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=Text=
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{{#Wiki_filter:April 20, 2006Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.ATTN:D. E. Grissette, Jr.Vice President - Vogtle ProjectP. O. Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35201-1295SUBJECT:VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTIONREPORT 05000424/2006002 AND 05000425/2006002
{{#Wiki_filter:April 20, 2006
 
==SUBJECT:==
VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000424/2006002 AND 05000425/2006002


==Dear Mr. Grissette:==
==Dear Mr. Grissette:==
On March 31, 2006, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspectionat your Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP), Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integratedinspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on April 13, 2006, with Mr. Tom Tynan and other members of your staff.The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety andcompliance with the Commission's rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
On March 31, 2006, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP), Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on April 13, 2006, with Mr. Tom Tynan and other members of your staff.
 
The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
 
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.


The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in theNRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of theNRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).


Sincerely,
Sincerely,
/RA/Scott M. Shaeffer, Acting ChiefReactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor ProjectsDocket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425License Nos.: NPF-68, NPF-81
/RA/
Scott M. Shaeffer, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68, NPF-81


===Enclosure:===
===Enclosure:===
Inspection Report 05000424/2006002 and 05000425/2006002 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
Inspection Report 05000424/2006002 and 05000425/2006002 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information


REGION IIDocket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425License Nos.: NPF-68, NPF-81 Report Nos.:05000424/2006002 and 05000425/2006002 Licensee:Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
REGION II==
Docket Nos.:
50-424, 50-425 License Nos.:
NPF-68, NPF-81 Report Nos.:
05000424/2006002 and 05000425/2006002 Licensee:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
 
Facility:
Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location:
7821 River Road Waynesboro, GA 30830 Dates:
January 1, 2006 through March 31, 2006 Inspectors:
G. McCoy, Senior Resident Inspector B. Anderson, Resident Inspector Approved by:
Scott M. Shaeffer, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects


Facility:Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2Location:7821 River RoadWaynesboro, GA 30830Dates:January 1, 2006 through March 31, 2006 Inspectors:G. McCoy, Senior Resident InspectorB. Anderson, Resident InspectorApproved by:Scott M. Shaeffer, Acting ChiefReactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure
Enclosure


=SUMMARY OF FINDINGS=
=SUMMARY OF FINDINGS=
IR 05000424/2006-002, 05000425/2006-002; 01/01/2006 - 03/31/2006; Vogtle ElectricGenerating Plant, Units 1 and 2; Routine Integrated Report.The report covered a three-month period of inspection by two resident inspectors. No findingsof significance were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation ofcommercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process,Revision 3, dated July 2000.A.
IR 05000424/2006-002, 05000425/2006-002; 01/01/2006 - 03/31/2006; Vogtle Electric
 
Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2; Routine Integrated Report.
 
The report covered a three-month period of inspection by two resident inspectors. No findings of significance were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process,
Revision 3, dated July 2000.


===NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings===
===NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings===
No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified.


===B.Licensee-Identified Violations===
===Licensee-Identified Violations===
No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified.


Enclosure
=REPORT DETAILS=
 
===Summary of Plant Status===
Unit 1 operated at full rated thermal power (RTP) for the entire inspection period.
 
Unit 2 started the period at full RTP. On February 2, power was reduced to 30% RTP and the turbine taken off-line to repair a turbine control oil system leak. Repairs were complete later that same day and the unit returned to full RTP. On February 3, the unit was shutdown to repair a failed primary coolant system boundary weld. The unit was restarted on February 14 and operated at full RTP until March 20 when the unit was shutdown to repair another failed primary coolant system boundary weld. The unit remained shutdown at the end of the inspection period.
 
==REACTOR SAFETY==
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity
{{a|1R04}}
 
==1R04 Equipment Alignment
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
Partial Walkdowns.==
The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the three systems listed to verify correct system alignment. The inspectors checked for correct valve and electrical power alignments by comparing positions of valves, switches, and breakers to the procedures and drawings listed in the Attachment. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the condition report (CR) database to verify that equipment alignment problems were being identified and appropriately resolved.
 
C Unit 2 train B emergency diesel generator (EDG) during train A EDG maintenance C Unit 1 train B containment spray (CS) during train A CS pump maintenance C Unit 2 train A charging during train B centrifugal charging pump (CCP) maintenance
 
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified. {{a|1R05}}
 
==1R05 Fire Protection
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
Fire Area Tours.==
The inspectors walked down the nine plant areas listed to verify that the licensee was controlling combustible materials and ignition sources as required by procedures 92015-C, Use, Control, and Storage of Flammable/Combustible Materials, and 92020-C, Control of Ignition Sources. The inspectors assessed the observable condition of fire detection, suppression, and protection systems and reviewed the licensees fire protection Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) log and CR database to verify that the corrective actions for degraded equipment were identified and appropriately prioritized. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees fire protection program to verify the requirements of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)
Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection Program, and Appendix 9A, Fire Hazards Analysis, were met. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
 
C Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater building C Unit 2 train A and B remote shutdown panel rooms C Unit 1 north main steam valve house C Unit 1 south main steam valve house C Unit 1 control building, level A, east penetration rooms C Unit 1 auxiliary building, level B, penetration room C Unit 2 train A and B containment spray rooms C Unit 2 train A diesel generator and day tank room C Unit 1 diesel generator tanks and pumphouse
 
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified. {{a|1R11}}
 
==1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
Resident Quarterly Observation.==
The inspectors evaluated operator performance on January 31, 2006, during licensed operator simulator training associated with Requalification Segment 20061 and described on simulator exercise guide V-RQ-SE-06101. The simulator scenario covered operator actions resulting from a loss of class 1E 125-V DC followed by a turbine runback and a loss of all AC power.
 
Procedures reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors specifically assessed the following areas:
C Correct use of the abnormal and emergency operating procedures C Ability to identify and implement appropriate actions in accordance with the requirements of the Technical Specifications (TSs)
C Clarity and formality of communications in accordance with procedure 10000-C, Conduct of Operations C Proper control board manipulations including critical operator actions C Quality of supervisory command and control C Effectiveness of post-evaluation critique
 
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified. {{a|1R12}}
 
==1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
==
The inspectors reviewed one equipment problem and one system-oriented issue to evaluate the effectiveness of the licensees handling of equipment performance problems and to verify that the licensees maintenance efforts met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and licensee procedure 50028-C, Engineering Maintenance Rule Implementation. The reviews included adequacy of the licensees failure characterization, establishment of performance criteria or 50.65 (a)(1)performance goals, and adequacy of corrective actions. Other documents reviewed during this inspection included control room logs, system health reports, the maintenance rule database, and maintenance work orders (MWOs). Also, the inspectors interviewed system engineers and the maintenance rule coordinator to assess the accuracy of identified performance deficiencies and extent of condition.
 
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
 
C CR 2006103344, 1PV3000 Hydraulics Pressurization is not performing properly C System Operability of the Unit 2 Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valves
 
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified. {{a|1R13}}
 
==1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
==
The inspectors reviewed the six following activities to verify that plant risk was properly assessed by the licensee prior to conducting the activities. The inspectors reviewed risk assessments and risk management controls implemented for these activities to verify that they were completed in accordance with procedure 00354-C, Maintenance Scheduling, and 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). The inspectors also reviewed the CR database to verify that maintenance risk assessment problems were being identified at the appropriate level, entered into the corrective action program, and appropriately resolved.
 
C Unit 2 train B EDG outage C Unit 2 train A EDG outage C Unit 1 train B piping penetration ventilation system outage C Unit 2 train B CCP outage C Unit 2 backup pressurizer heater maintenance C Unit 2 forced outage for Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system repairs
 
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified. {{a|1R14}}
 
==1R14 Operator Performance During Non-Routine Plant Evolutions
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
==
For the two non-routine plant evolutions described below, the inspectors reviewed the operating crews performance, operator logs, control board indications, and plant computer data to verify that operator response was in accordance with the associated plant procedures. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
 
C Unit 2 downpower to 30% for Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC) leak repair on main generator front standard C Unit 2 shutdown to repair primary coolant boundary leakage
 
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified. {{a|1R15}}
 
==1R15 Operability Evaluations
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
==
The inspectors reviewed the five listed evaluations to verify that they met the requirements of NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, and NMP-002-GL02, Corrective Action Program Details and Expectations Guideline. This scope included a review of the technical adequacy of the evaluations, the adequacy of compensatory measures, and the impact on continued plant operation.
 
C DOEJ-06-19000 C V29-001, Operations with Nuclear Service Cooling Water spray bypass valve open C CR 2006100473, Degraded o-rings in the steam generator atmospheric relief valve C CR 2006102295, Incorrect assembly of unit 1 Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) governor control linkage following maintenance C CR 2006101959 Part 21 affecting TDAFW governor operability C CR 2006103105, Unit 2 train A CS pump, leak on motor cooler vent valve
 
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified. {{a|1R19}}
 
==1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
==
The inspectors either observed post-maintenance testing or reviewed the test results for the following five listed maintenance activities to verify that the testing met the requirements of procedure 29401-C, Work Order Functional Tests, for ensuring that equipment operability and functional capability were restored. The inspectors also reviewed the test procedures to verify that the acceptance criteria was sufficient to meet the TS operability requirements.
 
C MWO 20517449, Unit 2 train B EDG exhaust stack replacement C DCP 20390005, Replace protective relays, 2B EDG C MWO 20541594, Unit 2 train B CCP system maintenance outage C MWO 20604876, Unit 2 train A containment spray pump motor cooler vent valve replacement C MWO 10600403, Plant Wilson blackstart diesel generator voltage regulator replacement
 
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified. {{a|1R20}}
 
==1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities
 
====a. Inspection Scope====
==
The inspectors performed the inspection activities described below for the two outages to repair reactor coolant boundary leaks on Unit 2. The first outage was from February 3 through February 16, and the second outage was from March 20 through April 2.
 
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
* Reviewed reactor cooling system (RCS) pressure, level, and temperature instruments to verify that the instruments provided accurate indication and that allowances were made for instrumentation errors
* Reviewed the status and configuration of electrical systems to verify that those systems met TS requirements and the licensees outage risk control plan
* Observed decay heat removal parameters to verify that the system was properly functioning and providing cooling to the core
* Reviewed selected control room operations to verify that the licensee was controlling reactivity in accordance with the technical specifications
* Reviewed the outage risk plan to verify that activities, systems, and/or components, which could cause unexpected reactivity changes, were identified in the outage risk plan and were controlled
* Observed licensee control of containment penetrations to verify that the requirements of the TSs were met
* Reviewed the licensees plans for changing plant configurations to verify that TSs, license conditions, and other requirements, commitments, and administrative procedure prerequisites were met prior to changing plant configurations
* Toured containment prior to reactor startup to verify that debris had not been left which could adversely impact the performance of the containment sumps and ECCS components
 
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified. {{a|1R22}}
 
==1R22 Surveillance Testing


=REPORT DETAILS=
====a. Inspection Scope====
Summary of Plant StatusUnit 1 operated at full rated thermal power (RTP) for the entire inspection period.Unit 2 started the period at full RTP. On February 2, power was reduced to 30% RTP and theturbine taken off-line to repair a turbine control oil system leak. Repairs were complete laterthat same day and the unit returned to full RTP. On February 3, the unit was shutdown to repair a failed primary coolant system boundary weld. The unit was restarted on February 14and operated at full RTP until March 20 when the unit was shutdown to repair another failedprimary coolant system boundary weld. The unit remained shutdown at the end of theinspection period.1.REACTOR SAFETYCornerstones:  Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity1R04Equipment Alignmenta.Inspection ScopePartial Walkdowns. The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the three systemslisted to verify correct system alignment. The inspectors checked for correct valve and electrical power alignments by comparing positions of valves, switches, and breakers to the procedures and drawings listed in the Attachment. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the condition report (CR) database to verify that equipment alignment problems were being identified and appropriately resolved.Unit 2 train B emergency diesel generator (EDG) during train A EDG maintenanceUnit 1 train B containment spray (CS) during train A CS pump maintenanceUnit 2 train A charging during train B centrifugal charging pump (CCP) maintenanceb.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
==
{{a|1R05}}
The inspectors reviewed the five listed surveillance test procedures and either observed the testing or reviewed test results to verify that testing was conducted in accordance with the procedures and that the acceptance criteria adequately demonstrated that the equipment was operable. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the CR database to verify that the licensee had adequately identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions for surveillance test problems. Documents reviewed are listed in the
==1R05 Fire Protectiona.Inspection ScopeFire Area Tours.==
.
The inspectors walked down the nine plant areas listed to verify thatthe licensee was controlling combustible materials and ignition sources as required by procedures 92015-C, Use, Control, and Storage of Flammable/Combustible Materials, and 92020-C, Control of Ignition Sources. The inspectors assessed the observable condition of fire detection, suppression, and protection systems and reviewed thelicensee's fire protection Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) log and CR database to verify that the corrective actions for degraded equipment were identified and appropriately prioritized. The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's fire protection program to verify the requirements of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)2EnclosureSection 9.5.1, Fire Protection Program, and Appendix 9A, Fire Hazards Analysis, weremet. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater buildingUnit 2 train A and B remote shutdown panel roomsUnit 1 north main steam valve houseUnit 1 south main steam valve houseUnit 1 control building, level A, east penetration roomsUnit 1 auxiliary building, level B, penetration roomUnit 2 train A and B containment spray roomsUnit 2 train A diesel generator and day tank roomUnit 1 diesel generator tanks and pumphouseb.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
Surveillance Tests C 13419-C, EDG 2B Extended Allowed Outage Time (AOT) Preparations C 14980A-1, EDG 1A Operability Test C 24568-1, RCP train A, Reactor Trip Underfrequency (281-A) and Undervoltage (227-A) Relays Trip Actuating Device Operational Test and Channel Calibration In-Service Tests C 14805-1, Unit 1 RHR Pump and Check Valve IST and Response Time Tests C 14805-2, Unit 2 RHR Pump and Check Valve IST and Response Time Tests
{{a|1R11}}
==1R11 Licensed Operator Requalificationa.Inspection ScopeResident Quarterly Observation.==
The inspectors evaluated operator performance onJanuary 31, 2006, during licensed operator simulator training associated with Requalification Segment 20061 and described on simulator exercise guide V-RQ-SE-06101. The simulator scenario covered operator actions resulting from a loss of class 1E 125-V DC followed by a turbine runback and a loss of all AC power.


Procedures reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors specifically assessed the following areas:Correct use of the abnormal and emergency operating proceduresAbility to identify and implement appropriate actions in accordance with therequirements of the Technical Specifications (TSs)Clarity and formality of communications in accordance with procedure 10000-C,Conduct of OperationsProper control board manipulations including critical operator actionsQuality of supervisory command and controlEffectiveness of post-evaluation critiqueb.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified. {{a|1R23}}


3Enclosure1R12Maintenance Effectivenessa.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed one equipment problem and one system-oriented issue toevaluate the effectiveness of the licensee's handling of equipment performance problems and to verify that the licensee's maintenance efforts met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and licensee procedure 50028-C, Engineering Maintenance Rule Implementation. The reviews included adequacy of the licensee's failure characterization, establishment of performance criteria or 50.65 (a)(1)performance goals, and adequacy of corrective actions. Other documents reviewed during this inspection included control room logs, system health reports, themaintenance rule database, and maintenance work orders (MWOs). Also, the inspectors interviewed system engineers and the maintenance rule coordinator toassess the accuracy of identified performance deficiencies and extent of condition.
==1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications


Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.CR 2006103344, 1PV3000 Hydraulics Pressurization is not performing properlySystem Operability of the Unit 2 Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valves
====a. Inspection Scope====
==
The inspectors evaluated the listed Temporary Modification (TM) and associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening against the system design basis documentation and UFSAR to verify that the modification did not adversely affect the safety functions of important safety systems. In addition, the inspectors reviewed licensee procedure 00307-C, Temporary Modifications, to assess if the modification was properly developed and implemented.
* TM 2060265001, Installation of instrumentation on Unit 2 RHR suction isolation valve bypass line (2HV8701B and 2HV8702B)


====b. Findings====
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.
No findings of significance were identified.
{{a|1R13}}
==1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluationa.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the six following activities to verify that plant risk was properlyassessed by the licensee prior to conducting the activities.==
The inspectors reviewed risk assessments and risk management controls implemented for these activities to verify that they were completed in accordance with procedure 00354-C, Maintenance Scheduling, and 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). The inspectors also reviewed the CR database to verify that maintenance risk assessment problems were being identified at the appropriate level, entered into the corrective action program, and appropriately resolved.Unit 2 train B EDG outageUnit 2 train A EDG outageUnit 1 train B piping penetration ventilati on system outageUnit 2 train B CCP outageUnit 2 backup pressurizer heater maintenanceUnit 2 forced outage for Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system repairsb.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.


4Enclosure1R14Operator Performance During Non-Routine Plant Evolutionsa.Inspection ScopeFor the two non-routine plant evolutions described below, the inspectors reviewed theoperating crews' performance, operator logs, control board indications, and plant computer data to verify that operator response was in accordance with the associatedplant procedures. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.Unit 2 downpower to 30% for Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC) leak repair on maingenerator front standardUnit 2 shutdown to repair primary coolant boundary leakageb.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
===Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness===
{{a|1R15}}
1EP6 Drill Evaluation
==1R15 Operability Evaluationsa.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the five listed evaluations to verify that they met therequirements of NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, and NMP-002-GL02,==


Corrective Action Program Details and Expectations Guideline. This scope included a review of the technical adequacy of the evaluations, the adequacy of compensatory measures, and the impact on continued plant operation.DOEJ-06-19000 C V29-001, Operations with Nuclear Service Cooling Water spraybypass valve openCR 2006100473, Degraded o-rings in the steam generator atmospheric relief valve CR 2006102295, Incorrect assembly of unit 1 Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater(TDAFW) governor control linkage following maintenanceCR 2006101959 Part 21 affecting TDAFW governor operabilityCR 2006103105, Unit 2 train A CS pump, leak on motor cooler vent valveb.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
====a. Inspection Scope====
{{a|1R19}}
The inspectors observed and reviewed the emergency drill on March 1 to verify that the licensee was properly classifying emergency events, making the required notifications, and making appropriate protective action recommendations. The inspectors verified that classifications, notifications, and protective action recommendations were performed in accordance with procedures 91001-C, Emergency Classification and Implementing Instructions; 91002-C, Emergency Notifications; and 91305-C, Protective Action Guidelines. In addition, the inspectors attended the licensees post-drill critique to verify performance weaknesses and improvements were identified.
==1R19 Post-Maintenance Testinga.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors either observed post-maintenance testing or reviewed the test results forthe following five listed maintenance activities to verify that the testing met the==


requirements of procedure 29401-C, Work Order Functional Tests, for ensuring that equipment operability and functional capability were restored. The inspectors also 5Enclosurereviewed the test procedures to verify that the acceptance criteria was sufficient to meetthe TS operability requirements.
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.


MWO 20517449, Unit 2 train B EDG exhaust stack replacementDCP 20390005, Replace protective relays, 2B EDGMWO 20541594, Unit 2 train B CCP system maintenance outageMWO 20604876, Unit 2 train A containment spray pump motor cooler vent valvereplacementMWO 10600403, Plant Wilson blackstart diesel generator voltage regulatorreplacementb.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
==OTHER ACTIVITIES==
{{a|1R20}}
{{a|4OA1}}
==1R20 Refueling and Outage Activitiesa.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors performed the inspection activities described below for the two outagesto repair reactor coolant boundary leaks on Unit 2.==
The first outage was from February 3 through February 16, and the second outage was from March 20 through April 2.


Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.*Reviewed reactor cooling system (RCS) pressure, level, and temperature instrumentsto verify that the instruments provided accurate indication and that allowances were made for instrumentation errors*Reviewed the status and configuration of electrical systems to verify that thosesystems met TS requirements and the licensee's outage risk control plan*Observed decay heat removal parameters to verify that the system was properlyfunctioning and providing cooling to the core*Reviewed selected control room operations to verify that the licensee was controllingreactivity in accordance with the technical specifications*Reviewed the outage risk plan to verify that activities, systems, and/or components,which could cause unexpected reactivity changes, were identified in the outage risk plan and were controlled*Observed licensee control of containment penetrations to verify that the requirementsof the TSs were met*Reviewed the licensee's plans for changing plant configurations to verify that TSs,license conditions, and other requirements, commitments, and administrative procedure prerequisites were met prior to changing plant configurations*Toured containment prior to reactor startup to verify that debris had not been leftwhich could adversely impact the performance of the containment sumps and ECCS components 6Enclosureb.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
==4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification==
{{a|1R22}}
====a. Inspection Scope====
==1R22 Surveillance Testinga.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors reviewed the five listed surveillance test procedures and either observedthe testing or reviewed test results to verify that testing was conducted in accordance==
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the listed PIs during the period from January 1, 2005, through December 31, 2005, for Unit 1 and Unit 2. The inspectors verified the licensees basis in reporting each data element using the PI definitions and guidance contained in: procedures 00163-C, NRC Performance Indicator and Monthly Operating Report Preparation and Submittal, and 50025-C, Reporting of Mitigating System Performance Indicator Unavailability; and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Revision 2.


with the procedures and that the acceptance criteria adequately demonstrated that theequipment was operable. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the CR database to verify that the licensee had adequately identified and implemented appropriate correctiveactions for surveillance test problems. Documents reviewed are listed in the
Initiating Events Cornerstone
.Surveillance Tests13419-C, EDG 2B Extended Allowed Outage Time (AOT) Preparations14980A-1, EDG 1A Operability Test24568-1, RCP train A, Reactor Trip Underfrequency (281-A) and Undervoltage(227-A) Relays Trip Actuating Device Operational Test and Channel CalibrationIn-Service Tests14805-1, Unit 1 RHR Pump and Check Valve IST and Response Time Tests14805-2, Unit 2 RHR Pump and Check Valve IST and Response Time Testsb.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
* Unplanned Scrams per 7,000 Critical Hours
{{a|1R23}}
* Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat Removal
==1R23 Temporary Plant Modificationsa.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors evaluated the listed Temporary Modification (TM) and associated10 CFR 50.59 screening against the system design basis documentation and UFSAR toverify that the modification did not adversely affect the safety functions of important==
* Unplanned Power Changes per 7,000 Critical Hours The inspectors reviewed Licensee Event Reports (LERs), Unit 1 and Unit 2 operator log entries, the monthly operating reports, monthly PI summary reports, the maintenance rule database, and NRC inspection reports to verify that the licensee had accurately submitted the PI data.


safety systems. In addition, the inspectors reviewed licensee procedure 00307-C,Temporary Modifications, to assess if the modification was properly developed and implemented.*TM 2060265001, Installation of instrumentation on Unit 2 RHR suction isolation valvebypass line (2HV8701B and 2HV8702B)b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.
====b. Findings====
No findings of significance were identified.
{{a|4OA2}}
 
==4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems==
===.1 Daily Screening of Corrective Action Items===
As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees corrective action program. This review was accomplished by either attending daily screening meetings that briefly discussed major CRs, or accessing the licensees computerized corrective action database and reviewing each CR that was initiated.
 
{{a|4OA5}}
 
==4OA5 Other Activities==
===.1 Review of Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Evaluation Report===
The inspectors reviewed the results of an INPO evaluation of licensee performance conducted during December 2005. The report did not identify any significant licensee performance issues that had not been previously addressed and/or reviewed by the NRC.
 
{{a|4OA6}}


7EnclosureCornerstone:  Emergency Preparedness1EP6Drill Evaluationa.Inspection ScopeThe inspectors observed and reviewed the emergency drill on March 1 to verify that thelicensee was properly classifying emergency events, making the required notifications, and making appropriate protective action recommendations. The inspectors verified that classifications, notifications, and protective action recommendations were performed in accordance with procedures 91001-C, Emergency Classification and Implementing Instructions; 91002-C, Emergency Notifications; and 91305-C, Protective Action Guidelines. In addition, the inspectors attended the licensee's post-drill critiqueto verify performance weaknesses and improvements were identified.b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.4.OTHER ACTIVITIES4OA1Performance Indicator (PI) Verification
==4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit==
===1.===
===Exit Meeting Summary===
On April 13, 2006, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Tom Tynan and other members of his staff, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.


====a. Inspection Scope====
===2. Annual Assessment Meeting Summary===
The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the listed PIs during the period fromJanuary 1, 2005, through December 31, 2005, for Unit 1 and Unit 2. The inspectors verified the licensee's basis in reporting each data element using the PI definitions and guidance contained in:  procedures 00163-C, NRC Performance Indicator and MonthlyOperating Report Preparation and Submittal, and 50025-C, Reporting of Mitigating System Performance Indicator Unavailability; and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02,Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Revision 2.Initiating Events Cornerstone*Unplanned Scrams per 7,000 Critical Hours*Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat Removal
On March 29, the NRCs Acting Chief of Reactor Projects Branch 2 and Resident Inspector assigned to the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) met with Southern Nuclear Operating Company to discuss the NRCs Reactor Oversight Process (ROP)and the NRCs annual assessment of VEGP safety performance for the period of January 1, 2005 - December 31, 2005. The major topics addressed were: the NRCs assessment program and the results of the VEGP assessment. A listing of meeting attendees and information presented during the meeting are available from the NRCs document system (ADAMS) as accession number ML061020062. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.
*Unplanned Power Changes per 7,000 Critical HoursThe inspectors reviewed Licensee Event Reports (LERs), Unit 1 and Unit 2 operator logentries, the monthly operating reports, monthly PI summary reports, the maintenancerule database, and NRC inspection reports to verify that the licensee had accuratelysubmitted the PI data.b.FindingsNo findings of significance were identified.


8Enclosure4OA2Identification and Resolution of Problems.1Daily Screening of Corrective Action ItemsAs required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, andin order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensee's corrective action program. This review was accomplished by either attending daily screening meetings that briefly discussed major CRs, or accessing the licensee's computerized corrective action database and reviewing each CR that was initiated.4OA5Other Activities.1Review of Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Evaluation ReportThe inspectors reviewed the results of an INPO evaluation of licensee performanceconducted during December 2005. The report did not identify any significant licensee performance issues that had not been previously addressed and/or reviewed by the NRC.4OA6Meetings, Including Exit1.Exit Meeting SummaryOn April 13, 2006, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. TomTynan and other members of his staff, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.2.Annual Assessment Meeting SummaryOn March 29, the NRC's Acting Chief of Reactor Projects Branch 2 and ResidentInspector assigned to the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) met with SouthernNuclear Operating Company to discuss the NRC's Reactor Oversight Process (ROP)and the NRC's annual assessment of VEGP safety performance for the period ofJanuary 1, 2005 - December 31, 2005. The major topics addressed were:  the NRC'sassessment program and the results of the VEGP assessment. A listing of meeting attendees and information presented during the meeting are available from the NRC'sdocument system (ADAMS) as accession number ML061020062. ADAMS is accessiblefrom the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html
ATTACHMENT:  
.ATTACHMENT:


=SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION=
=SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION=


==KEY POINTS OF CONTACT==
==KEY POINTS OF CONTACT==
===Licensee personnel===
===Licensee personnel===
:
:
Line 117: Line 274:
: [[contact::S. Swanson]], Engineering Support Manager
: [[contact::S. Swanson]], Engineering Support Manager
: [[contact::R. Dedrickson]], Assistant General Manager - Operations
: [[contact::R. Dedrickson]], Assistant General Manager - Operations
===NRC personnel===
===NRC personnel===
:
:
Line 122: Line 280:
: [[contact::C. Rapp]], Acting Chief, Region II Reactor Project Branch 2 (2/20 - 3/3 and 3/20 - 3/31)
: [[contact::C. Rapp]], Acting Chief, Region II Reactor Project Branch 2 (2/20 - 3/3 and 3/20 - 3/31)
: [[contact::S. Freeman]], Acting Chief, Region II Reactor Project Branch 2 (3/6 - 3/17)
: [[contact::S. Freeman]], Acting Chief, Region II Reactor Project Branch 2 (3/6 - 3/17)
==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED==
==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED==
==Section 1R04: ==
 
: Equipment AlignmentProcedures14980B-2, Diesel Generator 1B Operability Test11145-2, Diesel Generator Alignment
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 09:28, 15 January 2025

IR 05000424-06-002 and 05000425-06-002, on March 31, 2006, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant
ML061110018
Person / Time
Site: Vogtle  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 04/20/2006
From: Scott Shaeffer
NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB2
To: Grissette D
Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
IR-06-002
Download: ML061110018 (15)


Text

April 20, 2006

SUBJECT:

VOGTLE ELECTRIC GENERATING PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000424/2006002 AND 05000425/2006002

Dear Mr. Grissette:

On March 31, 2006, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP), Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on April 13, 2006, with Mr. Tom Tynan and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel. Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Scott M. Shaeffer, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-424, 50-425 License Nos.: NPF-68, NPF-81

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000424/2006002 and 05000425/2006002 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket Nos.:

50-424, 50-425 License Nos.:

NPF-68, NPF-81 Report Nos.:

05000424/2006002 and 05000425/2006002 Licensee:

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Facility:

Vogtle Electric Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location:

7821 River Road Waynesboro, GA 30830 Dates:

January 1, 2006 through March 31, 2006 Inspectors:

G. McCoy, Senior Resident Inspector B. Anderson, Resident Inspector Approved by:

Scott M. Shaeffer, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 2 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000424/2006-002, 05000425/2006-002; 01/01/2006 - 03/31/2006; Vogtle Electric

Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2; Routine Integrated Report.

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by two resident inspectors. No findings of significance were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process,

Revision 3, dated July 2000.

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Licensee-Identified Violations

No findings of significance were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 operated at full rated thermal power (RTP) for the entire inspection period.

Unit 2 started the period at full RTP. On February 2, power was reduced to 30% RTP and the turbine taken off-line to repair a turbine control oil system leak. Repairs were complete later that same day and the unit returned to full RTP. On February 3, the unit was shutdown to repair a failed primary coolant system boundary weld. The unit was restarted on February 14 and operated at full RTP until March 20 when the unit was shutdown to repair another failed primary coolant system boundary weld. The unit remained shutdown at the end of the inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

==1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

Partial Walkdowns.==

The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of the three systems listed to verify correct system alignment. The inspectors checked for correct valve and electrical power alignments by comparing positions of valves, switches, and breakers to the procedures and drawings listed in the Attachment. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the condition report (CR) database to verify that equipment alignment problems were being identified and appropriately resolved.

C Unit 2 train B emergency diesel generator (EDG) during train A EDG maintenance C Unit 1 train B containment spray (CS) during train A CS pump maintenance C Unit 2 train A charging during train B centrifugal charging pump (CCP) maintenance

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

Fire Area Tours.==

The inspectors walked down the nine plant areas listed to verify that the licensee was controlling combustible materials and ignition sources as required by procedures 92015-C, Use, Control, and Storage of Flammable/Combustible Materials, and 92020-C, Control of Ignition Sources. The inspectors assessed the observable condition of fire detection, suppression, and protection systems and reviewed the licensees fire protection Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) log and CR database to verify that the corrective actions for degraded equipment were identified and appropriately prioritized. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees fire protection program to verify the requirements of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection Program, and Appendix 9A, Fire Hazards Analysis, were met. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

C Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater building C Unit 2 train A and B remote shutdown panel rooms C Unit 1 north main steam valve house C Unit 1 south main steam valve house C Unit 1 control building, level A, east penetration rooms C Unit 1 auxiliary building, level B, penetration room C Unit 2 train A and B containment spray rooms C Unit 2 train A diesel generator and day tank room C Unit 1 diesel generator tanks and pumphouse

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

Resident Quarterly Observation.==

The inspectors evaluated operator performance on January 31, 2006, during licensed operator simulator training associated with Requalification Segment 20061 and described on simulator exercise guide V-RQ-SE-06101. The simulator scenario covered operator actions resulting from a loss of class 1E 125-V DC followed by a turbine runback and a loss of all AC power.

Procedures reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The inspectors specifically assessed the following areas:

C Correct use of the abnormal and emergency operating procedures C Ability to identify and implement appropriate actions in accordance with the requirements of the Technical Specifications (TSs)

C Clarity and formality of communications in accordance with procedure 10000-C, Conduct of Operations C Proper control board manipulations including critical operator actions C Quality of supervisory command and control C Effectiveness of post-evaluation critique

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors reviewed one equipment problem and one system-oriented issue to evaluate the effectiveness of the licensees handling of equipment performance problems and to verify that the licensees maintenance efforts met the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and licensee procedure 50028-C, Engineering Maintenance Rule Implementation. The reviews included adequacy of the licensees failure characterization, establishment of performance criteria or 50.65 (a)(1)performance goals, and adequacy of corrective actions. Other documents reviewed during this inspection included control room logs, system health reports, the maintenance rule database, and maintenance work orders (MWOs). Also, the inspectors interviewed system engineers and the maintenance rule coordinator to assess the accuracy of identified performance deficiencies and extent of condition.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

C CR 2006103344, 1PV3000 Hydraulics Pressurization is not performing properly C System Operability of the Unit 2 Main Steam Atmospheric Relief Valves

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors reviewed the six following activities to verify that plant risk was properly assessed by the licensee prior to conducting the activities. The inspectors reviewed risk assessments and risk management controls implemented for these activities to verify that they were completed in accordance with procedure 00354-C, Maintenance Scheduling, and 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). The inspectors also reviewed the CR database to verify that maintenance risk assessment problems were being identified at the appropriate level, entered into the corrective action program, and appropriately resolved.

C Unit 2 train B EDG outage C Unit 2 train A EDG outage C Unit 1 train B piping penetration ventilation system outage C Unit 2 train B CCP outage C Unit 2 backup pressurizer heater maintenance C Unit 2 forced outage for Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system repairs

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R14 Operator Performance During Non-Routine Plant Evolutions

a. Inspection Scope

==

For the two non-routine plant evolutions described below, the inspectors reviewed the operating crews performance, operator logs, control board indications, and plant computer data to verify that operator response was in accordance with the associated plant procedures. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

C Unit 2 downpower to 30% for Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC) leak repair on main generator front standard C Unit 2 shutdown to repair primary coolant boundary leakage

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors reviewed the five listed evaluations to verify that they met the requirements of NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, and NMP-002-GL02, Corrective Action Program Details and Expectations Guideline. This scope included a review of the technical adequacy of the evaluations, the adequacy of compensatory measures, and the impact on continued plant operation.

C DOEJ-06-19000 C V29-001, Operations with Nuclear Service Cooling Water spray bypass valve open C CR 2006100473, Degraded o-rings in the steam generator atmospheric relief valve C CR 2006102295, Incorrect assembly of unit 1 Turbine-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) governor control linkage following maintenance C CR 2006101959 Part 21 affecting TDAFW governor operability C CR 2006103105, Unit 2 train A CS pump, leak on motor cooler vent valve

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors either observed post-maintenance testing or reviewed the test results for the following five listed maintenance activities to verify that the testing met the requirements of procedure 29401-C, Work Order Functional Tests, for ensuring that equipment operability and functional capability were restored. The inspectors also reviewed the test procedures to verify that the acceptance criteria was sufficient to meet the TS operability requirements.

C MWO 20517449, Unit 2 train B EDG exhaust stack replacement C DCP 20390005, Replace protective relays, 2B EDG C MWO 20541594, Unit 2 train B CCP system maintenance outage C MWO 20604876, Unit 2 train A containment spray pump motor cooler vent valve replacement C MWO 10600403, Plant Wilson blackstart diesel generator voltage regulator replacement

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R20 Refueling and Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors performed the inspection activities described below for the two outages to repair reactor coolant boundary leaks on Unit 2. The first outage was from February 3 through February 16, and the second outage was from March 20 through April 2.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

  • Reviewed reactor cooling system (RCS) pressure, level, and temperature instruments to verify that the instruments provided accurate indication and that allowances were made for instrumentation errors
  • Reviewed the status and configuration of electrical systems to verify that those systems met TS requirements and the licensees outage risk control plan
  • Observed decay heat removal parameters to verify that the system was properly functioning and providing cooling to the core
  • Reviewed selected control room operations to verify that the licensee was controlling reactivity in accordance with the technical specifications
  • Reviewed the outage risk plan to verify that activities, systems, and/or components, which could cause unexpected reactivity changes, were identified in the outage risk plan and were controlled
  • Observed licensee control of containment penetrations to verify that the requirements of the TSs were met
  • Reviewed the licensees plans for changing plant configurations to verify that TSs, license conditions, and other requirements, commitments, and administrative procedure prerequisites were met prior to changing plant configurations
  • Toured containment prior to reactor startup to verify that debris had not been left which could adversely impact the performance of the containment sumps and ECCS components

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors reviewed the five listed surveillance test procedures and either observed the testing or reviewed test results to verify that testing was conducted in accordance with the procedures and that the acceptance criteria adequately demonstrated that the equipment was operable. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the CR database to verify that the licensee had adequately identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions for surveillance test problems. Documents reviewed are listed in the

.

Surveillance Tests C 13419-C, EDG 2B Extended Allowed Outage Time (AOT) Preparations C 14980A-1, EDG 1A Operability Test C 24568-1, RCP train A, Reactor Trip Underfrequency (281-A) and Undervoltage (227-A) Relays Trip Actuating Device Operational Test and Channel Calibration In-Service Tests C 14805-1, Unit 1 RHR Pump and Check Valve IST and Response Time Tests C 14805-2, Unit 2 RHR Pump and Check Valve IST and Response Time Tests

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors evaluated the listed Temporary Modification (TM) and associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening against the system design basis documentation and UFSAR to verify that the modification did not adversely affect the safety functions of important safety systems. In addition, the inspectors reviewed licensee procedure 00307-C, Temporary Modifications, to assess if the modification was properly developed and implemented.

  • TM 2060265001, Installation of instrumentation on Unit 2 RHR suction isolation valve bypass line (2HV8701B and 2HV8702B)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed and reviewed the emergency drill on March 1 to verify that the licensee was properly classifying emergency events, making the required notifications, and making appropriate protective action recommendations. The inspectors verified that classifications, notifications, and protective action recommendations were performed in accordance with procedures 91001-C, Emergency Classification and Implementing Instructions; 91002-C, Emergency Notifications; and 91305-C, Protective Action Guidelines. In addition, the inspectors attended the licensees post-drill critique to verify performance weaknesses and improvements were identified.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee submittals for the listed PIs during the period from January 1, 2005, through December 31, 2005, for Unit 1 and Unit 2. The inspectors verified the licensees basis in reporting each data element using the PI definitions and guidance contained in: procedures 00163-C, NRC Performance Indicator and Monthly Operating Report Preparation and Submittal, and 50025-C, Reporting of Mitigating System Performance Indicator Unavailability; and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Revision 2.

Initiating Events Cornerstone

  • Unplanned Scrams per 7,000 Critical Hours
  • Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat Removal
  • Unplanned Power Changes per 7,000 Critical Hours The inspectors reviewed Licensee Event Reports (LERs), Unit 1 and Unit 2 operator log entries, the monthly operating reports, monthly PI summary reports, the maintenance rule database, and NRC inspection reports to verify that the licensee had accurately submitted the PI data.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

.1 Daily Screening of Corrective Action Items

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Identification and Resolution of Problems, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed a daily screening of items entered into the licensees corrective action program. This review was accomplished by either attending daily screening meetings that briefly discussed major CRs, or accessing the licensees computerized corrective action database and reviewing each CR that was initiated.

4OA5 Other Activities

.1 Review of Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) Evaluation Report

The inspectors reviewed the results of an INPO evaluation of licensee performance conducted during December 2005. The report did not identify any significant licensee performance issues that had not been previously addressed and/or reviewed by the NRC.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

1.

Exit Meeting Summary

On April 13, 2006, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Tom Tynan and other members of his staff, who acknowledged the findings. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

2. Annual Assessment Meeting Summary

On March 29, the NRCs Acting Chief of Reactor Projects Branch 2 and Resident Inspector assigned to the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant (VEGP) met with Southern Nuclear Operating Company to discuss the NRCs Reactor Oversight Process (ROP)and the NRCs annual assessment of VEGP safety performance for the period of January 1, 2005 - December 31, 2005. The major topics addressed were: the NRCs assessment program and the results of the VEGP assessment. A listing of meeting attendees and information presented during the meeting are available from the NRCs document system (ADAMS) as accession number ML061020062. ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

R. Brown, Training and Emergency Preparedness Manager
C. Buck, Chemistry Manager
J. Robinson, Operations Manager
K. Dyar, Security Manager
T. Tynan, Nuclear Plant General Manager
I. Kochery, Health Physics Manager
J. Williams, Assistant General Manager - Plant Support
S. Swanson, Engineering Support Manager
R. Dedrickson, Assistant General Manager - Operations

NRC personnel

M. Widmann, Chief, Region II Reactor Project Branch 2 (1/1 - 2/19)
C. Rapp, Acting Chief, Region II Reactor Project Branch 2 (2/20 - 3/3 and 3/20 - 3/31)
S. Freeman, Acting Chief, Region II Reactor Project Branch 2 (3/6 - 3/17)

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED