IR 05000247/2002005

IR 05000247-02-005, on 8/10/2002, Indian Point 2 Nuclear Power Plant, Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Physical Protection, and Cross-Cutting

ML022670268
Person / Time
Site:	Indian Point
Issue date:	09/23/2002
From:	Brian Holian Division Reactor Projects I
To:	Dacimo F Entergy Nuclear Operations
References
IR-02-005
Download: ML022670268 (31)

Text

September 23, 2002

SUBJECT:

INDIAN POINT 2 - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50-247/02-05

Dear Mr. Dacimo:

On August 10, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection at the Indian Point 2 Nuclear Power Plant. The enclosed report presents the results of that inspection. The results were discussed on August 21, 2002, with members of your staff.

The inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your license. The inspection also reviewed security physical protection, radiological environmental monitoring, and occupational radiation safety. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of a selected examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, the inspectors identified four issues of very low safety significance, including two non-cited violations that were entered into the licensees corrective action system.

The NRC has increased security requirements at Indian Point 2 in response to terrorist acts on September 11, 2001. Although the NRC is not aware of any specific threat against nuclear facilities, the NRC issued an Order and several threat advisories to commercial power reactors to strengthen licensees capabilities and readiness to respond to a potential attack. The NRC continues to monitor overall security controls and will issue temporary instructions in the near future to verify by inspection the licensee's compliance with the Order and current security regulations.

The inspectors identified four findings of very low safety significance (Green). Two of the four findings were determined to be violations of NRC requirements. However, because of their very low safety significance and because the issues have been addressed and entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating these issues as non-cited violations, in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. If you deny these non-cited violations, you should provide a response with the basis for your denial, within 30 days of the receipt of this letter, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region 1; the Director, Office of Enforcement; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Indian Point 2 facility.

Mr. Fred Dacimo

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRCs "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). Should you have any questions regarding this report, please contact Mr. Peter Eselgroth at 610-337-5234.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Brian E. Holian, Deputy Director Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.50-247 License No. DPR-26

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 50-247/02-05 Attachment 1 - Supplemental Information

REGION I==

Docket No.

50-247 License No.

DPR-26 Report No.

50-247/02-05 Licensee:

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc..

Facility:

Indian Point 2 Nuclear Power Plant Location:

Buchanan, New York 10511 Dates:

June 30 - August 10, 2002 Inspectors:

Peter Habighorst, Senior Resident Inspector Lois James, Resident Inspector William Raymond, Senior Resident Inspector, Pilgrim John McFadden, Radiation Specialist Jason Jang, Radiation Specialist Paul Frechette, Security Inspector (In-office review)

Approved by: Peter W. Eselgroth, Chief Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects

ii

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000247-02-05, on 6/30 - 8/10/2002, Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.; Indian Point 2

Nuclear Power Plant. Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Physical Protection, and Cross-Cutting The report covered a six week period of inspection by resident and region-based inspectors.

Four findings of very low safety significance were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

GREEN. On July 19, 2002, a contractor worked outside his established job scope for landscaping activities. The consequences of this human performance error were the accidental electrocution of the individual and an offsite power electrical transient (loss of the 138 kilovolt station auxiliary transformer for approximately seven hours). This partial loss of offsite power event was more than minor, in that it impacted the reactor safety cornerstone with respect to the initiating event objective of limiting the likelihood of an event that upsets plant stability and challenges the critical safety function of the on-site emergency diesel generators.

Notwithstanding the loss of life (which the Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration is reviewing), this electrical transient event was of very low safety significance because it did not contribute to the likelihood of: loss of coolant accidents, a reactor trip and the unavailability of accident mitigation equipment or functions being unavailable; or of a fire or internal/external flood. No violations of NRC requirements were identified. (1R14)

Cornerstone: Mitigating System

GREEN. On July 19, 2002, operators did not identify the applicability of a shutdown Technical Specification (TS) associated with the planned removal from service of the 22 emergency diesel generator (EDG), while the 138 kilovolt off site power system was still out-of-service. This finding was associated with the reactor safety cornerstone with respect to the mitigating systems objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of the EDG to respond to initiating events, such as a loss of offsite power, to prevent undesirable consequences.

No violation of NRC requirements was identified, since Entergy restored the 22 emergency diesel generator prior to exceeding the allowed outage time per TS 3.0.1. This finding was of very low safety significance since it did not represent a total loss of emergency power safety function. (1R14)

Cornerstone: Physical Protection

GREEN. On July 29, 2002, a member of the Unit 2 security response force was found inattentive to assigned duties. This inspector identified finding was treated as a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 73.55(b)(1)(i), and the Indian Point 2 Physical Security Plan.

Summary of Findings (contd)iii The security response force officers inattentiveness to duties was determined to have very low safety significance, using the Interim Physical Significance Determination Process. The finding did not involve a significant compromise of the Physical Security Plan; no actual intrusion occurred; and, there have not been greater than two similar findings in the past four quarters.

(3PP3)

Cross-Cutting Issues:

GREEN. On July 23, 2002, Entergy did not appropriately evaluate and implement short-term actions associated with Condition Report (CR) IP2-2002-07253. The consequence of the finding was the relocation of spent fuel assembly G-28 without the appropriate handling tools and precautions. The finding is more than minor since it could be reasonably viewed as a precursor to a significant event (dropped spent fuel assembly in the spent fuel pool).

The Significance Determination Process is not modeled for a finding of this type. However, in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter 0612, this finding was reviewed by NRC risk analysts and management and has been determined to be of very low safety significance because no actual consequence existed and there was no unintended radiation worker exposure. The finding was determined to be a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, and is being treated as a non-cited violation. (1R20)

iv SUMMARY OF

PLANT STATUS

REACTOR SAFETY

................................................... 1 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection....................................... 1 1R04 Equipment Alignment............................................. 1 1R05 Fire Protection.................................................. 3 1R06 Flood Protection Measures........................................ 4

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessment and Emergent Work Activities.............. 4 1R14

Personnel Performance During Non-Routine Plant Evolutions and Events.... 5

1R15 Operability Evaluations

........................................... 7 1R19 Post Maintenance Testing......................................... 7 1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities..................................... 8

==1R22 Surveillance Testing

==

RADIATION SAFETY

................................................. 10 2OS1 Access Control to Radiologically Significant Areas

..................... 10 2OS2 ALARA Planning and Controls..................................... 11 2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment........... 11 2PS1 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP)................ 12 2PS2 Radioactive Material Control Program

SAFEGUARDS

...................................................... 13 3PP3 Response to Contingency Events

OTHER ACTIVITIES (OA)

.............................................. 15

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit.......................................... 17

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT................................................. 18 ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED................................... 19 LIST OF

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

R. Allen

Manager, Regulatory Affair

S. Baer

HP Supervisor

T. Barry

Security Superintendent

T. Burns

Environmental Supervisor

R. Burroni

I&C Maintenance Manager

J. Cambigianis

System Engineer

F. Dacimo

Vice President, Operations

G. Dahl

Fire Protection System Engineer

M. Dampf

Health Physics Manager

J. Danielle

HP Technician

R. Decensi

Radiological Protection/Chemistry Manager

R. Depatie

System Engineer

T. Foley

System Engineer

R. Fucheck

HP Supervisor

D. Gately

Radiation Protection Coordinator

L. Glander

Dosimetry Supervisor

J. Hendrickson

HP Technician

W. James

Maintenance and Construction Manager

R. Majes

Radiological Support Health Physicist

J. McCann

Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing

M. Miele

Manager Unit 1

K. Naku

I&C Maintenance Supervisor

V. Nutter

Radiological Support Manager

P. K. Parker

Maintenance Manager

J. Reynolds

Corrective Action Group

R. Richards

HP Supervisor

W. Rudolph

Security Guard

P. Rubin

Operations Manager

C. Schwarz

General Manager of Plant Operations

G. Schwartz

Director of Engineering

P. Speedling

Fire Protection Specialist

D. Thompson

Security Manager

M. Vasely

System Engineering Section Manager

J. Ventosa

System Engineering Manager

R. Zolotas

HP Technician

(contd)

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Closed

50-247/2002-02-02 URI Evaluation of Hydrogen Storage Locations.

50-247/2001-03-02 URI Review changes to the Facility per 10 CFR 50.59.

Open/Closed 50-247/02-05-01 NCV Fail to use the appropriate tooling device for movement of fuel assembly G28 on July 23, 2002.

50-247/02-05-02 NCV Failure to maintain safeguards in accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(b)(1)(i) and Entergys Indian Point 2 Physical Security Plan.