IR 05000348/2002002

IR 05000348-02-002 and IR 05000364-02-002, on 03/31/02 - 06/29/02, Farley Nuclear Plant Units 1 & 2. Routine Resident Report

ML022030345
Person / Time
Site:	Farley
Issue date:	07/18/2002
From:	Cahill S NRC/RGN-II
To:	Dennis Morey Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
IR-02-002
Download: ML022030345 (19)

Text

July 18, 2002

SUBJECT:

JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50-348/02-02 and 50-364/02-02

Dear Mr. Morey:

On June 29, 2002, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Farley Nuclear Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings discussed on July 1, 2002, with Mr. Randy Johnson and other members of your staff.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license relating to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

No findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be publicly available in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Stephen J. Cahill, Chief Reactor Projects, Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364 License Nos. NPF-2 and NPF-8

Enclosure:

NRC Integrated Inspection Report 50-348/02-02 and 50-364/02-02

REGION II==

Docket Nos.:

50-348 and 50-364 License Nos.:

NPF-2 and NPF-8 Report Nos.:

50-348/02-02 and 50-364/02-02 Licensee:

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Facility:

Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location:

7388 N. State Highway 95 Columbia, AL 36319 Dates:

March 31, 2002 to June 29, 2002 Inspectors:

T. Johnson, Sr. Resident Inspector C. Rapp, Sr. Project Engineer B. Holbrook, Sr. Project Engineer (Section 1R06)

Approved by:

Stephen J. Cahill, Chief Reactor Projects, Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000348/02-02, IR 05000364/02-02, Southern Nuclear Operating Company, 3/31/2002 -

06/29/2002, Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2, routine resident report.

The inspection was conducted by the resident inspector and two senior project engineers. No findings of significance were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000 at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/index.html.

A.

Inspector Identified Findings None B.

Licensee Identified Violation A violation of very low significance, which was identified by the licensee, has been reviewed by an inspector. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. The violation and corrective action tracking number is listed in section 4OA7 of this report.

Report Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 operated at 100% rated thermal power (RTP) until May 3 when the unit tripped due to loss of the Unit 1 B vital inverter. The unit was restarted on May 5 and operated at 100% RTP for the rest of the report period except for planned maintenance and testing.

Unit 2 operated at 100% RTP throughout the report period except for planned maintenance and testing.

1.

REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated the implementation of licensee procedures FNP-0-AOP-21.0, Severe Weather, and FNP-0-EIP-9.0, Emergency Classification and Actions, prior to hurricane season to verify the required planning and compensatory measures for equipment affected by high winds and flooding were satisfactorily completed. The inspectors walked down safety-related, risk significant, and fire protection equipment to verify adequate measures were taken. The inspectors interviewed selected personnel to assess their training and knowledge relative to hurricane preparedness. The inspectors also reviewed open work orders to verify the work orders did not adversely affect hurricane season readiness for the following systems:

• Building sumps and related pumping systems

• Off site power and switch yard

• On site emergency diesel generators

• DC and AC distribution systems

• Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) systems b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors performed partial walk downs to verify the three systems listed below were properly aligned when redundant systems or trains were out of service. The walk downs were performed using the criteria in licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-16, Conduct of Operations - Operations Group, and FNP-0-SOP-0, General Instructions to Operations Personnel. The inspectors also reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), plant procedures and drawings listed in the attachment, and checks of control room and plant valves, switches, components, electrical power line-ups, support equipment, and instrumentation.

• Unit 2 A train Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System

• Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system

• Unit 1 and 2 120 Volts (V) AC and 125/48 VDC Distribution Systems b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted a walk down of the six fire areas located in the buildings listed below to verify the licensee was controlling transient combustibles as required by licensee procedure, FNP-0-AP-38, Use of Open Flame, and verify the operational readiness of the fire suppression system, and the material condition and status of fire dampers, doors, and barriers as required by licensee procedure, FNP-0-AP-36, Fire Surveillance and Inspection. To verify implementation of licensee procedure, FNP-0-AP-39, Fire Patrols and Watches, the inspectors also checked that compensatory measures, including fire watches, were in place for degraded fire barriers.

The fire areas included the following:

• Diesel Generator Building (Fire Areas 58, 59)

• Unit 1 Turbine Building Elevations (Fire Area 1-84)

• Service Water Structure (Fire Area 72)

• Auxiliary Building (Fire Areas 1-5, 2-5)

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees internal and external flooding mitigation procedures and equipment to verify they were consistent with the licensees design requirements and risk analysis assumptions. For internal flooding, the inspectors reviewed the UFSAR and Individual Plant Examination (IPE) and walked down the areas listed below which contained risk-significant structures, systems and components (SSCs) below flood level to verify flood barriers were in place. Water-tight doors were observed to verify they were closed as required by licensee procedures, the locking mechanism functioned properly, and the sealing gasket material was intact and undamaged. The inspectors reviewed completed Surveillance Test and Preventative Maintenance (PM) work packages listed in the Attachment to verify the Technical Specification (TS) and PM requirements were met. The inspectors also reviewed selected Alarm Response Procedures to verify alarm setpoints and setpoints for sump pump operation were consistent with the UFSAR, the setpoint index, and TS.

For external flooding, the inspectors reviewed licensee procedure FNP-0-AOP-21.0, Severe Weather, to verify preparation and compensatory measures for flooding or heavy rain met the licensees design requirements and risk analysis assumptions. The inspectors discussed external flooding preparation and inspection of SSCs with engineering personnel to verify procedure steps could be accomplished during these conditions. The inspectors checked selected concrete valve boxes and cable tunnels to verify they were sealed or covered, the sump pumps functioned, and adverse water conditions did not exist.

The inspectors reviewed a sampling of Condition Reports (CRs) to verify the licensee was identifying and correcting problems associated with flood detection and protection of SSCs. Licensee documents and drawings reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment. Areas walked down included the following:

• Unit 1 and 2 Containment Spray Pump rooms - 77 foot elevation

• Unit 1 Motor Driven AFW Pump room - 100 foot elevation

• Unit 2 RHR Pump rooms - 83 foot elevation

• Unit 2 Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump rooms - 100 foot elevation b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors observed portions of the cleaning, engineering performance testing, and vendor eddy current testing of both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 CCW heat exchangers to verify implementation of licensee procedures FNP-0-ETP-4379, Performance Test for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 CCW Heat Exchangers, FNP-0-MP-94, CCW Heat Exchanger Tube Plugging, and vendor procedure ET001, Eddy Current Testing of Heat Exchanger Tubes. The inspectors reviewed the performance test results to verify the licensee had adequately identified and resolved any potential heat exchanger deficiencies which could mask degraded performance, common cause heat sink performance problems that could increase risk, and heat sink performance problems that could result in initiating events or affect multiple heat exchangers in mitigating systems. The inspector reviewed the eddy current testing results to verify the licensee had properly identified any additional heat exchanger tubes that required plugging. The inspectors also reviewed licensee calculation ES91-2016, CCW Design Basis Heat Load Summary Report, to verify the plugged heat exchanger tubes did not adversely affect heat removal capacity.

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors observed portions of the licensed operator training and testing program to verify implementation of procedures FNP-0-AP-45, Farley Nuclear Plant Training Program, FNP-0-TCP-17.6, Simulator Training Evaluation Documentation, and FNP-0-TCP-17.3, Licensed Operator Continuing Training Program. The inspectors observed scenarios conducted in the licensees simulator for a primary leak, loss of coolant accident, failure of the reactor protection system, stuck control rod, and offsite radioactive release. The inspectors observed critical operator actions, overall performance, self-critiques, training feedback, and management oversight to verify operator performance was evaluated against the performance standards of the licensees scenario. In addition, the inspectors observed implementation of the applicable emergency operating procedures to verify that licensee standards in procedures FNP-0-AP-16 and FNP-0-TCP-17.6 were met.

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the following six CRs to verify that functional, maintenance preventable functional, and repetitive failures were properly identified as required by licensee procedure FNP-0-M-89, FNP Maintenance Rule Site Implementation Manual.

The inspectors checked equipment availability and reliability monitoring to verify implementation of licensee procedure FNP-0-SYP-19, Maintenance Rule Performance Criteria. The inspectors also interviewed maintenance personnel, system specialists, the maintenance rule (MR) coordinator, and operations personnel to verify their knowledge of the program.

• CR 2002000318, 1D Service Water Pump Breaker Charging Motor

• CR 2002000607, Unit 1 Charging Pumps Auxiliary Cooling From Fire Water

• CR 2001002150, 2A CCW Pump Breaker Failure

• CR 2002000644, Unit 1 and 2 AFW Oil Samples for Particulate Above Limit

• CR 2002001033, 1C Battery Charge (spare) Failure

• CR 2002000162, Unit 1 A Train CCW Low Temperature For RHR Supply b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors assessed the licensees planning and control for the following six activities to verify the requirements in licensee procedures FNP-0-ACP-52.1, Guidelines

for Scheduling of On-Line Maintenance, AP-FNP-0-AP-52, Equipment Status Control and Maintenance Authorization, and FNP-0-AP-16, Conduct of Operations - Operations Group, and the Maintenance Rule risk assessment guidance in 10CFR50.65 a(4) were met.

• 1B Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> test and rocker arm repair

• High voltage switch yard work concurrent with 2B RHR pump outage

• 2B EDG 9 month preventive maintenance outage

• 2B steam generator feedwater pump (SGFP) temperature control valve (TCV)

troubleshooting

• Unit 1 main power transformer hot spot work

• Units 1 and 2 TDAFW uninterruptable power supply (UPS) capacitor replacements b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R14 Personnel Performance During Non-routine Plant Evolutions

.1 Unit 1 Reactor Trip a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors observed control room operators recovery from a Unit 1 automatic reactor trip on May 3. The inspectors observed control room operator actions to verify implementation of licensee operating procedures FNP-1-ARP-0001, Main Control Board Annunciator Panel, FNP-1-ESP-0.1, Reactor Trip Recovery, and FNP-1-EEP-0, Reactor Trip or SI. The observations also included command and control, post trip recovery, management involvement, training expectations, and communications. The inspectors reviewed operator logs, plant computer data, control room strip charts, and discussed the trip with operations personnel to verify the licensee had correctly assessed the cause. (See section 4OA3)

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Unit 2 Secondary Chemistry Transients a.

Inspection Scope During June 16-18, several secondary plant chemistry transients occurred possibly due to a condenser tube leak or a contaminant release from a heater drain tank. The inspectors observed control room operators and chemistry personnel response to verify the use of licensee procedures FNP-2-AOP-25, Abnormal Primary or Secondary Chemistry, and FNP-0-ETP-4021, Condenser Tube Leak Detection with the Water Box Isolated. The inspectors reviewed operator and chemistry logs, trended computer data,

chemical control specifications, and discussed the event with operations and chemistry personnel to verify the licensee responded appropriately.

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the following five operability evaluations to verify the technical adequacy, consideration of degraded conditions, and identification of compensatory measures met the requirements of licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-16 and FNP-0-ACP-9.2, Operability Determination (OD). The inspectors reviewed the design bases, as stated in the UFSAR and associated Functional System Descriptions (FSD),

to verify system operability was appropriately evaluated.

• OD-02-01,TDAFW UPS Capacitor Operability

• 2B SGFP TCV malfunctioning

• OD-02-02, 2A RHR Pump Minimum Flow Valve Operability

• OD-02-03, 2A RHR Pump Discharge Valve Flow Operability

• 1C EDG Alarm Panel Operability

• CR2002001273, Containment Air Locks b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R16 Operator Work-Arounds a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the following four operator work-arounds to verify that system functional or human performance capability were not affected and the prioritization of required actions met the requirements of licensee procedure FNP-0-ACP-17, Operator Work-Arounds. The inspectors also reviewed the cumulative effects of the operator work-arounds to verify they did not affect the operators ability to perform actions in both abnormal and emergency operating procedures, did not increase initiating event frequency, and did not affect multiple mitigating systems.

• Unit 1B cold leg accumulator back leakage

• 1C EDG low jacket water temperature

• Main Steam drain pot isolation valves

• 2B SGFP TCV malfunctioning

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R17 Permanent Plant Modifications a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the three following plant modifications and the related procedures and drawings to verify the requirements of licensee procedure FNP-0-AP-8, Design Modification Control were met. This included verification that the design bases, licensing bases, and performance capability of risk significant SSCs would not be degraded through the modifications and the modifications would not place the plant in an unsafe condition. The inspectors also observed the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) approval of these Design Change Packages (DCPs) and discussed the modifications with engineering and operations personnel to verify the licensee understood the scope of these modifications.

• S01-1(2)-9811(9810), TDAFW UPS Capacitor Replacements - Units 1 and 2

• S99-1-9472, Unit 1 High Voltage Switch 230 kV Line Upgrades

• S02-2-9794, Raccoon Creek Substation (North Tifton 5000 kV Line Project)

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the following six post-maintenance tests and reviewed the criteria in licensee procedures FNP-0-ACP-52.1, Guidelines for Scheduling of On-Line Maintenance, and AP-FNP-0-AP-52, Equipment Status Control and Maintenance Authorization, to verify the procedures and test activities were adequate to verify system operability and functional capability.

• 2B EDG 9 month overhaul post

• 2B RHR Pump post lubrication and preventive maintenance

• 2A CCW Pump post lubrication and preventive maintenance

• Unit 1, 2 TDAFW UPS capacitor replacements

• 1C EDG alarm panel repair

• 1B EDG rocker arm repair b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the following seven surveillance tests to verify the testing adequately demonstrated equipment operability. The inspectors checked for preconditioning of equipment, procedure adherence, and valve alignment following completion of the surveillance to verify the system was tested as required by licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-24, Test Control, FNP-0-M-050, Master List of Surveillance Requirements, and FNP-0-AP-16.

• FNP-2-STP-11.2, 2B RHR Pump Inservice Test

• FNP-2-STP-80.1, 2B EDG Operability Test

• FNP-1-STP-16.2, 1B Containment Spray Pump Inservice Test

• FNP-1-STP-4.2, 1B Charging Pump Inservice Test

• FNP-2-STP-80.1, 2B EDG Operability Test

• FNP-1-STP-80.6, 1B EDG 24 Hour Test

• FNP-2-STP-607.1, Containment Air Lock Leakage Test b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the following four temporary modifications and minor departures (MD) to verify they were properly implemented as required by licensee procedure FNP-0-AP-8, Design Modification Control. The review included configuration control, post-installation test activities, drawing and procedure updates, and operator awareness. The inspectors also reviewed associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening criteria against the system design bases information and documentation to verify if the licensee had correctly determined the modification would not affect plant safety.

• MD-02-2703, Defeat of the 2C Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Horizontal Shaft Vibration Alarm

• MD-02-2702, Pipe Clamp Around an Outside Leak in the Unit 2 Liquid Disposal System

• MD-02-2699, Unit 2 Main Generator Lead Box Temporary Supports

• MD-02-2707, Unit 2 Main Power Transformer Pressure relief Device Lifted Lead b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness (EP)

1EP6 Drill Evaluation a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors observed an emergency drill on May 1 to verify the licensee was properly classifying the event, making required notifications, making protective action recommendations, and conducting self-assessments as required by procedure FNP-0-EIP-15.0, Emergency Drills. The drills included activation of all emergency response facilities, including the alternate Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF). The inspectors reviewed procedure FNP-0-EIP-27.1, Alternate EOF Setup and Activation, to verify the alternate EOF was correctly activated.

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

4.

OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed licensee procedure FNP-0-AP-54, Preparation and Review of NRC Performance Indicator Data and the TS to verify the accuracy of the first quarter of 2002 PI data submitted by the licensee for both units safety system unavailability for the heat removal systems (AFW) and the emergency AC power systems. The inspectors reviewed the Unit 1 and Unit 2 operator logs for 2002, the daily morning reports (including CR descriptions), the monthly operating reports, Licensee Event Reports (LERs), NRC Inspection Reports, and several Limiting Conditions for Operation (LCOs). The inspectors also interviewed licensee personnel associated with the PI data collection, evaluation, and distribution.

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution a.

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed CR 2002001020, Unit 1 Reactor Trip and Root Cause Report, to verify that equipment, human performance, and program issues were being identified and corrected as required by licensee procedures FNP-0-AP-7, Corrective Action Reporting, FNP-0-AP-22, Nonconformance Control / Deficiency Reporting, FNP-0-AP-30, Preparation and Processing of Condition Reports Program, and FNP-0-ACP-9.1, Root Cause.

b.

Findings No findings of significance were identified.

4OA3 Event Follow-up (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-348/2002-001, Reactor Trip Due to Inadvertent Electrical Contact During Recorder NR45 Maintenance This event was discussed in Section 1R14.1. There were no inspector identified findings of significance. A licensee identified violation is addressed in Section 4OA7.

4OA6 Meetings Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Randy Johnson, Assistant General Manager - Operations, and other members of licensee management on July 1, 2002. The inspectors asked the licensee if any of the material examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

4OA7 Licensee Identified Violations The following finding of very low significance (Green) was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which met the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600 for being dispositioned as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV). If the licensee denies this NCV, they should provide a response with the basis of their denials, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant.

NCV Tracking Number Requirement Licensee Failed to Meet NCV 50-348/02-02-01 On May 3, 2002, an electrical short occurred while a technician was restoring power to a control room recorder with the circuit energized when the power lead contacted the grounding strip. This caused an electrical short which resulted in a momentary loss of the Unit 1 B vital inverter.

The respective reactor protection system relays de-energized, causing a reactor trip. The procedural guidance for taping of electrical leads when working on

energized safety related electrical circuits was not adequate. TS 5.4.1.a requires written procedures be established and maintained covering the activities listed in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Rev. 2, Appendix A, February 1978, including safety related electrical equipment. This violation was placed in the licensees corrective action program as CR 2002001020 (Section 4OA3).

Attachment: Supplemental Information

Attachment SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee R. V. Badham, Administration Manager C. L. Buck, Chemistry/Health Physics Manager R. M. Coleman, Outage and Modification Manager C. D. Collins, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support K. C. Dyar, Security Manager D. E. Grissette, Plant General Manager J. R. Johnson, Assistant General Manager - Operations R. R. Martin, Engineering Support Manager B. L. Moore, Maintenance Manager C. D. Nesbitt, Training Recovery Manager L. M. Stinson, Nuclear Support General Manager, Farley Project R. J. Vanderbye, Emergency Preparedness Coordinator L. Williams, Training Manager T. Youngblood, Operations Manager NRC S.J. Cahill, Division of Reactor Projects INSPECTION DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Section 1R04 FNP-1(2)-SOP-22(22A), AFW System FNP-1(2)-SOP-36, Plant Electrical Distribution Lineup FNP-1(2)-SOP-7, RHR System FNP-1(2)-SOP-36.4(4A), 120V AC Instrumentation System FNP-1(2)-SOP-36.3, 208/120V AC Electrical Distribution System FNP-1(2)-AOP-5.1, Contingency Electrical Alignments FNP-1(2)-AOP-5, Loss of Electrical Train A or B FNP-1(2)-AOP-12, Loss of Train A or B RHR System FNP-1(2)-SOP-37.1(1A), 125V DC Auxiliary Building Distribution Lineup FNP-1(2)-SOP-37.4(4A), Miscellaneous 125V DC Distribution Lineup Electrical Distribution System Functional System Description (FSD) - A181004 AFW System FSD - A181010 Section 1R06 FNP-Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) Sections 3 and 9 System Descriptions A-181000, A-181001, A-181008, and A-181009, FNP-2-STP-215.7, Flooding Detector Functional Test FNP-1-STP-215.7A, Main Steam Relief Valve Flood Detectors FNP-0-IMP-422.2, Float Chamber Level Switch Calibration FNP-0-SOP-0.0, General Instructions to Operations Personnel

Attachment Unit 1 Alarm Response Procedures, FNP-1-ARP-1.1-D1, 1.1-E1, 1.1-E2, 1.10-F1, 3.1-E3, 3.1-F2, 3.1-G2, 3.1-H2, 3.2-A2, 3.2-B2, 3.2-C2, 3.2-E2, 3.2-E3, 3.2-F2, 3.2-G2, 3.2-H2, 10-4, 10-11, and 10-14 FNP-B175968 (Unit 1 Setpoint Index)

FNP-B205968 (Unit 2 Setpoint Index)

Condition Reports 2000005856, Water Tight Door Left Open 2001002039, Failure To Perform Sump Pump Level Annunciator Test 2001002561, Sump Backed Up In RHR Pump Room (Sump Pump Not Operate)

2001002781, Water Tight Door Left Open 2002000504, River Water Pump Expansion Joint Found Damaged 2002000825, Failure to perform PM on Flooding Level Switches 2002001067, Water Tight Door Left Open Work Authorization Packages W00642892, CCW Pump Room Flood Annunciator Test (3084A)

W00642893, CCW Pump Room Flood Annunciator Test (3084B)

W00663974, Charging (CHG)/High-Head Safety Injection Pump 1C Sump W00663975, CHG/HHSI Pump 1A Sump W00663976, Containment (CTMT) Spray Pump Room Sump W00663977, CTMT Spray Pump Room Sump W00663978, CHG/HHSI Pump 1B Sump Pump W00663979, RHR/Low-Head Safety Injection Pump 1B Room Sump W00663980, RHR/LHSI Pump 1A Room Sump Section 1R14.2 CR 2002001298 FNP Daily Chemistry Reports June 15-18