Regulatory Guide 1.166: Difference between revisions

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{{Adams
{{Adams
| number = ML19266A616
| number = ML003740089
| issue date = 02/13/2020
| issue date = 03/31/1997
| title =  
| title = (Draft Was DG-1034) Pre-Earthquake Planning & Immediate Nuclear Power Plant Operator Postearthquake Actions
| author name = Graizer V, Weaver T
| author name =  
| author affiliation = NRC/RES
| author affiliation = NRC/RES
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
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| docket =  
| docket =  
| license number =  
| license number =  
| contact person = SJG1
| contact person =  
| case reference number = RG 1.166, Rev. 1
| case reference number = DG-1034
| package number = ML19266A614
| document report number = RG-1.166
| document type = Regulatory Guide
| document type = Regulatory Guide
| page count = 12
| page count = 8
}}
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{{#Wiki_filter:U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
{{#Wiki_filter:U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.166, REVISION 1
REGULATORY
 
March 1997 GUIDE
Issue Date: February 2020
÷o *OFFICE
Technical Leads: Vladimir Graizer Thomas Weaver
OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH
 
REGULATORY GUIDE 1.166 (Draft was DG-1034)  
Written suggestions regarding this guide or development of new guides may be submitted through the NRCs public Web site in the NRC Library at https://nrcweb.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/reg-guides/, under Document Collections, in Regulatory Guides, at https://nrcweb.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/reg-guides/contactus.html.
PRE-EARTHQUAKE PLANNING AND IMMEDIATE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OPERATOR
 
POSTEARTHQUAKE ACTIONS
Electronic copies of this RG, previous versions of RGs, and other recently issued guides are also available through the NRCs public Web site in the NRC Library at https://nrcweb.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/reg-guides/, under Document Collections, in Regulatory Guides. This RG is also available through the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html, under ADAMS Accession Number (No.)  
ML19266A616. The regulatory analysis may be found in ADAMS under Accession No. ML18268A187. The associated draft guide DG-1337 may be found in ADAMS under Accession No. ML18268A185, and the staff responses to the public comments on DG-1337 may be found under ADAMS Accession No. ML19266A619.
 
PRE-EARTHQUAKE PLANNING, SHUTDOWN, AND  
RESTART OF A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
FOLLOWING AN EARTHQUAKE


==A. INTRODUCTION==
==A. INTRODUCTION==
Purpose This regulatory guide (RG) describes guidance acceptable to the staff of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regarding pre-earthquake planning actions; actions necessary to determine the need to shut down a nuclear power plant; and the short- and long-term processes, inspections, and tests to demonstrate that a nuclear power plant is safe for restarting after a shutdown in response to an earthquake.
Paragraph IV(a)(4) of Appendix S, "Earthquake Engineering Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," to  
 
10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," requires that suitable instru mentation1 be provided so that the seismic response of nuclear power plant features important to safety can be evaluated promptly. Paragraph IV(a)(3) of Appendix S
Applicability This RG applies to applicants and licensees under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
to 10 CFR Part 50 requires shutdown of the nuclear power plant if vibratory ground motion exceeding that of the operating basis earthquake ground motion (OBE)
(10 CFR) Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities (Ref. 1),
or significant plant damage occurs. If systems,, struc tures, or components necessary for the safe shutdown of the nuclear power plant are not available after occur rence of the OBE, the licensee must consult with the NRC and must propose a plan for the timely, safe shut down of the nuclear power plant. Licensees of nuclear power plants that are subject to the earthquake engi neering criteria in Appendix S to 10 CFR Part 50 are re quired by 10 CFR 50.54(ff) to shut down the plant if the criteria in Paragraph IV(a)(3) of Appendix S are ex ceeded.
10 CFR Part 52, Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants (Ref. 2), and 10 CFR
Part 100, Reactor Site Criteria (Ref. 3).
 
Applicable Regulations
*
10 CFR 50.54(ff), Conditions of licenses, requires plant shutdown if the Operating Basis Earthquake has been exceeded or if significant plant damage occurs for licensees of nuclear power plants that have implemented the earthquake engineering criteria in Appendix S of Part 50.
 
Prior to resuming operations, the licensee is required to demonstrate to the Commission that no functional damage has occurred to those features necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public, and that the licensing basis is maintained.


*
1Regulatory Guide 1.12, Revision 2, "Nuclear Power Plant Instrumen tation for Earthquakes," describes seismic instrumentation that is ac ceptable to the NRC staff.
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, provides the General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, and establishes design, fabrication, construction, testing, and performance requirements for structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety through general design criteria (GDC). The GDC applicable to this RG include GDC 2, Design Bases for Protection against


RG 1.166, Page 2 Natural Phenomena, which requires, in part, that SSCs important to safety shall be designed to withstand the effects of natural phenomena such as earthquakes, without loss of capability to perform their safety functions.
USNRC REGULATORY GUIDES
Regulatory Guides we Issued to'describe n make available to the public such Informa tlon as methods acceptable to Vie NRC staff for Implementing specific pats of the Com mission's regulations, techniques used by the staff in evaluating specific problems or pos tulated accidents, and data needed by the NRC staff in its review of applications for per mits and icensee. Regulory guldes are not substitutes for regulations, and compllance with them Is not required. Methods aid solutions different from those set out In the guides will be acceptable If they provide a basis for the findings requisite to the Issuance or con tinuence of a permit or lcense by te Commission.


*
This guide was issued alter consideration of comments received from the public Com merts and suggestions for improvements In these guides we encouraged at all imes, and guides will be revised, as appropriate, to accommodate comments " to reflect new In formation or aspedence.
10 CFR 50, Appendix S, Earthquake Engineering Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, for plants licensed on or after January 10, 1997, requires, in part, plant shutdown if the Operating Basis Earthquake Ground Motion is exceeded or if significant plant damage occurs. Prior to resuming operations, the licensee must demonstrate to the Commission that no functional damage has occurred to those features necessary for continued operation without undue risk to health and safety of the public, and that the licensing basis is maintained.


*
Written comments may be submitted to the Rules Revew and Directives Branch, DFIPS,  
10 CFR 100, Appendix A, Seismic and Geologic Siting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, Section V(a)(2), requires plant shutdown if vibratory ground motion exceeding that of the Operating Basis Earthquake occurs. Prior to resuming operations, the licensee must demonstrate to the Commission that no functional damage has occurred to those features necessary for continued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public.
ADM, U.S. Nulear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.


Related Guidance
This guide provides guidance acceptable to the NRC staff for a timely evaluation after an earthquake of the recorded instrumentation data and for determining whether plant shutdown is required by 10 CFR Part 50.
*
RG 1.12, Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation for Earthquakes (Ref. 4), provides guidance for seismic instrumentation that is acceptable to the NRC staff. RG 1.12 endorses, in part, American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society (ANSI/ANS)-2.2-2016, Earthquake Instrumentation Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants (Ref. 5), as an acceptable method for placement of seismic sensors for various nuclear power plant configurations.


*
The information collections contained in this regu latory guide are covered by the requirements of 10 CFR  
RG 1.208, A Performance-Based Approach to Define the Site-Specific Earthquake Ground Motion (Ref. 6), provides guidance on the development of a site-specific ground motion response spectrum (GMRS).
Part 50,which were approved by the Office of Manage ment and Budget, approval number 3150-0011. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information un less it displays a currently valid OMB control number.
 
*
NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0326, Operability Determinations & Functionality Assessments for Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety (Ref. 7), provides guidance to NRC
inspectors in their review of licensees operability determinations and resolution of degraded or nonconforming conditions.
 
Purpose of Regulatory Guides The NRC issues RGs to describe to the public methods that the staff considers acceptable for use in implementing specific parts of the agencys regulations, to explain techniques that the staff uses in evaluating specific problems or postulated events, and to provide guidance to applicants. Regulatory guides are not substitutes for regulations and compliance with them is not required. Methods and solutions that differ from those set forth in RGs will be deemed acceptable if they provide a basis for the findings required for the issuance or continuance of a permit or license by the Commission.
 
Paperwork Reduction Act 
 
This RG provides voluntary guidance for implementing the mandatory information collections in
10 CFR Parts 50, 52, and 100 that are subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.). These information collections were approved by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), approval numbers 3150-0011, 3150-0151, and 3150-0093. Send comments regarding this information collection to the Information Services Branch (T6-A10M), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
 
RG 1.166, Page 3 Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc.gov, and to the OMB reviewer at: OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (3150-0011, 3150-0151,
3150-0093), Attn: Desk Officer for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 725 17th Street, NW,
Washington, DC 20503; e-mail: oira_submission@omb.eop.gov.
 
Public Protection Notification 
 
The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information unless the document requesting or requiring the collection displays a currently valid OMB  
control number.
 
RG 1.166, Page 4


==B. DISCUSSION==
==B. DISCUSSION==
Reason for Revision This guide merges two related RGsRG 1.166, Pre-Earthquake Planning and Immediate Nuclear Power Operator Postearthquake Actions, issued March 1997 (Ref. 8), and RG 1.167 Restart of a Nuclear Power Plant Shut Down by a Seismic Event, issued March 1997 (Ref. 9)into one and revises their technical content. The staff decided to combine these existing RGs because they are similar in nature and contain overlapping guidance. Both guides reference and endorse the same industry guidelines, which more recent standards have superseded. The merged RG incorporates lessons learned following the shutdown and restart of nuclear power plants in response to earthquake ground motion and post-earthquake evaluations since issuance of the two RGs in 1997, through endorsement of ANSI/ANS-
When an earthquake occurs, ground motion data are recorded by the seismic instrumentation. 1 These data are used to make a rapid determination of the de gree of severity of the seismic event. The data from the nuclear power plant's free-field seismic instrumenta tion, coupled with information obtained from a plant walkdown, are used to make the initial determination of whether the plant must be shut down, if it has not al ready been shut down by operational perturbations resulting from the seismic event. If on the basis of these initial evaluations (instrumentation data and walkdown) it is concluded that the plant shutdown cri teria have not been exceeded, it is presumed that the The guides wa issued In the following ten broad divisions:
2.10-2017, Criteria for Retrieval, Processing, Handling, and Storage of Records from Nuclear Facility Seismic Instrumentation (Ref. 10), and ANSI/ANS-2.23-2016, Nuclear Power Plant Response to an Earthquake (Ref. 11), with exceptions and clarifications.


Background The NRC endorsed Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) NP-6695, Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant Response to an Earthquake, dated December 1, 1989 (Ref. 12), in the initial version of RG 1.166 (Rev. 0) and RG 1.167 (Rev. 0), issued in 1997. Following the issuance of EPRI
===1. Power Reactors ===
NP-6695 in 1989, a significant amount of experience has been gained on the effects of earthquakes on nuclear power plants worldwide and the actions needed to restart a nuclear power plant after an earthquake. Based on these lessons learned, in 2015 EPRI significantly updated EPRI NP-6695 and the lessons were captured in EPRI Report 3002005284, Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake (Ref. 13). In addition, experience has been gained from the shutdown and restart of the Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO) North Anna Power Station following the August 23,
2. Research and Test Reactors
2011, earthquake in Mineral, Virginia. For example, the plant used older analogue recording instrumentation that took longer to process than modern digital instrumentation. This equipment contributed to the delay in determining if the OBE and SSE were exceeded. in contrast, modern digital recording instrumentation would have facilitated the determination earlier. In response to the earthquake, VEPCO committed to a number of long-term actions to address exceeding the design basis as a result of the August 23, 2011, seismic event in a letter to the NRC dated November 7, 2011 (Ref. 14). NRC responded to the VEPCO letter with a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) on November 11, 2011 (Ref. 15), which remained in effect until NRC concluded that all the actions in the enclosure to the CAL were completed.
3 Fuels erd Materials Facilities
4. Environmental ard Siting s Materials and Plant Protection
& Products
7. Transportation S. Occupaional Health
9. Antitrust and Financal Review
10.. General Single copies oa regulatory guides may be obtained free of charge by writing the Office of Administration, Attention: Distribution and Mail Services Section. US. Nudear Regulatory Commission, Washington. DC 20555-0001; or by fax at (301)415-2280.


ANSI/ANS-2.23-2016 incorporates the significant changes and additions included in EPRI
Issued guides may also be purchased from the National Technilcal Information Service on a standing order basis. Details on this service may be obtained by writing NTIS, 6285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.
Report 3002005284. ANSI/ANS-2.23-2016 provides guidance that implements both the observed damage level (DL) and earthquake shaking level (EL) to determine post-earthquake actions for an event that exceeds the OBE, whereas EPRI NP-6695 considers only the observed damage level to determine post- earthquake actions. In addition, ANSI/ANS-2.23-2016 builds on EPRI NP-6695 by adding guidance on action levels that clarify what actions should be taken, when they should be taken, and who should perform them. It also provides more comprehensive guidance than EPRI NP-6695 for short-term actions that a licensee should perform following an earthquake and for long-term post-earthquake evaluations.


Therefore, this RG endorses ANSI/ANS-2.23-2016.
plant will not be shut down (or could restart following a post-trip review, if it tripped off-line because of the earthquake). Guidance on postshutdown inspections and plant restart is contained in Regulatory Guide
1.167, "Restart of a Nuclear Power Plant Shut Down by a Seismic Event."
The Electric Power Research Institute has devel oped guidelines that will enable licensees to quickly identify and assess earthquake effects on nuclear power plants. These guidelines are in EPRI NP-5930, "A Cri terion for Determining Exceedance of the Operating Basis Earthquake," July 19882; EPRI NP-6695,
"Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earth quake," December 19892; and EPRI TR-100082,
"Standardization of the Cumulative Absolute Veloc ity," December 1991.2 This regulatory guide is based on the assumption that the nuclear power plant has operable seismic in strumentation, including the computer equipment and software required to process the data within 4 hours af ter an earthquake. This is necessary because the deci sion to shut down the plant will be made, in part, by comparing the recorded data against OBE exceedance criteria. The decision to shut down the plant is also based on the results of the plant walkdown inspections that take place within 8 hours of the event. If the seismic instrumentation or data processing equipment is inop erable, the guidelines in Appendix A to this guide should be used to determine whether the OBE has been exceeded.


This guide also endorses ANSI/ANS-2.10-2017, Criteria for Retrieval, Processing, Handling, and Storage of Records from Nuclear Facility Seismic Instrumentation, because the standard provides guidance on the retrieval of recorded data from seismic instrumentation in the event that an earthquake occurs with sufficient ground motion to activate the instrumentation, and because of the importance of the  
Shutdown of the nuclear power plant is required if the vibratory ground motion experienced exceeds that of the OBE. A criterion for determining exceedance of the OBE (based on data recorded in the free-field) is provided in EPRI NP-5930: a threshold response spec trum ordinate check and a cumulative absolute velocity (CAV) check. Seismic Category I structures at a nuclear power plant site may be designed using different ground motion response spectra; for example, one used for the certified standard design and another for site specific applications. The spectrum ordinate criterion is based on the lowest spectrum used in the design of the Seismic Category I structures. A procedure to standard ize the calculation of the CAV is provided in EPRI
TR-100082. A spectral velocity threshold has also been recommended by EPRI since some structures have fundamental frequencies below the range speci fied in EPRI NP-5930. The NRC staff now recom
2EPRI reports may be obtained from the Electric Power Research Insti tute, EPRI Distribution Center, 207 Coggins Dr., RO. Box 23205, Pleasant Hill, CA 94523.


RG 1.166, Page 5 storage, handling, and maintenance of recorded data and calculations. This information is important because it is used to assess the short-term and long-term actions needed to ensure the plant can be operated safely.
mends 1.0 to 2.0 Hz for the range of the spectral veloc ity limit since some structures have fundamental frequencies below 1.5 Hz. This is instead of the 1.5 to  
2.0 Hz range proposed by EPRI.


Harmonization with International Standards The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) works with member states and other partners to promote the safe, secure, and peaceful use of nuclear technologies. The IAEA develops safety standards for protecting people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. These standards provide a system of safety fundamentals, safety requirements, and safety guides reflecting an international consensus on what constitutes a high level of safety. Pertinent to this RG are: 
Because free-field seismic instrumentation data are used in the plant shutdown determiniation, it is im portant to ascertain that the time-history analysis hard ware and software were functioning properly. There fore, the response spectrum and CAV should be calculated using a suitable earthquake time-history or manufacturer's calibration standard after the initial in stallation and each servicing of the free-field instru mentation. After an earthquake at the plant site, the re sponse spectrum and CAV should be calculated using the time-history or calibration standard that was used during the last servicing (or initial instrumentation in stallation if no servicing has been performed) and the results compared with the latest data on file at the plant.


*
The NRC staff does not endorse the philosophy discussed in EPRI NP-6695, Section 4.3.4 (first para graph, last sentence), pertaining to plant shutdown con siderations following an earthquake based on the need for continued power generation in the region. If a li censee determines that plant shutdown is required by the NRC's regulations, but the licensee does not con sider it prudent to do so, the licensee would be required to consult with the NRC and propose a plan for the timely, safe shutdown of the nuclear power plant.
IAEA Safety Reports Series No. 66, Earthquake Preparedness and Response for Nuclear Power Plants (Ref. 16), which draws upon insights from three multiunit nuclear power plants in Japan and one in Armenia that experienced beyond-design-basis earthquakes. It addresses pre-earthquake planning, actions to follow when an earthquake is felt, actions to take before the restart of the nuclear power plant, and short- and long-term post-earthquake actions.


*
Because earthquake-induced vibration of the reac tor vessel could lead to changes in neutron fluxes, a prompt check of the neutron flux monitoring sensors would provide an indication that the reactor is stable.
IAEA Safety Guide NS-G-1.6, Seismic Design and Qualification for Nuclear Power Plants (Ref. 17), which provides guidance on seismic instrumentation.


This RG incorporates guidelines on actions by licensees to demonstrate plant readiness for restart similar to those in IAEA Safety Reports Series No. 66 and seismic instrumentation similar to IAEA
Since the containment isolation valves may have malfunctioned during an earthquake, inspection of the containment isolation system is necessary to ensure continued containment integrity.
Safety Guide NS-G-1.6.


Documents Discussed in Staff Regulatory Guidance This RG endorses the use of one or more codes or standards developed by external organizations, and other third-party guidance documents. These codes, standards, and third-party guidance documents may contain references to other codes, standards, or third party guidance documents (secondary references). If a secondary reference has itself been incorporated by reference into NRC regulations as a requirement, then licensees and applicants must comply with that standard as set forth in the regulation. If the secondary reference has been endorsed in a RG as an acceptable approach for meeting an NRC
Appendix B to this guide provides definitions to be used with this guidance.
requirement, then the standard constitutes a method acceptable to the NRC staff for meeting that regulatory requirement as described in the specific RG. If the secondary reference has neither been incorporated by reference into NRC regulations nor endorsed in a RG, then the secondary reference is neither a legally-binding requirement nor a generic NRC approved acceptable approach for meeting an NRC requirement. However, licensees and applicants may consider and use the information in the secondary reference, if appropriately justified, consistent with current regulatory practice, and consistent with applicable NRC requirements.


RG 1.166, Page 6 C. STAFF REGULATORY GUIDANCE
==C. REGULATORY POSITION==
This guide provides methods, approaches, or data that the staff considers acceptable for meeting the requirements of the Applicable Regulations stated in Section A. This guide endorses the following standards subject to the clarifications noted in this section:
1. BASE-LINE DATA
L1 Information Related to Seismic Instrumentation A file containing information on all the seismic in strumentation should be kept at the plant. The file should include:
1. Information on each instrument type such as make, model, and serial number; manufacturers' data sheet; list of special features or options; performance
1.166-2 K
L \\


*
characteristics; examples of typical instrumentation readings and interpretations; operations and mainte nance manuals; repair procedures (manufacturers' rec
ANSI/ANS-2.10-2017, Criteria for Retrieval, Processing, Handling, and Storage of Records from Nuclear Facility Seismic Instrumentation. The standard addresses the recording, retrieval, documentation and archiving of data from seismic instrumentation, subsequent to an earthquake sufficient to activate the instrumentation.
..
ommendations for repairing common problems); and a list of any special requirements, e.g., for maintenance, operation, or installation.


*
2. Plan views and vertical sections showing the lo cation of each seismic instrument and the orientation of the instrument components with respect to plant refer ence axes.
ANSI/ANS-2.23-2016, Nuclear Power Plant Response to an Earthquake. The standard provides guidance regarding pre-earthquake planning actions; actions necessary to determine the need to shut down a nuclear power plant; and the short- and long-term processes, inspections, and tests to demonstrate that a nuclear power plant is safe for restarting after a shutdown in response to an earthquake.


C. 1 Clarification of Post-shutdown Inspection and Test Documentation Requirements in Section
3. A complete service history of each seismic in strument. The service history should include informa tion such as dates of servicing, description of completed work, and calibration records and data (where applicable). The documentation and retention of these data should be commensurate with the recordkeeping for other plant equipment.


ANSI/ANS-2.23-2016, Section 8.8
4. A suitable earthquake time-history (e.g., the Oc tober 1987 Whittier, California, earthquake) or man ufacturer's calibration standard and the corresponding response spectrum and cumulative absolute velocity (CAV) (see Regulatory Positions 4.1 and 4.2). After the initial installation and each servicing of the free-field instrumentation, the response spectrum and CAV
should be calculated and filed (see Regulatory Position
4.3). 
1.2 Planning for Postearthquake Inspections Sections 4.3.4.1 and 5.3.1 of EPRI NP-6695,
"Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earth quake," describe actions, such as selecting equipment and structures for inspections and the content of the baseline inspections, that are to be taken before an earthquake and that are acceptable to the NRC staff for satisfying the requirements in Paragraph IV(a)(3) of Appendix S to 10 CFR Part 50 for ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants.


The documentation described in Section 8.8 of ANSI/ANS-2.23-2016 should be available for NRC inspection prior to restart. The documentation should include the condition report methodology, assumptions, assessments, technical specification (TS) surveillance requirement number for each surveillance test, and other inspections that demonstrated that the operability of all safety-related SSCs was not affected. In addition, the documentation should demonstrate that any nonsafety-related SSC impacts are corrected or that the risk is properly managed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65, Requirements for monitoring the effectiveness of maintenance at nuclear power plants. Specifically, if the plant is restarted with nonsafety-related equipment impacts left uncorrected or unevaluated, the increase in risk must be monitored and accounted for as required by 10 CFR 50.65.
2. ACTIONS IMMEDIATELY AFTER AN
EARTHQUAKE
The guidelines for actions immediately after an earthquake that are specified in Sections 4.3.1 (with the exception specified below) and 4.3.2 of EPRI NP-6695 are acceptable to the NRC staff for satisfying the re quirements in Paragraph IV(a)(3) of Appendix S to 10  
CFR Part 50.


C. 2 Clarification of Seismic Reevaluations in ANSI/ANS-2.23-2016, Section 9.1.3
"In Section 4.3.1, a check of the neutron flux moni toring sensors for changes should be added to the spe cific control room board checks.


Sections 9.1.3 provides guidance in selecting items for seismic reevaluations which include selecting items with the highest calculated stresses based on previous stress analysis results. The staff position is that items should also be selected where the fatigue Cumulative Usage Factor is highest.
3. EVALUATION OF GROUND MOTION
RECORDS
3.1 Data Identification A record collection log should be maintained at the plant, and all data should be identifiable and traceable with respect to:
1. The date and time of collection,
2. The make, model, serial number, location, and orientation of the instrument (sensor) from which the record was collected.


C.3 Clarification of Equipment and Structures Qualified by Analysis in ANSI/ANS-2.23-2016, Section 9.1.4.1
3.2 Data Collection
3.2.1 Only personnel trained in the operation of the instrument should collect the data.


When evaluating equipment and structures by analysis, staff finds it acceptable to use best estimate damping values and realistic material properties to determine if stresses or strains are greater than allowables. Strain based allowable values with adequate justification may be used when non-linear analyses are performed.
3.2.2 The steps for removing and storing records from each seismic instrument should be planned and performed in accordance with established procedures.
 
RG 1.166, Page 7 C.4 Clarification of Seismic Evaluation and Verification Plans in ANSI/ANS-2.23-2016, Section
9.5 Section 9.5 of ANSI/ANS-2.23-2016 provides guidance on developing a seismic evaluation and verification plan. Section 9.5 states that the plan should require the new and replacement safety-related SSCs to be qualified to both the licensing-basis design spectra and the observed spectra unless the licensee can demonstrate using appropriate risk-informed or performance-based approaches that the SSCs involved do not pose a significant seismic risk. All new or replacement equipment must meet current or amended site licensing-basis requirements.
 
C.5 Clarification of Initial and Short-Term Evaluations in ANSI/ANS-2.23-2016, Section 6 If the seismic event resulted in a plant automatic shutdown, the licensee needs to understand the cause and evaluate the extent of the condition before plant restart to ensure that (1) operability exists for safety-related SSCs and (2) risk is managed as required by 10 CFR 50.65 for both safety- and nonsafety-related SSCs. To accomplish this, as is done after any automatic reactor shutdown, the licensee must assess the performance of both safety- and nonsafety-related SSCs to determine whether all SSCs had performed as designed, installed, and maintained.
 
C.6 Clarification of Long-Term Evaluations in ANSI/ANS-2.23-2016, Section 9 Coincident with the long-term evaluations, as described in ANSI/ANS-2.23-2016, Section 9, the plant SSCs should be restored to match their licensing basis.
 
C.7 Clarification Addressing Exceptions to Restoration of the Licensing Basis When using ANSI/ANS-2.23-2016, licensees or applicants should note that correction of, or operation with, degraded or nonconforming conditions related to SSCs is accomplished, as appropriate, through evaluation, restoration, modification, license amendment, or regulatory relief (e.g., notice of enforcement discretion, emergency TS amendments, exigent TS changes, exemptions, relief requests, or other relief from a regulatory requirement as granted by the Commission). Operation with SSCs that are deemed operable/functional but are degraded or nonconforming is permitted if an analysis is performed and documented and if corrective actions are completed in a manner that meets the expectations of NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC)
0326.
 
C. 8 Clarification Addressing Degraded or Inoperable Instrumentation
 
If the seismic instrumentation or data-processing equipment is degraded or inoperable, Appendix A, Operating-Basis Earthquake Exceedance Guidelines if Instrumentation is Degraded or Inoperable, of this guide should be used to determine whether the OBE ground motion has been exceeded.
 
RG 1.166, Page 8
 
==D. IMPLEMENTATION==
The NRC staff may use this regulatory guide as a reference in its regulatory processes, such as licensing, inspection, or enforcement. However, the NRC staff does not intend to use the guidance in this regulatory guide to support NRC staff actions in a manner that would constitute backfitting as that term is defined in 10 CFR 50.109, Backfitting, and as described in NRC Management Directive 8.4, Management of Backfitting, Forward Fitting, Issue Finality, and
 
===
 
===Information Requests===
===
(Ref. 18), nor does the NRC staff intend to use the guidance to affect the issue finality of an approval under 10 CFR Part
52, Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants. The staff also does not intend to use the guidance to support NRC staff actions in a manner that constitutes forward fitting as that term is defined and described in Management Directive 8.4. If a licensee believes that the NRC is using this regulatory guide in a manner inconsistent with the discussion in this Implementation section, then the licensee may file a backfitting or forward fitting appeal with the NRC in accordance with the process in Management Directive 8.
 
===4.      ===
 
RG 1.166, Page 9 REFERENCES1
1.


U.S. Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, Part 50, Chapter 1, Title 10, Energy.
3.2.3 Extreme caution should be exercised to prevent accidental damage to the recording media and instruments during data collection and subsequent han dling.


2.
3.2A
As data are collected and the instrumenta tion is inspected, notes should be made regarding the condition of the instrument and its installation, for ex ample, instrument flooded, mounting surface tilted, or objects that fell and struck the instrument or the instru ment mounting surface.


CFR, Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants, Part 52, Chapter 1, Title 10, Energy.
3.2.5 For validation of the collected data, the in formation described in Regulatory Position 1.1(4)
should be provided.


3.
3.2.6 If the instrument's operation appears to have been normal, the instrument should remain in service without readjustment or change that would de feat attempts to obtain postevent calibration.


CFR, Reactor Site Criteria, Part 100, Chapter 1, Title 10, Energy.
3.3 Record Evaluation Records should be analyzed according to the man ufacturer's specifications and the results of the analysis should be evaluated. Any record anomalies, invalid data, and nonpertinent signals should be noted, along with any known causes.


4.
4.


U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.12, Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation for Earthquakes, Washington, DC.
DETERMINING OBE EXCEEDANCE
The evaluation to determine whether the OBE was exceeded should be performed using data obtained from the three components of the free-field ground mo tion (i.e., two horizontal and one vertical). The evalua tion may be performed on uncorrected earthquake records. It was found in a study of uncorrected versus
1.166-3


5.
corrected earthquake records (see EPRI NP-5930) that the use of uncorrected records is conservative. The evaluation should consist of a check of the response spectrum and CAV and a check on the operability of the instrumentation. This evaluation should take place within 4 hours of the earthquake.


American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society (ANSI/ANS)-2.2-2016, Earthquake Instrumentation Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, LaGrange, Illinois.2
4.1 Response Spectrum Check
4.1.1 The OBE response spectrum check is per formed using the lower of:
1. The spectrum used in the certified standard design, or
2. A spectrum other than (1) used in the design of any Seismic Category I structure.


6.
4.1.2 The OBE response spectrum is exceeded if any one of the three components (two horizontal and one vertical) of the 5 percent of critical damping re sponse spectra generated using the free-field ground motion is larger than:
1. The corresponding design response spectral acceleration (OBE spectrum if used in the de sign, otherwise 1/3 of the safe shutdown earth quake ground motion (SSE) spectrum) or
0.2g, whichever is greater, for frequencies be tween 2 to 10 Hz, or
2. The corresponding design response spectral velocity (OBE spectrum if used in the design, otherwise 1/3 of the SSE spectrum) or a spec tral velocity of 6 inches per second (15.24 cen timeters per second), whichever is greater, for frequencies between 1 and 2 Hz.


NRC, RG 1.208, A Performance-Based Approach to Define the Site-Specific Earthquake Ground Motion, Washington, DC.
4.2 Cumulative Absolute Velocity Check For each component of the free-field ground mo tion, the CAV should be calculated as follows: (1) the absolute acceleration (g units) time-history is divided into 1-second intervals, (2) each 1-second interval that has at least 1 exceedance of 0.025g is integrated over time, (3) all the integrated values are summed together to arrive at the CAy. The CAV check is exceeded if any CAV calculation is greater than 0.16 g-second. Addi tional information on how to determine the CAV is pro vided in EPRI TR-100082.


7.
4.3 Instrument Operability Check After an earthquake at the plant site, the response spectrum and CAV should be calculated using the same input as that used in Regulatory Position 1.1(4), and the results should be compared with the latest filed data to demonstrate that the time-history analysis hardware and software were functioning properly. The results of this comparison should be reported to the NRC.


NRC, Inspection Manual Chapter 0326, Operability Determinations & Functionality Assessments for Conditions Adverse to Quality or Safety, Washington, DC.
4.4 Inoperable Instrumentation or Data Processing Hardware or Software If the response spectrum and the CAV (Regulatory Positions 4.1 and 4.2) cannot be obtained because the seismic instrumentation is inoperable, data from the instrumentation are destroyed, or the data processing hardware or software is inoperable, the criteria in Ap pendix A to this guide should be used to determine whether the OBE has been exceeded.


8.
5. CRITERIA FOR PLANT SHUTDOWN
If the OBE is exceeded or significant plant damage occurs, the plant must be shut down unless a plan for the timely, safe shutdown of the nuclear power plant has been proposed by the licensee and accepted by the NRC
staff.


NRC, RG 1.166, Pre-Earthquake Planning and Immediate Nuclear Power Plant Operator Postearthquake Actions, Washington, DC.
5.1 OBE Exceedance If the response spectrum check and the CAV check (performed or calculated in accordance with Regulato ry Positions 4.1 and 4.2) were exceeded, the OBE was exceeded and plant shutdown is required. If either check does not exceed the criterion, the earthquake mo tion did not exceed the OBE. If only one check can be performed, the other check is assumed to be exceeded;
if neither check can be performed, see Regulatory Posi tion 4.4. The determination of whether or not the OBE
has been exceeded should be performed even if the plant automatically shuts down as a result of the earth quake.


9.
5.2 Damage The plant should be shut down if the walkdown inspections performed in accordance with Regulatory Position 2 discover damage. This evaluation should take place within 8 hours of the earthquake occurrence.


NRC, RG 1.167, Restart of a Nuclear Power Plant Shutdown by a Seismic Event, Washington, DC.
5.3 Continued Operation If the OBE was not exceeded and the walkdown in spection indicates no damage to the nuclear power plant, shutdown of the plant is not required. The plant may continue to operate (or may restart following a post-trip review, if it automatically shut down because of the earthquake). 
6. PRE-SHUTDOWN INSPECTIONS
The pre-shutdown inspections described in Sec tion 4.3.4 of EPRI NP-6695, "Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake," with the exceptions specified below, are acceptable to the NRC staff for
1.166-4 K
K


10.
satisfying the requirements in Paragraph IV(aX3) of Appendix S to 10 CFR Part 50 for ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants.


ANSI/ANS-2.10-2017, Criteria for Retrieval, Processing, Handling, and Storage of Records from Nuclear Facility Seismic Instrumentation, LaGrange Park, Illinois.
6.1 Shutdown Timing Delete the last sentence in the first paragraph of Section 4.3.4 of EPRI NP-6695.


11.
6.2 Safe Shutdown Equipment In Section 4.3.4.1 of EPRI NP-6695, a check of the containment isolation system should be added to the minimum list of equipment to be inspected.


ANSI/ANS-2.23-2016, Nuclear Power Plant Response to an Earthquake, LaGrange Park, Illinois.
6.3 Orderly Plant Shutdown The following paragraph in Section 4.3.4 of EPRI
NP-6695 is printed here to emphasize that the plant should shut down in an orderly manner.


12.
"Prior to initiating plant shutdown following an earthquake, visual inspections and control board checks of safe shutdown systems should be performed by plant operations personnel, and the availability of off-site and emergency on-site power sources should be determined.


Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) NP-6695, Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plant Response to an Earthquake, Palo Alto, California, December 1, 1989.3
The purpose of these inspections is to deter mine the effect of the earthquake on essential safe shutdown equipment which is not normal ly in use during power operation so that any re sets or repairs required as a result of the earth quake can be performed, or alternate equipment can be readied, prior to initiating shutdown activities. In order to ascertain possi ble fuel and reactor internal damage, the fol lowing checks should be made, if possible, be fore plant shutdown is initiated ..... "


1 Publicly available NRC-published documents are available electronically through the NRC Library on the NRCs public web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/ and through the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. The documents can also be viewed online or printed for a fee in the NRCs Public Document Room (PDR) at 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD. For problems with ADAMS, contact the PDR staff at 301-415-4737 or (800) 397-4209; fax
==D. IMPLEMENTATION==
(301) 415-3548; or e-mail pdr.resource@nrc.gov.
The purpose of this section is to provide guidance to applicants and licensees regarding the NRC staff's plans for using this regulatory guide.
 
2 Copies of ANSI/ANS standards may be purchased from the ANS web site (http://www.new.ans.org/store/), or by writing to American Nuclear Society, 555 North Kensington Avenue, La Grange Park, IL 60526 (telephone:
800-323-3044). 
 
3 Copies of EPRI standards and reports may be purchased from Electric Power Research Institute, 3420 Hillview Avenue, Palo Alto, CA 94304 (telephone: (800) 313-3774; fax: (925) 609-1310).
 
RG 1.166, Page 10
13.
 
EPRI Report 3002005284, Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake, Palo Alto, California, 2015.
 
14.
 
Virginia Electric and Power Company, letter to NRC, November 7, 2011, Virginia Electric and Power Company North Anna Power Station Units 1 and 2, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Revised Long-Term Actions Commitment List, ADAMS Accession number ML11314A069.


15.
Except in those cases in which the applicant pro poses an acceptable alternative method for complying with the specified portions of the Commission's regula tions, the method described in this guide will be used in the evaluation of applications for construction permits, operating licenses, combined licenses, or design certi fication submitted after January 10, 1997. This guide will not be used in the evaluation of an application for an operating license submitted after January 10, 1997, if the construction permit was issued prior to that date.


NRC letter to Virginia Electric and Power Company, November 11, 2011, Confirmatory Action Letter Regarding North Anna Power Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Long-Term Commitments to Address Exceeding Design Bases Seismic Event (TAC Nos. ME7254 and ME7255), ADAMS
Holders of an operating license or construction per mit issued prior to January 10, 1997, may voluntarily implement the methods described in this guide in com bination with the methods in Revision 2 to Regulatory Guide 1.12, "Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation for Earthquakes," and in Regulatory Guide 1.167, "Restart of a Nuclear Power Plant Shut Down by a Seismic Event." Other implementation strategies, such as vol untary implementation of portions of the cited regula tory guides, will be evaluated by the NRC staff on a case-by-case basis.
Accession number ML11311A201.


16.
1.166-5


International Atomic Energy Agency Safety (IAEA) Report Series No. 66, Earthquake Preparedness and Response for Nuclear Power Plants, Vienna, Austria.4  
APPENDIX A
INTERIM OPERATING BASIS EARTHQUAKE EXCEEDANCE GUIDELINES
This regulatory guide is based on the assumption that the nuclear power plant has operable seismic in strumentation and equipment (hardware and software)
to process the data. If the seismic instrumentation or data processing equipment is inoperable, the following should be used to determine whether the operating basis earthquake ground motion (OBE) has been exceeded:
1. For plants at which instrumentally determined data are available only from an instrument installed on a foundation, the cumulative absolute velocity (CAV) check (see Regulatory Position 4.2 of this guide) is not applicable. In this case, the determina tion of OBE exceedance is based on a response spectrum check similar to that described in Regula tory Position 4.1 of this regulatory guide. A com parison is made between the foundation-level de sign response spectra and data obtained from the foundation-level instruments. If the response spec trum check at any foundation is exceeded, the OBE
is exceeded and the plant must be shut down. At this instrument location it is inappropriate to use the 0.2g spectral acceleration limit or the 6 inches per second (15.24 centimeters per second) spectral velocity limit stated in Regulatory Position 4.1.2.


17.
2. For plants at which no free-field or foundation level instrumental data are available, or the data processing equipment is inoperable and the re sponse spectrum check and the CAV check can not be determined (Regulatory Positions 4.1 and 4.2),
the OBE will be considered to have been exceeded and the plant must be shut down if one of the fol lowing applies:
1. The earthquake resulted in Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) VI or greater within 5 km of the plant,
2. The earthquake was felt within the plant and was of magnitude 6.0 or greater, or
3. The earthquake was of magnitude 5.0 or great er and occurred within 200 km. of the plant.


IAEA Safety Guide NS-G-1.6, Seismic Design and Qualification for Nuclear Power Plants.
A postearthquake plant walkdown should be con ducted after the earthquake (see Regulatory Position 2 of this guide).
If plant shutdown is warranted under the above guidelines, the plant should be shut down in an orderly manner (see Regulatory Position 6 of this guide). 
Note: The determinations of epicentral loca tion, magnitude, and intensity by the U.S. Geo logical Survey, National Earthquake Informa tion Center, will usually take precedence over other estimates; however, regional and local determinations will be used if they are consid ered to be more accurate. Also, higher quality damage reports or a lack of damage reports from the nuclear power plant site or its imme diate vicinity will take precedence over more distant reports.


18.
1.166-6
11 K


NRC,  Management Directive 8.4, Management of Backfitting, Forward Fitting, Issue Finality, and
APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS
Certified Standard Design. A Commission ap proval, issued pursuant to Subpart B of 10 CFR Part 52, of a standard design for a nuclear power facility.


===
Design Response Spectra. Response spectra used to design Seismic Category I structures, systems, and components.


===Information Requests===
Operating Basis Earthquake Ground Motion (OBE). The vibratory ground motion for which those features of the nuclear power plant necessary for con- tinued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public will remain functional. The value of the OBE is set by the applicant.
===
, Washington, DC.


4 Copies of IAEA documents may be obtained through the IAEA Web site at www.iaea.org/ or by writing the International Atomic Energy Agency, P.O. Box 100 Wagramer Strasse 5, A-1400 Vienna, Austria.
Spectral Acceleration. The acceleration response of a linear oscillator with prescribed frequency and damping.


RG 1.166, Appendix A, Page A-1 APPENDIX A
Spectral Velocity. The velocity response of a lin ear oscillator with prescribed frequency and damping.


OPERATING-BASIS EARTHQUAKE EXCEEDANCE GUIDELINES IF
REGULATORY ANALYSIS
INSTRUMENTATION IS DEGRADED OR INOPERABLE
A separate regulatory analysis was not prepared for this regulatory guide. The regulatory analysis, "Revi sions of 10 CFR Part 100 and 10 CFR Part 50," was pre pared for these amendments, and it provides the regula tory basis for this guide and examines the costs and benefits of the rule as implemented by the guide. A
copy of the regulatory analysis is available for inspec tion and copying for a fee at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC, as Attachment 7 to SECY-96-118.


If the seismic instrumentation or data-processing equipment is degraded or inoperable, the following should be used to determine whether the operating-basis earthquake (OBE) ground motion has been exceeded: 
lPanper Federal Recycling Program
*
1.166-7
For plants at which instrumentally determined data are available only from an instrument installed on a foundation, the cumulative absolute velocity (CAV) check does not apply. In this case, the determination of OBE exceedance is based on a response spectrum check described in Section 6.4.1 of American National Standards Institute/American Nuclear Society (ANSI/ANS)-
2.23-2016, Nuclear Power Plant Response to an Earthquake (Ref. 1). A comparison should be made between the foundation-level design response spectra and data obtained from the foundation-level instruments. If the response spectrum check at any foundation is exceeded, the OBE is exceeded, and the plant must be shut down. At this instrument location, it is inappropriate to use the 0.2g spectral acceleration limit or the spectral velocity limit of 6 inches per second
(15.24 centimeters per second) in Section 6.4.1 of ANSI/ANS-2.23-2016.
 
*
For plants at which no free-field or foundation-level instrumental data are available or the data-processing equipment is inoperable and the response spectrum check and the CAV check cannot be determined, the OBE will be considered to have been exceeded, and the plant must be shut down if one of the following two conditions apply: 
 
(1) 
If instrumental intensity information is not available, the earthquake with moment magnitude M specified in Table B-1 occurred within a distance less than or equal to that specified in Table B-1.
 
Table B-1  Maximum Distance from an Earthquake with Moment Magnitude M at which the OBE Can Be Exceeded
 
Magnitude (M)
 
Distance (km)
5.0-5.5
 
80
5.6-6.0
 
150
6.1-6.5
 
250
6.6-7.0
 
300
7.1-7.5
 
380
7.6-8.0
 
480
If plant shutdown is warranted under the above guidelines, the plant should be shut down in an orderly manner (see Sections 6.2 and 6.5 of ANSI/ANS-2.23-2016).
 
RG 1.166, Appendix A, Page A-2 The licensee should conduct a post-earthquake plant walkdown after the earthquake (see Section 6.2 of ANSI/ANS-2.23-2016). 
 
(2) 
The earthquake resulted in Instrumental Intensity VI (Table B-2) or greater within 5 kilometers (km) of the plant.
 
Table B-2  ShakeMap Instrumental Intensity Scale (Ref. 2 and Ref. 3)
 
Note that the determination of epicentral location, magnitude, and intensity by the U.S. Geological Survey, National Earthquake Information Center, will usually take precedence over other estimates. However, higher quality damage reports or a lack of damage reports from the nuclear power plant site or its immediate vicinity will take precedence over more distant reports.
 
REFERENCES


S J .
.
. ... ..
...
1.
1.


ANSI/ANS-2.23-2016, Nuclear Power Plant Response to an Earthquake, LaGrange Park, IL.5
UNITED STATES
 
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
2.
WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001 FIRST CLASS MAIL
 
POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
Wald, D.J., V. Quitoriano, T.H. Heaton, H. Kanamori, C.W. Scrivner, and C.B. Worden, TriNet ShakeMaps: Rapid Generation of Peak Ground Motion and Intensity Maps for Earthquakes in Southern California, Earthquake Spectra, 15(3):537-556, 1991.6
USNRC
3.
PERMIT NO. G-67 OFmCIAL BUSINESS
 
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE, $300}}
U.S. Geological Survey, ShakeMap 3.5 Manual, available at https://usgs.github.io/shakemap/index.html.
 
5 Copies of ANSI/ANS standards may be purchased from the ANS Web site (http://www.new.ans.org/store/), or by writing to American Nuclear Society, 555 North Kensington Avenue, La Grange Park, IL 60526 (telephone:
800-323-3044). 
 
6 Earthquake Engineering Research Institute, 499 14th Street, Suite 220, Oakland, CA 94612-1934 USA
 
phone: 510-451-0905 l fax: 510-451-5411 l email: eeri@eeri.org}}


{{RG-Nav}}
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Latest revision as of 02:07, 17 January 2025

(Draft Was DG-1034) Pre-Earthquake Planning & Immediate Nuclear Power Plant Operator Postearthquake Actions
ML003740089
Person / Time
Issue date: 03/31/1997
From:
Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
To:
References
DG-1034 RG-1.166
Download: ML003740089 (8)


U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGULATORY

March 1997 GUIDE

÷o *OFFICE

OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH

REGULATORY GUIDE 1.166 (Draft was DG-1034)

PRE-EARTHQUAKE PLANNING AND IMMEDIATE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT OPERATOR

POSTEARTHQUAKE ACTIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

Paragraph IV(a)(4) of Appendix S, "Earthquake Engineering Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants," to

10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," requires that suitable instru mentation1 be provided so that the seismic response of nuclear power plant features important to safety can be evaluated promptly. Paragraph IV(a)(3) of Appendix S

to 10 CFR Part 50 requires shutdown of the nuclear power plant if vibratory ground motion exceeding that of the operating basis earthquake ground motion (OBE)

or significant plant damage occurs. If systems,, struc tures, or components necessary for the safe shutdown of the nuclear power plant are not available after occur rence of the OBE, the licensee must consult with the NRC and must propose a plan for the timely, safe shut down of the nuclear power plant. Licensees of nuclear power plants that are subject to the earthquake engi neering criteria in Appendix S to 10 CFR Part 50 are re quired by 10 CFR 50.54(ff) to shut down the plant if the criteria in Paragraph IV(a)(3) of Appendix S are ex ceeded.

1Regulatory Guide 1.12, Revision 2, "Nuclear Power Plant Instrumen tation for Earthquakes," describes seismic instrumentation that is ac ceptable to the NRC staff.

USNRC REGULATORY GUIDES

Regulatory Guides we Issued to'describe n make available to the public such Informa tlon as methods acceptable to Vie NRC staff for Implementing specific pats of the Com mission's regulations, techniques used by the staff in evaluating specific problems or pos tulated accidents, and data needed by the NRC staff in its review of applications for per mits and icensee. Regulory guldes are not substitutes for regulations, and compllance with them Is not required. Methods aid solutions different from those set out In the guides will be acceptable If they provide a basis for the findings requisite to the Issuance or con tinuence of a permit or lcense by te Commission.

This guide was issued alter consideration of comments received from the public Com merts and suggestions for improvements In these guides we encouraged at all imes, and guides will be revised, as appropriate, to accommodate comments " to reflect new In formation or aspedence.

Written comments may be submitted to the Rules Revew and Directives Branch, DFIPS,

ADM, U.S. Nulear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

This guide provides guidance acceptable to the NRC staff for a timely evaluation after an earthquake of the recorded instrumentation data and for determining whether plant shutdown is required by 10 CFR Part 50.

The information collections contained in this regu latory guide are covered by the requirements of 10 CFR

Part 50,which were approved by the Office of Manage ment and Budget, approval number 3150-0011. The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a collection of information un less it displays a currently valid OMB control number.

B. DISCUSSION

When an earthquake occurs, ground motion data are recorded by the seismic instrumentation. 1 These data are used to make a rapid determination of the de gree of severity of the seismic event. The data from the nuclear power plant's free-field seismic instrumenta tion, coupled with information obtained from a plant walkdown, are used to make the initial determination of whether the plant must be shut down, if it has not al ready been shut down by operational perturbations resulting from the seismic event. If on the basis of these initial evaluations (instrumentation data and walkdown) it is concluded that the plant shutdown cri teria have not been exceeded, it is presumed that the The guides wa issued In the following ten broad divisions:

1. Power Reactors

2. Research and Test Reactors

3 Fuels erd Materials Facilities

4. Environmental ard Siting s Materials and Plant Protection

& Products

7. Transportation S. Occupaional Health

9. Antitrust and Financal Review

10.. General Single copies oa regulatory guides may be obtained free of charge by writing the Office of Administration, Attention: Distribution and Mail Services Section. US. Nudear Regulatory Commission, Washington. DC 20555-0001; or by fax at (301)415-2280.

Issued guides may also be purchased from the National Technilcal Information Service on a standing order basis. Details on this service may be obtained by writing NTIS, 6285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.

plant will not be shut down (or could restart following a post-trip review, if it tripped off-line because of the earthquake). Guidance on postshutdown inspections and plant restart is contained in Regulatory Guide

1.167, "Restart of a Nuclear Power Plant Shut Down by a Seismic Event."

The Electric Power Research Institute has devel oped guidelines that will enable licensees to quickly identify and assess earthquake effects on nuclear power plants. These guidelines are in EPRI NP-5930, "A Cri terion for Determining Exceedance of the Operating Basis Earthquake," July 19882; EPRI NP-6695,

"Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earth quake," December 19892; and EPRI TR-100082,

"Standardization of the Cumulative Absolute Veloc ity," December 1991.2 This regulatory guide is based on the assumption that the nuclear power plant has operable seismic in strumentation, including the computer equipment and software required to process the data within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> af ter an earthquake. This is necessary because the deci sion to shut down the plant will be made, in part, by comparing the recorded data against OBE exceedance criteria. The decision to shut down the plant is also based on the results of the plant walkdown inspections that take place within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of the event. If the seismic instrumentation or data processing equipment is inop erable, the guidelines in Appendix A to this guide should be used to determine whether the OBE has been exceeded.

Shutdown of the nuclear power plant is required if the vibratory ground motion experienced exceeds that of the OBE. A criterion for determining exceedance of the OBE (based on data recorded in the free-field) is provided in EPRI NP-5930: a threshold response spec trum ordinate check and a cumulative absolute velocity (CAV) check. Seismic Category I structures at a nuclear power plant site may be designed using different ground motion response spectra; for example, one used for the certified standard design and another for site specific applications. The spectrum ordinate criterion is based on the lowest spectrum used in the design of the Seismic Category I structures. A procedure to standard ize the calculation of the CAV is provided in EPRI

TR-100082. A spectral velocity threshold has also been recommended by EPRI since some structures have fundamental frequencies below the range speci fied in EPRI NP-5930. The NRC staff now recom

2EPRI reports may be obtained from the Electric Power Research Insti tute, EPRI Distribution Center, 207 Coggins Dr., RO. Box 23205, Pleasant Hill, CA 94523.

mends 1.0 to 2.0 Hz for the range of the spectral veloc ity limit since some structures have fundamental frequencies below 1.5 Hz. This is instead of the 1.5 to

2.0 Hz range proposed by EPRI.

Because free-field seismic instrumentation data are used in the plant shutdown determiniation, it is im portant to ascertain that the time-history analysis hard ware and software were functioning properly. There fore, the response spectrum and CAV should be calculated using a suitable earthquake time-history or manufacturer's calibration standard after the initial in stallation and each servicing of the free-field instru mentation. After an earthquake at the plant site, the re sponse spectrum and CAV should be calculated using the time-history or calibration standard that was used during the last servicing (or initial instrumentation in stallation if no servicing has been performed) and the results compared with the latest data on file at the plant.

The NRC staff does not endorse the philosophy discussed in EPRI NP-6695, Section 4.3.4 (first para graph, last sentence), pertaining to plant shutdown con siderations following an earthquake based on the need for continued power generation in the region. If a li censee determines that plant shutdown is required by the NRC's regulations, but the licensee does not con sider it prudent to do so, the licensee would be required to consult with the NRC and propose a plan for the timely, safe shutdown of the nuclear power plant.

Because earthquake-induced vibration of the reac tor vessel could lead to changes in neutron fluxes, a prompt check of the neutron flux monitoring sensors would provide an indication that the reactor is stable.

Since the containment isolation valves may have malfunctioned during an earthquake, inspection of the containment isolation system is necessary to ensure continued containment integrity.

Appendix B to this guide provides definitions to be used with this guidance.

C. REGULATORY POSITION

1. BASE-LINE DATA

L1 Information Related to Seismic Instrumentation A file containing information on all the seismic in strumentation should be kept at the plant. The file should include:

1. Information on each instrument type such as make, model, and serial number; manufacturers' data sheet; list of special features or options; performance

1.166-2 K

L \\

characteristics; examples of typical instrumentation readings and interpretations; operations and mainte nance manuals; repair procedures (manufacturers' rec

..

ommendations for repairing common problems); and a list of any special requirements, e.g., for maintenance, operation, or installation.

2. Plan views and vertical sections showing the lo cation of each seismic instrument and the orientation of the instrument components with respect to plant refer ence axes.

3. A complete service history of each seismic in strument. The service history should include informa tion such as dates of servicing, description of completed work, and calibration records and data (where applicable). The documentation and retention of these data should be commensurate with the recordkeeping for other plant equipment.

4. A suitable earthquake time-history (e.g., the Oc tober 1987 Whittier, California, earthquake) or man ufacturer's calibration standard and the corresponding response spectrum and cumulative absolute velocity (CAV) (see Regulatory Positions 4.1 and 4.2). After the initial installation and each servicing of the free-field instrumentation, the response spectrum and CAV

should be calculated and filed (see Regulatory Position

4.3).

1.2 Planning for Postearthquake Inspections Sections 4.3.4.1 and 5.3.1 of EPRI NP-6695,

"Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earth quake," describe actions, such as selecting equipment and structures for inspections and the content of the baseline inspections, that are to be taken before an earthquake and that are acceptable to the NRC staff for satisfying the requirements in Paragraph IV(a)(3) of Appendix S to 10 CFR Part 50 for ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants.

2. ACTIONS IMMEDIATELY AFTER AN

EARTHQUAKE

The guidelines for actions immediately after an earthquake that are specified in Sections 4.3.1 (with the exception specified below) and 4.3.2 of EPRI NP-6695 are acceptable to the NRC staff for satisfying the re quirements in Paragraph IV(a)(3) of Appendix S to 10

CFR Part 50.

"In Section 4.3.1, a check of the neutron flux moni toring sensors for changes should be added to the spe cific control room board checks.

3. EVALUATION OF GROUND MOTION

RECORDS

3.1 Data Identification A record collection log should be maintained at the plant, and all data should be identifiable and traceable with respect to:

1. The date and time of collection,

2. The make, model, serial number, location, and orientation of the instrument (sensor) from which the record was collected.

3.2 Data Collection

3.2.1 Only personnel trained in the operation of the instrument should collect the data.

3.2.2 The steps for removing and storing records from each seismic instrument should be planned and performed in accordance with established procedures.

3.2.3 Extreme caution should be exercised to prevent accidental damage to the recording media and instruments during data collection and subsequent han dling.

3.2A

As data are collected and the instrumenta tion is inspected, notes should be made regarding the condition of the instrument and its installation, for ex ample, instrument flooded, mounting surface tilted, or objects that fell and struck the instrument or the instru ment mounting surface.

3.2.5 For validation of the collected data, the in formation described in Regulatory Position 1.1(4)

should be provided.

3.2.6 If the instrument's operation appears to have been normal, the instrument should remain in service without readjustment or change that would de feat attempts to obtain postevent calibration.

3.3 Record Evaluation Records should be analyzed according to the man ufacturer's specifications and the results of the analysis should be evaluated. Any record anomalies, invalid data, and nonpertinent signals should be noted, along with any known causes.

4.

DETERMINING OBE EXCEEDANCE

The evaluation to determine whether the OBE was exceeded should be performed using data obtained from the three components of the free-field ground mo tion (i.e., two horizontal and one vertical). The evalua tion may be performed on uncorrected earthquake records. It was found in a study of uncorrected versus

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corrected earthquake records (see EPRI NP-5930) that the use of uncorrected records is conservative. The evaluation should consist of a check of the response spectrum and CAV and a check on the operability of the instrumentation. This evaluation should take place within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of the earthquake.

4.1 Response Spectrum Check

4.1.1 The OBE response spectrum check is per formed using the lower of:

1. The spectrum used in the certified standard design, or

2. A spectrum other than (1) used in the design of any Seismic Category I structure.

4.1.2 The OBE response spectrum is exceeded if any one of the three components (two horizontal and one vertical) of the 5 percent of critical damping re sponse spectra generated using the free-field ground motion is larger than:

1. The corresponding design response spectral acceleration (OBE spectrum if used in the de sign, otherwise 1/3 of the safe shutdown earth quake ground motion (SSE) spectrum) or

0.2g, whichever is greater, for frequencies be tween 2 to 10 Hz, or

2. The corresponding design response spectral velocity (OBE spectrum if used in the design, otherwise 1/3 of the SSE spectrum) or a spec tral velocity of 6 inches per second (15.24 cen timeters per second), whichever is greater, for frequencies between 1 and 2 Hz.

4.2 Cumulative Absolute Velocity Check For each component of the free-field ground mo tion, the CAV should be calculated as follows: (1) the absolute acceleration (g units) time-history is divided into 1-second intervals, (2) each 1-second interval that has at least 1 exceedance of 0.025g is integrated over time, (3) all the integrated values are summed together to arrive at the CAy. The CAV check is exceeded if any CAV calculation is greater than 0.16 g-second. Addi tional information on how to determine the CAV is pro vided in EPRI TR-100082.

4.3 Instrument Operability Check After an earthquake at the plant site, the response spectrum and CAV should be calculated using the same input as that used in Regulatory Position 1.1(4), and the results should be compared with the latest filed data to demonstrate that the time-history analysis hardware and software were functioning properly. The results of this comparison should be reported to the NRC.

4.4 Inoperable Instrumentation or Data Processing Hardware or Software If the response spectrum and the CAV (Regulatory Positions 4.1 and 4.2) cannot be obtained because the seismic instrumentation is inoperable, data from the instrumentation are destroyed, or the data processing hardware or software is inoperable, the criteria in Ap pendix A to this guide should be used to determine whether the OBE has been exceeded.

5. CRITERIA FOR PLANT SHUTDOWN

If the OBE is exceeded or significant plant damage occurs, the plant must be shut down unless a plan for the timely, safe shutdown of the nuclear power plant has been proposed by the licensee and accepted by the NRC

staff.

5.1 OBE Exceedance If the response spectrum check and the CAV check (performed or calculated in accordance with Regulato ry Positions 4.1 and 4.2) were exceeded, the OBE was exceeded and plant shutdown is required. If either check does not exceed the criterion, the earthquake mo tion did not exceed the OBE. If only one check can be performed, the other check is assumed to be exceeded;

if neither check can be performed, see Regulatory Posi tion 4.4. The determination of whether or not the OBE

has been exceeded should be performed even if the plant automatically shuts down as a result of the earth quake.

5.2 Damage The plant should be shut down if the walkdown inspections performed in accordance with Regulatory Position 2 discover damage. This evaluation should take place within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> of the earthquake occurrence.

5.3 Continued Operation If the OBE was not exceeded and the walkdown in spection indicates no damage to the nuclear power plant, shutdown of the plant is not required. The plant may continue to operate (or may restart following a post-trip review, if it automatically shut down because of the earthquake).

6. PRE-SHUTDOWN INSPECTIONS

The pre-shutdown inspections described in Sec tion 4.3.4 of EPRI NP-6695, "Guidelines for Nuclear Plant Response to an Earthquake," with the exceptions specified below, are acceptable to the NRC staff for

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satisfying the requirements in Paragraph IV(aX3) of Appendix S to 10 CFR Part 50 for ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants.

6.1 Shutdown Timing Delete the last sentence in the first paragraph of Section 4.3.4 of EPRI NP-6695.

6.2 Safe Shutdown Equipment In Section 4.3.4.1 of EPRI NP-6695, a check of the containment isolation system should be added to the minimum list of equipment to be inspected.

6.3 Orderly Plant Shutdown The following paragraph in Section 4.3.4 of EPRI

NP-6695 is printed here to emphasize that the plant should shut down in an orderly manner.

"Prior to initiating plant shutdown following an earthquake, visual inspections and control board checks of safe shutdown systems should be performed by plant operations personnel, and the availability of off-site and emergency on-site power sources should be determined.

The purpose of these inspections is to deter mine the effect of the earthquake on essential safe shutdown equipment which is not normal ly in use during power operation so that any re sets or repairs required as a result of the earth quake can be performed, or alternate equipment can be readied, prior to initiating shutdown activities. In order to ascertain possi ble fuel and reactor internal damage, the fol lowing checks should be made, if possible, be fore plant shutdown is initiated ..... "

D. IMPLEMENTATION

The purpose of this section is to provide guidance to applicants and licensees regarding the NRC staff's plans for using this regulatory guide.

Except in those cases in which the applicant pro poses an acceptable alternative method for complying with the specified portions of the Commission's regula tions, the method described in this guide will be used in the evaluation of applications for construction permits, operating licenses, combined licenses, or design certi fication submitted after January 10, 1997. This guide will not be used in the evaluation of an application for an operating license submitted after January 10, 1997, if the construction permit was issued prior to that date.

Holders of an operating license or construction per mit issued prior to January 10, 1997, may voluntarily implement the methods described in this guide in com bination with the methods in Revision 2 to Regulatory Guide 1.12, "Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation for Earthquakes," and in Regulatory Guide 1.167, "Restart of a Nuclear Power Plant Shut Down by a Seismic Event." Other implementation strategies, such as vol untary implementation of portions of the cited regula tory guides, will be evaluated by the NRC staff on a case-by-case basis.

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APPENDIX A

INTERIM OPERATING BASIS EARTHQUAKE EXCEEDANCE GUIDELINES

This regulatory guide is based on the assumption that the nuclear power plant has operable seismic in strumentation and equipment (hardware and software)

to process the data. If the seismic instrumentation or data processing equipment is inoperable, the following should be used to determine whether the operating basis earthquake ground motion (OBE) has been exceeded:

1. For plants at which instrumentally determined data are available only from an instrument installed on a foundation, the cumulative absolute velocity (CAV) check (see Regulatory Position 4.2 of this guide) is not applicable. In this case, the determina tion of OBE exceedance is based on a response spectrum check similar to that described in Regula tory Position 4.1 of this regulatory guide. A com parison is made between the foundation-level de sign response spectra and data obtained from the foundation-level instruments. If the response spec trum check at any foundation is exceeded, the OBE

is exceeded and the plant must be shut down. At this instrument location it is inappropriate to use the 0.2g spectral acceleration limit or the 6 inches per second (15.24 centimeters per second) spectral velocity limit stated in Regulatory Position 4.1.2.

2. For plants at which no free-field or foundation level instrumental data are available, or the data processing equipment is inoperable and the re sponse spectrum check and the CAV check can not be determined (Regulatory Positions 4.1 and 4.2),

the OBE will be considered to have been exceeded and the plant must be shut down if one of the fol lowing applies:

1. The earthquake resulted in Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) VI or greater within 5 km of the plant,

2. The earthquake was felt within the plant and was of magnitude 6.0 or greater, or

3. The earthquake was of magnitude 5.0 or great er and occurred within 200 km. of the plant.

A postearthquake plant walkdown should be con ducted after the earthquake (see Regulatory Position 2 of this guide).

If plant shutdown is warranted under the above guidelines, the plant should be shut down in an orderly manner (see Regulatory Position 6 of this guide).

Note: The determinations of epicentral loca tion, magnitude, and intensity by the U.S. Geo logical Survey, National Earthquake Informa tion Center, will usually take precedence over other estimates; however, regional and local determinations will be used if they are consid ered to be more accurate. Also, higher quality damage reports or a lack of damage reports from the nuclear power plant site or its imme diate vicinity will take precedence over more distant reports.

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APPENDIX B

DEFINITIONS

Certified Standard Design. A Commission ap proval, issued pursuant to Subpart B of 10 CFR Part 52, of a standard design for a nuclear power facility.

Design Response Spectra. Response spectra used to design Seismic Category I structures, systems, and components.

Operating Basis Earthquake Ground Motion (OBE). The vibratory ground motion for which those features of the nuclear power plant necessary for con- tinued operation without undue risk to the health and safety of the public will remain functional. The value of the OBE is set by the applicant.

Spectral Acceleration. The acceleration response of a linear oscillator with prescribed frequency and damping.

Spectral Velocity. The velocity response of a lin ear oscillator with prescribed frequency and damping.

REGULATORY ANALYSIS

A separate regulatory analysis was not prepared for this regulatory guide. The regulatory analysis, "Revi sions of 10 CFR Part 100 and 10 CFR Part 50," was pre pared for these amendments, and it provides the regula tory basis for this guide and examines the costs and benefits of the rule as implemented by the guide. A

copy of the regulatory analysis is available for inspec tion and copying for a fee at the NRC Public Document Room, 2120 L Street NW. (Lower Level), Washington, DC, as Attachment 7 to SECY-96-118.

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