ML17059A504

Nine Mile Point - Unit 2 Safety Evaluation Summary Rept 1994.

ML17059A504
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	12/31/1994
From:	NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
To:
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ML17059A503	List: ML17059A502 ML17059A504
References
NMP2L-1504, NUDOCS 9411020168
Download: ML17059A504 (138)

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EnclosuretoNIVIP2L1504NINEMILEPOINT-UNIT2SAFETYEVALUATIONSUMMARYREPORT1994DocketNo.50-410LicenseNo.NPF-6994110201b8941028PDRADOCK05000410KPDR

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SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage1of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:87-162Rev.0L1Mod.PN2Y87lVIX100Figures11.5-2,11.5-2a,11.5-6,11.5-6aDigitalRadiationMonitoringSystem(DBMS)DeleteGaseousFlowControlBoardsDescriptionofChange:Revision0ofthissafetyevaluationevaluatedachangeto21gaseousprocessradiationmonitors.Revision1ofthissafetyevaluationreducedthescopeofthismodificationto4gaseousprocessradiationmonitors.Thismodificationreplacedtheautomaticflowcontrolvalvesandtheirassociatedflowcontrolprintedcircuitboardswithmanualflowcontrolvalves.Thechangesapplytothefollowingdigitalradiationmonitoringsystem(DRIVIS)monitors:2GTS-CAB1052OFG-CAB13A2OFG-CAB13B2HVW-CAB196'afetyEvaluationSummary:ThismodificationincreasestheoperabilityandreliabilityoftheDRMSsystembyeliminatingtheautomaticsampleflowcontrolvalvesandtheirassociatedprintedcircuitboards(onfourmonitors)andreplacingthemwithhandcontrolvalves.Themodulatedsampleflowhasbeendeterminednottoberequiredandtobeacontributingfactoringeneratingspuriousalarms.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage2of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:88-009Mod.PN2Y86MX1659.5-42;Tables8.3-1Sh25,8.3-5Sh5;Figures8.3-10,9.5-40aSystem:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:HPCSDieselAirStartSystemReplacementofPetterDieselThismodificationreplacedanonsafety-relateddiesel-drivenmotorintheDivisionIIIdieselairstartsystemwithanonsafety-relatedelectricmotor.Thismodificationalsoprovidedanewpowerfeedbetween2NHS-!VICC008andEGA-MST004.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheaircompressorsanddrivemotorsthatsupplyairtotheairstartsystemdonotprovideasafetyfunctionandwillnotimpactthesafeoperationoftheHPCSdiesel.Duetothecurrentfailuresassociatedwiththedieseldrivemotor,thismodificationwillincreaseairsystemreliability.Basedontheevaluatio'nperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage3of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:89-001Rev.2L3SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0132-90,SC2-0091-93USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Figures9.3-1E,9.3-1FInstrumentAirCappingofIASDrainandTestValvesAssembliesonADSAccumulatorsDescriptionofChange:Revision1toSafetyEvaluation89-001wasreportedinJune1990.Revision2addressedTemporaryModification89-006Baspermanent.Thus,thedrainvalveassembliesfortheADSaccumulators2IAS"TK34throughTK38,theassociatedinstrumentlinedrainvalveassembliesfor2IAS"TK32throughTK38,andthetestvalveassembliesinsideprimarycontainmentfortheIASsupplyheaderstotheADSaccumulators,willbepermanentlymaintainedwithsealweldedplugsorcaps.Revision3returnedvalves2IAS"V190,193,653,654totheiroriginaldesignconfiguration.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThevalveassembliesnotedabovewerefoundtobeleakingexcessivelyduringsurveillancetestN2-IAS-ADS-R106.TemporaryModification89-006Brevisedthevalveassembliesbyeitherremoving/cuttingthepipenippleandcapdownstreamofthesecondrootvalve,andsealweldingaplugtothesecondrootvalve,orremoving/cuttingthesecondrootvalveandsealweldingacaptothenippleofthefirstrootvalve.ThedrainvalvessealedbyTemporaryModification89-006Bwillbeleftasisastheyarenotrequiredfordepressurizingthetanksandinstrumentlines.Thepressuretransmitterventsareusedforthispurpose.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReport,Page4of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:89-006Rev.1SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0450-919.4-3,9.4-4;Figures9.4-1c,9.4-5Sh6ControlBuildingAirConditioning(HVC)ControlRoom/RelayRoomSmokeRemoval-ElectricalDisablingof2HVC-HVU1DescriptionofChange:Revision0ofSafetyEvaluation89-006wasreportedinJune1990.Revision1addressesthedesignchangethatmadeTemporaryModification89-057permanent.Thepowerleadstomakeupairunit2HVC-HVU1wereliftedfrom2NHS-MCC007CUB7Bandthebreakerleftintheoffposition.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thischangemodifiesthecontrolbuildingsmokeremovaloperation.Failureofsafety-relatedair-operateddamper2HVC"AOD142(failopen)withtheinadvertentoperationofmakeupairunit2HVC-HVU1createsapotentialforoutsideairtobeintroducedintothecontrolroomduringanaccident.Toprecludetheinadvertentoperationoftheunit,thepowerleadcableislifteduntilsuchtimeasneeded.Thereisnoimpactonsafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.ThereisnoTechnicalSpecificationimpact.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage5of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:89-010Rev.1SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0072-93Figure11.4-1bSolidRadioactiveWasteRemovalof2WSS-RV320Revision0ofSafetyEvaluation89-010wasreportedinJune1990.Revision1addressesTemporaryModification89-010asapermanentmodification.Thischangedeletedathermalreliefvalveinthesuctionpipingatthewasteconcentratetransferpumpwhichisintheevaporatorbottomshandlingsystem.Whenthissystemwasoperatingandbeingflushed,thethermalreliefvalvecausedoperationalproblems.Thismodificationremovedthethermalreliefvalve,andaddedablankflangewhichmaintainssystemintegritywithoutjeopardizingsystemoperation.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thischangeenhancestheintegrityandperformanceoftheevaporatorbottomshandlingsystem.Whenthissystemwasoperationalandbeingflushed,theflushingpressureswereliftingthethermalreliefvalveandthevalvewasnotreseating.Currently,thesystemisusedonaninfrequentbasisforshortperiodsoftime.Additionally,whenthesystemisnonoperationalitisdrainedofprocessfluid,thereforeprecludingthesystemconfigurationthatwouldrequireathermalreliefvalveinthepumpsuction.Sinceathermalreliefvalveisnotrequiredandthepressureintegrityofthesystemismaintained,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage6of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:89-047Rev.2L3Mod.PN2Y89MX038Figures9.3-9cthru9.3-9e,9.3-12g,9.3-13Sh1,9.3-16Sh5,6,8,9System:TitleofChange:FloorDrainSumpsReplacementofMiscellaneousCannedSumpPumpsDescriptionofChange:AspreviouslyreportedinOctober1991,Revision1ofSafetyEvaluation89-047addressedthereplacementof57existingfloordrainsumppumpswithstandardoff-the-shelfsubmersiblepumps.USARRevisions3and4includedchangestoreflectthoseportionsofthemodificationwhichhadbeencompleted.Revision3ofSafetyEvaluation89-047addressesadecreaseinthescopeofthemodificationfrom57to55sumppumps.USARRevision7reflectsthecompletionofModificationPN2Y89MX038.SafetyEvaluationSummary:AsdescribedintheOctober1991SafetyEvaluationSummaryReport,theequipmentinvolv'edinthismodificationservesnosafety-relatedfunction,anditsoperationorfailuretooperatedoesnotaffectsafety-relatedequipment.Thefunctionoftheexistingfloordrainsystemandtheparametersunderwhichitoperatesarenotchanged.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage7of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:90-021EDC2E10032Figure9.2-2Sh11ServiceWaterSystem(SWP)Revisionof2SWP"TE145ARBQACategoryThischangerevisedUSARFigure9.2-2Sheet11tochangetheQAcategorydesignationfortemperatureelements2SWP"TE145ALBfromQACategoryItonon-QACategoryI.Thiswasaccomplishedbychangingtheasterisk(")intheequipmentmarknumbertoadash(-)(i.e.,thenewdesignationis2SWP-TE145ARB).SafetyEvaluationSummary:Temperatureelements2SWP-TE145ALBareconnectedtonondivisional(black)cablestoprovideservicewaterloopA8cBdischargetemperatureinputstotheplantcomputer.Theydonotserveanysafety-relatedfunction.Theassociatedthermowells2SWP"TW145ASBaresafetyrelatedonlytoprovideapressureboundaryontheSWPsystempiping.ThismodificationisadocumentationonlychangeanddoesnotadverselyaffecttheSWPsystemoritsabilitytosupportplantoperation.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage8of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:90-048Rev.354Mod.PN2Y89MX0853.6A-34,3.6A-35,3.6A-36,Tables1.9-1Sh2,20,21,3.6A-1Sh1thru5,3.6A-2thru3.6A-71,3.9B-2xSh2,4,6A.9-3,6A.9-5,6A.9-6;Figures3.6A-12thru3.6A-49,6A.9-1,6A.9-3System:Feedwater(FWS),MainSteam(MSS),ReactorWaterCleanup(WCS),ResidualHeatRemoval(RHS),ServiceWater(SWP)TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:NMP2SnubberReductionRevision2ofSafetyEvaluation90-048wasreportedinOctober1991.Revisions3and4provideadditionalevaluationoftheNMP2snubberreductionprogram.Thesnubberreductionmodificationprogramreducesthenumberofmechanical'nubbersonNMP2safetyandnonsafety-relatedpipingsystemsbyreanalyzingthepipingsystemsforsnubberremovalorsnubberreplacementwithstruts.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Duetofailureratesassociatedwithsnubbers,snubberremovalresultsinpipingsystemsthataremorereliable.Otherbenefitsoftheprogramincludereducedlong-termmaintenance,inspectionandtestrequirements.TheUSARisbeingupdatedtoreflectrevisedanalysiscriteriaandanalysisresults.NMP2TechnicalSpecificationsareunaffected.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage9of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:90-126Rev.1SimpleDesignChangeSC1-0187-91N/ATechnicalSupportCenterEmergencyVentilationSystemTitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:TSCMD-3HVACDamperTemporaryModification5316consistedofde-energizingthedampermotoractuatorandmechanicallyrestrainingdamper212-41(MD-3)atapositionforaflowrateof3000cfma10%.ThischangewasevaluatedunderSafetyEvaluation90-054,Rev.0,andreportedtotheNRCin1992.Thischange(SC1-0187-91)permanentlyde-energizesthedampermotoractuatorandmechanicallyretiresdamper212-41inafixedopenposition.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thisdesignchangeisconsistentwiththeapplicablesystemdesignandqualityrequirements.Basedonanalysisandperformancetesting,thischangedoesnotaffecttheabilityoftheTechnicalSupportCenterHVACsystemtoperformwithinitsdesignbasis.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage10of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:90-311Rev.0L1Mod.PN2Y88MX133N/AMaterialHandling-RadwasteRadwasteCCTVCameraReplacementTheoriginalCCTVsysteminstalledintheradwastebuildingrequiredextensiverepairsandmaintenance.Theoriginalequipmentbecameobsoleteandspare/repairpartswerenotavailablewithoutspecialtoolingbythemanufacturer.TheoriginalCCTVsystemwasreplacedwithanewsystem.Revision0alsoevaluatedtheadditionofaboom-mountedcamera/channeltobeinstalledinthetruckbay.However,aftertheoriginalcamerasystemwasreplaced,itwasdeterminedthattheadditionalboom-mountedcamerawasnotneeded.Revision1deletestheevaluationforanadditionalcamera.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheCCTVsystemintheradwastebuildingispassiveinnature.Thissystemallowsremotemonitoringofprocesshandlingfromacentrallocation.TheradwasteCCTVsystemisnonsafetyrelatedandtherearenoseismicorenvironmentalrequirementsfortheinstallation.Thenewequipmentisinstalledtothesamestandardsastheoriginalequipment.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage11of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:IImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:91-074Rev.3EDC2M10304AFigure5.4-16bReactorWaterCleanupandControlRodDrive-HydraulicTitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:CRDtoRWCUPumpsPipingInstallationThischangeinstalledanewsourceofpumpsealinjectionwatertotheRWCUpumps.TheoriginalsourceofsealinjectionwaterwasfromtheRWCUpumpdischargewhilethenewsourceistakenfromtheCRDpumpdischarge.ThisprovidesbettermechanicalsealperformancefortheRWCUpumps.TheoriginalsealinjectionsourcecanbevalvedinforRWCUpumpoperationwhentheCRDpumpsarenotoperating.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thepipinginstalledisseismicallysupportedandroutedsoasnottoimpactanyequipmentrequiredforsafeoperationandshutdownofthereactor.TheimpactofunmonitoredflowintotheRWCUsystemhasbeenevaluatedanddeterminedtobeboundedbyexistinganalyses.TheflowremovedfromtheCRDsystemwillnotadverselyimpactthesystem'sabilitytorechargethescramaccumulators.Thesafetyclassification,design,performance,andreliabilityoftheCRDandRWCUpumpsarenotdegradedbythischange.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage12of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:91-076Mod.PN2Y89MX138Figures1.2-15Sh2,9.5-6EnergyManagementSystem(EMS)InstallEIVISRemoteTerminalUnit(RTU)Thismodificationinstalledanenergymanagementsystem(EMS)remoteterminalunit(RTU)atUnit2.TheRTUprovidesdataacquisitionandtransferofthecurrentstatusoftheUnit2electricsystemtoadigitizeddatabaseattheEMScontrolcenter.TheEIVISRTUpanel(2CEC-PNL817)housesthenecessaryequipmenttoprovidesignalconditioningandtransmissionofdataviaadedicatedphonelinetosystempowercontrol.Aninterfacepanel(2CEC-PNL816)wasinstalledtohousethenecessaryrelays,transducersandtestdevicesfortheincomingplantsignals.CableswereroutedfrompanelsP802,P805,P808andP869toobtainthestationgeneratorandtransformerstatus.Theauxiliaryrelaysmultiplythecontactsforthe115-kVand345-kVmodificationstatusfromP852andP868.Allcableswereterminatedfirsttotestdevicestoallowforisolationduringmaintenanceandtestingactivities.AllconnectionstotheRTUaremadefromthispanel.InterfacepanelP816andRTUpanelP817havebeenlocatedonpanelmodule2CEC"APF733inthelowercontrolroomel~288'-6".SafetyEvaluationSummary:EMSpanelsP816andP817willbeinstalledinaseismicCategoryIstructure.Thepanelshavebeenclassifiedas04,whosefunctionisnotrequiredduringorfollowingaseismicevent,butwhosefailurecouldimpactthefunctionofasafety-relatedcomponent.ThepanelshavebeenseismicallymountedinaccordancewithRegulatoryGuide1.29topreventthisoccurrence.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage13of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:91-085ProceduresN2-OP-100A5.N2-OP-100BTable4-1Sh3MaterialHandlingSystem(IVIHS)ReplacetheAlarmLightSystemwithAdministrativeControlsfortheEmergencyDieselGeneratorCranes,2IVIHS-CRN2,3,and4DescriptionofChange:Thedieselgeneratorcranes'larmlightsystemreferencedintheUSARwasomittedfromplantdesignconfiguration.Thefunctionofthealarmlightsystemwastoalertoperatorswhenthecranewasoutofitsstoredposition.Theonlytimewhenthecraneloadisallowedtobeoversafety-relatedequipmentwouldbewhenthedieselgeneratorisdeclaredinoperative.ThisisbasedoncalculationMS-1917whichseismicallyqualifiesthecranesinthestoredpositiononly.Intheabsenceofthisalarmlightsystem,theoperatorsplaceamarkuptagonthedisconnectswitchforeachofthedieselgeneratorcranes,asameansofcontrollingtheuseandmovementofthecranesduringplantoperation.Inadditiontothismeansofcontrolforthesecranes,operationalproceduresN2-OP-100AandN2-OP-100Bhavebeenrevisedtoincludeaprecautionarystatementontheuseofthesecranes.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theadministrativecontrolfortheuseofthedieselgeneratorcranesisanacceptableandeffectivemeansofreplacingthealarmlightsystem.Thischangeinvolvesanalternativemethodforthecontrolofthestoredpositionofthenonsafety-relateddieselgeneratorcraneswhiletheplantisinthenormaloperatingmode(withthedieselgeneratorsoperable).Thealternativemethodforthecontrolofthestoredpositionofthecranesprovidesadequateassurancethattheoperabilityoftheemergencydieselgeneratorswillnotbeadverselyaffectedduringaseismicevent.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage14of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:91-086Rev.1SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0256-91Figure11.5-3dServiceWaterDeleteSolenoidValvesfromLiquidDRMSCabinetsDescriptionofChange:Thisdesignchangeremovedsolenoidvalvesoriginallyinstalledontheliquidmonitoringskidstofacilitateanautomaticpurgefeature.Theremovalofthesolenoidvalveseliminatesflowrestrictionsassociatedwithlowflowproblems.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheproposeddeletionofthesolenoidvalvesdoesnotaltertheoperatingdesignbasisorpostaccidentmonitoringrequirementsevaluatedintheUSAR.Followingdeletionofthesolenoidvalves,theliquidmonitoringskidswillcontinuetomeetsystemdesignpressure,flowandtemperaturerequirements.Thechangewillnotaffectthesafeoperationofthesystem.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage15of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitfeofChange:DescriptionofChange:91-096Rev.1L3EDC2M10135Table3.9A-12Sh3;Figure9.3-20bNitrogenSystem(GSN)Deletionof2GSN"RV32A/BandRV34A/BThischangedeletedvalves2GSN"RV32A/BandRV34A/Bfromthenitrogensystem.Inordertodeletethesevalves,valves2GSN"V71A/BandV72A/Bwerelockedopensothatoverpressureprotectioncouldbemaintainedby2IASASV19A/B.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Withdeletionof2GSN"RV32A/BandRV34A/B,thischangewillmaintainoverpressureprotectionoftheautomaticdepressurizationsystemN~supplylinesthroughvalve2IAS"SV19A/Bwithvalves2GSN"V71A/BandV72A/Blockedopen.Deletionofvalves2GSN"RV32A/BandRV34A/Bwillreducethenumberofvalvesrequiringin-servicetestingandeliminatevalvesthatcouldhavepotentialforproblemsinthefuture.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage16of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:92-003Calculation2-SQ-007Table3.10A-1ContainmentMonitoringSystem(CMS)ReviseUSARTable3.10A-1forResistanceTemperatureDetectors(RTDs)ofCMSSystemDescriptionofChange:InvestigationrevealedthatthedynamictestingperformedoncertainRTDssuppliedbyPYCO,underDesignSpecificationC-041D,didnotreflectfieldinstalledconditions.ThesubjectRTDsweretestedwiththermowellsbutwereinstalledwithoutthem.ThissafetyevaluationevaluatedtheinstalledconditionoftheRTDs.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThesafetyfunctionoftheRTDsinthecontainmentmonitoringsystemistomonitorthedrywellandsuppressionchamberairandsuppressionpooltemperatures,andprovideanalogsignalstothecontrolroomplantcomputerand"recorder,whichinturnprovidesahightemperaturealarm.ThesubjectRTDs,whichwerediscoveredinstalledwithoutthermowells,havesubsequentlybeendynamicallyqualifiedbysupplementingtheoriginaltestreportwithananalysis.TheanalysisdemonstratesthatthesubjectRTDscanperformtheirintendedsafetyfunctionwhensubjectedtothepostulatedseismicandhydrodynamicloads.ThedetailsoftheanalysisareprovidedinNIVlP2Calculation2-SQ-007.Nodesignorfieldmodificationisrequiredasaresultoftheanalysis.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage17of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:92-011Rev.1N2-OP-48AuxiliaryBoilerSystemN/AServiceWater(SWP)andFireProtection-Water(FPW)TitleofChange:AlternateCoolingWaterSupplytoAuxiliaryBoilerCirculatingPumpSealCoolersandSampleCoolersDescriptionofChange:Thisprocedurechangepermittedtheinstallationofatemporaryfirehosefromfirehosereel2FPW-FHR32toservicewatersystemdrainvalve2SWP-V1011inordertosupplythesealandsamplecoolersoftheauxiliaryboilercirculatingpumpswhilethenormalsupplyofservicewaterwasisolatedduringRefuelingOutage2.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thistemporaryalterationwillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperationorcapabilitytokeeptheplantinthesafeshutdowncondition.Theportionofservicewaterwhichnormallysuppliesthecoolingwaterandtheservicewaterisolationvalveshallbothbeadministrativelycontrolledbyaprocedure.Fireprotectioncapabilitiesarenotdegradedatanytime,becausesystempressureandflowwillbemaintainedinthefireprotectionsystemwhilethisprocedureisineffect.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage18of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:92-035Rev.1ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0098-929.5-62,9.5-63;Figures9.5-52b,10.1-3h,10.1-4dSystem:1TitleofChange:MainSteamandAuxiliaryBoilerSystemsPermanentRemovalof2lVISS-IVIOV19A&.2IVISS-MOV19BDescriptionofChange:Thissimpledesignchangewasinitiatedtodocumentandprovideengineeringdirectionforthepermanentremovalofvalves2MSS-MOV19Aand2MSS-MOV19B.Theirfunctionwastoprovideisolationbetweenthemainsteamandauxiliaryboilersystems.Thesubjectvalveswerenormallyclosedandwereneverusedforprovidingblanketingsteamtotheirrespectivemoistureseparatorreheatersduringstartup,heatupandplantcooldown.Theinletandoutletpipingshallremaininstalledbutcapped.Cables/interlockwiringwillberemovedasrequired.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thissimpledesignchangewillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperationorcapabilitytokeeptheplantinasafeshutdowncondition.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage19of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:92-037Rev.1,3Ec4Mod.PN2Y91MX0059.4-50,9.4-53,9.4-56,10.4-17,10.4-18;Table9.4-1Sh4;Figures1.2-1,2.4-1,10.4-7d,10.4-7j,10.4-7k,10.4-7ISystem:TitleofChange:CirculatingWaterSystem(CWS)CWSChemicalInjectionandAnalysisFacilityDescriptionofChange:Thismodificationinvolvedconstructionofanewfacilityforthestorageandinjectionofsulfuricacid,scaledispersantandcoppercorrosioninhibitor.Thefacilityalsoincludesalaboratorytobeusedfortheanalysisofcirculatingwater,microbiology,anddieseloil.TheoriginalCWSacidinjectionsystem,whichwasnotinuse,hasbeenabandonedinplace.ThetemporaryCWSchemicalinjectionsystem,whichwasusedtoinjectthechemicalintothecirculatingwater,hasalsobeendiscontinued.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thismodificationprovidesapermanent,reliableandwell-controlledCWSchemicaladditionsystem.Thissystemisnotrequiredforsafeshutdownoftheplant,andanyrealisticaccidents/failuresthatmaybeassociatedwiththischangewillnotadverselyaffectthedesignfunctionofanysafety-relatedstructure,systemorcomponent.Thechangedoesnotadverselyimpactsafeoperationand/orshutdownoftheplant.Afailureoftheinjectionsystemcouldimpactplantefficiencyoveraperiodoftime.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage20of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:92-045Rev.2LDCR2-93-UFS-1709.1-32;Table9.1-4Sh2MHRAcceptabilityofCAVSPANGantry/ManliftatNMP2DescriptionofChange:InanefforttoimproveALARAandimproveoutageefficiency,NMPCOperationspurchasedtheCAVSPANsystemforrefuelingoutagereactorcavityandstoragepooldecontamination.TheCAVSPANisareactorrefuelingcavity-spanninggantry,designedbyAppliedRadiologicalControls,Inc.(ARC)andusedforsuspendingworkcagesinsupportofdecontaminatingthereactorcavityandinternalstoragepool.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheCAVSPANwasreviewedperUSARAppendix9C"ControlofHeavyLoads"criteriaforacceptabilityforuseoverthereactorcavity.Basedonthisreview,itwasdeterminedthattheCAVSPANwasacceptableforuseviatheseismicexceptionevaluationperformed.TheuseoftheCAVSPANsystemfordecontaminationofthereactorcavityandstoragepoolisanalternatemethodfromthemethoddescribedinUSARSection9.14.2.7,whichdescribestheuseofthedecontaminationplatformforthesepurposes.ThischangeincorporatesadescriptionofthealternatedecontaminationmethodintoSection9.14.2.7.Thetemporarychangeindecontaminationtechniqueforthereactorcavityandstoragepool,asdescribedinthisevaluation,willnotaffectnuclearsafety.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluation.SummaryReportPage21of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:implementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:92-047N/AN/ANRCEmergencyTelecommunicationsSystem(ETS)TitleofChange:ReflectionofNRC/ETSUpgradeintheSiteEmergencyPlanDescriptionofChange:GenericLetter91-14directedlicenseestoassistinimplementinganupgradetotheNRC'sEmergencyTelecommunicationsSystem(ETS).ThisincludedreplacementoftheENS(redphone)withamorereliablephonesystem.ThisreplacementwasreflectedintheSiteEmergencyPlan(SEP),whichpreviouslydescribedtheENSasadedicatedphone(hotline)thatringsattheNRCOperationsCenterwhenpickedup.Thenewphonerequiresdialinga10-digitnumberlistedonthephoneinstrument.(Controlroomshavespeeddialcapabilities.)SafetyEvaluationSummary:ReplacementoftheENSwillenhancethereliabilityoftheENSandotherphonesinthesystembyutilizingtheFederalTelecommunicationSystems(FTS)2000network.ThischangetotheSEPwillnotaffectthesafeoperationorsafeshutdownofeitherUnit1orUnit2.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage22of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:92-051Rev.2N/A13.2-26System:TideofChange:N/AModificationofFireBrigadeContinuingTrainingDescriptionofChange:TheannualFireBrigadetrainingconsistingof40hoursemergencycorecoolingsystem(ECCS)and40hourselectricaldistributioncourseshasbeeneliminated.FireBrigademembersstillreceivetrainingonECCSandelectricaldistributioninordertomeettherequirementsof10CFR50AppendixR.BrigademembersmeettherequirementsbytakingIntroductiontoBoilingWaterReactors(BWR),ECCS,andElectricalDistributionwithintwoyearsofemployment.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThecontinuedtrainingprogramforFireBrigademembersdoesnotaffecttheabilityoftheBrigadetosuppressafire.BrigademembersstillreceivetrainingonECCSandelectricaldistributioninordertomeettherequirementsof10CFR50AppendixR.Removingthe80hoursofECCSandelectricaldistributioncontinualtrainingwillbringtheNineMilePointFireBrigadetrainingprograminlinewiththeindustryforplantswithadedicatedfiredepartment,whilemaintaining10CFR50AppendixRcompliance.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage23of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:92-055Rev.2N/AFigures1.2-1,2.4-1,9.2-8a,9.5-1bN/ADemolitionofPresent"AreaComplex"BuildingandConstructionofSwing/UnitTwoOperationsBuildingDescriptionofChange:TheUnit2operationsbuildingwasconstructedwheretheareacomplexbuildingwaslocated.TheareacomplexbuildingwasdemolishedandthelandusedfortheinstallationoftheUnit2operationsbuilding.Thischangeconsolidatesoperatingactivitiesfromvarioustemporaryfacilities.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheconstructionactivityoftheUnit2operationsbuildingdoesnotimpactthepertinentlicensingissuesevaluatedintheUSARthatareassociatedwithhydrologicengineering.Thepertinentissuesareflooding,localintenseprecipitation(probablemaximumprecipitation),andtheimpactontheairintakeaccidentX/0(CHi/0),theatmosphericdispersioncoefficient.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage24of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:92-069SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0294-92Figure9.2-17b-CondensateMakeupandTransfer/RemoveReliefValve2CNS-RV133Thissimpledesignchangeremovedreliefvalve2CNS-RV133.SafetyEvaluationSummary:IThissimpledesignchangewillnotimpactthesafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.Thecondensatestoragefacilitycondensatemakeupanddrawoffsystemisnotrequiredtoeffectorsupportsafeshutdownofthereactorortosupporttheoperationofanynuclearsafetysystem.Engineeringevaluationindicatesthatnopiping,componentsorequipmentwillbeoverpressurizedbytheremovalofreliefvalve2CNS-RV133.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage25of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:92-072Rev.2N2-SOP-01,02and03NIAStationBlackoutStationBlackout(CompleteLossofAcPower)DescriptionofChange:Revision1ofthissafetyevaluationwasreportedOctober29,1993.Revision2ofthissafetyevaluationreflectsachangeforRCICroomhightemperatureisolationbypass"fromtwohourstotwentyminutes"inaccordancewithNMPCCalculationES-268"RCICPump/TurbineRoomHeatAnalysisDuringStationBlackout."SafetyEvaluationSummary:NUMARC87-00andRegulatoryGuide1.155specifythestationblackout(SBO)durationthatplantsshouldbecapableofwithstanding.BasedonareviewoftheonsiteandoffsitepowerdistributionsystemsatNMP2,theplantmustmeeta4-hourcapability,withatargetemergencydieselgeneratorreliabilityof0.975maintained.ThereviewoftheNlVIP2SBOcapabilitiesaddressedthefollowing:~Thecorecoolingcapabilityofinstalledsystems.~Thesupportsystems(i.e.,pneumaticsuppliesandstationbatteries).Theavailabilityofinstrumentationandcontrolstomonitorandcarryoutrequiredoperatoractions.~Potentiallimitationsthatmayresultfromtheheatupofcertainareasoftheplantduringtheevent.Theresultsofthisanalysisshowthatwithcertainspecificoperatoractions,NMP2canoperatelongerthan4hourswithoutjeopardizingcorecoolingorthecontainmentcapability.Operatoractionsneededtoachievethiscapabilityinclude SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage26of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:92-072Rev.2(cont'd.)SafetyEvaluationSummary:(cont'd.)sheddingofnonessentialbatteryloads,maintainingmanualRClCflowcontrolandthebypassingofcertainRClCisolationlogics.TheseactionsareaddressedintheSpecialOperatingProcedures(N2-SOP-01,02and03).Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage27of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:92-073SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0310-92Figure10.1-6cReactorFeedPumpSealWater(FWP)ReactorFeedPumpSealWaterInstrumentation(FWPSystem)DescriptionofChange:Thissimpledesignchangeaddedflowandtemperaturemonitoringinstrumentationtothereactorfeedpumpsealwaterlines.Thisinstrumentationallowssealdegradationtobemonitoredandallowssealreplacementasaplannedevolutionandnotadramaticfailurewithresultantfeedwatersystemtransients.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theadditionoftemperatureandflowinstrumentationtomonitorreactorfeedpumpsealwaterwillprovidegreaterreliabilityofthenonsafety-relatedpumpsbyallowingmonitoringoftheseal'sconditioninordertopreventpumpseal'*degradationfromadverselyaffectingpumpoperation.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage28of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:implementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:92-082SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0143-92Figures9.2-3a,9.2-3gReactorBuildingClosedLoopCooling-CCPAdditionofVacuumBreakerstoExpansionTankOverflowLinesDescriptionofChange:ThissimpledesignchangeaddedvacuumbreakerstotheoverflowlinesfromCCPexpansiontanks2CCP-TK1and2CCP-TK2.Thiswasdonetopreventnegativepressureintheexpansiontanks,duetoflowintheoverflowlines,fromcausingspuriousalarmsand/ortripsoftheCCPpumps.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThissimpledesignchangeenhancesthereliabilityoftheCCPsystemwhichhasnosafety-relatedfunctions.TiesoftheCCPsystemtosafety-relatedcomponentsorsystemsareunaffectedbythischange.Existingevaluationsforspraying=andfloodingenvelopanysprayingwhichcouldresultfromtheadditionofthevacuumbreakers.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage29of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:92-084SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0122-91Figure11.2-1bRadioactiveLiquidWasteSystemAddAirFilter2LWS-FLT3Thissimpledesignchangeaddedairfilter2LWS-FLT3upstreamof2LWS-SOV'169.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thissimpledesignchangewillenhancethesystemreliability.Theradioactiveliquidwastesystemisnotrequiredtoeffectorsupportsafeshutdownofthereactorortosupporttheoperationofanynuclearsafetysystem.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage30of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:92-088Rev.1N/A8.2-24,8.3-40bN/AAllowtheUseofCalculatedVoltagesforACMOVStartingDescriptionofChange:Thischangeallowstheuseofcalculatedminimummotorstartingvoltagesforsafety-relatedvalves.Thesevoltagesareusedindeterminingifthevalvecandevelopsufficienttorquetooperateunderdesignconditions.CalculationEC-154determinesthestartingvoltageavailableatthemotorterminalforeachvalveintheGL89-10programunderdegradedvoltageconditions.ThestartingpointforthecalculationisthesteadystatedegradedvoltagerelaysetpointfromCalculationEC-136.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theuseofthecalculateddegradedvoltageisacceptablebecausethemotorwillhavethisvoltageavailableundertheworstpossiblevoltageconditions.Theuseofthesteadystatedegradedvoltagerelaysetpointtodeterminethevoltageavailableatthemotorterminalsforstartingisconservative.Ifthevoltagegoesbelowthesetpointofthedegradedvoltagerelay,thedieselgeneratorforthatdivisionwouldstart.ThedieselgeneratorwouldthensupplytheClass1Eloads.CalculationEC-154showsthatwhensuppliedfromthedieselgenerators,theMOVswouldhaveatleastasmuchvoltageavailableascalculatedfortheoffsitesource.Therefore,itisacceptabletousethecalculatedminimummotorstartingvoltagetodetermineifthevalvecandevelopsufficienttorquetooperateunderdesignconditions.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage31of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:92-091DER2-92-0-0865,EDC2M00266Figure10.1-6eZincInjectionPassivationSystem(ZIP)As-BuiltUpdate,TheAdditionofZincInjectionPassivationSystemComponentsDescriptionofChange:ProblemReportPR-08590andDER2-92-0-0865statedthattheflush/ventconnectionslocatedonboththesuctionanddischargesideofzincinjectionfeedpumps2ZIP-P1AandP1B(2ZIP-SKD1)didnotappearonPAID6E.Inaddition,thesightflowglassesonthesuctionsidewerenotshown.ThecomponentsbeingaddedareoriginalsystemcomponentsinadvertentlyleftoffthesystemP&ID.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thisdocumentationchangewillhavenoimpactonsafeoperationorsafeshutdownconditions.Nophysicalchangesarebeingmadetothenonsafety-relatedZIPsystem.TheZIPsystemwillcontinuetofunctionasdesigned.DocumentationisenhancedbyprovidingNMPCcomponentidentificationnumbers.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummary'eportPage32of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:93-002SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0003-93'igure5.4-9cReactorCoreIsolationCoolingSystem(ICS)DeletionofRCICTestLineThischangeisrelatedtothereactorcoreisolationcoolingsystem(ICS).Duetorepeatedpinholeleakageattheteeconnectiontotestline2-ICS-750-65-2,thislinehasbeeneliminated.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thisreview,whichincludedtheeffectsofthechangeonthesystem'soperability,reliability,maintainability,structuralintegrity,andsysteminteractionshasfoundthatthedeletionofthesubjectlinewillimprovethesystem'sreliabilitywithoutcausinganysignificantsafetyoroperabilityissues.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage33of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-005Rev.061N/A12.5-1,12.5-2;Tables1.8-2Sh3,9A.3-15;Figures1.2-1,2.4-1,9.5-1b,9A.3-1,12.3-3,12.3-18,12.3-36,12.3-51System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:IN/ANewUnit2AccessControlBuildingTheUnit2accesscontrolbuildingwasconstructedwheretheradiationprotectiontrailer(74)waslocatedinsidetheprotectedarea,southoftheUnit2reactorbuildingandsouthauxiliarybayroof.Thebuildingwasconstructedtofacilitateimplementationofthesingle-pointcontrolofentryintotherestrictedarea,enhancingtheradiationprotectionmeasureatUnit2.Thebuildingisasingle-story,nonsafety-relatedstructureconsistingofaslabongradeandhasatotalareaofapproximately14,000squarefeet.Thisbuilding-providesofficefacilitiesforupto75personnel.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thepertinentsafetyissuesidentifiedinthissafetyevaluationareflooding,theimpactonthecontrolroomfreshairintake,radiologicalatmosphericdispersioncoefficient,and,impactofconstructionandbuildingloadsontheDiv.3ductbankEDB-922.Itcanbeconcluded,baseduponanalysis,thattheconstructionoftheUnit2accesscontrolbuildingdoesnotimpactthepertinentlicensingissuesevaluatedintheUnit1UFSARortheUnit2USAR.Revision0of,thesafetyevaluationaddressedchangestothefacilityasdescribedintheUnit2USAR.'Revision1tothesafetyevaluationexpandedthescopeandevaluationtoaddresschangestothefacilityasdescribedintheUnit1UFSAR.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage34of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-010Rev.2Mod.PN2Y92MX0039C.8-5;Tables3-1,3-2Sh3,3-4,4-1Sh2;Figure5-1System:TitleofChange:SRVRemovalPhaseIIIDescriptionofChange:Thefollowingarechangesthathavebeenimplementedbythismodification:1.Extendedthemonorailatel.305'-9ntheprimarycontainmentby4'-3"~~Thebusbarthatservicesthismonorailwasalsoincreasedinlengthby4I3ff2.Theuseofanalternatecraneinlieuofexistingcrane2MRH-CRN65isnowallowed.Thealternatecraneisanelectricaltrolleyandchainhoistcranedesignatedascrane2MHR-CRN65X.3.Amonorailsystemwasinstalledoutsideofthenorthhatchwaytoservicethe261'loorelevation,andconsistsofa4-tonchain-operatedtrolleyandhoistcrane.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheimprovementsbeingmadebythismodificationtotheremovalandreplacementprocessoftheSRVsdonotaffectanysafety-relatedsystems.Theextensionofthemonorailatel.305'-9"andtheuseofalternatecrane2MHR-CRN65XintheprimarycontainmentarebothconsideredandincludedintherevisedHeavyLoadAnalysis.Theinstallationofbothcraneandmonorailinthesecondarycontainmentmeetstherequirementsoftheseismicevaluationofnonsafety-relatedcomponentsinsafety-relatedareas,anddoesnotaffectthesafetyandreliabilityofNMP2.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage35of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:93-019SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0004-93Figures9.2-1L,9.5-52a,9.5-52cAuxiliaryBoilerSystem(ABM),ServiceWaterSystem(SWP)TitleofChange:InstallationofChestertonMechanicalSealson2ABM-P1A&P1BDescriptionofChange:DER2-92-3456describesfailureswhichoccurredtothepreviousmechanicalsealsmanufacturedbyJohnCrane.Withthepreviousdesign,degradedsealwaterpassedthroughthesealfaces,scoringthesurfaceanddamagingtheseal,thuscausingsealfailure.Also,duringhotstandbyconditions,thewaterdrainedtotheboilerraisingthewaterlevelaboveacceptablelimits.Toincreasesystemreliability,anewsealmanufacturedbyChesterton,designedwithanoutersealwatercoolingjacket,wasinstalled.Thecoolingwaterisisolatedfromthesealfacescircumventingintrusionofforeignmaterial.Newsealcoolingwaterinletandoutletpipingwasalsoinstalled.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thissimpledesignchangewillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperationorcapabilitytoshutdownorkeeptheplantina'safeshutdowncondition.TheABMsystemandtheaffectedportionoftheSWPpipingareclassifiedasnonsafetyrelated,andarenotrequiredtoeffectorsupportsafeshutdownofthereactorortoperformintheoperationofthereactorsafetyfeatures.TheABMandSWPwillcontinuetoperformtheirfunctionasdescribedinUSARSections9.5.10and9.2.1.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage36of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:93-020SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0049-93Table9.4-4Sh4,5RadwasteBuildingVentilationRadwasteControlRoomNoiseImprovementThisdesignchangewasrequiredtoreduceexcessivenoiseintheradwastecontrolroom.Underthismodification,theexisting7.5hpreturn/exhaustairfans(2HVW-FN12Aand2HVW-FN12B)werereplacedwithnew3.0hpfans.Thenewsmallerfanshaveacapacitytoprovide10,700cfmat1200rpm.Thedrivesheaveandbeltonairhandlingunits2HVW-ACU2Aand2HVW-ACU2Bmayalsohavetobereplacedtoreducethespeedofsupplyairfanstoapproximately.1400rpmifthedesiredspeedisnotachievedbyadjustingthemotorbaseplate.Thisisnecessarytoprovideabalancedairflowbetweenthesupplyairandtheexhaustairside.Thenewfanmotorsarepoweredusingappropriatelysizedmotorstartersandoverloadheaterstoprovidepropercircuitprotection.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thisdesignchangewillimproveenvironmentalworkingconditionsintheradwastecontrolroombyreducingnoiselevels.Theproposedchangedoesnotaffectorinvolveanysafety-relatedequipmentintheplant.Allchangesunderthismodificationareassociatedwiththenonsafety-relatedequipment.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage37of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-022SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0261-91Figures11.3-1b,11.5-2Offgas(OFG)Offgas/DRMSProcessFlowElement/Transmitter(s)ReplacementDescriptionofChange:Thissimpledesignchangereplacedthe6-52.5scfmrangeoffgasprocessflowelement/transmitterunitswithsimilarunitscapableofmonitoringflowovera15-150scfmrangeofprocessflow(aswellasprovidinglocalindication).Therequiredchangestotheoffgascabinetmicroprocessorstoproperlycommunicatewiththereplacementunitsisalsoincludedinthischange.USARFigures11.3-1band11.5-2havebeenrevisedtoshowtheflowtransmittersasflowindicatingtransmitters.Additionally,USARFigure11.3-1bwascorrectedtoshowtheas-builtlocationsfortheflowelements(whichwerephysicallyrelocatedfromtheoffgascharcoalabsorbertank(s)roomtoalowerelevation,inJune1986byStone5Webster;changepackagenoticeCPM-Y152).SafetyEvaluationSummary:Anengineeringreviewoftheproposedchangeshasdete'rminedthattheimplementationofthischangewillimprovetheoffgassystem'sreliability/operabilitywithoutcausinganysignificantsafetyoroperabilityissues.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage38of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo;:USARAffectedPages:93-023Mod.PN2Y92MX0041.2-31,9.3-2thru9.3-6,9.3-8thru9.3-10;Tables8.3-1Sh31,8.3-2Sh30,9A.3-6Sh6;Figures1.2-19Sh2,1.2-23Sh1,8.3-1,9.2-1n,9.2-3b,9.2-3g,9.3-1athru9.3-1c,9.3-2Sh1,2,5,12,13,9.3-3a,9.3-3c,9.3%,9.3-10g,12.3-14,12.3-47System:InstrumentAirSystem(IAS),ServiceAirSystem(SAS),BreakingAirSystem(AAS)TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:IASUpgradeThismodificationupgradedtheexistinginstrumentairsystem(IAS)byreplacingtheexistingcompressorsanddraintrapsandreplacingthecarbonsteelpiping,betweenthecompressorsanddryerswithstainlesssteelpipe.Otherimprovementsincluded:relocationofthepressuresensorforpressureindicator2IAS-PI101fromitspositionupstreamoftheIASprefilterstoapointdownstreamoftheIASairreceivertanks;providedatie-intothebreathingairsystem(AAS);providedameanstorepressurizetheserviceairsystem(SAS)graduallyafteraSASsystemoutage;andinstalledanewsupplylinefromtheIASsystemfortheSASsystemdownstreamfromtheIASdryers.Theseimprovementsreducedmoisturecarryover,improvedairquality,increasedcompressoravailability,reducedsystemmaintenance,eliminatedtheneedtoupgrademajorcomponentsintheAASsystem,andimprovedserviceairqualityandsystemdesign.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThismodificationimprovestheIASsystembyprovidingadditionalcapacitytomeetcompressedairrequirements.TheSASsystemisimprovedbytheadditionofasecondtapfromIASthatsuppliesdrycompressedairtotheSASsystem.Also,provisionismadetograduallyrepressurizetheSASsystemafteraSASsystemoutage.TheAASremainsfunctionalwithnochangestocapacityorpressure.TheAAScompressorisdeletedandtheIASsuppliessufficientairtotheAASsystemtoallowittofunctionasdesigned.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage39of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary:(cont'd.)93-023(cont'd.)ThelASprovidesairtobothsafety-relatedandnonsafety-relatedcomponents.However,thesystemisnotconsideredasafety-relatedcontrolairsystemsinceallofthesafety-relatedcomponentsthatitsuppliesperformtheirsafetyfunctionswithoutairorareprovidedwithsafety-relatedaccumulatorscapableofsupplyingtherequiredquantitiesofair.TheSASandAASareusedonlyfornonsafety-relatedequipmentandcomponentsduringnormalplantoperation.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage40of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-027Rev.1N2-FHP-149.1-23,9.1-41FNRLowerorRemoveFuel-PreparationMachineFull-Up-StopsDescriptionofChange:Thissafetyevaluationaddressesthetemporarychangeofthepositionoffuelpreparationmachine(FPM)full-up-stops.Thischangereducesthetime/exposurespentduringthetransferofnewfueltothespentfuelpool.Additionally,thisreducesthepotentialforpersonalcontaminationandplantcontamination.ItisdesirabletoloadnewfuelassembliesintothespentfuelpoolusingaFPMtoavoidcontaminationofthecrane.ThisisaccomplishedbytransferringafuelassemblyfromthenewfuelinspectionstandtoaFPM.Thein-useFPMhasitsfull-up-stopsset(orremoved)suchthatanewfuelassemblyloadedintoitscarriagehasitsbailhandleabovethespentfuelpoolwaterlevel.(PositivestoppingoftheFPIVIcarriageisperformedbytheendstopsontherollerchainmechanism).Afterthecraneisdisconnectedfromthenewfuelassembly,whichissittingintheFPM,theassemblywillbetransferredbytherefuelingplatformtoitstemporarystoragelocationinthespentfuelstoragerack.Whenallthenewfuelhasbeenloadedintothespentfuelpool,theFPMmechanicalstopsshallberepositionedintheiroriginallocation.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThepurposeofthemechanicalstopsistopreventthecarriageontheFPIVIfromliftingafuelassembly,channel,orbundletoaheightwherewatershieldingislessthan7ft.abovethefuelbundle,channel,orassembly.Themechanicalstopsshouldonlypreventtheliftingofanirradiatedfuelassemblyorbundletoaheightwherewatershieldingislessthan7ft.aboveafuelbundleorassembly-notnewunirradiatedfuel.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage41of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:93-028SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0085-9311.3-6;Figures11.3-1a,11.3-1bOffgasSystem(OFG)TitleofChange:RetireOffgasFlowSwitches2OFG-FS17A/Band2OFG-FS140DescriptionofChange:Thissimpledesignchangedefeatedthecontrol,alarm,andannunciationfunctionsofflowswitches2OFG-FS17A/Band2OFG-FS140,whichhaveahistoryofspuriouslyde-energizinghydrogenanalyzers2OFG-AT16A/Band2OFG-AT115.ThischangemadeTemporaryModification89-053permanent.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheseflowswitchesarenotutilizedinthedeterminationofhydrogenanalyzeroperabilityrequiredperTechnicalSpecification3.3.7.10.Thecircuitrytoberemovedwillnotimpactanysafety-relatedor0-relatedequipment,norwillithaveanyadverseimpactonanyplanteffluentsortheeffluentmonitoringcapabilitiesoftheenvironmentalprotectionplan..Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage42of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:93-029SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0086-93Figures9.3-3a,9.3-4BreathingAirSystem(AAS)RemovalofValve2AAS-SOV125Thissimpledesignchangeremovedvalve2AAS-SOV125fromtheclosedloopcoolingsubsystemfortheAASaircompressor.Removalofthevalveallowscoolingtocirculatethroughthecompressoratalltimesinlieuofonlywhenthecompressorisrunningasperoriginaldesign.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Anengineeringreviewofthischange,whichincludedtheeffectsofthechangeonthesystem'soperability,maintainability,structuralintegrity,andsysteminteractions,hasfoundthattheimplementationofthischangewillnotadverselyimpacttheAASsystemorcauseanysignificantsafetyoroperabilityissues,whileatthesametimereducingmaintenanceassociatedwiththevalve.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage43of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-030SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0434-91Figure9.4-23Sh2HotWaterHeating(HVH)ExpansionTank2HVH-TK1LevelChangeforMakeupControlDescriptionofChange:ThissimpledesignchangemadeTemporaryModification88-231apermanentchangetotheplant.Thechangeinvolvedtheadditionofajumperwireinlocalpanel2CES-IPNL203(intheturbinebuilding)todefeattheswitchforthelowerlevelfloatoflevelswitch2HVH-LS114.Thelevelswitchcontrolsthehotwaterheatingexpansiontanklevelcontrolband,anddefeatingthelowerfloatswitchresultedinnarrowingthebandtotheupperswitchtripandresetdifferential.Thischangereducedtheexcessiveusageofnitrogengasinthetankduetothepreviouswideband(12inches)causingthereliefvalvetolift.Thiswouldresultfromthemakeuppumprefillingthetankwaterandcompressingthenitrogenenoughtoliftthereliefduringnormalsystemmakeupcycle.ThenarrowbandimplementedbytheTemporaryModificationjumperadditionhasbeenproven(byfunctionaltestingofthehotwatermakeup)toreducetheexcessivenitrogenusage.SafetyEvaluationSummary:AnengineeringreviewoftheproposedchangetomakeTemporaryModification88-231permanentwasperformedanddocumentedintheanalysissectionofthesafetyevaluation.Thereview,whichincludedoperability,availability,constructabilityandpotentialsysteminteractionshasdeterminedthatthischangewillimprovethehotwaterheatingsystemoperation(byreducingtheexcessiveusageofnitrogen)withoutcausinganysignificantsafetyoroperabilityissues.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage44of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-032SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0084-93Figure9.2-6aMakeupWaterSystemPermanentMakeupWaterSystemConnectionforthePortableDemineralizerDescriptionofChange:TemporaryModification87-2008controlledinstallationfortheuseoftheportabledemineralizerasprovidedwithintheecolochemtrailer.Thetemporarymodificationalsodescribedhoseconnectionstovalve2WTS-V261andanewconnectioninstalledupstreamofvalve2MWS-V42.TemporaryModification87-2008isbeing,cleared.Thissimpledesignchangemadepermanentthenewhoseconnectionswithisolationandsamplevalves,andrevisestheaffecteddrawingsaccordingly.TheuseofthedemineralizertrailerandintermittentattachmentofthehosestoboththemakeupwaterandwatertreatingsystemswillnowbeprocedurallycontrolledasdescribedinN2-OP-15.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thissimpledesignchangewillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperationorcapabilitytoshutdownorkeeptheplantinasafeshutdowncondition.Themakeupwatersystemisclassifiedasnonsafetyrelated,andisnotrequiredtoeffectorsupportsafeshutdownofthereactorortoperformintheoperationofthereactorsafetyfeatures.ThemakeupwatersystemwillcontinuetoperformitsfunctionasdescribedinSections9.2.3oftheUSAR.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage45of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:93-035N2-SOP-03N/AServiceWaterSystem6OffsiteReserveAcPowerTitleofChange:ServiceWaterSystemDivisionalSeparationAssociatedwith2SWP"MOVGOA/B,3A/B,19A/B,93A/8,and599and2SWP"FV47A/BandFV54A/BDuringaLossofOffsitePowerDescriptionofChange:N2-SOP-03Sections1.3and2.3allowoperatoractiontooverrideopenservicewatervalves2SWP"MOVSOA/B,3A/B,19A/B,93A/B,and599,and2SWP"FV47A/BandFV54A/Bduringalossofoffsitepower(LOOP).SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thepurposeofthissafetyevaluationistojustifyoverridingtheservicewatersystemdivisionalseparationisolationvalves2SWPMOV50A/B,3A/B,19A/B,93A/Band599,and2SWP"FV47A/BandFV54A/BduringaLOOP.Thesevalvesarebeingoverriddenopen,duringaLOOP,tominimizetheplanttransientthatwouldresultifservicewaterremainsisolatedtothebalanceofplantsystems.TheplanttransientthatwouldresultifservicewaterremainedisolatedtothebalanceisdescribedinUSARSection15.2.6,LossofAcPower.Subsequentoperatoractionisacceptableforrealigningtheservicewatersystemintheeventaloss-of-coolantaccidentoralossofanemergencydieselgeneratoroccurs.Theseactionsmaintaintheservicewatersystemanditsabilitytoperformitssafetyfunctions.Thejustificationfortheseactionsis:1)theyarethesafestactionsfortheplant,2)theapplicableTechnicalSpecificationsLimitingConditionsforOperation3.0.3and3.8.1.1.fareimplemented,and3)aplantshutdowniscommencedontheinitiatingevent.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage46of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-038Rev.0,1L2SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0287-928.3-42a,8.3-70RCICInstallShortingBarsinLieuofOverloadHeatersforDcMotor-OperatedValvesDescriptionofChange:Thissimpledesignchangeinstalledshortingbarsinthethermaloverloadheater(TOL)circuitsforthedcIVlOVsintheGL89-10program.ThetripcontactsoftheTOLarebypassedbyanautomaticsafetysignalorformanualoperationbyholdingtheswitchintheoperateposition.Althoughtheoverloadheater'stripcontactsarebypassed,theoverloadheaterphysicallyremainsinthepowercircuit.Thisincreasesthevoltagedropfromthepowersourcetothevalvemotor.ReplacingtheTOLswithshortingbarswillalsoremovetheresistanceoftheTOLsfromthepowercircuit.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ReplacingtheTOLswithshortingbarswillensurethatsufficientvoltagewillbeavailableatthedcMOVsasshowninelectricalcalculationdispositionEC-154-01C.Asaprecautionarymeasureforvalveprotection,thevalve'sstroketimewillbemonitoredduringperiodictesting.Afteranymaintenanceonthevalves,appropriatepostmaintenancetestingwillbeperformed.Ifitisshownthatthemotoroperatorwassubjectedtoanoverloadcondition,thenprocedureswillrequirethatitbeanalyzedforoperability.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage47of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:93-046Mod.PN2Y91MX027Figures5.4-13d,5.4-13eResidualHeatRemoval(RHS)AddValvestoRHSCondensingLinesThismodificationinstalledmanualisolationvalves(onevalveineachloop)intheRHSsteamcondensingsupplylinesbetweentheloopheatexchangerandthepressurecontrolvalvesPV21A(B).ThischangewasmadeduringtheR-3refueloutage.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheproposedchangetotheRHSsteamcondensingsupplylineswillenhancethesysteminthefollowingways:Theinstallationofthemanualisolationvalveswilleliminatetheneedtoin-optherespectiveloopheatexchangerduringvalveseatleakagetest(VSLT)andmaintenanceofthelinevalves.Thetimepreviouslyrequiredtodrainandrefilltheheatexchangerswillbesaved.2.HavingbothloopheatexchangersavailableduringVSLTofoneloopincreasestheoperator'sflexibilitybyallowinguseofbothshutdowncoolingloops.3.Maintenancecanbeperformedonsupplylinevalvesmuchmoreeasilyandmanremexposurerates,willbelower.Installationofnewsupportsand/orremovalofsnubberswillbeperformedinaccordancewithallapplicableprocedures,codes,andcriteriaestablishedinSafetyEvaluation90-048(NMP2SnubberReductionModificationProgram).

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage48of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary:(cont'd.)93-046(cont'd.)Theproposedchangeissafetyrelated;however,therewillbenoimpactonthesafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.TheRHSsystemdesignbasesspecifiedinUSARSection5.4.7.1,andthefunctionaldesignbasisofthereactorsteamcondensingmodespecifiedinUSARSection5.4.7.1,willnotbechanged.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage49of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-047SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0070-925.4-36,6.3-15;Figures5.4-13a,5.4-13b,6.3-7aSystem:ResidualHeatRemoval(RHS),LowPressureCoreSpray(CSL)TitleofChange:ValveModificationtoPreventPressureLockingDescriptionofChange:ThischangeaddedsmallborepipingtothreevalvesintheRHSsystemandonevalveintheCSLsystem.Thispipingpreventsbonnetpressurelockinginthesevalves.ThesechangesweremadeduringtheR-3refueloutage.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theproposedchangetovalves2RHS"MOV24A,24B,24Cand2CSL"MOV104willallowthesevalvestoperformtheirintendeddesignfunctions.Theproposedchangesaremadetosafety-relatedcomponents.Asentenceisaddedtothevalves'escriptiontoindicatethatthevalveshavebeenmodifiedtopreventbonnetpressurelocking.Basedontheevaluationperformeditisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage50of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:93-048implementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:N/A9A.3-53bCarbonDioxideFireProtectionSystemEliminationofPuffTestRequirementsThischangeremovedtherequirementtoperformaflowtest(commonlyknownasa"puff"test)aspartoftheCO,systemfunctionaltest.RemovalofthispartofthefunctionaltestisincompliancewithNFPA12,CarbonDioxideExtinguishingSystems.SafetyEvaluationSummary:NFPACode12-1993,Section1-10,doesnotsuggestthataCO~systemnozzlepufftestbeperformedatregularintervalsaspartofasystemfunctionaltest.NMP1performedthisflow,orpuff,testevery6monthsasaconservativeactioninfunctionaltestingoftheCO~system.Additionally,thesystemsareroutinely(monthly)visuallyinspectedasdescribedinNFPA12,Section1-10.3A.Thesefunctionaltestsandmonthlyvisualinspectionsprovidesufficientsystemoperabilitychecks.Todate,pufftestinghasfoundnosystemnozzleorpipingtobeblocked.TheremovalofthepufftestremainsincompliancewithNFPAcodeswhichareappropriateperNRCBranchTechnicalPosition(BTP)CMEB9.5-1,positionC.6.a.Thischangedoesnotchangethereliabilityofthecarbondioxideextinguishingsystemortheabilitytoachieveandmaintainsafeshutdownintheeventofafire.Nofieldworkisrequiredasaresultofthischange,andnooperabilityconcernsorproceduresareaffected.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage51of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-050SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0033-935.4-25,Table6.2-56Sh2,3,4,5,6,7,11CCP,DFR,ICS,RHSGearSetChangesforVariousMotorOperatedValve(MOV)ActuatorsDescriptionofChange:Thissimpledesignchangechangedoperatorgearsetsofsafety-relatedMOVstoprovideasufficientthrustwindowtousethevalveoperationtestandevaluationsystem(VOTES)diagnosticequipmentfortestingofMOVswithinthescopeofNMP2'sGenericLetter(GL)89-10program.Asaresultofoperatorgearsetchanges,valveclosurestroketimeshavebeenincreased.Areviewofmechanical,radiationprotectionandengineeringsafeguardcalculationsensuredthatthesehigherstroketimesdonotadverselyimpactplantsafety.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thissimpledesignchangeinstallsnewoperatorgearsetsinsafety-relatedMOVstoaccommodateGL89-10testing.ThiswillensurethattheMOVswillperformtheirintendedsafetyfunctionsduringand/orfollowingdesignbasisaccidents.ActuatorsizingcalculationsperformedduringdesignbasisreviewsinaccordancewiththeGL89-10programverifythattheMOVswillnotoperateoutsideoftheirdesignortestinglimitsduetooperatorgearsetchanges.Thissimpledesignchangewillhavenoadverseeffectonthesafeoperationorshutdown'oftheplant.PostinstallationMOVstroketimetestinginaccordancewithsiteprocedureswillverifyvalveoperability.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage52of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-051SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0096-93Figures5.1-2a,7.7-8ReactorVesselInstrumentation(ISC)EnhancedMonitoringofRPVLevelInstrumentReferenceLegsDescriptionofChange:ThischangeprovidedfortwoadditionalanalogRPVlevelsignalstotheEmergencyResponseFacility(ERF)computersystemfromchannelsCandDofthenarrowrangeseriesofvesselinstruments.Thesetwosignals,alongwiththetwoexistingchannelAandBsignalsinthesystem,allowoperationstobettermonitor,asrequiredperNRCBulletin93-03,fordiscrepancies,inaccuraciesornotchinginRPVlevelindicationscausedbydegassingintheinstruments'eferencelegswhenthevesselisdepressurizing.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThelevelsignalsprovidedtotheERFcomputerbythischangeareeitherelectricallyisolatedfromtheirsafety-relatedsourceorwillhavenoadverseloadingeffectonthetrips,isolationfunctionsoftheirassociatedcomponents,orcircuits.Theproposedchangewillnotimpactanysystemsorcomponentsimportantforsafetyofthefacilitynorwillthischangehaveanyimpactontheplant'seffluentsoreffluentmonitoringcapabilities.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage53of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:93-052Rev.1N/A1.10-139,1.10-140ICS,RHS,GTSDeletionofHeliumLeakTestPreviously,thereactorcoreisolationcooling(RCIC),residualheatremoval(RHR),andstandbygastreatment(GTS)systemsoutsidetheprimarycontainmentwereleaktestedbyhelium.TheRCICandRHRheliumtestswerereplacedbyasystemwalkdown/inspectionforleaksduringsystemoperationalorhydrostatictesting.TheGTSsystemheliumleaktestwasmodifiedtotestonlytheportionofthesystemwhichoperatesatpositivepressure.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheNMP2commitmentprovidedforleaktestingeitherbyphysicaltestingorsystemwalkdownforleaksduringoperationtesting.Thewalkdownalternative,however,islimitedtoliquidsystemsonly.Therefore,RCICandRHRaretestedusinghelium.Byredefiningourcommitmentforthesteamportionofthesystem,itispossibletodeletetheheliumtestandusevisualinspectionforleaksasavalidmethodforleakdetectionforRCICandRHRsystems.ThebulkoftheGTSsystemoperatesundervacuum,andintegrityofthisportionofthesystemisindirectlyverifiedbytheGTSsurveillancetests(drawdownandin-leakage).Therefore,theheliumleaktestingisnotrequiredfortheportionofthesystemwhichoperatesundervacuum.However,leakdetection(visualinspectionwithaleakdetectionagent)fortheportionoftheGTSsystemwhichoperatesatpositivepressureisrequiredtomeettheexistingcommitment.Thischangemeetsthecurrentregulatoryrequirement.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage54of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-053N2-PM-W3N/AMainTurbineAlternateMethodofPerformingtheMainTurbineMechanicalOverspeedTripTestDescriptionofChange:Thisprocedurechangeallowstheuseofarigexternaltothefrontstandardtosprayturbineoilintotheconcentricringofthemechanicaloverspeeddevice.Thisisbeingperformedtocompensateforabrokenoillinetothenozzleoftheoiltriplocatedinthefrontstandard.Thischangealsoalteredthefrequencyofthetestfromweeklytobi-monthly.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theuseofthisrigperformsthefunctionofsprayingtheoilintotheringasadequatelyasthenormalmethod.Thefrequencyforperformanceofthiswaschangedfromweeklytobi-monthlyforALARA,heatstress,riskofincident,andhumanfactorsconcernsandisbasedonsoundengineeringjudgement.Changingthemethodofperformingthetesthasnoimpactonthemechanismforitisnotthedeliveryoftheoiltotheconcentricringthatcausestheaction,buttheoilintheringwhichthencausescentrifugalforcestoovercomespringtension.Duetothisreasontheabilityofthemechanicaloverspeedprotectiondevicetoperformitsfunctionisnotalteredorimpaired.Changingofthis.frequencydoesnotimpactthefailureprobabilityofthemechanism,onlyitsdetection.Thefrequencychangehasnodetrimentaleffectsonthealternatetestmethodologyso,therefore,hasnoeffectonthemechanicaloverspeedmechanism.Inaddition,theUSARstatesthattheoverspeedprotectioncontrolhasnoimpactonnuclearsafety,sotheimplementationofthischangewillinnowayadverselyaffectthecapabilitiesoftheturbinegeneratoroverspeedprotectionsystemtoperformitsfunction.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage55of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-054Rev.0,162Mod.PN2Y89MX1359.5-64,9.5-66;Figures9.5-52a,9.5-52c,9.5-53Sh5System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:AuxiliaryBoilerSystem(ABF,ABH,ABM)AuxiliaryBoilerSystemUpgradeThismodificationmadethefollowingchangestotheauxiliaryboilersystem:Modifiedthefeedwaterpumpsuctionpipingtoeliminatepumpcavitationproblems.Relocatedthesodiumsulfiteinjectionpointfromtheauxiliaryboilerstothedeaeratorinordertoprotectthepipingbetweenthedeaeratorandtheauxiliaryboilersfromoxygenattackandtoreducetheburdenontheoperators.Replacedthefeedwaterdischargepipingduetocorrosion.Addedamanualflushlineforthephosphatefeedlineinordertopreventfutureplugging.Addedabypasslinearoundauxiliarysteampressurecontrolvalves2ABM-PV11A/Btofacilitatestartup.Addedisolationvalvestotheauxiliaryboilerpressureinstrumentationtreestoallowformaintenanceofthedevices.AbandonedinplacepHinstrumentationloops2ABD-10Aand2ABD-10B.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thesechangesweremadetoupgradetheauxiliaryboilersystemtoimprovesystemreliabilityanditscapabilitytosupporttheplantoperations.Thesechangeswillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperationorshutdownoftheplantsincetheaffectedsystemisnonsafetyrelated,isnotrequiredtoachieveormaintainsafeshutdown,isnotrequiredforsafereactoroperations,anddoesnotdirectlyinterfacewithanysafety-relatedsystems.Furthermore,thechangesareconfinedtothenonseismicauxiliaryboilerbuildingwhichdoesnotcontainanysafety-relatedcomponents;therefore,indirectinterfacebetweentheproposedchangesandsafety-relatedsystemsisprecludedbyphysicalseparation.Finally,all SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage56ofl36SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary:(cont'd.)93-054Rev.0,i&.2(cont'd)pipingchangeshavebeendesignedinaccordancewiththeoriginaldesignbasisanddonotintroducepipingtoanareawhichdidnotpreviouslycontainthistypeofpiping.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion:

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage57of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-057Rev.0,1L2Mod.PN2Y93MX0013.9B-S,3.9B-23,9.1-27,9.1-30,9.1-31,9C.3-4,9C.3-5;Tables3.9B-2nSh3,9.1-2,9.1-4Sh1;Figure9.1-7,9.1-25System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:N/ARefuelBridgeUpgradesThissafetyevaluationevaluatedrefuelbridgeupgradesimplementedunderModificationPN2Y93MX001.Thismodificationaddressedtheservicepolecaddysystem(SPCS)scopeandthereadoutassemblyscope.ServiePoladTheSPCSisanattachmenttotheexistingrefuelingbridge.TheSPCSconsistsofahandlingplatformontherefuelingbridgeandasetofhi-torqueservicepoles.Theplatformstoresandalsoprovidesamotorizedhoisttohandlethehi-torquepoles.Thehandlingplatformisattachedtoarigidframewhichisattachedtothesouthendoftherefuelingbridge.ReadouAssemblScoeThepositionreadoutassemblywasrelocatedfromtheeastsideofthecontrolconsoletothewestsideofthecontrolconsole.Thesupportbracketishingedtoallowforpositionadjustment.Inthepreviouslocation,thereadoutassemblydisplaybecameanobstructiontotheoperatorsduringvariousin-coreevaluations.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theimprovementsbeingmadebythismodificationtotherefuelingbridgedonotaffectanysafety-relatedsystem.Theelectricalactivitiesarenotsafetyrelated.TherefuelingplatformwiththeSPCSstructurehasbeenseismically/dynamicallyre-evaluatedandisconsideredQualityCategoryQ5.Theservicepolecaddyhoistcapacityis1/4ton;therefore,theHeavyLoadCriteriaspecifiedinNUREG-0612andreferencedinUSARAppendix9Cdonotapply.TheUSARanalysisinChapter9andAppendix9Carestillbounding.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage58of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary:(cont'd.)93-057Rev.0,1L2(cont'd.)Theservicepolecaddysystemisanauxiliaryplatformattachedtotherefuelingplatform.Itisusedtocarryservicepolestodesiredlocationsoverthereactorcavitytoperformunderwaterservicingactivitiesonreactorequipment,suchasshroudheadboltsremovalandinstallation,steamlineplugsinstallationandremoval,andunderwatercameramanipulation.Therelocationofthereadoutassemblyfromtheeastsidetothewestsideofthecontrolconsoledoesnotaffectthestructuralanalysisoftherefuelbridge.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage59of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:93-058Rev.0L1CalculationH21C-027ProcedureN2-MPM-GEN-R901USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:9.1-36FHSRemovalofReactorCavityShieldPlugsA,B,C,andDat40%orLessReactorPowerDescriptionofChange:ThissafetyevaluationevaluatedtheUSARchangesandtheimpactoftheNMP2designasaresultoftheremovalofreactorcavityshieldplugsA,B,CandDat40percentorlessreactorpower.Areviewofthestructuralconsiderationsregardingtheremovalofthetopfourshieldplugsindicatedthattheremovaloftheseplugswillnotaffectthestructuralintegrityofthisshieldplugbarrier.Specifically,theseismicandtornadodesignloadsthattheoriginaleightplugbarriersweredesignedforwillnotbeexceededbyhavingonlythelowerfourplugsinplacewhenat40percentorlessreactorpower.Theradiologicalconsiderationsregardingtheremovalofthesefourplugs(A,B,CandD)havebeenevaluatedviacalculationH21C-027andresultinaprojectedaccumulateddoserateperoutageworkerfarbelow10CFR20limits.ThepotentialincreaseincumulativedoserateduetothisshieldplugchangewasreviewedandapprovedbytheNlVlP2ALARACommitteeonJune17,1993.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheremovalofreactorcavityshieldplugsA,B,CandDat40percentorlessreactorpowerdoesnotaffectthestructuralintegrityoftheshieldplugbarrier.Theradiologicaleffectsoftheproposedchangehavebeencalculatedanddeterminedtobenegligibleforradiologicalconsequencestotherefuelingoperatorsduringnormalrefuelingoperations.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage60of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:93-059TemporaryMod.93-042N/AHighPressureCoreSpray(HPCS)JumperControlSignalfor2CSH"MOV118AtemporaryjumperwasinstalledinthecontrolcircuitoftheHPCSsuppressionpoolsuctionvalve2CSH"MOV118tosimulateaclosedvalvesignalfromtheHPCStestreturnvalve2CSH"MOV112.Thisprovidedapermissivesignalfor2CSH"MOV118toopeneventhoughvalve2CSH"MOV112wasdeenergizedand/orstrokedopen(notclosed).With2CSH"MOV118capableofopening,theHPCSiscapableoftransferringwaterfromthesuppressionpooltothereactorvesselandmeetstherequirementsofTechnicalSpecification3/4.5.1.c.TheHPCScanbedeclaredoperablewithout2CSH"MOV112functioning,whichallowsittoberepairedandtestedpriortotherefuelingoutage.'afetyEvaluationSummary:TheHPCSsystemcanbeconsideredoperablesincethisjumperinstallationwillallowittoperformitsdesignedfunctionswithoutanyimpactfrom2CSH"MOV112onthesystem'sflowrates,pressures,responsetimes,flowpaths,orsetpoints.Thejumperwillnotaffectanyothercomponentsorsystems.Therepairsandtestingof2CSH"MOV112canbeperformedsafelypriortotherefuelingoutage.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage61of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-062Rev.08c1SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0038-939.1-28,9.1-29,9.1-29a,9.1-32,9.1-37thru9.1%0,9C.6-1;Tables3.2-1Sh7,9.1-2,9.1-4Sh1,3-3Sh1,2,3(App.9C);Figures1.2-10Sh2,9.1-19a,9.1-20a,9.1-25,9.1-27,5-2(App.9C),12.3-12,12.3-45System:TitleofChange:FuelHandlingSystem(FHS)RefuelFloorImprovements-RPVStrongbackCarousel,WetliftSystem,MainSteamLinePlugsEcKevlarSlingsDescriptionofChange:Thissafetyevaluationevaluatedtheimplementationoffourkeyimprovementsintherefuelfloorequipmenthandlingandservicingmethodsusedforvesselopeningandclosingactivitiesduringrefuelingoperations.Specifically,thefourchangeswereasfollows:Useofreactorpressurevessel(RPV)headstrongbackcarouselcapableofliftingthevesselhead.(Thesimultaneousliftingofvesselhead,closurestudhardware,tensioningequipment,andthecarouselandallassociatedequipmenthasbeenevaluatedandwillbeimplementedfollowingadditionalrelatedmodificationstotheplant.)2.Useofnewwetliftsystemthatconsistsofadryer/separatorspreaderbeamwithair-actuatedliftpins,fourturnbucklesforleveladjustment,andtwopairsofmatched-lengthKevlarslingseachwithaspecialshackletomatchtheturnbuckles.3.UseofnewGEREM"lightsteamlineplugstopermitthelocalleakratetesting(LLRT)oftheMSIVstobeperformedinthedirectionofthenormalsteamflowwiththereactorvesselandcavityflooded.4.UseoflightweightKevlarslingsforliftingreactorshieldplugs,WCSfilteranddemineralizerplugs,storagepoolplugs,drywellhead,insulationframe,storagep'oolgate,andfueltransferbridge.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage62of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:DescriptionofChange:(cont'd.)93-062Rev.05.1(cont'd.)Thedesignofthisnewhandlingandservicingequipmentmeetsthesingle-failureproofcriteriaofNUREG-0612.Theuseofthisnewequipmentreducesthetimerequiredtomanuallyperformthecorrespondingriggingattachmentactivitiesassociatedwitheachcomponentduringrefueling.Thistimesavingsresultsinanetreductioninpersonnelexposuretoradiation/contamination.Thenewwetliftsystemwillallowthewettransferofthedryerwhichprovidesadditionalshieldingviathefloodedreactorcavity.Thenewmainsteamlineplugsaredesignedtobeinstalledunderwaterfromtherefuelingbridge.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThealternateliftingequipmentforvesselopeningandclosingactivitiesassociatedwithrefuelingoperationshasbeenprovidedconsistentwiththecommitmentstoNUREG-0612,whichisreferencedinUSARSectionAppendixSC.ThenewmainsteamlineplugshavebeenprovidedassafetyrelatedandareboundedfromanaccidentstandpointbythefuelroddropaccidentasdescribedinUSARSection15.7.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage63of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:)mpiementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:93-0633.1-27,4.1-2a,4.6-25ControlRodDriveControlBladeReplacementThereplacementof21controlbladespreviouslyinstalledintheUnit2reactorwasrequiredinordertomeetshutdownmarginrequirementsinCycle4.Inadditiontotheseblades,theacceleratedreplacementofanadditional12bladesreducedthespreadofactivatedcobaltthroughouttheplantandallowedforsomeradioactivedecayofcobaltinthesebladespriortoburial.Someradioactivedecayofcobaltinthesebladesreducestheirdisposalcosts.TheStellitepinsandrollersusedinthepreviousdesignweremajorcontributorstoincreasingradioactivedoseratesintheplant.Thecontrolbladestobereplacedwereselectedbasedonnuclearconsiderationsandtheblades'oncentrationofactivatedcobalt.Atotalof33All-B4CcontrolbladespreviouslyinstalledwerereplacedwitheightGeneralElectricDuralife215and25Marathoncontrolblades.SafetyEvaluationSummary:CertaincontrolbladesmustbereplacedtoensurethatthereactorcanbeshutdownnextcycleasdefinedintheTechnicalSpecificationbasisforshutdownmargin.ThehighcobaltstainlesssteelAll-B4CcontrolbladeswithStellitepinsandrollerscurrentlyusedwillbereplacedwithlowcobaltstainlesssteelcontrolbladeswithInconelpinsandrollers.Thiswillreducethespreadofactivatedcobaltthroughouttheplantandreducefuturecontrolbladedisposalcosts.ThereplacementofcertainAll-B4CcontrolbladeswithDuralife215andMarathoncontrolbladeswillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.TheNRCperformedasafetyevaluationreviewoftheMarathoncontrolbladeandconcludedthatitisacceptableforuseasacontrolbladeinaBWR.AllofthefeaturesintheDuralife215controlbladehavebeenreviewedandapprovedbytheNRConothercontrolbladedesigns.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage64of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:"93-064SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0153-929.5-43,9.5-44Div.IIIDieselAirStartSystem(EGA)RevisetheSetpointsfortheDivisionIIIDieselAirStartAirCompressorsandAirReceiversDescriptionofChange:ThissimpledesignchangereducedtheDivisionIIIdieselairstartsystemaircompressorstartpressurefrom230psigto215psig.Previously,thecompressorsstartedat230psigandstoppedat240psig.Thischangemaximizesthedifferentialbetweenthestartandstoppressurestoreducecompressorcyclingandreducecompressorwear.Thenewsetpointmaintainssufficientmargintothe190psigminimumpressurerequirementinTechnicalSpecificationSection4.8.1.1.2.a.8.Thischangealsoreducedtheairreceiverlowpressurealarmfrom225psigto200psigtocoordinatealarmsetpointswithoperatingpressuresetpoints.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thischangewillincreasethedifferentialbetweenthestartandstoppressuretoreducecompressorcyclingandreducecompressorwear.Thischangewillalsoreducetheairreceiverlowpressurealarmtocoordinatealarmsetpointswithoperatingpressuresetpoints.ThenewsetpointsremainconservativeinrelationtosystemoperatingrequirementsandwillmaintainsufficientmargintoensureTechnicalSpecificationrequirementsaremet.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage65of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-066Rev.1N2-OP-728.3-11EHSMomentaryParallelingofMotorControlCenter(MCC)MainorTieFeederBreakerswithKirkKeyInterlocksDescriptionofChange:Thischangeallowsthemomentaryparallelingofpowersuppliestothemotorcontrolcenters(MCC)duringapowertransfer,inlieuofadeadbustransferbytheuseofKirkKeys.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheMCCsaredesignedwithdualfeeds;eachfeederissizedtocarrytheentireloadoftheMCC.Themomentaryparallelingwouldhavenoeffectontheoperationoftheequipmentasthepowersupplieswouldbesynchronizedbecausebothpowerfeedersareconnectedtothesamepowerandtheexistingcoordinationisadequate.ThisprocedurechangewillenhancetheavailabilityoftheMCCs.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcluded'thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage66of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-067TemporaryMod.93-046N/AOffgas(OFG)TemporaryBypassoftheOffgasCharcoalFiltersDescriptionofChange:TheoffgasfiltersshownonPAID42Chaveexperiencedhightemperaturesbeyondnormallimits.Thistemporarymodificationinstalledanalternatebypasslinetobypassandisolatethecharcoalfilterstomitigatetheconsequencesofacharcoalfire.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Anengineeringreviewoftheeffectsofthischangeontheoffgassystemandtheradiologicalreleaselimitshasbeenperformed.ThealternatetemporarybypassingofthefilterswillallowquenchingofthecharcoalfirewithoutcausingtheoffgasradiologicalreleaselimitsthroughthemainstacktoexceedtheTechnicalSpecificationlimits.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage67of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-068Rev.0,1Ea2TemporaryMod.93-047N/AOffgas(OFG)NitrogenInsertionintotheOffgasCharcoalFiltersDescriptionofChange:TheoffgasfiltersshownonPSID42Chaveexperiencedhightemperaturesbeyondnormallimits,withindicationsoffireinthecharcoalbeds.Thistemporarymodificationintroducednitrogenintothefilterstomitigatethehightemperaturecondition.Thenitrogensupplysourcewasatankertruckwithtubing,valves,andinstrumentation.NotethatthecharcoalfilterswereisolatedviaTemporaryModification93-046priortonitrogeninsertion.ThepurposeofRevision2wastoverifythatthecharcoalfirewascompletelyextinguishedandthatre-ignitionwouldnottakeplacewhenthefilterswereplacedbackintoservice.Thiswasaccomplishedbygradualadmissionofdryairintothefiltersafterhavingreasonableassurancethatthecharcoalfirehadbeenputoutasmonitoredbymeasuringthecarbonmonoxideconcentrationandcharcoalfiltertemperature.,SafetyEvaluationSummary:Anengineeringreviewoftheeffectsofthischangeontheoffgascharcoalfiltersandthesystemhasbeenperformed.Thischangeistomitigatetheconsequencesofthecharcoalhightemperatureconditions.Sincethecharcoalfilterswillbeisolatedpriortotheuseofthistemporarymodification,noadverseimpactonthesystem'sfunctionalcapabilityisintroduced.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthis-changedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage68of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:93-069GAP-POL-01,QAP-POL-1.01,NLAP-POL-01,NTP-POL-500USARAffectedPages:13.1-3,13.1-5,13.2-1;Figures13.1-1,13.1-2,13.1-5;AppendixBSystem:TitleofChange:N/ANuclearQualityAssurance,Licensing,andTrainingOrganizationalReportingStructure-RevisedProceduresGAP-POL-01andQAP-POL-1.01DescriptionofChange:TheNuclearQualityAssurance,LicensingandTrainingBrancheswerereorganizedasfollows:thepositionofVicePresidentNuclearQualityAssurancehasbeeneliminatedandthenewpositionofGeneralManagerSafetyAssessment,Licensing,andTrainingestablished.TheorganizationalstructureoftheQualityAssurance,Licensing,and.TrainingorganizationshaschangedsuchthattheManagersQualityAssuranceUnits1and2,Licensing,andTrainingreportdirectlytotheGeneralIVlanagerSafetyAssessment,Licensing,andTraining.TheManagerQualityAssuranceSupportreportsadministrativelytotheManagerQualityAssuranceUnit2,butretainsfunctionalresponsibilitiesforbothunits.Priortothischange,theIVlanagersQualityAssuranceUnits1and2andtheManagerQualityAssuranceSupportreportedtotheVicePresidentNuclearQualityAssurance;theManagerLicensingreportedtotheExecutiveVicePresidentNuclear;andtheManagerTrainingreportedtotheVicePresidentNuclearGeneration.FunctionscurrentlyperformedbytheQualityAssurance,Licensing,andTrainingorganizationsarenotaffectedbytherevisedreportingstructure.NOTE:SeesummaryforSafetyEvaluation93-127,Rev.1,forsubsequentorganizationchanges.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThechangesmadetotheorganizationalstructureofQualityAssurance,Licensing,andTrainingcontinuetoprovidefortheintegratedmanagementofactivitiestosupporttheoperationandmaintenanceofNineMilePointUnit1andUnit2.Clearmanagement-controlandeffectivelinesofcommunicationandauthoritybetweentheorganizationalunitsinvolvedinthemanagement,operation,andtechnicalsupportfortheoperationofNineIVlilePointUnit1andUnit2continuetobe SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage69of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary:(cont'd.)93-069(cont'd.)provided.TheManagersQualityAssuranceUnits1and2retainoverallauthorityandresponsibilityfortheQAProgramfortheirrespectiveunits,andtheGeneralManagerSafetyAssessment,Licensing,andTrainingwillhaveseniormanagementresponsibilityforQualityAssurance,Licensing,andTraining/EmergencyPreparednessactivities,allowingfortheeliminationoftheVicePresidentNuclearQualityAssuranceposition.TheManagersQualityAssuranceUnits1and2,LicensingandTraining,willhavedirectaccesstoresponsiblecorporatemanagementatalevelwhereactionappropriatetothemitigationofqualityassurance,licensingandtraining/emergencypreparednessconcernscanbeaccomplished,andsufficientindependencefromcostandscheduleismaintained.Basedonthisevaluation,theorganizationalstructuresoftheQualityAssurance,Licensing,andTraining/EmergencyPreparednessorganizationscontinuestosatisfytheacceptancecriteriaofSRP13.1.1,SRP13.1.2-13.1.3,SRP17.1,SRP17.2andUnit1and2TechnicalSpecification6.2.1,anddoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage70of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-070SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0039-939.1-37;Figure3.8-8PCBAdditionofJackingBlockstotheDrywellHeadDescriptionofChange:Thissafetyevaluationevaluatedtheimplementationoffourjackingblocksonthedrywellheadforthepurposeofprovidingameansviahydraulicjackstoassistthepolarcraneinremovingthedrywellhead.Thepreviousmethodofremovingtheheadwiththepolarcraneresultedintheswayingofthedrywellheadasthebindingbetweentheheadandthechimneysectionissuddenlyrelievedasthecraneliftsthehead.Thefourhydraulicjackshavebeenequallyspacedaroundthebaseofthedrywellheadandareconnectedtoacommonpumpunittoensurethattheyactsimultaneouslyandevenlyliftthehead.Thedesignofthefourjackingblocksenvelopsthecasewherethedrywellhead'weightiscarriedbythefourjacks.Theintentofthejacksistoprovidetheadditionalcontrolledupliftforcetoovercomethefrictionalforcebetweentheheadandthechimneysectionasthepolarcraneliftstheheadoutofthechimneysection.Throughtheuseofthesejacks,whichassistthepolarcraneinliftingthedrywellhead,theswayingoftheheadduringtheliftiseliminated.Thepolarcranewillremainastheprimaryliftingdeviceforthedrywellhead.Therefore,theJackingblocksandjacksarenotrequiredtomeetthesingle-failureproofcriteriaofNUREG-0612forheavyloads.TheweldingofthejackingblockstotheexteriorofthedrywellheadisnotconsideredpressureboundaryweldingandweldingwasdoneinaccordancewithASMESectionIII,1971throughSummer1973Addenda.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheadditionofthefourjackingblocksonthedrywellheadtoimprovethepresentmethodofdrywellheadremovaldoesnotaffectthecommitmenttoGuidelinefortheControlofHeavyLoadstNUREG-0612)asdescribedinUSARAppendix9C.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage71of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary:(cont'd.)93-070(cont'd.)Theweldingoftheblockstothedrywellheaddoesnotaffectthedrywellhead'functionasaprimarycontainmentboundary.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage72of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:93-073ProcedureN2-OP-62ProcedureN2-OSP-CNT-M001USARAffecte'dPages:System:TitleofChange:NIADBAHydrogenRecombinerDeactivationof2HCS"MOV1A,18,3Aand38DescriptionofChange:10CFR50AppendixJrequiresTypeCtestingof2HCS"MOV4A,48,6Aand68forprimarycontainmentpenetrationleakageandrequiresthetestpressurebeappliedinthesamedirectionthevalvemustfunctiontoprecludeleakageinanaccident.However,reversedirectiontestingispermittedifitcanbedemonstratedthatsuchtestresultsareequivalentormoreconservativethanforwardpostaccidentdirectiontesting.TheHCSinboardisolationvalves2HCS"MOV4A,48,6Aand68areflexiblediscgatevalvesandwerereversedirectiontestedinawaythattestresultsarenotequivalentormoreconservativethanresultsobtainedusingforwardpostaccidentdirectiontesting.Therefore,outboardisolationvalves2HCS"MOV1A,18,3Aand38weredeactivatedintheclosedpositiontomaintainprimarycontainmentintegrity.ThissafetyevaluationevaluatestheoperabilityofHCSfollowingimplementationoftheactionsassociatedwithTechnicalSpecification3.6.3.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Sincetheleak-tightnessofHCSinboardisolationvalves2HCS"MOV4A,48,6Aand68cannotbeconfirmed,thesevalvesaredeclaredinoperable.Therefore,HCSoutboardvalves2HCS"MOV1A,18,3Aand38needtobetemporarilydeactivatedintheclosedpositiontomaintainprimarycontainmentintegrityuntilsuchtimethattheinboardisolationvalvescanbeTypeCtestedsatisfactorilytoensureprimarycontainmentisolationrequirementsaremet..TheHCSoutboardisolationvalveswillbedeactivatedintheclosedpositionbyopeningtheirrespectivebreakersat2EHS"MCC102and2EHS"MCC302.Thesebreakerswillbeadministrativelycontrolledandbeallowedtobeclosedonlywhen SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage73of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary:(cont'd.)93-073(cont'd.)HCSoperationisrequiredperOperatingProcedureN2-OP-62.However,itisrecognizedthatinaccordancewithTechnicalSpecificationLCO3.6.3,andapplicablefootnote,thattheoutboardisolationvalvesmaybeactivatedonanintermittentbasiswithadministrativecontrol.RequiredsurveillanceswillbemaintainedcurrenttoassureHCSoperability.ClosingthebreakersasrequiredbyN2-OP-62willensurethatprimarycontainmentpressuresandtemperaturesareconsistentwiththedesignpressureandtemperatureofHCS.TheMCCshavebeenevaluatedforaccessibility.WalkingpathsforanoperatorfromthecontrolroomtotheMCCsandfromtheOSCtotheMCCshavebeenanalyzedtodeterminetheradiationdosesthattheoperatorwouldreceive.ItisexpectedthatthetimerequiredforanoperatortowalkfromthecontrolroomtotheMCCs,closethebreakersandreturntothecontrolroomis10minutesorlessandfromtheOSCtotheMCCs,closethebreakersandreturntotheOSCis15minutesorless.AseparateoperatorwillwalktoeachMCC.TheresultingdoseshavebeenevaluatedanddeterminedtobewithintheacceptablelimitsasdefinedintheStandardReviewPlan(NUREG-0800)Section6AandmeettherequirementsofGDC19in10CFR50AppendixA.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage74of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-074TemporaryMod.93-040N/AFireProtection-Water(FPW)ConnectingFireProtectionSystemtoCondenserTubeFlushRigDescriptionofChange:Thistemporarymodificationpermittedtheinstallationofatemporaryfirehosefromfirehosereel2FPW-FHR14fortheflushingofthemaincondensertubesduringrefuelingoutage3.TheconnectionatthefirehosereelrequiredtheinstallationofanangleY-gatewithtwovalves;onetoisolatethefirefightinghoseandanothertoisolatethetemporaryfirehoseusedfortubeflushing.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thistemporarymodificationwillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperationorcapabilitytokeeptheplantinasafeshutdowncondition.Fireprotectioncapabilitiesarenotdegradedatanytime,becausesystempressureandflowwillbemaintainedinthefireprotectionsystemwhilethistemporarymodificationisineffect.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage75of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-076Rev.1CalculationNo.A10.1-E-1163.9A-27aRHR,RCIC,LPCS,HPCSValveAirLeakagetoWaterLeakageCorrelationDescriptionofChange:ThischangeallowssomeofthereactorcoolantsystempressureisolationvalvestoutilizetheirType"C"airtestleakagedatatosatisfythehigh-pressurewaterleakratetestrequirement.SafetyEvaluationSummary:AnanalysiswasmadeoftheairleakageandwaterleakagedatatakenatNMP2from1986to1992,andfromthisanalysisanempiricalcorrelationwasdevelopedtoconverttheType"C"airtestleakageratetoahigh-pressurewaterleakrateinordertomeettherequirementsofTechnicalSpecification3.4.3.2.Thisanalysiswillhavethepracticaleffectofeliminatingthehigh-pressurewaterleakagetestforcheckandglobevalvesthathavebeenType"C"airtested,andtheleakagerateconvertedtowaterleakageusingthecorrelationmeetsexistingacceptancecriteria.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage76of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-077N/AN/A115-kVOffsitePowerSourcesReplace115-kVCircuitBreakers(R50,R60,R115andR225)atScribaStationDescriptionofChange:Thismodificationreplacedthefour115-kVcircuitbreakersatScribaStationwithbreakersofthesameelectricalrating.Thereplacementbreakersareofdifferentdesignsothatpreviousbreakertripsassociatedwiththebreakerhydraulicsystemwereeliminated.Theworkwasscheduledsuchthatboththemainandfeederbreakerforone115-kVlinepositionwerereplacedatthesametimesothatonlyasinglelineoutagewasrequired.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thismodificationenhancesoperationofthe115-kVoffsitesupplysystembyreplacingexistingcircuitbreakerswithmorereliableunits.Thismodificationwillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.Theworkwillbeperformedwhiletheunitisshutdown;therefore,therequirementsofTechnicalSpecification3.8.1.2willbemetbyensuringthatoneotheroffsitesupplylineandatleastoneotherdieselgeneratorwillbeavailable.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage77of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-078Rev.08c1TemporaryMod.93-024N/AIAS,AASTemporaryCompressorsfortheIASUpgradeModificationDescriptionofChange:Thischangewasrelatedtotheinstrumentairsystem(IAS)andthebreathingairsystem(AAS)asdescribedinUSARSection9.3.ItwasrequiredtobeimplementedtofacilitatetheimplementationofpermanentModificationPN2Y92MX004,InstrumentAirSystemUpgrade.Aspartoftheabove-referencedpermanentmodification,theplant'sexistingaircompressorshavebeenreplacedandtheplant'spermanentbreathingaircompressorhasbeeneliminated.Thepurposeofthistemporarymodificationwastoinstalltwotemporaryaircompressorstosupplytheplant'sinstrumentandbreathingairneedswhilethenewpermanentcompressorswerebeinginstalled.Basedonacompressedairavailability/reliabilityreview,OperationsrequestedtohavecheckvalvesinstalledonthetemporaryairlinestoreducetheloadonthepermanentIAScompressorsintheeventofalinebreakorlossoftemporaryairwhiletheplantisoperating.Inaddition,atemporaryhosewasinstalledfromtheoutletof2IAS-DRY1Btotheinletof2IAS-FLT3B,bypassingexistingplantpiping.Thischangefacilitatespermanenttie-instobeimplementedasdirectedbythepermanentmodification.SafetyEvaluationSummary:AnengineeringreviewoftheeffectsofthischangeontheIAS,AAS,andotherinterfacingsystemshasbeenperformed.Nuclearsafetywillnotbecompromisedasthesafety-relatedcomponentssuppliedbythesetemporaryaircompressorsdonotrelyonairtoperformtheirsafetyfunction,orareprovidedwithsafety-relatedaccumulatorscapableofsupplyingtheamountofrequiredairfortheperformanceoftheirsafetyfunctions.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage78of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitfeofChange:93-079TemporaryMod.93-025N/ASAS,IASTemporarySASCompressorfortheIASUpgradeModificationDescriptionofChange:Thischangewasrelatedtotheserviceairsystem(SAS)andtheinstrumentairsystem(IAS)asdescribedinUSARSection9.3.ItwasrequiredtobeimplementedtofacilitatetheimplementationofpermanentModificationPN2Y92MX004,InstrumentAirSystemUpgrade.Aspartoftheabove-referencedpermanentmodification,theplant'saircompressorshavebeenreplaced.Thepurposeofthistemporarymodificationwastoinstallatemporaryaircompressortosupplytheplant'sserviceairneedswhilethenewpermanentcompressorswerebeinginstalled.SafetyEvaluationSummary:AnengineeringreviewoftheeffectsofthischangeontheSAS,IAS,andotherinterfacingsystemshasbeenperformed.Nuclearsafetywillnotbecompromisedasthelossofserviceairwillnotaffecttheplant'ssafeshutdowncapabilityortheplant'sabilitytomaintaintheplantinasafeshutdowncondition.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage79of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-080SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0102-939.1-7a;Figures9.1-3,5-2(App.9C);Table3-3Sh3(App.9C)System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:FNS(NuclearFuelStorage)ControlBladeStorageFrameThischangeprovidedadesignforasafety-relatedstorageframe(2FNS"FRM1)whichsupportsthreenonsafety-relatedcontrolrodbladeracks(2FNS-RAK19,2FNS-RAK20,and2FNS-RAK21).Theframewasplacedonthespentfuelpoolfloorandprovidesstorageforanadditional30controlrodblades.Theadditionalstoragelocationallowsforreplacementofoldcontrolrodbladeswithnewcontrolrodbladeswithoutdelaytotherefuelingprocess.Placementofthestorageframeandthethreecontrolrodbladerackswithinthespentfuelpoolwasaccomplishedbyuseofthemainhoistofthereactorbuildingcrane.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theadditionofthecontrolbladestorageframeandthreecontrolbladeracksenhancestherefuelingprocessforthereplacementofcontrolrodblades.Theframealsoprovidesstorageforthecontrolrodbladesuntilarrangementsforoffsitestoragearemade.Thestorageframeshallbeclassifiedasanuclearsafety-relatedcomponent,designedandanalyzedtothesametechnicalcriteriaasspecifiedinUSARSection9.1forthespentfuelstorageracks.Theliftingoftheframeandracksshallbeaccomplishedutilizingthemainhoistofthereactorbuildingcrane,whichisofsingle-failureproofdesign.TheliftingriggingshallmeetthecriteriaprovidedinNlVIPC'scommitmenttotheguidelinesfortheControlofHeavyLoads(NUREG-0612)andtherequirementsofANSIN-14.6.ThischangetothearrangementinthespentfuelpoolshallhavenoimpactonthesafeoperationorshutdownoftheUnit2reactor.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage80of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-082SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0011-.93Figures1.2-10,9.1-25,5-2(App.9C),12.3-12,12.3-45System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:SCA,MHFAccessControlBuilding,RefuelFloorThissimpledesignchangeinstalledanaccesscontrolbuildingontherefuelfloorofthereactorbuildingatel~353'-10".TheaccessbuildingisusedasanofficeprimarilybyRadiationProtectionforcontrollingaccesstoandactivitiesontherefuelfloor.Thedesignatedstoragelocationfortwojibcranes,onestoragepoolplug,andreactorshieldplugswasrevisedtoaccommodatethenewbuildingandavoidphysicalinterference.Electricalpowerrequiredforbuildinglighting,recepticals,exhaustfan,andheatingandcoolingunitsissuppliedbythenormalplantacdistributionsystem..SafetyEvaluationSummary:Therefuelfloorstructure,usedtosupporttheaccessbuilding,alongwithsystemsusedtosupporttheoperationofthebuilding,havebeenevaluatedanddeterminednottobeadverselyimpactedbythischange.Thebuilding,whichisclassifiedasnonsafetyrelated,hasbeenevaluatedinaccordancewithNuclearEngineeringAdministrativeProcedureNEP-DES-243sinceitisbeinglocatedinasafety-relatedarea,anditwasdeterminedthatnocomponentsrelatedtosafetywillbeimpactedbythebuildingduringaseismicevent.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage81of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:implementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-083N2-EPM-GEN-V582Table7B-1Sh5SCAChangingtheTestingCycleforNon-Class1ERedundantProtectiveDevicesWithinPGCCFromEachRefuelingOutageto18MonthsDescriptionofChange:USARTable7B-1wasrevisedtoindicatetestingwillbeperformedontheredundantprotectivecircuitbreakerswithinPGCConan18-monthcycleinlieuofthecurrent"eachrefuelingoutage."Therewerenoequipment,installationoroperatingchanges.Thischangeallowstestingoftheseprotectivedeviceson18-monthcyclesinsteadofeachrefuelingoutage.Thereisnoneedtotestthebreakersduringrefuelingoutages;theycanbetestedduringnormalplantoperations.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Non-Class1Ecablesroutedindivisionalductsareinstalledingroundedflexibleconduit.Flexibleconduitisnotconsideredasaseparationbarrier.InordertosatisfytherequirementtheredundantcircuitbreakerswereprovidedforprotectionofClass1EcircuitsinPGCCdivisionalductsfromnon-Class1Ecircuitrunsinflexibleconduit.TherespectivecircuitsprovidelightingandconvenienceoutletpowertocontrolroomandrelayroomPGCCpanels.ThereisnospecifiedfrequencyfortestingofthecircuitbreakerswithinRegulatoryGuide1.75orIEEEStandard384-1974.NMPCselfimposed"eachrefuelingoutage"inacommitmenttotheNRCin1986.The18-monthcycleiswithinageneralrefuelingoutagescheduleof18months.Therefore,changingofthetestfrequencyfromeachrefuelingoutageto18monthshasnoimpactonthebreakerperformancebecausethetimeintervalisnotchanged.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage82of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:93-085ImplementationDocumentNo.:ProceduresN2-FHP-13.1,N2-FHP-13.2,andN2-FHP-3USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:15E.2-1Refuel,NuclearFuel,ReactivityControlModificationoftheNMP2Reload/OffloadProceduresDescriptionofChange:TheNMP2coreoffload/reloadprocedureswererevisedtoincludethefollowingchanges:~FourexposedfuelbundlesaroundeachSRMwillbeunloadedafterthespiraloffloadpatternhasbeencompleted.Conversely,fourfuelbundleswillbeloadedaroundeachSRMbeforethespiralreloadpatternhasbegun.AddedacontingencyforaninoperableSRMintheprecautionssectionoftheoffload/reloadprocedures.Duringcoreoffload/reload,withallrodsinserted,theRPScircuitrymaybeincoincidentlogic(i.e.,shortinglinksinstalled).Beforeacontrolrodiswithdrawn,theRPScircuitryshallbeplacedinanoncoincidentconfiguration.Theinstructionsforremoving/installingtheRPSshortinglinksduringreloadwasmovedtoProcedureN2-FHP-13.2,Attachments3and4,respectively.Duringcorereload,aholdouttagwillbeplacedonthecontrolrodwithdrawalpushbutton.Thisprovidesadministrativecontrolstoassureallcontrolrodsremainfullyinserted.~Acoreoffload/reloadsequencemapwasaddedtoproceduresN2-FHP-13.1andN2-FHP-13.2,respectively.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage83of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:DescriptionofChange:(cont'd.)93-085(cont'd.)~InstructionstodefeattheSRMperiodalarmsweremovedfromN2-FHP-3totheendofN2-FHP-13.1.Likewise,theinstructionstorestorethealarmsweremovedtothebeginningofN2-FHP-13.2.~InstructionswillbeaddedtoN2-FHP-3,the"RefuelingManual,"toplacetheRPSinnoncoincidentmodepriortoperformingtheshutdownmargintest,anditshallbeinanoncoincidentconfigurationforallcontrolrodmanipulationspriortothedemonstrationofshutdownmargin.RPSwillberestoredtocoincidentmodefollowingshutdownmargintesting.Severalofthesechangessavetimeduringcoreoffloadandreloading.Otherchangeseliminateproblemsthatcouldbecomecriticalpathfortheoutage.Additionally,byplacingtheRPSincoincidentmode,surveillanceandmaintenanceactivitiesthatpreviouslysuspendedcoremovementorthathadtowaituntilrefuelingwascompletecannowbedoneconcurrentwithoffload/reloadactivities.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theproposedchangestotherefuelprocedureswillnotresultinanunreviewedsafetyquestion.EachchangefollowstheNMP2licensingbasisrefuelingrequirements.Inaddition,industryrecommendationshavebeenreviewedand,whereappropriateforNMP2,havebeenincorporatedintothesuggestedchanges.Specifically;therequirementsofTechnicalSpecifications3/4.1and3/4.9,GESILs068and372,GERICSIL039,GEPRC89-10andNSAC/164Lwillbemetbythesechanges.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage84of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:93-087SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0105-93Figure5.4-9cReactorCoreIsolationCooling(ICS)ReplacementofSteamTrap2ICS-TRP1Thissimpledesignchangewasinitiatedtodocumentandcontroltheworkactivitiesassociatedwiththereplacementofreactorcoreisolationsteamtrap2ICS-TRP1.Theprevioustrapdidnotperformitsintendeddesignfunction.Replacementwasrequiredwithatypebetterdesigned,thusmorereliable.Thereplacementtrapisnotprovidedwithadrainconnection;therefore,theexistingdrainlinewasremoved.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thissimpledesignchangewillhavenoimpactonthesafeshutdownorthecapabilitytokeep'theplantinasafeshutdowncondition.ThefunctionorthemethodofperformingthefunctionoftheICSsystemisnotdegradedatanytime.Materialsofconstruction,designandinstallationrequirementsareconsistentwiththeoriginaldesignofthesystem.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage85of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-088Rev.0L1N/A9A.3-3,9A.3-4,9A.3-31N/AAdoptionofNFPA-600PhysicalFitnessRequirementsforFireBrigadeDescriptionofChange:ThischangemodifiedtheFireBrigadephysicalfitnessrequirementstoreflectthecurrentconsensusstandardaspublishedbytheNationalFireProtectionAssociation(NFPA600).SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThephysicalfitnessrequirementsforFireBrigademembersincludedarequirementforanannualagilitytest.ThisrequirementwascontainedinNFPA1001,astandardwhichwasapplicabletomunicipalfiredepartmentfirefighters.In1991,NFPAapprovedtheissuanceofNFPA600toaddresstherequirementsofindustrialFireBrigadeorganizations,suchastheoneatNineMilePoint.ThisevaluationadoptsthephysicalfitnessrequirementsfromNFPA600forapplicationtotheFireBrigade.SincethequalificationsoutlinedinNFPA600satisfyrequirementsdelineatedin10CFRAppendixR,SectionIII.H,nodegradationwillresultfromthischange.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage86of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-089GAP-POL-01,Rev.0413.1-13,13.6-1;Figure13.1-2N/ANuclearSecurityandProcurementOrganizationalStructures-RevisedProcedureGAP-POL-01DescriptionofChange:TheNuclearSecurityandProcurementBranchesofSiteSupportwerereorganizedasfollows:1~TheManagerNuclearSecurity'sneworganizationiscomprisedofthefollowingDirectReports/Sections:GeneralSupervisorNuclearSecurityOperationsSupervisorNuclearSecuritySupportNuclearSecurityInvestigatorsSupervisorNuclearSecurityAdministrationSupervisorAccessAuthorization/Fitness-For-Duty~TheManagerProcurement'sneworganizationiscomprisedofthefollowingDirectReports/Sections:SupervisorProcurementEngineeringGeneralSupervisorInventoryManagementSupervisorIVlaterialReceipt,Test,andInspectionSupervisorWarehouseandStoreroomOperationsGeneralSupervisorPurchasingThediscussionanddepictionofpositionsreportingdirectlytotheIVlanagerNuclearSecurityweredeletedfromSection13oftheUSAR.TheNRC-approvedPhysicalSecurityPlanincludesanorganizationchartandfunctionaldescriptionsofresponsibilitiesandrelationshipsforkeypersonnelpositionsintheNuclearSecurityBranch.ChangestothePhysicalSecurityPlanareimplementedpertheprovisionsof10CFR50.54(p).

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage87of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:DescriptionofChange:(cont'd.)93-089(cont'd.)NOTE:SubsequentorganizationchangeswereevaluatedunderSafetyEvaluations93-127,94-010and94-016.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThechangesmadetotheorganizationalstructuresofNuclearSecurityandProcurementcontinuetoprovidefortheintegratedmanagementofactivitiestosupporttheoperationandmaintenanceofNineMilePointUnit1andUnit2.Clearmanagementcontrolandeffectivelinesofcommunicationandauthoritybetweentheorganizationalunitsinvolvedinthemanagement,operation,andtechnicalsupportfortheoperationofNineMilePointUnit1andUnit2continuetobeprovided.Basedonthisevaluation,theorganizationalstructuresofNuclearSecurityandProcurementcontinuetosatisfytheacceptancecriteriaofSRP13.1.1andSRP13.6anddonotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage88of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-090Rev.0L1Mod.PN2Y93MX0034.6-7,4.6-8,4.6-8a,7.2-5,7.2-5a,7.2-5b;Figures4.6-5a,5.1-2aSystem:TitleofChange:ControlRodDrive,ReactorInstrumentationReactorVesselInstrumentationReferenceLegBackfillDescriptionofChange:Thismodificationaddedaflow-controlledbackfilltofourreactorvessellevelinstrumentationreferencelegs.Thebackfillwasintendedtopreventdissolvednoncondensablegasfromcollectinginthereferencelegsandcreatingafalsehighlevelmeasurement.Backfillflowwastakenfromcontrolroddrivepumpsdischarge,filtered,metered,andpassedthroughthereferencelegs.ThismodificationwasmadeinresponsetoNRCBulletin93-03.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Anengineeringreviewoftheproposedchangeswasperformed.Thereview,whichincludeddesign,operability,andpotentialsysteminteractions,hasdeterminedthattheimplementationofModificationPN2Y93MX003willimprovetheresponseofthelevelinstrumentationonreductionofreactorpressurewithoutcausinganysignificantsafetyoroperabilityissues.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage89of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:93-092CalculationsPR(C)-26-GRev.0,2-93-004,H21C-029USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:N/AFHSAllowingWorktoProceedintheUpperElevationsoftheDrywellWhileRemovingReactorCoreControlBlades,LPRMs,andOtherNonfuel-IrradiatedComponentsDescriptionofChange:ThissafetyevaluationevaluatedtheUSARandtheimpactontheNMP2designasaresultofallowingpersonneltoworkintheupperareasofthedrywellduringthemovementofnonfuel-irradiatedhardware.Thefunctionofthisreviewwastoassurethatradiationworkerscouldsafelycarryontheirdutiesduringtherefueloutage.TheNMP2unitmaybeoperatedsafelywiththeimplementationofthechange.ThechangehasbeenevaluatedwithrespecttoALARAconsiderations,allowingworktoproceedinthedrywellduringirradiatedcomponentmovement.Althoughthischangecouldhaveresultedinanincreaseddoseratetotheindividualradiationworker,engineered(fueltransfershieldbridge)andprogrammaticcontrolswereinplacetominimizeanyimpact.Theprojectedaccumulateddoseperoutageworkerremainsfarbelow10CFR20limits.Section15oftheNMP2USARprovidesthedesignbasisanalysisfortheradiologicalconsequencesofpostulatedaccidents.Calculationssupportingtheseanalyseswerereviewed.Theradiologicalconditionsofanyoftheanalyzedaccidents,asrequiredinNUREG-0800(StandardReviewPlan),arenotaffectedbythischange.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Basedonthereviewandanalysesperformed,allanticipatedeffectsofthischangeonplantsystemsandsetpointshavebeenreviewedandfoundtobeboundedwithinexistingUSARevaluations.Thischangeallowsthemovementofirradiatedhardwarewithoutadverselyimpactingpermanentplantmonitoringsystems.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage90of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary:(cont'd.)93-092(cont'd.)Radiationwillcontinuetobemonitoredbyexistingplantinstrumentation.Theactivitieshavenoactivefunctionrelativetoplantsafeshutdownortoquantitativemonitoringofreleasesofradioactivematerialtotheenvironment.Theproposedactivitieshavenoimpactonanyeffluentstreams.ThebasisforcontrollingmovementofirradiatedcomponentsistolimitradiationexposuretooperatorsduringthenormaloperationofNMP2incompliancewith10CFR20.IrradiatedhardwareremovalwillnotcreatethepossibilityofadifferenttypeofaccidentorequipmentmalfunctiondifferentthancurrentlyevaluatedintheNMP2USAR.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage91of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-093ProcedureN2-TlP-HVR-5001N/ASystem:TitleofChange:ReactorBuildingVentilation(HVR)RemovingUnitCoolers2HVR"UC408A&.Bor2HVR"UC409A&BfromServiceSimultaneouslyforTestingperN2-TTP-HVR-5001DescriptionofChange:GenericLetter89-13requiresthatheatexchangerscooledbyservicewaterberegularlytestedtoevaluatetheiractualcapacityagainstdesign.Testingofthedivisionalswitchgearunitcoolers2HVR"UC408A&Band2HVR"UC409A&.B,locatedintheauxiliarybays,requiredthatbothunitcoolersinoneswitchgearroombeoutofserviceforshortperiodsoftime.Thissafetyevaluationaddressestheacanddcdivisionalswitchgearequipmentoperabilityconcernsraisedbythistestingmethod.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theunitcoolersfortheacanddcdivisionalswitchgearroomsmaybothberemovedfromservicefortestinginaccordancewiththisprocedure.Adedicatedoperatorwillensurethattheoperableunitcoolerisreturnedtoservicewhenthe'roomtemperaturereaches95'F.Thisensuresthatcoolingisestablishedpriortotheroomtemperaturereachingthe104'Facanddcdivisionalswitchgearequipmentqualificationlimit.Therefore,thistestmethoddoesnotimpairthesafeoperationoftheplant,safeshutdown,fireprotection,jetimpingement,CategoryIIOverI,ALARA,equipmentqualification,controlroomhabitability,fuelanalysis,equipmentclearancesorseismicqualifications.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage92of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-094TemporaryIVlod.93-050N/AServiceWaterSystem(SWP)2SWP"PSX1003AInternalDiaphragmReplacementDescriptionofChange:Thistemporarymodificationrepairedswitch2SWP"PSX1003Awithnoncertifiedparts(diaphragmand0-ring)andreturnedittooperation.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thesafety-relatedfunctionofvalve2SWP"FV47AistoisolateCWSfromSWPunderalossofoffsitepowercondition.Theproposedchangedoesnotaffectthesafety-relatedparametersofthevalvesincethemechanicalportionofthisswitchisisolatedfromtheportionsofthevalveprovidingthesafety-relatedfunction.Failureoftheswitchdoesnotinhibitthevalve'sabilitytoperformitssafety-relatedfunction.However,sincetheswitchispoweredfromasafety-relatedClass1Esourceandisnotisolatedfromit,theelectricalportionsoftheswitchalongwiththeassociatedstructuralpartsareclassifiedassafetyrelatedtomeetRegulatoryGuide1.75r'equirements.Theproposeddiaphragmchangeoutwillhavenoimpactonthestructuralorelectricalpropertiesoftheswitchand,therefore,nonewfailurescenariosareintroduced.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage93of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:93-095N/A5.4%2a,10.4-22aN/AMethodsofChemicalAnalysisChangeThischangeallowedfortheidentificationofadditionalmethodstobeusedforthedeterminationofchlorides,pH,andconductivityinthereactorvesselwater.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theidentificationofionchromatographyforthedeterminationofchlorideion,andtechniquesprovidingadequatesensitivitytomeetthelimitsspecifiedinRegulatoryGuide.1.56Revision1,Table1,fortheanalysesofchlorides,conductivity,andpHinreactorvesselwaterisconsistentwithindustrypractices,providesasuitabletechnique(s)tomeasureatorbelowacceptablereactorwaterchemistrylimits,isincompliancewithregulatoryrequirements,andmaintainsthedesignbasisforthereactorwatercleanupsystem.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage94of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-096GAP-DES-03N/AN/AInstallationandControlofTemporaryCommunicationsEquipmentPerGAP-DES-03DescriptionofChange:ProcedureGAP-DES-03wasrevisedtoincludeanexclusionfortemporarycommunicationsinstalledinaccordancewithanewTechnicalSupportAdministrativeProcedure.Thenewprocedurewasdevelopedtoallowtheinstallationandcontroloftemporarycommunicationsequipment(GAI-TRONICS)infacilitiesatNineMilePoint(e.g.,temporarytrailersinstalledinsupportofrefuelingoutageactivities).SafetyEvaluationSummary:ProcedureGAP-DES-03isbeingrevisedtoallowtemporarycommunicationsequipmenttobeinstalledintemporaryfacilitiesatNineMilePointutilizingaTechnicalSupportAdministrativeProcedure.Thisprocedurecontrolstheinstallationandremovalofthetemporarycommunicationsequipmentandensuresthatnoadditionalelectricalloadisaddedtothenormalplantcommunicationssystempowersource.Pageandpartylinesignalsfromtheplantcommunicationssystemwillbefedtothetemporaryequipmentbutthe120Vacpowershallbesuppliedfromtheindividualfacility'swalloutlets.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage95,of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:93-098SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0147-93,ProcedureN2-ESP-RCS-R737USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:Figure8.3-88Sh12ReactorRecirculationSystemRecirculationPumpMotorsPrimaryContainmentPenetrationProtectionSetpointChange'escriptionofChange:Thischangeincreasedthesetpointoftheinstantaneousovercurrentprotectionofthepenetrationwhichprovidespowertoreactorrecirculationpumps.Thesetpointincreasefrom52Ato64A,orfrom12timesto15timesthefullloadcurrentofthemotor,wasneededtoeliminateinadvertenttripsofthepumpsduringupshiftingfromlowtohighspeed.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Afterincreaseofthesetpoint,theprotectiverelaysstillprovideadequateprotectionofthepenetration.Theworstconditionoftheshortcircuitforthepenetrationwhichisallowedbytheprotectiverelaysisstillbelowthepenetrationcapability.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage96of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:93-100SAFER/GESTRLOCAMethodologySections6.3,15B,15C,AppendixAVariousOperationofNMP2Reload3/Cycle4Duetotheintroductionoffuelofanewdesign(GE11)inReload3(9x9latticeversus8x8latticeusedinpreviousreloads),variousissuesnotnormallyconsideredinpreviousreloadshavebeenevaluated.TheReload3fuelbundledesignisknownasGE11-P9CUB332-13GZ-120M-146-TandisanapprovedfueldesigninGESTAR.TheReload3bundleshaveanaverageenrichmentof3.32wtloU-235.TheGE11designconsistsof74fuelrods(8beingpartlengthrods)and2largecentralwaterrodscovering7fuelrodlatticepositions.ThemaximumallowablepeakLHGRfortheGE11fuelis14.4kW/ft.TheCycle4coreloadingwillinsert196freshGE11bundlesand32twiceburnedGE6BbundlesthatweredischargedattheendofCycle2.TheGE11fueldesignwaslicensedunderAmendment22oftheGESTARprocessapprovedbytheNRCinJuly1990.Amendment22containedfueldesigncriteriaagainstwhichanewfueldesigncouldbecomparedandjudgedacceptable,thusallowingtheintroductionofnewfuelwithoutpriorNRCreviewandapproval.TheSAFER/GESTRLOCAmethodologywasusedfortheReload3/Cycle4loss-of-coolantaccident(LOCA)analysis.ATechnicalSpecificationchangewasobtainedwhichallowedtheuseoftheSAFER/GESTRmethodology.SAFER/GESTRistheGEimprovedLOCAmethodology,whichhasbeenapprovedforusebytheNRC.TheNRCapprovedtheuseofSAFER/GESTRatNMP2inAmendmentNo.52,datedNovember10,1993.ThelimitingtransientforReload3istherodwithdrawalerrorevent.ThechangeinMCPRforthiseventsettheOLMCPRat1.36fortheGE11fueland1.31fortheGE6BandGE9Bfuel.ThelimitingeventforthevesseloverpressurizationanalysisistheMSlVclosure(fluxscram).Thepeaksteamlineandvesselbottompressuresare1252and1283psig,whichiswellbelowthesafetylimitof1375psig.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage97of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:DescriptionofChange:(cont'd.)93-100(cont'd.)Aspartofthereload,additionalanalyseswereperformedforequipmentoutofservice.Thisanalysisdeterminestheallowablecombinationsandtheiroperatingimpactforvariousequipmentoutofservice.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatNineMilePointUnit2canbesafelyoperatedduringReload3/Cycle4.OperationinaccordancewiththissafetyevaluationdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestionnorisaTechnicalSpecificationchangerequired.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage98of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-101TemporaryMod..93-056N/ARodSequenceControlSystem(RSCS)AlternatePowerSourceforRSCSPowerSupplyDescriptionofChange:ThistemporarymodificationprovidedforanalternatepowersourceforRSCSPS¹6bydisconnectingcable2RDSNNK523(fedfrom2VBS-PNLB101)in2CEC"PNL701andconnectingcable2RDSNNK504(fedfrom2VBS-PNLA101)initsplace.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thereisnoadversenuclearsafetysignificancetothischangesincethenormal.powerprovidedtothisdeviceisblack(nondivisional,nonsafetyrelated)fromthevitalbusu'ninterruptiblepowersupply2VBB-UPS1B.Thealternatepowersourceutilizedinthistemporarymodificationisfrom2VBB-UPS1Awhichisalsopartoftheplant'snormal120-Vacsystem.TheRSCSisnotasafety-relatedsystemandisnotrequiredduringtherefuelingmode.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage99of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-102SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0158-93Table3.9A-12Sh9;Figures5.4-13b,5.4-13c,5.4-13eSystem:TideofChange:ResidualHeatRemovalSystem(RHS)RemovalofInternalsfrom2RHS"V7,V8andV9DescriptionofChange:Thissimpledesignchangeremovedtheinternalsfromthecheckvalves,2RHS"V7,V8,andV9,locatedintheminimumflowtestlinesoftheRHSpumps(P1A,B,C).SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thisdesignchangewillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperationorcapabilitytokeeptheplantinthesafeshutdowncondition.TheRHSsystemwillnotbedegradedatanytimesincesystempressureandflowwillbemaintainedduringpumpminimumflowoperation,andthatsystempressureintegritywill.bemaintainedduringallmodesofsystemoperation.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage100of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-103Rev.1N2-OP-38,Rev.6N/ASFCBackupSpentFuelPoolCoolingDuringRefuelingOutageDescriptionofChange:FourmethodswereproposedforthespentfuelcoolingandmixingasbackupstotheSFCLoopBduringthisoutage.Ofthese,oneiscurrentlyapprovedandtheremainingarebeingevaluated.TheSFCLoopApumpwasusedbyrestoringDiv.Ipowertoitandbyremovingsomeunavailablepumpprotectivefunctions.Thedisablingoftheprotectivefeaturesallowstheavailabilityofthespentfuelcoolingsystemthatotherwisewouldbeunavailable.ThetwomethodsofcirculatingpoolandcavitywaterwereacceptablebecausetheydidnotinterferewiththeexistingSFCandhelpedreducethespentfuelpoolheatuprate.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thedisabilityofthelowflowpumptripwillbereplacedbymanualtripuponexceedingpredeterminedmotorcurrent.Therefore,pumplowflowprotectionwillstillbeavailable.Theothertwoprotectivefunctions(lowsuctionanddischargepressures)areindirectlyavailablethroughthemotorcurrent.Thetemporarycavitycleanupsystemandsumppumpsarebeingproposedforenhancingthemixingbetweenthespentfuelpoolandreactorcavity.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunieviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage101of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-104N2-TTP-RHR-5001TN/AResidualHeatRemovalSystemDefeatInterlockof2RHS"P1BAssociatedwithValves2RHS"MOV112and2RHS"MOV113DescriptionofChange:Thischangedefeatedtheinterlockthatpreventspump2RHS"P1Bfromstartingunlessbothvalves2RHS"MOV112and2RHS"MOV113areinthefullopenposition.Thischangewasdonetofacilitatedynamictestingofvalve2RHS"MOV40B.Thisisatemporarybypassingofthepumpprotectionwhilethetestingisbeingdone.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Inordertoperformthedynamictestingof2RHS"MOV40B,asuctionpathforpump2RHS"P1Bisprovidedbyopening2RHS"MOV113.SinceDivisionIdcpowerfor2RHS"MOV113isunavailable,thevalvecontrollogicwillmaintainthepumpinatripconditionandpreventthepumpfromstarting.Theinterlockassociatedwith2RHS"MOV113topreventstartingpump2RHS"P1Bwithout2RHS"MOV113fullopenmustbedefeated.Thiswillbeaccomplishedbyliftingleads'inthevalvecontrolcircuit.Thesimilarinterlockforvalve2RHS"MOV112willalsobebypassedduetothephysicalarrangementofthewiring.Thiswillallowthepumptobestartedwithoutpositionindicationfor2RHS"MOV113.Thefunctionofthedefeatedinterlockswillbeprovidedbyproceduralcontrol.Thistemporaryalterationwillberemoveduponthecompletionofthe2RHS"MOV40Bdynamictestprocedure.Allotherdesignfunctionsremainunchanged.TheSFCBsystemwillbeavailableforheatremovalandisunaffectedbythischange.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage102of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-105N2-OP-38N/ASFCNaturalCirculationofReactorVesselDuringRefuelingPhaseofRFO3DescriptionofChange:NaturalconvectivecoolingofthereactorvesselisevaluatedasanalternatemethodofcompliancewithTechnicalSpecification3/4.9.11.1incasetheprimarycoolingmethod(RHRloop)islost.Toincreasetheeffectivenessofthenaturalcirculation,itwasnecessarytochangetheSFCflowarrangement(coldwaterisroutedtobothreactorcavityspargers).Inaddition,tocomplywiththeTechnicalSpecificationrequirementoftemperaturemonitoring,amethodisrecommendedtomonitorthereactorcoolanttemperature.Thereactorcoolanttemperaturewillbemonitoredattwolocations:(1)coreoutlettemperature(hotplume)within-5'fthetopofcore,and(2)nearthevesselwallindowncomerregion,nearthejetpumpinletarea.Thearithmeticaverageofthesetwotemperaturesistheaveragereactorcoolanttemperature.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theabovechangeshavebeenevaluatedfortheirimpactonthefuelassemblycoolingandlocalboilingwithinthespentfuelpool.Thenewflowarrangementswillcontinuetoprovideadequatecoolingtofuelassembliesinthespentfuelpool.Thecurrentmargin(-35F)betweenthelocalsaturationtemperatureandpeakcladtemperaturewillnotbesignificantlyaffected.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage103of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-106Rev.1NLINCR-02-37,9-22-19928.3-58BYSReductioninOneIVlinuteDischargeRateforDivisionIandDivisionIIEmergencyDcBatteriesDescriptionofChange:OneminutedischargerateofDivisionIandDivisionIIemergencydcbatterieshasbeenreducedbythevendorduetomoreaccuratebatterytest.ThisdatumisapartofthedcsystemdescriptionintheUSAR.TheUSARhasbeenrevisedtoreflectthischange.Oneminutedischargeratealsoaffectsthebatterydischargecurves.Thesecurvesdescribetheperformanceofthebatteries.Theimpactofthenewoneminutedischargerateandnewbatterydischargecurveshasbeenanalyzed.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theanalysisperfo'rmedrevealedthatnewoneminutedischargerateandnewbatterydischargecurvesdonotaffecttherequiredsizeofDivisionIandDivisionIIemergencydcbatteries.Thebatteriesstillcansupportadequatelytwo-hoursemergencydischargecycleandstationblackout.AtanypointofpostulatedemergencydischargethevoltageofthebatteriesdoesnotdropbelowthelimitsidentifiedintheUSAR.Thechangehasnoimpactondcsafety-relatedcablessizing.Short-circuitcurrentofthebatteryisreduced;therefore,thedcshort-circuitcurrentmarginisincreased.Thisanalysisisappliedforexistingbatteriesandforreplacementcells.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage104of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:implementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:93-108ProceduresN2-OSP-EGS-R0035R004N/A,.SpentFuelPoolCooling(SFC)OverridingOperationof2SFC"HV6Aor6BOperationsrequestedthecapabilityofoverridingtheclosureof2SFC"HV6Aor6BduringOperatingConditions4or5whenconductingProcedureN2-OSP-EGS-R003andR004.Thesevalvesarethesuctioncross-connectsbetweentherespectiveskimmersurgetanksinDivisionIandIIoftheSFCsystem.Asdesigned,thevalvesmayeitherbeoperatedmanuallytoopenorcloseorwillcloseautomaticallyuponalossofpower.ThedesignbasesofSFCpermitseitherthesystemtobeoperatedcross-connectedorsplit,withthedivisioncross-connectisolationvalvesclosed,wheneitheroneorbothpumpsareinoperation.N2-OSP-EGS-R003andR004testsareconductedontheSFCdivisionwhichdoesnothaveitspumpinoperation.Whenpowerislosttothatdivisionitsassociatedsuctioncross-connectvalvewillgoclosed.PrioroperatingexperiencehasindicatedthattherunningpumpmaytriponlowsuctionpressurewiththeresultingconditionthatallSFCislost.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Theseprocedurechangeshavenoimpactonthesafeoperationorcapabilitytokeeptheplantinthesafeshutdownconditionorprecluderemovingthedecayheatfromthespentfuelpool.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage105of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-109Rev.0L1SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0176-93N/AHighPressureCoreSprayReplacementofHPCSValveMotorContractorsDescriptionofChange:Thischangeinstallednewstartercontactorsintothecontrolcircuitofvalves2CSH"MOV107,2CSH"MOV110,2CSH"MOV111and2CSH"MOV112.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thenewstartercontactorstobeinstalled"pullin"atalowervoltageandrequireless"holdin"current.Thiswillensurethatevenunderdegradedvoltageconditionsthecontrolcircuitwillperformitsintendedfunction.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage106of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-111N/AFigures1.2-1,2.4-1,9A.3-1N/AConstructionoftheHazardousMaterialStorageBuildingDescriptionofChange:Thehazardousmaterialstoragebuildingwasconstructedtothesouthofthemainwarehouseandwestofthebottledgasstoragebuilding,outsidetheprotectedarea.Thestoragefacilityisasingle-story,nonsafety-relatedstructurehavingaslabongradeandprovidesatotalareaofapproximately6,000squarefeet.Thisbuildingisdesignedtostorehazardousmaterialcurrentlystoredinthetemporaryconstructionbuilding(warehouseCannex)andmeetsallfederal/localcodeandenvironmentalrequirements.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthattheconstructionofthehazardousmaterialstoragebuildingdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage107of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:93-112Rev.0&.1N/AUSARAffectedPages:N/ASystem:TitleofChange:VariousRevision5oftheNMP2EmergencyOperatingProceduresDescriptionofChange:ThisrevisionoftheEOPschangedsomeoperatinglimitsasaresultofthenewGE11fuel.Thelimitswhichhavebeenrevisedarethefollowing:minimumalternateRPVfloodingpressure,minimumnumberofSRVsrequiredforemergencydepressurization,minimumRPVfloodingpressure,minimumcorefloodinginterval,maximumcoreuncoverytimelimit,minimumsteamcooling,minimumzeroinjectionRPVwaterlevel,heatcapacitytemperaturelimit,heatcapacitylevellimitandthepressuresuppressionpressure.SafetyEvaluationSummary:AlthoughsomechangeshavebeenmadetotheEOPsbyRevision5,itwasverifiedthat:theoperatoractionsprescribedinthisnewrevisionareinaccordancewiththeBWROGEPGs,andwhenappliedtolicensingbasisaccidentsandtransients,theEOPswillnotincreasetheconsequencesoftheseeventsasdepictedintheUSAR.Noneofthesechangeshasalteredthephilosophy,logic,orvalidityoftheNMP2EOPs.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatRevision5oftheEOPsdoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage108of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-114NIP-DES-04Table8.3-16ReactorBuildingCranes(MHR)RevisiontotheNMP2USARTable8.3-16andAttachment(3)ofNIP-DES-04,PrimaryContainmentElectricalPenetrationsandPenetrationConductorswhicharenotRequiredDuringReactorOperationandareProtectedbyDe-energizationDescriptionofChange:ThischangeupdatedUSARTable8.3-16andAttachment(3)ofNIP-DES-04toreflectas-installedplantconditionsforthosecircuitsassociatedwithelectricalpenetrationsandelectricalpenetrationconductorswhichwererequiredtobede-energizedduringreactoroperation.Thischangeremovescircuitsfor2MHR-CRN3,4,65,67and66,whichhaveprimaryandbackupcircuitovercurrentprotectionat2NHS-MCC005cubicle7B,7C,7D,7Eand7F,respectively.Newcircuitfor2RDS-PLAT1isaddedtothetablewhichwasinadvertentlyleftinthelistoflistsforde-energizedcircuits.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThischangeamendsNMP2USARTable8.3-16andAttachment(3)ofNIP-DES-04toincludeacircuitfor2RDS-PLAT1,whichisrequiredtobede-energizedforelectricalpenetrationandpenetrationprotectionduringreactoroperation,andremovingthosecircuitswhicharenolongerrequiredtobede-energizedduetooperabilityofprimaryandbackupcircuitovercurrentinterruptingdevicesat2NHS-MCC005cubicle7B,7C,7D,7Eand7Fforreactorbuildingcranes2MHR-CRN3,4,65,67566,respectively.The2SCA-PNL406breaker¹9providespowerattheplatform(2RDS-PLAT1)forlightingpurposesonly.Theplatform2RDS-PLAT1isusedtorotateandpositionCRDhandlingequipmentduringrefuelingoutageonly.ThiscircuitshallbeincludedinUSARTable8.3-16andAttachment(3)ofNIP-DES-04.Theoutboardcables(2RCSANC52862RCSBNC538)from2SCI-PNLC104shallbesparedinplace.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage109of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary:(cont'd.)93-114(cont'd.)TherearenoTechnicalSpecificationchangesrequiredtoSections3/4.8A.1or3/4.8.4.2asaresultofthesedocumentationonlychanges.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage110of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:93-115DER2-93-2511Figures5.4-13a,5.4-13bResidualHeatRemoval(RHS)Orientationof2RHS"MOV40A/BThischangeacceptedasistheinstallationofoutboardisolationglobevalves2RHS"MOV40A/B.Thesevalveswerethrottledtocontrolthecooldownrateintheshutdowncoolingmode.ThesevalveswereinstalledsuchthatLOCAandreactorvesselpressurecouldbeappliedtotheaboveseatsideoftheglobevalveshouldtheinboardisolationcheckvalves2RHS"AOV39A/Bfailopen,thuscreatingapotentialleakpaththroughthevalvepacking.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thoughtheinstalledorientationof2RHS"MOV40A/Benhancesthethrottlingcapabilitiesofthevalve,theorientationalsocreatesapotentialleakpaththroughthevalvepacking.However,thedesignofthevalvepackingarrangementisbasedonpressuresthatexceedLOCApressureof39.75psigandpeakreactorvesselbottompressureof1279psig.Inaddition,valves2RHS"MOV40A/Barelocalleakratetestedtoatleast39.75psigandhydropressuretestedevery18months.Therefore,thereisahighdegreeofassurancethatthesevalveswillmaintainleak-tightintegrity.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage111of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:93-116DER2-93-2511Figure5.4-13cResidualHeatRemoval(RHS)Orientationof2RHS"MOV33BThischangeacceptedasistheinstallationofcontainmentisolationglobevalve2RHS"MOV33B.Thisvalveisthrottledtocontrolsuppressionchambersprayflow.Thisvalvewasinstalledsuchthatpeaksuppressionchambercouldbeappliedtotheaboveseatsideoftheglobevalve,thuscreatingapotentialleakpaththroughthevalvepacking.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thoughtheinstalledorientationof2RHS"MOV33Benhancesthethrottlingcapabilitiesofthevalve,theorientationalsocreatesapotentialleakpaththroughthevalvepacking.However,thedesignofthevalvepackingarrangementisbasedonpressurethatexceedsthecalculatedpeaksuppressionchamberpressureof33.98psig.Inaddition,valve2RHS"MOV33Bislocalleakratetestedat40-42psigevery18months.Therefore,thereisahighdegreeofassurancethatthisvalvewillmaintainleak-tightintegrity.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage112of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:93-118Rev.05.1TemporaryMod.93-062N/AHotWaterHeating5.Glycol(HVH)TemporaryHotWaterHeatingPlantThissafetyevaluationcoveredtheinstallationandoperationofatemporaryhotwaterheatingplant,whichisusedtoprovideanalternatesupplyofhotwatertothereactorbuildingglycolheatexchanger,2HVG-E2.ThenormalsupplyofhotwaterfromtheHVHhotwaterheatexchangersmaynotbeavailableduringnormalplantoperationandasourceofhotwaterisneededforglycolheating.Thetemporaryhotwaterheatingunitislocatedatleast50feetfromanyplantstructure.Demineralizedwaterforsystemfillingisfurnishedviadrainvalve2CCP-V915.Electricpowerfortheunitisprovidedfromtheexistingconstructionpowerloop.SafetyEvaluationSummary:AsdiscussedinUSARSection9.4.11,theplantglycolheatingsystemfunctionsinconjunctionwiththeplanthotwaterheatingsystem(discussedinUSARSection9.4.12)toheatoutdoormakeupairusedforventilation.AsdescribedinUSARSection94.11.3fortheglycolsystemandinUSARSection9.4.12.5fortheplanthotwaterheatingsystem,thefailureormalfunctionofeitherorbothsystem(s)willnotcompromiseanysafety-relatedsystemorcomponentorpreventsafereactorshutdown.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage113of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:93-120N2-ISP-LRT-R5058ATable6.2-65Sh1ReactorCoreIsolationCooling(ICS)AppendixJTestingof2ICS"MOV126Thischangeallowedreversetestingofcontainmentisolation2ICS"MOV126.ThischangeresultedinachangetotestingprocedureN2-ISP-LRT-R5058Awhichcontrolsthetestingofthisvalve.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thischange,reversetestingof2ICS"MOV126,'isamoreconservativetestbecauseboththeLOCAandnon-LOCAseatwillbesubjectedtotheLLRTpressure.Thischangewillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperationoftheplant.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage114of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-121EDC2F00874,DER2-93-0501Figure11.2-1JLWSLiquidWasteManagementSystemAs-BuiltConditionDescriptionofChange:Thischangeprovidedas-builtconditionsontheaffecteddrawingstoshowremovalofflushinglines(2-LWS-002-464-4and2-LWS-002-625-4)andvalves(2LWS-V194and2LWS-V203).SafetyEvaluationSummary:DuetoESDCRC94489B,andinaccordancewithECNLWS-631,pressureswitches2LWS-PS42Aand2LWS-PS42Bweredeletedfromthesystem.Theflushinglines(2-LWS-002-464-4and2-LWS-002-625-4)andvalves(2LWS-V194and2LWS-V203)weretheflushingconnectionsforthepressureswitchesandhavebeenremoved.Tomaintainplantconfigurationcontrol,saidflushinglinesandvalveswillberemovedfromaffecteddrawingstoshowas-builtcondition.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage115of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:93-122TemporaryMod.93-067N/AMainSteamSystemLeakRepair2MSS-PV29VThistemporarychangewasrelatedtothemainsteamsystem(MSS).Thereheatingsteamlowloadisolationvalvetomoistureseparatorreheater2MSS-E1B,valve2MSS-PV29B,wasexperiencingasteamleakthroughthevalvepackingarea.Thechangeinvolvedthetemporaryinjectionofleakrepairnucleargradesealanttype2Xtoisolatetheleakuntilpermanentrepairsweremade.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Anengineeringreviewoftherequestedchangehasbeenperformed.Thisreview,whichincludedtheeffectsofthistemporarychangeonthesystem'soperability,reliability,maintainability,structuralintegrity,andsysteminteractions,hasfoundthattheinjectionofthesealantandpossibleseizureofvalve2MSS-PV29Bintheopenpositionwillnotcauseanyadversesafetyoroperabilityissues.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage116of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:93-126Rev.0&1N/A12.3-8thru12.3-11,12.3-19,12.3-22,12.5-1thru12.5-4,12.5-6,12.5-10thru12.5-14,12.5-16,12.5-17;Tables1.8-2Sh3,4,1.9-1Sh49,50System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:N/A10CFR20RevisionToincorporatethechangesnecessarytoimplementtherevised10CFR20,"StandardsforProtectionAgainstRadiation."SafetyEvaluationSummary:Revision1providesabasisforchangingtheTLDprocessingfrequencythatwasincorporatedintheRadiationProtectionProgrambasedon,butnotspecificallyaddressedin,Revision0.Also,theTechnicalReviewCommittee'scommentsofMay25,1994,concerningtheuseof0-200mRpocketdosimetersandclarificationofradiationzoneterminologyareincludedinRevision1.Thechangesarefundamentallyadministrativeinnature.ThechangesnecessarytosupporttherevisedPart20areconsistentwiththephilosophyofmaintainingdoseAsLowAsisReasonablyAchievable(ALARA).Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage117of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:93-127Rev.1GAP-POL-01,Rev.05;NSAS-POL-01,Rev.00;QAP-POL-1.01,Rev.04USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:9A.3-1,9A.3-1a,9A.3-2,Section13.1,13.2-1,AppendixBN/ANuclearSBUOrganizationalStructureandResponsibilities-RevisedProceduresGAP-POL-015QAP-POL-1.01,andNewProcedureNSAS-POL-01DescriptionofChange:ThepositionsofGeneralManagerSiteSupportandGeneralIVlanagerSafetyAssessment,Licensing,andTrainingwerecombinedunderthesinglepositionofVicePresidentNuclearSafetyAssessmentandSupport.SeniormanagementresponsibilitiesfortheVicePresidentNuclearSafetyAssessmentandSupportincludethepresent"SafetyAssessment"functionalareasofQualityAssurance(QA),Licensing,andTraining;andthe"Support"functionspreviouslyimplementedwithintheSiteSupportorganization.TheManagerQualityAssurancereportsdirectlytotheExecutiveVicePresidentNuclearforallQAactivitieswithintheNuclearSafetyAssessmentandSupportorganization(toensuresufficientauthorityandindependenceforeffectivelyimplementingQAresponsibilitieswithintheNuclearSafetyAssessmentandSupportorganization).TheUnit1OperatingOrganization(IVlaintenance,TechnicalSupport,andWorkControl/OutageBranchesonly)wasrevisedtoincludethefollowingBranchManagerdirectreports:~Maintenance-GeneralSupervisorl&CMaintenance,GeneralSupervisorMechanical/ElectricalMaintenance(combined),SupervisorIVlaintenanceProcedures,LeadMaintenanceSupport,andProgramDirector89-10Implementation.~WorkControl/Outage-GeneralSupervisorMaintenancePlanning,SupervisorOutageManagement,andSupervisorMaintenancePlanningPrograms.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage118of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:DescriptionofChange:(cont'd.)93-127Rev.1(cont'd.)~TechnicalSupport-LeadSystemEngineers(2)andAdministrativeSupportCoordinator(s)(forSORC,NPRDS,TechnicalReview,andModificationactivities).SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheproposedorganizationcontinuestoprovidefortheintegratedmanagementofactivitiestosupporttheoperationandmaintenanceofNineMilePointUnits1h2.Clearmanagementcontrol,effectivelinesofauthority,andcommunicationbetweentheorganizationalunitsirivolvedinthemanagement,operation,andtechnicalsupportofNineMilePointUnits1L2aremaintained.Theorganizationalchangesalterthereportingstructureofexistingpositionsbutdonotaffecttheperformanceoffunctionsorresponsibilities.Linesofauthority,responsibilityandcommunicationfor"onsite"and"offsite"organizationalelementswhichfunctionunderthecognizanceoftheQAProgramareestablishedintheformofrevisedorganizationalcharts.FunctionaldescriptionsoftheNuclearSafetyAssessmentandSupportOrganizationandtherevisedUnit1OperatingOrganization,andjobdescriptions,relationships,andresponsibilitiesforkeypersonnelpositionsaredocumentedinProcedureGAP-POL-01,NSAS-POL-01,andQAP-POL-1.01.Basedonthisevaluation,therevisedorganizationalstructureoftheNuclearSBUcontinuestosatisfytheacceptancecriteriaofSRP9.5.1(BTPCMEB9.5-1),SRP13.1.1,SRP13.1.2-13.1.3,SRP13.6,SRP17.2,andUnit1and2TechnicalSpecification6.2.1.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage119of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:93-128DER2-93-23968.3-62,8.3-70BYSIEEEStandardIssueChangeforClass1EBatteryTestingDescriptionofChange:DuringthereplacementofDivisionIdcbatteryitwasdiscoveredthattherewasadiscrepancybetweentheUSARandTechnicalSpecifications.TechnicalSpecificationBases,pg.B3/48-2statesthatthesurveillancerequirementsfordemonstratingtheoperabilityofthebatteriesareinaccordancewiththerecommendationsofReg.Guide1.129andIEEE-Std-450-1980.However,USARSection8.3.2statesthattheregularinspectionandmaintenanceofthebatteriesisperformedinaccordancewithReg.Guide1.129(IEEE-Std-450-1975).EngineeringanalyzedthisdiscrepancyandcametotheconclusionthattheUSARwasinerrorandneededtobecorrectedtoagreewithTechnicalSpecifications.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Engineeringperformedacomparisonbetween1975and1980issueofIEEE-Std-450toensurethatthischangeisnotadverselyaffectingtheClass1Ebatteries.ThiscomparisonrevealedthatintheMaintenanceandCorrectiveActionssections,the1980issueofthestandardisequivalenttothe1975issueormorerestrictive.IntheBatteryCapacityTestsection,thereisaslightdifferencebetweenthesetwoissues.Thenatureofthisdifferencedependsonthebatterytesttemperature.However,thevalueofthisdifferenceisinsignificanttocomparewiththeexcessofthecapacityofthedcbatteries.Basedontheanalysisperformed,theconclusionismadethatthischangedoesnotcompromisetheabilityofthebatteriestoperformthesafety-relatedfunctionasdesignedandasdescribedintheUSAR.C%Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage120of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:94-002TemporaryMod.94-003,N2-OP-35N/AReactorCoreIsolationCooling(ICS)ProcedureChangeEvaluation,N2-OP-35Thischangewasrelatedtothereactorcoreisolationcoolingsystem(ICS)asdescribedinUSARSection54.Thechangethrottledopen2ICS-LV132asrequiredtodecreaseitscycling(opening/closing)frequencytoanacceptablelevel.Previously,tocontrolthelevelintheICSsteamsupplydrainlinedrainpot,thisvalvewascycledatapproximately5-minuteintervalscausingannunciator601302toalarm.ThischangehasbeenprocedurallyimplementedandiscontrolledviaTemporaryModification94-003tominimizeannunciationuntiltheunderlyingcauseoftheproblemisevaluatedandresolved(referenceDER2-93-2805).SafetyEvaluationSummary:AnengineeringreviewoftheeffectsofthischangeontheICSandotherinterfacingsystemshasbeenperformed.Nuclearsafetywillnotbecompromisedasthechangewillcontinuetoprovideanadequatelevelcontrolsystemforthesteamsupplydrainlinedrainpot.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage121of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:94-003TemporaryMod.94-008N/AReactorProtectionSystem(RPS)GroupFourScramPilotValvePowerSourceInadvertentcableterminationsathydrauliccontrolunit(HCU)2RDS-L704causedreactorprotectionsystemtripchannelsA1andA2tocontrolthe"8"pilotscramvalvesolenoidinsteadoftheintended"A"solenoid.Accordingly,tripchannelsB1andB2controlthe"A"solenoidinsteadoftheintended"B"coil.ThewiringerrorwaslocatedatthefirstHCUofa24HCUdaisychain,therebyaffectingtheentirechain.AllgroupfourHCUsonsidetwoofthereactorwerebeingaffectedby.thedescribedcondition.Thechangedocumentsthewiringerrorasatemporarymodificationsincerestorationwillnotbeperformeduntilthenextscheduledplantshutdown.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thesafety-relatedfunctionoftheRPSistoscramthereactorwhenspecificpredeterminedvariablesareexceeded.Thedualtripprotectivesystememploysaone-out-of-twotakentwicelogictocontrolfail-safesolenoids.ThefunctionoftheRPSisnotadverselyaffectedbythereversedwiringatthegroupfourHCUs.Twoseparatepowersourcescontrolledbytwoseparatetripsystemsarestillprovidedforeachcontrolrodasdelineatedbysystemeliminators.ThisdeviationintroducesaconfigurationcontrolconcernbuthasnofunctionalimpactontheRPSortheaffectedcontrolroddrives.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage122of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:DescriptionofChange:94-004SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0170-919.3-6ServiceAirSystem(SAS)1/2InchHoseCouplingReplacementThischangemadepermanentthe1"hosecouplingsinstalledatstations2SAS-V264and2SAS-V265perTemporaryModification90-069.Theincreaseinhosecoupling,valveandassociatedcomponentsfrom1/2"to1"providesincreasedairflowtoequipmentasneeded.SafetyEvaluationSummary:AnengineeringreviewoftheeffectsofthischangeontheSASandotherinterfacingsystemshasbeenperformed.Nuclearsafetywillnotbecompromisedasthechangewillcontinuetoprovideanadequatesupplyofserviceairtoequipmentondemand.ThischangedoesnotcauseanyequipmentimportanttosafetytobedependentonSAStoperformitssafetyfunction.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage123of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-005TemporaryMod.94-018,N2-OP-35N/AReactorCoreIsolationCooling(ICS)ProcedureChangeEvaluation,N2-OP-35ThrottleOpen2ICS-LV132DescriptionofChange:Thistemporarymodificationthrottledopen2ICS-LV132asrequiredtodecreaseitscycling(opening/closing)frequencytoanacceptablelevel.Currently,tocontrolthelevelintheICSsteamsupplydrainlinedrainpot,thisvalveiscyclingatfrequentintervalscausingannunciator601302toalarm.ThischangehasbeenprocedurallyimplementedandiscontrolledviaTemporaryIVlodification94-018tominimizeannunciationuntiltheunderlyingcauseoftheproblemisevaluatedandresolved.SafetyEvaluationSummary:AnengineeringreviewoftheeffectsofthischangeontheICSandotherinterfacingsystemshasbeenperformed.Nuclearsafetywillnotbecompromisedasthechangewillcontinuetoprovideanadequatelevelcontrolsystemforthesteamsupplydrainlinedrainpot.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage124of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-007CalculationMS-2162-OOCTable3.9A-10Sh1,4ServiceWaterSystemUpdateUSARTable3.9A-10"SummaryofSeismicStressAnalysisResults"DescriptionofChange:CalculationdispositionMS-2162-OOCwasperformedtoreflectthelatestresultsoftheseismicstressanalysisoftheservicewaterpumps(2SWP"P1A,B,C,D,E5F)atNMP2.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThecalculationwasreviewedandapprovedtoprovidethetechnicaljustificationoftherevisedvaluesinUSARTable3.9A-10.Thecalculationdispositionshowsthattheresultsofthelatestseismicstressanalysisareallwithintheircorrespondingallowables.Thischangedoesnotresultinanyphysicalchangetotheequipmentnorwillitaffectthefunction,operabilityandstructuralintegrityofthesubjectpumps.Therefore,thischangedoesnothaveanimpactonthesafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage125of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-008DER2-93-1896Table6.2-56Sh19,20ResidualHeatRemoval(RHS)ReviseTypeCTestingof2RHS"MOV26A,26B,27Aand27BfromAirtoWaterDescriptionofChange:DuringanindependentauditoftheNMP210CFR50AppendixJprogramitwasnotedthatUSARTable6.2-56indicatedthatvalves2RHS"MOV26A,26B,27Aand27BwereTypeCtested.Thesevalveswereonlineswhosedischargeswerebelowsuppressionpoolminimumwaterleveland,therefore,werenotexposedtoprimarycontainmentatmosphere.ThesevalveswerepreviouslyTypeCtestedwithairinaccordancewithAppendixJ,SectionIII.C.2.a.Inanswertotheaudititem,testingofthesevalveshasbeenchangedfromaTypeCtestusingairtoahydrostatictest.,SafetyEvaluationSummary:Valves2RHS"MOV26A,26B,27Aand27Btieintolinesthatpenetratetheprimarycontainmentanddischargeintothesuppressionpoolat193'-23/8".Thelowestminimumsuppressionpoolwaterlevelis199'-6".ThesevalvesdonotbecomeexposedtotheprimarycontainmentatmosphereduringaDBA-LOCAsincetheirdischargeisbelowminimumsuppressionpoolwaterleveland,therefore,donot.representpotentialcontainmentatmosphericleakagepaths.Inaddition,minimumsuppressionpoolwaterlevelismaintainedperTechnicalSpecificationsuchthatthewatersealisassured.Thesevalveswillbehydrostaticallytestedatapressureof1.1Pa.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage126of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-010NSAS-POL-01,Rev.01;POL,Rev.5Section13.1N/AAlterOrganizationalStructureandResponsibilitiesWithintheNuclearStrategicBusinessUnit-RevisedProcedureNSAS-POL-01andNuclearDivisionPolicy,llPOIffDescriptionofChange:AdministrativeresponsibilityfortheFitnessforDutyProgramwastransferredfromtheIVlanagerNuclearSecuritytotheDirectorHumanResourceDevelopment.ThepositionoftheSupervisorAccessAuthorization/FitnessforDutyreportingtotheManagerNuclearSecuritywaseliminated.Responsibilityforadministeringthe.AccessAuthorizationProgramwasassumedbytheSupervisorNuclearSecuritySupport,whoalsoassumedtheresponsibilitiesoftheSupervisorNuclearSecurityAdministrationleadingtotheeliminationofthatposition.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheneworganizationalstructurewillcontinuetoprovidefortheintegratedmanagementofactivitiesthatsupportoperationofNineIVlilePointUnits1and2.ClearmanagementcontrolandeffectivelinesofauthorityarecontinuedforNuclearSecuritywithintheNuclearSafetyAssessmentandSupportorganizationandforFitnessforDutywithinHumanResourceDevelopment.AlthoughorganizationalchangesalterthereportingstructureasitappliestomanagementoftheFitnessforDutyProgramandsupervisionoftheUnescortedAccessAuthorizationProgramandSecurityadministrativeservices,theactualfunctionswithintheseprogramswillnotbeaffected.Linesofauthority,responsibilityandcommunicationrelatingtoHumanResourceDevelopmentarecurrentlyestablishedinorganizationalchartsintheUnit1andUnit2UFSARs.Linesofauthority,responsibility,andcommunicationrelatingtoNuclearSecurityarealsoshownintheorganizationalchartsintheUFSARs,aswellasinthePhysicalSecurityPlan.Revisedjobdescriptionsandresponsibilitiesfor SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage127of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary:(cont'd.)94-010(cont'd.)theManagerNuclearSecurityandtheDirectorHumanResourceDevelopmentwillbedocumentedinNSAS-POL-01andinPOL,"NuclearDivisionPolicy,"respectively.TherevisedorganizationalstructureoftheNuclearSBUmeetstheacceptancecriteriaofSRPSections13.1,13.1.1,13.6,and17.2,aswellasUnit1andUnit2TechnicalSpecification6.2.1.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage128of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-011SimpleDesignChangeSC2-0146-93Figure8.2-7SPG,YXC,CECRemoveControlRoomRecorderRFM-2SPGN02(Frequency)andRV-2YXCN10(Voltage)fromPanel2CEC"PNL852DescriptionofChange:FrequencyrecorderRFM-2SPGN02andvoltagerecorderRV-2YXCN10wereinoperableandrepairpartswerenolongeravailablefromthemanufacturer.Therecordersmonitoredthe345/25-kVGeneratorScribaStationLine¹23potentialcircuit.TheinformationisavailablefromotherexistinginstrumentationonthepanelandasoutputfromGETARS.Therefore,therecorderswereremoved.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Thedesignchangehasremovedinoperableandunnecessaryequipmentfromthecontrolroompaneltoenhanceoperatorvisualfocusonotheroperatinginstrumentation.Thischangewillhavenoimpactonthesafeoperationorshutdownoftheplant.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage129of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:94-014NSAS-POL-01,Rev.01;NIP-FPP-01,Rev.03USARAffectedPages:9A.3-2thru9A.3-4,9A.3-31,13.2-21;Table13.1-1;Figure13.1-5System:TitleofChange:N/AFireProtectionOrganizationalStructure-RevisedProceduresNSAS-POL-01andNlP-FPP-01DescriptionofChange:TheFireProtectionorganizationwasrestructuredfromunitspecifictoasiteorganizationreportingtoasiteSupervisorFireProtection.The"Site"SupervisorFireProtectionreportstotheManagerTechnicalServices,andtheManagerTechnicalServicescontinuestomaintainoverallresponsibilityforsiteimplementationoftheFireProtectionProgram.TheFireBrigadeiscomprisedofatleastthreemembersfromtheFireProtectionstaffanduptotwomembersfromothersiteorganizations,therebysatisfyingtheminimumsiteBrigadecomplementoffive.BrigademembersdonotincludetheSSSorothermembersoftheminimumshiftcrewnecessaryforsafeshutdownoftheunit,oranyotherpersonnelrequiredforotheressentialfunctionsduringafireemergency.AllmembersoftheFireBrigadecontinuetobetrained/qualifiedperexistingFireBrigadeTrainingProgramrequirements.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TheproposedorganizationalchangesalterthereportingstructureofexistingFireProtectionstaffpositionsandthecompositionoftheFireBrigade,butdonotaffecttheperformanceofFireProtectionstafffunctionsorresponsibilities.The"site"organizationcontinuestoprovideforintegrated.managementoffireprotectionactivitiestosupporttheoperationandmaintenanceofNineMilePointUnits1and2,andtoachieveandmaintainsafeshutdownintheeventofafire.Clearmanagementcontrolandeffectivelinesofauthorityandcommunicationbetweentheorganizationalunitsinvolvedinthemanagement,operation,andtechnicalsupportfortheoperationofNineMilePointUnits1and2aremaintained,andtheresponsecapabilityoftheFireBrigadeisnotaffectedbythereorganization.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage130of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:94-014(cont'd.)SafetyEvaluationSummary:(cont'd.)FunctionaldescriptionsoftheFireProtectionorganization,andjobdescriptions,relationships,andresponsibilitiesforkeypersonnelpositionsresponsibleforimplementationoftheFireProtectionProgram,aredocumentedinProceduresNSAS-POL-01andNIP-FPP-01.Basedonthisevaluation,therevisedstructureoftheFireProtectionorganizationcontinuestosatisfytheacceptancecriteriaofSRP9.5.1(BTPCMEB9.5-1),SRP13.1.1,andUnit1TechnicalSpecification6.2.1,anddoesnotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage131of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:94-015ProceduresN2-OP-29,N2-OP-101A,N2-OP-101C,N2-OP-101DUSARAffectedPages:System:TileofChange:N/AReactorRecirculationSystem(RRS)ReviseProceduresN2-OP-29,N2-OP-101A,N2-OP-101C,andN2-OP-101DtoAddOwners'roupStabilityGuidanceWhenOperatingNeartheStabilityRegionDescriptionofChange:ThissafetyevaluationevaluatedtheimpactofaddingtherevisedBWROwners'roupguidanceconcerningoperationnearthestabilityregion.Thischangeincreasedthesizeofthestabilityexitregion.Thechangealsoaddedaregionofheightenedawarenessbetweenthe65%and70%rodlineandlessthan45%coreflow,andtheareagreaterthanthe65%rodlineandbetween45%and50%coreflow.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Currentpracticeistoupshifttherecirculationpumpsatthelowestrodlinepossibletomaximizethemargintothestabilityregions.Thesechangeswillproceduralizethisoperatingphilosophyandensurethatrecirculationpumpupshiftanddownshiftduringanormalstartuporshutdownwilloccuratlessthanthe65%rodline.~Previouslytheguidancewouldallowrecirculationpumpupshiftuptothe80%rodline.Anyentryintotheheightenedawarenesszonewillrequirecontinuousmonitoringforthermalhydraulicoscillations.Thesechangesareconservativemeasureswhichhelptoprovideagreatermargintothestabilityexclusionregion.Theoperatingprocedureswhichareimpactedbythesechangesareasfollows:N2-OP-29N2-OP-101AN2-OP-101CN2-OP-101DReactorRecirculationSystemPlantStartupPlantShutdownPowerChanges SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage132of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary:(cont'd.)94-015(cont'd.)Baseduponthisevaluation,itisconcludedthatNineMilePointUnit2canbesafelyoperatedinaccordancewiththeseprocedurechanges.Thechangesevaluatedinthissafetyevaluationwillservetoincreasetheoperatingmargintotheregionofthepower/flowmapinwhichreactorstabilityisaconcern.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage133of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:94-016GAP-POL-01,Rev.06;NSAS-POL-01,Rev.01;GAP-OPS-01,Rev.03;NIP-TQS-01,Rev.04USARAffectedPages:12.1-7,12.1-8,12.5-12,Section13.1,13.2-22System:TitleofChange:N/ANuclearSBUOrganizationalStructureandResponsibilities-RevisedProceduresGAP-POL-01,NSAS-POL-01,GAP-OPS-01,andNIP-TQS-01DescriptionofChange:ThischangeanalyzedtheimpactofproposedrightsizingandorganizationalchangeswithintheNuclearGenerationandNuclearSafetyAssessmentandSupportorganizations.ThechangesreflectanoverallreductioninsitestaffinglevelsandareductioninthemanagementlayersofcertaingroupswithintheOperations,Maintenance,WorkControl/Outage,RadiationProtection,andTechnicalSupportBranchesofNuclearGeneration;andtheTrainingBranch,OccupationalSafety&.Health,ConstructionServices,andOfficeAdministration/FacilitiesgroupsofNuclearSafetyAssessmentandSupport.Responsibilitiesforcertainfunctionswereconsolidatedwithinbranchesortransferredbetweenbranches,andseveralGeneralSupervisorandSupervisorpositionswereabolishedresultinginanincreaseinthenumberofdirectreportstoapplicableBranchManagers.Afterrightsizing,thetotalNineMilePointsitestaffisapproximately918people.ThisstafflevelisconsistentwithNUREG-1047,Section13.1.2.1,whichidentifiestheanticipatedNineMilePointsitestaffofabout900peopleasbeingwithintherangenormallyexpectedforatwo-unitsite.SafetyEvaluationSummary:TherightsizedNuclearGenerationandNuclearSafetyAssessmentandSupportorganizationscontinuetoprovidefortheintegratedmanagementofactivitiestosupporttheoperationandmaintenanceofNineMilePointUnits1and2.Clear SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage134of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:SafetyEvaluationSummary:(cont'd.)94-016(cont'd.)managementcontrolandeffectivelinesofauthorityandcommunicationaremaintained.FunctionaldescriptionsoftheNuclearGenerationandNuclearSafetyAssessmentandSupportorganizations,andjobdescriptions,relationships,andresponsibilitiesforkeypersonnelpositionsaredocumentedinProceduresGAP-POL-01,NSAS-POL-01,GAP-OPS-01,andNIP-TQS-01.Basedonthisevaluation,therevisedorganizationalstructuresoftheNuclearGenerationandNuclearSafetyAssessmentandSupportorganizationscontinuetosatisfyacceptancecriteriafromSRP13.1.1,SRP13.1.2-13.1.3,Unit1and2TechnicalSpecification6.2.1,ANSIN18.1-1971(Unit1),andANSI/ANS3.1-1978(Unit2);andsitestafftotalisconsistentwiththestaffingrangeexpectedfortwo-unitsites(perNUREG-1047).TheorganizationalchangesareincompliancewithNRCstandardsanddonotconstituteanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage135of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:94-041DER2-94-0624Table8.3-16RSCRemovalofMaintenanceandCalibrationJacksfromtheListofDe-energizedCircuitsUSARTable8.3-16DescriptionofChange:ThischangerevisedUSARTable8.3-16toremovemaintenanceandcalibration(jacks124,128,134and137)circuitsthatprovidedlowenergydcsignaltocommunicationjacksintheprimarycontainment.SafetyEvaluationSummary:Themaintenanceandcalibrationcircuitsforjacks124,128,134and137carrylow-energydcsignalsontheorderofmilliamperes.TheoutputcurrentfromthepowersupplyatRCS-88islimitedsothatitwilldelivernomorethan230maundershortedlineconditions.Theshort-circuitcurrentvalueisinsignificantascomparedtothecurrent-carryingcapabilityofthepenetrationassembly(2CES-Z38E).Moreover,theTechnicalSpecification3.8.4.1requirementsareapplicabletoaccircuitsonly.Therefore,maintenanceandcalibrationcircuitsthatcarrylow-energydcsignalsforthesejackscanberemovedfromthelistofde-energizedcircuitsinUSARTable8.3-16.ProceduresNIP-DES-04andN2-OSP-LOG-D001wererevisedaccordingly.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.

SafetyEvaluationSummaryReportPage136of136SafetyEvaluationNo.:ImplementationDocumentNo.:USARAffectedPages:94-042N/A13.5-1,13.5-3,13.5-5;Tables13.5-1Sh1,13.5-5,13.5-6Sh5,6,13.5-7System:TitleofChange:N/AImplementationofOperatingProcedureImprovementsDescriptionofChange:ThischangewasmadetoincorporateadescriptionofthescopeandformatofSpecialOperatingProcedureswithintheUnit2procedureprogramstructure.OtherchangestotheUSARweretoimproveinternalconsistencyandtomoredearlydescribetheUnit2procedureprogram.SafetyEvaluationSummary:ThesafetyevaluationaddressestheacceptabilityofusingSpecialOperatingProcedurestosatisfytherequirementoftheNMP2TechnicalSpecificationsandlicensingbasis.ThechangestotheUSARsimplyclarifythemethodofimplementingtheguidanceofANSI/ANS3.2-1982andprovideanotherproceduralmechanismforaddressingeventsthathavearegulatoryspecifiedprocedurerequirement.Basedonth'eevaluationperformed,thesechangesmeettherequirementsoftheTechnicalSpecification,thelicensingbasis,andindustrystandards,andareincompliancewithNRCstandards.Basedontheevaluationperformed,itisconcludedthatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewedsafetyquestion.