IR 05000387/2007004

IR 05000387-07-004, 05000388-07-004; 07/01/2007 - 09/30/2007; Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2; Routine Integrated Report

ML073190338
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	11/14/2007
From:	Paul Krohn Reactor Projects Region 1 Branch 4
To:	Mckinney B Susquehanna
krohn pg
References
IR-07-004
Download: ML073190338 (25)

Text

November 14, 2007

SUBJECT:

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000387/2007004 AND 05000388/2007004

Dear Mr. McKinney:

September 30, 2007

SUBJECT:

SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000387/2007004 AND 05000388/2007004

Dear Mr. McKinney:

On September 30, 2007, the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on October 12, 2007, with you and other members of your staff.

This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any), will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publically Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely, Paul G. Krohn, Chief /RA/

Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.

50-387; 50-388 License Nos.

NPF-14, NPF-22 Distribution w/encl:

(via e-mail)

S. Collins, RA G. West, RI OEDO M. Dapas, DRA J. Lubinski, NRR D. Lew, DRP M. Kowal, NRR J. Clifford, DRP J. Kim, NRR P. Krohn, DRP R. Guzman, PM, NRR R. Fuhrmeister, DRP J. Hughey, Backup, NRR F. Jaxheimer, DRP - Sr RI Susquehanna ROPreports@nrc.gov (All IRs)

P. Finney, DRP - RI Susquehanna Region I Docket Room (with concurrences)

S. Farrell, DRP - OA Susquehanna DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\DRP\\BRANCH4\\Draft Inspection Report for DRP Br 4 for 2007\\Draft Br 4 IRs 3rd Qtr 2007\\Susquehanna 3rd Qtr 2007IR\\SSES2007_004rev1.wpd ML073190338 SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE: _____pgk_____(Reviewers Initials)

After declaring this document An Official Agency Record it will be released to the Public.

To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure

"E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy OFFICE RI/DRP RI/DRP Rl/DRP NAME Fjaxheimer/PGK for TSetzer/PGK PKrohn/

DATE 10/19 /07 11/ 01/07 11 / 14/07 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Docket Nos.: 50-387, 50-388 License Nos.: NPF-14, NPF-22 Report No.:

05000387/2007004 and 05000388/2007004 Licensee:

PPL Susquehanna, LLC Facility:

Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 Location:

Berwick, Pennsylvania Dates:

July 1, 2007 through September 30, 2007

Inspectors:

F. Jaxheimer, Senior Resident Inspector P. Finney, Resident Inspector J. Jandovitz, Resident Inspector M. Patel, Reactor Inspector P. Presby, Operations Engineer E. Gray, Senior Reactor Inspector M. Brown, Resident Inspector J. Tifft, Reactor Inspector Approved by: Paul G. Krohn, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects

ii

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000387/2007-004, 05000388/2007-004; 07/01/2007 - 09/30/2007; Susquehanna Steam Electric

Station, Units 1 and 2; Routine Integrated Report.

The report covered a 3-month period of inspection by resident inspectors and announced inspections by regional reactor inspectors and an operations engineer. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.

NRC Identified Findings and Self-Revealing Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES) Unit 1 began the inspection period at full rated thermal power (RTP) and operated at or near full power, except for a planned power reduction to perform a control rod sequence exchange on July 14, 2007, and planned reductions to test and assess control cell friction issues on August 12 and September 9, 2007.

Unit 2 began the inspection period at full RTP and operated at or near full power, except for a planned power reduction to 80 percent RTP to perform control rod scram time testing and a control rod sequence exchange on August 26, 2007. The reactor was returned to full power after approximately 17 hours1.967593e-4 days <br />0.00472 hours <br />2.810847e-5 weeks <br />6.4685e-6 months <br /> of reduced power operation.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

==1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04 - 4 Samples)

==

.1 Partial Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial walkdowns to verify system and component alignment and to identify any discrepancies that would impact system operability. The inspectors verified that selected portions of redundant or backup systems or trains were available while other system components were out of service. The inspectors reviewed selected valve positions, electrical power availability, and the general condition of major system components. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The walkdowns included the following systems:

C Common, B and D emergency diesel generator (EDG) auxiliaries; C

Unit 1, reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC);

C Unit 1, residual heat removal (RHR), both divisions; and C

Unit 2, control rod drive (CRD) including scram discharge volume - components near permanent and temporary scaffolding.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Complete Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted one complete system walkdown of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 emergency service water (ESW) system to assess the alignment and condition of the mechanical components and piping. The inspectors reviewed the system health report, open condition reports, system operating procedures, and process and instrument diagrams. The inspectors evaluated the systems overall condition including a specific look at pipe corrosion which included discussions of system corrosion with the cognizant engineer.

C Units 1 and 2, ESW system condition, alignment, and review of pipe corrosion status, activity report (AR) 895266 and plant component work order (PCWO) 855802.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05Q - 9 Samples)

==

.1 Fire Protection - Tours

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PPL's fire protection program to determine the required fire protection design features, fire area boundaries, and combustible loading requirements for selected areas. The inspectors walked down those areas to assess PPLs control of transient combustible material and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression capabilities, fire barriers, and any related compensatory measures to assess PPL's fire protection program in those areas. The inspected areas included:

C Common, standby gas treatment filter area and control room emergency outside air system (CREOAS), EP-013-187; C

Common, E emergency diesel generator building, FP-013-236; C

Common, ESW pump house loop A and B pump rooms, FP-013-200, 201; C

Common, emergency diesel generator bay B, FP-013-192; C

Common, emergency diesel generator bay D, FP-013-198; C

Unit 1, east and west battery rooms, FP-013-168 and FP-013-169; C

Unit 1, reactor building Division 1, 4.16 kV switchgear room at elevation 749'-1";

C Unit 1, reactor building containment access area fire area R-1A and fire area 1-4A-S; and C

Unit 2, east and west battery rooms, FP-013-170 and FP-013-171.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07B - 2 Samples)

1. Biennial Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors reviewed PPLs programs for maintenance, testing, and monitoring of risk significant heat exchangers (HXs) to determine whether potential HX deficiencies could mask degraded performance, and to assess the capability of the HXs to perform their design functions. The inspectors assessed whether Susquehannas HX programs conformed to PPLs commitments to NRC Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment." In addition, the inspectors evaluated whether any potential common cause heat sink performance problems could affect multiple HXs in mitigating systems or result in an initiating event. Based on risk significance and prior inspection history, the following HXs were selected:

C Unit 1, high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) turbine lubricating oil cooler (1E213);and C

Unit 2, reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) heat exchanger (2E201A).

The inspectors assessed the external condition of the HXs in the field: reviewed the most recent eddy current, inspection and cleaning work results; and reviewed the applicable system heath reports to confirm that results were acceptable and that design basis assumptions for flow rate, plugged tube percentage, and heat transfer capability had been met.

Inspectors reviewed the chemical treatment programs for the spray pond (ESW ultimate heat sink) and the cooling tower basin (service water heat sink) to verify that potential bio-fouling mechanisms were being addressed, including on-going treatment and monitoring as specified in the chemistry manual. The review included discussions with chemistry personnel and the ESW and service water system engineer.

The inspectors reviewed a sample of condition reports (CRs) related to the selected HXs and service water system, to verify that PPL was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems related to these systems and components. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program

==

.1 Resident Inspector Quarterly Review

(71111.11Q - 1 Sample)

a. Inspection Scope

On August 16, 2007, the inspectors observed licensed operator simulator training during routine operator requalification training. The inspectors compared their observations to Technical Specifications, emergency plan implementation, and the use of system operating procedures. The inspectors also evaluated PPLs critique of the operators' performance to identify discrepancies and deficiencies in operator training. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The following training was observed:

C Scenario numbered OP002-07-06-09C - simulation of a series of electrical and mechanical problems including implementation of the plant Emergency Plan.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Review of the Annual Operator License Exams

(71111.11B - 1 Sample)

a. Inspection Scope

The following inspection activities were performed using NUREG 1021, Revision 9, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors; Inspection Procedure Attachment 71111.11, Licensed Operator Requalification Program, Appendix A, Checklist for Evaluating Facility Testing Material; and Appendix B, Suggested Interview Topics.

A review was conducted of recent operating history documentation found in inspection reports, licensee event reports, PPLs corrective action program, and the most recent NRC plant issues matrix (PIM). The inspectors reviewed specific events from PPLs corrective action program to verify that they had been appropriately addressed. The senior resident inspector was consulted for insights regarding licensed operator performance.

The inspectors reviewed three reactor operator and three senior reactor operator comprehensive biennial written examinations administered in 2006. In addition, the inspectors reviewed three sets of dynamic simulator exam scenarios (weeks 1, 5 and 6) and two sets of job performance measures (weeks 5 and 6) administered during this current examination cycle to ensure the quality of these examinations met or exceeded the criteria established in the Examination Standards and 10 CFR 55.59.

On September 28, 2007, the results of the annual operating tests for 2007 and the written examination for 2006 were reviewed to determine whether pass fail rates were consistent with the guidance of NUREG-1021, Revision 9, Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors. Examination results were also evaluated against criteria in NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, Operator Requalification Human Performance Significance Determination Process (SDP). The inspectors verified the following:

• Crew failure rate on the dynamic simulator test was less than 20 percent. (Failure rate was 6.7 percent);

• Individual failure rate on the dynamic simulator test was less than or equal to 20 percent. (Failure rate was 4 percent);

• Individual failure rate on the walk-through test job performance measures (JPMs) was less than or equal to 20 percent. (Failure rate was 1.3 percent); and

• Individual failure rate on the comprehensive biennial written examination was less than or equal to 20 percent. (Note: This exam was administered in the 2006 examination cycle and failure rate was zero percent).

More than 75 percent of the individuals passed all portions of the exam (94.7 percent of the individuals passed all portions of the exam).

Dynamic simulator exam and JPM administration was observed during the weeks of September 17 and September 24, 2007. These observations included facility evaluations of crew and individual performance during the dynamic simulator examinations and individual performance of five JPMs.

The remediation plans for a crew/individuals failure were reviewed to assess the effectiveness of the remedial training.

The inspectors interviewed instructors, training and operations management personnel, and licensed operators for feedback regarding the implementation of the licensed operator requalification program to ensure the requalification program was meeting their needs and responsive to their noted deficiencies and recommended changes. In addition, plant modifications were reviewed to ensure that they were adequately addressed in the Requalification Training Program.

For the site-specific simulator, the inspectors observed simulator performance during the conduct of the examinations. Simulator performance and fidelity were reviewed for conformance to the reference plant control room. Inspectors interviewed simulator staff regarding current status of hardware and software modifications and open deficiencies. A sample of completed American National Standards Institute (ANSI) ANSI/ANS-3.5-1985 simulator tests were reviewed to verify adherence with the standard and to confirm model fidelity. These sampled tests included normal operations, steady state, malfunction, transient, and deficiency resolution validation. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

A sample of records for requalification training attendance, program feedback, reporting, and medical examinations were reviewed for compliance with license conditions, including NRC regulations.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12Q - 4 Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors evaluated PPLs work practices and corrective actions for selected structures, systems and components (SSC) issues to assess the effectiveness of PPL's maintenance activities. The inspectors reviewed the performance history of those SSCs and assessed PPLs extent-of-condition determinations for those issues with potential common cause or generic implications to evaluate the adequacy of PPLs corrective actions. The inspectors reviewed PPL's problem identification and resolution actions for these issues to evaluate whether PPL had appropriately monitored, evaluated, and dispositioned the issues in accordance with PPL procedures and the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65, "Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance." In addition, the inspectors reviewed selected SSC classification, performance criteria and goals, and PPL's corrective actions that were taken or planned to determine whether the actions were reasonable and appropriate. In addition, the inspectors performed field walkdowns and interviewed PPL staff to determine whether the identified actions were appropriate and to verify that known performance problems were included and evaluated in accordance with the PPL Maintenance Rule program and the corrective action process. The documents reviewed are listed in the

. The following issues were reviewed:

C Common, B emergency diesel generator kilovars (KVAR) fluctuations; C

Units 1 and 2, emergency diesel generator inaccessible underground power cable monitoring per PPL response to Generic Letter 2007-001, "Inaccessible or Underground Power, Cable Failures that Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients";

C Unit 1, control cell friction with four inoperable control rods following testing on September 9, 2007; and C

Unit 2, rod control system issues within the reactor manual control system.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13 - 6 Samples) a.

==

Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the assessment and management of selected maintenance activities to evaluate the effectiveness of PPL's risk management for planned and emergent work. The inspectors compared the risk assessments and risk management actions to the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50.65(a)(4) and the recommendations of Nuclear Utilities Management and Resources Council (NUMARC) 93-01, "Assessment of Risk Resulting from Performance of Maintenance Activities," Section 11. The inspectors evaluated the selected activities to determine whether risk assessments were performed when required and appropriate risk management actions were identified.

The inspectors reviewed scheduled and emergent work activities with licensed operators and work-coordination personnel to evaluate whether risk management action threshold levels were correctly identified. In addition, the inspectors compared the assessed risk configuration to the actual plant conditions and any in-progress evolutions or external events to evaluate whether the assessment was accurate, complete, and appropriate for the emergent work activities. The inspectors performed control room and field walkdowns to verify that the compensatory measures identified by the risk assessments were appropriately performed.

The selected maintenance activities included:

C Common, A engineering safeguard system (ESS) transformer OX201; C

Common, orange risk following declaring E EDG inoperable, CR 896129; C

Common, yellow risk during station blackout (SBO) diesel part replacement activities, PCWO 876900 and release work order (RLWO) 893763; C

Common, E EDG/OB565 bus agastat relay replacement, removed control power from E EDG and undervoltage protection, CR and RLWO 894084; C

Unit 1 RCIC out-of-service following failure of pump discharge check valve, CR 890913; and C

Unit 1 steam jet air ejector (SJAE) work 10701A(B).

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15 - 5 Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors reviewed operability determinations that were selected based on risk insights to assess the adequacy of the evaluations, the use and control of compensatory measures, and compliance with the Technical Specifications. In addition, the inspectors reviewed selected operability determinations to verify that the determinations were performed in accordance with NDAP-QA-0703, "Operability Assessments." The inspectors used the Technical Specifications, Technical Requirements Manual, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), and associated Design Basis Documents as references during these reviews. The issues reviewed included:

C Common, standby gas treatment start, CR 889683; C

Common, refuel floor rad monitor setpoint calculation errors, CR 895253; C

Unit 1, flange bolting on reactor vessel hood spray line; C

Unit 1, RHR scaffolding deficiencies - clearances and tie off points, CR 892152; C

Unit 2, local power range monitor (LPRM) module reset and bypass of average power range monitor (APRM) #1; and

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19 - 7 Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors observed portions of post-maintenance testing activities in the field to determine whether the tests were performed in accordance with the approved procedures.

The inspectors assessed the test adequacy by comparing the test methodology to the scope of maintenance work performed. In addition, the inspectors evaluated acceptance criteria to determine whether the test demonstrated that components satisfied the applicable design and licensing bases and Technical Specification requirements. The inspectors reviewed the recorded test data to determine whether the acceptance criteria were satisfied. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The post-maintenance testing activities reviewed included:

C Common, A EDG aligned testing following engine overhaul, TP-024-145; C

Common, standby gas treatment system (SGTS)/CREOAS in service data collection; C

Unit 1, RCIC flow verification SO-150-002; C

Unit 1, RHR 1A motor breaker replacement, RTPM 783149; C

Unit 1, control rod timing test to verify proper insert and withdraw times, TP-055-010, Revision 4; C

Unit 1, restoration of the A main steam supply to the steam jet air ejector to compensate for a degraded B main steam supply pressure, OP-172-001; and C

Unit 2, 2A residual heat removal service water (RHRSW) re-baseline of reference values for comprehensive flow test.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22 - 5 Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors observed portions of selected surveillance test activities in the control room and in the field and reviewed test data results. The inspectors compared the test results to the established acceptance criteria and the applicable Technical Specification or Technical Requirements Manual operability and surveillance requirements to evaluate whether the systems were capable of performing their intended safety functions. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The sampled surveillance tests included:

C Common, D EDG 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> endurance run/load rejects; C

Common, control structure ventilation system operability testing, SO-030-00 and SE-030-002; C

Unit 1, quarterly RHR system flow verification, Division 1, SO-149-A02; C

Unit 1, In-Service Test (IST) and inspection of B core spray check valve, 152F036B; and C

Unit 2, drywell leakage calculation SO-200-006, Revision 45.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

==1R23 Temporary Plant Modifications (71111.23 - 1 Sample)

a. Inspection Scope

==

The inspectors reviewed a temporary modification (TMOD) to determine whether the temporary change adversely affected system or support system availability, or adversely affected a function important to plant safety. The inspectors reviewed the associated system design bases, including the UFSAR, Technical Specifications, and assessed the adequacy of the safety determination screenings and evaluations. The inspectors also assessed configuration control of the temporary changes by reviewing selected drawings and procedures to verify that appropriate revisions had been made. The inspectors compared the actual installations to the temporary modification documents to determine whether the implemented changes were consistent with the approved documents. The inspectors reviewed selected post installation test results to determine whether the actual impact of the temporary changes had been adequately demonstrated by the test. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The following temporary modification was included in the review:

C Unit 1, turbine control and stop valve closure input to the reactor protection system (RPS) - TMOD #EC 866700.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06 - 1 Sample) Simulator-based Training Event

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted this inspection to assess:

• Training quality and conduct;

• Emergency plan procedure implementation;

• Facility and equipment readiness;

• Personnel performance in drills and exercises;

• Organizational and management changes; and

• Communications equipment readiness.

On August 7, 2007, the inspectors observed a full scale drill. The primary focus of this inspection was to verify SSESs critique of classification, notification, and protective action recommendation (PAR) development activities. Selected portions of the drill were observed in the control room simulator and later in the technical support center (TSC). The inspectors observed licensed operator and emergency response organization (ERO)personnel adherence to the Emergency Plan implementing procedures. The ERO personnel responses to simulated degraded plant conditions were inspected to identify weaknesses and deficiencies in classification and notification. The inspectors also observed the transition of responsibility for the ERO from the shift manager in the simulated control room to the TSC. The inspectors observed SSESs critique of the drill to evaluate SSESs identification of weaknesses and deficiencies. The inspectors compared SSESs identified issues against the inspectors observations to determine whether SSES adequately identified problems and entered them into the corrective action program (CAP).

This inspection activity represented one sample. The documents reviewed are listed in the

.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151 - 8 Samples)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PPLs performance indicator (PI) data for the period of July 2006 through July 2007 to determine whether the PI data was accurate and complete. The inspectors examined selected samples of PI data, PI data summary reports, and other plant records. The inspectors compared the PI data against the guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline.

The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. The following performance indicators were included in this review.

Initiating Event Performance Indicators C

Units 1 & 2 Unplanned Scrams per 7000 Critical Hours (IE01)

C Units 1 & 2 Unplanned Power Changes per 7000 Critical Hours (IE03)

Barrier Integrity Performance Indicators C

Units 1 & 2 RCS Activity (BI01)

C Units 1 & 2 RCS Identified Leak Rate (BI02)

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

(71152 - 1 Annual Sample)

.1 Review of Items Entered into the Corrective Action Program

a. Inspection Scope

As required by inspection procedure (IP) 71152, "Identification and Resolution of Problems,"

and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed screening of all items entered into PPLs corrective action program. This was accomplished by reviewing the description of each new action request/condition report and attending daily management meetings. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Heat Sink Performance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed a sample of CRs related to the selected HXs and service water system, to verify that PPL was appropriately identifying, characterizing, and correcting problems related to these systems and components. Documents reviewed during the inspection are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Annual Sample Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed PPLs evaluation and corrective actions associated with several truck operated cell (TOC) switch failures in 4 kV breakers. The inspectors reviewed condition reports and the associated actions against the requirements of PPLs corrective action program to ensure that the full extent of the issues were identified, appropriate evaluations were performed, and appropriate corrective actions were specified and prioritized. The inspectors interviewed relevant station personnel and reviewed applicable station procedures to ensure that the issues were appropriately addressed.

b. Findings and Observations

No findings of significance were identified. The failure mechanism of the TOC switches was adequately understood and corrective actions were appropriate. PPL adequately tracked the TOC switch issues and incorporated the issues into the overall system health.

However, the inspectors noted that while the issues were adequately identified and tracked, PPL did not accurately prioritize the details of the long term corrective action plan. While the specific over-travel issues were fixed, procedures updated, and the old style TOC switches that failed were replaced with new style switches; there was a delay in completing long term corrective actions due to the lower priority the tasks were assigned. Inspectors observed that corrective actions were adequate to meet regulatory requirements (10 CFR 50 Appendix B), however, the lower priority of some long term corrective actions was unexpected given the number of examples and the known extent of the problem.

4OA3 Event Followup

(71153 - 3 Samples)

.1 (Closed) Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000387/2006-006-00, Automatic Scram Due to

Main Generator Lockout On November 25, 2006, the Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed from 100 percent power as a result of a turbine trip which was in response to a main generator lockout. The main generator automatic voltage regulation circuitry did not respond correctly to changes to the offsite grid which resulted in a loss of generator field and subsequent unit shutdown. All control rods inserted and all safety systems responded as designed in response to the reactor scram. This LER, including the determination of cause, was reviewed by inspectors.

Corrective actions were evaluated against the contributing causes including the PPL identified cause of a lack of sufficient, in-house understanding of the automatic voltage regulator dynamic response and design. The auto-voltage regulator issues were previously inspected under an annual PI&R sample as documented in inspection report 05000387/2007003, Section 4OA2.3. This LER was reviewed by the inspectors and no findings of significance were identified. The inspectors found that the issue is properly captured in the PPL corrective action process with actions to address the apparent causes.

The corrective actions for Unit 1 are scheduled for implementation in October, 2007. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. This LER is closed.

.2 Misposition Control Rod During Sequence Exchange

On July 15, 2007, operators moved a control rod in the wrong direction. The human performance failure was the operator pressing the insert pushbutton instead of the withdraw pushbutton. Residents responded and performed followup inspection of this reactivity control related event. Inspectors observed that for this event the verifier did not prevent the mistake from occurring. Inspectors also performed followup review because PPL staff did not characterize this issue as a mispositioned rod, and the operators did not enter the offnormal procedure for a mispositioned rod. As a result, the inspectors provided PPL management with the observation that the offnormal procedure could be enhanced to define this type of issue as a mispositioned rod. Inspectors reviewed the operator response and the corrective action processing of this issue. This issue was entered into the Corrective Action process (Condition Report #888358). This condition report and associated level 2 cause determination has the specific action to change the procedure definition of a mispositioned rod so as to follow the BWR Owner's group definition. These issues were not considered to be more than minor because there was no effect on mitigating system reliability and the reactor remained within all analyzed core power distribution assumptions.

The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Start of Both Trains of Standby Gas Treatment System (SGTS)

On Friday, July 20, 2007, both fans of the SGTS started automatically and several alarms were received. Shortly after starting, both fans of SGTS stopped automatically and additional alarms were received. Recognizing that two trains of inoperable SGTS would put Susquehanna in a dual-unit, four-hour Technical Specification (TS) required shutdown, the resident inspectors responded to the site to perform followup inspection, including an assessment of PPL's operability and reportability determination.

PPLs initial investigation revealed that this event was caused by work related to the ongoing CREOAS intake modification. Workers were applying a plastic template (for determining bolt hole measurements) over the outside air inlet opening when the template was sucked into and against the intake opening. The workers then immediately removed the template. The field workers reported that they did not realize this outside air inlet was a common inlet for normal control structure ventilation, CREOAS, and SGTS.

Inspectors observed PPLs response to the event including a work stoppage for all work on the associated ductwork modification, the declaration of the SGTS and CREOAS equipment as protected equipment, and the installation of appropriate protective equipment postings. Inspectors reviewed the engineering evaluation which concluded that the plant systems responded as designed for this condition.

Inspectors observed that problems in work control (work planning) and coordination of effected work groups appeared to be a cause of this event. Inspectors found through inspection that the availability of SGTS and CREOAS were not affected. The documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment. No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On October 12, 2007, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. C.

Gannon, Vice President - Nuclear Operations, and other members of his staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

None.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

R. Bogar, EDG System Engineer

B. Boesch, Supervisor Operations Instruction

D. Brophy, Acting Site Supervisor

P. Capotosto, Supervising Engineer, Electrical Engineering

R. Centenaro, Senior Engineer, Nuclear Design

C. Dodge, Supervisor Computer Engineering (Simulator)

R. Fry, Operations Shift Manager

C. Hess, Simulator Instructor

M. Jacopetti, Simulator Instructor

J. Jeanguenot, ESW System Engineer

A. Klopp, Component Engineer

E. Miller, Senior Engineer, Regulatory Affairs

F. Negvesky, Senior Engineer, Electrical Breakers Program Engineering

M. Peal, Training Manager

B. Stitt, Supervisor Operations Training

D. Szatkowski, 13.8KV System Engineer

F. Tarselli, Simulator Instructor

T. Walters, Service Water System Engineer

J. Wolfer, Senior Chemist

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

None

Opened and Closed

None

Closed

05000387/2006-006-00 LER Automatic Scram Due to Main Generator Lockout (Section 4OA3.1)