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{{#Wiki_filter:January 18, 2007Mr. John Senior Vice President - Generation and Chief Nuclear Officer Pacific Gas and Electric Company P.O. Box 770000, Mail Code B32San Francisco, California 94177-0001 SUBJECT:NRC INSPECTION REPORT 050-00133/06-004
{{#Wiki_filter:January 18, 2007
 
==SUBJECT:==
NRC INSPECTION REPORT 050-00133/06-004


==Dear Mr. Keenan:==
==Dear Mr. Keenan:==
A special NRC inspection was conducted on December 18 - 22, 2006, at your Humboldt BayPower Plant Unit 3 facility. This inspection was an examination of activiti es conducted underyour license as they relate to safety and compliance of the Commission's rules and regulationsand with the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection included reviews ofyour solid radioactive waste management and transportation of radioactive materials. OnDecember 22, 2006, at the conclusion of the site visit, an exit briefing was conducted with Mr.Terry Nelson, Plant Manager, and other members of your staff. The enclosed report presentsthe scope and results of that inspection. The inspection determined that you were conductingdecommissioning activities in compliance with regulatory and license requirements. In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, itsenclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available electronically for pub lic inspectionin the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's document system (ADAMS), accessiblefrom the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/Adams.html. To the extent possible,your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards informationso that it can be made available to the public without redaction. Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, please contact the undersigned at(817) 860-8191 or Emilio M.
A special NRC inspection was conducted on December 18 - 22, 2006, at your Humboldt Bay Power Plant Unit 3 facility. This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance of the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection included reviews of your solid radioactive waste management and transportation of radioactive materials. On December 22, 2006, at the conclusion of the site visit, an exit briefing was conducted with Mr.
 
Terry Nelson, Plant Manager, and other members of your staff. The enclosed report presents the scope and results of that inspection. The inspection determined that you were conducting decommissioning activities in compliance with regulatory and license requirements.
 
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/Adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction.


Garcia at (530) 756-3910.
Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, please contact the undersigned at (817) 860-8191 or Emilio M. Garcia at (530) 756-3910.


Sincerely,
Sincerely,
/RA/D. Blair Spitzberg, Ph.D., ChiefFuel Cycle and Decommissioning BranchDocket No.: 050-00133License No.: DPR-7
/RA/
D. Blair Spitzberg, Ph.D., Chief Fuel Cycle and Decommissioning Branch Docket No.: 050-00133 License No.: DPR-7


===Enclosure:===
===Enclosure:===
NRC Inspection Report 050-00133/06-004 Pacific Gas and Electric Company - 2 -
NRC Inspection Report 050-00133/06-004
 
Pacific Gas and Electric Company  
- 2 -
 
REGION IV==
Docket No.:
050-00133 License No.:
DPR-7 Report No.:
050-00133/06-004 Licensee:
Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E)
Facility:
Humboldt Bay Power Plant (HBPP), Unit 3 Location:
1000 King Salmon Avenue Eureka, California 95503 Dates:
December 18-22, 2006 Inspectors:
Emilio M. Garcia, Health Physicist Approved By:
D. Blair Spitzberg, Ph.D., Chief Fuel Cycle and Decommissioning Branch Attachments:
Supplemental Inspection Information ADAMS Entry:
IR 05000133-06-04, on 12/18-22/06; Pacific Gas & Electric Co.;
Humboldt Bay, Unit 3. No violations.
 
-2-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Humboldt Bay Power Plant, Unit 3 NRC Inspection Report 050-00133/06-004 The Humboldt Bay Power Plant (HBPP), Unit 3 was shutdown in 1976. The facility has been in a SAFSTOR status since shutdown with minimal decommissioning activity. This special inspection was conducted to review the licensees practices during the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP)
cleanup project. The inspector reviewed procedures and observed portions of the processing, packaging and preparation for shipping of miscellaneous and irradiated hardware from the HBPP SFP.
 
Solid Radwaste Management & Transportation of Radioactive Materials
*
The licensee had successfully processed and loaded the first of three Class C waste liners with miscellaneous waste and irradiated hardware from the spent fuel pool.
 
Personnel radiation exposures were below projections (Section 1).
 
-3-Report Details Summary of Plant Status Humboldt Bay Power Plant, Unit 3, is currently in decommissioning SAFSTOR status. Unit 3 received an operating license from the Atomic Energy Commission on August 28, 1962. On July 2, 1976, Unit 3 was shutdown for annual refueling and seismic modifications. This work was suspended in December 1980 and in June 1983, PG&E announced its intention to decommission the unit. Unit 3 has been essentially in SAFSTOR since July 1985. On July 19, 1988, NRC approved the licensees SAFSTOR plan and amended the license to a possess-but-not-operate status. The license will expire on November 9, 2015. The facility has undergone minimal decommissioning activity since shutdown. In preparation for the relocation of the spent fuel to an onsite Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI), the licensee staff was conducting a removal and disposal campaign of miscellaneous and irradiated hardware in the spent fuel pool (SFP).
 
1.0 Solid Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation (86750)
 
1.1 Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed the licensees preparations and practices for the processing, inventorying and disposal of miscellaneous and irradiated hardware in the spent fuel pool. The inspector observed portions of the preparations, dry runs and actual loading of the first of three Class C waste liners to be disposed at a low level radioactive waste site.
 
1.2 Observations and Findings In preparation for the relocation of the spent fuel to an ISFSI, the licensee staff was conducting a removal and disposal campaign of miscellaneous and irradiated hardware in the SFP. Due to the high levels of alpha contamination in the SFP and the need to move the highly irradiated hardware outside the pool and with limited shielding, this activity had the potential of high radiation exposures to the personnel involved. An inspection of preparations and loading of the first of three waste liners was conducted on December 18-22, 2006.
 
The licensee had contracted with NUKEM Corporation, the Contractor, to plan, inventory, process, package and ship miscellaneous and irradiated hardware present in the SFP, that were considered waste and no longer required for either SAFSTOR nor ISFSI operations. The miscellaneous and irradiated hardware to be disposed consisted of:
*
Poison Curtains
*
Fuel Channels
*
Stellite rollers and balls
*
Non special nuclear material portion of the incore detector strings
*
Miscellaneous hardware such as spring clips, cap screws, sample coupon racks and other reactor hardware and tools, and
*
other contaminated materials.
 
-4-The Contractors tasks included:
*
Procedural Development
*
Equipment mobilization and setup
*
Component dose profiling
*
Component processing
*
Loading and shipping of the miscellaneous waste and irradiated hardware, and
*
Preparation of appropriate records.
 
To control these activities, the licensee and the Contractor had developed a number of procedures. The Contractor developed procedures that had been incorporated into the licensees procedures after review and approval by the Plant Safety Review Committee (PSRC). These procedures are listed in Attachment 2 to this report.
 
During the inspection, the licensee completed processing the contents of the first of three packages being prepared for shipment. This first package consisted principally of crushed fuel channels and poison curtains. The second shipment would consist of Stellite rollers and balls, and other miscellaneous hardware such as spring clips, cap screws, and sample coupon racks. The final shipment would have the remaining crushed fuel channels.
 
The materials were to be shipped using a Type B package, a 10-142B certified cask, NRC Certificate of Compliance number 9208. The licensee and contractor crew had pre-loaded the waste liner into the cask. Inside the liner, a basket containing crushed fuel channels would be placed and in the center of the basket a transfer box would be loaded with the higher irradiated components for this shipment, the poison curtains.
 
The loading of the liner/cask combination involved two lifts from the SFP, the basket with the crushed fuel channels and a second lift with the transfer box containing the poison curtains. Each lift involved a period of time when the load was suspended above the SFP to permit draining of the water until only incidental dripping occurred. The transfer box was lifted in a transfer shield in order to minimize the radiation exposure to personnel during the time when the transfer box was lifted from the SFP.
 
The inspector observed portions of the basket loading with the last pieces of crushed fuel channels. The poison curtains had been previously loaded into the transfer box.
 
Once all material was ready for movement into the liner/cask combination, the licensee conducted a series of dry runs lifting and placing an uncontaminated and empty basket into the liner/cask combination. These dry runs were necessary to provide practice to the crew when moving and placing the loaded basket into the liner/cask combination, and to determine the best locations for personnel to assure that radiation exposures were maintained as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). These dry runs resulted in a change in the locations of the crane operator.
 
The licensee issued radiation work permit (RWP) 2006-0133, for the transfer of the waste from the SFP to the transport cask. The requirements of this RWP were based on assessments of the direct radiation dose and airborne contamination that were expected. The direct radiation estimates were based on MicroShield computer code calculations based on the radioactive quantities of the crushed channels and poison
 
-5-curtains. The airborne contamination estimates were based on prior experience with contamination on materials removed from the SFP and their likeliness to become airborne. These calculations estimated that the highest direct radiation dose rate was 590 millirem per hour at eight feet from the basket and that airborne contamination would exceed 650 derived air concentration (DAC), with a potential for 976 DAC-hour exposure to individuals. Besides the usual practice of placing individuals in Powered Air Purifying Respirator (PAPR) the licensee took two additional actions to minimize the likelihood of the airborne contamination. Specifically, the building ventilation was placed on a mode that provides minimum airflow, and the surfaces that were contaminated were sprayed with a solution to prevent drying. Other RWP requirements included the use of extremity dosimetry, placement of dosimeters on the highest likely exposure location on the body, and the use of lapel air samplers to evaluate individual airborne contamination exposure, as well as full anti contamination clothing and the use and change of multiple pairs of gloves. The inspector determined that the radiation safety measures specified under the RWP adequately addressed the range of potential radiation hazards anticipated.
 
On Thursday, December 21, 2006, the liner/cask combination was successfully loaded with the basket and transfer box. The inspector remotely observed the entire process and noted that the requirements of the licensees procedures and the RWP were followed. Electronic dosimeters on personnel indicated that the highest direct radiation exposure was 10.5 millirem and the combined exposures for all personnel involved in the loading of the liner/cask combination was 36.9 person millirem. Based on the lapel air sample results and the protection factor provided by the PAPR no committed dose was assigned. Subsequent to completing the loading of the first cask, the Senior Radiation Protection Engineer concluded that the lower than expected radiological conditions were due to the conservatism used in calculating the anticipated direct radiation levels and the effectiveness of the airborne contamination controls used.
 
Subsequent to the site visit, licensee personnel informed the inspector that the first cask had been shipped and that the second liner/cask combination had been successfully loaded.


REGION IV Docket No.:050-00133License No.:DPR-7 Report No.:050-00133/06-004 Licensee:Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E)
1.3 Conclusions The licensee had successfully processed and loaded the first of three Class C waste liners with miscellaneous waste and irradiated hardware from the spent fuel pool.
Facility:Humboldt Bay Power Plant (HBPP), Unit 3Location:1000 King Salmon AvenueEureka, California 95503Dates:December 18-22, 2006 Inspectors:Emilio M. Garcia, Health Physicist Approved By:D. Blair Spitzberg, Ph.D., ChiefFuel Cycle and Decommissioning BranchAttachments:Supplemental Inspection Information ADAMS Entry:IR 05000133-06-04, on 12/18-22/06; Pacific Gas & Electric Co.;Humboldt Bay, Unit 3. No violations.


-2-EXECUTIVE SUMMARYHumboldt Bay Power Plant, Unit 3NRC Inspection Report 050-00133/06-004The Humboldt Bay Power Plant (HBPP), Unit 3 was shutdown in 1976. The facility has been ina SAFSTOR status since shutdown with minimal decommissioning activity. This specialinspection was conducted to review the licensee's practices during the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP)cleanup project. The inspector reviewed procedures and observed portions of the processing,packaging and preparation for shipping of miscellaneous and irradiated hardware from the HBPP SFP.Solid Radwaste Management & Transportation of Radioactive Materials*The licensee had successfully processed and loaded the first of three Class C wasteliners with miscellaneous waste and irradiated hardware from the spent fuel pool. Personnel radiation exposures were below projections (Section 1).
Personnel radiation exposures were below projections.


-3-Report DetailsSummary of Plant StatusHumboldt Bay Power Plant, Unit 3, is currently in decommissioning SAFSTOR status. Unit 3received an operating license from the Atomic Energy Commission on August 28, 1962. OnJuly 2, 1976, Unit 3 was shutdown for annual refueling and seismic modifications. This workwas suspended in December 1980 and in June 1983, PG&E announced its intention todecommission the unit. Unit 3 has been essentially in SAFSTOR since July 1985. On July 19, 1988, NRC approved the licensee's SAFSTOR plan and amended the license to a possess-but-not-operate status. The license will expire on November 9, 2015. The facility hasundergone minimal decommissioning activity since shutdown. In preparation for the relocationof the spent fuel to an onsite Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI), the licenseestaff was conducting a removal and disposal campaign of miscellaneous and irradiatedhardware in the spent fuel pool (SFP).1.0Solid Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation (86750)
1.0 Exit Meeting On December 22, 2006, at the conclusion of the site visit, the inspector presented to the plant manager and other licensee staff members, the preliminary results of the inspection. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspectors.
1.1Inspection ScopeThe inspector reviewed the licensee's preparations and practices for the processing,inventorying and disposal of miscellaneous and irradiated hardware in the spent fuelpool. The inspector observed portions of the preparations, dry runs and actual loadingof the first of three Class C waste liners to be disposed at a low level radioactive wastesite.1.2Observations and FindingsIn preparation for the relocation of the spent fuel to an ISFSI, the licensee staff wasconducting a removal and disposal campaign of miscellaneous and irradiated hardwarein the SFP. Due to the high levels of alpha contamination in the SFP and the need tomove the highly irradiated hardware outside the pool and with limited shielding, thisactivity had the potential of high radiation exposures to the personnel involved. Aninspection of preparations and loading of the first of three waste liners was conducted onDecember 18-22, 2006. The licensee had contracted with NUKEM Corporation, the Contractor, to plan,inventory, process, package and ship miscellaneous and irradiated hardware present inthe SFP, that were considered waste and no longer required for either SAFSTOR norISFSI operations. The miscellaneous and irradiated hardware to be disposed consisted of:*Poison Curtains*Fuel Channels*Stellite rollers and balls*Non special nuclear material portion of the incore detector strings*Miscellaneous hardware such as spring clips, cap screws, sample coupon racksand other reactor hardware and tools, and*other contaminated materials.


-4-The Contractor's tasks included:*Procedural Development*Equipment mobilization and setup*Component dose profiling*Component processing*Loading and shipping of the miscellaneous waste and irradiated hardware, and *Preparation of appropriate records.To control these activities, the licensee and the Contractor had developed a number ofprocedures. The Contractor developed procedures that had been incorporated into thelicensee's procedures after review and approval by the Plant Safety Review Committee(PSRC). These procedures are listed in Attachment 2 to this report.During the inspection, the licensee completed processing the contents of the first ofthree packages being prepared for shipment. This first package consisted principally ofcrushed fuel channels and poison curtains. The second shipment would consist of Stellite rollers and ba lls, and other miscellaneous hardware such as spring clips, capscrews, and sample coupon racks. The final shipment would have the remainingcrushed fuel channels.The materials were to be shipped using a Type B package, a 10-142B certified cask,NRC Certificate of Compliance number 9208. The licensee and contractor crew hadpre-loaded the waste liner into the cask. Inside the liner, a basket containing crushedfuel channels would be placed and in the center of the basket a transfer box would beloaded with the higher irradiated components for this shipment, the poison curtains. The loading of the liner/cask combination involved two lifts from the SFP, the basket withthe crushed fuel channels and a second lift with the transfer box containing the poisoncurtains. Each lift involved a period of time when the load was suspended above theSFP to permit draining of the water until only incidental dripping occurred. The transferbox was lifted in a transfer shield in order to minimize the radiation exposure topersonnel during the time when the transfer box was lifted from the SFP.The inspector observed portions of the basket loading with the last pieces of crushedfuel channels. The poison curtains had been previously loaded into the transfer box. Once all material was ready for movement into the liner/cask combination, the licenseeconducted a series of dry runs lifting and placing an uncontaminated and empty basketinto the liner/cask combination. These dry runs were necessary to provide practice tothe crew when moving and placing the loaded basket into the liner/cask combination,and to determine the best locations for personnel to assure that radiation exposureswere maintained as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). These dry runs resulted ina change in the locations of the crane operator.The licensee issued radiation work permit (RWP) 2006-0133, for the transfer of thewaste from the SFP to the transport cask. The requirements of this RWP were based onassessments of the direct radiation dose and airborne contamination that wereexpected. The direct radiation estimates were based on MicroShield computer codecalculations based on the radioactive quantities of the crushed channels and poison-5-curtains. The airborne contamination estimates were based on prior experience withcontamination on materials removed from the SFP and their likeliness to becomeairborne. These calculations estimated that the highest direct radiation dose rate was 590 millirem per hour at eight feet from the basket and that ai rborne cont aminationwould exceed 650 derived air concentration (DAC), with a potential for 976 DAC-hourexposure to individuals. Besides the usual practice of placing individuals in Powered AirPurifying Respirator (PAPR) the licensee took two additional actions to minimize thelikelihood of the airborne contamination. Specifically, the building ventilation was placedon a mode that provides minimum airflow, and the surfaces that were contaminatedwere sprayed with a solution to prevent drying. Other RWP requirements included theuse of extremity dosimetry, placement of dosimeters on the highest likely exposurelocation on the body, and the use of lapel air samplers to evaluate individual airbornecontamination exposure, as well as full anti contamination clothing and the use andchange of multiple pairs of gloves. The inspector determined that the radiation safetymeasures specified under the RWP adequately addressed the range of potentialradiation hazards anticipated. On Thursday, December 21, 2006, the liner/cask combination was successfully loadedwith the basket and transfer box. The inspector remotely observed the entire processand noted that the requirements of the licensee's procedures and the RWP werefollowed. Electronic dosimeters on personnel indicated that the highest direct radiationexposure was 10.5 millirem and the combined exposures for all personnel involved inthe loading of the liner/cask combination was 36.
ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee Personnel:
J. Albers, Radiation Protection Manager J. Atchley, Operator Specialist J. Chadwick, Senior Radiation Protection Engineer Z. Easley, Security Supervisor V. Jensen, Quality Control Supervisor T. Nelson, Plant Manager - Nuclear L. Pulley, ISFSI Manager D. Sokolsky, Licensing Supervisor Contractor Personnel:
A Berry, Project Manager - AM Solutions R. Koontz, Cask Supervisor - NUKEM Corporation K. Milliken, Project Manager - NUKEM Corporation INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 86750 Solid Radwaste Management & Transportation of Radioactive Materials ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened None Closed None Discussed None


9 person millirem.
-2-LIST OF ACRONYMS ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable DAC Derived Air Concentration ISFSI Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation PAPR Powered Air Purifying Respirator PSRC Plant Safety Review Committee RWP Radiation Work Permit SFP Spent Fuel Pool


Based on the lapelair sample results and the protection factor provided by the PAPR no committed dosewas assigned. Subsequent to completing the loading of the first cask, the SeniorRadiation Protection Engineer concluded that the lower than expected radiologicalconditions were due to the conservatism used in calculating the anticipated directradiation levels and the effectiveness of the airborne contamination controls used. Subsequent to the site visit, licensee personnel informed the inspector that the first caskhad been shipped and that the second liner/cask combination had been successfullyloaded.1.3ConclusionsThe licensee had successfully processed and loaded the first of three Class C wasteliners with miscellaneous waste and irradiated hardware from the spent fuel pool. Personnel radiation exposures were below projections.1.0Exit MeetingOn December 22, 2006, at the conclusion of the site visit, the inspector presented to theplant manager and other licensee staff members, the preliminary results of theinspection. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any information provided to, orreviewed by, the inspectors.
ATTACHMENT 2 PARTIAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Licenses and Certificates
*
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Certificate of Compliance Number 9208, Revision 16, issued September 27, 2006.


ATTACHMENTSUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION INFORMATIONPARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTEDLicensee Personnel:
Procedures
J. Albers, Radiation Protection ManagerJ. Atchley, Operator SpecialistJ. Chadwick, Senior Radiation Protection EngineerZ. Easley, Security SupervisorV. Jensen, Quality Control SupervisorT. Nelson, Plant Manager - NuclearL. Pulley, ISFSI ManagerD. Sokolsky, Licensing Supervisor Contractor Personnel:
*
A Berry, Project Manager - AM SolutionsR. Koontz, Cask Supervisor - NUKEM Corporation K. Milliken, Project Manager - NUKEM CorporationINSPECTION PROCEDURES USEDIP 86750 Solid Radwaste Management & Transportation of Radioactive MaterialsITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened None Closed None Discussed None-2-LIST OF ACRONYMSALARA As Low As Reasonably AchievableDAC Derived Air ConcentrationISFSI Independent Spent Fuel Storage InstallationPAPR Powered Air Purifying RespiratorPSRC Plant Safety Review CommitteeRWPRadiation Work PermitSFP Spent Fuel Pool ATTACHMENT 2PARTIAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWEDLicenses and Certificates*US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Certificate of Compliance Number 9208, Revision16, issued September 27, 2006.Procedures*Humboldt Bay Temporary Procedure 2006-12, Processing Spent Fuel Pool Hardware,revision 2, effective December 6, 2006.*Humboldt Bay Temporary Procedure 2006-15, Shipment of Solid Radioactive Waste tothe Barnwell Disposal Facility, revision 0, effective November 22, 2006.*Humboldt Bay Procedure B-3, Movement of Non-Fuel Material in Spent Fuel Pool,revision 28, effective June 23, 2005.*Humboldt Bay Procedure B-10, Movement of SNM Articles in the Spent Fuel Pool,revision 1, effective October 3, 2006.*Humboldt Bay -NUKEM Procedure 1009, Handling the10-142B Transport Cask at theHumboldt Bay Power Plant, revision 0, effective December 11, 2006.*Humboldt Bay -NUKEM Procedure 1064, Processing and Packaging Components at theHumboldt Bay Power Plant, revision 1, effective November 30, 2006.*Humboldt Bay Power Plant Special Work Permit 2006-0130, Task 01, Revision 00,Approved October 27, 2006.*Humboldt Bay Security Procedure SP-312, Vehicle Barrier System, Searches and EscortRequirements, revision 9, effective October 24, 2006.*RWE NUKEM Corporation RSM-10-142B, User's Information Package for the 10-142BShielded Transportation Cask, Data Sheets*ALARA Review and Job Planning Form for Special Work Permit (SWP) 2006-0130,dated October 24, 2006.*Attachment 6.3, to SP-312, Exception to Standard Search Procedures, 142B #007 Cask,December 18, 2006.*HBPP Area Survey Report 06-494, Receive Type-B Cask, 0800 hours, December 15, 2006.*US NRC List of Register Users for Certificate 9208, for Model 10-142.
Humboldt Bay Temporary Procedure 2006-12, Processing Spent Fuel Pool Hardware, revision 2, effective December 6, 2006.
* Humboldt Bay Temporary Procedure 2006-15, Shipment of Solid Radioactive Waste to the Barnwell Disposal Facility, revision 0, effective November 22, 2006.
* Humboldt Bay Procedure B-3, Movement of Non-Fuel Material in Spent Fuel Pool, revision 28, effective June 23, 2005.
* Humboldt Bay Procedure B-10, Movement of SNM Articles in the Spent Fuel Pool, revision 1, effective October 3, 2006.
* Humboldt Bay -NUKEM Procedure 1009, Handling the10-142B Transport Cask at the Humboldt Bay Power Plant, revision 0, effective December 11, 2006.
* Humboldt Bay -NUKEM Procedure 1064, Processing and Packaging Components at the Humboldt Bay Power Plant, revision 1, effective November 30, 2006.
* Humboldt Bay Power Plant Special Work Permit 2006-0130, Task 01, Revision 00, Approved October 27, 2006.
* Humboldt Bay Security Procedure SP-312, Vehicle Barrier System, Searches and Escort Requirements, revision 9, effective October 24, 2006.
* RWE NUKEM Corporation RSM-10-142B, Users Information Package for the 10-142B Shielded Transportation Cask, Data Sheets
*
ALARA Review and Job Planning Form for Special Work Permit (SWP) 2006-0130, dated October 24, 2006.
* Attachment 6.3, to SP-312, Exception to Standard Search Procedures, 142B #007 Cask, December 18, 2006.
* HBPP Area Survey Report 06-494, Receive Type-B Cask, 0800 hours, December 15, 2006.
* US NRC List of Register Users for Certificate 9208, for Model 10-142.
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 04:05, 15 January 2025

IR 05000133-06-004, on 12/18-22/2006, Pacific Gas and Electric Company, at Humboldt Bay Power Plant Unit 3 Facility
ML070180471
Person / Time
Site: Humboldt Bay
Issue date: 01/18/2007
From: Spitzberg D
NRC/RGN-IV/DNMS/FCDB
To: Keenan J
Pacific Gas & Electric Co
References
IR-06-004
Download: ML070180471 (12)


Text

January 18, 2007

SUBJECT:

NRC INSPECTION REPORT 050-00133/06-004

Dear Mr. Keenan:

A special NRC inspection was conducted on December 18 - 22, 2006, at your Humboldt Bay Power Plant Unit 3 facility. This inspection was an examination of activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance of the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. Within these areas, the inspection included reviews of your solid radioactive waste management and transportation of radioactive materials. On December 22, 2006, at the conclusion of the site visit, an exit briefing was conducted with Mr.

Terry Nelson, Plant Manager, and other members of your staff. The enclosed report presents the scope and results of that inspection. The inspection determined that you were conducting decommissioning activities in compliance with regulatory and license requirements.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's document system (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/Adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction.

Should you have any questions concerning this inspection, please contact the undersigned at (817) 860-8191 or Emilio M. Garcia at (530) 756-3910.

Sincerely,

/RA/

D. Blair Spitzberg, Ph.D., Chief Fuel Cycle and Decommissioning Branch Docket No.: 050-00133 License No.: DPR-7

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 050-00133/06-004

Pacific Gas and Electric Company

- 2 -

REGION IV==

Docket No.:

050-00133 License No.:

DPR-7 Report No.:

050-00133/06-004 Licensee:

Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E)

Facility:

Humboldt Bay Power Plant (HBPP), Unit 3 Location:

1000 King Salmon Avenue Eureka, California 95503 Dates:

December 18-22, 2006 Inspectors:

Emilio M. Garcia, Health Physicist Approved By:

D. Blair Spitzberg, Ph.D., Chief Fuel Cycle and Decommissioning Branch Attachments:

Supplemental Inspection Information ADAMS Entry:

IR 05000133-06-04, on 12/18-22/06; Pacific Gas & Electric Co.;

Humboldt Bay, Unit 3. No violations.

-2-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Humboldt Bay Power Plant, Unit 3 NRC Inspection Report 050-00133/06-004 The Humboldt Bay Power Plant (HBPP), Unit 3 was shutdown in 1976. The facility has been in a SAFSTOR status since shutdown with minimal decommissioning activity. This special inspection was conducted to review the licensees practices during the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP)

cleanup project. The inspector reviewed procedures and observed portions of the processing, packaging and preparation for shipping of miscellaneous and irradiated hardware from the HBPP SFP.

Solid Radwaste Management & Transportation of Radioactive Materials

The licensee had successfully processed and loaded the first of three Class C waste liners with miscellaneous waste and irradiated hardware from the spent fuel pool.

Personnel radiation exposures were below projections (Section 1).

-3-Report Details Summary of Plant Status Humboldt Bay Power Plant, Unit 3, is currently in decommissioning SAFSTOR status. Unit 3 received an operating license from the Atomic Energy Commission on August 28, 1962. On July 2, 1976, Unit 3 was shutdown for annual refueling and seismic modifications. This work was suspended in December 1980 and in June 1983, PG&E announced its intention to decommission the unit. Unit 3 has been essentially in SAFSTOR since July 1985. On July 19, 1988, NRC approved the licensees SAFSTOR plan and amended the license to a possess-but-not-operate status. The license will expire on November 9, 2015. The facility has undergone minimal decommissioning activity since shutdown. In preparation for the relocation of the spent fuel to an onsite Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI), the licensee staff was conducting a removal and disposal campaign of miscellaneous and irradiated hardware in the spent fuel pool (SFP).

1.0 Solid Radioactive Waste Management and Transportation (86750)

1.1 Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed the licensees preparations and practices for the processing, inventorying and disposal of miscellaneous and irradiated hardware in the spent fuel pool. The inspector observed portions of the preparations, dry runs and actual loading of the first of three Class C waste liners to be disposed at a low level radioactive waste site.

1.2 Observations and Findings In preparation for the relocation of the spent fuel to an ISFSI, the licensee staff was conducting a removal and disposal campaign of miscellaneous and irradiated hardware in the SFP. Due to the high levels of alpha contamination in the SFP and the need to move the highly irradiated hardware outside the pool and with limited shielding, this activity had the potential of high radiation exposures to the personnel involved. An inspection of preparations and loading of the first of three waste liners was conducted on December 18-22, 2006.

The licensee had contracted with NUKEM Corporation, the Contractor, to plan, inventory, process, package and ship miscellaneous and irradiated hardware present in the SFP, that were considered waste and no longer required for either SAFSTOR nor ISFSI operations. The miscellaneous and irradiated hardware to be disposed consisted of:

Poison Curtains

Fuel Channels

Stellite rollers and balls

Non special nuclear material portion of the incore detector strings

Miscellaneous hardware such as spring clips, cap screws, sample coupon racks and other reactor hardware and tools, and

other contaminated materials.

-4-The Contractors tasks included:

Procedural Development

Equipment mobilization and setup

Component dose profiling

Component processing

Loading and shipping of the miscellaneous waste and irradiated hardware, and

Preparation of appropriate records.

To control these activities, the licensee and the Contractor had developed a number of procedures. The Contractor developed procedures that had been incorporated into the licensees procedures after review and approval by the Plant Safety Review Committee (PSRC). These procedures are listed in Attachment 2 to this report.

During the inspection, the licensee completed processing the contents of the first of three packages being prepared for shipment. This first package consisted principally of crushed fuel channels and poison curtains. The second shipment would consist of Stellite rollers and balls, and other miscellaneous hardware such as spring clips, cap screws, and sample coupon racks. The final shipment would have the remaining crushed fuel channels.

The materials were to be shipped using a Type B package, a 10-142B certified cask, NRC Certificate of Compliance number 9208. The licensee and contractor crew had pre-loaded the waste liner into the cask. Inside the liner, a basket containing crushed fuel channels would be placed and in the center of the basket a transfer box would be loaded with the higher irradiated components for this shipment, the poison curtains.

The loading of the liner/cask combination involved two lifts from the SFP, the basket with the crushed fuel channels and a second lift with the transfer box containing the poison curtains. Each lift involved a period of time when the load was suspended above the SFP to permit draining of the water until only incidental dripping occurred. The transfer box was lifted in a transfer shield in order to minimize the radiation exposure to personnel during the time when the transfer box was lifted from the SFP.

The inspector observed portions of the basket loading with the last pieces of crushed fuel channels. The poison curtains had been previously loaded into the transfer box.

Once all material was ready for movement into the liner/cask combination, the licensee conducted a series of dry runs lifting and placing an uncontaminated and empty basket into the liner/cask combination. These dry runs were necessary to provide practice to the crew when moving and placing the loaded basket into the liner/cask combination, and to determine the best locations for personnel to assure that radiation exposures were maintained as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). These dry runs resulted in a change in the locations of the crane operator.

The licensee issued radiation work permit (RWP) 2006-0133, for the transfer of the waste from the SFP to the transport cask. The requirements of this RWP were based on assessments of the direct radiation dose and airborne contamination that were expected. The direct radiation estimates were based on MicroShield computer code calculations based on the radioactive quantities of the crushed channels and poison

-5-curtains. The airborne contamination estimates were based on prior experience with contamination on materials removed from the SFP and their likeliness to become airborne. These calculations estimated that the highest direct radiation dose rate was 590 millirem per hour at eight feet from the basket and that airborne contamination would exceed 650 derived air concentration (DAC), with a potential for 976 DAC-hour exposure to individuals. Besides the usual practice of placing individuals in Powered Air Purifying Respirator (PAPR) the licensee took two additional actions to minimize the likelihood of the airborne contamination. Specifically, the building ventilation was placed on a mode that provides minimum airflow, and the surfaces that were contaminated were sprayed with a solution to prevent drying. Other RWP requirements included the use of extremity dosimetry, placement of dosimeters on the highest likely exposure location on the body, and the use of lapel air samplers to evaluate individual airborne contamination exposure, as well as full anti contamination clothing and the use and change of multiple pairs of gloves. The inspector determined that the radiation safety measures specified under the RWP adequately addressed the range of potential radiation hazards anticipated.

On Thursday, December 21, 2006, the liner/cask combination was successfully loaded with the basket and transfer box. The inspector remotely observed the entire process and noted that the requirements of the licensees procedures and the RWP were followed. Electronic dosimeters on personnel indicated that the highest direct radiation exposure was 10.5 millirem and the combined exposures for all personnel involved in the loading of the liner/cask combination was 36.9 person millirem. Based on the lapel air sample results and the protection factor provided by the PAPR no committed dose was assigned. Subsequent to completing the loading of the first cask, the Senior Radiation Protection Engineer concluded that the lower than expected radiological conditions were due to the conservatism used in calculating the anticipated direct radiation levels and the effectiveness of the airborne contamination controls used.

Subsequent to the site visit, licensee personnel informed the inspector that the first cask had been shipped and that the second liner/cask combination had been successfully loaded.

1.3 Conclusions The licensee had successfully processed and loaded the first of three Class C waste liners with miscellaneous waste and irradiated hardware from the spent fuel pool.

Personnel radiation exposures were below projections.

1.0 Exit Meeting On December 22, 2006, at the conclusion of the site visit, the inspector presented to the plant manager and other licensee staff members, the preliminary results of the inspection. The licensee did not identify as proprietary any information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspectors.

ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INSPECTION INFORMATION PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Licensee Personnel:

J. Albers, Radiation Protection Manager J. Atchley, Operator Specialist J. Chadwick, Senior Radiation Protection Engineer Z. Easley, Security Supervisor V. Jensen, Quality Control Supervisor T. Nelson, Plant Manager - Nuclear L. Pulley, ISFSI Manager D. Sokolsky, Licensing Supervisor Contractor Personnel:

A Berry, Project Manager - AM Solutions R. Koontz, Cask Supervisor - NUKEM Corporation K. Milliken, Project Manager - NUKEM Corporation INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 86750 Solid Radwaste Management & Transportation of Radioactive Materials ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened None Closed None Discussed None

-2-LIST OF ACRONYMS ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable DAC Derived Air Concentration ISFSI Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation PAPR Powered Air Purifying Respirator PSRC Plant Safety Review Committee RWP Radiation Work Permit SFP Spent Fuel Pool

ATTACHMENT 2 PARTIAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED Licenses and Certificates

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Certificate of Compliance Number 9208, Revision 16, issued September 27, 2006.

Procedures

Humboldt Bay Temporary Procedure 2006-12, Processing Spent Fuel Pool Hardware, revision 2, effective December 6, 2006.

  • Humboldt Bay Temporary Procedure 2006-15, Shipment of Solid Radioactive Waste to the Barnwell Disposal Facility, revision 0, effective November 22, 2006.
  • Humboldt Bay Procedure B-3, Movement of Non-Fuel Material in Spent Fuel Pool, revision 28, effective June 23, 2005.
  • Humboldt Bay Procedure B-10, Movement of SNM Articles in the Spent Fuel Pool, revision 1, effective October 3, 2006.
  • Humboldt Bay -NUKEM Procedure 1009, Handling the10-142B Transport Cask at the Humboldt Bay Power Plant, revision 0, effective December 11, 2006.
  • Humboldt Bay -NUKEM Procedure 1064, Processing and Packaging Components at the Humboldt Bay Power Plant, revision 1, effective November 30, 2006.
  • Humboldt Bay Power Plant Special Work Permit 2006-0130, Task 01, Revision 00, Approved October 27, 2006.
  • Humboldt Bay Security Procedure SP-312, Vehicle Barrier System, Searches and Escort Requirements, revision 9, effective October 24, 2006.
  • RWE NUKEM Corporation RSM-10-142B, Users Information Package for the 10-142B Shielded Transportation Cask, Data Sheets

ALARA Review and Job Planning Form for Special Work Permit (SWP) 2006-0130, dated October 24, 2006.

  • Attachment 6.3, to SP-312, Exception to Standard Search Procedures, 142B #007 Cask, December 18, 2006.
  • HBPP Area Survey Report 06-494, Receive Type-B Cask, 0800 hours0.00926 days <br />0.222 hours <br />0.00132 weeks <br />3.044e-4 months <br />, December 15, 2006.
  • US NRC List of Register Users for Certificate 9208, for Model 10-142.