IR 05000373/2003007

IR 05000373-03-007; 05000374-03-007; on 7/21-8/8/2003; Exelon Generation Company; LaSalle County Station; Identification and Resolution of Problems

ML032471674
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	09/04/2003
From:	Burgess B NRC/RGN-III/DRP/RPB2
To:	Skolds J Exelon Generation Co
References
IR-03-007
Download: ML032471674 (19)

Text

September 4, 2003

SUBJECT:

LASALLE COUNTY STATION NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 50-373/03-07; 50-374/03-07

Dear Mr. Skolds:

On August 8, 2003, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a team inspection at the LaSalle County Station. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on August 8, 2003, with members of your staff.

This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to the identification and resolution of problems, compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your operating license. Within these areas, the inspection involved selected examination of procedures and representative records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel. No findings were identified On the basis of the sample selected for review, the team concluded that in general, problems were being properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. The team made several observations regarding the effectiveness of problem identification and resolution program implementation as detailed in the enclosed report.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Bruce Burgess, Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No. 50-373; 50-374 License No. NPF-11/NPF-18

Enclosures:

Inspection Report No. 50-373/03-07; 50-374/03-07

REGION III==

Docket No:

50-373; 50-374 License No:

NPF-11; NPF-18 Report No:

50-373/03-07; 50-374/03-07 Licensee:

Exelon Nuclear Generation Company Facility:

LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Location:

2601 N. 21st Road Marseilles, IL 61341 Dates:

July 21 through August 8, 2003 Inspectors:

G. Wright, Project Engineer - Team Lead D. Kimble, Senior Resident Inspector R. Winter, Electrical Engineering Inspector Approved by:

Bruce Burgess, Chief Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000373-03-007, 05000374-03-007; on 7/21-8/8/2003; Exelon Generation Company;

LaSalle County Station; Identification and Resolution of Problems.

The inspection was conducted by two region-based inspectors and one senior resident inspector. No findings of significance were identified.

Identification and Resolution of Problems In general, the plant identified issues and entered them into the corrective action process at an appropriate level. Nuclear Oversight (NOS) assessment reports identified issues for the plant to resolve, including issues with corrective action follow through. The majority of issues reviewed were properly categorized and evaluated although some evaluations were narrowly focused, particularly for cause evaluations. Most corrective actions reviewed were appropriately implemented and appeared to have been effective. While no findings were identified during the inspection, the team developed a number of observations including:

1.

A more thorough assessment of issues associated with ineffective corrective action(s) is an aspect of the corrective action process that could be strengthened to reduce repeat issues at the plant.

2.

Additional attention to thoroughness and quality of documentation in program descriptions, procedures, condition reports, and cause analyses would enhance the corrective action process by ensuring consistency in program application, completeness of reviews, and preservation of the historical record without reliance on institutional knowledge.

REPORT DETAILS

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

.1 Effectiveness of Problem Identification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed NRC inspection report findings issued over the last 2 years, selected plant corrective action documents, Nuclear Oversight (NOS) assessments, operating experience reports and trend assessments to determine if problems were being identified at the proper threshold and entered into the corrective action process.

The inspectors also conducted focused plant walkdowns of one emergency diesel generator and the diesel generator ventilation system to ensure that equipment problems were entered into the corrective action system. The documents used during the review are listed in Attachment 1.

b.

Issues In general, the plant identified issues and entered them into the corrective action process at an appropriate level. NOS assessment reports identified issues for the plant to resolve, including timely entry of deficiencies into the corrective action program (CAP). The licensee appropriately used the CAP to document instances where previous corrective actions were ineffective or inappropriate; however, in most instances, the need to identify and address why the initial corrective actions were not effective was not recognized. The teams review also noted the following items:

• The team identified a minor error within procedure LS-AA-125, Corrective Action Program Procedure, which appeared to have occurred because of a lack of attention to detail. A Condition Report (CR) was issued to correct this condition.

• The team identified minor differences in cause codes defined in procedure LS-AA-125 and the PASSPORT software used to track corrective action documentation. A CR was issued to correct this condition.

• A review of previous inspection findings appeared to indicate that, at times, the licensees perspective on plant conditions did not always consider all potential impacts of the observed condition. For example, the licensee had not associated foreign material in a corner room and the drywell with potential corner room flooding and operability of the drywell leak detection system until brought to their attention by the NRC.

b.1 Identification Threshold The licensee had defined an adequate threshold for the identification of issues to be entered into the corrective action program in accordance with the LaSalle County Station procedure LS-AA-125 Corrective Action Program (CAP) Procedure. La Salle uses an electronic database system. Corrective action documents are called an Action Request (AR) or Condition Report (CR). The generation rate for ARs/CRs was appropriate, with 4356 condition reports written in 2002 and 3149 CRs written in 2003 to date. Both the number and significancy level distribution of CRs appeared to be appropriate for the facility. While the threshold and generation rate appeared appropriate, the licensee found several examples of departments not placing issues in the corrective action program in a timely manner.

b.2 Operating Experience The inspectors reviewed a sampling of industry operating experience (OPEX) reports and concluded that the licensee was appropriately including the issues in the CAP.

Refer to Section

.2. b.3 for additional information on operating experience.

b.3 Nuclear Oversight The inspectors reviewed a sample of NOS assessment reports from the past 2 years and determined that the NOS staff, in general, was effectively identifying plant performance issues including issues with implementation of the CAP.

.2 Prioritization and Evaluation of Issues

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed inspection reports and corrective action documents to verify that identified issues were appropriately characterized and entered into the CAP.

Inspection team members attended management meetings to observe the assignment of CR categories for current issues and the review of root, apparent, and common cause analyses, and corrective actions for existing CRs.

The team conducted an independent assessment of the prioritization and evaluation of selected CRs. The assessment included a review of the category assigned, the operability and reportability determinations, the extent of condition evaluations, the cause investigations, and the appropriateness of assigned corrective actions. Other attributes reviewed by the team included the quality of the licensees trending of conditions and the corresponding corrective actions. The team also assessed licensee corrective actions stemming from Non-Cited Violations (NCVs) and Licensee Event Reports (LERs). This review included the controlling procedures, selected records of activities, and observation of various licensee meetings. In addition, the team conducted several interviews with cognizant licensee personnel.

The team likewise reviewed the licensees efforts to capture industry OPEX issues in the CAP. Documents reviewed included the licensees assessment of industry operating event reports, NRC, and vendor generic notices.

Information reviewed by the team dated back to the previous problem identification and resolution inspection conducted in September 2001 (NRC IR 50-373/01-16; 50-374/01-16).

b.

Issues The team verified that the issues reviewed were properly categorized and evaluated.

The team did, however, have several observations regarding the licensees trending program and the quality of its documentation. Details of the teams observations are described in the following subsections.

b.1 Overview of Prioritization and Evaluation Process The corrective action process included a review of newly initiated CRs by the Management Review Committee (MRC) composed of senior plant management. The MRC reviewed the investigation class assigned to each CR by a departmental CAP coordinator. Within the licensees program, an A was assigned to a Significant Condition Adverse to Quality (SCAQ) requiring a root cause evaluation, a B was assigned to a Condition Adverse to Quality (CAQ) requiring an apparent cause evaluation, and C was a CAQ requiring a condition evaluation to determine the proper corrective actions. A significance level D was also available for conditions that were not adverse to quality.

b.2 Trending Program The team performed an in-depth examination of the licensees trending program as a follow-on to an observation made in the previous problem identification and resolution inspection.

As discussed in subsection b.3 below, the team initially had some difficulty identifying the total depth and breadth of the licensees current trending program due to the lack of a single document that identified all of program subcomponents. Following discussions with the licensee, the team concluded that the licensee had in place an extensive trending program.

With respect to the quality of the trending program, the team had two observations:

• The team noted that the licensees trend analyses rarely, if ever, examined the underlying cause for the apparent trend. The question of, Why did this adverse trend occur in the first place?, was infrequently addressed.

• In the CAP coding area, the team noted that the licensees use of computer-based, or computer-aided trend analysis relied primarily on individuals to identify trends. While the licensee used the system to generate lists of potentially related issues, it did not use the computer to identify when a trend may exist. The lack of such computer enhanced trending tools in the CAP coding arena placed the burden of trend identification on the judgement of individual CAP coordinators.

The team identified that tools for trending system and component performance were in place.

b.3 Documentation In general, the team found the licensees documentation practices associated with the CAP to be weak. In several instances, the team was only able to successfully understand the licensees actions because key individuals recalled details of what had occurred and, more importantly, why it had occurred. The team noted that this documentation weakness leaves the licensee vulnerable to the loss of key information should certain employees with the institutional knowledge leave LaSalle County Station.

Examples noted by the team are described below.

• When the team began inspection of the licensees trending program and requested CAP documents that addressed the trending weaknesses identified in the previous problem identification and resolution inspection, the team members were informed that no such documents existed. Through interviews with key licensee personnel, the team learned that the licensee had made a conscious decision to forego the creation of specific corrective actions to address the trending weaknesses because the rollout of a new licensee CAP was imminent.

The new program was believed to be sufficient to address the trending program weaknesses. However, this decision and its basis were not documented.

• As discussed in b.2 above, the team found no documentation which described the total depth and breadth of the licensees current trending program. For example, the team identified an apparent adverse trend regarding control room log deficiencies. Seemingly, some 80 percent of the identified deficiencies over a 20 month period were either identified by the NRC or the licensees internal NOS group. However, upon further examination, the team found that control room log deficiencies self-identified by Operations personnel over the same 20 month period were about 7 times greater than the number identified by the NRC and NOS. The Operations group did not, however, document these deficiencies in the CAP as CRs, but rather in a scorecard program database used for various Operations group internal observations.

• In reviewing OPEX items, the team examined the program item which initially looked at the reactor recirculation jet pump hold down beam failure at the Quad Cities Nuclear Station in 2002 (GE RICSIL 086). The licensee evaluated this OPEX item as not applicable to LaSalle Station based upon an understanding that the jet pump hold down beams in use at LaSalle Station were of a different type than those identified in the OPEX item and not susceptible to the discussed failure mechanism. The licensee closed the OPEX item on this basis. The licensee subsequently identified that the assumption was not entirely true, i.e.,

LaSalle Station did have in service some susceptible jet pump hold down beams.

However, the documentation for the original OPEX item was not revised to reflect the new information or the licensees current corrective and compensatory actions.

• Regarding the root cause analysis for an unexpected radiation level in the drywell, during a recent refueling outage, the licensee did not include all actions it had taken in preparation for the outage. While in this case the team did not believe that the root cause outcome would have been different, failure to include all pertinent information in the assessment limits the evaluation and may deprive the organization of valuable insights and potential corrective actions.

.3 Effectiveness of Corrective Action

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed past inspection results, selected CRs, root cause reports and common cause evaluations to verify that corrective actions, commensurate with the safety significance of the issues, were specified and implemented in a timely manner.

The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of corrective actions. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees corrective actions for Non-Cited Violations (NCVs) documented in NRC inspections in the past 2 years. The inspectors conducted a walkdown of one emergency diesel generator and the diesel generator ventilation system to assess the material condition of the system and verify that the licensee appropriately identified degraded conditions within the corrective action program.

b.

Issues In general, the licensees corrective action for the sample reviewed were appropriate and appeared to have been effective. The team noted that the licensee generated CRs when they identified a corrective action which was either inadequate or inappropriate.

b.1 Observations on the Effectiveness of Corrective Actions The inspectors had several observations regarding corrective actions that were not fully implemented, not fully effective in correcting the identified issue, or were narrowly focused. These observations are described below.

• A minor issue was identified for inadequate corrective action to preclude repetition concerning diesel generator erratic VAR indication. On May 30, 2002, the 2B diesel generator was started and slowly full loaded, until after about 20 minutes of operation, the VAR meter indicated repetitive spiking. A root cause report 00110032 identified a primary cause and contributing causes.

However, this did not preclude recurrence because on October 16, 2002 the 2B diesel generator during a fast start surveillance again had erratic VAR meter indication. Another root cause report (00127728) was performed and identified the primary cause as a different component within the same governor and identified contributing causes. The self-revealing problem repetition highlighted that the key features in minimizing vulnerability from a number of components was not fully recognized during the first troubleshooting, root cause and analysis.

• A minor issue was identified for inadequate corrective action to preclude repetition concerning diesel generator air start compressor relief valve problems.

From the period of January through September 2002, a series of ARs were generated because the air start compressor relief valves lifted on several different diesel generators and on one occasion, one relief valve stuck open.

The corrective action was not particularly timely but a solution eventually emerged and actions to prevent recurrence include the change out of the air dryers associated with the diesel generators air start compressors.

• In evaluating inadequate or ineffective corrective actions, the licensee appropriately addressed the initial issue; however, rarely was an evaluation conducted to review why appropriate corrective actions were not initially proposed or implemented.

.4 Practice of Closing CRs to Work Requests or other CRs

a. Inspection Scope

The inspection team reviewed condition reports which had been closed to work requests or other condition reports to assess whether the original issue was appropriately addressed in the follow-on document.

b.

Issues The team verified that the issues addressed in the initial CR were appropriately addressed in subsequent work requests or CRs.

.5 Assessment of Safety-Conscious Work Environment

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted interviews with plant staff to assess whether there were impediments to the establishment of a safety conscious work environment. During these interviews, the inspectors used Appendix 1 to Inspection Procedure 71152, Suggested Questions for Use in Discussions with Licensee Individuals Concerning PI&R Issues, as a guide to gather information and develop insights. The inspectors also discussed the implementation of the Employee Concerns Program (ECP) and selected concerns with the plants ECP Coordinators. Additional discussions with the ECP Coordinators centered on integration of the ECP and CAP programs.

b.

Issues Plant staff interviewed did not express any concerns regarding the safety conscious work environment. The staff was aware of and generally familiar with the corrective action program and other plant processes including the Employee Concerns Program through which concerns could be raised. Further, a review of the types of issues in the ECP indicated that site personnel were appropriately using the corrective action and employee concerns programs to address their concerns. Based on interviews, the ECP Coordinators were appropriately focused on ensuring all site individuals were aware of the program, reviewing individual concerns, and integrating where appropriate the ECP and CAP programs to resolve concerns.

4OA6 Management Meetings

Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Ms. Susan Landahl and other members of licensee management in an exit meeting on August 8, 2003. Ms. Landahl acknowledged the findings presented and indicated that no proprietary information was provided to the inspectors.

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee D. Barrett LaSalle NO - Employee Concerns J. Barchello Security J. Beardon Operations Corrective Action Program Coordinator (CAPCo)

R. Bellettini Corrective Action Program Coordinator A. Byers Radiation Protection CAPCo B. Carter Nuclear Oversight B. Cockrel Diesel Generator System Engineer D. Czufin Engineering Director C. Dieckmann Training Director L. Kofoid-Durdan Chemistry CAPCo D. Enright Operation Services Manager S. Fatora Chemistry Manager A. Ferko LaSalle Nuclear Oversight (NO) Manager M. Hayworth LaSalle NO - Employee Concerns P. Holland Regulatory Assurance G. Kaegi Regulatory Assurance Manager S. Landahl Plant Manager P. Manning Engineering CAPCo B. McConnaughay Work Control M. McDowell Assistant Plant Manager M. Murskyj Electrical Design Engineering Supervisor M. Phalen Radiation Protection Superintendent M. Poland Maintenance CAPCo G. Randle Maintenance Director S. Shields Operating Experience Coordinator B. Werder Engineering J. Wieging Electrical Design Engineering Supervisor G. Wilhelmsen Engineering Balance of Plant Systems Manager M. Williams BOP System Engineer C. Wilson LaSalle Security Manager ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Items Opened: None Items Closed: None LIST OF ACRONYMS AR Action Request CAP Corrective Action Program CAQ Condition Adverse to Quality CR Condition Report ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System ECP Employee Concerns Program LER Licensee Event Report MRC Management Review Committee NCV Non-cited Violation NOS Nuclear Oversight NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission OPEX Operating Experience PI&R Problem Identification and Resolution SCAQ Significant Condition Adverse to Quality LIST OF

DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a list of licensee documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion of a

document on this list does not imply that NRC inspectors reviewed the entire documents, but,

rather that selected sections or portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall

inspection effort. In addition, inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC

acceptance of the document, unless specifically stated in the body of the inspection report.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

Plant Procedures and Audits

EI-AA-101

Employee Concerns Program

Rev. 2

LS-AA-21

Nuclear Oversight Audit Process Description

Rev. 0

LS-AA-115

Operating Experience Procedure

Rev. 1

LS-AA-125

Corrective Action Program (CAP) Procedure

Rev. 5

LS-AA-125-1001

Root Cause Analysis Manual

Rev. 3

LS-AA-125-1002

Common Cause Analysis Manual

Rev. 2

LS-AA-125-1003

Apparent Cause Evaluation Manual

Rev. 2

LS-AA-125-1004

Effectiveness Review Manual

Rev. 1

LS-AA-125-1005

Coding and Trending Manual

Rev. 3

LS-AA-125-1006

CAP Process Expectations Manual

Rev. 3

LS-AA-126

Self-Assessment Program

Rev. 2

LS-AA-126-1001

Focused Area Self-Assessments

Rev. 1

NO-AA-200-001

Nuclear Oversight Continuous Assessment

Procedure

Rev. 2

NOA-LS-03-2Q

Nuclear Oversight Quarterly Report LaSalle

County Station April-June 2003

07/23/03

NOSA-LAS-03-03

NOS Security Audit Report

04/04/03

NOA-LS-01-3Q

Nuclear Oversight Continuous Assessment

Report

10/25/01

NOA-LS-02-1Q

Nuclear Oversight Continuous Assessment

Report

04/30/02

NOA-LS-02-1Q

Nuclear Oversight Continuous Assessment

Report

01/29/03

Condition Reports Reviewed During LaSalle County Station PI&R Inspection:

CR/AR #

Title

Date

00001119

Perform an effectiveness review in accordance with

NSWP-A-16 to the implemented corrective actions resulting

from LER 97-043.

11/11/99

00001149

Testing of Removed/Damaged rupture disc assembly

03/07/00

L2001- 05688

Potential for Non-Conservative Steam Carryover Fraction in

Computer Heat Balance Calculation.

10/03/01

L2001-06182

Locked high rad door #208 found open

11/01/01

L2001-05717

NRC identified: Procedure Adherence with AD-AA-106 CCA

condition report identification

10/02/01

L2001-03138

U-2 Scram generated High Rad Area.

05/27/01

L2001-03153

Uncoupled Control Rod During Unit 2 Startup

05/29/01

L2001-05949

Untimely Station Response

10/19/01

00002477

Perform an Effectiveness review of the corrective actions

11/30/99

00002503

Perform EFF review of corrective action #4, to perform torque

checks

2/03/99

00030864

Intermediate Hot Spot discovered on the Unit 2 east MPT

during Thermogoraphy

06/28/00

00076848

Increase In U-1 Offgas Pretreatment Radiation

09/25/01

00078266

NRC ident: RCR risk analyses not quantitative.

10/09/01

00082155

Testing Required For 2A DG Governor Replacement

11/08/01

00085020

Ineffective Perimeter Zone

2/04/01

00085280

2A DG exhaust Temps >200 deg delta T during LOS-DG-M2

2/05/01

00086988

NRC Identified, ineffective corrective actions from scram

2/14/01

00088342

NRC Id - Human Performance Related Error Trend

Identification

2/28/01

00088688

Potential NCV for unlocked High Rad door

2/31/01

00089048

2A DG Cylinder Exhaust Temperatures Erratic

01/02/02

00089355

LOS-DG-Q3 Could not be performed for 2B DG A Air

Compressor

01/07/02

00090734

Improper wiring determ in panels 1FW06JA and 1FW06JB

01/14/02

00091429

Unacceptable through bolt location

01/19/02

00091988

Fuel moves stopped at step 91 of L1C10 Axis shuffle

01/23/02

00092014

Fuel Handling Error during Shuffle 2

01/23/02

00092638

2A DG A Air Compressor Interstage Relief lifting

01/28/02

00092542

1E22-F024, HPCS Pump Discharge Check Failed Acceptance

Criteria

01/26/02

00092596

Unusual Flow Noise During HPCS Pp Run

01/27/02

00093177

2A DG 'A' Compressor Relief lifting While Running

01/30/02

00094268

Unexpected temperatures observed on 1TE-VP115

2/07/02

00094589

2B D/G A Air Compressor Tripping Breaker

00095253

Potential Bus duct Fire seal deficiencies Discovered by NRC

2/14/02

00097020

Off-pretreat purge valve not opening

2/27/02

00099302

Crew Critique for EMD Crew ECM

03/15/02

00099679

Unit 2 HPCS Pump IST Adverse Trend

03/18/02

00100428

Adverse Trend on Past Due PMs in Maintenance

06/03/02

00104619

NOS IDd, RP: Ineffective Corrective Actions for CR 90284

04/20/02

00105133

CRD rebuild rooms continue to challenge RP and station

04/24/02

00106428

Adverse Trend on Backlog of Past Due PMs in Maintenance

05/02/02

00108670

U-1 B RHR pump seal leak causing contamination

05/18/02

00108841

Workers continue to leave scrubs in locker rooms

05/20/02

00109626

MSIV A Limit Switch Temperature exceeds 175 Degrees

5/28/02

00110168

Issues Identified During 2B DG Operability Run

05/31/02

00114125

1A DG Cooling Water Flow Adjustment Reqd During

LOS-DG-Q2

07/02/02

00114397

New Quincy Compressors Have Incorrect Hydraulic Unloader

Asm

07/03/02

00116251

0DG B Air Start Compressor Discharge Relief Lifting

07/19/02

00116992

Persistent recontamination of 2A RHR room

07/25/02

00117431

Safety Concern: CO2 Monitor INOP at Lake Screen House

07/30/02

00117569

0DG B Air Start Compressor Discharge Relief Lifting

07/30/02

00118101

0DG "A" Compressor Relief Valve Stuck Open

08/04/02

00119063

Tech Spec SR 3.8.1.6 not tracked/completed

10/19/02

00120845

Inadequate Closure of a CAPR

03/20/02

00121102

Ineffective CAPRs IDd during EFR

08/29/02

00121634

Relief Valve 0DG022 B Lifting During Compressor Operation;

09/04/02

00121822

Diesel Gen Air Cmpr "A" Relief Vlv Lifting

09/06/02

00124828

NRC 2002 SSDI Identified - DG Air Flow Regulator Calibration

09/27/02

00125571

NOS Idd: (ENG) Potential Adverse trend in Eng. Clock Resets

10/02/02

00127728

2B Voltage Regulator Very Erratic

10/16/02

00128981

0" Diesel Generator Cooler Outlet Throttle Valve Drifted

10/25/02

00131093

GE Part 21 TIP System Ball and Shear Valve Radiation Spec

10/08/02

00131665

TIP system Ball and Shear Valve Radiation Specification

11/14/02

00134097

Safeguards Drawing found in AEs uncontrolled file

2/04/02

00134417

Safeguards Drawing found in AEs uncontrolled file

2/06/02

00140501

NOS Idd: (ENG) Decline in Engineering Performance for 02-

4Q

01/22/03

00142758

Adverse Trend on Backlog of Non-Outage Maintenance PMs

03/04/03

00142779

Incorrect wiring termination for EC 331396 U2 SLMS

2/03/03

00142811

Adverse Trend on Backlog of Non-Outage PMs

20/4/03

00142933

NOS Identified undersized welds

20/4/03

00143002

B DWFDS sump pump tripped on thermals

2/05/03

00143006

2B33-015B fails leak testing

20/4/03

00143076

Repeated trips of the RMCS system with no rod motion

2/05/03

00143130

2E51-F068 valve failed LLRT

2/05/03

00143131

2MS01-2888S missing locking screws

2/05/03

00143169

2E12-F050A fails high pressure water leak rate test

2/05/03

00143175

Incorrect sample tubing routing for EC 331396, SLMS

2/06/03

00143367

Discrepancies on snubbers 2MS01-2877S and 2MS01-2888S

2/06/03

00143658

Incomplete termination of ground on 2FE-RF021 for EC 51151

2/08/03

00143876

Effectiveness Review Reveals CAPRs not closed as written

2/10/03

00143954

2E51-F008, 63,76,357 LLRT failure in L2R09

01/26/03

00144084

Safeguards Drawing for Work Package

2/11/03

00144297

Water on Undervessel Sump Cover mat Routed to DWEDS

2/12/03

00144336

NOS IDd inadequate Closure of Root Cause Corrective Action

2/12/03

00144487

Observed leakage RBCCW line to seal cooler

2/13/03

00144683

Pipe support M01-NB-16-2402X found out of tolerance

2/14/03

00144744

2E51-F063 valve failed LLRT

2/15/03

00144744

2E51-F063 valve failed LLRT

2/14/03

00144778

2B TDRFP Woodward hydraulic piping bent

2/11/03

00144839

2FW08JA system 1 pressure at 220 instead of 260-280 psig.

2/17/03

00145072

Drains continue to challenge contamination control

2/17/03

00145074

Strainer leak contaminates 710 for second time in three days

2/18/03

00145338

Inappropriate Style matting utilized under vessel sump area

2/16/03

00146687

Contamination spread in 1A RHR 673" room

2/27/03

00147370

ACE (RP) Rejected by MRC

030/4/03

00151231

Actions in Self Assessment Determined to be ineffective

03/28/03

00153681

Gland Steam Seal Evap low Level Alarm

04/13/03

00153686

SSE low level condition

04/12/03

00155426

DG Room exhaust damper is stuck open

04/23/03

00155441

Diesel Generator Partial CO2 Actuation

04/23/03

00156861

1E12-F068a has dual indication when closed

05/01/03

00157037

1E12-F068A did not fully close

050/2/03

00159489

Discovery of an unposted neutron area

05/19/03

00162229

Significant RP resource concern by RPT

06/06/03

00165440

Potential Adverse Trend Identified - RP Procedure Adherence

06/29/03

00167023

2A RHR pump run contaminates entire room

07/08/03

00167691

Inadequate evaluation of Temporary lead shielding Permit

070/8/03

00168900

Corrective action closed before actions taken

04/30/03

Completed Root Cause Reports

Number

Title

Date/Rev.

00082092

2A D/G Governor Failed to Respond During Monthly Run

11/ 07/ 01

00095677

Unit 1 RR System unable to Obtain Rated Core Flow

2/01/02

00110032

2B Diesel Generator (DG) VARs Erratic

05/30/02

00130964

Entered Region B during Control Rod Maneuver

11/10/02

00139037

Unit 2 Manual Reactor Scram

01/10/03

00143880

Numerous Challenges during Installation of EC 338974

2/10/03

00146141

RR Flow Units Settings Discovered Non-conservative

2/25/03

00148413

Mispositioned Control Rod

03/11/03

00090319

Higher than anticipated drywell dose rates

01/12/01

Operability Evaluations

Number

Title

Date/Rev.

OE02-014

RHR Pump Seal Cooler Flows

2/6/2003