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Virginia Electric and Power Company
Virginia Electric and Power Company
ATTN: Mr. David A. Christian
ATTN: Mr. David A. Christian
        Sr. Vice President and
Sr. Vice President and
        Chief Nuclear Officer
Chief Nuclear Officer
Innsbrook Technical Center - 2SW
Innsbrook Technical Center - 2SW
5000 Dominion Boulevard
5000 Dominion Boulevard
Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711
Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711
SUBJECT:         SURRY POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT NOS.
SUBJECT:
                5000280/2004004, AND 5000281/2004004
SURRY POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT NOS.
5000280/2004004, AND 5000281/2004004
Dear Mr. Christian:
Dear Mr. Christian:
On September 25, 2004, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed
On September 25, 2004, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed
an inspection at your Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection
an inspection at your Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection
report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on October 12, 2004, with Mr.
report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on October 12, 2004, with Mr.
Blount and other members of your staff.
Blount and other members of your staff.  
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.  
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed  
personnel.
personnel.
This report documents one NRC identified finding. The finding was determined to involve a
This report documents one NRC identified finding. The finding was determined to involve a
violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance and
violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance and
because the violation was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating the
because the violation was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating the
finding as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement
finding as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement
Policy. Additionally, two licensee-identified violations which were determined to be of very low
Policy. Additionally, two licensee-identified violations which were determined to be of very low
safety significance (Green) are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report. If you contest any non-
safety significance (Green) are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report. If you contest any non-
cited violation in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this
cited violation in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this
inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the United States Nuclear Regulatory
inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the United States Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; with copies to
Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; with copies to
the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States
the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident
Line 50: Line 51:
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its
enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the
enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the
NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of
NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of  


VEPCO                                           2
VEPCO
NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
2
NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
                                                  Sincerely,
Sincerely,
                                                  /RA/
/RA/
                                                  Kerry D. Landis, Chief
Kerry D. Landis, Chief
                                                  Reactor Projects Branch 5
Reactor Projects Branch 5
                                                  Division of Reactor Projects
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket Nos.: 50-280, 50-281
Docket Nos.: 50-280, 50-281
License Nos.: DPR-32, DPR-37
License Nos.: DPR-32, DPR-37
Enclosure:     Integrated Inspection Report 5000280,281/2004004 w/Attachment:
Enclosure:
                  Supplemental Information
Integrated Inspection Report 5000280,281/2004004 w/Attachment:                      
    Supplemental Information
cc w/encl:
cc w/encl:
Chris L. Funderburk, Director
Chris L. Funderburk, Director
Nuclear Licensing and
Nuclear Licensing and
Operations Support
  Operations Support
Virginia Electric & Power Company
Virginia Electric & Power Company
Electronic Mail Distribution
Electronic Mail Distribution
Line 78: Line 81:
Division of Energy Regulation
Division of Energy Regulation
P. O. Box 1197
P. O. Box 1197
Richmond, VA 23209
Richmond, VA 23209
Lillian M. Cuoco, Esq.
Lillian M. Cuoco, Esq.
Senior Counsel
Senior Counsel
Line 86: Line 89:
Supreme Court Building
Supreme Court Building
900 East Main Street
900 East Main Street
Richmond, VA 23219
Richmond, VA 23219


        VEPCO                                               3
VEPCO
        Distribution w/encl:
3
        S. Monarque, NRR
Distribution w/encl:
        L. Slack, RII EICS
S. Monarque, NRR
        RIDSNRRDIPMLIPB
L. Slack, RII EICS
        PUBLIC
RIDSNRRDIPMLIPB
OFFICE             RII/DRP       RII/DRP       RII/DRP         RII/DRP     RII/DRS       RII/DRS       RII/DRP
PUBLIC
SIGNATURE         NXG           GJM1         DCA                         WTL for       WTL           BBD
OFFICE
NAME               NGarrett     GMcCoy       DArnett         LGarner     ETesta       WLoo         BDesai
RII/DRP
DATE                 10/18/2004   10/18/2004   10/15/2004                   10/14/2004   10/14/2004   10/15/2004
RII/DRP
E-MAIL COPY?         YES      NO  YES       NO YES       NO   YES   NO   YES       NO YES       NO YES       NO
RII/DRP
PUBLIC DOCUMENT     YES     NO   YES     NO   YES     NO     YES   NO     YES     NO   YES     NO   YES     NO
RII/DRP
        OFFICIAL RECORD COPY       DOCUMENT NAME: C:\ORPCheckout\FileNET\ML042940715.wpd
RII/DRS
RII/DRS
RII/DRP
SIGNATURE
NXG
GJM1
DCA
WTL for
WTL
BBD
NAME
NGarrett
GMcCoy
DArnett
LGarner
ETesta
WLoo
BDesai
DATE
10/18/2004
10/18/2004
10/15/2004
10/14/2004
10/14/2004
10/15/2004
E-MAIL COPY?
    YES
NO     YES
NO     YES
NO     YES
NO     YES
NO     YES
NO     YES
NO  
PUBLIC DOCUMENT
    YES
NO       YES
NO       YES
NO       YES
NO       YES
NO       YES
NO       YES
NO  
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY           DOCUMENT NAME: C:\\ORPCheckout\\FileNET\\ML042940715.wpd


                U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Enclosure
                                    REGION II
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
Docket Nos.: 50-280, 50-281
Docket Nos.: 50-280, 50-281
License Nos.: DPR-32, DPR-37
License Nos.: DPR-32, DPR-37
Report Nos.: 5000280/2004004, 5000281/2004004
Report Nos.:
Licensee:     Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)
5000280/2004004, 5000281/2004004
Facility:     Surry Power Station, Units 1 & 2
Licensee:
Location:     5850 Hog Island Road
Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)
              Surry, VA 23883
Facility:
Dates:       June 27 - September 25, 2004
Surry Power Station, Units 1 & 2
Inspectors:   N. Garrett, Senior Resident Inspector
Location:
              G. McCoy, Senior Resident Inspector
5850 Hog Island Road
              D. Arnett, Resident Inspector
Surry, VA 23883
              L. Garner, Senior Project Engineer
Dates:
              E. Testa, Senior Radiation Protection Inspector (Sections 2OS1and 3,
June 27 - September 25, 2004
                2PS1and 3, 4OA1,5,and 7)
Inspectors:
              W. Loo, Senior Radiation Protection Inspector (Sections 2OS1and 3,
N. Garrett, Senior Resident Inspector
                2PS1and 3, 4OA1,5,and 7)
G. McCoy, Senior Resident Inspector
D. Arnett, Resident Inspector
L. Garner, Senior Project Engineer
E. Testa, Senior Radiation Protection Inspector (Sections 2OS1and 3,  
  2PS1and 3, 4OA1,5,and 7)  
W. Loo, Senior Radiation Protection Inspector (Sections 2OS1and 3,  
  2PS1and 3, 4OA1,5,and 7)  
Approved by: K. Landis, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 5
Approved by: K. Landis, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 5
              Division of Reactor Projects
  Division of Reactor Projects
                                                                Enclosure


                                      SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000280/2004004, IR 05000281/2004004, 6/27/2004 - 9/25/2004, Virginia Electric and
IR 05000280/2004004, IR 05000281/2004004, 6/27/2004 - 9/25/2004, Virginia Electric and
Power Co.; Surry Power Station Units 1 & 2, Routine Integrated Inspection.
Power Co.; Surry Power Station Units 1 & 2, Routine Integrated Inspection.
The report covered a three month period of inspection by resident inspectors, a senior project
The report covered a three month period of inspection by resident inspectors, a senior project
engineer, and an announced inspection by two senior radiation protection inspectors. One
engineer, and an announced inspection by two senior radiation protection inspectors. One
Green non-cited violation (NCV) and two licensee identified violations were identified. The
Green non-cited violation (NCV) and two licensee identified violations were identified. The
significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC
significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC
0609, Significance Determination Process, (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply
0609, Significance Determination Process, (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply
may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs
may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs
program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in
program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in
NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
A.     NRC Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
A.
        Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety
NRC Identified and Self-Revealing Findings
        *       Green. The inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR 20.1703(c)(4)(ii) which
Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety
                requires the licensee to implement and maintain a respiratory protection program
*
                that includes written procedures regarding training of respirator users. In
Green. The inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR 20.1703(c)(4)(ii) which
                addition, this was related to the emergency planning standards of 10 CFR
requires the licensee to implement and maintain a respiratory protection program
                50.47(b) (10). Specifically, procedures were not in place to ensure that all
that includes written procedures regarding training of respirator users. In
                Control Room staff had demonstrated proficiency in changing Self Contained
addition, this was related to the emergency planning standards of 10 CFR
                Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) air cylinders during emergencies.
50.47(b) (10). Specifically, procedures were not in place to ensure that all
                This finding is greater than minor because emergency workers who are required
Control Room staff had demonstrated proficiency in changing Self Contained
                to use respiratory protective equipment are not trained to use that equipment.
Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) air cylinders during emergencies.
                This finding is of very low safety significance because an adequate number of
This finding is greater than minor because emergency workers who are required
                SCBA qualified plant personnel/staff, which were designated emergency
to use respiratory protective equipment are not trained to use that equipment.  
                responders, would have been available to respond in the event of an actual
This finding is of very low safety significance because an adequate number of
                emergency (Section 2OS3).
SCBA qualified plant personnel/staff, which were designated emergency
B.     Licensee-Identified Violations
responders, would have been available to respond in the event of an actual
        Two violations of very low safety significance, which were identified by the licensee have
emergency (Section 2OS3).
        been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee
B.
        have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. These violations and
Licensee-Identified Violations
        corrective actions are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
Two violations of very low safety significance, which were identified by the licensee have
been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee
have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. These violations and
corrective actions are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.  


                                        REPORT DETAILS
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 and Unit 2 operated at or near rated power the entire reporting period.
Unit 1 and Unit 2 operated at or near rated power the entire reporting period.
1.       REACTOR SAFETY
1.
        Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
REACTOR SAFETY
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
   .1   Hurricane Preparations
1R01
Adverse Weather Protection
   .1
Hurricane Preparations
       a. Inspection Scope
       a. Inspection Scope
        On July 19, 2004, early in the hurricane season, inspectors conducted a tour of all the
On July 19, 2004, early in the hurricane season, inspectors conducted a tour of all the
        owner-controlled area. The purpose of the tour was to evaluate the licensees
owner-controlled area. The purpose of the tour was to evaluate the licensees
        preparedness for high winds and hurricane conditions well in advance of the approach
preparedness for high winds and hurricane conditions well in advance of the approach
        of any hurricanes. Emphasis was placed on the identification of any loose material
of any hurricanes. Emphasis was placed on the identification of any loose material
        which would become airborne hazards to either the plant or the switchyard during high
which would become airborne hazards to either the plant or the switchyard during high
        winds. Inspectors toured the low level intake, the construction buildings, the sewage
winds. Inspectors toured the low level intake, the construction buildings, the sewage
        treatment plant, the area outside the warehouse, and the vicinity of the gas turbines at
treatment plant, the area outside the warehouse, and the vicinity of the gas turbines at
        Gravel Neck.
Gravel Neck.
     b.   Findings
     b.
        No findings of significance were identified.
Findings
   .2   Hurricane Charlie Preparations
No findings of significance were identified.
   .2
Hurricane Charlie Preparations
       a. Inspection Scope
       a. Inspection Scope
        The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the adverse weather preparation
The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the adverse weather preparation
        procedures and compensatory measures prior to the arrival of Hurricane Charlie.
procedures and compensatory measures prior to the arrival of Hurricane Charlie.  
        Inspectors reviewed Operations Checklist (OC) 21 Severe Weather Checklist,
Inspectors reviewed Operations Checklist (OC) 21 Severe Weather Checklist,
        Abnormal Procedure (AP) 37.01 Abnormal Environmental Conditions, and the
Abnormal Procedure (AP) 37.01 Abnormal Environmental Conditions, and the
        Dominion Hurricane Response Plan (Nuclear) (HRP-N). Inspectors assured that vital
Dominion Hurricane Response Plan (Nuclear) (HRP-N). Inspectors assured that vital
        systems and components were protected from high winds and flooding associated with
systems and components were protected from high winds and flooding associated with
        hurricanes. Additionally, the inspectors conducted walkdowns of the plant to check for
hurricanes. Additionally, the inspectors conducted walkdowns of the plant to check for
        any vulnerabilities, such as inadequate sealing of water tight penetrations, inoperable
any vulnerabilities, such as inadequate sealing of water tight penetrations, inoperable
        sump pumps, and other sources of potential internal and external flooding.
sump pumps, and other sources of potential internal and external flooding.
     b.   Findings
     b.
        No findings of significance were identified.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.


                                                2
2
1R04 Equipment Alignment
1R04
  a. Inspection Scope
Equipment Alignment
      The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems to verify correct
    a.
      system alignment. The inspectors checked for correct valve and electrical power
Inspection Scope
      alignments by comparing positions of valves, switches, and breakers to the procedures
The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems to verify correct
      and drawings listed in the Attachment.
system alignment. The inspectors checked for correct valve and electrical power
      *       Unit 2 low head safety injection (LHSI) pump 2-SI-P-1B while LHSI pump 2-SI-P-
alignments by comparing positions of valves, switches, and breakers to the procedures
              1A was tagged out for maintenance
and drawings listed in the Attachment.  
      *       Unit 1 motor driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) pumps, 1-FW-P-3A and -3B
*
              while the turbine drive auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump, 1-FW-P-2 was
Unit 2 low head safety injection (LHSI) pump 2-SI-P-1B while LHSI pump 2-SI-P-
              tagged out for a modification and maintenance
1A was tagged out for maintenance
      *       Unit 2 MDAFW pumps, 2-FW-P-3A and -3B while the TDAFW pump, 2-FW-P-2
*
              was tagged out for a modification and maintenance
Unit 1 motor driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) pumps, 1-FW-P-3A and -3B
      *       Number 2 emergency diesel generator (EDG) and number 3 EDG, 2-EE-EG-1
while the turbine drive auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump, 1-FW-P-2 was
              and 3-EE-EG-1 while number 1, EDG, 1-EE-EG-1 was tagged out for planned
tagged out for a modification and maintenance
              maintenance.
*
  b. Findings
Unit 2 MDAFW pumps, 2-FW-P-3A and -3B while the TDAFW pump, 2-FW-P-2
      No findings of significance were identified.
was tagged out for a modification and maintenance
1R05 Fire Protection
*
.1   Fire Area Walkdowns
Number 2 emergency diesel generator (EDG) and number 3 EDG, 2-EE-EG-1
  a. Inspection Scope
and 3-EE-EG-1 while number 1, EDG, 1-EE-EG-1 was tagged out for planned
      The inspectors toured eight risk significant areas to assess the adequacy of the fire
maintenance.
      protection program implementation. The inspectors checked for the control of transient
    b.
      combustibles and assessed the condition of the fire detection and fire suppression
Findings
      systems using SPS Appendix R Report. In addition, the inspectors reviewed 0-FS-FP-
No findings of significance were identified.
      116, Loss Prevention Strategy to verify the necessary fire fighting equipment was in
1R05
      place for the following areas:
Fire Protection
      *       Black battery house
  .1
      *       Mechanical equipment room (MER) # 3
Fire Area Walkdowns
      *       MER # 5
    a.
      *       Fuel building
Inspection Scope
      *       Unit 1 safeguards
The inspectors toured eight risk significant areas to assess the adequacy of the fire
      *       MER # 1
protection program implementation. The inspectors checked for the control of transient
      *       Number 3 EDG room
combustibles and assessed the condition of the fire detection and fire suppression
      *       Main control room
systems using SPS Appendix R Report. In addition, the inspectors reviewed 0-FS-FP-
116, Loss Prevention Strategy to verify the necessary fire fighting equipment was in
place for the following areas:
*
Black battery house
*
Mechanical equipment room (MER) # 3
*
MER # 5
*
Fuel building
*
Unit 1 safeguards
*
MER # 1
*
Number 3 EDG room
*
Main control room  


                                              3
3
  b. Findings
    b.
    No findings of significance were identified.
Findings
1R06 Flood Protection Measures
No findings of significance were identified.
  a. Inspection Scope
1R06
    The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and the
Flood Protection Measures
    Individual Plant Examination of Non-Seismic External Events and Fires for analyzed
    a.
    external and internal flooding events. Walkdowns were performed of the turbine
Inspection Scope
    building internal and external walls to review compliance with external flooding. To
The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and the
    review internal flooding preparation, the inspectors reviewed licensee procedure 0-MPM-
Individual Plant Examination of Non-Seismic External Events and Fires for analyzed
    1900-01, Periodic Inspection of Flood and Spill Protection Dikes, Dams, and Expansion
external and internal flooding events. Walkdowns were performed of the turbine
    Joint Shields. In addition, the inspectors walked down various expansion joint throttle
building internal and external walls to review compliance with external flooding. To
    shields in the turbine building and flood and spill control dams in the turbine and service
review internal flooding preparation, the inspectors reviewed licensee procedure 0-MPM-
    building. The inspectors compared observed equipment condition and documented
1900-01, Periodic Inspection of Flood and Spill Protection Dikes, Dams, and Expansion
    system deficiencies to determine system readiness for prevention of internal flooding.
Joint Shields. In addition, the inspectors walked down various expansion joint throttle
    The inspectors reviewed completed preventative maintenance and surveillance records
shields in the turbine building and flood and spill control dams in the turbine and service
    for the turbine building sump pump testing, station flood detection testing equipment,
building. The inspectors compared observed equipment condition and documented
    and floor drain back water stop valve replacement. The documents reviewed are listed
system deficiencies to determine system readiness for prevention of internal flooding.  
    in the Attachment of the report.
The inspectors reviewed completed preventative maintenance and surveillance records
  b. Findings
for the turbine building sump pump testing, station flood detection testing equipment,
    No findings of significance were identified.
and floor drain back water stop valve replacement. The documents reviewed are listed
1R07 Heat Sink Performance
in the Attachment of the report.
  a. Inspection Scope
    b.
    The inspectors evaluated the condition of the Unit 1 component cooling (CC) heat
Findings
    exchangers, 1-CC-E-1A. The inspectors discussed the heat exchanger performance
No findings of significance were identified.
    monitoring program and historical heat exchanger performance with engineering
1R07
    personnel. The inspectors reviewed the results of surveillance procedure 1-OSP-SW-
Heat Sink Performance
    002, Measurement of Macrofouling Blockage of Component Cooling Heat Exchanger 1-
    a.
    CC-E-1A. The inspector observed the condition of the 1A heat exchanger before and
Inspection Scope
    after performance of tube scraping. The documents reviewed are listed in the
The inspectors evaluated the condition of the Unit 1 component cooling (CC) heat
    Attachment of the report.
exchangers, 1-CC-E-1A. The inspectors discussed the heat exchanger performance
  b. Findings
monitoring program and historical heat exchanger performance with engineering
    No findings of significance were identified.
personnel. The inspectors reviewed the results of surveillance procedure 1-OSP-SW-
002, Measurement of Macrofouling Blockage of Component Cooling Heat Exchanger 1-
CC-E-1A. The inspector observed the condition of the 1A heat exchanger before and
after performance of tube scraping. The documents reviewed are listed in the
Attachment of the report.
    b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.


                                                4
4
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
1R11
a. Inspection Scope
Licensed Operator Requalification Program
    The inspectors observed licensed operator performance during simulator training
  a.
    session RQ-04.6-SP-1:PMS to determine whether the operators:
Inspection Scope
    *       were familiar with and could successfully implement the procedures associated
 
              with recognizing and recovering from a ruptured and faulted steam generator
              with loss of unit 1 power;
The inspectors observed licensed operator performance during simulator training
    *       recognized the high-risk actions in those procedures; and,
session RQ-04.6-SP-1:PMS to determine whether the operators:
    *       were familiar with related industry operating experiences.
*  
  b. Findings
were familiar with and could successfully implement the procedures associated
    No findings of significance were identified.
with recognizing and recovering from a ruptured and faulted steam generator
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
with loss of unit 1 power;
  a. Inspection Scope
*
    For the two equipment issues described in the plant issues listed below, the inspectors
recognized the high-risk actions in those procedures; and,
    evaluated the licensees effectiveness of the corresponding preventive and corrective
*
    maintenance. For each selected item below, the inspectors performed a detailed review
were familiar with related industry operating experiences.
    of the problem history and surrounding circumstances, evaluated the extent of condition
    b.
    reviews as required, and reviewed the generic implications of the equipment and/or work
Findings
    practice problem. Inspectors performed walkdown of the accessible portions of the
No findings of significance were identified.
    system, performed in-office reviews of procedures and evaluations, and held
1R12
    discussions with system engineers. Inspectors compared the licensees actions with the
Maintenance Effectiveness
    requirements of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65), VPAP 0815, Maintenance Rule
    a.
    Program, and the Surry Maintenance Rule Scoping and Performance Criteria Matrix.
Inspection Scope
    The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment of the report.
For the two equipment issues described in the plant issues listed below, the inspectors
    *       Component Cooling Chillers and
evaluated the licensees effectiveness of the corresponding preventive and corrective
    *       Charging Pump Service Water
maintenance. For each selected item below, the inspectors performed a detailed review
  b. Findings
of the problem history and surrounding circumstances, evaluated the extent of condition
    No findings of significance were identified.
reviews as required, and reviewed the generic implications of the equipment and/or work
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
practice problem. Inspectors performed walkdown of the accessible portions of the
  a. Inspection Scope
system, performed in-office reviews of procedures and evaluations, and held
    The inspectors reviewed the following six Plan of the Day (POD) documents listed below
discussions with system engineers. Inspectors compared the licensees actions with the
    to verify the adequacy, accuracy, and completeness of plant risk assessments
requirements of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65), VPAP 0815, Maintenance Rule
    performed prior to changes in plant configuration for maintenance activities or in
Program, and the Surry Maintenance Rule Scoping and Performance Criteria Matrix.
    response to emergent conditions. When applicable, inspectors assessed if the licensee
The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment of the report.  
*
Component Cooling Chillers and
*
Charging Pump Service Water
    b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13
Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
    a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the following six Plan of the Day (POD) documents listed below
to verify the adequacy, accuracy, and completeness of plant risk assessments
performed prior to changes in plant configuration for maintenance activities or in
response to emergent conditions. When applicable, inspectors assessed if the licensee


                                              5
5
    entered the appropriate risk category in accordance with plant procedures. Specifically,
entered the appropriate risk category in accordance with plant procedures. Specifically,
    the inspectors reviewed:
the inspectors reviewed:
    *       POD for Week of 6/27 - 7/2, including failure of 1EP-BC-UPS-1A2
*
    *       POD for Week of 7/24 - 30, including failure of 1-EE-P-1D, Unit 1 EDG fuel oil
POD for Week of 6/27 - 7/2, including failure of 1EP-BC-UPS-1A2
            transfer pump
*
    *       POD for Week of 8/21-27, including extended outage time for 1-EE-EG-1, Unit 1
POD for Week of 7/24 - 30, including failure of 1-EE-P-1D, Unit 1 EDG fuel oil
            EDG
transfer pump
    *       POD for Week 8/28 - 9/3
*
    *       POD for Week 9/4 - 10
POD for Week of 8/21-27, including extended outage time for 1-EE-EG-1, Unit 1
    *       POD for Week 9/18 - 24, including declaration of main control room and auxiliary
EDG  
            building systems emergency ventilation out of service
*
  b. Findings
POD for Week 8/28 - 9/3
    No findings of significance were identified.
*
1R15 Operability Evaluations
POD for Week 9/4 - 10
  a. Inspection Scope
*
    The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of five operability evaluations to
POD for Week 9/18 - 24, including declaration of main control room and auxiliary  
    ensure that operability was properly justified and the subject component or system
building systems emergency ventilation out of service  
    remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The operability
    b.
    evaluations were described in the plant issues listed below:
Findings
    *       Plant Issue S-2004-2531, During quarterly performance test, number 2 EDG
No findings of significance were identified.
            speed could not be reduced below 935 rpm.
1R15
    *       Plant Issue S-2004-2575, During leak test, 1-VS-FL-3B, charcoal filters failed to
Operability Evaluations
            prevent minimum bypass leakrate.
    a.
    *       Plant Issue S-2004-2821, During monthly run, 1-SW-P-1B, emergency service
Inspection Scope
            water pump (ESW) developed a coolant leak between the support plate and the
The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of five operability evaluations to
            engine.
ensure that operability was properly justified and the subject component or system
    *       Plant Issue S-2004-2938, After receiving an annunciator, it was discovered that
remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The operability
            the unit 2 uninteruptable power supply had switched to its alternate power supply
evaluations were described in the plant issues listed below:
            for an unknown reason.
*
    *       Plant Issue S-2004-2935, 1-VS-E-4D, main control room chiller tripped due to a
Plant Issue S-2004-2531, During quarterly performance test, number 2 EDG
            condenser leak.
speed could not be reduced below 935 rpm.
  b. Findings
*
    No findings of significance were identified.
Plant Issue S-2004-2575, During leak test, 1-VS-FL-3B, charcoal filters failed to
1R19 Post Maintenance Testing
prevent minimum bypass leakrate.
  a. Inspection Scope
*
    The inspectors reviewed five post maintenance test procedures and activities associated
Plant Issue S-2004-2821, During monthly run, 1-SW-P-1B, emergency service
    with the repair or replacement of the following components to determine whether the
water pump (ESW) developed a coolant leak between the support plate and the
engine.
*
Plant Issue S-2004-2938, After receiving an annunciator, it was discovered that
the unit 2 uninteruptable power supply had switched to its alternate power supply
for an unknown reason.
*
Plant Issue S-2004-2935, 1-VS-E-4D, main control room chiller tripped due to a
condenser leak.
    b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19
Post Maintenance Testing
    a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed five post maintenance test procedures and activities associated
with the repair or replacement of the following components to determine whether the


                                              6
6
    procedures and test activities were adequate to verify operability and functional
procedures and test activities were adequate to verify operability and functional
    capability following maintenance of the following equipment:
capability following maintenance of the following equipment:
    *       Work Order (WO) 513031-02, Inspect and repair 1-CH-P-1C motor leads,
*
    *       WO 515181-01, Replacement of Unit 1 plant protection relay PRB-YB,
Work Order (WO) 513031-02, Inspect and repair 1-CH-P-1C motor leads,
    *       WO 515598-01, Coolant leak found on B ESW Pump
*
    *       WO 517518-02 thru -07, Adjust relays for 1-EE-EG-1, Unit 1 EDG start
WO 515181-01, Replacement of Unit 1 plant protection relay PRB-YB,
            sequence
*
    *       WO 517385-01, Damper failed to close during 0-OPT-VS-007
WO 515598-01, Coolant leak found on B ESW Pump
  b. Findings
*
    No findings of significance were identified.
WO 517518-02 thru -07, Adjust relays for 1-EE-EG-1, Unit 1 EDG start
1R22 Surveillance Testing
sequence
  a. Inspection Scope
*
    For the seven surveillance tests listed below, the inspectors examined the test
WO 517385-01, Damper failed to close during 0-OPT-VS-007
    procedure and either witnessed the testing and/or reviewed test records to determine
    b.
    whether the scope of testing adequately demonstrated that the affected equipment was
Findings
    functional and operable:
No findings of significance were identified.
    Surveillance Tests
1R22
    *       0-NSP-CW-001, High Level Intake Structure Canal Probes Inspection
Surveillance Testing
    *       0-OP-4.2, Receipt and Storage of New Fuel
    a.
    *       1-OPT-RX-006, Rod Position Verification Using the Incore Flux Mapping System
Inspection Scope
    *       1-OPT-EG-008, Number 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Starting Sequence Test
For the seven surveillance tests listed below, the inspectors examined the test
    In-Service Test
procedure and either witnessed the testing and/or reviewed test records to determine
    *       0-OPT-EG-001, Number 3 Emergency Diesel Generator Monthly Start Exercise
whether the scope of testing adequately demonstrated that the affected equipment was
            Test
functional and operable:
    *       2-OPT-CH-003, Charging Pump Operability and Performance Test for 2-CH-P-
Surveillance Tests
            1C
*
    Reactor Coolant Leakage Test
0-NSP-CW-001, High Level Intake Structure Canal Probes Inspection
    *       1-OPT-RC-10.0, Reactor Leakage - Computer Calculated
*
  b. Findings
0-OP-4.2, Receipt and Storage of New Fuel
    No findings of significance were identified.
*
1-OPT-RX-006, Rod Position Verification Using the Incore Flux Mapping System  
*
1-OPT-EG-008, Number 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Starting Sequence Test
In-Service Test
*
0-OPT-EG-001, Number 3 Emergency Diesel Generator Monthly Start Exercise
Test
*
2-OPT-CH-003, Charging Pump Operability and Performance Test for 2-CH-P-
1C
Reactor Coolant Leakage Test  
*
1-OPT-RC-10.0, Reactor Leakage - Computer Calculated
    b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.


                                                  7
7
      Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
1EP6
    a. Inspection Scope
Drill Evaluation
      The inspectors observed an unannounced emergency response training drill conducted
    a.
      on August 25, 2004, to assess the licensees performance in emergency classification,
Inspection Scope
      notification, and protective action recommendation development. This drill included the
The inspectors observed an unannounced emergency response training drill conducted
      response actions taken by the shift operating crew in the simulator as well as the
on August 25, 2004, to assess the licensees performance in emergency classification,
      management team in the Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility.
notification, and protective action recommendation development. This drill included the
      This drill evaluation will contribute to the Emergency Response Performance Indicator
response actions taken by the shift operating crew in the simulator as well as the
      statistics.
management team in the Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility.  
  b. Findings
This drill evaluation will contribute to the Emergency Response Performance Indicator
      No findings of significance were identified.
statistics.
2.     RADIATION SAFETY
    b.
      Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety (PS)
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2.
RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety (PS)
2OS1 Access Controls To Radiologically Significant Areas
2OS1 Access Controls To Radiologically Significant Areas
a.     Inspection Scope
a.
      Access Controls
Inspection Scope
      During the inspection the licensees program activities for monitoring workers and
Access Controls
      controlling their access to radiologically significant areas and tasks were evaluated. The
During the inspection the licensees program activities for monitoring workers and
      inspectors evaluated the adequacy of procedural guidance, directly observed
controlling their access to radiologically significant areas and tasks were evaluated. The
      implementation of administrative and physical controls, and assessed resultant worker
inspectors evaluated the adequacy of procedural guidance, directly observed
      exposures to radiation and radioactive material.
implementation of administrative and physical controls, and assessed resultant worker
      The inspectors evaluated the licensees procedures for posting, surveying, and
exposures to radiation and radioactive material.
      controlling access to radiation areas, high radiation areas, and very high radiation areas,
The inspectors evaluated the licensees procedures for posting, surveying, and
      against the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20. During tours conducted June 7-9, 2004,
controlling access to radiation areas, high radiation areas, and very high radiation areas,
      the inspectors evaluated radiological postings and barricades against the current
against the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20. During tours conducted June 7-9, 2004,
      radiological surveys in areas of the auxiliary buildings to determine the appropriateness
the inspectors evaluated radiological postings and barricades against the current
      of the established radiological controls. In addition, the inspectors independently
radiological surveys in areas of the auxiliary buildings to determine the appropriateness
      verified the dose rates recorded on current survey maps at various locations in plant
of the established radiological controls. In addition, the inspectors independently
      areas. General area dose rates were compared to licensee survey records. The
verified the dose rates recorded on current survey maps at various locations in plant
      inspectors observed HP technician proficiency in performing and documenting the
areas. General area dose rates were compared to licensee survey records. The
      radiation surveys for observed activities.
inspectors observed HP technician proficiency in performing and documenting the
      Access controls for locked high radiation areas were reviewed and discussed with
radiation surveys for observed activities.  
      radiation protection management and supervision. The inspectors directly inspected the
Access controls for locked high radiation areas were reviewed and discussed with
      licensees designated locked doors locations and reviewed documentation to verify the
radiation protection management and supervision. The inspectors directly inspected the
licensees designated locked doors locations and reviewed documentation to verify the


                                              8
8
    condition and status of the locked doors. The inspectors also evaluated implementation
condition and status of the locked doors. The inspectors also evaluated implementation
    of key controls and postings for very high radiation areas (VHRAs) and locked high
of key controls and postings for very high radiation areas (VHRAs) and locked high
    radiation areas.
radiation areas.
    The inspectors observed radiological significant work areas within radiation areas and
The inspectors observed radiological significant work areas within radiation areas and
    high radiation areas as well as the spent fuel pool storage area. The licensees physical
high radiation areas as well as the spent fuel pool storage area. The licensees physical
    and program controls for highly activated or contaminated materials (non-fuel) stored
and program controls for highly activated or contaminated materials (non-fuel) stored
    within the spent fuel pool were also reviewed with licensee representatives. The
within the spent fuel pool were also reviewed with licensee representatives. The
    inspectors conducted independent radiological surveys of selected plant areas and
inspectors conducted independent radiological surveys of selected plant areas and
    compared the results to the licensees surveys. Radiological postings and barricade
compared the results to the licensees surveys. Radiological postings and barricade
    requirements were evaluated for the observed areas.
requirements were evaluated for the observed areas.
    The inspectors reviewed the extent of airborne radiological hazards and associated
The inspectors reviewed the extent of airborne radiological hazards and associated
    controls. Airborne radiological areas and resulting internal exposures since the last
controls. Airborne radiological areas and resulting internal exposures since the last
    NRC inspection were reviewed with the licensees technical staff. During observation of
NRC inspection were reviewed with the licensees technical staff. During observation of
    selected tasks, the use of engineering controls to minimize airborne radioactivity was
selected tasks, the use of engineering controls to minimize airborne radioactivity was
    evaluated
evaluated
    Radiation Protection (RP) program activities and their implementation were evaluated
Radiation Protection (RP) program activities and their implementation were evaluated
    against 10 CFR 19.12; 10 CFR Part 20; the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
against 10 CFR 19.12; 10 CFR Part 20; the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
    (UFSAR) details in Section 12, RP; Technical Specification (TS), Section 6.4; and
(UFSAR) details in Section 12, RP; Technical Specification (TS), Section 6.4; and
    approved licensee procedures. Licensee documents, records, and data reviewed within
approved licensee procedures. Licensee documents, records, and data reviewed within
    this inspection area are listed in Section 2OS1 of the report Attachment.
this inspection area are listed in Section 2OS1 of the report Attachment.
    Problem Identification and Resolution
Problem Identification and Resolution
    Issues identified through RP departmental self-assessments and Corrective Action
Issues identified through RP departmental self-assessments and Corrective Action
    Program (CAP) documents associated with radiological controls, personnel monitoring,
Program (CAP) documents associated with radiological controls, personnel monitoring,
    and exposure assessments were reviewed and discussed with cognizant licensee
and exposure assessments were reviewed and discussed with cognizant licensee
    representatives. The inspectors assessed the licensees ability to resolve the issues
representatives. The inspectors assessed the licensees ability to resolve the issues
    identified in this RP program area. Specific assessments and Plant Issue documents
identified in this RP program area. Specific assessments and Plant Issue documents
    reviewed and evaluated in detail for this inspection area are identified in Section 2OS1
reviewed and evaluated in detail for this inspection area are identified in Section 2OS1
    of the report Attachment.
of the report Attachment.
b.   Findings
b.
    No findings of significance were identified.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment
2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment
a.   Inspection Scope
a.
    Radiation Monitoring
Inspection Scope
    During the inspection, the operability, availability, and reliability of selected area
Radiation Monitoring
    radiation monitor (ARM) and continuous air monitor (CAM) equipment used for routine
During the inspection, the operability, availability, and reliability of selected area
    and accident monitoring activities were reviewed and evaluated. The inspectors
radiation monitor (ARM) and continuous air monitor (CAM) equipment used for routine
    observed material condition, installed configurations (where accessible), and results of
and accident monitoring activities were reviewed and evaluated. The inspectors
observed material condition, installed configurations (where accessible), and results of  


                                          9
9
performance checks for selected ARMs and CAMs. The monitors which were inspected
performance checks for selected ARMs and CAMs. The monitors which were inspected
are listed in Section 2OS3 of the report Attachment.
are listed in Section 2OS3 of the report Attachment.
Program guidance, performance activities, and equipment material condition for the
Program guidance, performance activities, and equipment material condition for the
direct radiation detection instrumentation and continuous air sampling equipment were
direct radiation detection instrumentation and continuous air sampling equipment were
reviewed against details documented in TS, 10 CFR Parts 20 and 50, UFSAR
reviewed against details documented in TS, 10 CFR Parts 20 and 50, UFSAR
Chapter 11, and applicable procedures. Radiation detection and sampling equipment
Chapter 11, and applicable procedures. Radiation detection and sampling equipment
required for use in accident monitoring also were reviewed against applicable sections
required for use in accident monitoring also were reviewed against applicable sections
of NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements; and Regulatory Guide
of NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements; and Regulatory Guide
(RG) 1.97, Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess
(RG) 1.97, Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess
Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident, Revision (Rev.) 3.
Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident, Revision (Rev.) 3.  
Licensee guidance documents, records, and data reviewed within this inspection area
Licensee guidance documents, records, and data reviewed within this inspection area
are listed in Section 2OS3 of the report Attachment.
are listed in Section 2OS3 of the report Attachment.
Line 458: Line 599:
Current program guidance, including calibration and operation procedures, and its
Current program guidance, including calibration and operation procedures, and its
implementation to maintain operability and accuracy of selected portable survey
implementation to maintain operability and accuracy of selected portable survey
instruments was reviewed and evaluated. The inspectors reviewed current calibration
instruments was reviewed and evaluated. The inspectors reviewed current calibration
data for selected personnel survey instruments and assessed operability of various
data for selected personnel survey instruments and assessed operability of various
portable survey instruments staged or in use by the Health Physics (HP) staff.
portable survey instruments staged or in use by the Health Physics (HP) staff.  
Responsible staffs knowledge and proficiency regarding portable survey
Responsible staffs knowledge and proficiency regarding portable survey
instrumentation calibration activities were evaluated through interviews, record reviews,
instrumentation calibration activities were evaluated through interviews, record reviews,
and direct observation of daily performance checks of a Model RO-2A portable survey
and direct observation of daily performance checks of a Model RO-2A portable survey
instrument and a Teletector Model 6112B. The accuracy and operability determinations
instrument and a Teletector Model 6112B. The accuracy and operability determinations
for instrumentation used to perform surveys in high radiation or greater areas were
for instrumentation used to perform surveys in high radiation or greater areas were
assessed.
assessed.
Operability and analysis capabilities of the Personnel Contamination Monitor (PCM)-1C
Operability and analysis capabilities of the Personnel Contamination Monitor (PCM)-1C
equipment and portal monitor (PM)-7 employed for surveys of individuals exiting the
equipment and portal monitor (PM)-7 employed for surveys of individuals exiting the
radiologically controlled area (RCA) were evaluated. The inspectors examined current
radiologically controlled area (RCA) were evaluated. The inspectors examined current
calibration and selected performance check data, and directly observed daily functional
calibration and selected performance check data, and directly observed daily functional
checks of one of each of the monitors.
checks of one of each of the monitors.
Line 477: Line 618:
Respiratory Protection - Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA)
Respiratory Protection - Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA)
The licensees respiratory protection program guidance and its implementation for
The licensees respiratory protection program guidance and its implementation for
SCBA equipment use were evaluated. The SCBA units staged for Control Room
SCBA equipment use were evaluated. The SCBA units staged for Control Room
emergency use were inspected for material condition, air pressure, and number of units
emergency use were inspected for material condition, air pressure, and number of units
available. Cognizant Control Room operations personnel were interviewed to determine
available. Cognizant Control Room operations personnel were interviewed to determine
their knowledge of available SCBA equipment locations, proper use, and availability of
their knowledge of available SCBA equipment locations, proper use, and availability of
prescription lens inserts, if required.
prescription lens inserts, if required.
Line 485: Line 626:
reviewed against TS; 10 CFR Part 20.1703; UFSAR Chapter 11; Emergency Plan
reviewed against TS; 10 CFR Part 20.1703; UFSAR Chapter 11; Emergency Plan


                                              10
10
  commitments; RG 8.15, Acceptable Programs for Respiratory Protection, Rev. 1,
commitments; RG 8.15, Acceptable Programs for Respiratory Protection, Rev. 1,
  October 1999; ANSI-Z88.2-1992, American National Standard Practices for Respiratory
October 1999; ANSI-Z88.2-1992, American National Standard Practices for Respiratory
  Protection; and applicable procedures listed in Section 2OS3 of the report Attachment.
Protection; and applicable procedures listed in Section 2OS3 of the report Attachment.
  Problem Identification and Resolution
Problem Identification and Resolution
  Selected licensee PI documents associated with ARMs and CAMs, portable radiation
Selected licensee PI documents associated with ARMs and CAMs, portable radiation
  detection instrumentation, and respiratory protection program activities were reviewed
detection instrumentation, and respiratory protection program activities were reviewed
  and assessed. The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify, characterize,
and assessed. The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify, characterize,
  prioritize, and resolve the identified issues. Specific documents reviewed and evaluated
prioritize, and resolve the identified issues. Specific documents reviewed and evaluated
  are listed in Section 2OS3 of the report Attachment.
are listed in Section 2OS3 of the report Attachment.
b. Findings
b.
  (Closed) URI 50-280, 281/2002003-01: Adequacy of procedures for the self-contained
Findings
  breathing apparatus (SCBA) training program in that all designated users were not
(Closed) URI 50-280, 281/2002003-01: Adequacy of procedures for the self-contained
  required to demonstrate proficiency in changing SCBA air cylinders or backpacks.
breathing apparatus (SCBA) training program in that all designated users were not
  Introduction. A Green NCV of 10 CFR 20.1703(e) was identified for the failure to
required to demonstrate proficiency in changing SCBA air cylinders or backpacks.
  establish and implement adequate written procedures to train emergency workers on
Introduction. A Green NCV of 10 CFR 20.1703(e) was identified for the failure to
  respiratory protective equipment. This finding is also related to the emergency planning
establish and implement adequate written procedures to train emergency workers on
  standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). Specifically, the licensees written and implemented
respiratory protective equipment. This finding is also related to the emergency planning
  SCBA training program was incomplete in that it did not assure that all Control Room
standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). Specifically, the licensees written and implemented
  staff demonstrate proficiency in the change out SCBA air cylinders during emergencies.
SCBA training program was incomplete in that it did not assure that all Control Room
  Description.
staff demonstrate proficiency in the change out SCBA air cylinders during emergencies.
  During the previous inspection in this program area (NRC Inspection Report 050-280,
 
  281/2002003) the inspectors determined, through interviews with select Control Room
Description.
  personnel and training supervisors, that not all Control Room staff were required to
During the previous inspection in this program area (NRC Inspection Report 050-280,
  demonstrate proficiency in the change out of SCBA air cylinders or backpacks. Specific
281/2002003) the inspectors determined, through interviews with select Control Room
  hands-on training in this area was provided to personnel trained for Fire Brigade, which
personnel and training supervisors, that not all Control Room staff were required to
  did not include all Senior Reactor Operators. Interviews with Control Room staff
demonstrate proficiency in the change out of SCBA air cylinders or backpacks. Specific
  regarding changing out air cylinders during an emergency yielded inconsistent
hands-on training in this area was provided to personnel trained for Fire Brigade, which
  responses on bottle and/or pack replacement. This issue was entered into the
did not include all Senior Reactor Operators. Interviews with Control Room staff
  licensees Corrective Action Program (CAP) as Plant Issue S-2002-2768.
regarding changing out air cylinders during an emergency yielded inconsistent
  Analysis. During this inspection the inspectors determined that the licensees training in
responses on bottle and/or pack replacement. This issue was entered into the
  the use of SCBAs did not require instruction of all SCBA qualified personnel, e.g.,
licensees Corrective Action Program (CAP) as Plant Issue S-2002-2768.
  Senior Reactor Operators who were not fire brigade members, to demonstrate
Analysis. During this inspection the inspectors determined that the licensees training in
  proficiency in the change out of SCBA air cylinders during emergencies. From a review
the use of SCBAs did not require instruction of all SCBA qualified personnel, e.g.,
  of select training records and discussions with cognizant licensee training and Control
Senior Reactor Operators who were not fire brigade members, to demonstrate
  Room representatives, the inspectors determined that the licensee had implemented
proficiency in the change out of SCBA air cylinders during emergencies. From a review
  several training program changes to ensure that all worker disciplines with emergency
of select training records and discussions with cognizant licensee training and Control
  response workers demonstrate the change out of SCBA air cylinders. The licensees
Room representatives, the inspectors determined that the licensee had implemented
  continuing training program specifically included hands on training that individuals
several training program changes to ensure that all worker disciplines with emergency
  demonstrate proficiency in the change out of SCBA air cylinders. This finding is greater
response workers demonstrate the change out of SCBA air cylinders. The licensees
  than minor because emergency workers who are required to use respiratory protective
continuing training program specifically included hands on training that individuals
  equipment are not trained to use that equipment. This finding is of very low safety
demonstrate proficiency in the change out of SCBA air cylinders. This finding is greater
than minor because emergency workers who are required to use respiratory protective
equipment are not trained to use that equipment. This finding is of very low safety


                                              11
11
    significance because an adequate number of SCBA qualified plant personnel/staff,
significance because an adequate number of SCBA qualified plant personnel/staff,
    which were designated emergency responders, would have been available to respond in
which were designated emergency responders, would have been available to respond in
    the event of an actual emergency. Therefore, the issue did not result in the failure to
the event of an actual emergency. Therefore, the issue did not result in the failure to
    meet a planning standard.
meet a planning standard.
    Enforcement. 10 CFR 20.1703(c)(4)(ii) requires that the licensee implement and
Enforcement. 10 CFR 20.1703(c)(4)(ii) requires that the licensee implement and
    maintain a respiratory protection program that includes written procedures regarding
maintain a respiratory protection program that includes written procedures regarding
    training of respirator users. Contrary to the above, as of August 19, 2002, the licensee
training of respirator users. Contrary to the above, as of August 19, 2002, the licensee
    had not established and implemented adequate written procedures for training respirator
had not established and implemented adequate written procedures for training respirator
    users. Specifically, the licensees written and implemented SCBA training program was
users. Specifically, the licensees written and implemented SCBA training program was
    incomplete in that it did not assure that all designated SCBA users were required to
incomplete in that it did not assure that all designated SCBA users were required to
    demonstrate proficiency in the change out of SCBA air cylinders. Because the failure to
demonstrate proficiency in the change out of SCBA air cylinders. Because the failure to
    train all Control Room staff in the use of respiratory protective equipment is of very low
train all Control Room staff in the use of respiratory protective equipment is of very low
    safety significance and was entered into the CAP (Plant Issue S-2002-2768), this
safety significance and was entered into the CAP (Plant Issue S-2002-2768), this
    violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section IV.A.1 of the NRC
violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section IV.A.1 of the NRC
    Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000280, 281/2004004-001: Failure to Implement and
Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000280, 281/2004004-001: Failure to Implement and
    Maintain a Respiratory Protection Program That Includes Written Procedures Regarding
Maintain a Respiratory Protection Program That Includes Written Procedures Regarding
    Training of Respirator Users in Demonstrating Proficiency in the Change Out of SCBA
Training of Respirator Users in Demonstrating Proficiency in the Change Out of SCBA
    Air Cylinders.
Air Cylinders.
2PS1 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Monitoring Systems
2PS1
a.   Inspection Scope
Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Monitoring Systems
    Radioactive Effluent Treatment and Monitoring Systems
a.
    The licensees Radioactive Effluent Release Report for Calendar Years (CY) 2002 and
Inspection Scope
    2003 was reviewed and discussed. Report format, the radionuclides and quantities
Radioactive Effluent Treatment and Monitoring Systems
    released in liquid and gaseous effluents, and resultant doses to the public were
The licensees Radioactive Effluent Release Report for Calendar Years (CY) 2002 and
    evaluated against applicable regulations. The inspectors reviewed the recent changes
2003 was reviewed and discussed. Report format, the radionuclides and quantities
    to Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) and evaluated whether those changes were
released in liquid and gaseous effluents, and resultant doses to the public were
    technically justified and consistent with the regulatory guidance.
evaluated against applicable regulations. The inspectors reviewed the recent changes
    The inspectors toured the Surry Radwaste Facility (SRF) and assessed major
to Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) and evaluated whether those changes were
    radioactive effluent process and monitoring equipment against descriptions documented
technically justified and consistent with the regulatory guidance.
    in the UFSAR and the ODCM. The material condition and operability of select SRF
The inspectors toured the Surry Radwaste Facility (SRF) and assessed major
    liquid effluent monitors and ventilation stack gaseous effluent monitors were evaluated.
radioactive effluent process and monitoring equipment against descriptions documented
    Compensatory sampling and analyses for three randomly selected effluent monitors
in the UFSAR and the ODCM.   The material condition and operability of select SRF
    which were out-of-service at various times during the previous twelve months were
liquid effluent monitors and ventilation stack gaseous effluent monitors were evaluated.  
    assessed. The inspectors reviewed the most recent calibration data for select effluent
Compensatory sampling and analyses for three randomly selected effluent monitors
    monitors, a gaseous effluent sample flow rate monitor, and one gamma spectroscopic
which were out-of-service at various times during the previous twelve months were
    instrument in the count room. Results of inter-laboratory comparisons for calendar
assessed. The inspectors reviewed the most recent calibration data for select effluent
    years 2002 and 2003 for samples typical of plant effluents were reviewed and evaluated.
monitors, a gaseous effluent sample flow rate monitor, and one gamma spectroscopic
    During the inspection, the inspectors observed sampling and analysis of select
instrument in the count room. Results of inter-laboratory comparisons for calendar
    ventilation stack gaseous effluents in accordance with licensee release permit. The
years 2002 and 2003 for samples typical of plant effluents were reviewed and evaluated.  
    inspectors assessed adherence to procedures and to dose limits for that release.
During the inspection, the inspectors observed sampling and analysis of select
    License procedures and activities related to plant effluents were evaluated for
ventilation stack gaseous effluents in accordance with licensee release permit. The
    consistency with TS; ODCM; UFSAR Chapter 11.0, Radioactive Wastes and Radiation
inspectors assessed adherence to procedures and to dose limits for that release.
License procedures and activities related to plant effluents were evaluated for
consistency with TS; ODCM; UFSAR Chapter 11.0, Radioactive Wastes and Radiation


                                                  12
12
    Protection; 10 CFR 20.1302, 10 CFR 50.36a, and Appendix I to 10 CFR 50; RG 1.109,
Protection; 10 CFR 20.1302, 10 CFR 50.36a, and Appendix I to 10 CFR 50; RG 1.109,
    Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the
Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the
    Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I; RG 4.15, Quality
Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I; RG 4.15, Quality
    Assurance for Radiological Monitoring Programs (Normal Operation) - Effluent Streams
Assurance for Radiological Monitoring Programs (Normal Operation) - Effluent Streams
    and the Environment, December 1977; and NUREG-0133. Licensee plant effluent
and the Environment, December 1977; and NUREG-0133. Licensee plant effluent
    related procedures, reports and records reviewed during the inspection are listed in
related procedures, reports and records reviewed during the inspection are listed in
    Section 2PS1 of the report Attachment.
Section 2PS1 of the report Attachment.
    Problem Identification and Resolution
Problem Identification and Resolution
    The most recent audit of the effluent monitoring program and the Plant Issues
The most recent audit of the effluent monitoring program and the Plant Issues
    generated in response to the audit findings were selected for detailed evaluation and are
generated in response to the audit findings were selected for detailed evaluation and are
    listed in Section 2PS1 of the report Attachment. The inspectors assessed the licensees
listed in Section 2PS1 of the report Attachment. The inspectors assessed the licensees
    ability to identify, characterize, prioritize, and resolve the identified issues.
ability to identify, characterize, prioritize, and resolve the identified issues.
b.   Findings
b.  
    No findings of significance were identified.
Findings
2PS3 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP)
No findings of significance were identified.
a.   Inspection Scope
2PS3
    Environmental Monitoring
Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP)
    The inspectors toured selected REMP air sampling equipment and direct radiation
a.
    monitoring stations. Inspectors observed verification/collection of eight weekly
Inspection Scope
    particulate and charcoal samples, and assessed material condition of air sampling
Environmental Monitoring
    monitoring equipment. The inspectors verified the location of forty three (43)
The inspectors toured selected REMP air sampling equipment and direct radiation
    thermoluminescence dosimeter (TLD) locations including three control locations.
monitoring stations. Inspectors observed verification/collection of eight weekly
    Calibration records for environmental air samplers were reviewed.
particulate and charcoal samples, and assessed material condition of air sampling
    The inspectors reviewed and discussed with licensee personnel the results published in
monitoring equipment. The inspectors verified the location of forty three (43)
    the Surry Annual Radiological Environmental Operating report for CYs 2002 and 2003
thermoluminescence dosimeter (TLD) locations including three control locations.  
    and the land use census report for CY 2003. The inspectors reviewed and discussed a
Calibration records for environmental air samplers were reviewed.
    quality assurance audit of the current vendor laboratory activities conducted by another
The inspectors reviewed and discussed with licensee personnel the results published in
    utility and documented as an Attachment to the most recent Environmental Operating
the Surry Annual Radiological Environmental Operating report for CYs 2002 and 2003
    report.
and the land use census report for CY 2003. The inspectors reviewed and discussed a
    The inspectors reviewed the operability of the meteorological monitoring equipment and
quality assurance audit of the current vendor laboratory activities conducted by another
    operator access to meteorological data. Current meteorological monitoring equipment
utility and documented as an Attachment to the most recent Environmental Operating
    performance and calibration were reviewed with the system engineer. Licensee
report.
    technicians primarily responsible for equipment maintenance and surveillance were
The inspectors reviewed the operability of the meteorological monitoring equipment and
    interviewed by the inspectors concerning equipment performance, reliability and routine
operator access to meteorological data. Current meteorological monitoring equipment
    inspections.
performance and calibration were reviewed with the system engineer. Licensee
    REMP guidance, implementation, and results were reviewed against TS; 10 CFR Parts
technicians primarily responsible for equipment maintenance and surveillance were
    20 and Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 design criteria requirements; UFSAR details;
interviewed by the inspectors concerning equipment performance, reliability and routine
    ODCM guidance; and applicable procedures listed in Section 2PS3 of the Attachment to
inspections.
REMP guidance, implementation, and results were reviewed against TS; 10 CFR Parts
20 and Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 design criteria requirements; UFSAR details;
ODCM guidance; and applicable procedures listed in Section 2PS3 of the Attachment to


                                                13
13
      this report. Specific laboratory QC activities were evaluated against RG 1.21,
this report. Specific laboratory QC activities were evaluated against RG 1.21,
      Measuring, Evaluating and Reporting Radioactivity in Solid Wastes and Releases of
Measuring, Evaluating and Reporting Radioactivity in Solid Wastes and Releases of
      Radioactive Materials In Liquid and Gaseous Effluents from Light-Water Cooled Nuclear
Radioactive Materials In Liquid and Gaseous Effluents from Light-Water Cooled Nuclear
      Power Plant, June 1974; and RG 4.15, Quality Assurance for Radiological Monitoring
Power Plant, June 1974; and RG 4.15, Quality Assurance for Radiological Monitoring
      Programs (Normal Operation) - Effluent Streams and the Environment, December 1977.
Programs (Normal Operation) - Effluent Streams and the Environment, December 1977.  
      The meteorological program implementation and activities were reviewed against
The meteorological program implementation and activities were reviewed against
      10 CFR Part 20, TS, UFSAR, ODCM, Safety Guide 23, and applicable procedures
10 CFR Part 20, TS, UFSAR, ODCM, Safety Guide 23, and applicable procedures
      documented in Section 2PS3 of the report Attachment.
documented in Section 2PS3 of the report Attachment.
      Unrestricted Release of Materials from the Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA)
Unrestricted Release of Materials from the Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA)
      The inspectors reviewed selected program procedures and observed surveys of
The inspectors reviewed selected program procedures and observed surveys of
      potentially contaminated materials released from the RCA to assess the licensees
potentially contaminated materials released from the RCA to assess the licensees
      effectiveness in preventing the improper release of radioactive material for unrestricted
effectiveness in preventing the improper release of radioactive material for unrestricted
      use. The radionuclides identified within recent waste stream analyses were compared
use. The radionuclides identified within recent waste stream analyses were compared
      against current calibration source radionuclide types and results to evaluate the
against current calibration source radionuclide types and results to evaluate the
      appropriateness and accuracy of release survey instrumentation. Licensee data to
appropriateness and accuracy of release survey instrumentation. Licensee data to
      evaluate survey requirements for hard-to-detect radionuclides were reviewed and
evaluate survey requirements for hard-to-detect radionuclides were reviewed and
      discussed with responsible personnel.
discussed with responsible personnel.
      The licensee practices and implementation of their monitoring activities were evaluated
The licensee practices and implementation of their monitoring activities were evaluated
      against 10 CFR Part 20, TS, UFSAR, and applicable procedures documented in the
against 10 CFR Part 20, TS, UFSAR, and applicable procedures documented in the
      Section 2PS3 of the report Attachment.
Section 2PS3 of the report Attachment.
      Problem Identification and Resolution
Problem Identification and Resolution
      The most recent audit of the effluent monitoring program and the Plant Issues
The most recent audit of the effluent monitoring program and the Plant Issues
      generated in response to the audit findings were selected for detailed evaluation and are
generated in response to the audit findings were selected for detailed evaluation and are
      listed in Section 2PS3 of the report Attachment.
listed in Section 2PS3 of the report Attachment.
b.     Findings
b.
      No findings of significance were identified.
Findings
4     OTHER ACTIVITIES
No findings of significance were identified.
4
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
   .1   Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Performance Indicator
   .1
     a. Inspection Scope
Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Performance Indicator
      The inspectors performed a periodic review of the Unplanned Power Changes per 7000
     a.
      Critical Hours performance indicator for Units 1 and 2. Specifically, the inspectors
Inspection Scope
      reviewed this performance indicator from the third quarter of 2003 through the second
The inspectors performed a periodic review of the Unplanned Power Changes per 7000
      quarter of 2004. Inspectors evaluated whether the performance indicator was
Critical Hours performance indicator for Units 1 and 2. Specifically, the inspectors
      calculated in accordance with the guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory
reviewed this performance indicator from the third quarter of 2003 through the second
quarter of 2004. Inspectors evaluated whether the performance indicator was
calculated in accordance with the guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory  


                                                14
14
      Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline. Documents reviewed included
Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline. Documents reviewed included
      applicable monthly operating reports, licensee event reports, and operator logs.
applicable monthly operating reports, licensee event reports, and operator logs.
     b. Findings
   
      No findings of significance were identified.
     b.
   .2   Safety System Functional Failure Performance Indicator
Findings
     a. Inspection Scope
No findings of significance were identified.
      The inspectors performed a periodic review of the Safety System Functional Failure
   .2
      performance indicator for Units 1 and 2. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed this
Safety System Functional Failure Performance Indicator
      performance indicator from the third quarter of 2003 through the second quarter of
     a.
      2004. Inspectors evaluated whether the performance indicator was calculated in
Inspection Scope
      accordance with the guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment
The inspectors performed a periodic review of the Safety System Functional Failure
      Performance Indicator Guideline. Documents reviewed included applicable monthly
performance indicator for Units 1 and 2. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed this
      operating reports, licensee event reports and operator logs.
performance indicator from the third quarter of 2003 through the second quarter of
     b. Findings
2004. Inspectors evaluated whether the performance indicator was calculated in
      No findings of significance were identified.
accordance with the guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment
.3     Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat Removal Performance Indicator
Performance Indicator Guideline. Documents reviewed included applicable monthly
     a. Inspection Scope
operating reports, licensee event reports and operator logs.
      The inspectors performed a periodic review of the Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat
   
      Removal performance indicator for Units 1 and 2. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed
     b.
      this performance indicator from the third quarter of 2003 through the second quarter of
Findings
      2004. Inspectors evaluated whether the performance indicator was calculated in
No findings of significance were identified.
      accordance with the guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment
.3
      Performance Indicator Guideline. Documents reviewed included applicable monthly
Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat Removal Performance Indicator
      operating reports, licensee event reports, Integrated inspection reports and operator
     a.
      logs.
Inspection Scope
     b. Findings
The inspectors performed a periodic review of the Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat
      No findings of significance were identified.
Removal performance indicator for Units 1 and 2. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed
.4     Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness
this performance indicator from the third quarter of 2003 through the second quarter of
     a. Inspection Scope
2004. Inspectors evaluated whether the performance indicator was calculated in
      The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Occupational Exposure Control
accordance with the guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment
      Effectiveness PI for the period from December 2003 through August 2004. To verify the
Performance Indicator Guideline. Documents reviewed included applicable monthly
      accuracy of the PI data reported during that period, PI definitions and guidance
operating reports, licensee event reports, Integrated inspection reports and operator
      contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,
logs.
      Rev. 2, were used to verify the basis in reporting for each data element.
   
     b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.4
Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness
     a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Occupational Exposure Control
Effectiveness PI for the period from December 2003 through August 2004. To verify the
accuracy of the PI data reported during that period, PI definitions and guidance
contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,
Rev. 2, were used to verify the basis in reporting for each data element.


                                                15
15
      The inspectors reviewed Plant Issue records generated from December 2003 through
The inspectors reviewed Plant Issue records generated from December 2003 through
      August 2004 to ensure that radiological occurrences were properly classified per NEI
August 2004 to ensure that radiological occurrences were properly classified per NEI
      99-02. The inspectors also reviewed electronic dosimeter alarm logs, radioactive
99-02. The inspectors also reviewed electronic dosimeter alarm logs, radioactive
      material intake records, and monthly PI reports for CY 2004. In addition, licensee
material intake records, and monthly PI reports for CY 2004. In addition, licensee
      procedural guidance for classifying and reporting PI events was evaluated. Reviewed
procedural guidance for classifying and reporting PI events was evaluated. Reviewed
      documents are listed in Section 4OA1 of the report Attachment.
documents are listed in Section 4OA1 of the report Attachment.
b.     Findings
b.
      No findings of significance were identified.
Findings
.5     RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluents Occurrence
No findings of significance were identified.
     a. Inspection Scope
.5
      The inspectors reviewed records used by the licensee to identify occurrences of
RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluents Occurrence
      quarterly doses from liquid and gaseous effluents in excess of the values specified in
     a.
      NEI 99-02 guidance. Those records included monthly effluent dose calculations for CY
Inspection Scope
      2004. The inspectors also interviewed licensee personnel that were responsible for
The inspectors reviewed records used by the licensee to identify occurrences of
      collecting and reporting the PI data. In addition, licensee procedural guidance for
quarterly doses from liquid and gaseous effluents in excess of the values specified in
      classifying and reporting PI events was evaluated. Reviewed documents are listed in
NEI 99-02 guidance. Those records included monthly effluent dose calculations for CY
      Section 4OA5 of the report Attachment.
2004. The inspectors also interviewed licensee personnel that were responsible for
   b. Findings
collecting and reporting the PI data. In addition, licensee procedural guidance for
      No findings of significance were identified.
classifying and reporting PI events was evaluated. Reviewed documents are listed in
Section 4OA5 of the report Attachment.
   b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution
  .1   Daily Review of Plant Issues
  .1
   a. Inspection Scope
Daily Review of Plant Issues
      As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems,
   a.
      and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance
Inspection Scope
      issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems,
      licensees corrective action program. This review was accomplished by a daily review of
and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance
      hard copies of each plant issue and attending the daily Plant Issue Review Team
issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the
      meeting.
licensees corrective action program. This review was accomplished by a daily review of  
     b. Findings
hard copies of each plant issue and attending the daily Plant Issue Review Team
      No findings of significance were identified.
meeting.
     b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.


                                              16
16
.2   Detailed Review of Individual Issues
.2
  a. Inspection Scope
Detailed Review of Individual Issues
    The inspectors performed an in-depth review of the failure of a power cable termination
  a.
    for the 1G transformer in March 2004 and the 2G transformer in May 2004. The issues
Inspection Scope
    are documented in the corrective action program as Plant Issues S-2004-0876 and S-
The inspectors performed an in-depth review of the failure of a power cable termination
    2004-2306 respectively. The review was performed to ensure the full extent of the issue
for the 1G transformer in March 2004 and the 2G transformer in May 2004. The issues
    was identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective
are documented in the corrective action program as Plant Issues S-2004-0876 and S-
    actions were specified and prioritized. The inspectors evaluated the plant issues against
2004-2306 respectively. The review was performed to ensure the full extent of the issue
    the requirements of the licensees corrective action program as delineated in Station
was identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective
    Administrative Procedure VPAP-1601, Corrective Action, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,
actions were specified and prioritized. The inspectors evaluated the plant issues against
    Criterion XVI, Corrective Action.
the requirements of the licensees corrective action program as delineated in Station
b. Findings and Observations
Administrative Procedure VPAP-1601, Corrective Action, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,
    No findings of regulatory significance were identified. The licensee performed an
Criterion XVI, Corrective Action.  
    apparent cause and a maintenance rule evaluation for each loss of the 1G and 2G bus.
  b.
    In March 2004, one termination to the 1G transformer failed. The transformer was
Findings and Observations
    supplied 4160 volts by a combination of underground and overhead lines from the main
 
    switchyard to the low level intake area. The termination that failed had been in service
No findings of regulatory significance were identified. The licensee performed an
    since 1994. The 1G failure root cause was determined to be workmanship in that the
apparent cause and a maintenance rule evaluation for each loss of the 1G and 2G bus.  
    assembly documents were not followed correctly. The corrective action consisted of
In March 2004, one termination to the 1G transformer failed. The transformer was
    repairing the failed connector and writing a work order to remake the remaining five
supplied 4160 volts by a combination of underground and overhead lines from the main
    terminations. In May 2004, a terminator on the 2G line to the low level area failed. This
switchyard to the low level intake area. The termination that failed had been in service
    was a new underground line installed to protect the low level intake power supply from
since 1994. The 1G failure root cause was determined to be workmanship in that the
    severe weather and animals. The 2G line had been in service approximately 20 hours
assembly documents were not followed correctly. The corrective action consisted of
    when failure occurred. The licensee determined the root cause was workmanship in
repairing the failed connector and writing a work order to remake the remaining five
    that the assembly documents were not followed correctly. The corrective actions
terminations. In May 2004, a terminator on the 2G line to the low level area failed. This
    specified were to repair the failed connector and develop and implement a special
was a new underground line installed to protect the low level intake power supply from
    procedure to return the power supply to service. The 2G apparent cause did not
severe weather and animals. The 2G line had been in service approximately 20 hours
    address the need for a plant procedure for assembly of the terminations, however, the
when failure occurred. The licensee determined the root cause was workmanship in
    maintenance rule evaluation included an assignment to develop a procedure with
that the assembly documents were not followed correctly. The corrective actions
    appropriate inspection points. The 2G failure occurred within three months of the 1G
specified were to repair the failed connector and develop and implement a special
    failure with the same root cause. The licensee did not view this as repetitive and did not
procedure to return the power supply to service.   The 2G apparent cause did not
    address corrective actions to prevent workmanship issues in the apparent cause
address the need for a plant procedure for assembly of the terminations, however, the
    corrective actions. This is a Minor Finding that does not have regulatory significance.
maintenance rule evaluation included an assignment to develop a procedure with
    The 1G and 2G transformers are non-safety related. The loss of the 1G or 2G
appropriate inspection points. The 2G failure occurred within three months of the 1G
    transformer is a transient initiator and the transformers are included in the maintenance
failure with the same root cause. The licensee did not view this as repetitive and did not
    rule. Due to the unique design of the Surry intake canal the loss of one transformer
address corrective actions to prevent workmanship issues in the apparent cause
    does not have an immediate impact on decay heat removal.
corrective actions. This is a Minor Finding that does not have regulatory significance.  
  c. Findings
The 1G and 2G transformers are non-safety related. The loss of the 1G or 2G
    No findings of significance were identified.
transformer is a transient initiator and the transformers are included in the maintenance
rule.   Due to the unique design of the Surry intake canal the loss of one transformer
does not have an immediate impact on decay heat removal.
  c.
Findings
 
No findings of significance were identified.


                                                17
17
4OA3 Event Follow-up
4OA3 Event Follow-up
   .1 (Closed) LER 05000281/2003001-00, Electrical Conduit Bushing Failure Resulting in a
   .1
      Reactor Trip.
(Closed) LER 05000281/2003001-00, Electrical Conduit Bushing Failure Resulting in a
      A Unit 2 reactor trip and resulting engineering safety feature activations on Unit 1 and 2
Reactor Trip.
      were attributed to a failed insulating conduit busing connection. The failed bushing
A Unit 2 reactor trip and resulting engineering safety feature activations on Unit 1 and 2
      allowed damage to the Unit 2 main generator protective circuitry wiring which resulted in
were attributed to a failed insulating conduit busing connection. The failed bushing
      the protective circuit actuating. The inspectors reviewed the licensee root cause
allowed damage to the Unit 2 main generator protective circuitry wiring which resulted in
      evaluation S-2003-03599 and corrective action taken and planned to be taken. The root
the protective circuit actuating. The inspectors reviewed the licensee root cause
      cause evaluation properly identified the root and contributing causes to be the bushing
evaluation S-2003-03599 and corrective action taken and planned to be taken. The root
      failure and the corrective actions should be sufficient to preclude a similar event on
cause evaluation properly identified the root and contributing causes to be the bushing
      either Unit 1 or 2.
failure and the corrective actions should be sufficient to preclude a similar event on
  .2   (Closed) LER 05000280/2003002-00, Manual Steam Generator Level Control Results in
either Unit 1 or 2.
      Power Ascension Reactor Trip.
  .2
      The supplement LER 05000280/2003002-10 inspection activity documented in NRC
(Closed) LER 05000280/2003002-00, Manual Steam Generator Level Control Results in
      Supplemental Inspection Report No. 05000280/2004009 sufficiently addressed the
Power Ascension Reactor Trip.
      original LER.
The supplement LER 05000280/2003002-10 inspection activity documented in NRC
  .3   (Closed) LERs 05000280, 281/2003004-00 and 05000280, 281/2003004-01, Manual
Supplemental Inspection Report No. 05000280/2004009 sufficiently addressed the
      Reactor Trips due to Loss of All Circulating Water Pumps.
original LER.
      These LERs are associated with the manual trip of both units due to the loss of all
  .3
      circulating water pumps during Hurricane Isabel. The LERs also report the automatic
(Closed) LERs 05000280, 281/2003004-00 and 05000280, 281/2003004-01, Manual
      safety feature actuations that occurred as a result of the trips. The inspectors reviewed
Reactor Trips due to Loss of All Circulating Water Pumps.
      Plant Issue S-2003-4165 and associated documents which document the events,
These LERs are associated with the manual trip of both units due to the loss of all
      response of plant equipment, root and contributing cause evaluation results and
circulating water pumps during Hurricane Isabel. The LERs also report the automatic
      corrective actions. NRC Supplemental Inspection Report No. 05000280/2004009
safety feature actuations that occurred as a result of the trips. The inspectors reviewed
      concluded that the planned actions for loss of power to the circulating water pumps was
Plant Issue S-2003-4165 and associated documents which document the events,
      appropriate. During the inspection, the inspectors verified that the licensee had
response of plant equipment, root and contributing cause evaluation results and
      completed actions to install underground power cables to the transformers which
corrective actions. NRC Supplemental Inspection Report No. 05000280/2004009
      supplied power to the pumps. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee evaluation
concluded that the planned actions for loss of power to the circulating water pumps was
      concerning tripping of two of the emergency service water pumps during the event. The
appropriate. During the inspection, the inspectors verified that the licensee had
      inspectors agreed with the licencees cause determinations and actions taken to prevent
completed actions to install underground power cables to the transformers which
      similar emergency service water pump trips in the future.
supplied power to the pumps. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee evaluation
  .4   (Closed) Apparent Violation (AV) 05000280, 281/2003008-002: Alternative Shutdown
concerning tripping of two of the emergency service water pumps during the event. The
      Capability and Response Procedures Not Adequate to Ensure Safe Shutdown of Unit 1
inspectors agreed with the licencees cause determinations and actions taken to prevent
      and URI 05000281/2003008-001: Fire Response Procedures 2-FCA-4.00 And 0-FCA-
similar emergency service water pump trips in the future.
      14.00 Not Adequate To Ensure Safe Shutdown Of Unit 2
  .4
      The Final Significance Determination associated with the AV and the URI was issued in
(Closed) Apparent Violation (AV) 05000280, 281/2003008-002: Alternative Shutdown
      a letter dated September 15, 2004. This issue regarding Surry fire response procedures
Capability and Response Procedures Not Adequate to Ensure Safe Shutdown of Unit 1
      that were not effective in ensuring a safe shutdown of a unit following postulated fires
and URI 05000281/2003008-001: Fire Response Procedures 2-FCA-4.00 And 0-FCA-
      was determined to be a White finding and will be tracked as VIO 05000280,
14.00 Not Adequate To Ensure Safe Shutdown Of Unit 2
      281/2004008-001, Alternative Shutdown Capability and Response Procedures Not
The Final Significance Determination associated with the AV and the URI was issued in
      Adequate to Ensure Safe Shutdown.
a letter dated September 15, 2004. This issue regarding Surry fire response procedures
that were not effective in ensuring a safe shutdown of a unit following postulated fires
was determined to be a White finding and will be tracked as VIO 05000280,
281/2004008-001, Alternative Shutdown Capability and Response Procedures Not
Adequate to Ensure Safe Shutdown.


                                              18
18
4OA5 Other Activities
4OA5 Other Activities
  .1 (Closed) NRC Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/156, Offsite Power System Operational
  .1
    Readiness
(Closed) NRC Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/156, Offsite Power System Operational
    The inspectors have completed all onsite inspection as documented in NRC inspection
Readiness
    report 05000280,281/2004003, paragraph 4OA5.4. Consequently, based on completion
The inspectors have completed all onsite inspection as documented in NRC inspection  
    of the onsite review, this TI is closed. All further inspection related activities will
report 05000280,281/2004003, paragraph 4OA5.4. Consequently, based on completion
    originate with NRC headquarters staff.
of the onsite review, this TI is closed. All further inspection related activities will
  .2 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations
originate with NRC headquarters staff.
    Access controls and surveillance results for the licensees ISFSI activities were
  .2
    evaluated. The evaluation included review of ISFSI radiation control surveillance
Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations
    procedures and assessment of ISFSI radiological surveillance data. The inspectors
Access controls and surveillance results for the licensees ISFSI activities were
    toured the ISFSI facilities and observed access controls, TLD locations and condition,
evaluated. The evaluation included review of ISFSI radiation control surveillance
    and radiological postings on the perimeter security fence. The inspectors conducted
procedures and assessment of ISFSI radiological surveillance data. The inspectors
    independent radiation surveys of the Pad 1 cask and Pad 2 general area and compared
toured the ISFSI facilities and observed access controls, TLD locations and condition,
    the data with licensee survey results.
and radiological postings on the perimeter security fence. The inspectors conducted
    Program guidance, access controls, postings, equipment material condition and
independent radiation surveys of the Pad 1 cask and Pad 2 general area and compared
    surveillance data results were reviewed against details documented in applicable
the data with licensee survey results.
    sections of the UFSAR, TS; 10 CFR Parts 20 and 72, and applicable licensee
Program guidance, access controls, postings, equipment material condition and
    procedures. Licensee guidance documents, records, and data reviewed within this
surveillance data results were reviewed against details documented in applicable
    inspection area are listed in Section 4OA5 of the report Attachment.
sections of the UFSAR, TS; 10 CFR Parts 20 and 72, and applicable licensee
b.   Findings
procedures. Licensee guidance documents, records, and data reviewed within this
    No findings of significance were identified.
inspection area are listed in Section 4OA5 of the report Attachment.
b.
Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
   .1 Exit Meeting Summary
   .1
    On October 12, 2004, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr.
Exit Meeting Summary
    Blount and other members of his staff who acknowledge the findings.
On October 12, 2004, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr.
    The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined
Blount and other members of his staff who acknowledge the findings.
    during the inspection.
The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined
during the inspection.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations
    The following violations of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the
The following violations of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the
    licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meet the criteria of Section VI.A
licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meet the criteria of Section VI.A
    of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as an NCV.
of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as an NCV.
    *       Technical Specification 6.4.B requires that procedures for personnel radiation
*
            protection shall be prepared consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20
Technical Specification 6.4.B requires that procedures for personnel radiation
protection shall be prepared consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20


                                    19
19
  and shall be approved, maintained and adhered to for all operations involving
and shall be approved, maintained and adhered to for all operations involving
  personnel radiation exposure. Section 6.2.2, titled Plant Access Training to
personnel radiation exposure. Section 6.2.2, titled Plant Access Training to
  Procedure VPAP-2101 titled Radiation Protection Program,states, in part, that
Procedure VPAP-2101 titled Radiation Protection Program,states, in part, that
  individuals who have completed only Plant Access Training shall not be allowed
individuals who have completed only Plant Access Training shall not be allowed
  unescorted access into an RCA unless Access Authorization to RCA for
unescorted access into an RCA unless Access Authorization to RCA for
  Visitors/Non-Radiation Worker is completed and shall not perform any physical
Visitors/Non-Radiation Worker is completed and shall not perform any physical
  work in the RCA. Furthermore, Section 6.8.1 titled Supervision and Monitoring
work in the RCA. Furthermore, Section 6.8.1 titled Supervision and Monitoring
  of Radiological Work to Procedure VPAP-2101, states, in part, that foremen
of Radiological Work to Procedure VPAP-2101, states, in part, that foremen
  shall ensure that each worker is qualified to perform required task and have
shall ensure that each worker is qualified to perform required task and have
  appropriate training and experience. Contrary to the above, an individual gained
appropriate training and experience. Contrary to the above, an individual gained
  unescorted access to the RCA without an Access Authorization to the RCA for a
unescorted access to the RCA without an Access Authorization to the RCA for a
  Visitor/ Non-Radiation worker and was allowed to performed work in the RCA.
Visitor/ Non-Radiation worker and was allowed to performed work in the RCA.  
  This was identified in Plant Issue S-2003-5018. This finding is of very low safety
This was identified in Plant Issue S-2003-5018. This finding is of very low safety
  significance because the individual was assigned to conduct such activities in the
significance because the individual was assigned to conduct such activities in the
  RCA with other experienced, trained and currently qualified Basic Radiation
RCA with other experienced, trained and currently qualified Basic Radiation
  Workers and under the supervision of a foreman.
Workers and under the supervision of a foreman.
* 10 CFR 71.5(a) requires, in part, that a licensee who transport licensed material
*
  outside of the confines of its plant or delivers licensed material to a carrier for
10 CFR 71.5(a) requires, in part, that a licensee who transport licensed material
  transport comply with the applicable requirements of the regulations appropriate
outside of the confines of its plant or delivers licensed material to a carrier for
  to the mode of transport of the Department of Transportation (DOT) in 49 CFR
transport comply with the applicable requirements of the regulations appropriate
  Parts 170 through 189. 49 CFR 173.471(a) requires, in part, that the offeror of a
to the mode of transport of the Department of Transportation (DOT) in 49 CFR
  Type B package make the shipment in compliance with the terms of the
Parts 170 through 189. 49 CFR 173.471(a) requires, in part, that the offeror of a
  packaging approval. Section 7.1.6 of Certificate of Compliance No. 9168,
Type B package make the shipment in compliance with the terms of the
  Revision 12, dated June 25, 2001, states, in part, when seals are replaced, leak
packaging approval. Section 7.1.6 of Certificate of Compliance No. 9168,
  testing is required as specified in Section 8.2.2.2 titled Assembly Verification
Revision 12, dated June 25, 2001, states, in part, when seals are replaced, leak
  Leak Test. Contrary to this, the licensee did not leak test a secondary lid seal
testing is required as specified in Section 8.2.2.2 titled Assembly Verification
  before shipping Shipment No. B2001-2 on June 28, 2001. This was identified in
Leak Test. Contrary to this, the licensee did not leak test a secondary lid seal
  Plant Issue S-2001-1863-E1. This finding is of very low safety significance
before shipping Shipment No. B2001-2 on June 28, 2001. This was identified in
  because the package did not have any indications of leakage upon receipt at the
Plant Issue S-2001-1863-E1. This finding is of very low safety significance
  burial site.
because the package did not have any indications of leakage upon receipt at the
burial site.


                              SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
                                  KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee
Licensee
R. Allen, Manager, Outage and Planning
R. Allen, Manager, Outage and Planning
R. Blount, Site Vice President
R. Blount, Site Vice President
M.Gaffney, Director, Nuclear Station Safety and Licensing
M.Gaffney, Director, Nuclear Station Safety and Licensing
B.Garber, Supervisor, Licensing
B.Garber, Supervisor, Licensing  
T. Huber, Manager, Engineering
T. Huber, Manager, Engineering
L. Jones, Manager, Radiation Protection and Chemistry
L. Jones, Manager, Radiation Protection and Chemistry
D. Llewellyn, Manager, Training
D. Llewellyn, Manager, Training
R. MacManus, Manager, Nuclear Oversight
R. MacManus, Manager, Nuclear Oversight  
K. Sloane, Director, Nuclear Station Operations and Maintenance
K. Sloane, Director, Nuclear Station Operations and Maintenance
B. Stanley, Manager, Maintenance
B. Stanley, Manager, Maintenance
J. Swientoniewski, Manager, Operations
J. Swientoniewski, Manager, Operations  
NRC
NRC
K. Landis, Chief, Branch 5, Division of Reactor Projects, Region II
K. Landis, Chief, Branch 5, Division of Reactor Projects, Region II
                    LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened and Closed
Opened and Closed
05000280, 281/2004004-001             NCV           Failure to implement and maintain a
05000280, 281/2004004-001
                                                    respiratory protection program that includes
NCV
                                                    written procedures regarding training of
Failure to implement and maintain a
                                                    respirator users in demonstrating
respiratory protection program that includes
                                                    proficiency in the change out of SCBA air
written procedures regarding training of
                                                    cylinders (Section 2OS3.b)
respirator users in demonstrating
proficiency in the change out of SCBA air
cylinders (Section 2OS3.b)
Closed
Closed
05000281/2003001-00                   LER           Electrical Conduit Bushing Failure Results
05000281/2003001-00
                                                    in a Reactor Trip (Section 4OA3.1)
LER
05000280/2003002-00                   LER           Manual Steam Generator Level Control
Electrical Conduit Bushing Failure Results
                                                    Results in Power Ascension Reactor Trip
in a Reactor Trip (Section 4OA3.1)
                                                    (Section 4OA3.1)
05000280/2003002-00
05000280,281/2003004-00               LER           Manual Reactor Trips Due to Loss of All
LER
                                                    Circulating Water Pumps (Section 4OA3.1)
Manual Steam Generator Level Control
05000280,281/2003004-01               LER           Manual Reactor Trips Due to Loss of All
Results in Power Ascension Reactor Trip
                                                    Circulating Water Pumps (Section 4OA3.1)
(Section 4OA3.1)
05000280,281/2003004-00
LER
Manual Reactor Trips Due to Loss of All
Circulating Water Pumps (Section 4OA3.1)  
05000280,281/2003004-01
LER
Manual Reactor Trips Due to Loss of All
Circulating Water Pumps (Section 4OA3.1)  


                                              A-2
A-2
5000280, 281/2002003-01             URI         Failure of respiratory protection program to
5000280, 281/2002003-01
                                                  include demonstration of proficiency in
URI
                                                  changing SCBA air cylinders (Section
Failure of respiratory protection program to
                                                  2OS3.b)
include demonstration of proficiency in
05000281/2003008-001                 URI         Fire Response Procedures 2-FCA-4.00 And
changing SCBA air cylinders (Section
                                                  0-FCA-14.00 Not Adequate To Ensure Safe
2OS3.b)
                                                  Shutdown Of Unit 2 (Section 4OA3)
05000281/2003008-001
05000280,281/2003008-002             AV           Alternative Shutdown Capability and
URI
                                                  Response Procedures Not Adequate to
Fire Response Procedures 2-FCA-4.00 And
                                                  Ensure Safe Shutdown of Unit 1 (Section
0-FCA-14.00 Not Adequate To Ensure Safe
                                                  4OA3)
Shutdown Of Unit 2 (Section 4OA3)
TI 2515/156                         TI           Offsite Power System Operational
05000280,281/2003008-002
                                                  Readiness (Section 4OA5.1)
AV
                          PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Alternative Shutdown Capability and
Response Procedures Not Adequate to
Ensure Safe Shutdown of Unit 1 (Section
4OA3)
TI 2515/156
TI
Offsite Power System Operational
Readiness (Section 4OA5.1)
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED
Partial List of Persons Contacted:
Partial List of Persons Contacted:
R. Cramer, NSS Manager
R. Cramer, NSS Manager
Line 924: Line 1,129:
L. Jones, Manager Radiological Protection
L. Jones, Manager Radiological Protection
J. Keithley, Supervisor Health Physics Operations
J. Keithley, Supervisor Health Physics Operations
                              LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1R04
Section 1R04
Plant Procedures
Plant Procedures
2-OP-SI-001A, Safety Injection System Alignment
2-OP-SI-001A, Safety Injection System Alignment
0-OP-EG-001A, EDG 3 System Alignment
0-OP-EG-001A, EDG 3 System Alignment  
2-OP-EG-001A, EDG 2 System Alignment
2-OP-EG-001A, EDG 2 System Alignment  
Plant Drawings
Plant Drawings
11548-FM-089A, Safety Injection System
11548-FM-089A, Safety Injection System
Line 937: Line 1,142:
11448-FM-55A
11448-FM-55A


                                            A-3
A-3
11448-FM-55B
11448-FM-55B
Plant Procedures
Plant Procedures
Line 950: Line 1,155:
PL-P-2C (Turbine Building Sump No. 3)
PL-P-2C (Turbine Building Sump No. 3)
0-AP-13.00, Turbine Building or MER 3 Flooding
0-AP-13.00, Turbine Building or MER 3 Flooding
0-AP-FCA-6.01, Uncontrollable Turbine Building Flooding
0-AP-FCA-6.01, Uncontrollable Turbine Building Flooding  
Work Orders
Work Orders
489929 01, 479493 01, 487910 01, 487911 01, 491419 01
489929 01, 479493 01, 487910 01, 487911 01, 491419 01
Line 968: Line 1,173:
C-HP-1032.020, Radiological Survey Criteria and Scheduling, Rev. 4
C-HP-1032.020, Radiological Survey Criteria and Scheduling, Rev. 4
C-HP-1032.030, Radiation Surveys, Rev. 3
C-HP-1032.030, Radiation Surveys, Rev. 3
C-HP-1032.060, Radiological Posting and Controls, Rev. 1
C-HP-1032.060, Radiological Posting and Controls, Rev. 1  
C-HP-1032.061, High Radiation Area Key Control, Rev. 2
C-HP-1032.061, High Radiation Area Key Control, Rev. 2
C-HP-1061.110, Radiological Control Areas, Rev. 3
C-HP-1061.110, Radiological Control Areas, Rev. 3
Line 975: Line 1,180:
Audits
Audits


                                              A-4
A-4
Audit 01-07:Radiological Protection/Chemistry, 08/16/01
Audit 01-07:Radiological Protection/Chemistry, 08/16/01
Radiation Work Permit (RWP)
Radiation Work Permit (RWP)
RWP - 04-1-0001, Rev. 1, General Entry
RWP - 04-1-0001, Rev. 1, General Entry
RWP - 04-2-1101, Rev. 2, Posted Locked High Radiation Areas and Hot particle Areas
RWP - 04-2-1101, Rev. 2, Posted Locked High Radiation Areas and Hot particle Areas
RWP - 04-2-1506, Rev. 2, Auxiliary Building, Decon Building and Yard
RWP - 04-2-1506, Rev. 2, Auxiliary Building, Decon Building and Yard  
RWP Briefings
RWP Briefings
RWP 04-2-1101, RWP Briefing Attendance Roster
RWP 04-2-1101, RWP Briefing Attendance Roster
Line 988: Line 1,193:
375, Auxiliary Building 2 Elevation Overview, 06/09/04
375, Auxiliary Building 2 Elevation Overview, 06/09/04
384, PDT, Gas Stripper and Liquid Waste Tank Room - Gate 11, 06/08/04
384, PDT, Gas Stripper and Liquid Waste Tank Room - Gate 11, 06/08/04
512, Decontamination (Decon) Building 27 overview - Gate 27, 06/09/04
512, Decontamination (Decon) Building 27 overview - Gate 27, 06/09/04
513, Decon Building 6 Overview - Gate 22, 06/09/04
513, Decon Building 6 Overview - Gate 22, 06/09/04
516, Decon Building Roof Overview, 06/09/04
516, Decon Building Roof Overview, 06/09/04
519, Unit 2 Safeguards 27 and 8 Overview, 06/09/04 (Survey of de-watering lines after resin
519, Unit 2 Safeguards 27 and 8 Overview, 06/09/04 (Survey of de-watering lines after resin
transfer from Blend Tank)
  transfer from Blend Tank)
521, Unit 2 Valve Pit 12, 19 and 27 Overview, 06/09/04
521, Unit 2 Valve Pit 12, 19 and 27 Overview, 06/09/04
Corrective Action Program (CAP) Documents
Corrective Action Program (CAP) Documents
Plant Issue (PI) S-2002-2913-E1, CAT 2 Root Cause Evaluation s-2002-2913-E1 A protective
Plant Issue (PI) S-2002-2913-E1, CAT 2 Root Cause Evaluation s-2002-2913-E1 A protective
clothing hood was found on a coat rack in the NSS Electrical Prefab shop outside the
  clothing hood was found on a coat rack in the NSS Electrical Prefab shop outside the
protected area. Discovery date: 09/11/2002
  protected area. Discovery date: 09/11/2002
PI S-2002-3478-E1, CAT 2 Root Cause Evaluations S-2002-3478, Worker Exits Protected Area
PI S-2002-3478-E1, CAT 2 Root Cause Evaluations S-2002-3478, Worker Exits Protected Area
with 120,000 dpm Discrete Radioactive Particle Embedded in Jacket. Discovery date:
  with 120,000 dpm Discrete Radioactive Particle Embedded in Jacket. Discovery date:
11/05/2002
  11/05/2002
PI S-2003-1241-E1, CAT 3 Root Cause Evaluation Response, S-2003-1241-E1, Purple painted
PI S-2003-1241-E1, CAT 3 Root Cause Evaluation Response, S-2003-1241-E1, Purple painted
crescent wrench found inside of tool box on vehicle 4183. Vehicle located outside the
  crescent wrench found inside of tool box on vehicle 4183. Vehicle located outside the
protected area on the construction site. Discovery date: 03/28/2003
  protected area on the construction site. Discovery date: 03/28/2003
PI S-2004-2166-E1, Purple tools found in survey for free release of materials from the RCA
PI S-2004-2166-E1, Purple tools found in survey for free release of materials from the RCA
06/07/2004. Discovery date: 06/07/2004
  06/07/2004. Discovery date: 06/07/2004
PI S-2003-5439-E1, CAT 3 Root Cause Evaluation Response - S-2003-5439-E1, Purple 2
PI S-2003-5439-E1, CAT 3 Root Cause Evaluation Response - S-2003-5439-E1, Purple 2
pound maul found outside the protected area. The tool was found on an air dryer in the
  pound maul found outside the protected area. The tool was found on an air dryer in the
Construction side parking lot.
  Construction side parking lot.
2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment (71121.03)
2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment (71121.03)
Procedures, Lesson Plans, and Manuals
Procedures, Lesson Plans, and Manuals
Line 1,014: Line 1,219:
C-HP-1033.610, Eberline Air Monitor AMS-4 Calibration and Operation, Rev. 2
C-HP-1033.610, Eberline Air Monitor AMS-4 Calibration and Operation, Rev. 2


                                              A-5
A-5
C-HP-1042.350, Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Use, Rev. 4
C-HP-1042.350, Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Use, Rev. 4
HP-1033.015, Contamination Monitoring Instrumentation Control, Rev. 8
HP-1033.015, Contamination Monitoring Instrumentation Control, Rev. 8
Line 1,020: Line 1,225:
Lesson Plan: SCBA Cylinder Exchange, Rev. 1 dated 07/18/2003
Lesson Plan: SCBA Cylinder Exchange, Rev. 1 dated 07/18/2003
Nuclear Employee Training Manual, Volume II (included section on Respiratory Protection
Nuclear Employee Training Manual, Volume II (included section on Respiratory Protection
Training), Rev. 10
  Training), Rev. 10
0-AP-20.00, Main Control Room Inaccessibility, Rev. 6
0-AP-20.00, Main Control Room Inaccessibility, Rev. 6
0-AP-48.00, Fire Protection - Operations Response, Rev. 15
0-AP-48.00, Fire Protection - Operations Response, Rev. 15
0-LSP-FP-005, Loss Prevention Surveillance Procedure (Attachment 4: Main Control Room
0-LSP-FP-005, Loss Prevention Surveillance Procedure (Attachment 4: Main Control Room
Emergency SCBA), Rev. 6
  Emergency SCBA), Rev. 6
VPAP-1902, Industrial Respiratory Protection, Rev. 5
VPAP-1902, Industrial Respiratory Protection, Rev. 5
Area Radiation Monitors Evaluated
Area Radiation Monitors Evaluated
RM-RM-127/128, Unit 1 (U1) Containment High-Range Radiation Monitor (CHRRM), calibrated
RM-RM-127/128, Unit 1 (U1) Containment High-Range Radiation Monitor (CHRRM), calibrated
10/22/2001
  10/22/2001
RM-RM-138, 139, Spent Resin Handling Area Monitor, calibrated 1994 (out of service)
RM-RM-138, 139, Spent Resin Handling Area Monitor, calibrated 1994 (out of service)
RM-RM-227/228, Unit 2 (U2) CHRRM, calibrated 03/27/2002RM-RM-164, U1 In-Core
RM-RM-227/228, Unit 2 (U2) CHRRM, calibrated 03/27/2002RM-RM-164, U1 In-Core
Instrument Transfer Area Monitor, calibrated 10/17/2001
  Instrument Transfer Area Monitor, calibrated 10/17/2001
RM-RM-264, U2 In-Core Instrument Transfer Area Monitor, calibrated 04/07/2002
RM-RM-264, U2 In-Core Instrument Transfer Area Monitor, calibrated 04/07/2002
RMS-RM-161, U1 Containment Personnel Hatch Area Monitor (CPHAM), calibrated 01/24/2001
RMS-RM-161, U1 Containment Personnel Hatch Area Monitor (CPHAM), calibrated 01/24/2001
RMS-RM-261, U2 CPHAM, calibrated 02/20/2002
RMS-RM-261, U2 CPHAM, calibrated 02/20/2002
RRM-RE-126, Radwaste Facility HIC Storage and Handling Area Monitor, calibrated
RRM-RE-126, Radwaste Facility HIC Storage and Handling Area Monitor, calibrated
01/30/2002
  01/30/2002
Continuous Air Monitors Evaluated
Continuous Air Monitors Evaluated
AMS-4 Monitor (S/N 797) in Auxiliary Building, 27 elevation, calibrated 03/19/2002
AMS-4 Monitor (S/N 797) in Auxiliary Building, 27 elevation, calibrated 03/19/2002
Line 1,043: Line 1,248:
PI S-2002-0331, Shepherd Model 89 Calibrator in a degraded condition, 02/06/2002
PI S-2002-0331, Shepherd Model 89 Calibrator in a degraded condition, 02/06/2002
PI S-2002-0544, Shepherd Model 89 Calibrator in an unstable condition because of an
PI S-2002-0544, Shepherd Model 89 Calibrator in an unstable condition because of an
apparent electrical short, 02/26/2002
  apparent electrical short, 02/26/2002
PI S-2002-0715, Shepherd Model 89 Calibrator has a broken door-alignment latch, 03/11/2002
PI S-2002-0715, Shepherd Model 89 Calibrator has a broken door-alignment latch, 03/11/2002
PI S-2002-1129, Shepherd Model 89 Calibrator has source exposed indicator light
PI S-2002-1129, Shepherd Model 89 Calibrator has source exposed indicator light
malfunction, 04/02/2002
  malfunction, 04/02/2002
PI S-2002-1776, Shepherd Model 89 Calibrator out of service because door-locking device
PI S-2002-1776, Shepherd Model 89 Calibrator out of service because door-locking device
failed, 05/12/2002
  failed, 05/12/2002
PI S-2002-2203, Shepherd Model 89 Calibrator has a broken mechanical door latch,
PI S-2002-2203, Shepherd Model 89 Calibrator has a broken mechanical door latch,
06/22/2002
  06/22/2002
PI S-2004-2243, Review of Respiratory Protection records during the RP Audit 04-08
PI S-2004-2243, Review of Respiratory Protection records during the RP Audit 04-08
PI S-2002-2768, No guidance for sustained use of SCBAs in the Control Room
PI S-2002-2768, No guidance for sustained use of SCBAs in the Control Room


                                              A-6
A-6
2PS1 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Monitoring (71122.01)
2PS1 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Monitoring (71122.01)
Reports, Procedures, Instructions, and Manuals
Reports, Procedures, Instructions, and Manuals
Surry Power Station (SPS), 2002 and 2003 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports
Surry Power Station (SPS), 2002 and 2003 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports
SPS, Calibration, Procedure Number (No.) CAL-004, Revision (Rev.) No. 6, Process Radiation
SPS, Calibration, Procedure Number (No.) CAL-004, Revision (Rev.) No. 6, Process Radiation
Monitor Alarm Setpoint Calibration
  Monitor Alarm Setpoint Calibration
SPS, Calibration, Procedure No. CAL-255, Rev. No. 7, Kaman Normal Range Gas Effluent
SPS, Calibration, Procedure No. CAL-255, Rev. No. 7, Kaman Normal Range Gas Effluent
Monitor (RI-GW-130-1A)
  Monitor (RI-GW-130-1A)
SPS, Calibration, Procedure No. CAL-258, Rev. No. 5, Kaman Accident Range Gas Effluent
SPS, Calibration, Procedure No. CAL-258, Rev. No. 5, Kaman Accident Range Gas Effluent
Monitor RI-VG-131-2A
  Monitor RI-VG-131-2A
SPS, Calibration, Procedure No. CAL-298, Rev. No. 3, Kaman Radiation Monitor Alarm
SPS, Calibration, Procedure No. CAL-298, Rev. No. 3, Kaman Radiation Monitor Alarm
Setpoint Calibration
  Setpoint Calibration
SPS, Health Physics (HP), Procedure No. HP-3030.031, Rev.12, Radioactive Gaseous Waste
SPS, Health Physics (HP), Procedure No. HP-3030.031, Rev.12, Radioactive Gaseous Waste
Sampling and Analysis, Rev. 10
  Sampling and Analysis, Rev. 10
SPS, HP Periodic Test, Procedure No. 1-PT-50.17, Rev. No. 2, Health Physics Sampling
SPS, HP Periodic Test, Procedure No. 1-PT-50.17, Rev. No. 2, Health Physics Sampling
Condenser Air Ejector
  Condenser Air Ejector
SPS, HP Periodic Test, Procedure No. 1-PT-50.3, Rev. No. 1, Health Physics Sampling -
SPS, HP Periodic Test, Procedure No. 1-PT-50.3, Rev. No. 1, Health Physics Sampling -
Ventilation Vent # 2
  Ventilation Vent # 2
SPS, HP Surveillance Procedure, Procedure No. 0-HSP-RM-003, Rev. No. 4, Dose
SPS, HP Surveillance Procedure, Procedure No. 0-HSP-RM-003, Rev. No. 4, Dose
Contributions from Station Effluents
  Contributions from Station Effluents
SPS, Instrument Maintenance, Procedure No. IMP-C-RM-36, Rev. No. 27, Checking, Repairing
SPS, Instrument Maintenance, Procedure No. IMP-C-RM-36, Rev. No. 27, Checking, Repairing
or Replacing a Component in the Radiation Monitoring System
  or Replacing a Component in the Radiation Monitoring System
SPS, Instrument Preventive Maintenance, Procedure No. 0-IPM-RM-G-001, Rev. No. 10, Digital
SPS, Instrument Preventive Maintenance, Procedure No. 0-IPM-RM-G-001, Rev. No. 10, Digital
Ratemeter Model 942B Process Monitor Calibration
  Ratemeter Model 942B Process Monitor Calibration
SPS, Instrument Preventive Maintenance, Procedure No. 0-IPM-CC-RRM-LIQD-001, Rev.
SPS, Instrument Preventive Maintenance, Procedure No. 0-IPM-CC-RRM-LIQD-001, Rev.
No. 4, Radwaste Facility Liquid Effluent Monitor Calibration
  No. 4, Radwaste Facility Liquid Effluent Monitor Calibration
SPS, Instrument Preventive Maintenance, Procedure No. 0-IPM-CC-RRM-MISC-001, Rev.
SPS, Instrument Preventive Maintenance, Procedure No. 0-IPM-CC-RRM-MISC-001, Rev.
No. 2-P1, Surry Radwaste Facility Radiation Monitor Setpoint Calibration
  No. 2-P1, Surry Radwaste Facility Radiation Monitor Setpoint Calibration
SPS, Instrument Preventive Maintenance, Procedure No. 0-IPM-CC-RRM-VENT-001, Rev.
SPS, Instrument Preventive Maintenance, Procedure No. 0-IPM-CC-RRM-VENT-001, Rev.
No. 6, Radwaste Facility Vent Stack Effluent Monitor Calibration
  No. 6, Radwaste Facility Vent Stack Effluent Monitor Calibration
Station Administrative Procedure, Procedure No. VPAP-2103S, Offsite Dose Calculation
Station Administrative Procedure, Procedure No. VPAP-2103S, Offsite Dose Calculation
Manual (Surry), Rev. 5
  Manual (Surry), Rev. 5
UFSAR Chapter 11.0 Radioactive Wastes and Radiation Protection
UFSAR Chapter 11.0 Radioactive Wastes and Radiation Protection
Calibration/Performance Data
Calibration/Performance Data
Dominion Generation (DG), SPS, HP-1033.203, Gaseous Radioactive Waste Release Permits
Dominion Generation (DG), SPS, HP-1033.203, Gaseous Radioactive Waste Release Permits
40093.009.002.G, 40124.010.003.G, 40139.007.021.G, 40141.003.021.G, 40155.007.023.G,
  40093.009.002.G, 40124.010.003.G, 40139.007.021.G, 40141.003.021.G, 40155.007.023.G,
and 40156.003.024.G dated 04/08/04, 05/11/04, 05/25/04, 05/26/04, 06/08/04, and 06/09/04
  and 40156.003.024.G dated 04/08/04, 05/11/04, 05/25/04, 05/26/04, 06/08/04, and 06/09/04
DG, SPS, HP-1033.203, Liquid Radioactive Waste Release Permits 40083.032.002.L,
DG, SPS, HP-1033.203, Liquid Radioactive Waste Release Permits 40083.032.002.L,
40102.030.007.L, and 40118.034.022.L dated 04/22/04, 05/22/04, and 05/31/04
  40102.030.007.L, and 40118.034.022.L dated 04/22/04, 05/22/04, and 05/31/04
Virginia Power, SPS, Cal-817, Rev. 22, Data Sheets for RMs 1-VG-RM-110, GW-RM-1-1,
Virginia Power, SPS, Cal-817, Rev. 22, Data Sheets for RMs 1-VG-RM-110, GW-RM-1-1,
GW-RM-102, and VG-RM-109 dated 10/09/03, 03/07/03, 03/07/03, and 10/09/03
  GW-RM-102, and VG-RM-109 dated 10/09/03, 03/07/03, 03/07/03, and 10/09/03


                                                A-7
A-7
Audits
Audits
Audit 03-11: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM), Radiological Environmental Monitoring
Audit 03-11: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM), Radiological Environmental Monitoring
Program (REMP), and Environmental Protection Plan (EPP) dated 02/25/04
  Program (REMP), and Environmental Protection Plan (EPP) dated 02/25/04
Dominion Nuclear Health Physics Procedure, C-HP-1091.273, Rev. 5, Radioactive Effluent
Dominion Nuclear Health Physics Procedure, C-HP-1091.273, Rev. 5, Radioactive Effluent
Control Program Evaluation for Surry Power Station for the period 2002 to 2003
  Control Program Evaluation for Surry Power Station for the period 2002 to 2003
Trend Evaluation Response S-2003-5601-E1, Gamma isotopic analysis results for # 1 Storm
Trend Evaluation Response S-2003-5601-E1, Gamma isotopic analysis results for # 1 Storm
Drain Composite dated 10/05/03 are anomalous in that Co-58 was identified in the sample
  Drain Composite dated 10/05/03 are anomalous in that Co-58 was identified in the sample
CAP Documents
CAP Documents
PI S-2003-1425, During background performance check of detector # 3 in the Count Room an
PI S-2003-1425, During background performance check of detector # 3 in the Count Room an
anomaly occurred regarding the computer printout
  anomaly occurred regarding the computer printout
PI S-2004-0577, A degrading trend on filter differential pressure was noted revealing a 0"
PI S-2004-0577, A degrading trend on filter differential pressure was noted revealing a 0"
differential pressure and a high flow fault light lit
  differential pressure and a high flow fault light lit
Plant Issue Resolution (PIR) S-2002-2596-R1, The Kaman process vent low range noble gas
Plant Issue Resolution (PIR) S-2002-2596-R1, The Kaman process vent low range noble gas
effluent monitor did not respond to the 08/03/02 waste gas decay tank release until six hours
  effluent monitor did not respond to the 08/03/02 waste gas decay tank release until six hours
after the release
  after the release
PIR S-2003-0402-R1, Insensitivity of U1 and 2 air ejector radiation monitor to </= 30 gallons per
PIR S-2003-0402-R1, Insensitivity of U1 and 2 air ejector radiation monitor to </= 30 gallons per
day primary to secondary leakage during the start-up of U1 on 01/24/03 and 02/26/03 and U2
  day primary to secondary leakage during the start-up of U1 on 01/24/03 and 02/26/03 and U2
on 01/28/03
  on 01/28/03
PIR S-2003-0847-R1, Moisture accumulation in the sample lines for the RM-RMS-259/260 skid
PIR S-2003-0847-R1, Moisture accumulation in the sample lines for the RM-RMS-259/260 skid
PIR S-2003-0876-E1, While releasing a Liquid Waste Monitoring tank, the SRF control room
PIR S-2003-0876-E1, While releasing a Liquid Waste Monitoring tank, the SRF control room
received annunciator DCS-LSM-B1, Liquid Discharge Radioactivity HIGH
  received annunciator DCS-LSM-B1, Liquid Discharge Radioactivity HIGH
PIR S-2004-1027-R1, Analysis of the particulate filter for the effluent sample form the SRF Vent
PIR S-2004-1027-R1, Analysis of the particulate filter for the effluent sample form the SRF Vent
from the week of 02/11-02/18/04 yielded positive results for gross alpha
  from the week of 02/11-02/18/04 yielded positive results for gross alpha
PIR S-2003-1209-R1, January 2003 monthly liquid composite tritium values for the
PIR S-2003-1209-R1, January 2003 monthly liquid composite tritium values for the
miscellaneous batch and continuous pathways were unusually high
  miscellaneous batch and continuous pathways were unusually high
2PS3 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (71122.03)
2PS3 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (71122.03)  
Procedures, Instructions, Lesson Plans, and Manuals
Procedures, Instructions, Lesson Plans, and Manuals
Annual Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program, January 1 to December 31, 2002
Annual Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program, January 1 to December 31, 2002
Annual Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program, January 1 to December 31, 2003
Annual Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program, January 1 to December 31, 2003
Audit 03-11, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
Audit 03-11, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program
and Environmental Protection Plan
  and Environmental Protection Plan
C-HP-1091.100, Member Of The Public Dose Evaluation, Rev. 1
C-HP-1091.100, Member Of The Public Dose Evaluation, Rev. 1
C-HP-1091.274, Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program: Surveillance and Evaluation,
C-HP-1091.274, Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program: Surveillance and Evaluation,
Rev. 1
  Rev. 1
HP-1033.015, Contamination Monitoring Instrument Control, Rev 8
HP-1033.015, Contamination Monitoring Instrument Control, Rev 8
HP-3051.010 Environmental Monitoring Program, Rev. 10
HP-3051.010 Environmental Monitoring Program, Rev. 10
Line 1,137: Line 1,342:
HP Surveillance Procedure 0-HPS-REMP-001, Land Use Census, Rev. 2,
HP Surveillance Procedure 0-HPS-REMP-001, Land Use Census, Rev. 2,
0-HSP-SS-001 Storm Drain Sampling Using The American Sigma Ultrasonic Flow Meter,
0-HSP-SS-001 Storm Drain Sampling Using The American Sigma Ultrasonic Flow Meter,
Rev.5
  Rev.5
UFSAR, Section 2.2, Meteorology and Climatology, Rev 33
UFSAR, Section 2.2, Meteorology and Climatology, Rev 33


                                                A-8
A-8
Instrument Calibration and Performance Data Records
Instrument Calibration and Performance Data Records
CAL-93, Met Tower Delta T Loop Calibration, Rev. 6, Performed 08/03/04
CAL-93, Met Tower Delta T Loop Calibration, Rev. 6, Performed 08/03/04
Line 1,153: Line 1,358:
   ID 7133 dated 01/20/04, ID 7130 dated 01/20/04, and ID 5022 dated 01/20/04
   ID 7133 dated 01/20/04, ID 7130 dated 01/20/04, and ID 5022 dated 01/20/04
CAP Documents
CAP Documents
PI S-2003-0612, Environmental TLD at Kingsmill location missing
PI S-2003-0612, Environmental TLD at Kingsmill location missing  
PI S-2004-1248, Station sewage holding tank contaminated with I-131 from an individual with a
PI S-2004-1248, Station sewage holding tank contaminated with I-131 from an individual with a
   medical administration
   medical administration
Line 1,170: Line 1,375:
Procedures, Instructions, Lesson Plans, and Manuals
Procedures, Instructions, Lesson Plans, and Manuals
HP Periodic Test, 0-HPT-ISFSI-001, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)
HP Periodic Test, 0-HPT-ISFSI-001, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)
   Radiological Surveillance, Rev. 9
   Radiological Surveillance, Rev. 9  
ISFSI Security Fence Survey, 04/07/04
ISFSI Security Fence Survey, 04/07/04
ISFSI Perimeter Fence Survey, 04/07/04
ISFSI Perimeter Fence Survey, 04/07/04
Neutron and Noble Gas Dose Calculation Record C-HP-1031.022, Rev. 8
Neutron and Noble Gas Dose Calculation Record   C-HP-1031.022, Rev. 8  
Surry ISFSI, Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendment 15, Docket 72-2, SNM-2501 Chapter 7,
Surry ISFSI, Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendment 15, Docket 72-2, SNM-2501 Chapter 7,
   Radiation Protection
   Radiation Protection
Line 1,179: Line 1,384:
   Specifications for Safety Licensee No. SNM-2501, Amendment 12
   Specifications for Safety Licensee No. SNM-2501, Amendment 12


                                            A-9
A-9
CAP Documents
CAP Documents
PI S-200-0788, HP used incorrect survey instrument at ISFSI
PI S-200-0788, HP used incorrect survey instrument at ISFSI
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 00:39, 16 January 2025

IR 05000280-04-004 & 05000281-04-004 on 06/27/2004 - 09/25/2004, Virginia Electric and Power Co., Surry Power Station Units 1 and 2, Routine Integrated Inspection
ML042940715
Person / Time
Site: Surry  Dominion icon.png
Issue date: 10/18/2004
From: Landis K
NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB5
To: Christian D
Virginia Electric & Power Co (VEPCO)
References
IR-04-004
Download: ML042940715 (34)
v • d • e


See also: IR 05000280/2004004

Text

October 18, 2004

Virginia Electric and Power Company

ATTN: Mr. David A. Christian

Sr. Vice President and

Chief Nuclear Officer

Innsbrook Technical Center - 2SW

5000 Dominion Boulevard

Glen Allen, VA 23060-6711

SUBJECT:

SURRY POWER STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT NOS.

5000280/2004004, AND 5000281/2004004

Dear Mr. Christian:

On September 25, 2004, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed

an inspection at your Surry Power Station, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection

report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on October 12, 2004, with Mr.

Blount and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and

compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed

personnel.

This report documents one NRC identified finding. The finding was determined to involve a

violation of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance and

because the violation was entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating the

finding as a non-cited violation (NCV) consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement

Policy. Additionally, two licensee-identified violations which were determined to be of very low

safety significance (Green) are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report. If you contest any non-

cited violation in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this

inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the United States Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; with copies to

the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident

Inspector at the Surry Power Station.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its

enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the

NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of

VEPCO

2

NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Kerry D. Landis, Chief

Reactor Projects Branch 5

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-280, 50-281

License Nos.: DPR-32, DPR-37

Enclosure:

Integrated Inspection Report 5000280,281/2004004 w/Attachment:

Supplemental Information

cc w/encl:

Chris L. Funderburk, Director

Nuclear Licensing and

Operations Support

Virginia Electric & Power Company

Electronic Mail Distribution

Richard H. Blount, II

Site Vice President

Surry Power Station

Virginia Electric & Power Company

Electronic Mail Distribution

Virginia State Corporation Commission

Division of Energy Regulation

P. O. Box 1197

Richmond, VA 23209

Lillian M. Cuoco, Esq.

Senior Counsel

Dominion Resources Services, Inc.

Electronic Mail Distribution

Attorney General

Supreme Court Building

900 East Main Street

Richmond, VA 23219

VEPCO

3

Distribution w/encl:

S. Monarque, NRR

L. Slack, RII EICS

RIDSNRRDIPMLIPB

PUBLIC

OFFICE

RII/DRP

RII/DRP

RII/DRP

RII/DRP

RII/DRS

RII/DRS

RII/DRP

SIGNATURE

NXG

GJM1

DCA

WTL for

WTL

BBD

NAME

NGarrett

GMcCoy

DArnett

LGarner

ETesta

WLoo

BDesai

DATE

10/18/2004

10/18/2004

10/15/2004

10/14/2004

10/14/2004

10/15/2004

E-MAIL COPY?

YES

NO YES

NO YES

NO YES

NO YES

NO YES

NO YES

NO

PUBLIC DOCUMENT

YES

NO YES

NO YES

NO YES

NO YES

NO YES

NO YES

NO

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: C:\\ORPCheckout\\FileNET\\ML042940715.wpd

Enclosure

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos.: 50-280, 50-281

License Nos.: DPR-32, DPR-37

Report Nos.:

5000280/2004004, 5000281/2004004

Licensee:

Virginia Electric and Power Company (VEPCO)

Facility:

Surry Power Station, Units 1 & 2

Location:

5850 Hog Island Road

Surry, VA 23883

Dates:

June 27 - September 25, 2004

Inspectors:

N. Garrett, Senior Resident Inspector

G. McCoy, Senior Resident Inspector

D. Arnett, Resident Inspector

L. Garner, Senior Project Engineer

E. Testa, Senior Radiation Protection Inspector (Sections 2OS1and 3,

2PS1and 3, 4OA1,5,and 7)

W. Loo, Senior Radiation Protection Inspector (Sections 2OS1and 3,

2PS1and 3, 4OA1,5,and 7)

Approved by: K. Landis, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 5

Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000280/2004004, IR 05000281/2004004, 6/27/2004 - 9/25/2004, Virginia Electric and

Power Co.; Surry Power Station Units 1 & 2, Routine Integrated Inspection.

The report covered a three month period of inspection by resident inspectors, a senior project

engineer, and an announced inspection by two senior radiation protection inspectors. One

Green non-cited violation (NCV) and two licensee identified violations were identified. The

significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply

may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs

program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in

NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.

A.

NRC Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

Green. The inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR 20.1703(c)(4)(ii) which

requires the licensee to implement and maintain a respiratory protection program

that includes written procedures regarding training of respirator users. In

addition, this was related to the emergency planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) (10). Specifically, procedures were not in place to ensure that all

Control Room staff had demonstrated proficiency in changing Self Contained

Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) air cylinders during emergencies.

This finding is greater than minor because emergency workers who are required

to use respiratory protective equipment are not trained to use that equipment.

This finding is of very low safety significance because an adequate number of

SCBA qualified plant personnel/staff, which were designated emergency

responders, would have been available to respond in the event of an actual

emergency (Section 2OS3).

B.

Licensee-Identified Violations

Two violations of very low safety significance, which were identified by the licensee have

been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee

have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. These violations and

corrective actions are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 and Unit 2 operated at or near rated power the entire reporting period.

1.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R01

Adverse Weather Protection

.1

Hurricane Preparations

a. Inspection Scope

On July 19, 2004, early in the hurricane season, inspectors conducted a tour of all the

owner-controlled area. The purpose of the tour was to evaluate the licensees

preparedness for high winds and hurricane conditions well in advance of the approach

of any hurricanes. Emphasis was placed on the identification of any loose material

which would become airborne hazards to either the plant or the switchyard during high

winds. Inspectors toured the low level intake, the construction buildings, the sewage

treatment plant, the area outside the warehouse, and the vicinity of the gas turbines at

Gravel Neck.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2

Hurricane Charlie Preparations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the implementation of the adverse weather preparation

procedures and compensatory measures prior to the arrival of Hurricane Charlie.

Inspectors reviewed Operations Checklist (OC) 21 Severe Weather Checklist,

Abnormal Procedure (AP) 37.01 Abnormal Environmental Conditions, and the

Dominion Hurricane Response Plan (Nuclear) (HRP-N). Inspectors assured that vital

systems and components were protected from high winds and flooding associated with

hurricanes. Additionally, the inspectors conducted walkdowns of the plant to check for

any vulnerabilities, such as inadequate sealing of water tight penetrations, inoperable

sump pumps, and other sources of potential internal and external flooding.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2

1R04

Equipment Alignment

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the following systems to verify correct

system alignment. The inspectors checked for correct valve and electrical power

alignments by comparing positions of valves, switches, and breakers to the procedures

and drawings listed in the Attachment.

Unit 2 low head safety injection (LHSI) pump 2-SI-P-1B while LHSI pump 2-SI-P-

1A was tagged out for maintenance

Unit 1 motor driven auxiliary feedwater (MDAFW) pumps, 1-FW-P-3A and -3B

while the turbine drive auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump, 1-FW-P-2 was

tagged out for a modification and maintenance

Unit 2 MDAFW pumps, 2-FW-P-3A and -3B while the TDAFW pump, 2-FW-P-2

was tagged out for a modification and maintenance

Number 2 emergency diesel generator (EDG) and number 3 EDG, 2-EE-EG-1

and 3-EE-EG-1 while number 1, EDG, 1-EE-EG-1 was tagged out for planned

maintenance.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05

Fire Protection

.1

Fire Area Walkdowns

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors toured eight risk significant areas to assess the adequacy of the fire

protection program implementation. The inspectors checked for the control of transient

combustibles and assessed the condition of the fire detection and fire suppression

systems using SPS Appendix R Report. In addition, the inspectors reviewed 0-FS-FP-

116, Loss Prevention Strategy to verify the necessary fire fighting equipment was in

place for the following areas:

Black battery house

Mechanical equipment room (MER) # 3

MER # 5

Fuel building

Unit 1 safeguards

MER # 1

Number 3 EDG room

Main control room

3

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06

Flood Protection Measures

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and the

Individual Plant Examination of Non-Seismic External Events and Fires for analyzed

external and internal flooding events. Walkdowns were performed of the turbine

building internal and external walls to review compliance with external flooding. To

review internal flooding preparation, the inspectors reviewed licensee procedure 0-MPM-

1900-01, Periodic Inspection of Flood and Spill Protection Dikes, Dams, and Expansion

Joint Shields. In addition, the inspectors walked down various expansion joint throttle

shields in the turbine building and flood and spill control dams in the turbine and service

building. The inspectors compared observed equipment condition and documented

system deficiencies to determine system readiness for prevention of internal flooding.

The inspectors reviewed completed preventative maintenance and surveillance records

for the turbine building sump pump testing, station flood detection testing equipment,

and floor drain back water stop valve replacement. The documents reviewed are listed

in the Attachment of the report.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R07

Heat Sink Performance

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the condition of the Unit 1 component cooling (CC) heat

exchangers, 1-CC-E-1A. The inspectors discussed the heat exchanger performance

monitoring program and historical heat exchanger performance with engineering

personnel. The inspectors reviewed the results of surveillance procedure 1-OSP-SW-

002, Measurement of Macrofouling Blockage of Component Cooling Heat Exchanger 1-

CC-E-1A. The inspector observed the condition of the 1A heat exchanger before and

after performance of tube scraping. The documents reviewed are listed in the

Attachment of the report.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4

1R11

Licensed Operator Requalification Program

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed licensed operator performance during simulator training

session RQ-04.6-SP-1:PMS to determine whether the operators:

were familiar with and could successfully implement the procedures associated

with recognizing and recovering from a ruptured and faulted steam generator

with loss of unit 1 power;

recognized the high-risk actions in those procedures; and,

were familiar with related industry operating experiences.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12

Maintenance Effectiveness

a.

Inspection Scope

For the two equipment issues described in the plant issues listed below, the inspectors

evaluated the licensees effectiveness of the corresponding preventive and corrective

maintenance. For each selected item below, the inspectors performed a detailed review

of the problem history and surrounding circumstances, evaluated the extent of condition

reviews as required, and reviewed the generic implications of the equipment and/or work

practice problem. Inspectors performed walkdown of the accessible portions of the

system, performed in-office reviews of procedures and evaluations, and held

discussions with system engineers. Inspectors compared the licensees actions with the

requirements of the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65), VPAP 0815, Maintenance Rule

Program, and the Surry Maintenance Rule Scoping and Performance Criteria Matrix.

The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment of the report.

Component Cooling Chillers and

Charging Pump Service Water

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13

Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following six Plan of the Day (POD) documents listed below

to verify the adequacy, accuracy, and completeness of plant risk assessments

performed prior to changes in plant configuration for maintenance activities or in

response to emergent conditions. When applicable, inspectors assessed if the licensee

5

entered the appropriate risk category in accordance with plant procedures. Specifically,

the inspectors reviewed:

POD for Week of 6/27 - 7/2, including failure of 1EP-BC-UPS-1A2

POD for Week of 7/24 - 30, including failure of 1-EE-P-1D, Unit 1 EDG fuel oil

transfer pump

POD for Week of 8/21-27, including extended outage time for 1-EE-EG-1, Unit 1

EDG

POD for Week 8/28 - 9/3

POD for Week 9/4 - 10

POD for Week 9/18 - 24, including declaration of main control room and auxiliary

building systems emergency ventilation out of service

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15

Operability Evaluations

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of five operability evaluations to

ensure that operability was properly justified and the subject component or system

remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The operability

evaluations were described in the plant issues listed below:

Plant Issue S-2004-2531, During quarterly performance test, number 2 EDG

speed could not be reduced below 935 rpm.

Plant Issue S-2004-2575, During leak test, 1-VS-FL-3B, charcoal filters failed to

prevent minimum bypass leakrate.

Plant Issue S-2004-2821, During monthly run, 1-SW-P-1B, emergency service

water pump (ESW) developed a coolant leak between the support plate and the

engine.

Plant Issue S-2004-2938, After receiving an annunciator, it was discovered that

the unit 2 uninteruptable power supply had switched to its alternate power supply

for an unknown reason.

Plant Issue S-2004-2935, 1-VS-E-4D, main control room chiller tripped due to a

condenser leak.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19

Post Maintenance Testing

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed five post maintenance test procedures and activities associated

with the repair or replacement of the following components to determine whether the

6

procedures and test activities were adequate to verify operability and functional

capability following maintenance of the following equipment:

Work Order (WO) 513031-02, Inspect and repair 1-CH-P-1C motor leads,

WO 515181-01, Replacement of Unit 1 plant protection relay PRB-YB,

WO 515598-01, Coolant leak found on B ESW Pump

WO 517518-02 thru -07, Adjust relays for 1-EE-EG-1, Unit 1 EDG start

sequence

WO 517385-01, Damper failed to close during 0-OPT-VS-007

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22

Surveillance Testing

a.

Inspection Scope

For the seven surveillance tests listed below, the inspectors examined the test

procedure and either witnessed the testing and/or reviewed test records to determine

whether the scope of testing adequately demonstrated that the affected equipment was

functional and operable:

Surveillance Tests

0-NSP-CW-001, High Level Intake Structure Canal Probes Inspection

0-OP-4.2, Receipt and Storage of New Fuel

1-OPT-RX-006, Rod Position Verification Using the Incore Flux Mapping System

1-OPT-EG-008, Number 1 Emergency Diesel Generator Starting Sequence Test

In-Service Test

0-OPT-EG-001, Number 3 Emergency Diesel Generator Monthly Start Exercise

Test

2-OPT-CH-003, Charging Pump Operability and Performance Test for 2-CH-P-

1C

Reactor Coolant Leakage Test

1-OPT-RC-10.0, Reactor Leakage - Computer Calculated

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

7

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6

Drill Evaluation

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed an unannounced emergency response training drill conducted

on August 25, 2004, to assess the licensees performance in emergency classification,

notification, and protective action recommendation development. This drill included the

response actions taken by the shift operating crew in the simulator as well as the

management team in the Technical Support Center and Emergency Operations Facility.

This drill evaluation will contribute to the Emergency Response Performance Indicator

statistics.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2.

RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety Public Radiation Safety (PS)

2OS1 Access Controls To Radiologically Significant Areas

a.

Inspection Scope

Access Controls

During the inspection the licensees program activities for monitoring workers and

controlling their access to radiologically significant areas and tasks were evaluated. The

inspectors evaluated the adequacy of procedural guidance, directly observed

implementation of administrative and physical controls, and assessed resultant worker

exposures to radiation and radioactive material.

The inspectors evaluated the licensees procedures for posting, surveying, and

controlling access to radiation areas, high radiation areas, and very high radiation areas,

against the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20. During tours conducted June 7-9, 2004,

the inspectors evaluated radiological postings and barricades against the current

radiological surveys in areas of the auxiliary buildings to determine the appropriateness

of the established radiological controls. In addition, the inspectors independently

verified the dose rates recorded on current survey maps at various locations in plant

areas. General area dose rates were compared to licensee survey records. The

inspectors observed HP technician proficiency in performing and documenting the

radiation surveys for observed activities.

Access controls for locked high radiation areas were reviewed and discussed with

radiation protection management and supervision. The inspectors directly inspected the

licensees designated locked doors locations and reviewed documentation to verify the

8

condition and status of the locked doors. The inspectors also evaluated implementation

of key controls and postings for very high radiation areas (VHRAs) and locked high

radiation areas.

The inspectors observed radiological significant work areas within radiation areas and

high radiation areas as well as the spent fuel pool storage area. The licensees physical

and program controls for highly activated or contaminated materials (non-fuel) stored

within the spent fuel pool were also reviewed with licensee representatives. The

inspectors conducted independent radiological surveys of selected plant areas and

compared the results to the licensees surveys. Radiological postings and barricade

requirements were evaluated for the observed areas.

The inspectors reviewed the extent of airborne radiological hazards and associated

controls. Airborne radiological areas and resulting internal exposures since the last

NRC inspection were reviewed with the licensees technical staff. During observation of

selected tasks, the use of engineering controls to minimize airborne radioactivity was

evaluated

Radiation Protection (RP) program activities and their implementation were evaluated

against 10 CFR 19.12; 10 CFR Part 20; the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

(UFSAR) details in Section 12, RP; Technical Specification (TS), Section 6.4; and

approved licensee procedures. Licensee documents, records, and data reviewed within

this inspection area are listed in Section 2OS1 of the report Attachment.

Problem Identification and Resolution

Issues identified through RP departmental self-assessments and Corrective Action

Program (CAP) documents associated with radiological controls, personnel monitoring,

and exposure assessments were reviewed and discussed with cognizant licensee

representatives. The inspectors assessed the licensees ability to resolve the issues

identified in this RP program area. Specific assessments and Plant Issue documents

reviewed and evaluated in detail for this inspection area are identified in Section 2OS1

of the report Attachment.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment

a.

Inspection Scope

Radiation Monitoring

During the inspection, the operability, availability, and reliability of selected area

radiation monitor (ARM) and continuous air monitor (CAM) equipment used for routine

and accident monitoring activities were reviewed and evaluated. The inspectors

observed material condition, installed configurations (where accessible), and results of

9

performance checks for selected ARMs and CAMs. The monitors which were inspected

are listed in Section 2OS3 of the report Attachment.

Program guidance, performance activities, and equipment material condition for the

direct radiation detection instrumentation and continuous air sampling equipment were

reviewed against details documented in TS, 10 CFR Parts 20 and 50, UFSAR

Chapter 11, and applicable procedures. Radiation detection and sampling equipment

required for use in accident monitoring also were reviewed against applicable sections

of NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements; and Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97, Instrumentation for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants to Assess

Plant and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident, Revision (Rev.) 3.

Licensee guidance documents, records, and data reviewed within this inspection area

are listed in Section 2OS3 of the report Attachment.

Personnel Survey Instrumentation

Current program guidance, including calibration and operation procedures, and its

implementation to maintain operability and accuracy of selected portable survey

instruments was reviewed and evaluated. The inspectors reviewed current calibration

data for selected personnel survey instruments and assessed operability of various

portable survey instruments staged or in use by the Health Physics (HP) staff.

Responsible staffs knowledge and proficiency regarding portable survey

instrumentation calibration activities were evaluated through interviews, record reviews,

and direct observation of daily performance checks of a Model RO-2A portable survey

instrument and a Teletector Model 6112B. The accuracy and operability determinations

for instrumentation used to perform surveys in high radiation or greater areas were

assessed.

Operability and analysis capabilities of the Personnel Contamination Monitor (PCM)-1C

equipment and portal monitor (PM)-7 employed for surveys of individuals exiting the

radiologically controlled area (RCA) were evaluated. The inspectors examined current

calibration and selected performance check data, and directly observed daily functional

checks of one of each of the monitors.

Licensee activities associated with personnel radiation monitoring instrumentation were

reviewed against TS, 10 CFR 20.1501, and applicable licensee procedures listed in

Section 2OS3 of the report Attachment.

Respiratory Protection - Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA)

The licensees respiratory protection program guidance and its implementation for

SCBA equipment use were evaluated. The SCBA units staged for Control Room

emergency use were inspected for material condition, air pressure, and number of units

available. Cognizant Control Room operations personnel were interviewed to determine

their knowledge of available SCBA equipment locations, proper use, and availability of

prescription lens inserts, if required.

Licensee activities associated with maintenance and use of SCBA equipment were

reviewed against TS; 10 CFR Part 20.1703; UFSAR Chapter 11; Emergency Plan

10

commitments; RG 8.15, Acceptable Programs for Respiratory Protection, Rev. 1,

October 1999; ANSI-Z88.2-1992, American National Standard Practices for Respiratory

Protection; and applicable procedures listed in Section 2OS3 of the report Attachment.

Problem Identification and Resolution

Selected licensee PI documents associated with ARMs and CAMs, portable radiation

detection instrumentation, and respiratory protection program activities were reviewed

and assessed. The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify, characterize,

prioritize, and resolve the identified issues. Specific documents reviewed and evaluated

are listed in Section 2OS3 of the report Attachment.

b.

Findings

(Closed) URI 50-280, 281/2002003-01: Adequacy of procedures for the self-contained

breathing apparatus (SCBA) training program in that all designated users were not

required to demonstrate proficiency in changing SCBA air cylinders or backpacks.

Introduction. A Green NCV of 10 CFR 20.1703(e) was identified for the failure to

establish and implement adequate written procedures to train emergency workers on

respiratory protective equipment. This finding is also related to the emergency planning

standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). Specifically, the licensees written and implemented

SCBA training program was incomplete in that it did not assure that all Control Room

staff demonstrate proficiency in the change out SCBA air cylinders during emergencies.

Description.

During the previous inspection in this program area (NRC Inspection Report 050-280,

281/2002003) the inspectors determined, through interviews with select Control Room

personnel and training supervisors, that not all Control Room staff were required to

demonstrate proficiency in the change out of SCBA air cylinders or backpacks. Specific

hands-on training in this area was provided to personnel trained for Fire Brigade, which

did not include all Senior Reactor Operators. Interviews with Control Room staff

regarding changing out air cylinders during an emergency yielded inconsistent

responses on bottle and/or pack replacement. This issue was entered into the

licensees Corrective Action Program (CAP) as Plant Issue S-2002-2768.

Analysis. During this inspection the inspectors determined that the licensees training in

the use of SCBAs did not require instruction of all SCBA qualified personnel, e.g.,

Senior Reactor Operators who were not fire brigade members, to demonstrate

proficiency in the change out of SCBA air cylinders during emergencies. From a review

of select training records and discussions with cognizant licensee training and Control

Room representatives, the inspectors determined that the licensee had implemented

several training program changes to ensure that all worker disciplines with emergency

response workers demonstrate the change out of SCBA air cylinders. The licensees

continuing training program specifically included hands on training that individuals

demonstrate proficiency in the change out of SCBA air cylinders. This finding is greater

than minor because emergency workers who are required to use respiratory protective

equipment are not trained to use that equipment. This finding is of very low safety

11

significance because an adequate number of SCBA qualified plant personnel/staff,

which were designated emergency responders, would have been available to respond in

the event of an actual emergency. Therefore, the issue did not result in the failure to

meet a planning standard.

Enforcement. 10 CFR 20.1703(c)(4)(ii) requires that the licensee implement and

maintain a respiratory protection program that includes written procedures regarding

training of respirator users. Contrary to the above, as of August 19, 2002, the licensee

had not established and implemented adequate written procedures for training respirator

users. Specifically, the licensees written and implemented SCBA training program was

incomplete in that it did not assure that all designated SCBA users were required to

demonstrate proficiency in the change out of SCBA air cylinders. Because the failure to

train all Control Room staff in the use of respiratory protective equipment is of very low

safety significance and was entered into the CAP (Plant Issue S-2002-2768), this

violation is being treated as an NCV consistent with Section IV.A.1 of the NRC

Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000280, 281/2004004-001: Failure to Implement and

Maintain a Respiratory Protection Program That Includes Written Procedures Regarding

Training of Respirator Users in Demonstrating Proficiency in the Change Out of SCBA

Air Cylinders.

2PS1

Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Monitoring Systems

a.

Inspection Scope

Radioactive Effluent Treatment and Monitoring Systems

The licensees Radioactive Effluent Release Report for Calendar Years (CY) 2002 and

2003 was reviewed and discussed. Report format, the radionuclides and quantities

released in liquid and gaseous effluents, and resultant doses to the public were

evaluated against applicable regulations. The inspectors reviewed the recent changes

to Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) and evaluated whether those changes were

technically justified and consistent with the regulatory guidance.

The inspectors toured the Surry Radwaste Facility (SRF) and assessed major

radioactive effluent process and monitoring equipment against descriptions documented

in the UFSAR and the ODCM. The material condition and operability of select SRF

liquid effluent monitors and ventilation stack gaseous effluent monitors were evaluated.

Compensatory sampling and analyses for three randomly selected effluent monitors

which were out-of-service at various times during the previous twelve months were

assessed. The inspectors reviewed the most recent calibration data for select effluent

monitors, a gaseous effluent sample flow rate monitor, and one gamma spectroscopic

instrument in the count room. Results of inter-laboratory comparisons for calendar

years 2002 and 2003 for samples typical of plant effluents were reviewed and evaluated.

During the inspection, the inspectors observed sampling and analysis of select

ventilation stack gaseous effluents in accordance with licensee release permit. The

inspectors assessed adherence to procedures and to dose limits for that release.

License procedures and activities related to plant effluents were evaluated for

consistency with TS; ODCM; UFSAR Chapter 11.0, Radioactive Wastes and Radiation

12

Protection; 10 CFR 20.1302, 10 CFR 50.36a, and Appendix I to 10 CFR 50; RG 1.109,

Calculation of Annual Doses to Man from Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the

Purpose of Evaluating Compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix I; RG 4.15, Quality

Assurance for Radiological Monitoring Programs (Normal Operation) - Effluent Streams

and the Environment, December 1977; and NUREG-0133. Licensee plant effluent

related procedures, reports and records reviewed during the inspection are listed in

Section 2PS1 of the report Attachment.

Problem Identification and Resolution

The most recent audit of the effluent monitoring program and the Plant Issues

generated in response to the audit findings were selected for detailed evaluation and are

listed in Section 2PS1 of the report Attachment. The inspectors assessed the licensees

ability to identify, characterize, prioritize, and resolve the identified issues.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

2PS3

Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (REMP)

a.

Inspection Scope

Environmental Monitoring

The inspectors toured selected REMP air sampling equipment and direct radiation

monitoring stations. Inspectors observed verification/collection of eight weekly

particulate and charcoal samples, and assessed material condition of air sampling

monitoring equipment. The inspectors verified the location of forty three (43)

thermoluminescence dosimeter (TLD) locations including three control locations.

Calibration records for environmental air samplers were reviewed.

The inspectors reviewed and discussed with licensee personnel the results published in

the Surry Annual Radiological Environmental Operating report for CYs 2002 and 2003

and the land use census report for CY 2003. The inspectors reviewed and discussed a

quality assurance audit of the current vendor laboratory activities conducted by another

utility and documented as an Attachment to the most recent Environmental Operating

report.

The inspectors reviewed the operability of the meteorological monitoring equipment and

operator access to meteorological data. Current meteorological monitoring equipment

performance and calibration were reviewed with the system engineer. Licensee

technicians primarily responsible for equipment maintenance and surveillance were

interviewed by the inspectors concerning equipment performance, reliability and routine

inspections.

REMP guidance, implementation, and results were reviewed against TS; 10 CFR Parts 20 and Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50 design criteria requirements; UFSAR details;

ODCM guidance; and applicable procedures listed in Section 2PS3 of the Attachment to

13

this report. Specific laboratory QC activities were evaluated against RG 1.21,

Measuring, Evaluating and Reporting Radioactivity in Solid Wastes and Releases of

Radioactive Materials In Liquid and Gaseous Effluents from Light-Water Cooled Nuclear

Power Plant, June 1974; and RG 4.15, Quality Assurance for Radiological Monitoring

Programs (Normal Operation) - Effluent Streams and the Environment, December 1977.

The meteorological program implementation and activities were reviewed against

10 CFR Part 20, TS, UFSAR, ODCM, Safety Guide 23, and applicable procedures

documented in Section 2PS3 of the report Attachment.

Unrestricted Release of Materials from the Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA)

The inspectors reviewed selected program procedures and observed surveys of

potentially contaminated materials released from the RCA to assess the licensees

effectiveness in preventing the improper release of radioactive material for unrestricted

use. The radionuclides identified within recent waste stream analyses were compared

against current calibration source radionuclide types and results to evaluate the

appropriateness and accuracy of release survey instrumentation. Licensee data to

evaluate survey requirements for hard-to-detect radionuclides were reviewed and

discussed with responsible personnel.

The licensee practices and implementation of their monitoring activities were evaluated

against 10 CFR Part 20, TS, UFSAR, and applicable procedures documented in the

Section 2PS3 of the report Attachment.

Problem Identification and Resolution

The most recent audit of the effluent monitoring program and the Plant Issues

generated in response to the audit findings were selected for detailed evaluation and are

listed in Section 2PS3 of the report Attachment.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4

OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification

.1

Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours Performance Indicator

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a periodic review of the Unplanned Power Changes per 7000

Critical Hours performance indicator for Units 1 and 2. Specifically, the inspectors

reviewed this performance indicator from the third quarter of 2003 through the second

quarter of 2004. Inspectors evaluated whether the performance indicator was

calculated in accordance with the guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory

14

Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline. Documents reviewed included

applicable monthly operating reports, licensee event reports, and operator logs.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2

Safety System Functional Failure Performance Indicator

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a periodic review of the Safety System Functional Failure

performance indicator for Units 1 and 2. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed this

performance indicator from the third quarter of 2003 through the second quarter of

2004. Inspectors evaluated whether the performance indicator was calculated in

accordance with the guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment

Performance Indicator Guideline. Documents reviewed included applicable monthly

operating reports, licensee event reports and operator logs.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3

Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat Removal Performance Indicator

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a periodic review of the Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat

Removal performance indicator for Units 1 and 2. Specifically, the inspectors reviewed

this performance indicator from the third quarter of 2003 through the second quarter of

2004. Inspectors evaluated whether the performance indicator was calculated in

accordance with the guidance contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment

Performance Indicator Guideline. Documents reviewed included applicable monthly

operating reports, licensee event reports, Integrated inspection reports and operator

logs.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4

Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the Occupational Exposure Control

Effectiveness PI for the period from December 2003 through August 2004. To verify the

accuracy of the PI data reported during that period, PI definitions and guidance

contained in NEI 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline,

Rev. 2, were used to verify the basis in reporting for each data element.

15

The inspectors reviewed Plant Issue records generated from December 2003 through

August 2004 to ensure that radiological occurrences were properly classified per NEI 99-02. The inspectors also reviewed electronic dosimeter alarm logs, radioactive

material intake records, and monthly PI reports for CY 2004. In addition, licensee

procedural guidance for classifying and reporting PI events was evaluated. Reviewed

documents are listed in Section 4OA1 of the report Attachment.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.5

RETS/ODCM Radiological Effluents Occurrence

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed records used by the licensee to identify occurrences of

quarterly doses from liquid and gaseous effluents in excess of the values specified in

NEI 99-02 guidance. Those records included monthly effluent dose calculations for CY

2004. The inspectors also interviewed licensee personnel that were responsible for

collecting and reporting the PI data. In addition, licensee procedural guidance for

classifying and reporting PI events was evaluated. Reviewed documents are listed in

Section 4OA5 of the report Attachment.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

.1

Daily Review of Plant Issues

a.

Inspection Scope

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems,

and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance

issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the

licensees corrective action program. This review was accomplished by a daily review of

hard copies of each plant issue and attending the daily Plant Issue Review Team

meeting.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

16

.2

Detailed Review of Individual Issues

a.

Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed an in-depth review of the failure of a power cable termination

for the 1G transformer in March 2004 and the 2G transformer in May 2004. The issues

are documented in the corrective action program as Plant Issues S-2004-0876 and S-

2004-2306 respectively. The review was performed to ensure the full extent of the issue

was identified, an appropriate evaluation was performed, and appropriate corrective

actions were specified and prioritized. The inspectors evaluated the plant issues against

the requirements of the licensees corrective action program as delineated in Station

Administrative Procedure VPAP-1601, Corrective Action, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B,

Criterion XVI, Corrective Action.

b.

Findings and Observations

No findings of regulatory significance were identified. The licensee performed an

apparent cause and a maintenance rule evaluation for each loss of the 1G and 2G bus.

In March 2004, one termination to the 1G transformer failed. The transformer was

supplied 4160 volts by a combination of underground and overhead lines from the main

switchyard to the low level intake area. The termination that failed had been in service

since 1994. The 1G failure root cause was determined to be workmanship in that the

assembly documents were not followed correctly. The corrective action consisted of

repairing the failed connector and writing a work order to remake the remaining five

terminations. In May 2004, a terminator on the 2G line to the low level area failed. This

was a new underground line installed to protect the low level intake power supply from

severe weather and animals. The 2G line had been in service approximately 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />

when failure occurred. The licensee determined the root cause was workmanship in

that the assembly documents were not followed correctly. The corrective actions

specified were to repair the failed connector and develop and implement a special

procedure to return the power supply to service. The 2G apparent cause did not

address the need for a plant procedure for assembly of the terminations, however, the

maintenance rule evaluation included an assignment to develop a procedure with

appropriate inspection points. The 2G failure occurred within three months of the 1G

failure with the same root cause. The licensee did not view this as repetitive and did not

address corrective actions to prevent workmanship issues in the apparent cause

corrective actions. This is a Minor Finding that does not have regulatory significance.

The 1G and 2G transformers are non-safety related. The loss of the 1G or 2G

transformer is a transient initiator and the transformers are included in the maintenance

rule. Due to the unique design of the Surry intake canal the loss of one transformer

does not have an immediate impact on decay heat removal.

c.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

17

4OA3 Event Follow-up

.1

(Closed) LER 05000281/2003001-00, Electrical Conduit Bushing Failure Resulting in a

Reactor Trip.

A Unit 2 reactor trip and resulting engineering safety feature activations on Unit 1 and 2

were attributed to a failed insulating conduit busing connection. The failed bushing

allowed damage to the Unit 2 main generator protective circuitry wiring which resulted in

the protective circuit actuating. The inspectors reviewed the licensee root cause

evaluation S-2003-03599 and corrective action taken and planned to be taken. The root

cause evaluation properly identified the root and contributing causes to be the bushing

failure and the corrective actions should be sufficient to preclude a similar event on

either Unit 1 or 2.

.2

(Closed) LER 05000280/2003002-00, Manual Steam Generator Level Control Results in

Power Ascension Reactor Trip.

The supplement LER 05000280/2003002-10 inspection activity documented in NRC

Supplemental Inspection Report No. 05000280/2004009 sufficiently addressed the

original LER.

.3

(Closed) LERs 05000280, 281/2003004-00 and 05000280, 281/2003004-01, Manual Reactor Trips due to Loss of All Circulating Water Pumps.

These LERs are associated with the manual trip of both units due to the loss of all

circulating water pumps during Hurricane Isabel. The LERs also report the automatic

safety feature actuations that occurred as a result of the trips. The inspectors reviewed

Plant Issue S-2003-4165 and associated documents which document the events,

response of plant equipment, root and contributing cause evaluation results and

corrective actions. NRC Supplemental Inspection Report No. 05000280/2004009

concluded that the planned actions for loss of power to the circulating water pumps was

appropriate. During the inspection, the inspectors verified that the licensee had

completed actions to install underground power cables to the transformers which

supplied power to the pumps. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee evaluation

concerning tripping of two of the emergency service water pumps during the event. The

inspectors agreed with the licencees cause determinations and actions taken to prevent

similar emergency service water pump trips in the future.

.4

(Closed) Apparent Violation (AV) 05000280, 281/2003008-002: Alternative Shutdown

Capability and Response Procedures Not Adequate to Ensure Safe Shutdown of Unit 1

and URI 05000281/2003008-001: Fire Response Procedures 2-FCA-4.00 And 0-FCA-

14.00 Not Adequate To Ensure Safe Shutdown Of Unit 2

The Final Significance Determination associated with the AV and the URI was issued in

a letter dated September 15, 2004. This issue regarding Surry fire response procedures

that were not effective in ensuring a safe shutdown of a unit following postulated fires

was determined to be a White finding and will be tracked as VIO 05000280,

281/2004008-001, Alternative Shutdown Capability and Response Procedures Not

Adequate to Ensure Safe Shutdown.

18

4OA5 Other Activities

.1

(Closed) NRC Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/156, Offsite Power System Operational

Readiness

The inspectors have completed all onsite inspection as documented in NRC inspection

report 05000280,281/2004003, paragraph 4OA5.4. Consequently, based on completion

of the onsite review, this TI is closed. All further inspection related activities will

originate with NRC headquarters staff.

.2

Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations

Access controls and surveillance results for the licensees ISFSI activities were

evaluated. The evaluation included review of ISFSI radiation control surveillance

procedures and assessment of ISFSI radiological surveillance data. The inspectors

toured the ISFSI facilities and observed access controls, TLD locations and condition,

and radiological postings on the perimeter security fence. The inspectors conducted

independent radiation surveys of the Pad 1 cask and Pad 2 general area and compared

the data with licensee survey results.

Program guidance, access controls, postings, equipment material condition and

surveillance data results were reviewed against details documented in applicable

sections of the UFSAR, TS; 10 CFR Parts 20 and 72, and applicable licensee

procedures. Licensee guidance documents, records, and data reviewed within this

inspection area are listed in Section 4OA5 of the report Attachment.

b.

Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

.1

Exit Meeting Summary

On October 12, 2004, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr.

Blount and other members of his staff who acknowledge the findings.

The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined

during the inspection.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following violations of very low safety significance (Green) was identified by the

licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meet the criteria of Section VI.A

of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as an NCV.

Technical Specification 6.4.B requires that procedures for personnel radiation

protection shall be prepared consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 20

19

and shall be approved, maintained and adhered to for all operations involving

personnel radiation exposure. Section 6.2.2, titled Plant Access Training to

Procedure VPAP-2101 titled Radiation Protection Program,states, in part, that

individuals who have completed only Plant Access Training shall not be allowed

unescorted access into an RCA unless Access Authorization to RCA for

Visitors/Non-Radiation Worker is completed and shall not perform any physical

work in the RCA. Furthermore, Section 6.8.1 titled Supervision and Monitoring

of Radiological Work to Procedure VPAP-2101, states, in part, that foremen

shall ensure that each worker is qualified to perform required task and have

appropriate training and experience. Contrary to the above, an individual gained

unescorted access to the RCA without an Access Authorization to the RCA for a

Visitor/ Non-Radiation worker and was allowed to performed work in the RCA.

This was identified in Plant Issue S-2003-5018. This finding is of very low safety

significance because the individual was assigned to conduct such activities in the

RCA with other experienced, trained and currently qualified Basic Radiation

Workers and under the supervision of a foreman.

10 CFR 71.5(a) requires, in part, that a licensee who transport licensed material

outside of the confines of its plant or delivers licensed material to a carrier for

transport comply with the applicable requirements of the regulations appropriate

to the mode of transport of the Department of Transportation (DOT) in 49 CFR

Parts 170 through 189. 49 CFR 173.471(a) requires, in part, that the offeror of a

Type B package make the shipment in compliance with the terms of the

packaging approval. Section 7.1.6 of Certificate of Compliance No. 9168,

Revision 12, dated June 25, 2001, states, in part, when seals are replaced, leak

testing is required as specified in Section 8.2.2.2 titled Assembly Verification

Leak Test. Contrary to this, the licensee did not leak test a secondary lid seal

before shipping Shipment No. B2001-2 on June 28, 2001. This was identified in

Plant Issue S-2001-1863-E1. This finding is of very low safety significance

because the package did not have any indications of leakage upon receipt at the

burial site.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

R. Allen, Manager, Outage and Planning

R. Blount, Site Vice President

M.Gaffney, Director, Nuclear Station Safety and Licensing

B.Garber, Supervisor, Licensing

T. Huber, Manager, Engineering

L. Jones, Manager, Radiation Protection and Chemistry

D. Llewellyn, Manager, Training

R. MacManus, Manager, Nuclear Oversight

K. Sloane, Director, Nuclear Station Operations and Maintenance

B. Stanley, Manager, Maintenance

J. Swientoniewski, Manager, Operations

NRC

K. Landis, Chief, Branch 5, Division of Reactor Projects, Region II

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened and Closed

05000280, 281/2004004-001

NCV

Failure to implement and maintain a

respiratory protection program that includes

written procedures regarding training of

respirator users in demonstrating

proficiency in the change out of SCBA air

cylinders (Section 2OS3.b)

Closed

05000281/2003001-00

LER

Electrical Conduit Bushing Failure Results

in a Reactor Trip (Section 4OA3.1)05000280/2003002-00

LER

Manual Steam Generator Level Control

Results in Power Ascension Reactor Trip

(Section 4OA3.1)

05000280,281/2003004-00

LER

Manual Reactor Trips Due to Loss of All

Circulating Water Pumps (Section 4OA3.1)

05000280,281/2003004-01

LER

Manual Reactor Trips Due to Loss of All

Circulating Water Pumps (Section 4OA3.1)

A-2

5000280, 281/2002003-01

URI

Failure of respiratory protection program to

include demonstration of proficiency in

changing SCBA air cylinders (Section

2OS3.b)05000281/2003008-001

URI

Fire Response Procedures 2-FCA-4.00 And

0-FCA-14.00 Not Adequate To Ensure Safe

Shutdown Of Unit 2 (Section 4OA3)

05000280,281/2003008-002

AV

Alternative Shutdown Capability and

Response Procedures Not Adequate to

Ensure Safe Shutdown of Unit 1 (Section

4OA3)

TI 2515/156

TI

Offsite Power System Operational

Readiness (Section 4OA5.1)

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Partial List of Persons Contacted:

R. Cramer, NSS Manager

B. Garber, Licensing Supervisor

L. Jones, Manager Radiological Protection

J. Keithley, Supervisor Health Physics Operations

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R04

Plant Procedures

2-OP-SI-001A, Safety Injection System Alignment

0-OP-EG-001A, EDG 3 System Alignment

2-OP-EG-001A, EDG 2 System Alignment

Plant Drawings

11548-FM-089A, Safety Injection System

11548-FM-089B, Safety Injection System

Section 1R06

Plant Drawings

11448-FM-55A

A-3

11448-FM-55B

Plant Procedures

0-EPM-0805-01, Station Flood Detection Testing

0-MPM-1900-02, Flood Protection Floor Drain Back Water Stop Valve Replacement

1/2-EPM-0805-01, Turbine Building Flood Control Testing

1-OSP-PL-001, Performance Test of Turbine Building Sump Pumps 1-PL-P-2A, 1-PL-P-2B,1-

PL-P-2C (Turbine Building Sump No. 1)

1-OSP-PL-002, Performance Test of Turbine Building Sump Pumps 1-PL-P-2D, 1-PL-P-2E,1-

PL-P-2F (Turbine Building Sump No. 2)

2-OSP-PL-001, Performance Test of Turbine Building Sump Pumps 2-PL-P-2A, 2-PL-P-2B, 2-

PL-P-2C (Turbine Building Sump No. 3)

0-AP-13.00, Turbine Building or MER 3 Flooding

0-AP-FCA-6.01, Uncontrollable Turbine Building Flooding

Work Orders

489929 01, 479493 01, 487910 01, 487911 01, 491419 01

Plant Issues

S-2002-4023, S-2004-1336, S-2004-1337, S-2004-1338, S-2004-1339

S-2004-1348, S-2004-1351, S-2004-1432, S-2004-1517

Root Cause Evaluation S-2004-1339, Internal Flooding Licensing Basis Compromise

Section 1R07

Work Order 517551-01

SSES-8.15, Controlling Procedure for Addressing Heat Exchanger Issues

Section 1R22

Technical Report No. NE-1381, Evaluation of Surry Power Station Reactor Coolant System

Leak Rate Calculation

2OS1 Access Controls To Radiologically Significant Areas (71121.01)

Procedures, Instructions, Lesson Plans, and Manuals

C-HP-1020.011, Radiological Protection Action Plan During Diving Activities, Rev. 3

C-HP-1032.020, Radiological Survey Criteria and Scheduling, Rev. 4

C-HP-1032.030, Radiation Surveys, Rev. 3

C-HP-1032.060, Radiological Posting and Controls, Rev. 1

C-HP-1032.061, High Radiation Area Key Control, Rev. 2

C-HP-1061.110, Radiological Control Areas, Rev. 3

C-HP-1071.020, Controlling Contaminated Material, Rev 3

C-HP-1081.020, Radiological Work Permits: RWP Briefing and Controlling Work, Rev 4

Audits

A-4

Audit 01-07:Radiological Protection/Chemistry, 08/16/01

Radiation Work Permit (RWP)

RWP - 04-1-0001, Rev. 1, General Entry

RWP - 04-2-1101, Rev. 2, Posted Locked High Radiation Areas and Hot particle Areas

RWP - 04-2-1506, Rev. 2, Auxiliary Building, Decon Building and Yard

RWP Briefings

RWP 04-2-1101, RWP Briefing Attendance Roster

RWP 04-2-1506, RWP Briefing Attendance Roster

Radiological Surveys

358, Gas Stripper/PDT Room - Gate 31, 06/08/04

375, Auxiliary Building 2 Elevation Overview, 06/09/04

384, PDT, Gas Stripper and Liquid Waste Tank Room - Gate 11, 06/08/04

512, Decontamination (Decon) Building 27 overview - Gate 27, 06/09/04

513, Decon Building 6 Overview - Gate 22, 06/09/04

516, Decon Building Roof Overview, 06/09/04

519, Unit 2 Safeguards 27 and 8 Overview, 06/09/04 (Survey of de-watering lines after resin

transfer from Blend Tank)

521, Unit 2 Valve Pit 12, 19 and 27 Overview, 06/09/04

Corrective Action Program (CAP) Documents

Plant Issue (PI) S-2002-2913-E1, CAT 2 Root Cause Evaluation s-2002-2913-E1 A protective

clothing hood was found on a coat rack in the NSS Electrical Prefab shop outside the

protected area. Discovery date: 09/11/2002

PI S-2002-3478-E1, CAT 2 Root Cause Evaluations S-2002-3478, Worker Exits Protected Area

with 120,000 dpm Discrete Radioactive Particle Embedded in Jacket. Discovery date:

11/05/2002

PI S-2003-1241-E1, CAT 3 Root Cause Evaluation Response, S-2003-1241-E1, Purple painted

crescent wrench found inside of tool box on vehicle 4183. Vehicle located outside the

protected area on the construction site. Discovery date: 03/28/2003

PI S-2004-2166-E1, Purple tools found in survey for free release of materials from the RCA

06/07/2004. Discovery date: 06/07/2004

PI S-2003-5439-E1, CAT 3 Root Cause Evaluation Response - S-2003-5439-E1, Purple 2

pound maul found outside the protected area. The tool was found on an air dryer in the

Construction side parking lot.

2OS3 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation and Protective Equipment (71121.03)

Procedures, Lesson Plans, and Manuals

C-HP-1032.020, Radiological Survey Criteria and Scheduling, Rev. 2

C-HP-1033.610, Eberline Air Monitor AMS-4 Calibration and Operation, Rev. 2

A-5

C-HP-1042.350, Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus Use, Rev. 4

HP-1033.015, Contamination Monitoring Instrumentation Control, Rev. 8

HPAP-1042, Radiological Respiratory Protection Program, Rev. 3

Lesson Plan: SCBA Cylinder Exchange, Rev. 1 dated 07/18/2003

Nuclear Employee Training Manual, Volume II (included section on Respiratory Protection

Training), Rev. 10

0-AP-20.00, Main Control Room Inaccessibility, Rev. 6

0-AP-48.00, Fire Protection - Operations Response, Rev. 15

0-LSP-FP-005, Loss Prevention Surveillance Procedure (Attachment 4: Main Control Room

Emergency SCBA), Rev. 6

VPAP-1902, Industrial Respiratory Protection, Rev. 5

Area Radiation Monitors Evaluated

RM-RM-127/128, Unit 1 (U1) Containment High-Range Radiation Monitor (CHRRM), calibrated

10/22/2001

RM-RM-138, 139, Spent Resin Handling Area Monitor, calibrated 1994 (out of service)

RM-RM-227/228, Unit 2 (U2) CHRRM, calibrated 03/27/2002RM-RM-164, U1 In-Core

Instrument Transfer Area Monitor, calibrated 10/17/2001

RM-RM-264, U2 In-Core Instrument Transfer Area Monitor, calibrated 04/07/2002

RMS-RM-161, U1 Containment Personnel Hatch Area Monitor (CPHAM), calibrated 01/24/2001

RMS-RM-261, U2 CPHAM, calibrated 02/20/2002

RRM-RE-126, Radwaste Facility HIC Storage and Handling Area Monitor, calibrated

01/30/2002

Continuous Air Monitors Evaluated

AMS-4 Monitor (S/N 797) in Auxiliary Building, 27 elevation, calibrated 03/19/2002

AMS-4 Monitor (S/N 901) in Auxiliary Building, 13 elevation, calibrated 07/10/2002

CAP Documents

PI S-2002-0331, Shepherd Model 89 Calibrator in a degraded condition, 02/06/2002

PI S-2002-0544, Shepherd Model 89 Calibrator in an unstable condition because of an

apparent electrical short, 02/26/2002

PI S-2002-0715, Shepherd Model 89 Calibrator has a broken door-alignment latch, 03/11/2002

PI S-2002-1129, Shepherd Model 89 Calibrator has source exposed indicator light

malfunction, 04/02/2002

PI S-2002-1776, Shepherd Model 89 Calibrator out of service because door-locking device

failed, 05/12/2002

PI S-2002-2203, Shepherd Model 89 Calibrator has a broken mechanical door latch,

06/22/2002

PI S-2004-2243, Review of Respiratory Protection records during the RP Audit 04-08

PI S-2002-2768, No guidance for sustained use of SCBAs in the Control Room

A-6

2PS1 Radioactive Gaseous and Liquid Effluent Monitoring (71122.01)

Reports, Procedures, Instructions, and Manuals

Surry Power Station (SPS), 2002 and 2003 Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports

SPS, Calibration, Procedure Number (No.) CAL-004, Revision (Rev.) No. 6, Process Radiation

Monitor Alarm Setpoint Calibration

SPS, Calibration, Procedure No. CAL-255, Rev. No. 7, Kaman Normal Range Gas Effluent

Monitor (RI-GW-130-1A)

SPS, Calibration, Procedure No. CAL-258, Rev. No. 5, Kaman Accident Range Gas Effluent

Monitor RI-VG-131-2A

SPS, Calibration, Procedure No. CAL-298, Rev. No. 3, Kaman Radiation Monitor Alarm

Setpoint Calibration

SPS, Health Physics (HP), Procedure No. HP-3030.031, Rev.12, Radioactive Gaseous Waste

Sampling and Analysis, Rev. 10

SPS, HP Periodic Test, Procedure No. 1-PT-50.17, Rev. No. 2, Health Physics Sampling

Condenser Air Ejector

SPS, HP Periodic Test, Procedure No. 1-PT-50.3, Rev. No. 1, Health Physics Sampling -

Ventilation Vent # 2

SPS, HP Surveillance Procedure, Procedure No. 0-HSP-RM-003, Rev. No. 4, Dose

Contributions from Station Effluents

SPS, Instrument Maintenance, Procedure No. IMP-C-RM-36, Rev. No. 27, Checking, Repairing

or Replacing a Component in the Radiation Monitoring System

SPS, Instrument Preventive Maintenance, Procedure No. 0-IPM-RM-G-001, Rev. No. 10, Digital

Ratemeter Model 942B Process Monitor Calibration

SPS, Instrument Preventive Maintenance, Procedure No. 0-IPM-CC-RRM-LIQD-001, Rev.

No. 4, Radwaste Facility Liquid Effluent Monitor Calibration

SPS, Instrument Preventive Maintenance, Procedure No. 0-IPM-CC-RRM-MISC-001, Rev.

No. 2-P1, Surry Radwaste Facility Radiation Monitor Setpoint Calibration

SPS, Instrument Preventive Maintenance, Procedure No. 0-IPM-CC-RRM-VENT-001, Rev.

No. 6, Radwaste Facility Vent Stack Effluent Monitor Calibration

Station Administrative Procedure, Procedure No. VPAP-2103S, Offsite Dose Calculation

Manual (Surry), Rev. 5

UFSAR Chapter 11.0 Radioactive Wastes and Radiation Protection

Calibration/Performance Data

Dominion Generation (DG), SPS, HP-1033.203, Gaseous Radioactive Waste Release Permits

40093.009.002.G, 40124.010.003.G, 40139.007.021.G, 40141.003.021.G, 40155.007.023.G,

and 40156.003.024.G dated 04/08/04, 05/11/04, 05/25/04, 05/26/04, 06/08/04, and 06/09/04

DG, SPS, HP-1033.203, Liquid Radioactive Waste Release Permits 40083.032.002.L,

40102.030.007.L, and 40118.034.022.L dated 04/22/04, 05/22/04, and 05/31/04

Virginia Power, SPS, Cal-817, Rev. 22, Data Sheets for RMs 1-VG-RM-110, GW-RM-1-1,

GW-RM-102, and VG-RM-109 dated 10/09/03, 03/07/03, 03/07/03, and 10/09/03

A-7

Audits

Audit 03-11: Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM), Radiological Environmental Monitoring

Program (REMP), and Environmental Protection Plan (EPP) dated 02/25/04

Dominion Nuclear Health Physics Procedure, C-HP-1091.273, Rev. 5, Radioactive Effluent

Control Program Evaluation for Surry Power Station for the period 2002 to 2003

Trend Evaluation Response S-2003-5601-E1, Gamma isotopic analysis results for # 1 Storm

Drain Composite dated 10/05/03 are anomalous in that Co-58 was identified in the sample

CAP Documents

PI S-2003-1425, During background performance check of detector # 3 in the Count Room an

anomaly occurred regarding the computer printout

PI S-2004-0577, A degrading trend on filter differential pressure was noted revealing a 0"

differential pressure and a high flow fault light lit

Plant Issue Resolution (PIR) S-2002-2596-R1, The Kaman process vent low range noble gas

effluent monitor did not respond to the 08/03/02 waste gas decay tank release until six hours

after the release

PIR S-2003-0402-R1, Insensitivity of U1 and 2 air ejector radiation monitor to </= 30 gallons per

day primary to secondary leakage during the start-up of U1 on 01/24/03 and 02/26/03 and U2

on 01/28/03

PIR S-2003-0847-R1, Moisture accumulation in the sample lines for the RM-RMS-259/260 skid

PIR S-2003-0876-E1, While releasing a Liquid Waste Monitoring tank, the SRF control room

received annunciator DCS-LSM-B1, Liquid Discharge Radioactivity HIGH

PIR S-2004-1027-R1, Analysis of the particulate filter for the effluent sample form the SRF Vent

from the week of 02/11-02/18/04 yielded positive results for gross alpha

PIR S-2003-1209-R1, January 2003 monthly liquid composite tritium values for the

miscellaneous batch and continuous pathways were unusually high

2PS3 Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program (71122.03)

Procedures, Instructions, Lesson Plans, and Manuals

Annual Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program, January 1 to December 31, 2002

Annual Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program, January 1 to December 31, 2003

Audit 03-11, Offsite Dose Calculation Manual Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program

and Environmental Protection Plan

C-HP-1091.100, Member Of The Public Dose Evaluation, Rev. 1

C-HP-1091.274, Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program: Surveillance and Evaluation,

Rev. 1

HP-1033.015, Contamination Monitoring Instrument Control, Rev 8

HP-3051.010 Environmental Monitoring Program, Rev. 10

HP Periodic Test Procedure 0-HPS-REMP-002, Environmental Radiation Monitors, Rev.0

HP Procedure, HP-3051.010, Radiological Environmental Monitoring Program, Rev. 8

HP Surveillance Procedure 0-HPS-REMP-001, Land Use Census, Rev. 2,

0-HSP-SS-001 Storm Drain Sampling Using The American Sigma Ultrasonic Flow Meter,

Rev.5

UFSAR, Section 2.2, Meteorology and Climatology, Rev 33

A-8

Instrument Calibration and Performance Data Records

CAL-93, Met Tower Delta T Loop Calibration, Rev. 6, Performed 08/03/04

CAL-133, Sigma Theta Loop, Rev. 4, Performed 07/30/04

CAL-155, Wind Speed Lower Loop, Rev.4, Performed 08/03/04

CAL-193, Wind Speed Upper Loop, Rev. 5, Performed 08/03/04

CAL-194, Wind Direction Backup Loop, Rev 5, Performed 08/03/04

CAL-195, Wind Direction Upper Loop, Rev. 5, Performed 08/03/04

CAL-196, Wind Direction Lower Loop, Rev 5, Performed 08/03/04

Calibration Certificates - Portable Air Samplers ID 7725 dated 01/20/04, ID 6827 dated

01/20/04, ID 6828 dated 01/20/04, ID 7121 dated 01/20/04, ID 4148 dated 01/20/04,

ID 7133 dated 01/20/04, ID 7130 dated 01/20/04, and ID 5022 dated 01/20/04

CAP Documents

PI S-2003-0612, Environmental TLD at Kingsmill location missing

PI S-2004-1248, Station sewage holding tank contaminated with I-131 from an individual with a

medical administration

PI S-2004-1313, The EMS monthly data base is incomplete - 2 weeks of effluent data from

March are missing - likely associated with primary drive crash

PI S-2004-1354, Failed to meet the required airborne I-131 LLD at the Fort Eustis 9/16-23/03

Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

Procedures, Instructions, Lesson Plans, and Manuals

HPAP-2802, NRC Performance Indicator Program, Rev. 2

VPAP-1601, Corrective Action, Rev. 18

VPAP-1501, Deviations, Rev. 16

Plant Records

Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicators, Radiological Protection, - December 2003,

January 2004, February 2004, March 2004, April 2004, May 2004, June 2004, and July 2004

Section 4OA5: Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (60855)

Procedures, Instructions, Lesson Plans, and Manuals

HP Periodic Test, 0-HPT-ISFSI-001, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)

Radiological Surveillance, Rev. 9

ISFSI Security Fence Survey, 04/07/04

ISFSI Perimeter Fence Survey, 04/07/04

Neutron and Noble Gas Dose Calculation Record C-HP-1031.022, Rev. 8

Surry ISFSI, Final Safety Analysis Report, Amendment 15, Docket 72-2, SNM-2501 Chapter 7,

Radiation Protection

Virginia Electric and Power Surry Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Technical

Specifications for Safety Licensee No. SNM-2501, Amendment 12

A-9

CAP Documents

PI S-200-0788, HP used incorrect survey instrument at ISFSI

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