSsystemdesignisboundedbytheexistingsystemanalysis.TotalcombinedmassflowsandenthalpyoffeedwaterandRWCUwaterdonotchange.ThechangesinWCSflowcontroloccuronlyatreactorpowerlevelsunder204.Thereactorpressureboundaryisunaffectedbythischangesincetheoriginalcontainmentisolationvalvesandassociatedpipingremainunchanged.Designtemperaturesandpressuresremainunchangedasdonormaloperatingtemperatures.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage28of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:.SafetyEvaluationSummary:91-087,Rev.1&2(cont'd.)(cont'd.)Analysisoftheaffectedpiping.andsupportsisinaccordancewiththerequirementsofSectionIIXoftheASMECode1974Edition,andincompliancewiththerequirementsspecifiedinthe,USAR.Eachvalveweighedinexcessof1000lbs.;therefore,whenthevalveswereloadedintothereactorbuildingandmainsteamtunneltheyweretreatedasheavyloads.ThisrequiredthattheriggingarrangementsandloadpathschosenmettherequirementsoftheHeavyLoadsStudy(USARAppendix9C)andNUREG-0612.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage29of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:91-094SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0391-91USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Section9.4ControlBuildingHVACRemoteShutdownRoomAirConditionerFilterDifferentialPressureHighAlarmsDescriptionofChange:Originally,theinstrumentsensinglinesfortheremoteshutdownroomairconditioningunits(2HVC*ACU3A/B)airfilterdifferentialpressure(D/P)switches(2HVC-PDIS66A/B)wereinstalledsuchthatthelowsideoftheD/PswitchsensedthefilterdischargewhilethehighsideoftheD/Pswitchsensedroompressure.ThisconfigurationdidnotsensetruefilterD/Pandresultedinfrequentcontrolroomtroublealarms.ThischangeconnectedtheinstrumentsensinglinesforthehighsideoftheD/PswitchtoductworkonthesuctionsideoftheairfiltertoallowtruefilterD/Ptobesensed.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theremoteshutdownroom2HVC*ACU3A/Bfilterdifferentialpressureswitches(2HVC-PDIS66A/B)servenosafetyfunction.Theyarerequiredtoalertthemaincontrolroomthattheairfiltersshouldbechangedouttomaintainproperoperationof2HVC*ACU3A/B.Theirdesignfunctionisnotalteredbythischangetothesensinglinelocation.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage'30of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:XmplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:SystemTitleofChange:91-097TemporaryMod.91-093N/AMakeupWaterTreating(WTS)EcolochemPurgeBypassLineDescriptionofChange:TheWTSsystemcontinuestoemploythetemporarytrailer-containeddemineralizer(Ecolochem)tosupplementtheexistingsystem.Thistemporarymodificationinstalledapurgeline(flexiblehose)fromtheEcolochemtrailertoventvalveconnection2WTS-V263.TheadditionofthispurgelineprovidesarouteforinjectionoftheinitialEcolochemeffluent(predemineralizedwater)directlyintothewasteneutralizingtank(2WTS-TK1),thusbypassingtheexistingwastesumpandreducingtheworkloadonthesumppumps.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThetemporaryadditionofthepurgebypasshosewillhavenoadverseimpactontheWTSsystemoperationoranyothercomponentorsystemrequiredtoeffectorsupportsafeshutdownofthereactor,ortoperformintheoperationofreactorsafetyfeatures.Hoseinstallationfollowedallsafetyprecautions,andallworkwasinaccordancewithapprovedspecificationsandprocedures.Theflowtothemakeupwasteneutralizingtankwillcontainnoradiologicalcontaminatedfluid.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthistemporarychangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage31of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:SystemsTitleofChange!92-007EDC2M10281Section4.6ControlRodDrive(RDS)CRDPumpSuctionFilters-NormalLineupDescriptionofChange:TheoriginalRDSsystemdesignintendedforbothCRDpumpsuctionfilters(2RDS-FLT1A,1B)tobeinservice.Thischangemodifiedthesystemconfigurationsuchthatonefilterisnormallyinservice,withtheotherinstandby.Thischangewasaccomplishedbymaintainingvalve2RDS-V3Bnormallyclosed.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Therevisedsystemlineupallowsthestandbyfiltertobeplacedinservicewhenahighfilterdifferentialpressurealarmisreached.PastexperienceandconsultationwithGeneralElectricindicatethatthislineupisacceptableandeachfilteriscapableofhandlingfullsystemflow.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage32of93SafetyEvaluationMo.sImplementationDocumentNo.sUSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChanges92-015,TemporaryMod.92-024N/AFireProtection-Water(FPW)ConnectingFireProtectionSystemtoCondenserTubeFlushingRigDescriptionofChangesThistemporarymodificationinvolvedtheinstallationofatemporaryfirehosefromfirehosereel2FPW-FHR14fortheflushingofthemaincondensertubesduringRefuelingOutage2.TheconnectionatthefirehosereelrequiredtheinstallationofanangleY-gatewithtwovalves;onetoisolatethefire-fightinghoseandtheothertoisolatethetemporaryfirehoseusedfortubeflushing.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thistemporarymodificationwillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperationorcapabilitytokeeptheplantinthesafeshutdowncondition.Fireprotectioncapabilitiesarenotdegradedatanytime,becausesystempressureandflowwillbemaintainedinthefireprotectionsystemwhilethistemporarymodificationisineffect.Themakeupcapabilitiesofthefireprotectionsystemfarexceedthedemandsrequiredbythetubeflushingrigfortheintermittentusageexpectedforthedurationofflushing.Basedontheevaluationperformed,it.isconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionanddoesnotdecreasetheeffectivenessofthefireprotectionprogram.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage33of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:92-016,Rev.1ProcedureNIP-ECA-01Sections1.10,13.4N/AOperationsExperienceAssessmentDescriptionofChange:ThissafetyevaluationtakescreditfortheDeviation/EventReporting(DER)processasanequivalentmethodforensuringtheproperdisseminationanduseofinternalandexternaloperatingexperience.TheDERprocesseliminatestheneedfortheOEACommittee.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Revision1ofthissafetyevaluationaccountsforthefactthatprocedureNIP-SRE-01wasneverissued.NIP-SRE-01wasreferencedbySafetyEvaluation92-016ascontainingthenecessaryproceduralcontrols,inpart,for'heprocessingofoperatingexperienceinformation.ThediscontinuationofNIP-SRE-01isacceptablebecausetheportionsofNIP-SRE-01thatweretakencreditforintheoriginalsafetyevaluationwereincorporatedintothecurrentrevisionofDERprocedureNIP-ECA-01.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage34of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARMfectedPages:System:TitleofChange:92-021SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0247-91,EDC2F00467ASection9.2CirculatingWaterSystem(CWS),MakeupWaterTreatingSystem(WTS)CirculatingWaterPump2CWS-P1AthroughP1FSealWaterLineReplacementDescriptionofChange:Thischangereplacedthecarbonsteelcirculatingwaterpumpsealwaterlines,includingvalves,withstainlesssteelmaterial.ThischangewasnecessarybecausethepipingwasexperiencingreducedflowasaresultofMicrobiologically-InfluencedCorrosion,ironoxidesandsediment.Tofacilitatethischange,amanualisolationvalvewasaddedtothemakeupwatersealwatersupplyheader.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thecirculatingwaterandmakeuptreatingsystemsarenotrequiredtoeffectorsupportsafeshutdownofthereactorortoperformintheoperationofreactorsafetyfeatures.Changesmadeasdescribedwillenhancepumpandsystemperformance.Systemfunction,operability,andintegrityarenotaffected.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation.SummaryReportPage35of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:92-034DER2-92-Q-0144N/AServiceAir(SAS),CondensateDemineralizer(CND)TitleofChange:ConnectingtheServiceAirSystemtotheCondensateDemineralizerSystemDescriptionofChange:Thischangeinvolvedtheuseofamechanicaljumper,i.e.,redrubberhose,fromtheserviceairsystem(SAS)tothecondensatedemineralizersystem(CND)inordertoblowairintothepipingonthelowconductivitywastepumps,2CND-P5AandP5B,iftheybecameresinbound.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheSASandCNDsystemsarenotrequiredtoeffectorsupportthesafeshutdownofthereactorortofunctioninconjunctionwithanyreactorsafetyfeatures.Theportionsofthesystemsaffectedbythischangearelocatedinanareaoftheplantwhichdoesnotrequirecomponentstobeseismicallysupported.Connectingthetwosystemstounplugthelowconductivitywasteconductivitypumpsdoesnotdegradethedesign,function,ormethodbywhichthesystemsperformtheirdesignfunctions.Thehose(s)whichareusedfor,themechanicaljumperareratedforapressuregreaterthanthedesignpressuresoftheaffectedSASandCNDpipingtoensurethatnofailureswouldcauseanyradiologicalspills.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation-SummaryReportPage36of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:92-036SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0077-92USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Sections9.3,11.4RadioactiveSolidWaste(WSS)RadioactiveWasteDewateringSystemDescriptionofChange:Thischangeaddedaradioactivewastedewateringsystemtoreducethevolumeofwastetobedisposed.ThesystemisknownasRDS-1000,suppliedbyChemNuclearSystems,Inc.(CNSI).TheequipmentassociatedwithRDS-1000waslocatedintheradwastebuildingtruckbay.RDS-1000isaself-contained,freestandingportablesystemfordewateringradioactivespentbeadresinsandfiltersludgeinavarietyoflinerstomeetthecurrentdisposalcriteriaatlow-levelwastedisposalfacilities.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheNRChasreviewedthedesignandoperationoftheRDS-1000system,asdescribedinCNSITopicalReportNo.RDS-25506-01-P/NP,Revision1,andhasconcludedthatthetopicalreportisacceptableforreferencing.NMPCreviewedtheCNSI-suppliedinformationforplant-specificimpactsincludingdesign,testing,processcontrol,ALARAconsiderations,floorloading,fireprotection,plantservicesrequirements,andwastehandlinganddisposal.Noadverseplantimpactswereidentified.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage37of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:92-038,Rev.2&3ProceduresGAP-OPS-01Rev.00,GAP-POL-OlRev.01,GAP-RPP-01Rev.00,NEP-POL-300Rev.01,NIP-FPP-OlRev.01USARAffectedPages:Sections9A.3,12.1,12.5,13~lg13~2g13~5System:TitleofChange:N/ANineMilePointUnit2ReorganizationDescriptionofChange:Chapter13oftheUSARdescribestheorganizationresponsibleforoperationofNineMilePointUnit2.ThischangeaddressesrevisionstotheNuclearDivisionorganizationalstructure.DepartmentsandpositionswereredefinedandreorganizedtoenhancetheflowofcommunicationandproductivityoftheNuclearDivision.AffectedareasoftheDivisionorganizationincludeExecutive,GenerationandQualityAssurance.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheorganizationalchangesprovidetheNuclearDivisionorganizationwithresourcestobebothefficientandeffectivewhilemeetingNRCguidance.Nonewfunctionalareasorchainsofcommandwerecreatedcontrarytothisguidance.Thechangesdidnotreducetheeffectivenessofsupervisionortheabilityofgroupsorindividualstoperformactivitiesnecessarytoensuresafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.PositionsspecifictoUnit2meetANSI/ANS-3.1-1978requirementsasendorsedbyRegulatoryGuide1.8.Positionswithsite-relatedresponsibilitiesmeetbothANSI/ANS-3.1-1978andANSI/N18.1-1971asendorsedbyRegulatoryGuide1.8.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage38of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:92-040,Rev.1SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0119-92USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:N/ANeutronMonitoringSRMCountRateUpscaleAlarmSetpointChangeDescriptionofChange:Thischangerevisesthecountrateupscalealarmofthesourcerangemonitors(SRMs)duringcoreoffload/reload.Specifically,theupscalealarmsetpointwillbechangedfrom1x10~cpsto100cps(withananalyticallimitof200cps).Thischangewillbeimplementedonlyduringrefuelingoutagesinvolvingacompletecoreoffload/reload,andallowstheSRMcountrateupscalealarmtofulfillthecontinuousaudiblealarmfunctionrequiredbyTechnicalSpecification3.9.2b.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheSRMshortperiodaudiblealarmhadpreviouslybeenconsideredassatisfyingthecontinuousaudiblealarmrequirementofTechnicalSpecification3.9.2b.However,duringcompletecoreoffload/reload,whenthereactorcoreisnearlyempty,SRMshortperiodalarmsoccurfrequentlyeventhoughthereactivityconditionofthereactorisnotchanging.Thisrepresentsanuisancealarm.Reducingthesetpointofthecountrateupscalealarmprovidesthecontrolroomwithanadequateindicationofthecorestatus,andprovidesanaudiblealarmtomeettheintentofTechnicalSpecification3.9.2b.NochangeismadetotheSRMchanneltripunitoutputswhichperformtripfunctions.NotransientoraccidentanalysestakecreditforanyalarmfromtheSRMsystem.Basedonthe'valuationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage39of93SafetyEvaluationNo.!ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange!92-041Mod.PN2Y92MX006Section9.2ServiceWaterReviseLogicforServiceWaterValvesMOV95A/BandMOV66A/BDescriptionofChange:JThismodificationwasinitiatedtopreventdisablingtheDivisionIIIdieselduetoservicewaterpressureperturbationsfromsequentialsingledivisionallossofpowerorcompleteLOOPaftertheDivisionIIdieselwasrunning.Thischangeinstalledanewtimedelayrelayforthesupplyheader(SWP)transmitterallowingapproximately78secondspriortoclosingthesevalvesonlossofheaderpressure.Theexistingtimedelayintheaboverelaywasremoved,thuspreventingthelossoftheHPCSdieselonanylowpressureheadersignal.Inadditiontothesechanges,theexistingtimedelaysettingsfortheDivisionIandIISWPdischargevalveswasincreasedtodelayclosureofthedischargevalvesonlowSWPheaderpressure.ThisdelayallowstimefortheservicewatersupplyvalvestotheDivisionIIdieseltoclosepriortothedischargevalvesintheeventoflowservicewaterheaderpressure.ThisallowstimefortheservicewaterheadertorepressurizeintheeventofalinebreakdownstreamoftheDivisionIIIservicewatersupplyvalves.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThismodificationallowstheservicewatersystemtherequiredtimetorepressurizethesupplyheaderinresponsetoaLOOP,priortoisolating,theHPCSdieselcoolingwatersupply.Intheeventofal'ine;rupture,intheservicewaterpipingdownstreamof2SWP*MOV95A/B',-it-'alsoallowstimefortheisolationofthatpipingandthetimerequiredtorepressurizethesupplyheadertotheDivisionIandIIdieselpriortoisolatingthecoolingwatersupplyto'hosediesels.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage40of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:92-042EDC2M00365Sections9.2,9.3,11.2ServiceWater,RadioactiveLiquidWasteandInstrumentAirTitleofChange:RevisethePositionofaSeriesofValvesonFigurestoAgreewiththeOperatingProceduresDescriptionofChange:ThefollowingvalveswerediagrammaticallyshownincorrectlyintheUSARfiguresandcorrespondingsystemP&IDs:ServiceWaterSystem:2SWP-V933,2SWP-V934RadioactiveLiquidWasteSystem:2LWSV83IV276IV281gV306gV328~V329gV330gV331gV359gV360gV361gV362gV374gV375gV378gV379gV557gV558,V570andV571InstrumentAirSystem:2IAS-V176,2IAS-V177Theservicewatersystemvalveshavebeenrevisedfromnormallyclosedtonormallyopen.Theradioactiveliquidwastesystemvalveshavebeenrevisedfromnormallyopentonormallyclosed.Theinstrumentairsystemvalveshavebeenrevisedfromnormallyclosed.tolockedclosed.Thesechangesweremadetoreflectactualvalveconfigurationsandtoagreewiththeassociatedoperatingprocedures.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThechangestosystemPEIDsandcorrespondingUSARfiguresreflectthepositionofvariousvalvesinperformingtheirintendeddesignfunction.Thereviseddrawingsagreewithdesignrequirements,normalplantconfigurationandoperatingprocedures.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthisdocumentationchangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage41of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:92-044DER2-92-Q-1740,EDC2F00572Section9.5AuxiliaryBoilerSystem(ABM)AuxiliaryBoilerConductivitySpecificationChangesDescriptionofChange:ThischangeupdatedHydroSteamIndustries(HSI)vendormanualN2H32800HTEXCH001(N20843)andtheUSARtoreflectthecurrentconductivityrangeofauxiliaryboiler(2ABM-B1Aand2ABM-BlB)wateratlowsteamdemands.Theboilersmustoperateatlevelsbelowthosepreviouslyreferencedintheabovedocumentsduetolowsteamdemand.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thischangerevisedtheacceptableconductivityoperatingrangetoreflectcurrentboileroperation.Nochangesweremadewhichwouldimpactanysafety-relatedcomponents,systemsorstructuresrequiredforsafeoperationorrequiredtomaintaintheplantinasafeshutdowncondition.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage42of93SafetyEvaluationNo.!ImplementationDocumentNo.!USARAffectedPages:System!TitleofChange:92-045,Rev.0&1ProceduresARC-CSA2,ARC-CS02N/AN/AAcceptabilityof>>CAVSPAN>>Gantry/ManliftatNMP2DescriptionofChange!Thistemporarychangeinvolvestheuseofthe>>CAVSPAN>>systemforoutagedecontaminationactivities.The>>CAVSPAN>>isareactorrefuelingcavity-spanninggantrygdesignedbyAppliedRadiologicalControl,Inc.(ARC),andusedforsuspendingworkcagesinsupportofdecontaminatingthereactorcavityandinternalsstoragepool.The>>CAVSPAN>>hastwomanliftsattachedtothebeamandtwogantrieswithrailwheelswhichtravelalongtherefuelingbridgerails.Movementoftheunitisdonemanually.Themaximumloadwhichisallowedtobesuspendedineitherofthetwoworkcagesis800poundsincludingpersonnelweightandequipment.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theuseofthe>>CAVSPAN>>systemforthedecontaminationofthereactorcavityandinternalsstoragepooliswiththeplantincoldshutdownconditionafterthereactorvesselheadisinplaceandpriortoplantrestart.Stressanalysesofthebeam,manlift,anddriveassemblyhavebeenperformedtodemonstrateadequatesafetyfactors,andaloadtestofthestructurefor125percentofratedloadwasalsoconducted.AppropriatecriteriafromUSARAppendix9C,"ControlofHeavyLoads,"werealsoapplied.Duringaseismicevent,iftheCAVSPANwastojumpfromtherefuelingbridgerailsandfallintothereactorcavityorthereactorinternalsstoragepool,nosystems,equipmentorcomponentsrequiredtomaintainthesafeshutdownoftheplantwouldbedamaged.hfBasedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthistemporarychangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage43of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:1mplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:SystemsTitleofChange:92-046,Rev.0&1MajorOrderNo.1644Sections1.2,2.4N/ANineMilePointCompressedBottledGasStorageFacilityDescriptionofChange:Thischangeconsistsoftheconstructionofanewbottledgasstoragefacility.Thenewstoragefacilityisanonsafety-relatedstructureandislocatedoutsidetheprotectedareasouthoftheUnit2warehouse.Theareaofthenewfacilityisabout2500sq.ft.withinteriorceilingheightabout15ft.,andisdesignedtoaccommodate550bottlesofvariouscompressedgases.Thefacilityconsistsoftwoareasitheeastareaisdesignatedforstorageoftheflammablebottles,andthewestareaisdesignedforstorageofthenonflammablebottles.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theconstructionofthenewstoragefacilitydoesnotdisturbthoseattributesofthesiteintheimmediatevicinityoftheplant,whichsafelydivert.thelocalprobablemaximumprecipitation(PMP)runoffoverlandtoLakeOntario.Also,sincethenewfacilityislowinelevationandoutsidetheprotectedarea,thislocationwillnotcreateanywinddisturbanceswhichmayaffecttheatmosphericdispersionfactorstudy.Theeffectsofanaccidentalnitrogengasreleasefromthefacilityoncontrolroomhabitabilitywereevaluated.The.potentialformissilesasaresultoffireorexplosionwasalsoconsidered;Noadverseimpactswereidentified.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage44of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:92-049ProcedureN2-OP-55Section9.4TurbineBuildingVentilationAlternateOperationoftheTurbineBuildingVentilationSystemDescriptionofChange:Thischangepermitsvariousfanconfigurationsanddampercontrolsontheturbinebuildingventilationsystemtoprovideadditionalcapabilitytomaintainthebuildingatsubatmosphericpressure.ThechangeallowsmanualmanipulationofdampersHVT-AOD101&102,and/oroperationwithonesupplyfanandtwoexhaustfanstoensuretheabilitytomaintainslightnegativepressureintheturbinebuilding.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thechangetoturbinebuildingventilationsystemopera'tionenhancestheabilitytomaintainslightnegativepressureintheturbinebuildingwithrespecttoatmospheric,thusmaintainingthedesignbasesoftheturbinebuildingasdescribedintheUSAR.Thisisanonsafety-relatedsystem,andthischangehasnoimpactonsafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.Thischangewillnotresultinanyadditionalradioactivereleasesfromtheplantand,infact,willenhancetheabilitytopreventanunmonitoredreleasefromtheplant.Noequipmenthasbeenadded,deletedormodifiedasaresultofthischange.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage45of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:92-050,Rev.1TemporaryMods.92-053and92-055USARAffectedPages!System:TitleofChange:N/AVitalBus(VBB)TemporaryBypassof2VBB-UPS1Cand2VBB-UPS1DDescriptionofChange:Thesetemporarymodificationsconnectedtheloadsofuninterruptiblepowersupplies(UPSs)2VBB-UPS1Cand2VBB-UPS1DdirectlytothealternatepowersourcesoftheindividualUPSunits,whicharethe600-Vacstubbuses(2NJS-US5and2NJS-US6).ThepurposeofthischangewastopermitreplacementofthesubjectUPSunitsunderModificationPN2Y89MX042,whilemaintainingoperabletheplantcommunicationsandessentiallightingloadsthataresuppliedbytheUPSunits.Onlyoneofthesetemporarymodificationswasinplaceatanyonetime.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheloadsoftheaffectedUPSunits(2VBB-UPS1Cand2VBB-UPS1D)areessentiallightingandcommunicationcircuits.Thesetemporarychangeseliminatedthe125-VdcbatterybackupbyconnectingtheUPSloadsdirectlywiththe'alternatepowersupplies(the600-Vacstubbuses2NJS-US5and2NJS-US6)whicharenormallyfedfromthestationtransformer2STX-XNS1.Intheeventofalossofnormalpower,thesestubbuseswouldbeconnectedtooffsitepowerthroughthereservestationtransformers2RTX-XSR1A/B.Intheeventoflossofnormalandoffsitepower,thesestubbusescouldbemanuallyconnectedtotheemergencydieselgenerators(exceptinaLOCAsituation).Theemergencyandthe8-hourbattery-packlightingsystemswhicharerequiredforthesafeshutdownequipmentareasoftheplant,includingtheaccessandegressroutesthereto(requiredper10CFR50AppendixR),arenotaffectedbythesetemporarymodifications.Alternatemethodsofcommunicationarealsoavailableduringthetimethatthepageparty/publicaddresssystemiswithouttheuninterruptiblepowersource.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesetemporarychangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage46of93SafetyEvaluati.onNo.:XmplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:92-052TemporaryMod.92-044N/AN/AReroutetheSecurityFencetoSupporttheDemolitionof"AreaComplex"BuildingandtheConstructionoftheSwingBuildingDescriptionofChange:Thistemporarymodificationinstalleda"bubblefence"andreroutedthesecurityfencetosegregatetheareacomplexsitefromtheprotectedareaofNineMilePointsothatactivitiesassociatedwithconstructionoftheswingbuildingwouldbeoutsidethesecurityzone.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThistemporarymodificationdoesnotresultinasignificantelevationchangeinthefloodinglevelswithinthebermareaoftheNineMilePointsite.Therefore,reroutingthesecurityfenceandconstructionofthe"bubblefence"donotdisturbthoseattributesofthesiteintheimmediatevicinityoftheplantwhichsafelydivertthelocalprobablemaximumprecipation(PMP)runoffoverlandtoLakeOntario.Thetemporary"bubblefence"wasconstructedfollowingsecurityproceduresandregulation.Thefenceisequippedwithsecurityintrusiondetection,andaclosed-circuitTVcamera(CCTV)wasinstalledinaccordancewithlOCFRPart73.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage47of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:92-056TechnicalTestProcedureN2-TTP-LTC-9001USARAffectedPages:System:N/ANormalandReserveStationServiceTransformersTitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:SetupandTestingofLoadTapChangersThischangeconsistedoftestingtoverifysetupoftheloadtapchangers(LTC)automaticcontrolsforbothreservestationservice(RSS)transformersandthenormalstationservice(NSS)transformer,andtofunctionallyverifytheLTC'sabilitytocontrolbusvoltagewhenoperatedinautomatic.ThecontrolsoftheLTCshadbeenleftinthemanualmodeofoperationsincethestartupoftheplant.Thetestswereperformedduringnormalplantoperation.SafetyEvaluationSummary:BoththeRSStransformers(2RTX-XSR1Aand1B)andtheNSStransformer(2STX-XNS1A)arenonsafetyrelated.DevelopmentandperformanceoftheLTCtestsconsideredthefollowing:1.Thetestisperformedonetransformeratatime.2.Thetestfollowsthevendor-recommendedalternatemethodoftesting.3.Allprecautionsandprerequisitesofthetestprocedurearestrictlyadheredto.4.Lossofvoltage/sustaineddegradedvoltagewillstartthestandbydieselgeneratorandcarrytheemergencyloads.5.Anovervoltageconditionismonitoredandcorrectiveactiontakenasrequiredbythetestprocedure.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthistestdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage48of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:.92-057,Rev.1SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0018-92USARAffectedPages!System:TitleofChange:Section5.4ReactorCoreIsolationCooling(RCIC)RCICTurbineExhaustPressureTripSetpointModificationDescriptionofChange:ThismodificationincreasedthenominalRCICturbineexhaustpressuretripsetpointfrom25psigto50psig.ThischangeprovidesalongerperiodofRCICoperationbeforeitsturbineistrippedoffbyhighexhaustpressureduetoincreasedprimarycontainmentpressurefollowingpostulatedStationBlackout(SBO)events.SafetyEvaluationSummary:OperationofUnit2withtheincreasedRCICturbineexhaustpressuretripsetpointdoesnotaffectanyoftheUSARaccidentand/ortransientanalyses.Thenewexhaustpressuretripsetpointof50psigiswellwithinthedesignratingof165psigfortheRCICturbineexhaustcasingandthedesignratingof150psig,fortheRCICexhaustpiping.ThenewsetpointwillnothaveanadverseimpactontheRCICsystempumpingperformanceasdiscussedinSection4ofGEReportNEDE-22017.ThismodificationwillresultinanincreasedRCICturbineglandsealleakagerate.Theradiologicaleffectsofthishigherleakageratewillnotexceedthelimitsof10CFR20.EvaluationofequipmentqualificationdataconcludesthattheRCICsystemwillcontinuetooperateattheelevatedRCICroomtemperaturesresultingfromtheglandsealleakage.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage49of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:92-058TemporaryMods.92-071,92-072N/APrimaryContainmentPurge(CPS)TitleofChange:TemporaryReplacementof2CPS*AOV111DescriptionofChange:Thesetemporarymodificationsremovedsuppressionchamberpurgelinecontainmentisolationvalve2CPS*AOV111forrepairsandreplaceditwithtwoblankflanges.After2CPS*AOV111wasrepaired,itwasreinstalled,tested,andreturnedtoservice.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thesetemporarymodificationsallow2CPS*AOV111toberemovedforrepairsandatthesametimeprovidecontainmentisolationinaccordancewithTechnicalSpecification3.6.3.Theblankflangemeetsorexceedsthedesignpressure,temperature,andleakagerequirementsthatweremetby2CPS*AOV111.Installationoftheblankflangesresultsintheunavailability.ofthenormalsuppressionchamberpurgeflowpath.Intheeventofanaccidentoccurringwhiletheblankflangesareinstalled,alternatepathwaysareavailabletocontrolhydrogenconcentrationinthesuppressionchamber,performemergencycontainmentventing,andconductpostaccidentcleanupoperations.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthistemporarychangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage50of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:SystemsTitleofChange:92-059,Rev.1Unit1Mod.No.N1-86-026N/ATSCEmergencyVentilation(Systemf212)AdditiontoTSCVentilationControlPanelDescriptionofChange:ThismodificationinstalledindicationlightsforTechnicalSupportCenter(TSC)emergencyventilationfanFN-1anddampers212-42,212-31and212-87,locatedinthecharcoalfilterroom,aswellasindicationlightsfornormal/emergencypowersource.AdigitaltimerwasalsowiredtokeyswitchKS-2.ThetimerrunsonlywhentheTSCventilationsystemisintheemergencymodeofoperation.AllindicationisprovidedontheTSCventilationcontrolpanelATPC-1,locatedintheTSC.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThismodificationprovidesindicationattheTSCventilationcontrolpaneltomonitorstatusofventilationequipmentrelatedtotheTSC,withoutrequiringoccupantstoexittheTSC.AllowingpersonneltoremainintheTSCduringemergencyconditionsdecreasesthepossibilityofpersonnelcontaminationandlossofvaluableTSC'personneltime.Thenewequipment/materialintroducedbythismodificationonlyaffectstheTSCemergencyventilationsystem.ItisisolatedfromotherareasofNMP1andNMP2whichcouldaffectthesafeshutdownofeitherplant.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoes.notinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

Safety.EvaluationSummaryReportPage51of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:92-062Simple.DesignChangeSC2-168-92USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Section9.2ServiceWater(SWP),Reactor,BuildingVentilation(HVR)SimpleDesignChangetoEnhanceUnitCoolerTesting-RelatedtoSecondaryContainmentDrawdownDescriptionofChange:Thischangeaddedflangestotheservicewaterpipelinestounitcoolers2HVR*UC404Band2HVR*UC407Etofacilitateperformancetestingofthisequip'ment.Testingisperformedtoensureunit,cooleroperability.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thischangeenhancestheabilitytoperformancetestunitcoolers2HVR*UC404Band2HVR*UC407E.Theoriginaldesignbasisofthepipingsupportsismaintained.PipinginstallationandmaterialisASMEIIIClass3underthejurisdictionofASMEXI.Thus,themodificationwillnotadverselyaffectthesafetyfunctionofanyofthestructures,systemsorcomponents.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage52of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:92-063SimpleDesignChangeSC2-281-92USARAffectedPages:System!TitleofChange:Section9.3InstrumentAirSystemReviseUpdatedSafety'AnalysisReportInstrumentAir/NitrogenParticleSizeLimitfrom3Micronsto40MicronsDescriptionofChange:AsaresultofGenericLetter88-14,theparticlesizelimitforinstrumentair/nitrogenhasbeenrevisedfrom3micronsto40microns.The3-micronparticlesizelimitwasbasedonANSIMC11.1-1976,"QualityStandardsforInstrumentAir"(nowStandardISA-S7.3).Thenew40-micronlimitisbaseduponactualvendorrequirementsstatedinthevendorinstructionmanualstoprotectequipmentfrombeingdamagedbyparticulateintrusion.SafetyEvaluationSummary:The40-micronlimitestablishedbytheequipmentvendorswillavoidpluggingandwear/erosionofairpassagesandorificesofequipmentduetoparticulateintrusion.Thischangetookexceptionto*the3-micronlimitcontainedinStandardISA-S7.3andestablishedanew40-micronlimitbasedonvendorrecommendations.Allplantinstrumentairandnitrogenuserswillfunctionasdesignedwiththenewparticlesizelimitof40micronswithnoadverseeffects.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage53of93SafetyEvaluati.onNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:92-064,Rev.1LDCNU-1674Section3A.34N/AAdditionofIMAGESComputerSoftwaretoUSARAppendix3AforStructural/EquipmentAnalysisThischangepermitstheuseofIMAGEScomputersoftwareinqualifyingsafety-relatedstructuresandequipment,asanalternativetootherwell-knownmainframecomputerprograms.IMAGESisacompletedesktopFiniteElementsAnalysisPackageforthePC(byCelestialSoftware,Inc.),withthecapabilitytoperformstatic,thermal,modalanddynamicanalysesinwayssimilartoSTRUDL,STARDYNE,andANSYSmainframecomputerprograms.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheIMAGEScomputersoftwarehasbeenbenchmarkedtotheanalyticalresultspublishedintheliteratureinaccordancewithCSI'sQualityAssuranceProgramandStandardReviewPlan3.9.ThisQAProgramhasbeenauditedandacceptedbyNMPCQA.ItmeetstheintentofNMPC'sNuclearDivisionSoftwareQAProgramPlan.Inaddition,NMPCperformedlimitedprogramverificationonIMAGESbysatisfactorilycomparingitssolutionstosolutionsobtainedfromtherecognized,widely-knownSTRUDLprogram.TheIMAGESprogrammeetsthemethodologiesandcommitmentsdescribedinUSARSections3.7,3.9,3.10andAppendix6A.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage54of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:92-066ProcedureN2-OP-10AN/ACirculatingWater(CWS)DefeatLowSuctionPressureTripInterlockforCWSPumpsThistemporarychangedefeatsthelowsuctionpressuretripfortheoperatingCWSpumpswhilestartingastandbypump.LeadsareliftedattheCWSpumpswitchgeartodefeatthistripfunction,whileatthesametimemaintainingthelowsuctionpressurealarmandcomputerpointoperable.Followingsuccessfulpumpstart,theliftedleadsarerelandedtorestorethesystemtoitsdesignconfiguration.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thepurposeofthischangeistopreventinadvertentoperatingpumptripfromamomentarylowsuctionpressureconditionwhilestartingastandbypump.SufficientinstrumentationwillremainavailabletoalerttheOperatorsshouldasustaineddegradedconditionexist.Thisactivityisprocedurallycontrolledandrequiresindependentverificationforliftingandrelandingtheleads.Thelowsuctionpressuretrip,aswellastheentireCWSsystem,doesnotperformasafety-relatedfunction.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthistemporarychangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage55of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:92-067,Rev.1SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0253-92USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Section9.2ServiceWaterSDCgSC2-0253-92,DeleteServiceWatertoCirculatingWaterMakeupHeaderPressureLowAnnunciator(NuisanceAlarm)DescriptionofChange:ThissimpledesignchangedeletedcontrolroomannunciatorsCEC601123andCEC601213.Pressureswitches2SWP*PSL142A,2SWP*PSLX142A,2SWP*PSL142B,2SWP*PSLX142Bandtheirassociatedalarmcircuitsweredisconnectedandsparedinplace.2SWP*PT142Aand2SWP*PT142Bcontinuetoprovideservicewatertocirculatingwatermakeupheaderpressuresignalsavailableforinformationonlyread-outonthePMScomputerdisplayinthecontrolroom.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thissimpledesignchangeeliminatedcontrolroomannunciatorswhicharecontinuouslyinalarmandanuisanceanddistractiontothecontrolroomoperators.Thischangehasnoimpactonthesafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.Adequateindicationexistswithouttheseannunciators,tokeep,operatorsinformedastothestatusoftheservicewatersystemtocirculatingwatersystemmakeupheaders.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage56of93SafetyEvaluationNo.!ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:92-070N/ASections9A.2,9A.3,13.1N/AReductionFireBrigadeStaffingthroughPartialCombinationoftheUnitFireBrigadesDescriptionofChange:ThischangereducestheunitFireBrigadestaffingtoaminimumofaFireChiefandtwoFireFighters.ThisresultsinaminimumsiteresponseorganizationoffiveBrigademembers.SafetyEvaluationSummary:EstablishingaunitstaffsizeofaFireChiefandtwoFireFightersachievestherequirementsof10CFR50AppendixRandBTPCMEB9.5-1,'hichrequiresthatatleastfiveBrigademembersrespondtoafire.Ofthesefiveresponders,theFireChiefandtwomembersmustbefamiliarwiththeeffectsoffireandfiresuppressionactivitiesonplantsystems.Thereductioninunit-dedicatedFireBrigadestaffinglevelswillnowtresultinalesserresponsetoafire(eitherinnumberofpersonnelfightingthefireorinasignificantincreaseintheirresponsetime),orinalossoffirewatchorsurveillance/maintenanceactivities.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionanddoesnotdecreasetheeffectivenessofthefireprotectionprogram.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage57of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:SystemsTitleofChange:92-071ProcedureN2-OP-1N/AMainSteam(MSS),ReactorCoreIsolationCooling(RCIC)DefeatInterlockofMSSDrainValve2MSS*MOV189DescriptionofChange:Valve2MSS*MOV189isadrainvalvefromtheRCICsteamsupplylinethatconnectsintoacommondrainlineforthemainsteamlines.ThevalvehasaninterlockthatmaintainsitopenwheneveroneoftheRCICisolationvalvesisshut,toremoveanycondensationfromtheRCICsteamsupplyheader.Thistemporaryalterationdefeatsthisinterlocktoallowvalveclosurewhenamainsteamline(MSL)isisolated.Defeatingthe2MSS*MOV189interlockisaccomplishedbyliftingtheleadonterminalpoint.AA-7,2CEC-PNL856BayD.Thisremovestheautomaticopenfunctiononly.'emotemanualcontrolofthevalveandtheautoclosefunctionisunaffected.SafetyEvaluationSummary:WithaMSLisolated,adrainpathisestablishedtoallowsteam/condensateinthemainsteampipingtodraintothemaincondenser,asrecommendedinGeneralElectricServiceInformationLetterNumber404.IftheRCICsystembecomesisolatedduetoclosureofvalves2ICS*MOV121or2ICS*MOV128,2MSS*MOV189willautomaticallyopentoestablishadrainpath.ThesubsequentresultantpressureinthecombinedMSLdrainheadercouldaffecttheproperdrainageofthemainsteamlines.Thedefeatingoftheinterlockfor2MSS*MOV189isonlyrequiredwhenRCICisalreadyisolatedandconsideredinoperable.TechnicalSpecification3/4.7.4alreadydirectsactionstobetakeninthecaseofaninoperableRCICsystem.Controlofdefeatingandrestoringthisinterlockwillbeinaccordancewithapprovedprocedures.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage58of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:92-072,Rev.1SpecialOperatingProceduresN2-SOP-01,02,03USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:N/AN/AStationBlackout(CompleteLossofACPower)DescriptionofChange:Threespecialoperatingprocedures(SOPs)havebeendevelopedforcopingwithastationblackout(SBO).TheseSOPsmaybeexecutedconcurrentlywiththeapplicableemergencyoperatingprocedures(EOPs)~1~N2-SOP-01isaflowchart-basedproceduredesignedtoguidetheoperatorsthroughtheactionsrequiredtocopewiththeSBOeventaswellastogivedirectionforrecovery.2.N2-SOP-02isasupportprocedureforN2-SOP-01,andprovidesspecificdirectionsforoperatorsinresponsetoaSBOeventtoachievestableshutdownconditions.3~N2-SOP-03wascreatedinordertoconsolidatetheactionsneededforpowerrestorationintoasingleprocedure.AlthoughN2-SOP-03containssomeSBOspecificsteps(i.e.,canonlybeperformedduringanSBO),itcanalsobeusedfor,anylossofoffsiteacpowerorlossofonsiteemergencyacpower(i.e.,non-SBOpowerlosses).SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheresultsoftheSBOanalysisshowthatwithcertainspecificoperatoractions,NMP2canoperatelongerthan4hourswithoutjeopardizingcorecoolingorthecontainmentcapability.Operatoractionsneededtoachievethiscapabilityincludesheddingofnonessentialbatteryloads,maintainingmanualRCICflowcontrol,andthebypassingofcertainRCICisolationlogics.TheseactionsareaddressedinN2-SOP-01,02,and03,whichdirectoperatorstomakeuseofavailableplantsystemstocopewithaSBOanddo.notconflictinanywaywithestablishedEOPs.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage59of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary:92-072,Rev.1(cont'd.)(cont'd.)Theactions'pecifiedinN2-SOP-01,02and03areinaccordancewithcommitmentsmadebyNMPCtotheNRC.NRCacceptanceofNMPC'sresponsesandcommitmentsregardingtheSBOissueweredocumentedintheNRCsafetyevaluationdatedMay29,1991,andsupplementsdatedNovember21,1991,andFebruary7,1992.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage60of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:92-074,Rev.0,1&2SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0387-91USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Section9.3InstrumentAir(IAS)IASStrainer40BlowdownValveReplacementDescriptionofChange:Thissimpledesignchangereplacedtheblowdownconnectionfromstrainer2IAS-STR40,includingglobevalve2IAS-V355.Theweightoftheassembly,inadditiontotheforcerequiredtoopenandclosethevalve,hadproventoogreatforthe1/4"NPTconnectionatthebottomofthestrainerbody.Thereplacementconnectionutilizedtubeproductsandcompressionfittings,andtheglobevalvewasreplacedwithaNUPROplugvalve.Thismaterialislighter,andoperationoftheblowdownisolationvalverequireslesstorque.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thissimpledesignchangewillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperationorsafeshutdowncapabilityoftheplant.Thedesignofthereplacementconnectionexceedsthatoftheexistingconnectionandprovidesaleak-tight,easilymaintainedandoperatedstrainerblowdownconnection,thusmaintainingsystemintegrity.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage61of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages!System:92-076,Rev.0,1&2Mod.PN2Y89MX133Section9.2ServiceWater(SWP),ReactorBuildingVentilation(HVR),YardStructuresVentilation(HVY),ControlBuildingA/C(HVC),DieselGeneratorBui:ldingVentilation(HVP)TitleofChange!ProvideBreakoutSpoolsforUnitCoolersnotRelated'toDrawdownDescriptionofChange:NRCGenericLetter89-13requiresthatsafety-relatedcomponentscooledbyservicewaterbeadequatelymaintainedandtested.CurrentlyatNMP2,thecapabilitydoesnotexisttoisolateandtestsomesafety-relatedunitcoolers.Thescopeofthemodificationincludesprovisionofbreakoutspoolstothesupplyand/orreturnlinesofsafety-relatedunitcoolersthatarenotrelatedtosecondarycontainmentdrawdown.Revision1tothesafetyevaluationwasissuedtoindicatechangesinthelocationofcentralflanges.Revision2tothesafetyevaluationwasissuedtorevisetheresponsetoquestionDontheCertificateofCompliancetoNRCstandards.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Themodifiedpipingissafety-relatedandtherequirementsof10CFR50AppendixBapply.Theoriginaldesignbasisofthepipingandsupportsismaintained.PipinginstallationandmaterialisASMEIIIClass3underthejurisdictionofASMEXI.Themodificationwillnotadverselyaffectthesafetyfunctionofanyofthestructures,systemsorcomponents.Inaddition,thecapabilitytosafelyshutdowntheplantandmaintainitinasafeshutdownconditionwillnotbeadverselyaffected.ThemodificationdoesnotaffectthePlantTechnicalSpecifications,andcomponentsaddedormodifiedbythismodificationarenotsubjecttoanyTechnicalSpecificationsurveillances.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage62of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:SystemsTitleoiChange:92-077ProcedureN2-CTP-CWS-807N/ACirculatingWaterSystem(CWS)WaterTreatmentHypochlorite(WTH)JustificationofCirculatingWaterSodiumHypochloriteAdditionDescriptionofChange:Thischangeallowsforaprocedurally-controlledtemporaryalterationtobeusedinlieuofthepermanentplantWTHsystemtoaccomplishhypochloriteinjectionintotheCWSsystem.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theadditionofsodiumhypochloritetothecirculatingwater,bydirectpumpingfrombarrelsintothecoolingtowerflumes,allowscontinuedcontrolofbiologicalgrowthwithinthecirculatingwaterandthecoolingtowerwhiletheWTHsystemisinoperative.SecuringthecirculatingwaterblowdownallowssiteChemistrytoachievechlorinelevelsinthecirculatingwaterbelowlimitssetbytheSPDESpermitpriortoreopeningblowdown,ortoenactpropercontrolsasdelineatedwithinsiteprocedures.TheWTHsystemisnotrequiredforsafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.ThemethodofaddingsodiumhypochloritetothecirculatingwaterdoesnotimpactcontinuedoperationoftheCWSsystem.Thismethodofaddingsodiumhypochloritetocirculatingwaterprovidesanalternatemeansofperforminganonsafety-relatedfunctionthathasnonegativeimpactonthesafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage63of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:92-079SimpleDesignChangeSC2-282-92USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Section9.2ServiceWater(SWP)&ReactorBuildingVentilation(HVR)SimpleDesignChangetoEnhanceUnitCoolerTesting-RelatedtoSecondaryContainmentDrawdownDescriptionofChange:ThischangeaddedunionstotheSWPpipelinestounitcooler2HVR*UC406tofacilitateflushingandperformancetestingofthisequipment.Testingisrequiredtoensureunitcooleroperability.'afetyEvaluationSummary:Thischangeenhancedtheabilitytoflushandperformancetestunitcooler2HVR*UC406.Thecapabilitytocounteractvariousheatloadsisdependentontheperformanceoftheunitcoolers.Themodificationwillnotadverselyaffectthesafetyfunctionofanyofthestructures,systemsorcomponents.Theoriginaldesignbasisofthepipingandpipesupportswillbemaintained.Themodificationwillnotadverselyimpactsafeshutdownoftheplantorthecapabilitytomaintaintheplantinasafeshutdowncondition.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage64of93SafetyEvaluationNo.sImplementationDocumentNo.sUSARAffectedPages:SystemsTitleofChangesDescriptionofChange:92-080,.Rev.0&1CalculationEC-032Section8.3N/AUpdateDieselLoadingTablesTables8.3-1,8.3-2and8.3-3oftheUSARtabulatethedesignbasisaccidentdieselgeneratorloadingpossibilitiesfortheDivisionI,IIandIIIdieselgenerators.Tables8.3-5and8.3-6arethetotalsoftheseloadingtables.ThebasisforthesetablesiscalculationEC-032.Table8.3-4liststhesafety-relatedloadsbypowersource;thebasesforthesenumbersweretestreportsprovidedbyvendorsduringplantconstruction.Thefollowingchangesweremade:1~AlltheloadslistedinthetableswerereviewedagainsttheGENEtestdatasheetsforthemotorsandcorrectionsweremadeasneeded.AnycorrectionsinloadinginTables8;3-1and8.3-2werealsoreflectedinthetotalloadingTables8.3-5and8.3-6.2.Thepowerfactorsforthe4-kVmotorswererevisedtoprovideconsistencybetweenthevariouselectricalanalyses.3.ThischangedisplayssomeofthedatainTables8.3-1,8.3-2and8.3-3inadifferentformatbutallofthesamebasicinformationisstillavailablefromthetables.4~5.CorrectionstoTable8.3-3weremadeasnotalltheloadspoweredbytheDiv.IIIdieselgeneratorwereoriginallylisted.Itiscurrentlyassumedthat204ofmotor-operatedvalve(MOV)runningloadsareonaftertheinitial2minutesofdieselgeneratorloadingsequence.Thisassumptionischangedtoassume104oftherunningloadsareoperating.6.RevisionstoTables8.3-5and8.3-6weremadetoaddressadministrativelycontrollingtheloadingofthedieselgenerators.Tables8.3-1and8.3-2showallthesameloadsasbefore;onlytheformatforpresentingthisinformationhaschanged.Table8.3-3includessomeexistingloadsthatwerenotpreviouslyincludedintheloadtabulations.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage65of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary:92-080,Rev.0&1(cont'd.)Thelayoutofthetableinformationhasbeenchangedtoprovidemoreinformation.Thisdatahasalsobeencheckedagainsttheas-builtdataandupdatedwherenecessary.ThetotalkWloadonthedieselgeneratorsisshowntohavechanged.ThetotalkWloadforallthreedieselgeneratorsisstillunderthecontinuousratingof4400kWfortheDiv.IandIIdieselgeneratorsand2600kWfortheDiv.IIIdieselgenerator.Itisnowassumedthat10%oftheMOVsarerunningafterthefirst2minutesofdieselloading,whichisstillconservative.AnoteforTables8.3-5and8.3-6waschangedtoallowtheuseofNMP2operatingprocedurestoprovidedirectionforcontrollingloadingofthedieselgeneratorsduringaloss-of-offsitepowerwithdelayedloss-of-coolantaccident.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage66of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:1mplementatkonDocumentNo.:92-081SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0289-091USARAffectedPages:System:Section9.5Engine-DrivenFirePumpFuelOi:1TitleofChange:DieselFirePumpValveDescriptionofChange:Thismodificationpermanentlyreplacedthespringreturnballvalveonthefueloilsupplypipingtothedieselfirepumpwithamanualplugvalve.TheuseofthemanualvalveinthelockedopenpositioncomplieswithNFPA20andisinaccordancewiththeregulatoryguidanceofBranchTechnicalPosition(BTP)9.5-1.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thischangeassuresreliableoperationofthedieselfirepumpbyeliminatingthepotentialforclosingthefueloilsupplyvalveduringafireemergency.ThischangecomplieswithNFPA20andBTP9.5-1requirements.Theabilitytosafelyoperate,orshutdowntheplantintheeventofafire,hasnotbeenadverselyaffectedbythischange.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage67of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:92-083,Rev.1ProceduresN2-OP-13,N2-OP-14N/AReactorBuildingClosedLoopCooling(CCP),TurbineBuildingClosedLoopCooling(CCS),MakeupWater(MWS)TitleofChange:TemporaryHoseInstallationsontheMakeupWaterSystemto'upportFreezeSealActivitiesDescriptionofChange:Freezesealswereinstalledtoisolateasmallportionofthemakeupwatersystemtoallowmaintenanceonleakingflowtotalizerindicatorswitches2MWS-FQIS121and2MWS-FQIS122.InordertomaintaintheCCPandCCSsystemsoperablewhilethefreezesealswereestablished,hoseswereroutedtobypassthefreezeseallocation,allowingmakeupwaterflowtosurgetanks2CCP-TK1and2CCS-TK1asdemandnecessitated.Thehoseswereconnectedtoeitherventordrain'onnectionsoneachsideofthefreezeseals.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thetemporaryhoseinstallationsandfreezesealswillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperationorsafeshutdowncapabilityoftheplant.Failureofatemporaryhoseorpipingwithinthefreezeareawillnotaffectnuclearsafety.Essentialequipmentreceivescoolingwaterfromthesafety-relatedservicewatersystem.Useoffreezesealsandthetemporaryhosesisprocedurallycontrolled.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthistemporarychangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage68of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:92-085SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0335-92USARAffectedPages:System:Section9.5MiscellaneousEquipmentandFloorDrains(DFM)TitleofChange:AuxiliaryBoilerBuildingEquipmentDrainsDescriptionofChange:Thisevaluationaddressedtwoissuesconcerningpipinganddrainsassociatedwiththeauxiliaryboilerbuilding.Thefirstissuewasadocumentation-onlychangetoshowsmallborefeedwaterpumpdrainline2-ABF-001-83-4dischargingtoequipmentdrain2DFM-ED2002insteadof2DFM-ED2003.Thesecondissueinvolvedtheinstallationofan8"x4"concentricpipereducertoconvertequipmentdrain2DFM-ED2003toafunnelequipmentdrain.Thedocumentationchangewasmadetoaccuratelyreflectexistingplantconditions.Theconversionofequipmentdrain2DFM-ED2003toafunneldrainincreasedthedrainopeningsizesoastopreventwaterspillageandpotentialslabcontamination.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thedocumentationchangeprovidesclarificationoftheactualplantconfigurationanddoesnotrepresentanyphysicalchangetotheplant.Themodificationtodrain2DFM-ED2003willenhancetheoperationandfunctionofthedrainandreducethelikelihoodofwaterspillageandpossibleslabcontamination.Theoriginalequipmentdraindesignisnotaffectedbythesechangesasnonewwatersourcesforthedrainarebeingintroduced.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage69of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:92-086ProceduresNTP-TQS-201Rev.1,NTP-TQS-505Rev.0USARAffectedPages:System:Section13.2NuclearTrainingProcedures(NTP)TitleofChange:RadwasteOperatorTrainingSupervisorChangeDescriptionofchange:ThischangeallowsRadwasteOperatorTrainingtobeunderthesupervisionofeithertheGeneralSupervisoiOperationsTrainingortheGeneralSupervisorTechnicalTraining.Thisoptionallowsflexibilityofprogramadministrationinthemostefficientandcost-effectivemanner.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThischangeimprovesdistributionofadministrativeworkloadforNuclearTrainingbyallowingtheGeneralSupervisorTechnicalTrainingtosupervisetheRadwasteOperatorTrainingprogram,whilenotprecludingtheGeneralSupervisorOperationsTrainingfromsupervisingtheprograminthefuture.ThischangeisstrictlyadministrativeandwillnotaffectconductofRadwasteOperatortraining.TrainingwillcontinuetomeetINPOaccreditedtrainingprogramstandards.RadwasteOperatorsarenotLicensedReactorOperatorsand,assuch,theINPOcriteriaforanaccreditedtrainingprogramarethesameasfortherestoftheTechnicalTraininggroups.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage70of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:SystemsTitleofChange:92-087N/ASection8.3ReactorBuildingLighting(LAR),ControlBuildingLighting(LAC),ReactorBuildingDrains(DER)RevisiontotheNMP2USARTables8.3-16,PrimaryContainmentElectricalPenetrationsandPenetrationConductorsWhichAreNotRequiredDuringReactorOperationandAreProtectedbyDe-energization,and8.3-17,OvercurrentProtectiveDevicesforNonclass1ELighting*FixturesonClass1EEmergencySystemDescriptionofChange:ThischangerevisedUSARTable8.3-16toreflectas-installed.plantconditionsforthosecircuitsassociatedwithelectricalpenetrationsandelectricalpenetrationconductors.whicharerequiredtobede-energizedduringreactoroperation.Inaddition,USARTable8.3-17wasrevisedtoremoveextraneousinformation.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThischangerevisedTable8.3-16toincludealightingcircuitwhichisrequiredtobede-energizedforelectricalpenetrationandpenetrationprotectionduringreactoroperation,andremovedthosecircuitswhicharenolongerrequiredtobede-energizedduetoplantconfigurationchanges.Additionally,Table8.3-17wasrevisedtoremovesuperfluousinformation,suchasbreakermanufacturerandbreakersize,whichisnotrequiredforatabulationofthoselightingcircuitswhichisolatesafety-andnonsafety-relatedcircuitry.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage71of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:92-089N/A'SARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:N/A115-kVOffsitePowerSourcesTemporaryChangetoScribaSubstationto'JumperEitherBreakerR50,R60,R115orR225DescriptionofChange:ThisevaluationaddressedtheeffectofinstallingatemporarychangeattheScribaSubstationtobypasseitherbreakerR50,R115,R60orR225ifanyoneofthemshouldfail.Thisbypassallowstheoffsite115-kVsourcetobereenergizedifoneofthebreakersshouldfail.Onebreakerforeachsourcemaybebypassed,butnotboth.IfbreakerR50orR60isbypassed,thenthetransfertripsignalwillbewiredtoR115orR225,respectively.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheexistingUnit2protectionschemeswillnotbechanged.TheonlydifferenceiswhichbreakerintheScribaSubstationwillbetrippedbythetransfertripschemefromUnit2.ThereliabilityandprotectionofthetwooffsitesourcesforUnit2,lines5and6(sourcesAandB),willnotbeaffected.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthistemporarychangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage72of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages!93-001TemporaryMod.93-00510.4-20,Figures10.4-8Sh.8,10.4-7dSystem!TitleofChange:CirculatingWaterSystem(CWS)BypassofFailedCoolingTowerBasinRTDDescriptionofChange:Thisevaluationaddressedthetemporaryremovalofafailedcoolingtowertemperaturedetector.Signalwiresfromthedefectivecoolingtowerbasinwatertemperaturedetectorwereliftedtoprevent.potentialspuriousautomaticModeIVoperation(warmwaterbypass)ofthecoolingtower.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thetwo-out-of-fourlowbasinwatertemperaturelogicwhichautomaticallyinitiatestheModeIVoperationofthecoolingtowertoatwo-out-of-threelogicwasfoundacceptable.Thechangepreventedafaultyinstrument,fromspuriouslyinitiatingtheautomaticfunction.*Operationspersonnelstillmaintainedadequatemonitoringandcontrolcapabilitiesoftheinstruments,temperatures,andsystem.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage73of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo;:93-006,Rev.1SpecificationP304SA,ProcedureNMP2-IST-001Rev.3,2PPD-GL-89-10Rev.1USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:Section3.9ADBAHydrogenRecombinerSystemUpdateUSAR.Table3.9A-12"ActiveValves(BOP)"ThischangerevisedUSARTable3.9A-12,listofactivevalves,.toagreewithdescriptionsintheUSAR;withNMP2-IST-001Rev.3,"PumpandValveFirstTen-YearIn-serviceTestingProgramPlan"gand2PPD-GL-89-10Rev.1,"Motor-OperatedValveProgramPlanDescriptionfor-NineMilePointNuclearStationUnitg2."SafetyEvaluationSummary:Table3.9A-12wasrevisedtochangethevalvetypeandmanufacturerfor2HCS*MOVlA,2HCS*MOV1B,'2HCS*MOV3A,2HCS*MOV3Bg2HCS*MOV4A,2HCS*MOV4B,2HCS*MOV6A,and2HCS*MOV6BfromVelanglobetoWestinghousegate.Also,thevalveoperatormodelnumberfor2HCS*MOV1A,2HCS*MOV1B,2HCS*MOV3Aand2HCS*MOV3BwaschangedfromSMB-000-5toSMB-00-10.Thetableisnowconsistentwithas-builtplantconditionsanddesignbasisdocuments(designspecificationNMP2-P304SA).Thischangehasnoimpactonthesafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.Nophysicalhardwarechangesarerequired;therefore,thefunctionandoperabilityofthevalvesis,notaffected.ThechangefromglobetogatevalveswaspreviouslyreportedinsubmittalletterdatedApril28,1989,underSafetyEvaluation88U-008.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage74of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System!TitleofChange:93-009ProceduresGAP-POL-01Rev.01,NEP-POL-300Rev.01Sections13.1,13.2N/ARestructuringofNuclearSupportOrganizationFunctionsinAccordancewithRevisedProceduresGAP-POL-01andNEP-POL-300DescriptionofChange:Changeshavebeenmadetothecorporatelevelmanagementandt;echnicalsupportstructureofNMPC'sNuclearDivisionincluding:reorganizingtheLicensingBranchandInformationManagementBranchoftheNuclearSupportOrganizationback*undertheNuclearEngineeringOrganization;reorganizingtheTrainingBranchandEmergencyPreparednessBranchoftheNuclearSupportOrganizationbackundertheNuclearGenerationOrganization;reorganizingtheProcurementBranchofNuclearSupportundertheNuclearGenerationOrganization;dissolvingtheNuclearSupportOrganizationandeliminatingthepositionofVicePresidentNuclearSupport.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theneworganizationalstructureprovidesfortheintegratedmanagementofactivitiesthat.supporttheoperationandmaintenanceofNineMilePointUnit1andUnit2.TheVicePresidentNuclearGenerationwillhaveoverallresponsibilityforthesupportfunctionsofTraining,EmergencyPreparedness,andProcurement,inadditiontohisotherresponsibilities.TheVicePresidentNuclearEngineeringwillhaveoverallresponsibilityforthesupportfunctionsofLicensingandInformationManagement,inadditiontohisotherresponsibilities.Thesechangesprovideclearcorporatemanagementcontrol/directionofonsiteandoffsitesupportfunctions.Thesechangesallowfordissolvingthe-NuclearSupportOrganizationandeliminatingthepositionofVicePresidentNuclearSupport.Basedontheanalysisperformed,theneworganizationalstructureforthesupportfunctionsofLicensing,InformationManagement,Training,EmergencyPreparedness,andProcurementdoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage75of93SafetyEvaluationNo.sImplementationDocumentNo.sUSARAffectedPages:SystemsTitleofChanges93-014ProcessControlProgram,GAP-POL-01,GAP-OPS-01Sections13.1,13.5N/ARadwasteOperationsReorganizationDescriptionofChange:ResponsibilitiesforRadwasteOperationswastransferredfromtheManagerOperationstotheManagerRadiationProtection.Thechangeprovidessingle-pointaccountabilityforradioactivewasteshippingandimprovestheefficiencyofradwasteprocessing.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThereorganizationprovidesacloserworkrelationshipbetweenRadwasteOperatorsandRadiationProtectionworkers.ThisreorganizationdoesnotaffectTechnicalSpecifications,'thesafeoperation,orthesafeshutdownoftheplant.Basedontheevaluationperformed;itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage76of93SafetyEvaluationNo.sImplementationDooumentNo.:USARMfectedPages:93-015Temp.Mod.93-017Figure10.1-6CSystem:TitleofChange:RemovalofReactorWaterFeedPumpP1B,PumpSealVentValvesDescriptionofChange:Thischangerelatestothereactorfeedpumpsealwatersystem(FWP),whichsuppliessealwatertothereactorfeedpumpsmechanicalsealstominimizefeedwateroutleakage.TemporaryModification93-017documentsandcontrolsthetemporaryremovalofvalves2FWP-V2000Band2FWP-V2001Bandtheinstallationofthreadedcapsintheirplaceuntilthevalvesarereinstalled.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thisreview,whichincludedtheeffectsofthechangeonthesystemsoperability,reliability,maintainability,structuralintegrity,andsysteminteractions,hasfoundthattheimplementationofthischangewillnotcauseanysignificantsafetyoroperabilityissues.Theycanbeloosenedtoventanyentrappedairand,duetotheirweight,havenoeffectonstructuralintegrity.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage77of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange!93-016ProcedureNIP-TQS-01Section13.1N/AChangestoNIP-TQS-01toDescribeNineMilePointUnit1andNineMilePointUnit2StaffPositionsComparabletoANSIN18.1-1971andANSI/ANS3.1-1978DescriptionofChange:Thischangecross-referencestitlesusedforstaffmembersatNineMilePointUnit1andNineMilePointUnit2tocomparablepositionsasshowninANSI/ANS3.1-1978.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThischangeclarifiesthestaffmembertitlesandtheirqualificationsasrequiredbyANSI/ANS3.1-1978andascommittedtointheTechnicalSpecificationsandUSAR.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage78of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:93-021,Rev.1CalculationsHVC-072andHVC-073USARAffectedPages:System!TitleofChange:Section9.4ControlBuildingUnitCoolersTechnicalSpecificationInterpretationf25,USARandEQDChangesDescriptionofChange:USARTable9.4-1wasrevisedtoreflectnewdesigntemperaturestoallowunitcoolers2HVC*UC104,105,106E107tobeoutofservicewithoutimposinganLCO.Theequipmentlocatedinthezonesaffectedbyunavailabilityoftheaboveunitcoolerswilleithercontinuetofunction,orifitfails,itwillfailsafeandwillnotinterferewithothersafetyfunctions.Ifanyoneoftheunitcoolers(2HVC*UC104,105,106,107)isinoperable,thetemperatureoftheaffectedareasmustbemonitored.Ifthetemperatureexceeds1044F,anequipmentoperabilityreviewshallberequired.Inoperabilityofunitcoolers2HVC*UC103A/BrequiresLCO3.7.3(sevendays).Inanyoperationalcondition,theassociatedchillershouldbetaken.outofserviceifunitcooler2HVC*UC103AorBisoutof.service.TheproposedTechnicalSpecificationInterpretation(TSI)f25,Rev.11,canbeusedfortheplantoperation.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TechnicalSpecificationInterpretationf25allowedcontrolbuildingunitcoolers2HVC*UC103A/Band2HVC*UC104,105,106and107tobeoutofservicebasedonthefactthattheareascooledbytheseunitcoolerswereanalyzedforlossofcoolingandthattheconsequenceswillbewithinthedesignlimit.Furtherreviewindicatesthat2HVC*103A/Barerequiredtobeoperable.Unitcoolers2HVC*UC104,105,106and107canbetakenoutofservicewithoutenteringanLCO.Thefollowingprovidesthebasisfortheabovechanges:Inareascooledby2HVC*UC104,106and107,itwasdeterminedthat,althoughtemperaturesmayexceedthemaximumdesigntemperaturewhentheunitcoolersareoutofserviceandLOCA SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage79of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary:93-021,Rev.1(cont'd.)(cont'd.)occurs,equipmentwilleitherwithstandthehighertemperatures,orfailsafe,orwillhaveaccomplishedtheirsafetyfunctionpriortoexceedingthetemperatureforwhichtheyarequalified.In230'lectricaltunnel(Div.II),cooledby2HVC*UC105,itwasdeterminedthatthemaximumdesigntemperatureof104'FwillnotbeexceedediftheunitcoolerisoutofserviceandLOCAoccurs.Duringnormalplantoperationwithunitcoolersoperating,theareatemperaturesarelowerthantheabove-definedLOCAtemperatures.Therefore,equipmentoperabilityisnotimpacted.However,ifduringnormalplantoperationanysafety-relatedunitcooler(2HVC*UC104,105,106,107)shouldbeinoperable,andtheareatemperatureexceeds104'F,anengineeringevaluationwillberequiredtoensureequipmentoperability.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage80of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages':System:TitleofChange:93-024DER2-92-4027Section9A.3FireProtectionWater(FPW)24VdcStartingBatteriesOperabilityCriteriaDescriptionofChange:Batteries2FPW-BAT1Aand1Bareusedtostartdiesel-drivenfirepump2FPWQ-P1.Thischangerevisedthesurveillancerequirementofverifying.every92daysthatthedifferenceinspecificgravityoftheelectrolytebetweencellsdoesnotexceed.0.015,toanewvalueof0.040.Thenewacceptancecriteriaof0.040isbasedonthebatterymanufacturer'srecommendationtoensuresufficientchargeofthecellstostartthefirepump.Thepumpmanufacturer,whoestablishedtheoriginal0.015criteria,concurredwiththechangeto0.040.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thischangeestablishesamorerealisticcriterionof0.040forthespecificgravitydifferenceforthediesel-drivenfirepumpstartingbatteries.Thenewcriterionensuresasufficientdegreeofchargeandtheoperabilityofthebatteriestoprovideproperstartingofthedieselfirepump.Thefireprotectionsystemcontinuestofunctionasdesigned,ensuringtheavailabilityofequipmentimportanttosafetyintheeventofafire.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage81of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChanges93-025,Rev.1ProcedureN2-OP-53AN/AResolutionofDER2-93-0032OperatingprocedureN2-OP-53ArequiredthatwhenanoperatingcoolingunitinthecontrolroomorrelayroomisputintoPull-To-Lock(PTL)modetotestoperability,oftheredundantunit,theoperatingunitisdeclaredinoperable.Thisisnotrequiredaslongascoolingcanberestoredin10minutes.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ForsituationsdescribedinDER2-93-0032,thetimetoreachthedesigntemperatureof90'Fiscalculatedtobeabout13to15minutes.Ifcoolingisrestoredwithin10minutes,thenthetemperaturewithineitherthecontrolroomorrelayroomwillbewithinthedesignlimit,andcomponentoperabilityisnotimpacted.Therefore,OperatingProcedureN2-OP-53AwasrevisedsuchthattheHVC*ACUsmaybeplacedinPTLfor10minuteswithoutdeclaringtheoperatingunitinoperable.Basedonthe,evaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage82of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages!SystemsTitleofChange:93-026GenericLetter89-13N/AHVCPerformanceTestingofUnitCoolersDescriptionofChangersGenericLetter89-13requiresthatheatexchangerscooledbyservicewaterberegularlytestedtoevaluatetheirdesigncapacity.Thissafetyevaluationaddressestestingoftheunitcoolersusingservicewater.Sincetheunitcoolersdonothaveflowinstrumentationpermanentlyinstalled,atemporarytestloopwillbeconnectedusingfirehose.Thetestloopwillbeinstalledinplaceofspoolpiecesinstalledforflushingandtestingunitcoolers.Testresultswillbeanalyzedtoproviderepositioningofservicewaterflowcontrolvalveswherenecessary.'afetyEvaluationSummary:Thistestprogramaddsatestlooptoaunitcooler.Theadditionofthetestloopisonlyforthedurationofeachtestandnootherchanges(pressure,pipingarrangements)arerequired.Localizedfloodingfromruptureofthetestloopisboundedbypreviousfloodinganalysis.Therefore,thetestprogramdoesnotimpairthesafeoperationoftheplant.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage83of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-031ProceduresNEP-POL-300,NIP-IRG-01,NIP-ECA-04Section13.1N/ANuclearLicensingOrganizationalStructureandResponsibilities-RevisedProceduresNEP-POL-300,NIP-IRG-01andNIP-ECA-04DescriptionofChange:TheorganizationalstructureoftheNuclearLicensingOrganizationhaschangedsuchthat,theManagerLicensingreportsdirectlytotheExecutiveVicePresidentNuclear.Priortothischange,theManagerLicensingreporteddirectlytotheVicePresidentNuclearEngineering.Inaddition,theManagerLicensinghasassumedtheresponsibilitiesforinterfacingwithINPO,andimplementingtheQualityFirstProgram.TheseresponsibilitiesweretransferredfromtheManagerExecutiveStaff.TheManagerExecutiveStaffpositionhasbeeneliminated.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThechangesmadetotheorganizationalstructureoftheNuclearEngineeringandNuclearLicensingOrganizationscontinuetoprovidefortheintegratedmanagementofactivitiesthatsupporttheoperationandmaintenanceofNineMilePointUnit1andUnit2.Thesechangesalsocontinuetoprovideclearmanagementcontrolandeffectivelinesofauthorityandcommunicationsbetweentheorganizationalunitsinvolvedinthemanagement,operation,andtechnicalsupportoftheoperationofNineMilePointUnit1andUnit2.Basedonthisevaluation,theorganizationalstructureoftheNuclearEngineeringandNuclearLicensingOrganizationscontinuestosatisfytheacceptancecriteriaofSRP13.1.1,anddoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage84of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-033,Rev.1ProcedureN2-OP-94Section6.2TraversingIn-CoreProbe(TIP)SystemTreatmentofTIPLeakageinLOCAAnalysisDescriptionofChange:ThischangerevisedNote19ofUSARTable6.2-56asfollows:1~ThestatementthattheTIP.leakagepathconsideredintheChapter15.6.5LOCAanalysisaccountsforabreakinaTIPline"occurringsimultaneouslywithorbecauseofadesignbasisLOCA>>wasdeleted.20ThestatementthatonlyoneoffiveTIPballvalvesisopenatatimetoconductLPRMcalibrationswasrevisedtoindicatethatamaximumoffivevalvesmaybeopenedatanyonetime.SafetyEvaluationSummary:1.DeletingthestatementthattheTIPlinebreakoccurswith.orbecauseofadesignbasisLOCAremovedaneditorialchangemadeinUSARRev.0byLDCNU-238.LDCNU-983madeadditionalchangestoNote19inthesamerevision,withsubstantialtechnicalexplanation.LDCNU-983indicatedthatthesamestatementrevisedbyLDCNU-238shouldbedeleted.ChangestothesamestatementfrombothLDCNswereinadvertentlyincorporatedintoNote19.Thedeletionofthestatementresolvesthispriorinconsistency.LeakageviaabrokenTIPguidetubeisstillconsideredintheLOCAanalysis.2~NEDC-22253,>>BWROGEvaluationofContainmentIsolationConcerns,"October1982,and.NMP2compliancewiththeNEDCcriteria,havebeenacceptedbytheNRC.Thissafetyevaluationsummarizedthreetopicsinparticularfrom-theNEDC-22253analysisthatprovidethebasisforallowingallfiveTIPballvalvestobeopenatatime-eventprobability,instrumentlinebreakconsiderations,andtheLOCAandfailureoffiveTIPguidetubes.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage85of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary:93-033,Rev.1(cont'd.)(cont'd.)Thesechangesdidnotrequireplantmodifications.OperatingprocedureN2-0P-94,"TraversingIncoreProbe",changedstepD.16toallowamaximumoffiveballvalvestobeopenedatatime.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage86of93SafetyEvaluationNo.!ImplementationDocumentNo.:93-034ProceduresGAP-POL-01,NEP-POL-300USARAffectedPages:Sections9A.3,13.1,13.5,AppendixBSystemsTitleofChangersN/ARestructuringofNuclearGenerationandNuclearEngineeringOrganizationsperRevisedProceduresGAP-POL-01andNEP-POL-300DescriptionofChange:TheNuclearGenerationandNuclearEngineeringorganizationsarecontrolledadministrativelybyproceduresGAP-POL-01andNEP-POL-300,respectively.Theseproceduresestablishfunctionalpositionsandresponsibilitiesnecessarytoensurethesafeandefficientoperation,maintenance,modification,andtestingoftheNineMilePointNuclearStationandaredescribedinUSARChapter13.TherestructuringexpandstheexistingSiteServicesorganizationtoincludeNuclearSecurity,TechnicalServices(includingFireProtection,CentralMaintenance,EnvironmentalProtection,andProcedures),Procurement,andConstructionServices.Relevantproceduralchanges,USARchanges,andNRCapprovedPlanandProgramchangesrequiredtoimplementtheneworganizationalstructurehavebeenmade.SafetyEvaluati.onSummary:TheneworganizationalstructureprovidesfortheintegratedmanagementofcommonactivitiestosupporttheoperationandmaintenanceoftheNineMilePointNuclearStation.Thisorganizationalchangealteredthereportingstructureofpreviousexistingpositionsbut.doesnotaffecttheperformanceoffunctionsorresponsibilities.Thenewreportingstructureprovidesclearmanagementcontrolandeffectivelinesofauthorityandcommunicationsbetweentheorganizationalunitsinvolvedinthemanagement,operation,andtechnicalsupportfortheoperationofthefacility.ThesechangesmeettheacceptancecriteriaofBranchTechnicalPositionCMEB9.5.1,StandardReviewPlanChapter13.1,andTechnicalSpecification6.2.1.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthattherestructuredorganizationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.'

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReport'age87of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitlecfChange:93-049Appendix.JProgramReviewSection6.2ResidualHeatRemovalVentingofShutdownCooling,ContainmentSprayand.SuppressionPoolCoolingDuringtheILRTDescriptionofChange:ThischangecorrectsadiscrepancybetweentheAppendixJTypeATest(ILRT)configurationandtheUSARdescription.Theshutdowncooling,containmentsprayandsuppressionpoolcoolingsubsystemsoftheresidualheatremovalsystemhavebeenaddedtothelistofsystemsintheUSARwhichpenetrateprimarycontainmentthatmaynotbeventedtotheprimarycontainmentatmosphereduringtheILRT.ThischangeprovidesconsistencybetweentheUnit2AppendixJProgramandtheUSARwhiletakingcreditforanexceptionprovidedby10CFR50AppendixJ.SafetyEvaluationSummary:AppendixJprovidesforanexceptiontotheventingrequirementsforsystemsthatarerequiredtomaintaintheplantinasafeconditionduringtheILRT,andforthosesystemsthatarenormallyfilledwithwaterandoperateunderpostaccidentconditions.This.changetakescreditfortheAppendixJexceptionandhas.addedshutdowncooling,containmentsprayandsuppressionpoolcoolingtotheappropriatelistintheUSARofsystemswhichmaynotbeventedduringtheILRT.,Thischangedoesnotimpact'thecapabilityofthesesystemstoachieveormaintainsafeshutdownoftheplant.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage88of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages!System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:93-072LER93-04Section6.2TraversingIn-coreProbe(TIP)TypeBTestingofTIPBellowsAppendixJof10CFR50requiresaTypeBtestforthetraversingin-coreprobe(TIP)penetrationsZ31A-Eduetothemetalbellowsarrangement.ItwasrevealedduringanindependentreviewoftheNMP2Appendix.JprogramthatthesepenetrationshavenotbeenTypeBtestedbuthavebeenincludedintheTypeAtest.LDCN1458,datedNovember29,1984,addedNote34toUSARTable6.2-56,whichstatedthatduetothemetalbellowsarrangementonTIPdrywellpenetrationflanges,theywillbeincludedinTypeAtestingratherthanTypeBtesting.Thisnotewasinterpretedtoapplytothetestingofthemetalbellowsthemselves.Therefore,duetothisnote,theTIPpenetrationbellowswerenotTypeBtestedbutwereincludedintheTypeAtest.However,noformalexemptionrequestfromAppendixJTypeBtestrequirementswasgenerated.ItwasincorrectlyassumedwhentheoperatinglicensewasissuedthattheUSARassumptionofTypeAtestingwasacceptable.TheUSARhasbeenrevisedtocorrectlyidentifyTypeBtestingfortheTIPpenetrationbellows.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheStandardReviewPlan(NUREG-0800)statesthattheprimarycontainmentleaktestingprogram,asdescribedintheUSAR,willbeacceptableifitmeetstherequirementsof10CFR50'ppendixJ.AsstatedinparagraphII.G.1ofAppendixJ,containmentpenetrations,whosedesignincorporatespipingpenetrationsfittedwithexpansionbellowsandelectricalpenetrationsfittedwithflexiblemetalsealassemblies,areincludedinTypeBtesting.ConformancewiththerequirementsofAppendixJconstitutesanacceptablebasisforsatisfyingtherequirementsofGeneralDesignCriteria53asitpertainstopenetrationshavingresilientsealsandexpansionbellows.TheTIPpenetrationbellowsarebeingincludedinTypeBtestingaswellasTypeAtestingtomeettherequirementsof10CFR50AppendixJ.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage89of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages!System!TitleofChange:93-084NMP2-RG197-01Section7.5PostaccidentMonitoringandDisplayInstrumentationRevisionofUnit2FinalSafetyAnalysisReport(Updated)Subsection7.5.2.1andAssociatedTable7.5-2DescriptionofChange:USARTable7.5-2wasrevisedtocontainonly(1)aplant-specificlistingofthevariablesforwhichpostaccidentmonitoringinstrumentationistobeprovidedatNMP2,and'2)theidentificationofvariabletype(s)andthedesignationofinstrumentcategoryforeachofthesevariables.Instrument-specificdatasuchascomponentEPNnumbers,instrumentscaleranges,andinstrumentlooppowersupplies,havebeendeletedfromthetable.Alldeviationsfrominstrumentcategorydesignations,andalldeviations'frominstrumentdesignandqualificationcriteriarecommendedbyRG1.97foreachofthelistedvariables,continuestobeexplicitlyidentifiedand)ustifiedinreferencednotes.Theplant-specificlistofRG1.97variables,andtheidentifiedtypeforeach,areunchanged.Withtheexceptionofneutronfluxvariables,theinstrumentcategoryspecifiedforeachRG1.97variableisunchanged.ChangesmadetoUSARSection7.5.2.1reflecttherevisedscopeandcontentofrevisedTable7.5-2.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThelevelofdetailprovidedintherevisedtableisstillsufficientforreviewerstoassessNMP2conformancewiththerecommendationsofRG1.97.ChangestothedesignatedcategoryforneutronfluxinstrumentationareconsistentwithinformationpreviouslyidentifiedtotheNRCbyNMPCinLetterNo.NMP2L-1394,datedJune18,1993.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage90of93SafetyEvaluationNo.!SafetyEvaluationSummary:93-084(cont'd.)(cont'd.)Theinstrument-specificdatawhichwasdeletedfromtheUSARhasbeenrelocatedtoanewNMPCdocument,NMP2-RG197-01,"ImportantDesignFeaturesofRegulatoryGuide1.97InstrumentsforNineMilePointUnit2."ThechangestoUSARSection7.5.2.1andTable7.5-2wereimplementeduponapprovalofNMP2-RG197-01.Thesechangesdidnotphysicallyaddanynewinstrumentation,norwereanyexistingplantstructures,systemsorcomponentsdeletedorinanywayphysicallymodified.ImplementationofthechangesdidnotrequirechangestoTechnicalSpecifications.Also,implementationofthechangesdidnotrequirechangestoanyoperatinginstructionsortoanymaintenanceorcalibrationinstructionscurrentlyspecifiedinanyexistingplantprocedures.Implementationofthesechangeshasnoadverseimpactonthesafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionandareinfullcompliancewithNRCstandards.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage91of93SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-086N/ASection9A.3N/A1993FireHazardsAnalysisUpdateDescriptionofChangesThischangerevisedfireloadingtableinformationtoshowupdatedcalculationresultsandaddtransientcombustibleallowance.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thischangerevisedinformationinthefirehazardsanalysissummarytablesduetoupdatedcalculationresultsandtheadditionofanallowabletransientcombustibleloadingfactortoaccountforprocedurally-controlledtransientcombustibles.Thefirehazardanalysis,whichisperformedinaccordancewith10CFR50AppendixR,SectionII.B,andBTPCMEB9.5-1,PositionC.1.b,continuestoverifythatthefirehazardsassociatedwithUnit2havebeenappropriatelyconsidered.Therevisedanalysisdoesnotimpacttheabilitytosafelyshutdowntheplantintheeventofafire,andnoTechnicalSpecificationsareimpacted.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage92of93USARTEXT,TABLEANDFIGURECHANGES(BASEDONPREVIOUSLYREPORTEDSAFETYEVALUATIONS)AnumberoftextandfigurerevisionsweremadetotheUSARtoincludeadditionalchangesthatarebasedonpreviouslyreportedsafetyevaluations.Thesechangesareidentifiedbelow.SafetyEvaluationNo.:87-080PreviouslyReported:10/26/88ThepowersupplytotheHPCSdieselaircompressormotor(2EGA-C3)waschangedfromClass1Etonon-1E.ThefollowingadditionalUSARfigurehasbeenupdatedaccordingly:Figure:9.5-40aSafetyEvaluationNo.:88U-077,Rev.1PreviouslyReported:6/27/89Standbydieselgeneratorroomemergency-dutyoutdoorairventilationsystemairflowswitchesforapplicableexhaustfanswerepreviouslyrelocatedtotheintakesideofthefansafterdeterminingthelocationatthedischargeproducedinaccuratemonitoringcapability.ThefollowingadditionalUSARsectionandtablehavebeenupdatedaccordingly:Section:7.3Table:7.3-16Sh1SafetyEvaluationNo.:89-044,Rev.1PreviouslyReported:10/29/92Asetofstairswith'landingreplacedtheladderfortheel.320~-31/4"platformusedforaccessingthescreenwellbuildingHVACequipmentroom.ThefollowingadditionalUSARfigurehasbeenupdatedaccordingly:Figure:12.3-69Sh4 SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage93of93USARTEXT,TABLEANDFIGURECHANGES(BASEDONPREVIOUSLYREPORTEDSAFETYEVALUATIONS)(Cont'd.)SafetyEvaluationNo.:8$-075,Rev.5(currentlyRev.8)PreviouslyReported:10/30/91AdditionalmodificationstotheGaitronicscommunicationssystemhavebeencompletedinaccordancewithModificationPN2Y87MX038,asdescribedinSafetyEvaluation89-075.ThefollowingUSARsectionandfigureshavebeenupdatedaccordingly:Sections:9.5Figures:9~55Sh1&29~56g9~579~58Sh2g9~59Sh29.5-10Sh29.5-11;9.5-14;9.5-15(9.5-179.5-189.5-20Sh1/9'-21)9'-249'-299.5-339.5-34;9.5-36SafetyEvaluationNo.:90-096,Rev.1(currentlyRev.2)PreviouslyReported:10/30/91AdditionalmodificationstothenuisanceannunciatorwindowshavebeencompletedinaccordancewithModificationPN2Y86MX085.ThefollowingadditionalUSARfigureshavebeenupdatedaccordingly:Figures:10.1-9a;10.1-9b;10.1-9c e