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{{#Wiki_filter:May 6, 2020
{{#Wiki_filter:May 6, 2020  
Mr. Eric Larson
Site Vice President
Entergy Operations, Inc.
Mr. Eric Larson  
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
Site Vice President  
P.O. Box 756
Entergy Operations, Inc.  
Port Gibson, MS 39150
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station  
SUBJECT:       GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION
P.O. Box 756  
                REPORT 05000416/2020001
Port Gibson, MS 39150  
Dear Mr. Larson:
On March 31, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection
SUBJECT:  
at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. On April 7, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of
GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION  
this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are
REPORT 05000416/2020001  
documented in the enclosed report.
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding
Dear Mr. Larson:  
involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation
(NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
On March 31, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection  
A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is also
at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. On April 7, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of  
documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV)
this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are  
consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
documented in the enclosed report.  
If you contest the violations or the significance of the violations documented in this inspection
report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with
One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding  
the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document
involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation  
Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator,
(NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.  
Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Grand Gulf
Nuclear Station.
A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is also  
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a
documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV)  
response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your
consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.  
disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk,
Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the
If you contest the violations or the significance of the violations documented in this inspection  
NRC Resident Inspector at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.
report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with  
the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document  
Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator,  
Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Grand Gulf  
Nuclear Station.  
If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a  
response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your  
disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk,  
Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the  
NRC Resident Inspector at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.  


E. Larson                                       2
E. Larson  
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection
2  
and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document
Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public
This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection  
Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.
and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document  
                                                Sincerely,
Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public  
                                                Jason W.            Digitally signed by Jason
Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.  
                                                                    W. Kozal
                                                Kozal              Date: 2020.05.06 16:04:18
Sincerely,  
                                                                    -05'00'
                                                Jason W. Kozal, Chief
                                                Reactor Projects Branch C
                                                Division of Reactor Projects
Docket No. 05000416
Jason W. Kozal, Chief  
License No. NPF-29
Reactor Projects Branch C  
Enclosure:
Division of Reactor Projects  
As stated
cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV
Docket No. 05000416  
License No. NPF-29  
Enclosure:  
As stated
cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV  
Jason W.
Kozal
Digitally signed by Jason
W. Kozal
Date: 2020.05.06 16:04:18
-05'00'




  ML20127J013
  ML20127J013
                            Non-Sensitive                     Publicly Available
      SUNSI Review
SUNSI Review
                            Sensitive                        Non-Publicly Available
   
OFFICE SRI:DRP/C     RI:DRP/C           BC:DRS/EB1     BC:DRS/EB2             BC:DRS/OB
Non-Sensitive  
NAME     TSteadham   MThomas             VGaddy         NTaylor               GWerner/GEW
Sensitive
DATE     4/22/2020   04/23/2020         04/23/2020     04/22/2020             04/22/2020
OFFICE BC:DRS/RCB     TL:DRS/IPAT         BC:DNMS/RIB   SPE:DRP/C             BC:DRP/C
Publicly Available  
NAME     MHaire       AAgrawal ANA       GWarnick GGW   CYoung                 JKozal
Non-Publicly Available  
DATE     04/22/2020   04/27/2020         04/23/2020     04/22/2020             05/06/2020
                                   
OFFICE SRI:DRP/C  
                          U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
RI:DRP/C  
                                        Inspection Report
BC:DRS/EB1  
Docket Number:        05000416
BC:DRS/EB2  
License Number:        NPF-29
BC:DRS/OB  
Report Number:        05000416/2020001
NAME  
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-001-0004
TSteadham  
Licensee:              Entergy Operations, Inc.
MThomas  
Facility:              Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
VGaddy  
Location:              Port Gibson, MS
NTaylor
Inspection Dates:      January 1, 2020 to March 31, 2020
GWerner/GEW  
Inspectors:            I. Anchondo-Lopez, Reactor Inspector
DATE  
                      D. Antonangeli, Health Physicist
4/22/2020  
                      M. Chambers, Physical Security Inspector
04/23/2020  
                      N. Greene, PhD, Senior Health Physicist
04/23/2020  
                      J. Melfi, Project Engineer
04/22/2020  
                      T. Steadham, Senior Resident Inspector
04/22/2020  
                      M. Thomas, Resident Inspector
OFFICE BC:DRS/RCB  
                      C. Young, Senior Project Engineer
TL:DRS/IPAT  
Approved By:          Jason W. Kozal, Chief
BC:DNMS/RIB  
                      Reactor Projects Branch C
SPE:DRP/C  
                      Division of Reactor Projects
BC:DRP/C  
                                                                Enclosure
NAME  
MHaire  
AAgrawal ANA  
GWarnick GGW  
CYoung  
JKozal
DATE  
04/22/2020  
04/27/2020  
04/23/2020  
04/22/2020  
05/06/2020  


                                              SUMMARY
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees
Enclosure
performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, in
accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to
Inspection Report
https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. A licensee-
identified non-cited violation is documented in report Section 71153.
                                  List of Findings and Violations
Docket Number:
  Failure to Follow Procedures with an Improper Entry into a High Radiation Area
05000416
  Cornerstone          Significance                                Cross-Cutting      Report
                                                                  Aspect            Section
   
  Occupational          Green                                      [H.11] -          71124.01
License Number:  
  Radiation Safety      NCV 05000416/2020001-01                    Challenge the
NPF-29
                      Open/Closed                                Unknown
  The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation of
   
  Technical Specification 5.4.1 for a failure to follow procedures, which resulted in an improper
Report Number:  
  entry into a high radiation area. Specifically, on March 3, 2020, a worker received a dose rate
05000416/2020001  
  alarm after entering a high radiation area in an overhead section of the drywell without first
  contacting radiation protection or receiving a briefing to be aware of the actual dose rates in
   
  the area, as required by radiation protection procedures and the radiological work permit.
Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-001-0004
                                    Additional Tracking Items
  Type      Issue Number                  Title                          Report Section  Status
   
  LER        05000416/2016009-01          Entry into Mode of            71153            Closed
Licensee:
                                          Applicability with the
Entergy Operations, Inc.  
                                          Oscillation Power Range
                                          Monitor Upscale Settings
                                          Incorrectly Set
Facility:
  LER        05000416/2018008-00          Unplanned System Actuation    71153            Closed
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station
                                          (Diesel Generator) Caused
                                          by Inadvertently Opening the
                                          Wrong Fuse Drawer
Location:
  LER        05000416/2017-007-01          Engineered Safety Features    71153            Closed
Port Gibson, MS
                                          System Actuations due to
                                          the Loss of Engineered
   
                                          Safety Features
Inspection Dates:
                                          Transformer 11
January 1, 2020 to March 31, 2020  
                                                    2
Inspectors:
I. Anchondo-Lopez, Reactor Inspector
   
   
D. Antonangeli, Health Physicist
   
M. Chambers, Physical Security Inspector
N. Greene, PhD, Senior Health Physicist
J. Melfi, Project Engineer
   
   
T. Steadham, Senior Resident Inspector
M. Thomas, Resident Inspector
   
C. Young, Senior Project Engineer
   
Approved By:
Jason W. Kozal, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch C
Division of Reactor Projects


PLANT STATUS
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, began this inspection period at 95 percent reactor power.
2
On January 3, 2020, power was lowered to 65 percent for control rod pattern improvement. The
unit was returned to 98 percent power on January 8, 2020. On January 9, 2020, power was
SUMMARY
lowered to 71 percent for a rod pattern improvement. The unit returned to rated thermal power
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees
on January 10, 2020. On February 22, 2020, the unit was shut down for refueling outage 22
performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, in
and remained shut down for the remainder of the inspection period.
accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process.  The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs
INSPECTION SCOPES
program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in
https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information.  A licensee-
effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved
identified non-cited violation is documented in report Section 71153.  
IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html.
List of Findings and Violations
Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection
Failure to Follow Procedures with an Improper Entry into a High Radiation Area
activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor
Cornerstone
Inspection Program - Operations Phase. From January 1 - March 19, 2020, the inspectors
Significance
performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, and
Cross-Cutting
conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The
Aspect
inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
Report
personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and
Section
regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
Occupational
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President
Radiation Safety
of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident
Green
inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using
NCV 05000416/2020001-01
available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits
Open/Closed
each week and during that time conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515,
[H.11] -  
Appendix D; and observed risk-significant activities when warranted. In addition, resident and
Challenge the  
regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives
Unknown
and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be
71124.01
performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In the cases where it was
The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation of
determined the objectives and requirements could not be performed remotely, management
Technical Specification 5.4.1 for a failure to follow procedures, which resulted in an improper
elected to postpone and reschedule the inspection to a later date.
entry into a high radiation area. Specifically, on March 3, 2020, a worker received a dose rate
REACTOR SAFETY
alarm after entering a high radiation area in an overhead section of the drywell without first
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
contacting radiation protection or receiving a briefing to be aware of the actual dose rates in
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
the area, as required by radiation protection procedures and the radiological work permit.
    The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following
    systems/trains:
Additional Tracking Items
    (1)    Residual heat removal pump C while in cooldown on February 27, 2020
Type
    (2)    Residual heat removal A while in shutdown cooling on March 2, 2020
Issue Number
                                                  3
Title
Report Section
Status
LER
05000416/2016009-01
Entry into Mode of  
Applicability with the  
Oscillation Power Range
Monitor Upscale Settings
Incorrectly Set
71153
Closed
LER
05000416/2018008-00
Unplanned System Actuation
(Diesel Generator) Caused
by Inadvertently Opening the  
Wrong Fuse Drawer
71153
Closed
LER
05000416/2017-007-01
Engineered Safety Features
System Actuations due to
the Loss of Engineered
Safety Features
Transformer 11
71153
Closed


Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
    (1)    The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the
3
            reactor core isolation cooling system during the Division 3 maintenance outage on
            January 8, 2020.
PLANT STATUS
71111.05 - Fire Protection
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, began this inspection period at 95 percent reactor power.
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)
On January 3, 2020, power was lowered to 65 percent for control rod pattern improvement.  The  
    The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a
unit was returned to 98 percent power on January 8, 2020. On January 9, 2020, power was
    walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality,
lowered to 71 percent for a rod pattern improvement. The unit returned to rated thermal power
    material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:
on January 10, 2020. On February 22, 2020, the unit was shut down for refueling outage 22
    (1)     Emergency diesel generator building on February 27, 2020
and remained shut down for the remainder of the inspection period.
    (2)    Fire water pump house on February 28, 2020
    (3)     Residual heat removal A pump room on March 4, 2020
INSPECTION SCOPES
    (4)    Reactor core isolation cooling room on March 4, 2020
Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in
    (5)    Division 1 standby service water pump room on March 5, 2020
effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted.  Currently approved
    (6)    Residual heat removal B pump room on March 9, 2020
IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at
71111.07A - Heat Sink Performance
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html. 
Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection
    The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:
activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor  
    (1)    Division 3 emergency diesel generator jacket water heat exchanger A and B
Inspection Program - Operations Phase.  From January 1 - March 19, 2020, the inspectors
            inspections and cleaning, Work Orders 52791443 and 52790008, on January 7, 2020
performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, and
71111.08G - Inservice Inspection Activities (BWR)
conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The
BWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Nondestructive Examination and Welding
inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
Activities (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and
    (1)    The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, reactor vessel
regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.
            internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary were
            appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were
Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President
            appropriately fabricated, examined, and accepted by reviewing the following activities
of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident
            from March 2-5, 2020:
inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using
            03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities.
available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits
                1. Ultrasonic Examination
each week and during that time conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515,  
                        a. Weld 1B21G025W17, Feedwater System - Pipe-to-Flued Head
Appendix D; and observed risk-significant activities when warranted.  In addition, resident and  
                            circumferential weld
regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives
                        b. Weld 1B21G026W1, Feedwater System - Pipe-to-Flued Head
and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely.  If the inspections could be
                            circumferential weld
performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP.  In the cases where it was
                                                    4
determined the objectives and requirements could not be performed remotely, management
elected to postpone and reschedule the inspection to a later date.
REACTOR SAFETY
71111.04 - Equipment Alignment
Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following
systems/trains:
(1)
Residual heat removal pump C while in cooldown on February 27, 2020
(2)
Residual heat removal A while in shutdown cooling on March 2, 2020


                      c. 1B21F028D, Feedwater System - Bolt/Stud ultrasonic inspection
                      d. 1B21G026W4, Feedwater System - Valve-to-Pipe circumferential weld
4
                      e. N02C-IR, Reactor Coolant System - Inlet Nozzle to Reactor Pressure
                          Vessel Inner Radius Weld
Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)  
          Problem Identification and Resolution
(1)  
          The inspector reviewed 18 notifications that dealt with inservice inspections issues
The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the  
          and found that items were entered into the corrective action program at the
reactor core isolation cooling system during the Division 3 maintenance outage on  
          appropriate level and adequately addressed.
January 8, 2020.  
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)
(2 Samples)
71111.05 - Fire Protection
    (1)   The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control
Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)  
          room during control rod sequence exchange on January 3, 2020.
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a
    (2)    The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control
walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality,
          room during shutdown for Refueling Outage 22 on February 22, 2020.
material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:  
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
(1)  
    The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following
Emergency diesel generator building on February 27, 2020
    structures, systems, and components remain capable of performing their intended function:
(2)
    (1)   Reactor core isolation cooling 10-year overhaul inspection on March 6, 2020
Fire water pump house on February 28, 2020
    (2)   Reactor core isolation cooling maintenance rule review on March 25, 2020
(3)
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Residual heat removal A pump room on March 4, 2020
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)
(4)
    The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the
Reactor core isolation cooling room on March 4, 2020
    following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and
(5)
    appropriate work controls were addressed:
Division 1 standby service water pump room on March 5, 2020  
    (1)   Risk management for the Division 3 maintenance outage during the week of
(6)  
          January 6, 2020
Residual heat removal B pump room on March 9, 2020  
    (2)   Outage risk management during the week of March 9, 2020
    (3)   Risk management while residual heat removal A in shutdown cooling on
          March 6, 2020
71111.07A - Heat Sink Performance
    (4)    Foreign material exclusion risk to reactor core during fuel movement on
Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)  
          March 5, 2020
The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:
    (5)    Yellow outage risk management during recirculation pump B seal replacement and
          control rod drive mechanism removal on March 15, 2020
(1)  
                                                5
Division 3 emergency diesel generator jacket water heat exchanger A and B
inspections and cleaning, Work Orders 52791443 and 52790008, on January 7, 2020  
71111.08G - Inservice Inspection Activities (BWR)
BWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Nondestructive Examination and Welding
Activities (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)  
(1)  
The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, reactor vessel
internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary were
appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were
appropriately fabricated, examined, and accepted by reviewing the following activities
from March 2-5, 2020:
03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities.
1. Ultrasonic Examination
a. Weld 1B21G025W17, Feedwater System - Pipe-to-Flued Head
circumferential weld
b. Weld 1B21G026W1, Feedwater System - Pipe-to-Flued Head
circumferential weld


71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
5
    The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the
    following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
c. 1B21F028D, Feedwater System - Bolt/Stud ultrasonic inspection
    (1)    Reactor pressure and turbine control valve oscillations at 87 percent reactor power on
d. 1B21G026W4, Feedwater System - Valve-to-Pipe circumferential weld
          January 24, 2019
e. N02C-IR, Reactor Coolant System - Inlet Nozzle to Reactor Pressure
    (2)   Scram discharge volume vent and drain valves 1C11F010 and 1C11F011 after failure
Vessel Inner Radius Weld
          to meet surveillance test procedure acceptance criteria on February 12, 2020
    (3)    Seismic qualification of jet pump plugs, Engineering Change 86247, on
Problem Identification and Resolution
          March 31, 2020
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
The inspector reviewed 18 notifications that dealt with inservice inspections issues
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02)
and found that items were entered into the corrective action program at the
(2 Samples)
appropriate level and adequately addressed.
    The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
    (1)   New procedure issuance: Procedure 02-S-01-45, "Water Inventory Control,"
71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
          Revision 0, on February 28, 2020
Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)  
    (2)   Engineering Change 85565 replacement of the Division 3 emergency diesel
(2 Samples)  
          generator speed switch following its failure on March 31, 2020
(1)
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)
room during control rod sequence exchange on January 3, 2020.
    The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance test activities to verify system
(2)  
    operability and functionality:
The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control
    (1)   Division 3 emergency diesel generator post maintenance test following an extended
room during shutdown for Refueling Outage 22 on February 22, 2020.
          maintenance outage on January 10, 2020
    (2)   Division 3 emergency diesel generator speed switch and mag pickup functional post
71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness
          maintenance test following replacement on January 20, 2020
Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)  
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following  
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
structures, systems, and components remain capable of performing their intended function:  
    (1)    The inspectors evaluated outage-related activities from February 22, 2020,
          through March 31, 2020
(1)  
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
Reactor core isolation cooling 10-year overhaul inspection on March 6, 2020  
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
(2)  
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)
Reactor core isolation cooling maintenance rule review on March 25, 2020  
    (1)    Fire protection system testing on March 3, 2020
                                                6
71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)  
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the
following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and
appropriate work controls were addressed:  
(1)  
Risk management for the Division 3 maintenance outage during the week of
January 6, 2020  
(2)  
Outage risk management during the week of March 9, 2020
(3)
Risk management while residual heat removal A in shutdown cooling on  
March 6, 2020  
(4)  
Foreign material exclusion risk to reactor core during fuel movement on
March 5, 2020  
(5)  
Yellow outage risk management during recirculation pump B seal replacement and
control rod drive mechanism removal on March 15, 2020  


    (2)    Division 2 emergency core cooling system testing on March 26, 2020
    (3)    Containment electrical penetration local leak-rate test on March 4, 2020
6
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
    (1)   Standby liquid control pump B quarterly inservice test on January 16, 2020
71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)  
    (1)    Suppression pool water level penetrations local leak-rate test on March 5, 2020
The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the
FLEX Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
following operability determinations and functionality assessments:
    (1)   1FLEXS010 480 V battery charger emergency diesel generator annual operational
          test on January 14, 2020
(1)  
RADIATION SAFETY
Reactor pressure and turbine control valve oscillations at 87 percent reactor power on  
71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
January 24, 2019
Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)
(2)  
    (1)    The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identified the magnitude and extent of
Scram discharge volume vent and drain valves 1C11F010 and 1C11F011 after failure
          radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and
to meet surveillance test procedure acceptance criteria on February 12, 2020
          how the licensee assessed radiological hazards.
(3)  
Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)
Seismic qualification of jet pump plugs, Engineering Change 86247, on  
    (1)   The inspectors evaluated radiological protection-related instructions to plant workers.
March 31, 2020  
Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)
    The inspectors evaluated licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination
71111.18 - Plant Modifications
    and radioactive material.
Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02)  
    (1)   The inspectors observed workers donning and doffing personal protection equipment
(2 Samples)
          at the contaminated drywell entry/exit point.
The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:
    (2)   The inspectors observed the actions of workers while performing tasks in the
          contaminated areas of the drywell during the refueling outage.
(1)  
    (3)   The inspectors observed the radiation protection staff perform surveys of potentially
New procedure issuance:  Procedure 02-S-01-45, "Water Inventory Control,"
          contaminated material leaving the radiologically controlled area (RCA) and workers
Revision 0, on February 28, 2020
          monitored via the personnel contamination monitors as they exited the RCA during
(2)  
          the refueling outage.
Engineering Change 85565 replacement of the Division 3 emergency diesel  
                                                7
generator speed switch following its failure on March 31, 2020  
71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing
Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)  
The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance test activities to verify system
operability and functionality:
(1)
Division 3 emergency diesel generator post maintenance test following an extended
maintenance outage on January 10, 2020
(2)
Division 3 emergency diesel generator speed switch and mag pickup functional post
maintenance test following replacement on January 20, 2020
71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)  
(1)  
The inspectors evaluated outage-related activities from February 22, 2020,
through March 31, 2020
71111.22 - Surveillance Testing
The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:
Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)  
(1)  
Fire protection system testing on March 3, 2020


Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (5 Samples)
  The inspectors evaluated in-plant radiological conditions during facility walkdowns and
7
  observation of radiological work activities.
  (1)   Radiation Work Permit (RWP) 2020-1502, "Drywell Coordinator, Safety and NRC
(2)  
          Walkdowns/Tours in the Drywell"
Division 2 emergency core cooling system testing on March 26, 2020  
  (2)    RWP 2020-1509, "General Decon Activities and Support for the Drywell"
(3)  
  (3)   RWP 2020-1510, "Visually Inspect/Remove/Test/Replace Snubbers in RF-22"
Containment electrical penetration local leak-rate test on March 4, 2020
  (4)   RWP 2020-1511, "General Maintenance in the Drywell During RF-22"
  (5)   RWP 2020-1915, "Emergent Work for Maintenance, Tours and Inspections"
Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)  
High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (5 Samples)
(1)  
  The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following High Radiation Areas and Very
Standby liquid control pump B quarterly inservice test on January 16, 2020  
  High Radiation Areas:
  (1)   Turbine Building Areas (87-foot level and 133-foot level)
  (2)   AUX Building Areas (128-foot level, 180-foot level, 208-foot level)
Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)  
  (3)   Containment Areas (161-foot level, 170-foot level, 208-foot level)
(1)  
  (4)   Offgas Charcoal Vault Area (93-foot level)
Suppression pool water level penetrations local leak-rate test on March 5, 2020
  (5)   Radwaste Building Reactor Water Cleanup Phase Separator Decay Tank Area
          (118-foot level)
Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP
FLEX Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)  
Section 03.06) (1 Sample)
(1)  
  (1)   The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician
1FLEXS010 480 V battery charger emergency diesel generator annual operational
          performance as it pertains to radiation protection requirements.
test on January 14, 2020
71124.02 - Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls
Implementation of ALARA and Radiological Work Controls (IP Section 03.03) (4 Samples)
  The inspectors evaluated the licensees communication of as low as is reasonably
RADIATION SAFETY
  achievable (ALARA) and radiological work controls for the following work activities:
71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
  (1)   RWP 2020-1502, "Drywell Coordinator, Safety and NRC Walkdowns/Tours in the
Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)  
          Drywell"
(1)  
  (2)   RWP 2020-1509, "General Decon Activities and Support for the Drywell"
The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identified the magnitude and extent of
  (3)    RWP 2020-1510, "Visually Inspect/Remove/Test/Replace Snubbers in RF-22"
radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and
  (4)    RWP 2020-1915, "Emergent Work for Maintenance, Tours and Inspections"
how the licensee assessed radiological hazards.
Radiation Worker Performance (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)
  The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance
  during:
Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)  
  (1)   The inspectors evaluated the implementation of ALARA techniques for work activities
(1)  
          during Refueling Outage 22.
The inspectors evaluated radiological protection-related instructions to plant workers.  
                                                8
Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)  
The inspectors evaluated licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination
and radioactive material.
(1)  
The inspectors observed workers donning and doffing personal protection equipment
at the contaminated drywell entry/exit point.
(2)  
The inspectors observed the actions of workers while performing tasks in the
contaminated areas of the drywell during the refueling outage.
(3)  
The inspectors observed the radiation protection staff perform surveys of potentially
contaminated material leaving the radiologically controlled area (RCA) and workers
monitored via the personnel contamination monitors as they exited the RCA during
the refueling outage.  


OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
8
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01) (1 Sample)
Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (5 Samples)
    (1)   January 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019
The inspectors evaluated in-plant radiological conditions during facility walkdowns and
BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) (1 Sample)
observation of radiological work activities.
    (1)   January 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (1 Sample)
(1)  
    (1)   January 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019
Radiation Work Permit (RWP) 2020-1502, "Drywell Coordinator, Safety and NRC
OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 02.15) (1 Sample)
Walkdowns/Tours in the Drywell"
    (1)   July 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019
(2)  
PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
RWP 2020-1509, "General Decon Activities and Support for the Drywell"
Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample
(3)  
(IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample)
RWP 2020-1510, "Visually Inspect/Remove/Test/Replace Snubbers in RF-22"
    (1)   July 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019
(4)  
71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
RWP 2020-1511, "General Maintenance in the Drywell During RF-22"
Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (3 Samples)
(5)  
    The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
RWP 2020-1915, "Emergent Work for Maintenance, Tours and Inspections"
    (1)   LER 05000416/2016-009-01, Entry into Mode of Applicability with the Oscillation
          Power Range Monitor Upscale Settings Incorrectly Set (ADAMS Accession
High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (5 Samples)
          No. ML17228A275). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are
The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following High Radiation Areas and Very
          documented in this report as a licensee-identified non-cited violation in the Inspection
High Radiation Areas:
          Results.
    (2)   LER 05000416/2017-007-01, Engineered Safety Features System Actuations due to
(1)  
          the Loss of Engineered Safety Features Transformer 11 (ADAMS Accession
Turbine Building Areas (87-foot level and 133-foot level)
          No. ML18346A393). The inspectors determined that the licensee's cause evaluation
(2)  
          associated with the issue identified that the licensee's procedures for conducting
AUX Building Areas (128-foot level, 180-foot level, 208-foot level)
          Tan-Delta cable testing had previously failed to include a requirement to perform
(3)  
          cable shielding continuity testing. This performance deficiency was identified by the
Containment Areas (161-foot level, 170-foot level, 208-foot level)  
          licensee as being associated with a possible missed opportunity to identify cable
(4)  
          degradation prior to failure (not as being the direct cause of this event). The
Offgas Charcoal Vault Area (93-foot level)
          inspectors determined that the safety significance associated with this issue was not
(5)
          more than very low safety significance (Green). The testing of cables associated with
Radwaste Building Reactor Water Cleanup Phase Separator Decay Tank Area
          an offsite power circuit was a nonsafety-related activity. The inspectors did not
(118-foot level)  
          identify a violation of NRC requirements.
                                                9
Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP  
Section 03.06) (1 Sample)  
(1)  
The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician
performance as it pertains to radiation protection requirements.
71124.02 - Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls
Implementation of ALARA and Radiological Work Controls (IP Section 03.03) (4 Samples)  
The inspectors evaluated the licensees communication of as low as is reasonably
achievable (ALARA) and radiological work controls for the following work activities:  
(1)  
RWP 2020-1502, "Drywell Coordinator, Safety and NRC Walkdowns/Tours in the  
Drywell"
(2)  
RWP 2020-1509, "General Decon Activities and Support for the Drywell"
(3)  
RWP 2020-1510, "Visually Inspect/Remove/Test/Replace Snubbers in RF-22"
(4)  
RWP 2020-1915, "Emergent Work for Maintenance, Tours and Inspections"
Radiation Worker Performance (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)  
The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance
during:
(1)  
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of ALARA techniques for work activities
during Refueling Outage 22.  


    (3)   LER 05000416/2018-008-00, Unplanned System Actuation (Diesel Generator)
          Caused by Inadvertently Opening the Wrong Fuse Drawer (ADAMS Accession
9
          No. ML18187A402). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are
          documented in this report as a minor violation in the Inspection Results.
OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE
INSPECTION RESULTS
71151 - Performance Indicator Verification
  Failure to Follow Procedures with an Improper Entry into a High Radiation Area
The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:
  Cornerstone          Significance                              Cross-Cutting      Report
                                                                Aspect            Section
IE01:  Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01) (1 Sample)
Occupational          Green                                    [H.11] -          71124.01
(1)  
Radiation Safety      NCV 05000416/2020001-01                  Challenge the
January 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019
                      Open/Closed                              Unknown
  The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed Green non-cited violation of Technical
BI01:  Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) (1 Sample)  
  Specification 5.4.1 for a failure to follow procedures, which resulted in an improper entry into
(1)
a high radiation area. Specifically, on March 3, 2020, a worker received a dose rate alarm
January 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019
  after entering a high radiation area in an overhead section of the drywell without first
   
  contacting radiation protection or receiving a briefing to be aware of the actual dose rates in
BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (1 Sample)
the area, as required by radiation protection procedures and the radiological work permit.
(1)
Description: On March 3, 2020, the licensee briefed two workers for entry into the drywell to
January 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019
  identify some snubber components. The briefing informed the workers that they would enter
   
a maximum general area dose rate of 20 millirem per hour on their job travel path and work
OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 02.15) (1 Sample)
area. However, one of the workers climbed into a normally inaccessible overhead piping
(1)
area of the drywell to identify the serial number on a snubber, causing his self-reading
July 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019
dosimeter (SRD) to alarm unexpectedly. His SRD recorded a maximum dose rate of
   
  802 millirem per hour; the dose rate alarm set-point was 300 millirem per hour. The individual
PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
was signed onto Task 1 of radiation work permit (RWP) 2020-1510. Task 1 was a high
Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample
radiation area task, but the worker had not been briefed for entry into the specific overhead
(IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample)
  area within the high radiation area. Once the worker identified the alarm, the individual
(1)
  climbed down from the overhead area, informed his co-worker, and they both exited the RCA
July 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019
to contact radiation protection (RP).
   
  The RAD Worker Instructions section of RWP 2020-1510, Task 1, included the following
71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
statements:
Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (3 Samples)
        Be aware of and stay away from Hot spots/pipes
The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):
        Contact RP [radiation protection] for High Radiation Area entry requirements
   
        Contact RP prior to work in normally inaccessible area for current radiological
(1)  
        conditions and protective requirements
LER 05000416/2016-009-01, Entry into Mode of Applicability with the Oscillation
  Procedure EN-RP-101, Access Control for Radiologically Controlled Areas, Revision 14,
Power Range Monitor Upscale Settings Incorrectly Set (ADAMS Accession
Section 5.4, required a brief of personnel entering high radiation areas on the radiological
No. ML17228A275). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are
conditions, and access was allowed only after dose rates in the area were determined and
documented in this report as a licensee-identified non-cited violation in the Inspection
entry personnel were made aware of them.
Results.  
  Procedure EN-RP-100, Radiation Worker Expectations, Revision 12, Section 5.3 [4], stated
   
that No entry to areas above seven [7] feet is permitted without prior permission from
(2)
  [radiation protection] RP. The overhead piping area entered was above 7 feet from the floor
LER 05000416/2017-007-01, Engineered Safety Features System Actuations due to
  level and was normally inaccessible and not typically surveyed. Also, in this procedure,
the Loss of Engineered Safety Features Transformer 11 (ADAMS Accession
                                                  10
No. ML18346A393).  The inspectors determined that the licensee's cause evaluation
associated with the issue identified that the licensee's procedures for conducting
Tan-Delta cable testing had previously failed to include a requirement to perform
cable shielding continuity testing. This performance deficiency was identified by the
licensee as being associated with a possible missed opportunity to identify cable
degradation prior to failure (not as being the direct cause of this event).  The
inspectors determined that the safety significance associated with this issue was not
more than very low safety significance (Green). The testing of cables associated with
an offsite power circuit was a nonsafety-related activity. The inspectors did not  
identify a violation of NRC requirements.  


Section 5.3 [19] stated, in part, that to enter a high radiation area, the radiation worker must
be briefed and sign on the appropriate RWP. Section 5.4 [1] stated, in part, Compliance with
10
an RWP is a legal requirement. Failure to comply could result in NRC violation.
As allowed by procedure, the overhead area the worker entered had not been surveyed or
posted by RP prior to his entry, as there were no work plans for this area and it was deemed
(3)
inaccessible. After the dose rate alarm, a follow-up survey identified dose rates in the
LER 05000416/2018-008-00, Unplanned System Actuation (Diesel Generator)
overhead piping area, near the snubber, as approximately 3500 millirem per hour on contact
Caused by Inadvertently Opening the Wrong Fuse Drawer (ADAMS Accession
and 800 millirem per hour at 30 cm. The RP staff then posted the overhead as an area with
No. ML18187A402). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are
elevated dose rates. The licensee believes the individual utilized a nearby ladder to access
documented in this report as a minor violation in the Inspection Results.  
the overhead area. The ladder was not posted as Contact RP prior to working or climbing
above 7 feet or controlled, as required by licensee Procedure EN-RP-108, Radiation
INSPECTION RESULTS
Protection Posting.
Failure to Follow Procedures with an Improper Entry into a High Radiation Area
Corrective Actions: The licensee assessed this issue and implemented multiple immediate
Cornerstone
corrective actions. Some of the actions taken included:
Significance
      All involved parties were interviewed and coached
Cross-Cutting
      The individual was restricted from the RCA and placed in the licensees performance
Aspect
        management process
Report
      The occurrence was placed in the Site Outage Status Report to inform all licensee
Section
        staff of the requirements to follow RWP instructions and licensee procedures
Occupational
Corrective Action References: This issue was placed into the corrective action program as
Radiation Safety
Condition Report CR-GGN-2020-02586.
Performance Assessment:
Green
Performance Deficiency: A radiation worker failed to follow procedures and made an
NCV 05000416/2020001-01 
improper entry into a high radiation area.
Open/Closed
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor
[H.11] -
because it was associated with the program and process attribute of the Occupational
Challenge the  
Radiation Safety Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the
Unknown
adequate protection of the worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from
71124.01
radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. Specifically, the failure
The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed Green non-cited violation of Technical
to follow requirements involving radiological controls had the potential to increase the
Specification 5.4.1 for a failure to follow procedures, which resulted in an improper entry into
individuals dose. In addition, the inspectors reviewed NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612,
a high radiation area. Specifically, on March 3, 2020, a worker received a dose rate alarm  
Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, to inform the more-than-minor determination.
after entering a high radiation area in an overhead section of the drywell without first
Although Example 6.g was similar, there were no current examples that appropriately fit the
contacting radiation protection or receiving a briefing to be aware of the actual dose rates in
consequences of this occurrence. The failure to follow procedural requirements and making
the area, as required by radiation protection procedures and the radiological work permit.  
an improper entry into the overhead area, within the high radiation area, resulted in an
Description: On March 3, 2020, the licensee briefed two workers for entry into the drywell to
exposure of roughly 40 times the general area dose rates for which the individual was briefed.
identify some snubber components. The briefing informed the workers that they would enter
Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection
a maximum general area dose rate of 20 millirem per hour on their job travel path and work
Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety SDP. The inspectors
area.  However, one of the workers climbed into a normally inaccessible overhead piping
determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because (1) it was not
area of the drywell to identify the serial number on a snubber, causing his self-reading
associated with as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA) planning or work controls;
dosimeter (SRD) to alarm unexpectedly.  His SRD recorded a maximum dose rate of  
(2) there was no overexposure; (3) there was no substantial potential for an overexposure;
802 millirem per hour; the dose rate alarm set-point was 300 millirem per hour.  The individual
and (4) the ability to assess dose was not compromised.
was signed onto Task 1 of radiation work permit (RWP) 2020-1510. Task 1 was a high
                                                  11
radiation area task, but the worker had not been briefed for entry into the specific overhead
area within the high radiation area. Once the worker identified the alarm, the individual
climbed down from the overhead area, informed his co-worker, and they both exited the RCA
to contact radiation protection (RP).
The RAD Worker Instructions section of RWP 2020-1510, Task 1, included the following
statements:
Be aware of and stay away from Hot spots/pipes
Contact RP [radiation protection] for High Radiation Area entry requirements
Contact RP prior to work in normally inaccessible area for current radiological
conditions and protective requirements  
Procedure EN-RP-101, Access Control for Radiologically Controlled Areas, Revision 14,  
Section 5.4, required a brief of personnel entering high radiation areas on the radiological
conditions, and access was allowed only after dose rates in the area were determined and  
entry personnel were made aware of them.  
Procedure EN-RP-100, Radiation Worker Expectations, Revision 12, Section 5.3 [4], stated
that No entry to areas above seven [7] feet is permitted without prior permission from
[radiation protection] RP.  The overhead piping area entered was above 7 feet from the floor
level and was normally inaccessible and not typically surveyed. Also, in this procedure,


Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.11 - Challenge the Unknown: Individuals stop when faced with
uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding. Specifically, the
11  
worker failed to stop and assess the radiological conditions he may enter prior to entering the
overhead area in the drywell with elevated dose rates, resulting in a dose rate alarm.
Section 5.3 [19] stated, in part, that to enter a high radiation area, the radiation worker must
Licensee procedures require workers to adhere to RWP requirements, which required RP
be briefed and sign on the appropriate RWP.  Section 5.4 [1] stated, in part, Compliance with
approval to enter the overhead area. This enables RP to establish area dose rates and
an RWP is a legal requirement.  Failure to comply could result in NRC violation.  
controls, as overhead areas are not routinely surveyed or accessible.
Enforcement:
As allowed by procedure, the overhead area the worker entered had not been surveyed or
Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires, in part, that procedures be written,
posted by RP prior to his entry, as there were no work plans for this area and it was deemed
implemented, and established for those areas recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33,
inaccessible. After the dose rate alarm, a follow-up survey identified dose rates in the
Appendix A, Revision 2, 1978. Section 7(e) of this appendix requires RP procedures.
overhead piping area, near the snubber, as approximately 3500 millirem per hour on contact
Procedure EN-RP-100, Radiation Worker Expectations, Revision 12, Section 5.3 [4], stated
and 800 millirem per hour at 30 cm. The RP staff then posted the overhead as an area with
that no entry to areas above 7 feet was permitted without prior permission from RP.
elevated dose rates. The licensee believes the individual utilized a nearby ladder to access
Contrary to the above, on March 3, 2020, an individual failed to receive permission from RP
the overhead area.  The ladder was not posted as Contact RP prior to working or climbing
prior to entering an area above 7 feet, resulting in an improper entry into a high radiation area
above 7 feet or controlled, as required by licensee Procedure EN-RP-108, Radiation
and a dose rate alarm of 802 millirem per hour.
Protection Posting.  
Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with
Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
Corrective Actions:  The licensee assessed this issue and implemented multiple immediate
Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation                                              71153
corrective actions. Some of the actions taken included:
This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been
entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited
violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
All involved parties were interviewed and coached
Violation: Technical Specification 3.3.1.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS)
Instrumentation, required Action L, requires that thermal power be reduced to less than
The individual was restricted from the RCA and placed in the licensees performance
16.8 percent rated thermal power within 4 hours if action has not been initiated to implement
management process
the manual backup stability protection (BSP) regions defined in the Core Operating Limits
Report (COLR) in accordance with required Actions J.1 and K.1 after one or more required
The occurrence was placed in the Site Outage Status Report to inform all licensee
channels of the oscillation power range monitor (OPRM) upscale function has been
staff of the requirements to follow RWP instructions and licensee procedures
inoperable for longer than 12 hours.
Contrary to the above, on March 27, 2016, the licensee failed to reduce thermal power to less
Corrective Action References:  This issue was placed into the corrective action program as
than 16.8 percent rated thermal power within 4 hours when action had not been initiated to
Condition Report CR-GGN-2020-02586.  
implement the manual BSP regions defined in the COLR in accordance with required
Performance Assessment:
Actions J.1 and K.1 after one or more required channels of the OPRM upscale function had
been inoperable for longer than 12 hours. Specifically, the unit was operated at or above
Performance Deficiency:  A radiation worker failed to follow procedures and made an
16.8 percent rated thermal power without the OPRM function being calibrated to the
improper entry into a high radiation area.  
appropriate setpoints as required by technical specifications.
Significance/Severity: Green. The performance deficiency associated with this non-cited
Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor  
violation was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the design
because it was associated with the program and process attribute of the Occupational
control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the
Radiation Safety Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the  
cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that
adequate protection of the worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from
respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage).
radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation.  Specifically, the failure
Specifically, the failure to calibrate the OPRM function to the appropriate setpoints resulted in
to follow requirements involving radiological controls had the potential to increase the
an RPS function being in an inoperable condition while operating on a mode or condition of
individuals dose. In addition, the inspectors reviewed NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612,
applicability. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) in
Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, to inform the more-than-minor determination.
                                                12
Although Example 6.g was similar, there were no current examples that appropriately fit the  
consequences of this occurrence.  The failure to follow procedural requirements and making
an improper entry into the overhead area, within the high radiation area, resulted in an
exposure of roughly 40 times the general area dose rates for which the individual was briefed.
Significance:  The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection
Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety SDP. The inspectors
determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because (1) it was not
associated with as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA) planning or work controls;
(2) there was no overexposure; (3) there was no substantial potential for an overexposure;
and (4) the ability to assess dose was not compromised.


  accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2.C, because the
   
finding did not affect a single RPS trip signal to initiate a reactor scram nor the function of
12
  other redundant trips or diverse methods of reactor shutdown.
   
Corrective Action References: Condition Report CR-GGN-2016-08765
Cross-Cutting Aspect:  H.11 - Challenge the Unknown:  Individuals stop when faced with
  Minor Violation                                                                          71153
uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding. Specifically, the  
Minor Violation: On May 11, 2018, while performing the Division 1 emergency diesel
worker failed to stop and assess the radiological conditions he may enter prior to entering the  
  generator functional test portion of Division 1 loss of power (LOP)/loss of coolant accident
overhead area in the drywell with elevated dose rates, resulting in a dose rate alarm.   
  (LOCA) surveillance testing with the plant in Mode 5, a maintenance technician inadvertently
Licensee procedures require workers to adhere to RWP requirements, which required RP
opened the incorrect fuse drawer associated with the 15AA (Division 1) safety electrical bus.
approval to enter the overhead area. This enables RP to establish area dose rates and
This action resulted in an undervoltage condition on the 15AA bus and an unplanned
controls, as overhead areas are not routinely surveyed or accessible.  
automatic start of the Division 1 emergency diesel generator. Neither the Division 1
Enforcement:
  emergency diesel generator nor the associated Division 1 standby service water subsystem
were required to be operable in this mode of operation. This issue was entered into the
Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires, in part, that procedures be written,  
licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-GGN-2018-05485.
implemented, and established for those areas recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33,
  Technical Specification 5.4.1.a requires that written procedures shall be established,
Appendix A, Revision 2, 1978. Section 7(e) of this appendix requires RP procedures. 
implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in
Procedure EN-RP-100, Radiation Worker Expectations, Revision 12, Section 5.3 [4], stated
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Section 8.b of Appendix A to
that no entry to areas above 7 feet was permitted without prior permission from RP.
Regulatory Guide 1.33 requires implementing procedures for each surveillance test listed in
   
the technical specifications. The licensee established Procedure 06-OP-1P75-R-0003,
Contrary to the above, on March 3, 2020, an individual failed to receive permission from RP
  Attachment IV, SDG 11, Functional Test - Test No. 6 - Div 1 LOP/LOCA Test,
prior to entering an area above 7 feet, resulting in an improper entry into a high radiation area
  Revision 138, to meet the Regulatory Guide 1.33 requirement. Step 5.8.15 of this procedure
and a dose rate alarm of 802 millirem per hour.  
stated to RACK OUT line PT for Bus 15AA feeder Breaker 152-1514 ESF 11 PT, in front of
Cubicle M2 of Bus 15AA.
Enforcement Action:  This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with
  Contrary to the above, on May 11, 2018, the licensee failed to rack out line potential
Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.
transformer (PT) for bus 15AA feeder breaker 152-1514 ESF 11 PT, in front of Cubicle M2 of
   
  bus 15AA. Specifically, a maintenance technician opened the fuse drawer for the bus 15AA
Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation
PT fuse instead of the line PT fuse drawer.
71153
  Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor because it
This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been
could not be reasonably viewed as a precursor to a significant event; if left uncorrected, it
entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited
would not have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern; and it did not
violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.  
adversely affect the associated cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that
Violation:  Technical Specification 3.3.1.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS)
upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power
Instrumentation, required Action L, requires that thermal power be reduced to less than
operations. Specifically, the issue was determined to be similar to Example 4.b of Inspection
16.8 percent rated thermal power within 4 hours if action has not been initiated to implement
Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E.
the manual backup stability protection (BSP) regions defined in the Core Operating Limits
Enforcement: The licensee has taken actions to restore compliance. This failure to comply
Report (COLR) in accordance with required Actions J.1 and K.1 after one or more required
  with Technical Specification 5.4 constitutes a minor violation that is not subject to
channels of the oscillation power range monitor (OPRM) upscale function has been
  enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
inoperable for longer than 12 hours.  
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
   
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.
Contrary to the above, on March 27, 2016, the licensee failed to reduce thermal power to less
      On March 5, 2020, the inspectors presented the inservice inspection results to
than 16.8 percent rated thermal power within 4 hours when action had not been initiated to
        Mr. E. Larson, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
implement the manual BSP regions defined in the COLR in accordance with required
                                                  13
Actions J.1 and K.1 after one or more required channels of the OPRM upscale function had
been inoperable for longer than 12 hours. Specifically, the unit was operated at or above
16.8 percent rated thermal power without the OPRM function being calibrated to the  
appropriate setpoints as required by technical specifications.  
   
Significance/Severity: Green.  The performance deficiency associated with this non-cited
violation was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the design
control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the  
cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that  
respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage).
Specifically, the failure to calibrate the OPRM function to the appropriate setpoints resulted in
an RPS function being in an inoperable condition while operating on a mode or condition of
applicability. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) in


  On March 5, 2020, the inspectors presented the radiation safety inspection results to
  Mr. E. Larson, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
13
  On April 7, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to
  Mr. E. Larson, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2.C, because the
                                          14
finding did not affect a single RPS trip signal to initiate a reactor scram nor the function of
other redundant trips or diverse methods of reactor shutdown.
Corrective Action References:  Condition Report CR-GGN-2016-08765
Minor Violation
71153
Minor Violation: On May 11, 2018, while performing the Division 1 emergency diesel
generator functional test portion of Division 1 loss of power (LOP)/loss of coolant accident
(LOCA) surveillance testing with the plant in Mode 5, a maintenance technician inadvertently
opened the incorrect fuse drawer associated with the 15AA (Division 1) safety electrical bus. 
This action resulted in an undervoltage condition on the 15AA bus and an unplanned
automatic start of the Division 1 emergency diesel generator.  Neither the Division 1
emergency diesel generator nor the associated Division 1 standby service water subsystem
were required to be operable in this mode of operation.  This issue was entered into the
licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-GGN-2018-05485.
Technical Specification 5.4.1.a requires that written procedures shall be established,  
implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in
Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978.  Section 8.b of Appendix A to
Regulatory Guide 1.33 requires implementing procedures for each surveillance test listed in
the technical specifications.  The licensee established Procedure 06-OP-1P75-R-0003,
Attachment IV, SDG 11, Functional Test - Test No. 6 - Div 1 LOP/LOCA Test,
Revision 138, to meet the Regulatory Guide 1.33 requirement.  Step 5.8.15 of this procedure
stated to RACK OUT line PT for Bus 15AA feeder Breaker 152-1514 ESF 11 PT, in front of
Cubicle M2 of Bus 15AA.  
Contrary to the above, on May 11, 2018, the licensee failed to rack out line potential
transformer (PT) for bus 15AA feeder breaker 152-1514 ESF 11 PT, in front of Cubicle M2 of
bus 15AA. Specifically, a maintenance technician opened the fuse drawer for the bus 15AA
PT fuse instead of the line PT fuse drawer.
Screening:  The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor because it
could not be reasonably viewed as a precursor to a significant event; if left uncorrected, it
would not have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern; and it did not
adversely affect the associated cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that
upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power
operations.  Specifically, the issue was determined to be similar to Example 4.b of Inspection
Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E.
Enforcement:  The licensee has taken actions to restore compliance.  This failure to comply
with Technical Specification 5.4 constitutes a minor violation that is not subject to
enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS
The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.  
   
On March 5, 2020, the inspectors presented the inservice inspection results to  
Mr. E. Larson, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.  


DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Inspection Type              Designation  Description or Title                                        Revision or
14
Procedure                                                                                              Date
71111.04  Corrective Action CR-GGN-      2018-06005, 2018-06546, 2018-06784, 2018-09566
          Documents
On March 5, 2020, the inspectors presented the radiation safety inspection results to
          Drawings          E-0740-005    Motor Operated Valves Wiring Diagrams                        5
Mr. E. Larson, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
                            E-1185-002    Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System RCIC Injection Shutoff 10
                                          MOV F013-A
On April 7, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to
                            KA762E421D    Process Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System        A
Mr. E. Larson, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.
                            M-1065        P&I Diagram Condensate & Refueling Water Storage &          53
                                          Transfer System Unit 1
                            M-1083A      P&I Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System - Unit 1  43
                            M-1083B      P&I Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System - Unit 1  41
                            M-1086        High Pressure Core Spray System Unit 1                      35
          Engineering      EC-GGN-      Admin Change to Update Drawing E0740-005                    0
          Changes          0000079071
          Miscellaneous                  Clearance 1C22-1 Tagout E22-006-1E22C001
                                          GGNS UFSAR Chapters 4, 5, 6
                            ES-18        Motor Operated Valve - Wiring and Limit Switch Control      4
          Procedures        04-1-01-E51-1 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System                        142
                            04-1-01-P81-1 High Pressure Core Spray Diesel Generator                    81
                            SDC-E51      Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System                        3
          Work Orders      WO            00503748, 00507876
71111.05  Corrective Action CR-GGN-      2020-02580
          Documents
          Drawings          E1809        Smoke Detector SP65N6251 RHR A 93 ft West
          Fire Plans        A-04          Fire Pre-Plan                                                2
71111.07A  Corrective Action CR-GGN-      2020-0119, 2020-0123, 2020-0124, 2020-0125, 2020-0138
          Documents
          Drawings          M-1061B      P&I Diagram Standby Service Water System Unit 1              53
          Miscellaneous    AECM-90/0007  Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Response to Generic Letter 89-13
                            CCE 2006-0002 Generic Letter 89-13 Commitment Change
          Procedures        EN-DC-316    Heat Exchanger Performance and Condition Monitoring          11
                            EN-DC-340    Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion (MIC) Monitoring      5
                                          Program
                                                      15


Inspection Type             Designation   Description or Title                                       Revision or
Procedure                                                                                              Date
15
                            EN-EP-S-039-G Testing Standard for Safety Related Heat Exchangers Cooled  2
                                          by Standby Service Water
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
          Work Orders      WO            52790008, 52791443
Inspection  
71111.08G Corrective Action  CR-GGN-       2018-00329, 2018-01546, 2018-02542, 2018-03080, 2018-
Procedure
          Documents                      03129, 2018-03984, 2018-05620, 2018-05668, 2018-06215,
Type  
                                          2019-00266, 2019-01400, 2019-02395, 2019-03087, 2019-
Designation  
                                          09428, 2019-10463, 2020-02183, 2020-02270,
Description or Title  
          Corrective Action CR-GGN-       2020-02578, 2020-02602
Revision or  
          Documents
Date  
          Resulting from
71111.04
          Inspection
Corrective Action  
          Drawings          767E977      Recirc Loop Piping                                          2
Documents  
                            FW-11-07      Feedwater WTR Loop B                                        10
CR-GGN-  
                            HL-1328J      Feedwater CTMT to Reactor Pressure Vessel - Unit 1         6
2018-06005, 2018-06546, 2018-06784, 2018-09566
                            RR-11-06      Recirc Loop A                                              10
                            RR-11-11      Recirc Loop B                                              10
Drawings 
                            RR-11-4      Recirc Loop A                                              10
E-0740-005
          Miscellaneous    SEP-ISI-GGN- Program Section for ASME Section XI, Division 1 GGNS        10
Motor Operated Valves Wiring Diagrams
                            001          Inservice Inspection Program
5
          Procedures        CEP-NDE-0404 Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic Piping Welds      8
E-1185-002
                                          (Section XI)
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System RCIC Injection Shutoff
                            CEP-NDE-0407 Straight Beam Ultrasonic Examination of Bolts and Studs    6
MOV F013-A
                                          (ASME XI)
10
                            CEP-NDE-0423 Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Austenitic Piping Welds    8
KA762E421D
                                          (ASME XI)
Process Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System
                            CEP-NDE-0903  VT-3 Examination                                            6
A
                            WDI-STD-006  Manual Ultrasonic Procedure for Examination of Nozzle Inner 10
M-1065
                                          Corner Radius Areas in Accordance with ASME Section XI,
P&I Diagram Condensate & Refueling Water Storage &
                                          Including Appendix VIII
Transfer System Unit 1
                            WDI-STD-1107  Generic Procedure for the Manual Ultrasonic Examination of 3
53
                                          Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds in Accordance with PDI-UT-6
M-1083A
71111.11Q Procedures         EN-RE-215    Reactivity Maneuver Plan                                    7
P&I Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System - Unit 1
71111.12  Miscellaneous                  CR-GGN-2017-12314 MRFF
43
                                          CR-GGN-2019-1476 MRFF Evaluation
M-1083B
                                                      16
P&I Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System - Unit 1
41
M-1086
High Pressure Core Spray System Unit 1
35
Engineering
Changes 
EC-GGN-
0000079071
Admin Change to Update Drawing E0740-005
0
Miscellaneous 
Clearance 1C22-1 Tagout E22-006-1E22C001
GGNS UFSAR Chapters 4, 5, 6
ES-18
Motor Operated Valve - Wiring and Limit Switch Control
4
Procedures 
04-1-01-E51-1  
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System
142
04-1-01-P81-1
High Pressure Core Spray Diesel Generator
81
SDC-E51
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System
3
Work Orders  
WO
00503748, 00507876
71111.05
Corrective Action
Documents 
CR-GGN-  
2020-02580
Drawings  
E1809
Smoke Detector SP65N6251 RHR A 93 ft West 
   
Fire Plans 
A-04
Fire Pre-Plan
2
71111.07A
Corrective Action
Documents  
CR-GGN-
2020-0119, 2020-0123, 2020-0124, 2020-0125, 2020-0138
Drawings 
M-1061B
P&I Diagram Standby Service Water System Unit 1
53
Miscellaneous 
AECM-90/0007
Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Response to Generic Letter 89-13
   
CCE 2006-0002
Generic Letter 89-13 Commitment Change
Procedures
EN-DC-316
Heat Exchanger Performance and Condition Monitoring
11
EN-DC-340
Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion (MIC) Monitoring
Program
5


Inspection Type             Designation   Description or Title                                       Revision or
Procedure                                                                                              Date
16
                                            CR-GGN-2019-1597 MRFF Evaluation
          Procedures        EN-DC-203      Maintenance Rule Program                                  4
Inspection  
                            EN-DC-204      Maintenance Rule Scope and Basis                          4
Procedure
                            EN-DC-205      Maintenance Rule Monitoring                                7
Type  
          Work Orders       WO             82842039-01
Designation  
71111.13  Corrective Action CR-GGN-       2020-02571, 2020-02611
Description or Title  
          Documents
Revision or  
          Procedures        01-S-18-6      Risk Assessment of Maintenance Activities                  21
Date  
                            EN-OP-119      Protected Equipment Postings                              12
EN-EP-S-039-G
71111.15  Calculations      C-EC86247-     Structural/Seismic Analysis for the LaSalle Jet Pump Plug  0
Testing Standard for Safety Related Heat Exchangers Cooled
                            N1F14E021-8.0-
by Standby Service Water
                            001
2
          Corrective Action CR-GGN-       2020-00076, 2020-00901
Work Orders
          Documents
WO  
          Engineering      EC-86427      Seismic Qualification of Jet Pump Plugs                    0
52790008, 52791443
          Changes
          Procedures        07-1-34-B13-   Jet Pump Plug Installation and Removal                    1
71111.08G Corrective Action  
                            D006-3
Documents 
          Work Orders      WO            00530093
CR-GGN-
71111.18  Engineering      EC 85565      Replace 1P81K001 Div III EDG Speedswitch (SSA-1)          0
2018-00329, 2018-01546, 2018-02542, 2018-03080, 2018-
          Changes
03129, 2018-03984, 2018-05620, 2018-05668, 2018-06215,
          Miscellaneous                   IEE-344 - 2013
2019-00266, 2019-01400, 2019-02395, 2019-03087, 2019-
                            00200225      Procurement Engineering Evaluation
09428, 2019-10463, 2020-02183, 2020-02270,
                            E100.0        Technical Specification for Environmental Safety Related  8
                                            Parameter
Corrective Action  
          Procedures       02-S-01-45    Water Inventory Control                                    0
Documents
                            EN-DC-115      Engineering Change Process                                27
Resulting from
          Work Orders      WO            00537942
Inspection 
71111.19  Procedures        06-OP-1P81-M- HPCS Diesel Generator 13 Functional Test                  136
CR-GGN-
                            0002
2020-02578, 2020-02602
          Work Orders      WO            00537942-04, 52856327-04
71111.20  Drawings          M-0002        General Arrangement Plan at EL. 113'-0", 111'-0", 119'-0", 5
Drawings 
                                            120'-10", & 114'-6", Units 1 & 2
767E977
                                                      17
Recirc Loop Piping
2
FW-11-07
Feedwater WTR Loop B
10
HL-1328J
Feedwater CTMT to Reactor Pressure Vessel - Unit 1  
6
RR-11-06
Recirc Loop A
10
RR-11-11
Recirc Loop B
10
RR-11-4
Recirc Loop A
10
Miscellaneous
SEP-ISI-GGN-
001
Program Section for ASME Section XI, Division 1 GGNS
Inservice Inspection Program
10
Procedures
CEP-NDE-0404
Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic Piping Welds
(Section XI)
8
CEP-NDE-0407
Straight Beam Ultrasonic Examination of Bolts and Studs
(ASME XI)
6
CEP-NDE-0423
Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Austenitic Piping Welds
(ASME XI)
8
CEP-NDE-0903
VT-3 Examination
6
WDI-STD-006
Manual Ultrasonic Procedure for Examination of Nozzle Inner
Corner Radius Areas in Accordance with ASME Section XI,
Including Appendix VIII
10
WDI-STD-1107
Generic Procedure for the Manual Ultrasonic Examination of
Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds in Accordance with PDI-UT-6
3
71111.11Q Procedures 
EN-RE-215
Reactivity Maneuver Plan  
7
71111.12
Miscellaneous 
CR-GGN-2017-12314 MRFF
CR-GGN-2019-1476 MRFF Evaluation


Inspection Type             Designation     Description or Title                                         Revision or
Procedure                                                                                                  Date
17
                            M-0003          General Arrangement Plan at EL. 133'-0", 148'-0", 139'-0",  6
                                              135'-4", & 147'-7"
Inspection  
                            M-0004          General Arrangement Plan at EL. 166'-0", 161'-10", & 170'-0" 7
Procedure
71111.22  Drawings          M-1082          P&I Diagram Standby Liquid Control System Unit 1            29
Type  
          Miscellaneous    Attachment 4    Suppression Pool Level Instrument 1E30-LT-N003B
Designation  
          Procedures       04-1-05-E50-1 R3 Suppression Pool Water Level Penetrations
Description or Title  
                            04-1-05-M61-2,  LLRT Alignment Instructions for Electrical Penetrations      0
Revision or  
                            Att 1
Date  
                            04-1-07-E30-1    Suppression Pool Makeup System
                            R27
CR-GGN-2019-1597 MRFF Evaluation
                            06-OP-1C41-Q-    Standby Liquid Control Functional Test                      131
                            0001
Procedures 
                            06-OP-1M61-V-   Using Graftel Model 9623-7 Leak Rate Monitor                13
EN-DC-203
                            0002, Att I
Maintenance Rule Program
                            EN-WM-105        FLEX Portable Diesel Generator 1FLEXS010                    06/21/2011
4  
                            O4-S-03-P64-20  Transformer Deluge Functional and Full Flow Test            6
EN-DC-204
          Work Orders       WO               509598-03, 52782437-01, 52842248-01, 52842631-01,
Maintenance Rule Scope and Basis
                                              52872563, 5291252-01
4
71124.01  Corrective Action CR-GGN-         2019-06666; 2019-07844; 2019-07852; 2019-07933; 2019-
EN-DC-205
          Documents                          08263; 2019-08334; 2019-08335; 2019-08336; 2019-09421;
Maintenance Rule Monitoring
                                              2019-09535; 2020-01891; 2020-02586; 2020-02676; 2020-
7  
                                              02688
Work Orders 
          Miscellaneous                      Non-Nuclear Material Inventory                              02/11/2020
WO
                            GIN-2020-00005  2020 National Source Tracking System Reconciliation for NRC 01/08/2020
82842039-01
                                              License NPF-29
                            WO 52881814      Leak Test of Sealed Sources                                  11/21/2019
71111.13
          Procedures        EN-RP-100        Radiation Worker Expectations                                12
Corrective Action
                            EN-RP-101        Access Control for Radiologically Controlled Areas          15
Documents 
                            EN-RP-102        Conduct of Radiation Protection                              5
CR-GGN-  
                            EN-RP-106        Radiological Survey Documentation                            7
2020-02571, 2020-02611
                            EN-RP-108        Radiation Protection Posting                                22
                            EN-RP-121        Radioactive Material Control                                16
Procedures
                            EN-RP-131        Air Sampling                                                17
01-S-18-6
                                                        18
Risk Assessment of Maintenance Activities
21
EN-OP-119
Protected Equipment Postings
12
71111.15
Calculations 
C-EC86247-
N1F14E021-8.0-
001
Structural/Seismic Analysis for the LaSalle Jet Pump Plug
0  
Corrective Action
Documents 
CR-GGN-  
2020-00076, 2020-00901
Engineering
Changes 
EC-86427
Seismic Qualification of Jet Pump Plugs
0
Procedures 
07-1-34-B13-
D006-3
Jet Pump Plug Installation and Removal
1
Work Orders
WO  
00530093
71111.18
Engineering
Changes 
EC 85565
Replace 1P81K001 Div III EDG Speedswitch (SSA-1)
0
Miscellaneous 
IEE-344 - 2013
00200225
Procurement Engineering Evaluation 
E100.0
Technical Specification for Environmental Safety Related
Parameter
8
Procedures 
02-S-01-45
Water Inventory Control
0
EN-DC-115
Engineering Change Process
27
Work Orders 
WO
00537942
71111.19
Procedures 
06-OP-1P81-M-
0002
HPCS Diesel Generator 13 Functional Test
136
Work Orders  
WO  
00537942-04, 52856327-04
71111.20
Drawings 
M-0002
General Arrangement Plan at EL. 113'-0", 111'-0", 119'-0",
120'-10", & 114'-6", Units 1 & 2
5


Inspection Type             Designation   Description or Title                                       Revision or
Procedure                                                                                              Date
18
                            EN-RP-143      Source Control                                            14
          Radiation Surveys Air Sampling  010520-0017, 112019-0261, 112019-0262, 120419-0333,
Inspection  
                            (GGN-AS-)      122619-0421,
Procedure
                            GGN-1912-00010 133' Turbine Building Truck Bay                            12/01/2019
Type  
                            GGN-2002-00931 139' AUX Steam Tunnel Lower Level                         02/27/2020
Designation  
                            GGN-2002-00980 114' Drywell Entire Elevation                              02/28/2020
Description or Title  
                            GGN-2002-01052 147' Drywell                                              02/29/2020
Revision or  
                            GGN-2003-00091 161' Drywell Entire Elevation                              03/01/2020
Date  
                            GGN-2003-00213 147' Drywell Post-Alarm Survey                            03/03/2020
M-0003
                            GGN-2003-00253 139' AUX Steam Tunnel Lower Level                          03/03/2020
General Arrangement Plan at EL. 133'-0", 148'-0", 139'-0",  
          Radiation Work    2020-1502      Drywell Coordinator, Safety and NRC Walkdowns / Tours in  0
135'-4", & 147'-7"
          Permits (RWPs)                  the Drywell
6
                            2020-1509      General Decon Activities and Support for the Drywell      0
M-0004
                            2020-1510      Visually Inspect/Remove/Test/Replace Snubbers in RF-22    0
General Arrangement Plan at EL. 166'-0", 161'-10", & 170'-0"
                            2020-1915      Emergent Work for Maintenance, Tours, and Inspections      0
7
                                            (Normal and Low Risk Only)
71111.22
          Self-Assessments  LO-GLO-2020-   Pre-NRC Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure        01/24/2020
Drawings 
                            00005          Controls (71124.01)
M-1082
71124.02  Corrective Action CR-GGN-       2019-03675, 2019-04131, 2019-10146, 2019-10399
P&I Diagram Standby Liquid Control System Unit 1
          Documents
29
          Miscellaneous                   RF-21 Lessons Learned                                      02/06/2020
Miscellaneous 
                            LO-GLO-2018-   Pre-NRC Inspection: Occupational ALARA Planning and        12/03/2019
Attachment 4
                            00176          Controls Assessment (IP 71124.02)
Suppression Pool Level Instrument 1E30-LT-N003B
          Procedures        EN-FAP-RP-013  Radiation Protection Outage Preparation and Execution      0
                            EN-RP-105      Radiological Work Permits                                  19
Procedures 
                            EN-RP-110      ALARA Program                                              14
04-1-05-E50-1 R3
                            EN-RP-110-03  Collective Radiation Exposure (CRE) Reduction Guidelines  4
Suppression Pool Water Level Penetrations
                            EN-RP-110-06  Outage Dose Estimating and Tracking                        1
          Radiation Work    2020-1502      Drywell Coordinator, Safety and NRC Walkdowns/Tours in the 0
04-1-05-M61-2,
          Permits (RWPs)                  Drywell
Att 1
                            2020-1509      General Decon Activities and Support for the Drywell      0
LLRT Alignment Instructions for Electrical Penetrations
                            2020-1510      Visually Inspect/Remove/Test/Replace Snubbers in RF-22    0
0
                            2020-1915      Emergent Work for Maintenance, Tours, and Inspections      0
04-1-07-E30-1
                                                      19
R27
Suppression Pool Makeup System
06-OP-1C41-Q-
0001
Standby Liquid Control Functional Test
131
06-OP-1M61-V-
0002, Att I
Using Graftel Model 9623-7 Leak Rate Monitor
13
EN-WM-105
FLEX Portable Diesel Generator 1FLEXS010
06/21/2011
O4-S-03-P64-20
Transformer Deluge Functional and Full Flow Test  
6
Work Orders 
WO
509598-03, 52782437-01, 52842248-01, 52842631-01,
52872563, 5291252-01  
71124.01  
Corrective Action  
Documents 
CR-GGN-  
2019-06666; 2019-07844; 2019-07852; 2019-07933; 2019-
08263; 2019-08334; 2019-08335; 2019-08336; 2019-09421;
2019-09535; 2020-01891; 2020-02586; 2020-02676; 2020-
02688
Miscellaneous
Non-Nuclear Material Inventory
02/11/2020  
GIN-2020-00005
2020 National Source Tracking System Reconciliation for NRC
License NPF-29
01/08/2020
WO 52881814
Leak Test of Sealed Sources
11/21/2019  
Procedures 
EN-RP-100
Radiation Worker Expectations
12
EN-RP-101
Access Control for Radiologically Controlled Areas
15
EN-RP-102
Conduct of Radiation Protection
5
EN-RP-106
Radiological Survey Documentation
7
EN-RP-108
Radiation Protection Posting
22
EN-RP-121
Radioactive Material Control
16
EN-RP-131
Air Sampling
17


Inspection Type             Designation     Description or Title                                       Revision or
Procedure                                                                                               Date
19
                                              (Normal and Low Risk Only)
71153     Corrective Action CR-GGN-         2016-08765, 2017-12299, 2017-12314, 2018-05485
Inspection  
          Documents
Procedure
          Procedures       06-IC-1C51-R-   Average Power Range Monitor Calibration Channel A         100
Type  
                            0077A
Designation  
                            06-OP-1P75-R-   SDG 11, Functional Test - Test No. 6 - Div 1 LOP/LOCA Test 138
Description or Title  
                            0003, Attachment
Revision or  
                            IV
Date
                            EN-DC-159       System and Component Monitoring                           9
EN-RP-143
                            EN-DC-205       Maintenance Rule Monitoring                               7
Source Control
                            EN-DC-310       Predictive Maintenance Program                             8
14
                            EN-DC-324       Preventive Maintenance Program                             18
Radiation Surveys  Air Sampling
                            EN-DC-335       PM Basis Template                                         8
(GGN-AS-)
                            EN-DC-346       Cable Reliability Program                                 6
010520-0017, 112019-0261, 112019-0262, 120419-0333,
                            EN-MA-138       VLF Tan Delta and Withstand Testing Of Electrical Power   4
122619-0421, 
                                              Cables
          Work Orders       WO               0033200501, 0033200601
GGN-1912-00010
                                                        20
133' Turbine Building Truck Bay
12/01/2019
GGN-2002-00931
139' AUX Steam Tunnel Lower Level
02/27/2020
GGN-2002-00980
114' Drywell Entire Elevation
02/28/2020
GGN-2002-01052
147' Drywell
02/29/2020
GGN-2003-00091
161' Drywell Entire Elevation
03/01/2020
GGN-2003-00213
147' Drywell Post-Alarm Survey
03/03/2020
GGN-2003-00253
139' AUX Steam Tunnel Lower Level
03/03/2020
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs) 
2020-1502
Drywell Coordinator, Safety and NRC Walkdowns / Tours in
the Drywell
0
2020-1509
General Decon Activities and Support for the Drywell
0
2020-1510
Visually Inspect/Remove/Test/Replace Snubbers in RF-22
0
2020-1915
Emergent Work for Maintenance, Tours, and Inspections
(Normal and Low Risk Only)
0
Self-Assessments  LO-GLO-2020-
00005
Pre-NRC Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure
Controls (71124.01)
01/24/2020
71124.02
Corrective Action
Documents 
CR-GGN-
2019-03675, 2019-04131, 2019-10146, 2019-10399
Miscellaneous 
RF-21 Lessons Learned
02/06/2020
LO-GLO-2018-
00176
Pre-NRC Inspection: Occupational ALARA Planning and
Controls Assessment (IP 71124.02)
12/03/2019
Procedures 
EN-FAP-RP-013
Radiation Protection Outage Preparation and Execution
0
EN-RP-105
Radiological Work Permits
19
EN-RP-110
ALARA Program
14
EN-RP-110-03
Collective Radiation Exposure (CRE) Reduction Guidelines
4
EN-RP-110-06
Outage Dose Estimating and Tracking
1
Radiation Work
Permits (RWPs) 
2020-1502
Drywell Coordinator, Safety and NRC Walkdowns/Tours in the
Drywell
0
2020-1509
General Decon Activities and Support for the Drywell
0
2020-1510
Visually Inspect/Remove/Test/Replace Snubbers in RF-22
0
2020-1915
Emergent Work for Maintenance, Tours, and Inspections
0
 
20
Inspection
Procedure  
Type
Designation
Description or Title
Revision or
Date  
(Normal and Low Risk Only)  
71153  
Corrective Action  
Documents 
CR-GGN-  
2016-08765, 2017-12299, 2017-12314, 2018-05485  
Procedures
06-IC-1C51-R-
0077A
Average Power Range Monitor Calibration Channel A  
100  
06-OP-1P75-R-
0003, Attachment
IV
SDG 11, Functional Test - Test No. 6 - Div 1 LOP/LOCA Test  
138  
EN-DC-159  
System and Component Monitoring  
9  
EN-DC-205  
Maintenance Rule Monitoring  
7  
EN-DC-310  
Predictive Maintenance Program  
8  
EN-DC-324  
Preventive Maintenance Program  
18  
EN-DC-335  
PM Basis Template  
8  
EN-DC-346  
Cable Reliability Program  
6  
EN-MA-138  
VLF Tan Delta and Withstand Testing Of Electrical Power  
Cables  
4
Work Orders
WO  
0033200501, 0033200601
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 14:24, 25 May 2025

Integrated Inspection Report 05000416/2020001
ML20127J013
Person / Time
Site: Grand Gulf Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 05/06/2020
From: Jason Kozal
NRC/RGN-IV/DRP/RPB-C
To: Emily Larson
Entergy Operations
References
IR 2020001
Download: ML20127J013 (23)
v • d • e


See also: IR 05000416/2020001

Text

May 6, 2020

Mr. Eric Larson

Site Vice President

Entergy Operations, Inc.

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station

P.O. Box 756

Port Gibson, MS 39150

SUBJECT:

GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION - INTEGRATED INSPECTION

REPORT 05000416/2020001

Dear Mr. Larson:

On March 31, 2020, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection

at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. On April 7, 2020, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of

this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are

documented in the enclosed report.

One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in this report. This finding

involved a violation of NRC requirements. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation

(NCV) consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

A licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is also

documented in this report. We are treating this violation as a non-cited violation (NCV)

consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

If you contest the violations or the significance of the violations documented in this inspection

report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with

the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document

Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator,

Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at Grand Gulf

Nuclear Station.

If you disagree with a cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a

response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your

disagreement, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk,

Washington, DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the

NRC Resident Inspector at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station.

E. Larson

2

This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection

and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document

Room in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public

Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

Jason W. Kozal, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch C

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket No. 05000416

License No. NPF-29

Enclosure:

As stated

cc w/ encl: Distribution via LISTSERV

Jason W.

Kozal

Digitally signed by Jason

W. Kozal

Date: 2020.05.06 16:04:18

-05'00'

ML20127J013

SUNSI Review

Non-Sensitive

Sensitive

Publicly Available

Non-Publicly Available

OFFICE SRI:DRP/C

RI:DRP/C

BC:DRS/EB1

BC:DRS/EB2

BC:DRS/OB

NAME

TSteadham

MThomas

VGaddy

NTaylor

GWerner/GEW

DATE

4/22/2020

04/23/2020

04/23/2020

04/22/2020

04/22/2020

OFFICE BC:DRS/RCB

TL:DRS/IPAT

BC:DNMS/RIB

SPE:DRP/C

BC:DRP/C

NAME

MHaire

AAgrawal ANA

GWarnick GGW

CYoung

JKozal

DATE

04/22/2020

04/27/2020

04/23/2020

04/22/2020

05/06/2020

Enclosure

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Inspection Report

Docket Number:

05000416

License Number:

NPF-29

Report Number:

05000416/2020001

Enterprise Identifier: I-2020-001-0004

Licensee:

Entergy Operations, Inc.

Facility:

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station

Location:

Port Gibson, MS

Inspection Dates:

January 1, 2020 to March 31, 2020

Inspectors:

I. Anchondo-Lopez, Reactor Inspector

D. Antonangeli, Health Physicist

M. Chambers, Physical Security Inspector

N. Greene, PhD, Senior Health Physicist

J. Melfi, Project Engineer

T. Steadham, Senior Resident Inspector

M. Thomas, Resident Inspector

C. Young, Senior Project Engineer

Approved By:

Jason W. Kozal, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch C

Division of Reactor Projects

2

SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) continued monitoring the licensees

performance by conducting an integrated inspection at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, in

accordance with the Reactor Oversight Process. The Reactor Oversight Process is the NRCs

program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors. Refer to

https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html for more information. A licensee-

identified non-cited violation is documented in report Section 71153.

List of Findings and Violations

Failure to Follow Procedures with an Improper Entry into a High Radiation Area

Cornerstone

Significance

Cross-Cutting

Aspect

Report

Section

Occupational

Radiation Safety

Green

NCV 05000416/2020001-01

Open/Closed

[H.11] -

Challenge the

Unknown

71124.01

The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed Green finding and associated non-cited violation of

Technical Specification 5.4.1 for a failure to follow procedures, which resulted in an improper

entry into a high radiation area. Specifically, on March 3, 2020, a worker received a dose rate

alarm after entering a high radiation area in an overhead section of the drywell without first

contacting radiation protection or receiving a briefing to be aware of the actual dose rates in

the area, as required by radiation protection procedures and the radiological work permit.

Additional Tracking Items

Type

Issue Number

Title

Report Section

Status

LER 05000416/2016009-01

Entry into Mode of

Applicability with the

Oscillation Power Range

Monitor Upscale Settings

Incorrectly Set

71153

Closed

LER 05000416/2018008-00

Unplanned System Actuation

(Diesel Generator) Caused

by Inadvertently Opening the

Wrong Fuse Drawer

71153

Closed

LER 05000416/2017-007-01

Engineered Safety Features

System Actuations due to

the Loss of Engineered

Safety Features

Transformer 11

71153

Closed

3

PLANT STATUS

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, began this inspection period at 95 percent reactor power.

On January 3, 2020, power was lowered to 65 percent for control rod pattern improvement. The

unit was returned to 98 percent power on January 8, 2020. On January 9, 2020, power was

lowered to 71 percent for a rod pattern improvement. The unit returned to rated thermal power

on January 10, 2020. On February 22, 2020, the unit was shut down for refueling outage 22

and remained shut down for the remainder of the inspection period.

INSPECTION SCOPES

Inspections were conducted using the appropriate portions of the inspection procedures (IPs) in

effect at the beginning of the inspection unless otherwise noted. Currently approved

IPs with their attached revision histories are located on the public website at

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/insp-manual/inspection-procedure/index.html.

Samples were declared complete when the IP requirements most appropriate to the inspection

activity were met consistent with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 2515, Light-Water Reactor

Inspection Program - Operations Phase. From January 1 - March 19, 2020, the inspectors

performed plant status activities described in IMC 2515, Appendix D, Plant Status, and

conducted routine reviews using IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution. The

inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed

personnel to assess licensee performance and compliance with Commission rules and

regulations, license conditions, site procedures, and standards.

Starting on March 20, 2020, in response to the National Emergency declared by the President

of the United States on the public health risks of the coronavirus (COVID-19), resident

inspectors were directed to begin telework and to remotely access licensee information using

available technology. During this time the resident inspectors performed periodic site visits

each week and during that time conducted plant status activities as described in IMC 2515,

Appendix D; and observed risk-significant activities when warranted. In addition, resident and

regional baseline inspections were evaluated to determine if all or a portion of the objectives

and requirements stated in the IP could be performed remotely. If the inspections could be

performed remotely, they were conducted per the applicable IP. In the cases where it was

determined the objectives and requirements could not be performed remotely, management

elected to postpone and reschedule the inspection to a later date.

REACTOR SAFETY

71111.04 - Equipment Alignment

Partial Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during partial walkdowns of the following

systems/trains:

(1)

Residual heat removal pump C while in cooldown on February 27, 2020

(2)

Residual heat removal A while in shutdown cooling on March 2, 2020

4

Complete Walkdown Sample (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1)

The inspectors evaluated system configurations during a complete walkdown of the

reactor core isolation cooling system during the Division 3 maintenance outage on

January 8, 2020.

71111.05 - Fire Protection

Fire Area Walkdown and Inspection Sample (IP Section 03.01) (6 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the fire protection program by conducting a

walkdown and performing a review to verify program compliance, equipment functionality,

material condition, and operational readiness of the following fire areas:

(1)

Emergency diesel generator building on February 27, 2020

(2)

Fire water pump house on February 28, 2020

(3)

Residual heat removal A pump room on March 4, 2020

(4)

Reactor core isolation cooling room on March 4, 2020

(5)

Division 1 standby service water pump room on March 5, 2020

(6)

Residual heat removal B pump room on March 9, 2020

71111.07A - Heat Sink Performance

Annual Review (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated readiness and performance of:

(1)

Division 3 emergency diesel generator jacket water heat exchanger A and B

inspections and cleaning, Work Orders 52791443 and 52790008, on January 7, 2020

71111.08G - Inservice Inspection Activities (BWR)

BWR Inservice Inspection Activities Sample - Nondestructive Examination and Welding

Activities (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1)

The inspectors verified that the reactor coolant system boundary, reactor vessel

internals, risk-significant piping system boundaries, and containment boundary were

appropriately monitored for degradation and that repairs and replacements were

appropriately fabricated, examined, and accepted by reviewing the following activities

from March 2-5, 2020:

03.01.a - Nondestructive Examination and Welding Activities.

1. Ultrasonic Examination

a. Weld 1B21G025W17, Feedwater System - Pipe-to-Flued Head

circumferential weld

b. Weld 1B21G026W1, Feedwater System - Pipe-to-Flued Head

circumferential weld

5

c. 1B21F028D, Feedwater System - Bolt/Stud ultrasonic inspection

d. 1B21G026W4, Feedwater System - Valve-to-Pipe circumferential weld

e. N02C-IR, Reactor Coolant System - Inlet Nozzle to Reactor Pressure

Vessel Inner Radius Weld

Problem Identification and Resolution

The inspector reviewed 18 notifications that dealt with inservice inspections issues

and found that items were entered into the corrective action program at the

appropriate level and adequately addressed.

71111.11Q - Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

Licensed Operator Performance in the Actual Plant/Main Control Room (IP Section 03.01)

(2 Samples)

(1)

The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control

room during control rod sequence exchange on January 3, 2020.

(2)

The inspectors observed and evaluated licensed operator performance in the control

room during shutdown for Refueling Outage 22 on February 22, 2020.

71111.12 - Maintenance Effectiveness

Maintenance Effectiveness (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of maintenance to ensure the following

structures, systems, and components remain capable of performing their intended function:

(1)

Reactor core isolation cooling 10-year overhaul inspection on March 6, 2020

(2)

Reactor core isolation cooling maintenance rule review on March 25, 2020

71111.13 - Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Risk Assessment and Management Sample (IP Section 03.01) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and completeness of risk assessments for the

following planned and emergent work activities to ensure configuration changes and

appropriate work controls were addressed:

(1)

Risk management for the Division 3 maintenance outage during the week of

January 6, 2020

(2)

Outage risk management during the week of March 9, 2020

(3)

Risk management while residual heat removal A in shutdown cooling on

March 6, 2020

(4)

Foreign material exclusion risk to reactor core during fuel movement on

March 5, 2020

(5)

Yellow outage risk management during recirculation pump B seal replacement and

control rod drive mechanism removal on March 15, 2020

6

71111.15 - Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Operability Determination or Functionality Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's justifications and actions associated with the

following operability determinations and functionality assessments:

(1)

Reactor pressure and turbine control valve oscillations at 87 percent reactor power on

January 24, 2019

(2)

Scram discharge volume vent and drain valves 1C11F010 and 1C11F011 after failure

to meet surveillance test procedure acceptance criteria on February 12, 2020

(3)

Seismic qualification of jet pump plugs, Engineering Change 86247, on

March 31, 2020

71111.18 - Plant Modifications

Temporary Modifications and/or Permanent Modifications (IP Section 03.01 and/or 03.02)

(2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following temporary or permanent modifications:

(1)

New procedure issuance: Procedure 02-S-01-45, "Water Inventory Control,"

Revision 0, on February 28, 2020

(2)

Engineering Change 85565 replacement of the Division 3 emergency diesel

generator speed switch following its failure on March 31, 2020

71111.19 - Post-Maintenance Testing

Post-Maintenance Test Sample (IP Section 03.01) (2 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following post maintenance test activities to verify system

operability and functionality:

(1)

Division 3 emergency diesel generator post maintenance test following an extended

maintenance outage on January 10, 2020

(2)

Division 3 emergency diesel generator speed switch and mag pickup functional post

maintenance test following replacement on January 20, 2020

71111.20 - Refueling and Other Outage Activities

Refueling/Other Outage Sample (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1)

The inspectors evaluated outage-related activities from February 22, 2020,

through March 31, 2020

71111.22 - Surveillance Testing

The inspectors evaluated the following surveillance tests:

Surveillance Tests (other) (IP Section 03.01) (3 Samples)

(1)

Fire protection system testing on March 3, 2020

7

(2)

Division 2 emergency core cooling system testing on March 26, 2020

(3)

Containment electrical penetration local leak-rate test on March 4, 2020

Inservice Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1)

Standby liquid control pump B quarterly inservice test on January 16, 2020

Containment Isolation Valve Testing (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1)

Suppression pool water level penetrations local leak-rate test on March 5, 2020

FLEX Testing (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1)

1FLEXS010 480 V battery charger emergency diesel generator annual operational

test on January 14, 2020

RADIATION SAFETY

71124.01 - Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Radiological Hazard Assessment (IP Section 03.01) (1 Sample)

(1)

The inspectors evaluated how the licensee identified the magnitude and extent of

radiation levels and the concentrations and quantities of radioactive materials and

how the licensee assessed radiological hazards.

Instructions to Workers (IP Section 03.02) (1 Sample)

(1)

The inspectors evaluated radiological protection-related instructions to plant workers.

Contamination and Radioactive Material Control (IP Section 03.03) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated licensee processes for monitoring and controlling contamination

and radioactive material.

(1)

The inspectors observed workers donning and doffing personal protection equipment

at the contaminated drywell entry/exit point.

(2)

The inspectors observed the actions of workers while performing tasks in the

contaminated areas of the drywell during the refueling outage.

(3)

The inspectors observed the radiation protection staff perform surveys of potentially

contaminated material leaving the radiologically controlled area (RCA) and workers

monitored via the personnel contamination monitors as they exited the RCA during

the refueling outage.

8

Radiological Hazards Control and Work Coverage (IP Section 03.04) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated in-plant radiological conditions during facility walkdowns and

observation of radiological work activities.

(1)

Radiation Work Permit (RWP) 2020-1502, "Drywell Coordinator, Safety and NRC

Walkdowns/Tours in the Drywell"

(2)

RWP 2020-1509, "General Decon Activities and Support for the Drywell"

(3)

RWP 2020-1510, "Visually Inspect/Remove/Test/Replace Snubbers in RF-22"

(4)

RWP 2020-1511, "General Maintenance in the Drywell During RF-22"

(5)

RWP 2020-1915, "Emergent Work for Maintenance, Tours and Inspections"

High Radiation Area and Very High Radiation Area Controls (IP Section 03.05) (5 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated licensee controls of the following High Radiation Areas and Very

High Radiation Areas:

(1)

Turbine Building Areas (87-foot level and 133-foot level)

(2)

AUX Building Areas (128-foot level, 180-foot level, 208-foot level)

(3)

Containment Areas (161-foot level, 170-foot level, 208-foot level)

(4)

Offgas Charcoal Vault Area (93-foot level)

(5)

Radwaste Building Reactor Water Cleanup Phase Separator Decay Tank Area

(118-foot level)

Radiation Worker Performance and Radiation Protection Technician Proficiency (IP

Section 03.06) (1 Sample)

(1)

The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician

performance as it pertains to radiation protection requirements.

71124.02 - Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Implementation of ALARA and Radiological Work Controls (IP Section 03.03) (4 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the licensees communication of as low as is reasonably

achievable (ALARA) and radiological work controls for the following work activities:

(1)

RWP 2020-1502, "Drywell Coordinator, Safety and NRC Walkdowns/Tours in the

Drywell"

(2)

RWP 2020-1509, "General Decon Activities and Support for the Drywell"

(3)

RWP 2020-1510, "Visually Inspect/Remove/Test/Replace Snubbers in RF-22"

(4)

RWP 2020-1915, "Emergent Work for Maintenance, Tours and Inspections"

Radiation Worker Performance (IP Section 03.04) (1 Sample)

The inspectors evaluated radiation worker and radiation protection technician performance

during:

(1)

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of ALARA techniques for work activities

during Refueling Outage 22.

9

OTHER ACTIVITIES - BASELINE

71151 - Performance Indicator Verification

The inspectors verified licensee performance indicators submittals listed below:

IE01: Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours Sample (IP Section 02.01) (1 Sample)

(1)

January 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019

BI01: Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Specific Activity Sample (IP Section 02.10) (1 Sample)

(1)

January 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019

BI02: RCS Leak Rate Sample (IP Section 02.11) (1 Sample)

(1)

January 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019

OR01: Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness Sample (IP Section 02.15) (1 Sample)

(1)

July 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019

PR01: Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual

Radiological Effluent Occurrences (RETS/ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences Sample

(IP Section 02.16) (1 Sample)

(1)

July 1, 2019 - December 31, 2019

71153 - Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Event Report (IP Section 03.02) (3 Samples)

The inspectors evaluated the following licensee event reports (LERs):

(1)

LER 05000416/2016-009-01, Entry into Mode of Applicability with the Oscillation

Power Range Monitor Upscale Settings Incorrectly Set (ADAMS Accession

No. ML17228A275). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are

documented in this report as a licensee-identified non-cited violation in the Inspection

Results.

(2)

LER 05000416/2017-007-01, Engineered Safety Features System Actuations due to

the Loss of Engineered Safety Features Transformer 11 (ADAMS Accession

No. ML18346A393). The inspectors determined that the licensee's cause evaluation

associated with the issue identified that the licensee's procedures for conducting

Tan-Delta cable testing had previously failed to include a requirement to perform

cable shielding continuity testing. This performance deficiency was identified by the

licensee as being associated with a possible missed opportunity to identify cable

degradation prior to failure (not as being the direct cause of this event). The

inspectors determined that the safety significance associated with this issue was not

more than very low safety significance (Green). The testing of cables associated with

an offsite power circuit was a nonsafety-related activity. The inspectors did not

identify a violation of NRC requirements.

10

(3)

LER 05000416/2018-008-00, Unplanned System Actuation (Diesel Generator)

Caused by Inadvertently Opening the Wrong Fuse Drawer (ADAMS Accession

No. ML18187A402). The inspection conclusions associated with this LER are

documented in this report as a minor violation in the Inspection Results.

INSPECTION RESULTS

Failure to Follow Procedures with an Improper Entry into a High Radiation Area

Cornerstone

Significance

Cross-Cutting

Aspect

Report

Section

Occupational

Radiation Safety

Green

NCV 05000416/2020001-01

Open/Closed

[H.11] -

Challenge the

Unknown

71124.01

The inspectors reviewed a self-revealed Green non-cited violation of Technical

Specification 5.4.1 for a failure to follow procedures, which resulted in an improper entry into

a high radiation area. Specifically, on March 3, 2020, a worker received a dose rate alarm

after entering a high radiation area in an overhead section of the drywell without first

contacting radiation protection or receiving a briefing to be aware of the actual dose rates in

the area, as required by radiation protection procedures and the radiological work permit.

Description: On March 3, 2020, the licensee briefed two workers for entry into the drywell to

identify some snubber components. The briefing informed the workers that they would enter

a maximum general area dose rate of 20 millirem per hour on their job travel path and work

area. However, one of the workers climbed into a normally inaccessible overhead piping

area of the drywell to identify the serial number on a snubber, causing his self-reading

dosimeter (SRD) to alarm unexpectedly. His SRD recorded a maximum dose rate of

802 millirem per hour; the dose rate alarm set-point was 300 millirem per hour. The individual

was signed onto Task 1 of radiation work permit (RWP) 2020-1510. Task 1 was a high

radiation area task, but the worker had not been briefed for entry into the specific overhead

area within the high radiation area. Once the worker identified the alarm, the individual

climbed down from the overhead area, informed his co-worker, and they both exited the RCA

to contact radiation protection (RP).

The RAD Worker Instructions section of RWP 2020-1510, Task 1, included the following

statements:

Be aware of and stay away from Hot spots/pipes

Contact RP [radiation protection] for High Radiation Area entry requirements

Contact RP prior to work in normally inaccessible area for current radiological

conditions and protective requirements

Procedure EN-RP-101, Access Control for Radiologically Controlled Areas, Revision 14,

Section 5.4, required a brief of personnel entering high radiation areas on the radiological

conditions, and access was allowed only after dose rates in the area were determined and

entry personnel were made aware of them.

Procedure EN-RP-100, Radiation Worker Expectations, Revision 12, Section 5.3 [4], stated

that No entry to areas above seven [7] feet is permitted without prior permission from

[radiation protection] RP. The overhead piping area entered was above 7 feet from the floor

level and was normally inaccessible and not typically surveyed. Also, in this procedure,

11

Section 5.3 [19] stated, in part, that to enter a high radiation area, the radiation worker must

be briefed and sign on the appropriate RWP. Section 5.4 [1] stated, in part, Compliance with

an RWP is a legal requirement. Failure to comply could result in NRC violation.

As allowed by procedure, the overhead area the worker entered had not been surveyed or

posted by RP prior to his entry, as there were no work plans for this area and it was deemed

inaccessible. After the dose rate alarm, a follow-up survey identified dose rates in the

overhead piping area, near the snubber, as approximately 3500 millirem per hour on contact

and 800 millirem per hour at 30 cm. The RP staff then posted the overhead as an area with

elevated dose rates. The licensee believes the individual utilized a nearby ladder to access

the overhead area. The ladder was not posted as Contact RP prior to working or climbing

above 7 feet or controlled, as required by licensee Procedure EN-RP-108, Radiation

Protection Posting.

Corrective Actions: The licensee assessed this issue and implemented multiple immediate

corrective actions. Some of the actions taken included:

All involved parties were interviewed and coached

The individual was restricted from the RCA and placed in the licensees performance

management process

The occurrence was placed in the Site Outage Status Report to inform all licensee

staff of the requirements to follow RWP instructions and licensee procedures

Corrective Action References: This issue was placed into the corrective action program as

Condition Report CR-GGN-2020-02586.

Performance Assessment:

Performance Deficiency: A radiation worker failed to follow procedures and made an

improper entry into a high radiation area.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was more than minor

because it was associated with the program and process attribute of the Occupational

Radiation Safety Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the

adequate protection of the worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from

radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. Specifically, the failure

to follow requirements involving radiological controls had the potential to increase the

individuals dose. In addition, the inspectors reviewed NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612,

Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, to inform the more-than-minor determination.

Although Example 6.g was similar, there were no current examples that appropriately fit the

consequences of this occurrence. The failure to follow procedural requirements and making

an improper entry into the overhead area, within the high radiation area, resulted in an

exposure of roughly 40 times the general area dose rates for which the individual was briefed.

Significance: The inspectors assessed the significance of the finding using Inspection

Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety SDP. The inspectors

determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) because (1) it was not

associated with as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA) planning or work controls;

(2) there was no overexposure; (3) there was no substantial potential for an overexposure;

and (4) the ability to assess dose was not compromised.

12

Cross-Cutting Aspect: H.11 - Challenge the Unknown: Individuals stop when faced with

uncertain conditions. Risks are evaluated and managed before proceeding. Specifically, the

worker failed to stop and assess the radiological conditions he may enter prior to entering the

overhead area in the drywell with elevated dose rates, resulting in a dose rate alarm.

Licensee procedures require workers to adhere to RWP requirements, which required RP

approval to enter the overhead area. This enables RP to establish area dose rates and

controls, as overhead areas are not routinely surveyed or accessible.

Enforcement:

Violation: Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires, in part, that procedures be written,

implemented, and established for those areas recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33,

Appendix A, Revision 2, 1978. Section 7(e) of this appendix requires RP procedures.

Procedure EN-RP-100, Radiation Worker Expectations, Revision 12, Section 5.3 [4], stated

that no entry to areas above 7 feet was permitted without prior permission from RP.

Contrary to the above, on March 3, 2020, an individual failed to receive permission from RP

prior to entering an area above 7 feet, resulting in an improper entry into a high radiation area

and a dose rate alarm of 802 millirem per hour.

Enforcement Action: This violation is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with

Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Licensee-Identified Non-Cited Violation

71153

This violation of very low safety significance was identified by the licensee and has been

entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as a non-cited

violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy.

Violation: Technical Specification 3.3.1.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Instrumentation, required Action L, requires that thermal power be reduced to less than

16.8 percent rated thermal power within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> if action has not been initiated to implement

the manual backup stability protection (BSP) regions defined in the Core Operating Limits

Report (COLR) in accordance with required Actions J.1 and K.1 after one or more required

channels of the oscillation power range monitor (OPRM) upscale function has been

inoperable for longer than 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Contrary to the above, on March 27, 2016, the licensee failed to reduce thermal power to less

than 16.8 percent rated thermal power within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> when action had not been initiated to

implement the manual BSP regions defined in the COLR in accordance with required

Actions J.1 and K.1 after one or more required channels of the OPRM upscale function had

been inoperable for longer than 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Specifically, the unit was operated at or above

16.8 percent rated thermal power without the OPRM function being calibrated to the

appropriate setpoints as required by technical specifications.

Significance/Severity: Green. The performance deficiency associated with this non-cited

violation was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the design

control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the

cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that

respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage).

Specifically, the failure to calibrate the OPRM function to the appropriate setpoints resulted in

an RPS function being in an inoperable condition while operating on a mode or condition of

applicability. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) in

13

accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2.C, because the

finding did not affect a single RPS trip signal to initiate a reactor scram nor the function of

other redundant trips or diverse methods of reactor shutdown.

Corrective Action References: Condition Report CR-GGN-2016-08765

Minor Violation

71153

Minor Violation: On May 11, 2018, while performing the Division 1 emergency diesel

generator functional test portion of Division 1 loss of power (LOP)/loss of coolant accident

(LOCA) surveillance testing with the plant in Mode 5, a maintenance technician inadvertently

opened the incorrect fuse drawer associated with the 15AA (Division 1) safety electrical bus.

This action resulted in an undervoltage condition on the 15AA bus and an unplanned

automatic start of the Division 1 emergency diesel generator. Neither the Division 1

emergency diesel generator nor the associated Division 1 standby service water subsystem

were required to be operable in this mode of operation. This issue was entered into the

licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR-GGN-2018-05485.

Technical Specification 5.4.1.a requires that written procedures shall be established,

implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in

Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Section 8.b of Appendix A to

Regulatory Guide 1.33 requires implementing procedures for each surveillance test listed in

the technical specifications. The licensee established Procedure 06-OP-1P75-R-0003,

Attachment IV, SDG 11, Functional Test - Test No. 6 - Div 1 LOP/LOCA Test,

Revision 138, to meet the Regulatory Guide 1.33 requirement. Step 5.8.15 of this procedure

stated to RACK OUT line PT for Bus 15AA feeder Breaker 152-1514 ESF 11 PT, in front of

Cubicle M2 of Bus 15AA.

Contrary to the above, on May 11, 2018, the licensee failed to rack out line potential

transformer (PT) for bus 15AA feeder breaker 152-1514 ESF 11 PT, in front of Cubicle M2 of

bus 15AA. Specifically, a maintenance technician opened the fuse drawer for the bus 15AA

PT fuse instead of the line PT fuse drawer.

Screening: The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor because it

could not be reasonably viewed as a precursor to a significant event; if left uncorrected, it

would not have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern; and it did not

adversely affect the associated cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that

upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power

operations. Specifically, the issue was determined to be similar to Example 4.b of Inspection

Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E.

Enforcement: The licensee has taken actions to restore compliance. This failure to comply

with Technical Specification 5.4 constitutes a minor violation that is not subject to

enforcement action in accordance with the NRCs Enforcement Policy.

EXIT MEETINGS AND DEBRIEFS

The inspectors verified no proprietary information was retained or documented in this report.

On March 5, 2020, the inspectors presented the inservice inspection results to

Mr. E. Larson, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

14

On March 5, 2020, the inspectors presented the radiation safety inspection results to

Mr. E. Larson, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

On April 7, 2020, the inspectors presented the integrated inspection results to

Mr. E. Larson, Site Vice President, and other members of the licensee staff.

15

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

71111.04

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-GGN-

2018-06005, 2018-06546, 2018-06784, 2018-09566

Drawings

E-0740-005

Motor Operated Valves Wiring Diagrams

5

E-1185-002

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System RCIC Injection Shutoff

MOV F013-A

10

KA762E421D

Process Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System

A

M-1065

P&I Diagram Condensate & Refueling Water Storage &

Transfer System Unit 1

53

M-1083A

P&I Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System - Unit 1

43

M-1083B

P&I Diagram Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System - Unit 1

41

M-1086

High Pressure Core Spray System Unit 1

35

Engineering

Changes

EC-GGN-

0000079071

Admin Change to Update Drawing E0740-005

0

Miscellaneous

Clearance 1C22-1 Tagout E22-006-1E22C001

GGNS UFSAR Chapters 4, 5, 6

ES-18

Motor Operated Valve - Wiring and Limit Switch Control

4

Procedures

04-1-01-E51-1

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System

142

04-1-01-P81-1

High Pressure Core Spray Diesel Generator

81

SDC-E51

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System

3

Work Orders

WO 00503748, 00507876

71111.05

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-GGN-

2020-02580

Drawings

E1809

Smoke Detector SP65N6251 RHR A 93 ft West

Fire Plans

A-04

Fire Pre-Plan

2

71111.07A

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-GGN-

2020-0119, 2020-0123, 2020-0124, 2020-0125, 2020-0138

Drawings

M-1061B

P&I Diagram Standby Service Water System Unit 1

53

Miscellaneous

AECM-90/0007

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Response to Generic Letter 89-13

CCE 2006-0002

Generic Letter 89-13 Commitment Change

Procedures

EN-DC-316

Heat Exchanger Performance and Condition Monitoring

11

EN-DC-340

Microbiologically Influenced Corrosion (MIC) Monitoring

Program

5

16

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

EN-EP-S-039-G

Testing Standard for Safety Related Heat Exchangers Cooled

by Standby Service Water

2

Work Orders

WO 52790008, 52791443

71111.08G Corrective Action

Documents

CR-GGN-

2018-00329, 2018-01546, 2018-02542, 2018-03080, 2018-

03129, 2018-03984, 2018-05620, 2018-05668, 2018-06215,

2019-00266, 2019-01400, 2019-02395, 2019-03087, 2019-

09428, 2019-10463, 2020-02183, 2020-02270,

Corrective Action

Documents

Resulting from

Inspection

CR-GGN-

2020-02578, 2020-02602

Drawings

767E977

Recirc Loop Piping

2

FW-11-07

Feedwater WTR Loop B

10

HL-1328J

Feedwater CTMT to Reactor Pressure Vessel - Unit 1

6

RR-11-06

Recirc Loop A

10

RR-11-11

Recirc Loop B

10

RR-11-4

Recirc Loop A

10

Miscellaneous

SEP-ISI-GGN-

001

Program Section for ASME Section XI, Division 1 GGNS

Inservice Inspection Program

10

Procedures

CEP-NDE-0404

Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Ferritic Piping Welds

(Section XI)

8

CEP-NDE-0407

Straight Beam Ultrasonic Examination of Bolts and Studs

(ASME XI)

6

CEP-NDE-0423

Manual Ultrasonic Examination of Austenitic Piping Welds

(ASME XI)

8

CEP-NDE-0903

VT-3 Examination

6

WDI-STD-006

Manual Ultrasonic Procedure for Examination of Nozzle Inner

Corner Radius Areas in Accordance with ASME Section XI,

Including Appendix VIII

10

WDI-STD-1107

Generic Procedure for the Manual Ultrasonic Examination of

Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds in Accordance with PDI-UT-6

3

71111.11Q Procedures

EN-RE-215

Reactivity Maneuver Plan

7

71111.12

Miscellaneous

CR-GGN-2017-12314 MRFF

CR-GGN-2019-1476 MRFF Evaluation

17

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

CR-GGN-2019-1597 MRFF Evaluation

Procedures

EN-DC-203

Maintenance Rule Program

4

EN-DC-204

Maintenance Rule Scope and Basis

4

EN-DC-205

Maintenance Rule Monitoring

7

Work Orders

WO 82842039-01

71111.13

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-GGN-

2020-02571, 2020-02611

Procedures

01-S-18-6

Risk Assessment of Maintenance Activities

21

EN-OP-119

Protected Equipment Postings

12

71111.15

Calculations

C-EC86247-

N1F14E021-8.0-

001

Structural/Seismic Analysis for the LaSalle Jet Pump Plug

0

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-GGN-

2020-00076, 2020-00901

Engineering

Changes

EC-86427

Seismic Qualification of Jet Pump Plugs

0

Procedures

07-1-34-B13-

D006-3

Jet Pump Plug Installation and Removal

1

Work Orders

WO 00530093

71111.18

Engineering

Changes

EC 85565

Replace 1P81K001 Div III EDG Speedswitch (SSA-1)

0

Miscellaneous

IEE-344 - 2013

00200225

Procurement Engineering Evaluation

E100.0

Technical Specification for Environmental Safety Related

Parameter

8

Procedures

02-S-01-45

Water Inventory Control

0

EN-DC-115

Engineering Change Process

27

Work Orders

WO 00537942

71111.19

Procedures

06-OP-1P81-M-

0002

HPCS Diesel Generator 13 Functional Test

136

Work Orders

WO 00537942-04, 52856327-04

71111.20

Drawings

M-0002

General Arrangement Plan at EL. 113'-0", 111'-0", 119'-0",

120'-10", & 114'-6", Units 1 & 2

5

18

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

M-0003

General Arrangement Plan at EL. 133'-0", 148'-0", 139'-0",

135'-4", & 147'-7"

6

M-0004

General Arrangement Plan at EL. 166'-0", 161'-10", & 170'-0"

7

71111.22

Drawings

M-1082

P&I Diagram Standby Liquid Control System Unit 1

29

Miscellaneous

Attachment 4

Suppression Pool Level Instrument 1E30-LT-N003B

Procedures

04-1-05-E50-1 R3

Suppression Pool Water Level Penetrations

04-1-05-M61-2,

Att 1

LLRT Alignment Instructions for Electrical Penetrations

0

04-1-07-E30-1

R27

Suppression Pool Makeup System

06-OP-1C41-Q-

0001

Standby Liquid Control Functional Test

131

06-OP-1M61-V-

0002, Att I

Using Graftel Model 9623-7 Leak Rate Monitor

13

EN-WM-105

FLEX Portable Diesel Generator 1FLEXS010

06/21/2011

O4-S-03-P64-20

Transformer Deluge Functional and Full Flow Test

6

Work Orders

WO 509598-03, 52782437-01, 52842248-01, 52842631-01,

52872563, 5291252-01

71124.01

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-GGN-

2019-06666; 2019-07844; 2019-07852; 2019-07933; 2019-

08263; 2019-08334; 2019-08335; 2019-08336; 2019-09421;

2019-09535; 2020-01891; 2020-02586; 2020-02676; 2020-

02688

Miscellaneous

Non-Nuclear Material Inventory

02/11/2020

GIN-2020-00005

2020 National Source Tracking System Reconciliation for NRC

License NPF-29

01/08/2020

WO 52881814

Leak Test of Sealed Sources

11/21/2019

Procedures

EN-RP-100

Radiation Worker Expectations

12

EN-RP-101

Access Control for Radiologically Controlled Areas

15

EN-RP-102

Conduct of Radiation Protection

5

EN-RP-106

Radiological Survey Documentation

7

EN-RP-108

Radiation Protection Posting

22

EN-RP-121

Radioactive Material Control

16

EN-RP-131

Air Sampling

17

19

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

EN-RP-143

Source Control

14

Radiation Surveys Air Sampling

(GGN-AS-)

010520-0017, 112019-0261, 112019-0262, 120419-0333,

122619-0421,

GGN-1912-00010

133' Turbine Building Truck Bay

12/01/2019

GGN-2002-00931

139' AUX Steam Tunnel Lower Level

02/27/2020

GGN-2002-00980

114' Drywell Entire Elevation

02/28/2020

GGN-2002-01052

147' Drywell

02/29/2020

GGN-2003-00091

161' Drywell Entire Elevation

03/01/2020

GGN-2003-00213

147' Drywell Post-Alarm Survey

03/03/2020

GGN-2003-00253

139' AUX Steam Tunnel Lower Level

03/03/2020

Radiation Work

Permits (RWPs)

2020-1502

Drywell Coordinator, Safety and NRC Walkdowns / Tours in

the Drywell

0

2020-1509

General Decon Activities and Support for the Drywell

0

2020-1510

Visually Inspect/Remove/Test/Replace Snubbers in RF-22

0

2020-1915

Emergent Work for Maintenance, Tours, and Inspections

(Normal and Low Risk Only)

0

Self-Assessments LO-GLO-2020-

00005

Pre-NRC Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure

Controls (71124.01)

01/24/2020

71124.02

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-GGN-

2019-03675, 2019-04131, 2019-10146, 2019-10399

Miscellaneous

RF-21 Lessons Learned

02/06/2020

LO-GLO-2018-

00176

Pre-NRC Inspection: Occupational ALARA Planning and

Controls Assessment (IP 71124.02)

12/03/2019

Procedures

EN-FAP-RP-013

Radiation Protection Outage Preparation and Execution

0

EN-RP-105

Radiological Work Permits

19

EN-RP-110

ALARA Program

14

EN-RP-110-03

Collective Radiation Exposure (CRE) Reduction Guidelines

4

EN-RP-110-06

Outage Dose Estimating and Tracking

1

Radiation Work

Permits (RWPs)

2020-1502

Drywell Coordinator, Safety and NRC Walkdowns/Tours in the

Drywell

0

2020-1509

General Decon Activities and Support for the Drywell

0

2020-1510

Visually Inspect/Remove/Test/Replace Snubbers in RF-22

0

2020-1915

Emergent Work for Maintenance, Tours, and Inspections

0

20

Inspection

Procedure

Type

Designation

Description or Title

Revision or

Date

(Normal and Low Risk Only)

71153

Corrective Action

Documents

CR-GGN-

2016-08765, 2017-12299, 2017-12314, 2018-05485

Procedures

06-IC-1C51-R-

0077A

Average Power Range Monitor Calibration Channel A

100

06-OP-1P75-R-

0003, Attachment

IV

SDG 11, Functional Test - Test No. 6 - Div 1 LOP/LOCA Test

138

EN-DC-159

System and Component Monitoring

9

EN-DC-205

Maintenance Rule Monitoring

7

EN-DC-310

Predictive Maintenance Program

8

EN-DC-324

Preventive Maintenance Program

18

EN-DC-335

PM Basis Template

8

EN-DC-346

Cable Reliability Program

6

EN-MA-138

VLF Tan Delta and Withstand Testing Of Electrical Power

Cables

4

Work Orders

WO 0033200501, 0033200601

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