ML20140C699

Insp Rept 50-309/97-03 on 970316-0426.Violations Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Aspects of Licensee Operations, Engineering,Maintenance & Plant Support

ML20140C699
Person / Time
Site:	Maine Yankee
Issue date:	06/05/1997
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20140C683	List: ML20140C679 ML20140C691 ML20140C699
References
50-309-97-03, 50-309-97-3, NUDOCS 9706100030
Download: ML20140C699 (26)

See also: IR 05000309/1997003

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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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REGION I

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Docket No:

50-309

License No:

DPR-36

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Report No:

50-309/97-03

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Licensee:

Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (MYAPC)

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Facility:

Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station

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Location:

Bailey Point

Wiscasset, Maine

Dates:

March 16, through April 26,1997

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Inspectors:

Jimi Yerokun, Senior Resident !nspector

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Division of Reactor Projects

Richard Rasmussen, Resident inspector

Division of Reactor Projects

Randolph Ragland, Radiation Specialist

Division of Reactor Safety

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Approved by:

Curtis J. Cowgill, Ill, Chief, Projects Branch No. 5

Division of Reactor Projects

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9706100030 970605

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ADOCK 05000309

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company

NRC Inspection Report 50-309/97-03

This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, engineering,

maintenance, and plant support. The report covers a six week period of resident

inspection; in addition, it includes the results of an announced inspection by a regional

inspector in the area of radiation protection,

Ooerstions

Plant personnel responded appropriately when it was determined that some safety-related

valves had not been tested as required by in-Service Test Program. Operability

determinations were timely and well documented and provided an adequate basis for

returning the residual heat removal (RHR) system to an operable condition. When an RHR

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suction valve failed to open during this testing, operators were cautiously monitoring core

temperatures, and were prepared to open the valve manually, if necessary. (Section 01.2)

During the RHR suction valve testing, an inadequate cross-disciplinary review and lack of

understanding of the impact of other ongoing surveillance activities, was considered an

example of inadequate control of activities resulting in a configuration control problem. A

prior example was documented in NRC inspection report 50-309/97-01, which involved a

1300 gallon spill of RWST water due to operations not understanding the effects of

ongoing pump work on the pressure boundary. (Section 01.2)

Operators generally maintained good safety focus and properly operated the systems

needed to maintain the plant in a safe, shutdown condition. The " protected train" program

clearly identified components of concern and restricted access into these areas, providing

an additional level of control for this equipment. (Section 02.1)

Instances of weak operator performance continued to occur as demonstrated during the

baseline testing of a containment spray (CS) pump and during residual heat removal (RHR)

suction valve testing. As a result of inattention to detail, an operator started a low

pressure safety injection pump in lieu of a CS pump. Contributing to this event was

weakness in the control room command cnd control function and poor on-shift

communications. The Shift Operating Supervisor did not take the appropriate immediate

action to deal with the operator error, which would have been termination of the test, and

the Plant Shift Superintendent was not notified of the error in a timely manner. (Section

04.1)

Progress was made in implementing the Learning Process; however, continued focus to

fully implement the process was noted as necessary. Approximately three months after

initiation, a back log had developed and the majority of learning bank issues with the

highest risk levels (one and two), had not been formally accepted by issue managers.

(Section 07)

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Maintenance

As the focus shifted to a refueling outage, the volume of maintenance work increased.

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Work was appropriately controlled in the field and performed in accordance with approved

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procedures. (Section M1)

Enaineerina

Good efforts were ongoing to address the problems with fire barrier penetration seals.

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Initiallicensee engineering inspection results indicated that about 90% of the

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approximately 2,600 penetrations inspected required replacement or repair. Some of the

discrepancies included: inadequate seal thickness; improper damming; defective seals (bad

structure, gaps or voids); inadequate material (cerafiber only); and presence of foreign

materials. (Section E8.3)

Plant Sucoort

in the area of plant support, we found that Maine Yankee continued to maintain adequate

programs in the areas of occupational radiation exposure. ALARA planning and health

physics oversight of steam generator work activities were excellent, and contamination

control initiatives were very good. Notwithstanding, the restricted area tool control

program was not fully developed; some contamination monitoring practices were found to

be inconsistent. The newly implemented learning process had distinct advantages over the

formerly used radiological incident reporting system, although some difficulties with

administrative use of the learning bank were encountered and a backlog appeared to be -

developing relative to high priority issues that remained to be assigned to an issue

manager. Finally, although learning bank corrective action tasks were generally sufficient

to prevent recurrence, an example was identified where the corrective action addressed the

symptom and not the listed apparent cause. (Section R1)

In the security area, activities continued to be conducted well as evidenced by the good

performance of two security officers on April 15,1997, when they diligently performed

their task and identified contraband during a vehicle search and thus prevented the item

from being brought into the protected area. (Section S4.1)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS -

TABLE O F CO NT ENT S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

l . O pe r a tio n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

O1

Conduct of Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

02

Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

04

Operator Knowledge and Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .-. 3

07'

Quality Assurance in Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

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Miscellaneous Operations issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

ll. Maintenance...................................................

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M1

Conduct of Maintenance

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Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

111. Engineering

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Miscellaneous Engineering issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

I V. Pl a nt Su p p o rt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

R1

Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

R2

Status of RP&C Facilities and Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

R5

Staff Training and Qualification in RP&C . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

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RP&C Organization and Administration

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Quality Assurance in RP&C Activities

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Miscellaneous RP&C lssues

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Security and Safeguards Staff Knowledge and Performance

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V. Management Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19.

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Exit Meeting Summ ary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

X2.

April 3,1997, Public Meeting . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21-

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

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Report Details

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Summarv of Plant Status

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Maine Yankee remained in the cold shutdown condition and officiaily entered a refueling

outage during this period. The spent fuel pool re-rack project was the critical path for the

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outage. Maine Yankee plans a full core off-load in conjunction with the replacement of the

leaking fuel assemblies and similar, susceptible assemblies.

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l. Operations

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Conduct of Operations

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01.1

General Comments (71707)

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Using Inspection procedure 71707, the inspectors conducted reviews of ongoing plant

operations. Operations maintained good fccus on and control of the systems required for

chutdown cooling. They provided good support for ongoing outage activities, such as the

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spent fuel pool re-racking and the eddy current testing of the steam generators.

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01.2 Residual Heat Removal System Declared inoperable

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a.

Insoection Scope

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On April 11,1997, engineering personnel notified operations personnel of

deficiencies in the in-service test program (IST) that resulted in the technical

specification required boration flowpath and both trains of residual heat removal

(RHR) being declared inoperable. The inspector reviewed the testing and

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verifications performed prior to declaring the boration flowpath and RHR operable.

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b.

Observations and Findinas

Prior to the review of the IST issues on April 11,1997, RHR was in service and

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both trains were considered operable. The IST program review was being

performed as outlined in Appendix G of the Maine Yankee Restart Readiness Plan.

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identified deficiencies ranged from tests that were performed, but were not

adequately documented, to tests that were never performed, in total, thirty

deficiencies were identified that affected boration, RHR or RHR support systems.

Operations utilized the learning bank process and operability determinations to

address the various concerns. The operability determinations documented the

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resolutions to each of the specific problems. For some manually operated valves,

the IST test requirement was that the valve had operated properly within a specified

period of time. Several valves were declared operable based on records of having

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been operated due to normal plant procedures. However, some corrective actions

included developing and implementing new test procedures to test the valves.

Other deficiencies such as relief valves that required testing were able to be

compensated for in the shutdown condition by administratively tagging open vent

paths to provide alternate over pressure protection.

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Maine Yankee worked this issue as urgent on a 24-hour-per-day basis until

operability of the boration flowpath and one RHR train was restored. The second

train of RHR was not restored because it was scheduled to be taken out of service

for outage work and only one train was required for the current plant condition.

Maine Yankee experienced one problem while performing a test of the RHR suction

valves. Procedure 3.1.20.4, IST Valve Testing at Cold Shutdown, was revised to

incorporate the cycling of the RHR motor-operated suction valves, RH-M-1 and RH-

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M-2. The procedure required all RHR to be secured and the suction valves cycled.

During the cycling of the first valve, RH-M-2, the valve shut and failed to reopen.

The operators quickly determined that the failure was due to an open slide link

configured to support other ongoing instrumentation and control (l&C) work. The

valve was reopened within approximately 35 minutes. During the time RHR was

secured, operators were appropriately monitoring core temperatures and an operator

was stationed ready to manually open the suction valve if required.

The issue of RH-M-2 failing to open was entered into the learning process as a risk

level 2 issue, indicating that a root cause evaluation was required. The apparent

causes, initially identified by operations, inc!uded: an inadequate cross-disciplinary

review of the procedure change; and, inadequate understanding by operators of the

effects of other ongoing l&C surveillance activities.

c.

po glusions

Maine Yankee responded appropriately to the determination that key valves had not

been tested as required by IST. Operability determinations were well documented

and provided an adequate basis for returning the system to operable. The response

to the failure of the RHR suction valve to open was appropriate. Operators were

prepared to open the valve manually and were cautiously monitoring core

temperatures.

However, this is another example of challenges to the operators caused by a Icck of

knowledge of configuration control during the outage. The inadequate cross-

disciplinary review and lack of understanding of the effects of ongoing surveillance

activities indicate a lack of focus in the area of procedure development and work

coordination. A prior example was documented in NRC inspection report 50-

309/97-01, which involved a 1300 gallon spill of RWST water due to operations not

understanding the effects of ongoing pump work on the pressure boundary.

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Operational Status of Facilities and Equipment

02.1

Service Water and Primary Comoonent Coolina Water Systems

a.

Insoection Scope (71707)

The inspectors conducted walkdowns of portions of the service water (SW) and

primary component cooling (PCC) water systems to ascertain that the systems were

maintained operable for the plant condition.

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b.

Observations and Findinas

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With the plant in cold shutdown and preparing for refueling, the inspectors focused

on core and spent fuel pool cooling systems. The core was stillloaded, with RHR,

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train A, maintaining core cooling. The heat sink for RHR, train A is the primary

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component cooling water system via the RHR heat exchangers. The spent fuel pool

is cooled by PCC via the spent fuel pool heat exchangers. The PCC is cooled by

SW, the ultimate heat-sink via the PCC heat exchangers.

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The inspector observed the material conditions in areas of the PCC pumps and heat

exchangers in the turbine building, the RHR pump and heat exchanger in the

containment spray (CS) building, and the service water pump house. There were no

significant discrepancies observed. The pumps, heat exchangers, valves and other

components were maintained well and showed no deficient conditions. The -

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systems were operating well and within the expected flow and temperature

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conditions. Control room switches and indications were as expected.

As a method for ensuring outage work did not impact the equipment required for

maintaining the plant in a safe condition, operations developed and implemented the

" protected train" concept. -This required compononts of the protected train to be -

roped off and labeled with a warning sign. Access to the affected areas was

restricted and controlled by the plant shift supervisor (PSS). Personnel were

permitted into the area (s) only after discussing their tasks with, and being briefed by

the PSS. Exceptions included personnel such as operators, security and fire

watches, who make frequent tours and observations in these areas.

c.

Conclusion

Operators generally maintained good safety focus and properly operated systems

required to maintain the plant in a safe, shutdown condition. The " protected train"

program clearly identified components of concern, and as implemented, restricted

access to the areas containing these components providing an additional level of

control for the equipment.

04

Operator Knowledge and Performance

04.1 Containment Sorav (CS) Pumos Baseline Test

a.

Inspection Scool

The inspector observed and reviewed portions of tests of the containment spray

pumps conducted in accordance with surveillance test procedure 3-1-15-3,

emergency core cooling system (ECCS) Operational Pump Flow and Check Valve

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Testing.

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b.

Observations and Findinas

On April 9,1997, the inspector observed testing of CS pump, P-61 A. The test was

conducted to gather pump operating data as baseline information prior to the

proposed modification of the CS pumps. Pumps P-61B and P-61S were also

scheduled to be tested. The test involved operating the pump at various flow rates

and obtaining operating parameters (vibration, flow, and pressure). A temporary

procedure change (TPC 97-154) was incorporated into the test procedure to

accommodate the testing conditions.

The inspector reviewed the test instructions, observed testing activities and

discussed the test with the licensee. The test procedure and TPC were current and

had been properly approved. There was background information provided with the

TPC discussing the reason for the test. The pre-test brief in the control room was

detailed and well conducted. Test conduct, controls and expectations were clearly

discussed. Duties were clearly delineated. At the test locations, test instruments

were located well and properly calibrated. Test personnel were stationed at each

instrument location.

At the start of the test, the inspector observed that low pressure safety injection-

(LPSI) Pump, P-12A, started and stopped almost immediately. Subsequently, the

CS pump started and testing continued. After the test, when the inspector asked

the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) about the LPSI pump start, he was unaware -

that it had happened. Subsequently, he was informed by the reactor operator who

had made the error. He indicated that he had erroneously started the LPSI pump

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instead of the CS pump and upon realizing his error had immediately stopped the

LPSI pump and then started the CS pump. The controls for both pumps are located

on the ECCS portion of the control board in close proximity.

The inspector expressed concern regarding several aspects of the evolution. First,

the operator had continued with the conduct of the test after starting the wrong

ECCS pump. Also, the Shift Operating Supervisor (SOS) who had direct supervision

of the operator had not directed that the test be terminated. The PSS was not

made aware of the error in a timely fashion.

This issue was entered into the learning bank, Maine Yankee's corrective action

process. The SOS and operator involved were counseled and removed from shift

pending completion of the investigation of the event. Operations management

initiated additional immediate corrective actions that included re-emphasizing the

responsibilities and authorities of the SOS as delineated in procedure 1-26-4,

Responsibilities and Authorities of Operating Personnel, to operators. The LPSI

pump was inspected to verify that the inadvertent start and stop had no detrimental

effect. The licensee also verified that there was no effect on any other related

components.

The inspectors assessed the safety consequence of this error and determined that it

was minimal. The pump operation was for a short period of time and caused no

detrimental effect on the pump. There was no effect on core cooling since the train

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maintaining core cooling was unaffected. Nevertheless, the event was indicative of

a lack of attention to detail on the part of the operators, in, addition, operators

failed to properly execute their responsibilities as expected. Specifically, plant

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procedure 1-26-4, Responsibilities and Authorities of Operating Personnel, revision

9, Section 3.2.3, required the SOS to ensure that his personnel stop evolutions

when unexpected conditions arise. Section 3.3.3 of the same procedure required

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the Control Room Operator to stop an evolution when unexpected conditions arise.

the inspectors considered that operators failing to properly execute the

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responsibilities of their position as required by procedure 1-26-4 a violation of

Technical Specification (TS) 5.8.2. TS 5.8.2 required that written procedures shall

be established, implemented and maintained covering the activities referenced in

Appendix "A" of Regulatory Guide 1.33, (Rev. 2), February 1978, which include

administrative procedures for authorities and responsibilities for safe operation and

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shutdown. (VIO 50-309/97-03-01)

c.

Conclusion

The inspector concluded that this incident was indicative of weakness in operator

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performance due to inattention to detail. There was also weakness in control room

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command and control, and shift communications. The SOS did not take the

appropriate immediate action to deal with the issue, which would have been test

termination, and the PSS was not notified of the error in a timely manner.

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Quality Assurance in Operations

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a.

Inspection Scope (40500)

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The inspectors performed a review to evaluate the effectiveness of the station

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problem identification / resolution program (learning process) for correcting

deficiencies. Information was gathered by a review of lists of learning bank issues,

various learning bank reports, and through discussions with cognizant personnel.

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b.

Observations and Findinas

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The inspectors reviewed a report generated from the learning bank entitled,

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" Learning Bank Acceptance Report." This report listed the learning bank issue (s),

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discovery date, data entry date, general status, issue manager by name, and

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whether the issue had been formally accepted by the issue manager. Learning bank

issues were assigned risk levels from one to four. Risk level one issues were

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considered urgent with an extremely high risk. These required a formal root cause

and normally involved a multi-disciplined team to evaluate the issue. Risk level four

issues were considered to have a low risk to the company. The inspectors noted

that as of April 2,1997,42 risk level one issues had been entered into the learning

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bank; however, only 20 had been accepted by an issue manager. Similarly,74 risk

level two issues had been entered into the learning bank and only 21 had been

accepted by an issue manager. The inspectors raised a concern to a learning

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process team member that the report indicated that the majority of urgent and very

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urgent issues had not yet been accepted by issue managers. The learning bank

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team member stated that many of the issues that had not been formally

(administratively) accepted were associated with cable separation issues, and were

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actually being handled by management teams that were in place to address cable

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separation issues. The learning process team member also stated that although

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issues were being entered into the syster, at a higher rate than originally

anticipated, immediato actions were taken for such issues. Further, it was indicated

that management was aware of this concern and was considering additional

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actions.

c.

Conclusions

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The inspectors concluded that management attention and focus on the Learning

Bank continues to be warranted. Approximately three months after initiation of the

learning bank (problem identification / resolution system), a backlog had developed

and the majority of learning bank issues with the highest risk levels (one and two),

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had not been formally accepted for evaluation and resolution by issue managers.

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Miscellaneous Operations lasues

I.n.soection Scope (92901)-

The inspectors reviewed previously identified issues including Licensee Event

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Reports (LER), Inspector followup items, and unresolved items to determine if they

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could be closed.- The review included a review of documentation, and activities to

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ascertain that the issues had been properly addressed and that the appropriate

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regulatory action is taken as required. The following previously identified issues

were reviewed:

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08.1 Qosed. Licensee Event Reoort 96-001. Emeroency Core Coolina Pumos Declared

lnocerable Due to a Reduction of Ventilation Flow

On January 10,1996 Maine Yankee declared both trains of the LPSI and CS

systems inoperable due to less than design room ventilation flow rates. The

inadequate ventilation flow was caused by a partial blockage of the suction flow

path for the CS building HVAC unit, HV-7.

This issue was addressed in various NRC inspection reports and included in NRC

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Inspection Report 50-306/96-16 as an apparent violation of NRC requirements. The

inspectors reviewed the LER and verified that the information provided was

accurate. This item is closed.

08.2 Closed. IFl 50-309/96-02-01. Containment Sorav Buildina Heatina Unit HV-7

in NRC Inspection Report 50-309/96-02, the inspectors expressed a concern

regarding conduct of maintenance on a non-safety related component causing both

trains of LPSI and CS to be declared inoperable. The problem was that a blockage

of the inlet plenum of CS building heating unit, HV-7, caused fans FN-44A and 44B

to be inoperable. The insufficient ventilation to the CS building resulting from the

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inoperability of these fans caused both trains of LPSI and CS pumps to be

inoperable. HV-7 is a non-safety related component while fans, FN-44A and 44B,

and the LPSI and CS pumps are safety related. This issue was identified as an

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inspector follow-up item pending completion of further review to determine the

regulatory significance. In NRC Inspection Report 50-309/96-16, this issue was

dispositioned as an apparent violation of regulatory requirements. This item is

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closed.

11. Maintenance

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Conduct of Maintenance

M 1.1 General Comments

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During the period, the volume of maintenance work greatly increased as Maine

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Yankee shifted focus to the refueling outage. The outage management presence

was increased with the adoption of daily outage meetings. The inspectors

monitored the daily shutdown safety ascessment and found no work activities

compromising this assessment. Work observed in the field was appropriately

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controlled and performed in accordance with approved procedures. The following

maintenance and surveillance items were specifically observed. No discrepancies

were observed.

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- WO 97-00629

Periodic maintenance of check valve SCC-7

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- WO 96-00064

Repair of valve CS-72

- WO 97-00787

Replacement of the spent fuel pool purification pump motor

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- WO 96-3140

Periodic maintenance of 6.9 kv breakers

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- 3-1 -2

ECCS Routine Testing of Service Water Pumps

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M8

Miscellaneous Maintenance issues (92902)

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M8.1 Closed, URI 50-309/96-06-01, and URI 50-309/96-13-02, Auxiliarv Feedwater

(AFW) Pumo

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in NRC Inspection Report 50-309/96-06, the inspectors identified a concern with

maintenance activity on the AFW pump oil cooler. Specificaily, there appeared to

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be a weakness in the repair effort of the oil cooler on June 12,1996. Following

that repair, the oil cooler failed again on June 16. In general, the inspectors were

concerned with the licensee's efforts to maintain the reliability of the AFW pump

since a review of the pump's availability records revealed that numerous corrective

maintenance activities had occurred. The issue was left unresolved pending a

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review of licensee actions to ensure pump operability.

Also, in NRC Inspection Report 50-309/96-13, the inspectors identified an apparent

inadequacy during maintenance on the AFW pump. The maintenance was to

enhance the pump's operation because of the pump's relatively poor past operating

history causing it's reliability to be declining over the past several years.

Subsequent post-maintenance testing revealed some inadequacy with the pump

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packing rings testing. In addition, the inspector noted apparent inadequate test

control and inattentiveness by a technician who adjusted the steam admission valve

controller contrary to test requirements. This item was left unresolved pending

completion of licensee action and further NRC staff review.

In NRC Inspection Report 50-309/96 16, inadequate maintenance for the AFW

pump was identified as an apparent violation of regulatory requirements. The

licensee's corrective actions and activities to ensure the improved reliability of this

pump will be reviewed and addressed as part of the NRC's review and followup of

the response to the violation.

Ill. Enaineerina

E8

Miscellaneous Engineering issues

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E8.1

Closed. URI 50-309/96-11-02, HPSI Cut Wire, Event Review Board - Root Cause

Analvsis

in late August,1996, Maine Yankee convened an Event Review Board to

investigate the circumstances surrounding the severed wire found in the control

circuitry of high pressure safety injection (HPSI) pump, P-14A on August 17,1996.

In NRC Inspection Report 50-309/9611, this item was left unresolved pending the

NRC's review of the results of the board's investigation.

In NRC Inspection Report 50-309/96-16, the HPSI severed wire issue was identified

as an apparent violation of regulatory requirements. The licensee's corrective

actions, including the root cause determination will be reviewed as part of that

violation.

E8.2 Closed, URI 50-309/96-16-04. HPSI Flow Testina and Throttle Valve Settinas

In NRC Inspection Report 50-309/96-16, the inspectors identified a concern with

the testing of the HPSI pumps at high flow conditions and the setting of the HPSI

system throttle valves. During previous pump test at full flow, it appeared that the

pumps could have been operating at close to runout conditions. In addition, the

setting of the position of the throttle valves needed a more precise tolerance to

ensure that required flow is met and pump runout conditions are not exceeded.

This issue was left unresolved pending review of further licensee testing of the HPSI

pumps and resetting of the throttle valves.

In response to this concern, Maine Yankee performed testing of the HPSI system to

verify adequate net positive suction head for all required modes of pump operation.

The test was witnessed and reviewed by the inspectors as documented in NRC

Inspection Report 50-309/96-14 (section E1.1). The issue was identified as an

unresolved item (50-309/96-14-02) pending completion of detailed review of the

test results by the NRC. This issue will be tracked via item 50-309/96-14-02, and

this item, URI 50-309/96-16-04, is closed.

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E8.3 Open,URi 50-309/96-08-05, Fire Protection Barrier Seals

a.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's activities involving the fire barrier

penetration seal repair project.

Following the identification of several degraded 8-inch fire barrier penetration seals

in 1996, Maine Yankee embarked on a project to inspect all fire barrier penetrations

at the plant and restore each one to the qualified state. The NRC inspected this

issue and left it unresolved pending completion of NRC's reviews of the licensee's

actions to eddress the problem.

The inspectors reviewed on-going licensee actions to address this issue. In March

1997, the inspectors discussed and assessed the status of the project with the

licensee. The purpose of the project was to conduct detailed walkdowns of the

seals to identify problems and implement any required repairs / upgrades, in addition,

the intent was to properly label and map the barriers and improve the detail in

existing documentation.

With the initial inspection of all seals completed, the licensee has identified that

about 90% of the approximately 2,600 penetrations inspected, required

replacement or repair. Some discrepancies identified include: inadequate seal

thickness; improper damming; defective seals (bad structure, gaps or voids);

inadequate material; and presence of foreign materials.

The licensee had just initiated repairs to address the identified discrepancies. Along .

with fire barrier consideration, the seal design requirements include: high energy

line break; flooding; current induced heat load; and cardox/halon retention. The

inspectors will continue to monitor licensee efforts in this area. This item remains

open pending completion of the repairs, the root cause analysis, and NRC review of

the licensee effort.

LV. Plant Suocort

R1

Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls

Reviews were performed of occupational radiation exposure. Specific areas

reviewed included radiological cor:trols for steam generator inspections; locked high

radiation area key control; contamination controls; status of f acilities and

equipment; staff training; organization and administration; and a review of the

effectiveness of the newly imp!emented problem identification / resolution system

(learning process). A review of facility conditions versus the requirements in the

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) was also performed.

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R1.1 Steam Generator Work

a.

Inspection Scoce (83750)

!

The inspector reviewed radiological control preparation and planning for steam

generator work. Information was gathered through reviews of ALARA pre-job and

work-in-progress reviews; graphs of average historical dose rates for steam

generator bowls; pre- and post- steam generator bowl decontamination efforts;

i

inspections of health physics controls at the steam generator platforms and in the

steam generator monitoring trailer; and discussions with cognizant personnel.

b.

Observations and Findinas

.

The inspector reviewed various ALARA reviews for steam generator primary side

'

testing and repair, including setup and decontamination activities. Total radiation

i

dose for steam generator primary side testing and repair was estimated to be 62

person-rem. This included 2.5 person-rem for manway cover, diaphragm, and

ALARA shield door removal / installation; 4.5 person-rem for decontamination of the

steam generator bowls; 50 person-rem for primary side testing and repair; and 5 .

person-rem for radiological protection (RP) technician dose. Person-rem estimates

were based on anticipated work scope and historical data, and appeared reasonable.

In addition, ALARA reviews showed evidence of extensive planning; required

-

coordination between multiple work groups (e.g., health physics, decontamination

crews, maintenance); and were comprehensive and very detailed. Information was

included on work schedules, job prerequisites, dose reduction initiatives,

engineering controls, training, contamination controls, and radwaste considerations.

One of the major ALARA measures implemented in preparation for steam generator

inspections was a high pressure wash (decontamination) of the steam generator

channel heads (bowls). The process involved installing a specialized

decontamination manway with a remotely operated 3-D water jet lance. The

system (Hennigan decontamination system) delivered a high pressure water spray to

exposed surfaces within the bowls. The effluent was removed through suction

lines from the bottom of the bowls and filtered, and the entire process took

approximately two days to complete.

A graph of average steam generator tube channel head dose rates versus time

indicated that average channel head dose rates in 1978,1980, and 1985 were

greater than 30 R/h. The chemical decontamination performed in 1995 reduced

channel head dose rates to an average of about 6 R/h, and the post chemical

decontamination bowl wash' reduced channel head dose rates to about 2 R/h.

Nineteen ninety-seven survey results indicated that channel head dose rates had

increased to about 2.5 R/h, and contamination levels were estimated to be on the

order of 500,000 - 3,000,000 dpm/100 cm'. Upon completion of the high pressure

bowl wash, survey results showed that loose contamination levels in the c.hannel

head were reduced by about a factor of five, down to about 100,000- 600,000

dpm/100 cm'. In addition, although overall gamma levels were only slightly

reduced, the dose rates at a single point at the plane of the manway were reduced

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11

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by 40 percent. The inspector noted that this decontamination had the potential to

result in significant dose savings due to decreased needs for use of respirators, hot

particle controls, platform decontaminations, and trash changeouts.

The inspector noted that the health physics staff maintained very close oversight of

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work on the steam generator platforms from a remote health physics control point

located outside of the restricted area. Pan, tilt, zoom cameras, and audio head sets

allowed health physics technicians to communicate directly with personnel on the

~

steam generator platform, and observe essentially all activities. Remote reading

area radiation monitors allowed for dose rate monitoring, and remote readout

dosimetry (telemetry) allowed for continuous monitoring of personnel exposures and

exposure rates. Further, steam generator airborne radioactivity levels were also

remotely monitored by technicians in the remote control point. The inspector

questioned various health physics technicians concerning health physics monitoring

,

of steam generator work and found the technicians to be extremely knowledgeable

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of radiological controls and ongoing work. The inspector concluded that health

physics oversight, monitoring, and control of steam generator work was excellent.

c.

Conclusion

Based on this review, the inspector concluded the following:

ALARA planning for steam generator work was thorough, comprehensive, e

and detailed.

Health physics oversight, monitoring, and control of steam generator work

was excellent.

R1.2 Hiah Radiation Area Kev Control

a.

Inspection Scoce (83750)

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A review was performed on the use of keys to control access to high radiation

areas. Information was gathered by inspections of locked high radiation area doors,

inspections of the locked high radiation area key storage cabinet, review of the

health physics shift log, review of procedural guidance, and by interviewing a shift

)

health physics technician.

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b.

Observations and Findinas

During tours through the plant, the inspector checked the integrity of high radiation

area door locks. All doors to areas controlled as a locked high radiation area were

either locked or properly controlled to prevent inadvertent access. All doors and

locking devices inspected appeared to be in good physical condition.

The inspector examined the key storage locker located in the health physics office,

and noted that the keys were contained in a locked box, had encumbering devices,

and were well controlled by the shift technician. The health physics shift log book

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also showed evidence that keys were being properly inventoried on a shift-by-shift

basis.

The inspector reviewed procedural guidance contained in procedure 9-2-101,

" Control of Keys and Doors to High and Very High Radiation Areas," Rev. O.

Procedural guidance was good in that it was clear, specifically listed responsibilities

and methods for controlling access to locked high radiation areas, and keys were

only issued to health physics and operations personnel. The inspector did,

however, identify a program weakness in that high radiation area keys were generic

and each one could be used to unlock any Tech Spec 5.12 High Rad door in the

plant. The shift Health Physics technician explained that health physics supervision

had previously recognized this, and had initiated steps to eliminate the use of

generic keys, and use only specific keys for high radiation area doors.

c.

Conclusion

Based on this review, the inspector concluded the following:

The high radiation area key control program was generally good, and steps

were being taken to improve the program.

R1.3 Contamination Control

a.

Inspection Scoce (83750)

A review was performed on ongoing efforts to improve contamination controls at

Maine Yankee. Information was gathered by a review of procedural guidance and

other documentation, discussions with cognizant personner, and tours through the

plant.

b.

Observations and Findinas

The assistant Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) stated that efforts to improve

contamination and radioactive material controls included increased tracking and

trending of the type, activity, and cause of personal contaminations; procedure

revisions to require radioactive material stickers to be applied to equipment being

released from a contaminated area until a determination could be made that the

material met the condition for release into clean areas; decontamination staffing

augmentations; initiation of an extensive hot machine shop clean-up; increased area

wipe-downs; increased use of sticky pads at area exits; investigations into the use

of a temporary radioactive material processing facility; and the development of a

tool control program.

The inspector noted that the licensee was effectively tracking and trending

contamination events, and was addressing the root causes of personnel

contaminations. Efforts to increase staffing of decontamination personnel, increase

plant decontaminations, improve material handling practices, and development of a

tool control program were very good initiatives. However, the inspector noted that

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13

the tool control program was not fully developed, in that the maintenance

department had not yet taken the lead for this activity. The assistant RPM stated

that due to plant priorities, the maintenance department had not been able to

allocate the time necessary to meet preliminary goals for the development of the

tool control program.

The inspector also reviewed ALARA Review 96-01, " Spent Fuel Pool Reracking

Project Contamination Control Program," and discussed contamination controls

'

implemented during the fuel pool rerack project with a lead health physics

technician. The inspector noted that the rerack project required contaminated fuel

racks to be transported to outside areas (back yard of the restricted area) for

loading into transport containers. Contamination control measures included

requirements to rinse items down as they were removed from the fuel pool, wrap

items prior to transport to outside areas, and establishing contingencies in the case

of high winds or precipitation. The lead health physics technicians was able to

describe, in detail, contamination control measures implemented for each sequence

of work. The inspector concluded that although the fuel rerack project presented

significant contamination control challenges, the measures implemented were

reasonable and effective.

During tours of the facility, inspectors identified an inconsistency in the

contamination control program. An RP technician was observed transporting a cart

through the new fuel receiving area backyard door. The RP technician performed-

personnel contamination monitoring prior to exiting the door, but did not perform

,

'

contamination monitoring of the cart or wheels of the cart prior to transporting the

cart into the back yard. The inspectors questioned this practice, and the RP

technician and the shift RP technician explained that this was an accepted practice.

The rationale expressed was that if an individual was contaminated, the hands and

feet would be the most likely indicators; therefore, additional surveys of equipment

and materials were not necessary; and the potential for offsite release was low

since the back yard was not used as a routine restricted area exit point. The

inspectors acknowledged that it was unlikely that this practice would result in a

measurable offsite release (if contaminated equipment was inadvertently transported

to the back yard of the restricted area). However, trends for personnel

contaminations produced by the radiological controls department showed that, of

the personnel contaminations documented from January 1,1997 to March 31,

1997, only 35 of 94 of the contaminations occurred on hands or shoes. This issue

was raised to the RPM who stated that contamination monitoring practices would

be revised to require all cart wheels to be surveyed prior to transportation to

backyard areas, and that contamination monitoring practices at the new fuel

'

receiving area back yard door would undergo further review.

c.

Conclusions

Based on this review, the inspector made the following conclusions:

e

The licensee was effectively tracking and trending contamination events, and

was addressing the root causes of personnel contaminations.

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Contamination control program improvement initiatives such as increased

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plant decontaminations, procedure upgrades, and development of a tool

control program were very good.

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e'

.The restricted area tool control program was not fully developed, and

preliminary milestones for program development were not being met.

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e

Contamination monitoring practices were inconsistent in that contamination

monitoring was required for personnel, but not materials and equipment,

prior to movement through the new fuel receipt area door, to the back yard

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of the restricted area.

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'R2

Status of RP&C Facilities and Equipment

a.

Insoection Scope (86750)

The inspector performed an evaluation of radiological control boundaries,

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radiological postings, housekeeping, and personnel use of an automated access

control / electronic dosimetry system. Information was gathered through tours of the

primary auxiliary building (PAB), the vapor containment (VC), and the hot machine

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shop, reviews of radiological survey data, and interviews with plant workers.

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b.

Observations and Findinas

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Radiological boundaries in the PAB, VC, and hot machine shop were clearly

delineated and well maintained, and radiological postings met procedural and -

regulatory requirements, and were informative.

Overall housekeeping was good and showed improvement. Walkways and aisles in

the containment building and lower spray building were notably clear and free of

debris, and the boundary around the reactor cavity was wellidentified.

The inspector also observed personnel use of a newly installed automated access

control / electronic dosimetry system. The system was generally easy to use to

assign personnel to work-activity-numbers on radiation work permits, and to track

personnel radiation exposure. Training had been conducted prior to system

implementation, and personnel " greeters" were stationed at the restricted area

access point to assist personnel with use of the system. Based on this limited

,

review, the inspector concluded that the administrative implementation of the newly

installed automated access control system was good.

c.

Conclusions

Based on this review, the inspector made the following conclusions:

• -

Radiological boundaries including radiation areas, high radiation areas, and

contaminated areas were well defined and well maintained, and conditions of

housekeeping were good and showed improvement.

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The administrative implementation of a newly installed automated access

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control / electronic dosimetry system was good.

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R5

Staff Training and Qualification in RP&C

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a.

Insoection Scooe (83750)

The inspector performed a review of selected portions of the health physics

technician training program, information was gathered through discussions with

,

cognizant personnel, and a review of a syllabus for a three-week health physics

systems course,

b.

Observations and Findinas

The training manager stated that in order to address a need for more systems

training for health physics personnel, a three-week course was developed that

included specific radiological / health physics concerns. All Maine Yankee health

physics technicians were scheduled to attend the class, and at the time of the

inspection, seven health physics technicians were attending the third week of the

course. The training manager added that feedback from participants in the course

was very good. The inspector noted that the course syllabus included classrocm

training, plant walkdowns, and appeared broad in scope.

c.

Conclusion

Based on this review, the inspector made the following conclusions:

e

Health physics systems training represented a commitment to improving

health physics technicians' knowledge of plant systems.

R6

RP&C Organization and Administration

a.

Inspection Scooe (83522)

The inspector performed a review of the organization and administration of the

radiological controls organization. Information was gathered by a review of a

resume for the newly appointed RPM, reviews of current and proposed

organizational charts, and through discussions with cognizant personnel.

b.

Observations and Findinas

The inspector interviewed the newly appointed RPM, and reviewed a copy of the

!

individual's resurne. The individual was determined to be capable and qualified for

the position of RPM in accordance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.8, " Personnel

Selection and Training."

The RPM stated that the current focus of the radiological controls organization was

to support outage work. The assistant RPM duties had been limited to focus on

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oversight of health physics-operations, in order to support outage work. The

inspector interviewed the assistant RPM, various health physics technicians, and a

health physics planning supervisor. These individuals indicated that current staffing

levels were adequate to support ongoing work, but additional staffing would be

necessary to support future planned work. The RPM indicated that seven health

physics technicians would be available upon completion of systems training, and

additional staffing of contract health physics technicians was in progress.

c.

Conclusions

Based on this review the inspectors concluded the following:

The newly appointed RPM was capable and qualified for the position of RPM

in accordance with NRC Regulatory Guide 1.8, " Personnel Selection and

,

Training."

.

Current health physics technician staffing levels were adequate to support

ongoing work.

R7

Quality Assurance in RP&C Activities

a.

Insoection Scope (83750)

{

The inspector performed a review to evaluate the effectiveness of the station

problem identification / resolution program (learning process) for correcting

radiological deficiencies. Information was gathered by reviews of lists of learning

bank issues related to radiological controls, reviews of selected learning bank

issues, and discussions with cognizant personnel.

b.

Observations and Findinas

The inspector reviewed a list of radiological control issues entered into the learning

process during the first three months of 1997, and compared the list to the issues

entered into the former radiological incident reporting system in the first three

months of 1996. The inspector noted that during the first three months of 1997,

approximately 25 issues were entered into the learning process, which was greater

than five times the rate at which issues were entered into the former radiological

incident reporting system. The inspectors also noted that several of the issues

entered into the learning process would likely not have been entered into the

radiological incident reporting system (e.g., shortage of protective clothing hoods,

personnel contamination events, improper use of tool bags, and communications

breakdowns in health physics). As a result, the inspectors concluded that

radiological control issues were being entered into the learning process at a lower

threshold and at a higher volume than issues entered into the former radiological

incident reporting system. This was considered a positive observation.

The inspectors interviewed several members of the radiological controls staff

regarding their use of the learning process. The individuals had attended training

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and had access to the learning bank computer system. Although individuals could

easily enter the learning bank computer program and look at specific issues, some

difficulties were observed when individuals were requested to perform queries or

print out reports: system queries took an extended time during periods of high

system use; some printouts could only be obtained on a page-by-page basis; and a

computer screen locked-up during a print request. Although these individuals were

able to obtain the requested information with persistence or assistance, this raised

the concern that if individuals were not fully familiar with the system, or if data

retrieval was difficult, personnel may not fully utilize the system to evaluate and

resolve radiological control issues. A learning process team member indicated that

a computer memory upgrade was in progress to speed processing time; that training

was being conducted; that individual skills would improve with increased system

use; and that system enhancements were being performed to make the program

more user friendly.

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The inspector also reviewed procedure No. 0-16-1, " Learning Process

Implementation Procedure," Rev.10, and a Learning Bank " General Task Report" to

evaluate use of the learning process. The inspector noted that the learning process

did have strong advantages over previous problem identification / resolution systems.

For example, anyone could enter an issue into the learning process; multiple

personnel review, evaluate, and assess the significance of issues during the initial

review process (e.g., initial screening, team review, and management review

process); and accountability was designed into the system with the assignment of

issue and task " owners." The inspector noted that this was a significant

improvement over the former radiological incident reporting system.

The inspectors reviewed lists of tasks (corrective actions) associated with various

radiological control learning bank issues, and noted that tasks addressed apparent

causes and were generally sufficient to prevent recurrence. However, an example

was identified where corrective action " tasks" did not address the apparent cause.

Learning bank issue No. 96-00055 was generated to address the discovery of a

discrete radioactive particle (DRP) found in the back yard of the restricted area

during the performance of a prejob survey in preparation for digging trenches. The

listed " apparent cause" was " contaminated particles have come loose from

contaminated tools and equipment." The corrective action was to " perform more

frequent surveys to keep the discovery of DRPs to a minimum." The inspectors

noted that the corrective action appeared to address the symptom, but did not

identify " apparent cause."

c.

Conclusions

Based on this review, the inspector made the following conclusions:

Radiological control issues were being entered into the learning process at a

higher volume and lower threshold than issues entered into the former

radiological incident reporting system.

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Difficulties were encountered with administrative use of the learning bank

e

including extended computer processing times, system user friendliness

concerns, personnel unfamilimity with the system, and sorne system

programming weaknesses.

The learning process had distinct advantages over previously used

radiological control problem identification / resolution systems in that anyone

could enter an issue into the system, issues were reviewed by multiple

personnel, and accountability for resolving issues was designed into the

system.

e

Learning bank corrective action tasks were generally sufficient to prevent

recurrence.

R8

Miscellaneous RP&C lssues

R8.1 UFSAR Review

A recent discovery of a licensee operating their facility in a manner contrary to the

UFSAR description highlighted the need for a special focused review that compares

plant practices, and procedures and/or parameters to the UFSAR description. While

performing the inspections discussed in this report, the inspectors reviewed the

-

applicable portions of the UFSAR that related to the areas inspected.

1

The inspector reviewed selected sections of Chapters 11, " Radiation Protection" of

the UFSAR pertaining to radiological controls to evaluate the accuracy of the UFSAR

regarding existing plant conditions and practices. No UFSAR discrepancies were

identified during this review.

R8.2 Learnina BankJssue 97-01450

The inspector reviewed a licensee-identified learning bank issue, No. LB 97-01450-

001. Technical Specification 5.2.2(d) states that, "an individual qualified in

radiation protection procedures shall be on-site when fuelis in the reactor" (this

includes training in emergency planning procedures). This Technical Specification

was violated on March 12,1997, from approximately 0230 to 0530 hours0.00613 days <br />0.147 hours <br />8.763227e-4 weeks <br />2.01665e-4 months <br />, when

an RP supervisor allowed the Radiological Controls (RC) shiit technician to leave the

site due to illness, without finding a replacement who was fully trained in

emergency plan procedures. Identified causes included the f ailure to notify the

Plant PSS that the on-shift qualified RC shift technician was leaving the site; the on-

shift RC Supervisor was pre-occupied with ongoing work; the posted schedule did

not specifically identify who was assigned to act as the "on-shift qualified RC shift

technician;" and the replacement technician did not understand his role with regard

to qualifications and training associated with being the qualified RC shift technician.

This issue was entered into the learning bank for evaluation and corrective action.

The inspector reviewed the recommended corrective actions and noted that they

would be sufficient to prevent recurrence. This licensee-identified and corrected

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violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation, consistent with Section Vll.B.1

of the NRC Enforcement Poliev.

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S4

Security and Safeguards Staff Knowledge and Performance

S4.1 Contraband Found in Vehicle Durina Search

a.

inspection Scoce (717501

The inspector reviewed the circumstances involving the identification of marijuana

in a contractor's vehicle during a search of the vehicle in preparation for the

contractor's access into the protected area.

b.

Observations and Findinas

On April 15,1997, two Maine Yankee Security Officers identified a small bag of

marijuana in a contractor's truck. This occurred when the officers were conducting

a search of the vehicle in preparation for the vehicle to be taken into the protected

area for delivery of some non-safety related material. Upon discovery, the security

force notified the Control Room and local law enforcement. Local law enforcement

personnel respondet, to the site and dealt with the issue.

l

Maine Yankee reviewed the individual's previous access into the protected area. It

appeared that the individual had been on site on two occasions in the past. On

both occasions, the individual was escorted by, and under the supervision of a

badged employee. This person also had not been involved in any safety-related

activities. Based on this, the licensee was satisfied that the individual's prior on-site

activities had been monitored and considered acceptable.

The inspector noted that Maine Yankee handled the issue properly. The

notifications to the Control Room and the locallaw enforcement agency were

timely. The reviews to determine the potential impact of the individual's previous

site visits were thorough and revealed no adverse effect.

c.

Conclusions

Security activities continued to be conducted well as evidenced by the good

performance during the April 15,1997 event.

V. Manaaement Meetinas

X1

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of the licensee on May 2,

1997. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

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X2

April 3,1997, Public Meeting

!

On April 3,1997, the NRC held a' meeting with representatives of Maine Yankee at the

Maine Yankee Media Center. The meeting was to discuss the Maine Yankee Restart

Readiness Plan as documented in the March 7,1997 letter to the NRC. The meeting was

limited to public observation only. Later on, the NRC held a meeting with members of the

public at the Wiscasset Middle School, Wiscasset, Maine. The meeting was to receive

public comment regarding the Maine Yankee Restart Readiness Plan.

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,

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

.

IP 40500:

Effectiveness of Licensee Controls in Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing

4

Problems

IP 62707:

Maintenance Observation

>

IP 71707:

Plant Operations

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IP 92700:

Onsite Followup of Written Reports of Non-routine Events at Power Reactor

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Facilities

4

IP 92901:

Followup - Operations

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IP 92902:

Followup - Maintenance

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IP 92903:

Followup - Engineering

.

IP 37551:

Onsite Engineering

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IP 61726:

Surveillance Observation

IP 71750:

Plant Support

IP 83750:

Occupational Radiation Exposure

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IP 86750:

Solid Radiation Waste Management and Transportation of Radioactive

Materials

IP 83522:

Radiation Protection, Plant Chemistry, Organization and Management

Controls

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

ltems Opened:

VIO 50-309/97-03-01, Operators Failing to Perform Duties Required by TS 5.8.2 and plant

procedure,1-26-4, Responsibilities and Authorities of Operating Personnel. (04.1)

ltems Closed:

LER 96-001, Emergency Core Cooling Pumps Declared Inoperable Due to a Reduction of

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Ventilation Flow. (08.1)

IFl 50-309/96-02-01, Containment Spray Building Heating Unit, HV-7. (08.2)

URI 50-309/96-06-01, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. (M8.1)

URI 50-309/96-13-02, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump. (M8.1)

URI 50-309/96-11-02, HPSI cut wire, Event Review Board. (E8.1)

URI 50-309/96-16-04, HPSI Flow Testing and Throttle Valve Settings. (E8.2)

ltems Discursed:

URI 50-309/96-08-05, Fire Protection Berrier Seals. (F2.1)

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LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

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AFW

Auxiliary Feedwater

)

CFR

Code of Federal Regulations

1

CS

Containment Spray

{

CSB

Containment Spray Building

DRP

Discrete Radioactive Particle

l

ECCS

Emergency Core Cooling System

HP

Health Physics

HPSI

High Pressure Safety injection

l&C

Instrumentation and Control

IST

In-Service Test Program

LER

Licensee Event Report

LPSI

Low Pressure Safety injection

MYAPC

Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company

NRC

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

,

PAB

Primary Auxiliary Building

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PCC

Primary Component Cooling

PSS

Plant Shift Supervisor

RC

Radiological Controls

RHR

Residual Heat Removal

RP

Radiological Protection

RP&C

Radiological Protection and Chemistry

RPM

Radiation Protection Manager

RWST

Refueling Water Storage Tank

SALP

Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance

SOS

Shift Operating Supervisor

SW

Service Water

TPC

Temporary Procedure Change

UFSAR

Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

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VC

Vapor Containment

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