ML061700510

IR 05000458-06-011 on 05/03/2006 - 05/10/2006 for River Bend Station; Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

ML061700510
Person / Time
Site:	River Bend
Issue date:	06/19/2006
From:	Howell A NRC/RGN-IV/DRP
To:	Hinnenkamp P Entergy Operations
References
EA-06-103 IR-06-011
Download: ML061700510 (26)

See also: IR 05000458/2006011

Text

June 19, 2006

EA-06-103

Paul D. Hinnenkamp

Vice President - Operations

Entergy Operations, Inc.

River Bend Station

5485 US Highway 61N

St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775

SUBJECT:

RIVER BEND STATION - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000458/2006011;

PRELIMINARY WHITE FINDING

Dear Mr. Hinnenkamp:

On May 10, 2006, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at

your River Bend Station. The purpose of the inspection was to assess the impact that the

removal of seismic monitor instrumentation from service had on the ability of River Bend Station

personnel to make an accurate and timely emergency action level classification following a

seismic event. The enclosed inspection report documents an inspection finding which was

discussed on May 10, 2006, with you and other members of your staff.

The report discusses a finding that appears to have low to moderate safety significance. As

described in Section 1EP04 of this report, this issue involved a failure to ensure that adequate

preplanned measures were in place to ensure accurate and timely emergency classification

using seismic activity emergency action levels during periods when seismic monitoring

instrumentation was out of service at various times in 2004 and 2005. With certain seismic

monitor instrumentation removed from service, the River Bend Station Emergency Plan would

not provide adequate direction to station personnel to declare a Site Area Emergency following

a seismic event. This finding was assessed based on the best available information using the

applicable Significance Determination Process and was preliminarily determined to be a White

finding.

This finding does not present a current safety concern because your staff returned the seismic

monitors to an operable condition. Additionally, your staff issued Standing Order 194 on

April 11, 2006, which provided preplanned measures for implementing the Emergency Plan

emergency action levels should the seismic monitors be removed from service.

This finding is also an apparent violation of NRC requirements and is being considered for

escalated enforcement action in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The

current enforcement policy is included on the NRCs website at

http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/regulatory/enforcement.html.

Entergy Operations, Inc.

- 2 -

Before the NRC makes a final decision on this matter, we are providing you an opportunity to:

(1) present to the NRC your perspectives on the facts and assumptions, used by the NRC to

arrive at the finding and its significance, at a Regulatory Conference or (2) submit your position

on the finding to the NRC in writing. We note that a position paper was provided to the NRC on

April 18, 2006, related to the safety significance and regulatory considerations associated with

this issue. The NRC will consider this information prior to making a final decision on this

matter. If you request a Regulatory Conference, it should be held within 30 days of the receipt

of this letter and we encourage you to submit any additional supporting documentation at least

one week prior to the conference in an effort to make the conference more efficient and

effective. If a Regulatory Conference is held, it will be open for public observation. If you

decide to submit only a written response, such submittal should be sent to the NRC within

30 days of the receipt of this letter.

Regardless of the method you select to present your position on this matter, we request that

you specifically discuss the procedures that existed at River Bend Station, the training provided

to Operations Shift Managers and Emergency Directors, and the specific methods (including

data sources) that would be utilized by personnel to make an accurate and timely emergency

action level classification following a seismic event during the periods that seismic monitoring

instrumentation was out of service.

Please contact Mr. Kriss Kennedy at (817) 860-8144 within 10 business days of the date of this

letter to notify the NRC of your intentions. If we have not heard from you within 10 days, we will

continue with our significance determination and enforcement decision and you will be advised

by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.

Since the NRC has not made a final determination in this matter, no Notice of Violation is being

issued for the inspection finding at this time. In addition, please be advised that the

characterization of the apparent violation described in the enclosed inspection report may

change as a result of further NRC review.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its

enclosure, and your response will be made available electronically for public inspection in the

NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of

NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them

with you.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Arthur T. Howell III, Director

Division of Reactor Projects

Entergy Operations, Inc.

- 3 -

Docket: 50-458

License: NPF-47

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 05000458/2006001

w/attachments

cc w/enclosure:

Senior Vice President and

Chief Operating Officer

Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box 31995

Jackson, MS 39286-1995

Vice President

Operations Support

Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box 31995

Jackson, MS 39286-1995

General Manager

Plant Operations

Entergy Operations, Inc.

River Bend Station

5485 US Highway 61N

St. Francisville, LA 70775

Director - Nuclear Safety

Entergy Operations, Inc.

River Bend Station

5485 US Highway 61N

St. Francisville, LA 70775

Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway

P.O. Box 651

Jackson, MS 39205

Winston & Strawn LLP

1700 K Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20006-3817

Manager - Licensing

Entergy Operations, Inc.

River Bend Station

5485 US Highway 61N

St. Francisville, LA 70775

Entergy Operations, Inc.

- 4 -

The Honorable Charles C. Foti, Jr.

Attorney General

Department of Justice

State of Louisiana

P.O. Box 94005

Baton Rouge, LA 70804-9005

H. Anne Plettinger

3456 Villa Rose Drive

Baton Rouge, LA 70806

Bert Babers, President

West Feliciana Parish Police Jury

P.O. Box 1921

St. Francisville, LA 70775

Richard Penrod, Senior Environmental

Scientist

Office of Environmental Services

Northwestern State University

Russell Hall, Room 201

Natchitoches, LA 71497

Brian Almon

Public Utility Commission

William B. Travis Building

P.O. Box 13326

1701 North Congress Avenue

Austin, TX 78711-3326

Chairperson

Denton Field Office

Chemical and Nuclear Preparedness

and Protection Division

Office of Infrastructure Protection

Preparedness Directorate

Dept. of Homeland Security

800 North Loop 288

Federal Regional Center

Denton, TX 76201-3698

Entergy Operations, Inc.

- 5 -

Electronic distribution by RIV:

Regional Administrator (BSM1)

DRP Director (ATH)

DRS Director (DDC)

DRS Deputy Director (RJC1)

Senior Resident Inspector (PJA)

Branch Chief, DRP/C (KMK)

Senior Project Engineer, DRP/C (WCW)

Team Leader, DRP/TSS (RLN1)

RITS Coordinator (KEG)

DRS STA (DAP)

S. O'Connor, OEDO RIV Coordinator (SCO)

ROPreports

RBS Site Secretary (LGD)

W. A. Maier, RSLO (WAM)

K. S. Fuller, RC/ACES (KSF)

M. R. Johnson, D:OE (MRJ1)

OE:EA File (RidsOeMailCenter)

SUNSI Review Completed: ______ ADAMS: G Yes

G No Initials: ______

Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive

Non-Sensitive

R:\\_REACTORS\\_RBS\\2006\\RB2006-011RP-PJA.wpd

RIV:RI

SRI

C:DRS/OB

Senior Enf. Spec.

C:DRP/C lD:DRP

MOMiller

PJAlter

ATGody

GMVasquez

KMKennedy lATHowell III

T - KMK

E - KMK

/RA/

E - MHaire

/RA/ l /RA/

6/19/06

6/19/06

6/15/06

6/19/06

6/15/06 l6/19/06

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax

Enclosure

-1-

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket:

50-458

License:

NPF-47

Report:

05000458/2006011

Licensee:

Entergy Operations, Inc.

Facility:

River Bend Station

Location:

5485 U.S. Highway 61

St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775

Dates:

May 3-10, 2006

Inspectors:

P. Alter, Senior Resident Inspector, Project Branch C

M. Miller, Resident Inspector, Project Branch C

Approved By:

K. M. Kennedy

Chief, Project Branch C

Enclosure

-2-

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000458/2006011; 05/03/2006 - 05/10/2006; River Bend Station; Emergency Action Level

and Emergency Plan Changes

The report documents the NRCs inspection of the impact that the removal of seismic monitor

instrumentation from service had on the ability of River Bend Station personnel to make an

accurate and timely emergency action level classification following a seismic event. During this

inspection, a finding was identified which was preliminarily determined to be of low to moderate

safety significance (White). The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green,

White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination

Process. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power

reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July

2000.

A.

NRC-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

TBD. An apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q) was identified for the licensees failure

to ensure that adequate preplanned measures for Emergency Plan Emergency Action

Levels were in place when seismic monitoring instrumentation was out of service at

various times in 2004 and 2005. The seismic monitoring equipment was required to

ensure the prompt implementation of the River Bend Emergency Plan as required by

10 CFR 50.54(q) and the risk significant planning standard function,10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as

CR-RBS-2006-01283.

The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality

attribute of the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone objective to ensure that the

licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety

of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Utilizing the Failure to Comply

flow chart in Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B, Emergency Preparedness Significance

Determination Process, the inspectors determined that the finding was a failure to

comply with an NRC requirement and was a Risk-Significant Planning Standard

Problem involving a degraded Risk-Significant Planning Standard Function. The

performance deficiency represents a degraded risk-significant planning standard

function in that, during the periods that Reactor Mat Response Spectrum Recorder

ERS-NBR2D or Free Field Seismic Trigger ERS-NBS4A were out of service, an existing

Site Area Emergency emergency action level would not be declared. Based on the

results of this evaluation, the finding was preliminarily determined to be of low to

moderate safety significance (Section 1EP04).

Enclosure

-3-

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status: The plant was shut down for Refueling Outage 13 during this

inspection.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP04 Emergency Action Level (EAL) and Emergency Plan Changes

a.

Inspection Scope

On January 15, 2006, during a review of a seismic monitor surveillance performed on

November 10, 2005, conducted in accordance with Surveillance Test Procedure STP-

557-4209, Seismic Monitoring - Reactor BLDG MAT EL 70' 0", Triaxial Response

Spectrum Recorder Channel Calibration Test (ERS-NBR2D, ERS-NBI101),

Revision 07D, the inspectors noted that the procedure required removal of Reactor Mat

Response Spectrum Recorder ERS-NBR2D from service. Reactor Mat Response

Spectrum Recorder ERS-NBR2D provides input to Control Room Annunciator P680-

02A-B06, Seismic Event High-High. This annunciator, in turn, is an initiating condition

listed in Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure EIP-2-001, Classification of

Emergencies, Revision 12, Attachment 3, Alert, EAL 14, Severe Natural Phenomena

Experienced Beyond Notification of Unusual Event Levels, and Attachment 4, Site

Area Emergency, EAL 13, Severe Natural Event Near Site Being Experienced or

Projected with Plant Not in Cold Shutdown.

The inspectors observed that the test procedure did not require, and the licensee had

not taken any actions to ensure that, with Reactor Mat Response Spectrum Recorder

ERS-NBR2D removed from service, the emergency response organization could identify

the initiating conditions for an Alert or Site Area Emergency in an accurate and timely

manner.

As a result of these observations, the inspectors reviewed work control records and

control room and Technical Specification log entries for similar instances when seismic

monitoring instruments were removed from service. The inspectors reviewed the River

Bend Station Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EIP) to

determine what actions should have been taken, reviewed condition reports (CRs), and

questioned operators and members of the emergency preparedness staff with respect

to the consequences of removing these instruments from service.

b.

Findings

Introduction: The inspectors identified an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q) and

10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) for the failure of the licensee to ensure that adequate preplanned

measures were in place for the accurate and timely classification of Emergency Plan

EALs during periods when seismic monitoring instrumentation was out of service in

2004 and 2005.

Enclosure

-4-

Description: River Bend Station Procedure EIP-2-001, Classification of Emergencies,

Revision 12, described the initiating conditions under which seismic activity would

require the declaration of a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE), Alert, or Site Area

Emergency (SAE). The initiating conditions for the various EALs related to seismic

events, and the seismic monitors that provide input to the indications, are listed below:

Emergency Action Level

Initiating Condition

Seismic Monitor Input

Notification of Unusual Event

Unusual Natural Events

Near Site

Receipt of annunciators

Seismic Event High

(P680-02A-C06)

AND

Seismic Tape Recording

System Start

(P680-02A-D06)

Reactor Mat Seismic

Switch ERS-NBS4B

Free Field Seismic

Trigger ERS-NBS4A

Alert

Severe Natural

Phenomena Experienced

Beyond Notification of

Unusual Event Levels

Receipt of annunciators

Seismic Event High-High

(P680-02A-B06)

AND

Seismic Tape Recording

System Start

(P680-02A-D06)

AND

Amber light(s) on Panel

NBI-101

Reactor Mat Response

Spectrum Recorder

ERS-NBR2D

Free Field Seismic

Trigger ERS-NBS4A

Reactor Mat Response

Spectrum Recorder

ERS-NBR2D

Site Area Emergency

Severe Natural Event

Near Site Being

Experienced or Projected

With Plant Not in Cold

Shutdown

Receipt of annunciators

Seismic Event High-High

(P680-02A-B06)

AND

Seismic Tape Recording

System Start

(P680-02A-D06)

AND

Red light(s) on Panel

NBI-101

Reactor Mat Response

Spectrum Recorder

ERS-NBR2D

Free Field Seismic

Trigger ERS-NBS4A

Reactor Mat Response

Spectrum Recorder

ERS-NBR2D

The inspectors found that the licensee had removed seismic monitoring instrumentation

from service on numerous occasions during 2004 and 2005 without providing adequate

measures for the Operations Shift Manager, as Emergency Director, to assess plant

Enclosure

-5-

conditions against the criteria in EIP-2-001, Classification of Emergencies,

Revision 12, for determining the appropriate EAL for a seismic event.

From January 19 to August 26, 2004, Free Field Seismic Trigger ERS-NBS4A was out

of service for 216 days over a period of 220 days because of the planned demolition of

concrete. Free Field Seismic Trigger ERS-NBS4A provides input to the Seismic Tape

Recording System Start (P680-02A-D06) annunciator. (The seismic Tape Recording

System records the output signals from four seismic accelerometers for postevent

playback and analysis.) Thus, with this instrument out of service, the Operations Shift

Manager could not have determined if a seismic event met the criteria for declaring a

NOUE, Alert, or SAE using Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure EIP-2-001,

Classification of Emergencies, Revision 12, Attachment 2, Notification of Unusual

Event; Attachment 3, Alert; or Attachment 4, Site Area Emergency. During this

period that Free Field Seismic Trigger ERS-NBS4A was out of service, Reactor Mat

Response Spectrum Recorder ERS-NBR2D was also out of service for a total of

20 days because of a planned surveillance in one instance and an instrument

malfunction in another. Reactor Mat Response Spectrum Recorder ERS-NBR2D

provides input to the Seismic Event High-High (P680-02A-B06) annunciator and the

amber and red lights on Panel NBI-101. Thus, with this instrument out of service, the

Operations Shift Manager could not have determined if a seismic event met the criteria

for declaring an Alert or SAE using Procedure EIP-2-001, Classification of

Emergencies, Revision 12, Attachment 3, Alert or Attachment 4,Site Area

Emergency.

From July 29 to September 22, 2004, Reactor Mat Seismic Switch ERS-NBS4B was out

of service for 35 days over a period of 55 days due to a failed surveillance in one

instance and the discovery that a wrong part had been installed in another instance.

Reactor Mat Seismic Switch ERS-NBS4B provides input to the Seismic Event High

(P680-02A-C06) annunciator. Thus, with this instrument out of service, the Operations

Shift Manager could not have determined if a seismic event met the criteria for declaring

a NOUE using Procedure EIP-2-001, Classification of Emergencies, Revision 12,

Attachment 2, Notification of Unusual Event.

The inspectors also found that between January 17 and March 2, 2005, Free Field

Seismic Trigger ELS-NBS4A was out of service for 32 days in a 44-day period for

maintenance; Reactor Mat Response Spectrum Recorder ERS-NBR2D was out of

service for 16 days from October 25 to November 10, 2005, for a surveillance; and

Reactor Mat Seismic Switch ERS-NBS4B was out of service for 22 days from

February 8, 2005, to March 2, 2005, for a surveillance.

The inspectors determined that the River Bend Station Emergency Plan did not provide

adequate instructions to the Operations Shift Manager or Emergency Director to make

an accurate and timely EAL classification following a seismic event during the periods

that seismic monitoring instrumentation was out of service. The inspectors noted,

however, that each time the seismic monitoring instruments were out of service, the

operators entered the appropriate Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Limiting

Condition for Operation. Technical Requirement 3.3.7.5, Seismic Monitoring

Instrumentation, required that, with one or more seismic monitoring instruments

Enclosure

-6-

inoperable, actions be taken within 30 days to restore the affected monitor to operable

status. If the affected instrument was not returned to service within 30 days, then

Technical Requirement 3.3.7.5 directed personnel to initiate action to prepare an

appropriate deficiency document. CR-RBS-2004-00823 was written on March 17, 2004,

to document the inoperability of Free Field Seismic Trigger ERS-NBS4A. The condition

report did not identify the impact that the inoperable instrument had on implementation

of the River Bend Station Emergency Plan, and did not require any actions related to the

condition. CR-RBS-2004-02712 was written on September 18, 2004, to document the

inoperability of Reactor Mat Seismic Switch ERS-NBS4B. The CR did not identify the

impact that the inoperable instrument had on implementation of the River Bend Station

Emergency Plan and did not require any actions related to the condition.

Based on a review of licensee training material and interviews with plant personnel, the

inspectors determined that Operations Shift Managers and Emergency Directors had

not received training on how to implement the River Bend Station Emergency Plan and

properly classify seismic events in a timely manner during periods when the seismic

monitors were out of service. In addition, licensee procedures did not provide specific

instructions on what criteria the Operations Shift Manager or Emergency Director should

utilize to classify a seismic event during periods when seismic monitoring was out of

service. The inspectors noted that personnel were not trained, nor direction provided,

on methods to assess the magnitude of a seismic event during periods when seismic

monitor Recorder ERS-NBR2D was out of service. The correlation between an

Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE, ground acceleration of 0.05 g) and an Alert, and a

Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE, ground acceleration of 0.1 g) and a SAE was not

explained in licensee procedures. The licensee informed the inspectors that they

believed there was sufficient guidance provided in the River Bend Station alarm

response procedures, surveillance procedures, and Procedure EIP-02-001 (allowing the

Emergency Director to use his own judgment in assessing plant conditions against the

Emergency Plan EAL schemes) for the Operations Shift Manager or Emergency

Director to make an accurate and timely event classification during the periods that

these instruments were out of service. However, based on inspector interviews, three

shift managers were unable to demonstrate that they would make the correct event

classification if Recorder ERS-NBR2D was out of service.

The inspectors noted that NRC Information Notice 2005-19, Effect of Plant

Configuration Changes on the Emergency Plan, issued on July 18, 2005, described

instances in which licensees failed to properly evaluate the effect of plant configuration

changes (procedures, equipment, and facilities) on the Emergency Plan, including the

failure to identify the impact of equipment deficiencies on the Emergency Plan. The

Notice stated that Site configuration changes should be evaluated to ensure that the

licensee continuously maintains the ability to implement an effective emergency plan.

Configuration changes that impact the ability of a site to implement its emergency plan

need to be evaluated to determine the impact and, if necessary, to implement

compensatory measures. The inspectors reviewed the licensees evaluation of NRC

Information Notice 2005-19 documented in CR LO-OPX-2005-00241, Corrective

Action 6. The licensees evaluation concluded that their plant modification process and

procedure change process provided a cross-discipline review, including the emergency

Enclosure

-7-

preparedness organization, for any permanent plant equipment or procedure change.

However, the licensees evaluation did not address instances in which equipment was

out of service for other planned or unplanned reasons.

The inspectors reviewed Condition Report LO-OPX-2004-00224, initiated on

October 11, 2004, in which the licensee documented their evaluation of an emergency

preparedness peer group recommendation that licensees evaluate conditions when

instruments used to determine EALs are temporarily out of service for extended periods

of time. Specific reference was made to an NRC finding at another site that a licensee

removed a seismic monitor from service without evaluating its impact on the seismic

event EAL classification scheme. In their evaluation, River Bend Station personnel

stated that operators routinely contact the emergency preparedness staff when

performing an operability and reportability review for CRs or when reviewing

maintenance requests associated with equipment used to implement the Emergency

Plan, and that significant equipment outages are identified and compensatory actions

are built into the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, as needed. The inspectors

noted that neither of these actions were taken during the periods that seismic monitoring

instrumentation was out of service during the periods previously described.

In response to this finding, the licensee wrote Condition Report CR-RBS-2006-01283.

The licensee stated that they did not agree with the inspectors characterization of the

issue and did not believe a violation of regulatory requirements had occurred. The

licensee documented their position in Regulatory Position Regarding Seismic

Monitoring Instrumentation Allowed Outage Time, and provided a copy to the

inspectors. The licensees position paper is attached to this report.

In their position paper, the licensee concluded that they were confident that operators

would implement existing site procedures, evaluate available seismic instruments, be

sensitive to physical parameters, request site engineering assistance, and call upon

offsite seismology resources enabling the station to determine the magnitude of an

event and permit classification. They also believed that past performance served as

validation, using existing Alarm Response Procedures, shift briefings, and physical

indications of a seismic event, that appropriate actions would be taken to protect the

plant as well as the health and safety of the public.

In their paper, the licensee stated that a seismic event is by nature a self-revealing

event that the operators would have adequate indication of seismic activity and there

would be alarms in the control room for oscillating pool levels. The Operations Shift

Manager would then consult the seismic monitor alarm response procedures for the

disabled instruments and would be directed to Procedure STP-557-3700, Seismic

Event Report, where guidance is given to consult with the National Earthquake

Information Center. The Operations Shift Manager would then use the information

provided to assess the severity of the seismic activity against the criteria for the Alert

and SAE EALs.

In response to the inspectors observations, the licensee contacted the National

Earthquake Information Center and found that the information provided by the Center on

the magnitude of seismic activity would be for the seismic epicenter location based on

Enclosure

-8-

the Richter Scale, which was not easily correlated to ground motion acceleration at

River Bend Station. The inspectors also noted that there was no direct correlation

between actual ground motion acceleration and the seismic event EALs in either

Procedure EIP-02-001 or the seismic monitor alarm response procedures. In order for

the Operations Shift Manager to make this correlation, he would have to know that the

Alert EAL corresponds to an OBE and that an SAE corresponds to an SSE. He would

then have to look up the definitions of OBE and SSE in the Updated Safety Analysis

Report (USAR) and relate that data to the information provided from the National

Earthquake Information Center. The inspectors determined that this effort would not

meet the requirements of Emergency Plan Section 13.3.7, Maintaining Emergency

Preparedness, which states, in part, The EIPs contain detailed information extracted

from this plan and other pertinent documents. These procedures will enable station

personnel to implement this plan and take proper action without referral to numerous

documents. On April 11, 2006, Standing Order 194 was issued to provide specific

guidance for the Operations Shift Managers to contact the National Earthquake

Information Center following sensed seismic activity when the required seismic monitors

were out of service and how to interpret the information provided with respect to the

seismic event EAL criteria in Procedure EIP-2-001.

In their paper, the licensee stated that River Bend Station TRM Section 3.3.7.2, provided

for a 30-day allowed outage time for the seismic monitoring instruments to perform

maintenance or be removed from service. The TRM did not provide any specific actions

to be taken while an instrument was out of service. The inspectors noted that the TRM

action statement does not obviate the need to comply with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The

licensee also documented that the NRC has stated in Emergency Planning Position 1,

dated June 1, 1995, that Standard technical specifications allow a plants seismic

monitoring system to be out of service for days. In addition, loss of instrumentation

does not represent a significant loss of assessment capability. The inspectors review

of Emergency Preparedness Position No. 1 found that the NRC was stating that

licensees could remove the requirement to enter a NOUE when seismic activity

assessment capability is lost due to instrumentation being out of service and that it did

not relate to the requirement to maintain the seismic event EAL scheme at all times,

particularly with respect to the ability to classify seismic events at the Alert or SAE level.

The licensees position paper also referenced Regulatory Guide 1.166, Pre-Earthquake

Planning and Immediate Nuclear Power Plant Operator Postearthquake Actions, dated

March 1997, which described a method for evaluating on-site seismic activity to

determine if an OBE has occurred when seismic instrumentation is not available. The

licensees position was that the NRC was acknowledging that seismic instrumentation

was permitted to be out of service. The inspectors reviewed the guidance provided by

Regulatory Guide 1.166 for evaluating whether an OBE had occurred and determined

that this guidance was provided to assist the licensee in determining whether or not the

plant was required to be shut down following seismic activity greater than OBE. It did

not provide guidance to assist licensees in making an accurate and timely emergency

classification following a seismic event. The inspectors also noted that this guidance

was not available in any station procedure, the USAR, or the Emergency Plan, and

operators had not been trained on its use.

Enclosure

-9-

Analysis: The failure to provide adequate measures and instructions to enable the

Operations Shift Manager or Emergency Director to make accurate and timely

emergency classifications during periods when seismic monitoring instrumentation was

out of service was determined to be a performance deficiency. The finding was more

than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the

Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone objective to ensure that the licensee is capable

of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the

event of a radiological emergency. The licensees failure to reliably classify seismic

events could result in the failure to adequately protect members of the public and

nonemergency workers at River Bend Station and impacts offsite authorities ability to

implement measures to protect the health and safety of the general public. Utilizing the

Failure to Comply flow chart in Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B, Emergency

Preparedness Significance Determination Process, the inspectors determined that the

finding was a failure to comply with an NRC requirement and was a Risk-Significant

Planning Standard Problem involving a degraded Risk-Significant Planning Standard

Function. The performance deficiency represents a degraded risk-significant planning

standard function in that, during the periods that Reactor Mat Response Spectrum

Recorder ERS-NBR2D or Free Field Seismic Trigger ERS-NBS4A were out of service,

an existing EAL would not be declared for a Site Area Emergency. As a result, the

finding was preliminarily determined to be of low to moderate safety significance

(White).

Enforcement: Title 10 CFR 50.54 (q) requires, in part, that a licensee shall follow and

maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the planning standards in

Section 50.47(b). Risk significant planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) requires that a

standard scheme of emergency classification and actions levels be in use. Contrary to

this, at various times in 2004 and 2005, the licensee failed to maintain a standard

scheme of emergency classification and action levels in use. Specifically, River Bend

Station failed to ensure that adequate preplanned measures were in place for evaluating

the Emergency Plan EALs when seismic monitoring instrumentation was out of service.

The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR-RBS-2006-

01283. On April 11, 2006, Standing Order 194 was issued as an interim measure to

provide specific guidance for the Operations Shift Managers to contact the National

Earthquake Information Center following seismic activity and how to interpret the

information provided against the seismic event EAL criteria of Procedure EIP-2-001,

Classification of Emergencies. This violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q), was identified as an

apparent violation (AV 05000458/2006011-01), Failure to Maintain a Standard Scheme

of Emergency Classification and Action Levels in Use.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On May 10, 2006, the inspectors presented the results of the inspection to Paul

Hinnenkamp, Vice President - Operations, and other members of his staff who

acknowledged the finding.

The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided by the licensee

during this inspection.

Enclosure

-10-

ATTACHMENTS:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

LICENSEE POSITION PAPER

Attachment

A1-1

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

P. Hinnenkamp, Vice President - Operations

R. King, Director, Nuclear Safety Assurance

J. Leavines, Manager, Emergency Planning

D. Lorfing, Manager, Licensing

J. Miller, Manager, Training and Development

C. Stafford, Manager, Operations

D. Vinci, General Manager - Plant Operations

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

05000458/2006011-01

AV

Failure to Maintain a Standard Scheme of Emergency

Classification and Action Levels in Use

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1EP04: Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes

Control Room Logs

Technical Specification (TRM) Entry Logs

Operations Standing Order 194, Interim Actions for a Seismic Event with Seismic

Instrumentation Out Of Service, dated April 11, 2006

STP-557-3700, Seismic Event Report, Revision 03A

STP-557-4209, Seismic Monitoring - Reactor BLDG MAT EL 70' 0", Triaxial Response

Spectrum Recorder Channel Calibration Test (ERS-NBR2D, ERS-NBI101), Revision 07D

Alarm Response Procedure, ARP-680-02, P680-02 Alarm Response, Revision 15A

EIP-2-001, Classification of Emergencies, Revision 12

River Bend Station Emergency Plan

River Bend Station USAR

System Training Manual - 557, Seismic Monitoring System

Attachment

A1-2

NRC Information Notice 2005-19, Effect of Plant Configuration Changes on the Emergency

Plan, dated July 18, 2005

Regulatory Guide 1.12, Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation for Earthquakes, dated March

1997

Regulatory Guide 1.166, Pre-Earthquake Planning and Immediate Nuclear Power Plant

Operator Post-Earthquake Actions, March 1997

NRC Emergency Preparedness Position on Acceptable Deviations from Appendix 1 of

NUREG 0654, based upon the Staffs Regulatory Analysis of NUMARC/NESP-007,

Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels, dated June 1, 1995

Condition Reports

CR-RBS-2006-01283

CR-RBS-2004-00483

CR-RBS-2006-00337

CR-RBS-2004-00823

CR-RBS-1991-00510

CR-RBS-2002-00483

CR-RBS-2002-01723

CR-RBS-2004-02712

LO-OPX-2004-00142

LO-OPX-2004-00224

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AV

apparent violation

CR

condition report

EAL

emergency action level

EIP

emergency plan implementing procedure

NOUE

Notification of Unusual Event

OBE

operating basis earthquake

SAE

site area emergency

SSE

safe shutdown earthquake

TRM

Technical Requirements Manual

USAR

Updated Safety Analysis Report

Attachment

A2-1

Regulatory Position Regarding Seismic Monitoring Instrumentation Allowed

Outage Time

NRC has stated in an exit meeting that River Bend Station must have compensatory

measures in place whenever the station removes from service any of its seismic

monitoring equipment. Additionally, NRC stated that, Emergency Implementing

Procedures are inadequate in that the appropriate EAL cannot be determined when the

instrumentation is out of service given no compensatory action was implemented.

RBS is dedicated to fully and effectively implementing all elements of its Emergency

Plan and procedures. During this inspection activity, NRC has identified areas where

RBS believes enhancements could be made. RBS has improved the clarity and linkage

of existing information within our Alarm Response Procedures, Emergency

Implementing Procedures and Surveillance Test Procedures.

This position is being prepared to evaluate the regulatory implications of temporarily

removing seismic monitoring equipment from service at River Bend Station (RBS) as

allowed by TR 3.3.7.5 while complying with Required Action A.1. The stations

Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) requires the instruments to be removed from

service periodically for maintenance/testing.

RBS believes that the NRC positions referred to in this paper are taken with the

knowledge that the allowed outage time for the seismic monitoring system used for

Emergency Action Level (EAL) determination, would be subject to the requirements of a

licensees (RBS) TS or TRM.

Discussion

It should be recognized that a seismic event is by nature self-revealing and would

cause plant operators to immediately initiate actions to assess the event by all means

available. The Operating Bases Earthquake (OBE) and the Safe Shutdown Earthquake

(SSE) are such that instrumentation would not be the only means to determine that an

event of sufficient nature to be classified within the stations Emergency Action Level

scheme has occurred.

EIP-02-001, Revision 13, Classification of Emergencies provides the following

guidance:

q

Event Category N, Emergency Action Level 10 - Unusual natural events near

site (NOUE), Initiating Condition 1:

o

Receipt of annunciator Seismic Event High (P680-02A-C06) AND

o

Seismic Tape Recording System Start (P680-02A-DO6)

1 The National Earthquake Information Center and the USGS are essentially the same organization and can

be used interchangeably.

Attachment

A2-2

q

Event Category N, Emergency Action Level 14- Severe natural phenomenon

experienced beyond Notification of Unusual Event levels (ALERT), Initiating

Condition 1:

o

Receipt of annunciator Seismic Event High-High (P680-02A-B06) AND

o

Seismic Tape Recording System Start (P680-02A-D06) AND

o

Amber Light (s) on panel NBI-101

q

Event Category N, Emergency Action Level 13 - Severe Natural Event Near

Site Being Experienced or Projected with Plant Not in Cold Shutdown (SAE),

Initiating Condition 1:

o

Receipt of annunciator Seismic Event High-High (P680-02A-B06) AND

o

Seismic Tape Recording System Start (P680-02A-D06) AND

o

Red light (s) on panel NBI-101

This guidance provides the expected instrumentation that may indicate a seismic event

and allows classification of the event and in no way restricts the use of felt physical

indicators of an event.

Existing Alarm Response Procedures coupled with Surveillances, provide sufficient

information to enable the operators (Emergency Director) to contact the National

Earthquake Information Center1 and gain station engineering assistance as needed.

The National Earthquake Center will provide specific information relative to the

magnitude of an event to be used to aid in classification.

Additionally, Emergency Implementing Procedure, EIP-2-001, Classification of

Emergencies contains the following guidance to an Emergency Director:

For Emergency Action Levels based on plant instrumentation, the indication

shall be a valid indication. When all indications for a certain parameter have

been lost, the Emergency Director should use his best judgment and other plant

indications to classify the emergency (e.g., loss of level trend on all RPV level

instrumentation).

The station operations department past performance has demonstrated that the

expected behaviors related to seismic event response could reasonably be expected to

recur. For example, on November 3rd, 2002, the main control room received multiple

alarms related to the upper and lower Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pools (SFC). Alarms

were also received for high suppression pool water level. Upon further investigation, it

Attachment

A2-3

was discovered that an earthquake was experienced near McKinley Park, Alaska at

5:12 PM EST.

The effect of this earthquake at RBS was limited to oscillations on the surface of

holding tanks including the Suppression Pool, the Reactor Cavity/associated pools, and

the Spent Fuel Pool.

The entire plant was walked down with particular attention being paid to Safety-Related

systems. No abnormalities were found. The Seismic Monitoring System recorders did

not start and no 'Seismic' alarms were received in the Main Control Room; therefore,

the magnitude of this event was far less than the River Bend Operating Basis

Earthquake (OBE) and Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE). Based on the plant walk

down, absence of alarms, the Operability of plant equipment was not impacted by this

condition and no EAL was determined to require entry.

Other examples of appropriate operator response to seismic monitoring/events

demonstrate expected behavior; for example, Condition Report 2004-1630 details an

instance when Alarm Number 567, SEISMIC EVENT HIGH/HIGH was received.

Operators performed alarm response procedure actions (ARP), called the duty

Engineering Supervisor, and contacted the seismic lab at the National Earthquake

Information Center and verified that no seismic activity was recorded at St. Francisville,

Louisiana.

RBS concedes that the time to classify a seismic event may in some instances take

longer; however given the type of event, station procedures (ARPs, EIPs), available

seismic instrumentation, physical cues and National Earthquake Information Center

resources, the station would effectively implement appropriate EALs.

Position

The River Bend Station Emergency Plan and the implementing procedures were

approved by the NRC and all subsequent changes have received appropriate reviews

as required by regulations.

Subsection 50.47(b)(4) and Appendix E of 10 CFR Part 50 require licensees to develop

an emergency classification scheme whose purpose is to initiate a minimum set of

onsite and offsite emergency response actions commensurate with existing plant

conditions and the trend of those conditions. RBS has developed and implemented this

scheme.

Subsection 50.54(q) of 10 CFR Part 50 requires licensees to follow and maintain their

emergency plans which meet the standards in 50.47(b) and the requirements of

Appendix E. Thus, licensees are required to classify emergencies in accordance with

their approved emergency classification schemes.

2 NRCs position is that no specific time requirement exists to classify an event only that when indications

are available the event will be classified (generally within 15 minutes of access to indications).

3 EPPOS No. 2 dated August 1, 1995, Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS) on Timeliness of

Classification of Emergency Conditions.

4 Reg Guide 1.166, March 1997, Provides in Appendix A that it is acceptable to use felt indicators backed

by National Earthquake Information Center data.

Attachment

A2-4

RBS has implemented its Emergency Plan requirements relative to EALs in Emergency

Implementing Procedures (EIPs). EIP-2-001, Classification of Emergencies, contains

guidance for the Emergency Director to use if available primary instrumentation is out of

service. Specifically, Section 5.3 states:

For Emergency Action Levels based on plant instrumentation, the indication

shall be a valid indication. When all indications for a certain parameter have

been lost, the Emergency Director should use his best judgment and other plant

indications to classify the emergency (e.g., loss of level trend on all RPV level

instrumentation).

RBS recognizes that the declaration may be more complicated due to out of service

seismic instruments; however, the requirement to declare EALs ultimately will be

satisfied2. Below is an excerpt from NRC position3 stating clearly that the NRC staff

recognizes that no explicit regulatory requirement exists related to time to classify an

event and that availability of indications will start the time clock to classification:

Although the regulations do not provide an explicit time limit for classifying

emergencies, they do imply that classification should be made without delay. The

ultimate goal of the classification scheme is to ensure that emergency response

personnel and equipment are already in place if it becomes necessary to

implement actions to protect the public health and safety. Therefore, if

classification is not made promptly, following the availability of indications that an

emergency condition exists, the goal of the classification scheme is undermined

and the intent of the regulations would not be met.

The events in question (OBE and SSE) are of such a nature that instrumentation

would not be the only means to determine that a seismic event requiring

classification has occurred. The .05 g (OBE) event will be felt in the Main

Control Room, as will the .10 g (SSE) event. This is sufficient to trigger the

Operations Shift Manager (OSM) to pursue classification of the event even if the

instrumentation is out of service. This method of classification is recognized

within the more recent regulatory guidance provided to licensees as an

acceptable alternative4.

In the event the magnitude cannot be exactly determined, the EIP directs the

Emergency Director (ED) to use his best judgment in making an EAL determination. It

is reasonable to assume that the Alarm Response Procedures (ARP), physical

5 RBS System Training Manual provides instruction on how to classify seismic events given various

common measures of magnitude. Operators have been trained on this activity and the information is

readily available.

6 Regulatory Guide 1.166 dated 1997

Attachment

A2-5

indicators (felt motion, suppression pool wavelets, etc.) and training5 would be used to

estimate the size of the earthquake and an EAL selected.

The current Alarm Response Procedure provides information which will allow the OSM

to contact the Earthquake Center to assist in determining the magnitude of the event

(recognized in the license basis as off-site resources), at the site. The Center can

provide this information for the site in the form of a magnitude. Guidance exists in the

System Training Manual as to the comparison of the magnitude of an earthquake and

its associated range of ground acceleration values. Assistance from Engineering or

other sources could also be obtained to assess and classify the event.

Using newer NRC and industry guidance6, it is reasonable to conclude that the exact

magnitude of the event is not as important initially as the fact that an event did occur.

NRC has endorsed this new guidance that would expect actual determination of an

OBE to take up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or more. Therefore, this condition alone should not

constitute the inability to declare an EAL.

River Bend Station has implemented the Required Actions of TR 3.3.7.5 and is in full

compliance with its requirements. Historical NRC policies recognize that licensees will

take seismic monitoring equipment out of service in accordance with their license bases

and this is acceptable.

NRC Emergency Preparedness Position (EPPOS) on acceptable deviations from

Appendix 1 of NUREG-0654 based upon the staffs regulatory analysis of

NUMARC/NESP-007, Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels,

allows, among other things, the deletion of a NOUE classification for loss of seismic

instrumentation. The basis is that: Standard technical specifications allow a plants

seismic monitoring system to be out of service for days. In addition, loss of this

instrumentation does not represent a significant loss of assessment capability. These

statements link the out of service time for the seismic monitoring system used for EAL

determination, to the requirements of the current TRM section on seismic instruments

(formerly part of the Technical Specifications).

In view of the presented information, we believe that no regulatory basis exists for

issuance of a violation for this equipment having been out of service as allowed by the

Required Action time of TR 3.3.7.5. The NRC EPPOS establishes that the basis for

seismic monitoring instrumentation allowed outage time is the TRM as implemented by

RBS. Therefore, RBS does not believe that this would constitute a violation with a

significance of greater than green.

Regulatory Bases

Attachment

A2-6

EAL BASIS

Federal Regulations dictate that River Bend Station must develop and implement an

Emergency Plan.

Key regulatory requirements are provided below:

q

10CFR50.54 (q) A licensee authorized to possess and operate a nuclear power

reactor shall follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which meet the

standards in § 50.47(b) and the requirements in appendix E of this part [...]

q

10CFR50.47 (b) (4) A standard emergency classification and action level

scheme, the bases of which include facility system and effluent parameters, is in

use by the nuclear facility licensee, and State and local response plans call for

reliance on information provided by facility licensees for determinations of

minimum initial offsite response measures.

RBS responded to specific questions from NRC during their review of the stations

Emergency Plan (then a part of the SAR).

The station has implemented its Emergency Plan requirements relative to EALs in

Emergency Implementing Procedures (EIPs). EIP-2-001, Classification of

Emergencies, contains guidance for use by the Emergency Director if available primary

instrumentation is out of service. Specifically, Section 5.3 states

For Emergency Action Levels based on plant instrumentation, the indication

shall be a valid indication. When all indications for a certain parameter have

been lost, the Emergency Director should use his best judgment and other plant

indications to classify the emergency (e.g., loss of level trend on all RPV level

instrumentation).

Seismic Monitoring Basis

During initial licensing activities, NRC reviewed and approved the seismic monitoring

instruments at RBS. The depth of this review is evidenced by the questions and

answers some of which are provided below for demonstrative value.

River Bend Station FSAR Amendment 8 Question 810.32:

The plan does not adequately describe [] Geophysical phenomena monitors

(h.5.a) [] referred to in Section 13.3.6.3.1

Response:

7 USGS and National Earthquake Information Center are used interchangeably.

8 RBS USAR Section 3.7.4.1A states that seismic monitoring instrumentation complies with RG 1.12.

Attachment

A2-7

The response to this request is provided in revised Section 13.3.6.3.1.

Section 13.3.6.3.1, The seismic instrumentation at the station is utilized to

monitor and record [] complies with Regulatory Guide 1.12. []

Changes made were also included on Amendment 8, Table 13.3-8 listing the

monitors and their applicability.

River Bend Station FSAR Amendment 8 Question 810.33:

The capability to acquire or have access to offsite seismic and hydrological data

is not addressed. (H.6.a)

Response:

Seismic and hydrological data are available to GSU through the offices of the

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in New Orleans, Louisiana and the U. S.

Geological Survey7 in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

Allowed Outage Time as Applied to Seismic Monitoring

In Regulatory Guide 1.12, Revision 1, NRC provides a position requiring seismic

monitoring instrumentation. NRC goes on to state that Paragraph (c) of 10 CFR 50.36,

Technical Specifications, requires that the technical specifications include surveillance

requirements to assure that the necessary quality of systems and components is

maintained, that the facility operations will be within safety limits and that the limiting

conditions for operations (LCO) will be met. The 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A,

Seismic and Geological Siting Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants, also describes the

instrumentation acceptable to the Regulatory Staff. This scheme was implemented and

approved by NRC at RBS8.

Upon NRC approval, RBS implemented the Technical Specification 3.3.7.2, Seismic

Monitoring Instrumentation. An excerpt is below:

Limiting Condition for Operation

3.3.7.2 - The Seismic monitoring instrumentation shown in Table 3.3.7.2-1 shall

be operable.

ACTION:

a. With one or more of the above required seismic monitoring instruments

9 The relocation essentially moved the requirements from the Technical Specifications to the Technical

Requirements Manual unchanged.

10 RBS USAR Section 3.7.4A states that surveillance requirements for seismic instrumentation are listed

and controlled by the RBS Technical Requirements Manual (TRM).

11 EPPOS Number 1, dated June 1, 1995, This paper provides examples of some of the acceptable

changes that licensees may make based upon the staffs current understanding of the thresholds of the four

emergency classes.

Attachment

A2-8

inoperable for more than 30 days, prepare and submit within the next 10 days a

Special Report to the Commission, pursuant to Specification 6.9.2, outlining the

cause of the malfunction and the plans for restoring the instrument(s) to

OPERABLE status.

With implementation of Improved Technical Specifications, the station relocated the

seismic monitoring requirements to the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) with a

License Amendment Request (LAR). Below is the relocated specification discussion

approved by NRC9:

R.1 The seismic monitoring instrumentation provides information only and is not

considered in any design basis accident or transient. It does provide information

regarding the severity of an earthquake; however, the evaluation summarized in

NEDO-31466 determined the loss of this instrumentation to be a non-significant

risk contributor to core damage frequency and off-site release. Therefore, the

requirements specified for this function did not satisfy the NRC Interim Policy

Statement technical specification screening criteria as documented in the

Application of Selection Criteria to the RBS TS and have been relocated to plant

documents controlled in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59.

Given the Action Statement of the TS (now TRM), RBS has 30 days to perform

maintenance or otherwise take out of service the seismic monitors. Additionally, the

requirements allow separate entry for each channel. The TRM10 does not provide any

specified actions to be taken while an instrument is out of service.

Absent any specific regulatory guidance contained within the TRM, RBS reviewed

applicable NRC positions.

q

In EPPOS No. 111, NRC prepared a position providing guidance to the staff on

the acceptability of proposed emergency action level (EAL) revisions when those

revisions depart from the guidance in Appendix 1 of NUREG-0654.

Unusual Event #11 ...significant loss of assessment...all meteorological

instrumentation

Basis: Due to the shift in emphasis from classification based upon dose

assessment to classification based upon plant conditions [] For licensees who

have incorporated the loss of seismic monitoring instrumentation as an Unusual

12 RBS is not committed to this revision; however, this example clearly supports that NRC understands that

seismic monitors are at times out of service for various reasons; one of which would be per the TRM.

13 Modified Mercalli Intensity is based upon subjective criteria that are non-scientific; for example: people

awakening, furniture moving, damage to chimneys, etc. The data is gathered post-earthquake and

tabulated. The epicenter is where the observed intensity generally occurs (USGS sourced information).

Attachment

A2-9

Event, this EAL may also be eliminated. Standard technical specifications allow a

plants seismic monitoring system to be out of service for days. In addition, loss

of this instrumentation does not represent a significant loss of assessment

capability.

q

Regulatory Guide 1.12, Revision 2,12 Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation for

Earthquakes, dated March 1997, provides an additional data point that

demonstrates NRCs recognition that seismic monitors may be out of service.

SEE below:

An NRC staff evaluation of seismic instrumentation noted that instruments have

been out of service during plant shutdown and sometimes during plant operation

[] If the seismic instrumentation or data processing hardware and software

necessary to determine whether the OBE has been exceeded is inoperable, the

guidelines in Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.166 should be used []

Regulatory Guide 1.166, March 1997 states in Section 4.4:

Inoperable Instrumentation or Data Processing Hardware or Software

If the response spectrum and the CAV (Regulatory Positions 4.1 and 4.2) cannot

be obtained because the seismic instrumentation is inoperable, data from the

instrumentation are destroyed, or the data processing hardware or software is

inoperable, the criteria in Appendix A to this guide should be used to determine

whether the OBE has been exceeded.

Regulatory Guide 1.166, March 1997, Appendix A:

For plants at which no free-field or foundation-level instrumental data are

available, or the data processing equipment is inoperable [] the OBE will be

considered to have been exceeded and the plant must be shut down if one of the

following applies:

1. The earthquake resulted in Modified Mercalli Intensity13 (MMI) VI or greater

within 5 km of the plant,

2. The earthquake was felt within the plant and was of magnitude 6.0 or greater,

or

3. The earthquake was of magnitude 5.0 or greater and occurred within 200 km

of the plant.

A post earthquake plant walkdown should be conducted after the earthquake.

14 CR 2002-1723 - This Condition regards the effects felt at River Band Station from a Magnitude 7.9

earthquake near McKinley Park, Alaska. The effect of this earthquake at RBS was limited to oscillations on

the surface of holding tanks including the Suppression Pool, the Reactor Cavity and associated pools, and

the Spent Fuel Pool. The entire plant has been walked down, paying particular attention to all Safety-

Related systems. No abnormalities have been found. The Seismic Monitoring System did not start and no

'Seismic' alarms were received in the Main Control Room; therefore, the magnitude of this event was far

less than the River Bend Operating Basis Earthquake and Safe Shutdown Earthquake. Based on the plant

walk down, absence of alarms, the Operability of plant equipment is not indicted by this condition.

Attachment

A2-10

Note: The determinations of epicenter location, magnitude, and intensity by the

U.S. Geological Survey, National Earthquake Information Center, will usually

take precedence over other estimates; however, regional and local

determinations will be used if they are considered to be more accurate. Also,

higher quality damage reports or a lack of damage reports from the nuclear

power plant site or its immediate vicinity will take precedence over more distant

reports.

RBS believes that these referenced NRC positions are taken with the knowledge that

the allowed outage time for the seismic monitoring system used for EAL determination,

would be subject to the requirements of a licensees (RBS) TS or TRM. This then

establishes the TRM as the basis for allowed outage time.

Complying with TLCO 3.3.7.5, Condition A, Required Action A.1, instruments can be

out of service for up to 30 days (each channel). Should the need to exceed 30 days

arise, an appropriate action to be taken would be the initiation of a corrective action

document (CR).

Conclusion

RBS is confident that operators would implement existing site procedures (ARPs, EIPs,

STPs), evaluate available seismic instruments, be sensitive to physical parameters (felt

motion, tanks levels, pool level, etc.), request site engineering assistance, and call upon

offsite seismology resources enabling the station to determine the magnitude of an

event and permit classification.

Additionally, RBS believes that the stations past performance serves as validation that

using existing Alarm Response Procedures, TRM TLCO status (shift briefings), and

felt physical indicators of a seismic event, that appropriate actions will be taken to

protect the plant as well as the health and safety of the public. In 2002, operations

demonstrated that when suspected seismic events have occurred, they have called the

offsite seismic labs for validation14, initiated condition reports and have conducted

appropriate investigations to ensure plant and public safety.