IR 05000327/2002007: Difference between revisions

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=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:THIS IS A COVER SHEET OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING INFORMATION ARE AVAILABLE IN MANAGEMENT DIRECTIVE 12.6 THIS IS A COVER SHEET U.S.NUCLEAR NRC FORM 190B    REGULATORY COMMISSION (9-1999) NRCMD 12.6
{{#Wiki_filter:December 18, 2002


UNITED STATES N U CL E AR R E G U LAT O R Y C O M MI S S I O N R E G I O N II SAM NUNN ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER 61 FORSYTH STREET SW SUITE 23T85 ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8931 10 CFR 2.790(d)
December 18, 2002 Tennessee Valley Authority ATTN: Mr. J. Document transmitted herewith Chief Nuclear Officer and  contains sensitive unclassified Executive Vice President  information. When separated from the
==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT 50-327/2002-007 AND 50-328/2002-007
SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT 50-327/2002-007 AND 50-328/2002-007
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In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).


Due to the sensitive security nature of the Report Details, they are being withheld pursuant to 10 CFR 2.790(d). 10 CFR 2.790(d)
Due to the sensitive security nature of the Report Details, they are being withheld pursuant to 10 CFR 2.790(d).
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION 10 CFR 2.790(d)
 
TVA  2 Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact me at 404-562-4653.
Document transmitted herewith contains sensitive unclassified information. When separated from the Report Details this document is decontrolled.
 
TVA 2 10 CFR 2.790(d) 10 CFR 2.790(d)
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact me at 404-562-4653.


Sincerely,
Sincerely,
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REGION II==
REGION II==
Docket Nos.: 50-327, 50-328 License Nos.: DPR-77, DPR-79 Report No.: 50-327 and 328/2002-07 Licensee: Tennessee Valley Authority Facility: Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location: Sequoyah Access Road Soddy-Daisy, TN 37379 Dates: September 13 and November 18-19, 2002 Inspector: Jon H. Wallo Physical Security Inspector Approved by: Anne T. Boland, Chief Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety Document transmitted herewith contains sensitive unclassified information. When separated from the Report Details this document is decontrolled.
Docket Nos.:
50-327, 50-328 License Nos.:
DPR-77, DPR-79 Report No.:
50-327 and 328/2002-07 Licensee:
Tennessee Valley Authority Facility:
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location:
Sequoyah Access Road Soddy-Daisy, TN 37379 Dates:
September 13 and November 18-19, 2002 Inspector:
Jon H. Wallo Physical Security Inspector Approved by:
Anne T. Boland, Chief Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety


Enclosure 10 CFR 2.790(d)
Enclosure Document transmitted herewith contains sensitive unclassified information. When separated from the Report Details this document is decontrolled. 10 CFR 2.790(d) 10 CFR 2.790(d)
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION 10 CFR 2.790(d)
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000327-02-07, IR 05000328-02-07, Event Follow-up on 9/13 and 11/18-19/2002, Tennessee Valley Authority, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000327-02-07, IR 05000328-02-07, Event Follow-up on 9/13 and 11/18-19/2002, Tennessee Valley Authority, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2.


The inspection was conducted by a physical security inspector. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Significance Determination Process (SDP). The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/index.html.
The inspection was conducted by a physical security inspector. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Significance Determination Process (SDP). The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/index.html.


A. Inspector Identified Findings and Self-Revealing Findings Cornerstone: Safeguards Green. A non-cited violation was identified for the licensees failure to comply with Section 5.3.1 of the Physical Security Plan and Section 3.3 B of Security Instruction No. 1, in that on September 13, 2002, security officers failed to perform a physical search of an individual who had previously alarmed the explosives detector, prior to allowing the individual access to the protected area.
A.
 
Inspector Identified Findings and Self-Revealing Findings Cornerstone: Safeguards Green. A non-cited violation was identified for the licensees failure to comply with Section 5.3.1 of the Physical Security Plan and Section 3.3 B of Security Instruction No. 1, in that on September 13, 2002, security officers failed to perform a physical search of an individual who had previously alarmed the explosives detector, prior to allowing the individual access to the protected area.


The finding was of very low safety significance in that, using the Physical Protection Significance Determination Process, it was identified as a vulnerability in access control, without a malevolent act, and without two similar findings in four quarters.
The finding was of very low safety significance in that, using the Physical Protection Significance Determination Process, it was identified as a vulnerability in access control, without a malevolent act, and without two similar findings in four quarters.


B. Licensee Identified Violations None Document transmitted herewith contains sensitive unclassified information. When separated from the Report Details this document is decontrolled. 10 CFR 2.790(d)
B.
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
 
Licensee Identified Violations None Document transmitted herewith contains sensitive unclassified information. When separated from the Report Details this document is decontrolled.
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 13:37, 16 January 2025

IR 05000327-02-007, on 09/13 - 11/18-19/2002, Sequoyah, Units 1 & 2. Event Follow-Up. Non-Cited Violation Noted
ML023520529
Person / Time
Site: Sequoyah  Tennessee Valley Authority icon.png
Issue date: 12/18/2002
From: Boland A, Cahill S
Division of Reactor Safety II
To: Scalice J
Tennessee Valley Authority
References
IR-02-007
Download: ML023520529 (6)


Text

December 18, 2002

SUBJECT:

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC SPECIAL INSPECTION REPORT 50-327/2002-007 AND 50-328/2002-007

Dear Mr. Scalice:

This refers to the special inspection of a security event that was conducted on September 13 and November 18-19, 2002, at the Sequoyah facility. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on November 19, 2002, with Mr. Dennis Koehl and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspector reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, the inspectors identified one finding of very low safety significance (Green). The issue was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements.

However, due to its very low safety significance, and because it has been entered into your Corrective Action Program, the NRC is treating the issue as a non-cited violation (NCV), in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. If you deny this NCV, you should provide a response with the basis of your denial, within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Sequoyah facility.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams/index.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Due to the sensitive security nature of the Report Details, they are being withheld pursuant to 10 CFR 2.790(d).

Document transmitted herewith contains sensitive unclassified information. When separated from the Report Details this document is decontrolled.

TVA 2 10 CFR 2.790(d) 10 CFR 2.790(d)

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact me at 404-562-4653.

Sincerely,

/RA/ Stephen Cahill for Anne T. Boland, Chief Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-327, 50-328 License Nos. DPR-77, DPR-79

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report w/Attachment

REGION II==

Docket Nos.:

50-327, 50-328 License Nos.:

DPR-77, DPR-79 Report No.:

50-327 and 328/2002-07 Licensee:

Tennessee Valley Authority Facility:

Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location:

Sequoyah Access Road Soddy-Daisy, TN 37379 Dates:

September 13 and November 18-19, 2002 Inspector:

Jon H. Wallo Physical Security Inspector Approved by:

Anne T. Boland, Chief Plant Support Branch Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure Document transmitted herewith contains sensitive unclassified information. When separated from the Report Details this document is decontrolled. 10 CFR 2.790(d) 10 CFR 2.790(d)

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000327-02-07, IR 05000328-02-07, Event Follow-up on 9/13 and 11/18-19/2002, Tennessee Valley Authority, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2.

The inspection was conducted by a physical security inspector. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Significance Determination Process (SDP). The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/index.html.

A.

Inspector Identified Findings and Self-Revealing Findings Cornerstone: Safeguards Green. A non-cited violation was identified for the licensees failure to comply with Section 5.3.1 of the Physical Security Plan and Section 3.3 B of Security Instruction No. 1, in that on September 13, 2002, security officers failed to perform a physical search of an individual who had previously alarmed the explosives detector, prior to allowing the individual access to the protected area.

The finding was of very low safety significance in that, using the Physical Protection Significance Determination Process, it was identified as a vulnerability in access control, without a malevolent act, and without two similar findings in four quarters.

B.

Licensee Identified Violations None Document transmitted herewith contains sensitive unclassified information. When separated from the Report Details this document is decontrolled.