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{{Adams|number = ML080320590}}
{{Adams
| number = ML081230561
| issue date = 04/30/2008
| title = IR 05000528-07-012, 05000529-07-012, and 05000530-07-012, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Final Significance Determination for a Preliminary White Finding
| author name = Caniano R
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-IV/DRS
| addressee name = Edington R
| addressee affiliation = Arizona Public Service Co
| docket = 05000528, 05000529, 05000530
| license number = NPF-041, NPF-051, NPF-074
| contact person =
| case reference number = EA-08-003
| document report number = IR-07-012
| document type = Letter
| page count = 6
}}


{{IR-Nav| site = 05000528 | year = 2007 | report number = 012 }}
{{IR-Nav| site = 05000528 | year = 2007 | report number = 012 }}


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:
{{#Wiki_filter:April 30, 2008
[[Issue date::February 1, 2008]]


EA-08-003 Randall Senior Vice President, Nuclear Mail Station 7602 Arizona Public Service Company P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, AZ 85072-2034
==SUBJECT:==
PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000528/2007012, 05000529/2007012, AND 05000530/2007012, FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION FOR A PRELIMINARY WHITE FINDING


SUBJECT: PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION: INSPECTION REPORT 05000528/2007012, 05000529/2007012, AND 05000530/2007012; PRELIMINARY WHITE FINDING
==Dear Mr. Edington:==
The purpose of this letter is to provide you the final results of our significance determination of the preliminary White finding identified in the subject inspection report (ADAMS accession number ML080320562) and by letter dated February 1, 2008 (ADAMS accession number ML080320590). The inspection finding was preliminarily characterized as White (i.e., a finding with low to moderate increased importance to safety that may require additional U. S.
 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspections) using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B, Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process. This preliminary White finding, and associated apparent violation of NRC requirements, involved the failure of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station personnel to correct an identified weakness in the performance of senior reactor operators. Specifically, when evaluated during training evolutions beginning in May 2007, a high percentage of senior operators incorrectly classified a general emergency for simulated plant conditions that required a site area emergency declaration, and corrective actions were not completed until October 2007.
 
At your request, a Regulatory Conference was held on March 25, 2008, to further discuss your views on this issue. A copy of the presentation you provided at this meeting is attached to the Regulatory Conference Meeting Summary dated April 10, 2008 (ADAMS accession number ML081020348). During the meeting, your staff described your assessment of the significance of the findings and detailed corrective actions to address the failure to correct the weakness in senior reactor operator performance. Specifically,
 
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION R E GI ON I V 611 RYAN PLAZA DRIV E, SUITE 400 ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4005
 
Arizona Public Service Company
- 2 -
*
You agreed that beginning on May 2, 2007, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station personnel identified a knowledge deficiency among senior operators regarding their evaluation of the reactor coolant fission product barrier and knowledge of the definition of prolonged release, that the station corrective action program was not effectively used when the knowledge deficiency was identified, and that the knowledge deficiency was not corrected until October 25, 2007.
* You discussed your analysis of the job performance measure that identified the knowledge deficiency, and concluded that the job performance measure was incomplete and technically flawed.
* You discussed your view that the failure by Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station personnel to promptly correct the identified knowledge deficiency had very low safety significance because the knowledge deficiency could not result in an incorrect emergency classification during an actual plant event involving a steam generator tube rupture and use of the atmospheric dump valves for reactor coolant temperature control.
* You discussed corrective actions that included requiring the operations training department to enter errors discovered in operator examination materials and operator failures on examinations and job performance measures into the corrective action program, initiating routine trending of weaknesses in operator performance during training, and requiring the concurrence of the emergency preparedness department on examinations and job performance measures used to test operator knowledge of emergency preparedness topics.
* Following the conference you provided additional information (ADAMS accession number ML081130231), in response to our request, describing the simulator scenarios that formed the basis for your determination that the knowledge deficiency could not result in an incorrect classification during a steam generator tube rupture event.
 
After considering the information you provided during and following the conference, the NRC has concluded that the knowledge deficiency identified among senior operators would not likely result in an incorrect emergency classification during a steam generator tube rupture event.
 
Specifically, the NRC concluded that, given the identified knowledge weakness, an incorrect classification of a steam generator tube rupture event with atmospheric dump valves in operation can only occur with a concurrent potential loss of the fuel clad barrier, and that under these conditions all credible scenarios resulting in potential losses of the fuel clad barrier also cause loss of the reactor coolant barrier. The combination of a potential loss of the fuel clad barrier, loss of reactor coolant barrier, and the loss of containment barrier which results from operating the atmospheric dump valves, results in a general emergency condition, irrespective of the operators knowledge of whether a prolonged release is occurring. The NRC has determined your analysis of steam generator tube rupture events reasonably bounds the possible scenarios leading to a potential loss of the fuel clad barrier.
 
Arizona Public Service Company
- 3 -
 
Because the identified knowledge deficiency among senior operators would not likely result in an incorrect emergency classification during an actual plant event, the NRC has concluded the significance of the inspection finding is appropriately characterized as Green (i.e., a finding of very low safety significance).
 
The NRC has also determined the failure to correct an identified weakness in emergency preparedness performance with a promptness appropriate to its risk significance is a violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV(F)(2)(g). The circumstances surrounding the violation are described in detail in the subject inspection report. This violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy. Therefore, no response to this letter is necessary. However, if you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this letter, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-001, with copies to; (1) the Regional Administrator, Region IV; (2) the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-001; and (3) the NRC Resident Inspector at Palo Verde.
 
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response, if you choose to provide one, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction.
 
Sincerely,
/RA/
 
Roy Caniano, Director
 
Division of Reactor Safety
 
Dockets: 50-528; 50-529; 50-530 Licenses: NPF-41; NPF-51; NPF-74
 
cc:
Steve Olea Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington Street Phoenix, AZ 85007
 
Arizona Public Service Company
- 4 -
 
Douglas K. Porter, Senior Counsel Southern California Edison Company Law Department, Generation Resources P.O. Box 800 Rosemead, CA 91770
 
Chairman Maricopa County Board of Supervisors 301 W. Jefferson, 10th Floor Phoenix, AZ 85003
 
Aubrey V. Godwin, Director Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency 4814 South 40 Street Phoenix, AZ 85040
 
Scott Bauer, Director Regulatory Affairs Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Mail Station 7636 P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, AZ 85072-2034
 
Mr. Dwight C. Mims Vice President, Regulatory Affairs and Performance Improvement Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Mail Station 7605 P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, AZ 85072-2034
 
Jeffrey T. Weikert Assistant General Counsel El Paso Electric Company Mail Location 167 123 W. Mills El Paso, TX 79901
 
Eric J. Tharp Los Angeles Department of Water & Power Southern California Public Power Authority P.O. Box 51111, Room 1255-C Los Angeles, CA 90051-0100
 
Arizona Public Service Company
- 5 -
 
James Ray Public Service Company of New Mexico 2401 Aztec NE, MS Z110 Albuquerque, NM 87107-4224
 
Geoffrey M. Cook Southern California Edison Company 5000 Pacific Coast Hwy, Bldg. D21 San Clemente, CA 92672
 
Robert Henry Salt River Project 6504 East Thomas Road Scottsdale, AZ 85251


==Dear Mr. Edington:==
Brian Almon Public Utility Commission William B. Travis Building P.O. Box 13326 1701 North Congress Avenue Austin, TX 78701-3326
This letter discusses a finding that appears to have low-to-moderate safety significance. As described in Section 5.7 of NRC Inspection Report 05000528/2007012, 05000529/2007012, and 05000530/2007012, weaknesses in senior operators' ability to implement Emergency Action Level 1-7 (potential loss of the reactor coolant system barrier) were identified by Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station during emergency response organization training for operators, and the weaknesses were not corrected in a timely manner appropriate to the significance of the knowledge deficiencies. Specifically, when evaluated during training evolutions beginning in May 2007, a high percentage of senior operators incorrectly declared a general emergency for simulated plant conditions that would require only a site area emergency declaration, and corrective actions were not completed until October 2007. The NRC determined that weaknesses associated with the senior operators' implementation of Emergency Action Level 1-7 were identified on or about May 2, 2007, during Licensed Operator Continuing Training, Cycle 3. Subsequently, the same weaknesses were observed during an initial license examination in July 2007, and again during the subject NRC inspection in October 2007. The NRC determined that the weaknesses were not entered into the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station's corrective action program until August 2007, and corrective actions to address the weaknesses for on-watch senior operators were not implemented until October 2007. The NRC determined that corrective actions were implemented to correct the weaknesses of those senior operators and senior operator candidates whose implementation of Emergency Action Level 1-7 were specifically evaluated; however, actions to ensure the correct implementation of Emergency Action Level 1-7 by all on-shift senior operators were not performed in a timely manner when the weakness was identified (reference NRC Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B, Section 5.0). Randall This finding was assessed based on the best available information, including influential assumptions, using the applicable significance determination process and was preliminarily determined to be a White finding. The final resolution of this finding will convey the increment in the importance to safety by assigning the corresponding color, i.e., (WHITE) a finding with some increased importance to safety, which may require additional NRC inspection. The finding has a low-to-moderate safety significance because the identified senior operator performance weakness in implementing an emergency action level was associated with risk significant planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). Part 50.47(b)(4) is a risk significant planning standard as described in Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix B, Section 2.0. The performance deficiency constituted a planning standard functional failure because Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station failed to correct a performance deficiency associated with a risk significant planning standard within a time appropriate to its significance. The finding is also an apparent violation of NRC requirements 10 CFR 50.54(q) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV.F.2.g., and is being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The current Enforcement Policy is available on the NRC's Web site at www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html.
 
Karen O' Regan Environmental Program Manager City of Phoenix Office of Environmental Programs 200 West Washington Street Phoenix, AZ 85003
 
Matthew Benac Assistant Vice President Nuclear & Generation Services El Paso Electric Company 340 East Palm Lane, Suite 310 Phoenix, AZ 85004
 
Chief, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Section National Preparedness Directorate Technological Hazards Division Department of Homeland Security 1111 Broadway, Suite 1200 Oakland, CA 94607-4052
 
Arizona Public Service Company
- 6 -  
 
Electronic distribution by RIV:
Regional Administrator (Elmo.Collins@nrc.gov)
DRP Director (Dwight.Chamberlain@nrc.gov)
DRS Director (Roy.Caniano@nrc.gov)
DRS Deputy Director (Troy.Pruett@nrc.gov)
Senior Resident Inspector (Greg.Warnick@nrc.gov)
Branch Chief, DRP/D (Michael.Hay@nrc.gov)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/D (Greg.Werner@nrc.gov)
Senior Project Engineer, DRP/D (Geoff Miller@nrc.gov)
Team Leader, DRP/TSS (Chuck.Paulk@nrc.gov)
RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov)
 
DISTRIBUTION:
via e-mail:
AHowell - ATH Fuller - KSF
 
C Maier - MCM1 Vasquez - GMV D Furst, NSIR Vegel - AXV


The apparent violation and underlying performance deficiency was discussed during a conference call between Messrs. S. Bauer, Department Leader, Regulatory Affairs; E. O'Neil, Department Leader, Emergency Preparedness; and R. Lantz, Chief, Operations Branch, NRC Region IV, on January 9, 2008.
N Hilton, OE June Cai, OE Lantz - REL John Wray, OE


Before we make a final decision on this matter, we are providing you an opportunity, (1) to present to the NRC at a Regulatory Conference your perspectives on the facts and assumptions used by the NRC to arrive at the finding and its significance, or (2) submit your position on the finding to the NRC in writing. If you request a Regulatory Conference, it should be held within 30 days of the receipt of this letter and we encourage you to submit supporting documentation at least one week prior to the conference in an effort to make the conference more efficient and effective. If a Regulatory Conference is held, it will be open for public observation. If you decide to submit only a written response, such submittal should be sent to the NRC within 30 days of receiving this letter.
Warnick - GXW Coleman - PRC


Please contact Mr. Ryan E. Lantz, Chief, Operations Branch, Division of Reactor Safety, at (817) 860-8159, within 10 business days of the date of this letter to notify the NRC of your intentions. If we have not heard from you within 10 days, we will continue with our significance determination and enforcement decision, and you will be advised by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter. Since the NRC has not made a final determination in this matter, no Notice of Violation is being issued for this inspection finding at this time. In addition, please be advised that the number and characterization of apparent violations described in the subject inspection report may change as a result of further NRC review.
Starkey, OE - DRS Mary Ann Ashley, NRR


Randall In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
M Burrell, OE Dricks - VLD


Sincerely,/RA/ Roy J. Caniano, Director Division of Reactor Safety Dockets: 50-528; 50-529; 50-530 Licenses: NPF-41; NPF-51; NPF-74 cc: Steve Olea Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington Street Phoenix, AZ 85007 Douglas K. Porter, Senior Counsel Southern California Edison Company Law Department, Generation Resources P.O. Box 800 Rosemead, CA 91770 Chairman Maricopa County Board of Supervisors 301 W. Jefferson, 10th Floor Phoenix, AZ 85003 Aubrey V. Godwin, Director Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency 4814 South 40 Street Phoenix, AZ 85040 Scott Bauer, Director Regulatory Affairs Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Mail Station 7636 P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, AZ 85072-2034 Randall Mr. Dwight C. Mims Vice President, Regulatory Affairs and Performance Improvement Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Mail Station 7636 P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, AZ 85072-2034 Jeffrey T. Weikert Assistant General Counsel El Paso Electric Company Mail Location 167 123 W. Mills El Paso, TX 79901 Eric J. Tharp Director of Generation Los Angeles Department of Water & Power Southern California Public Power Authority P.O. Box 51111, Room 1255 Los Angeles, CA 90051-5700 John Taylor Public Service Company of New Mexico 2401 Aztec NE, MS Z110 Albuquerque, NM 87107-4224 Geoffrey M. Cook Southern California Edison Company 5000 Pacific Coast Hwy, Bldg. D21 San Clemente, CA 92672 Robert Henry Salt River Project 6504 East Thomas Road Scottsdale, AZ 85251 Brian Almon Public Utility Commission William B. Travis Building P.O. Box 13326 1701 North Congress Avenue Austin, TX 78701-3326 Karen O' Regan Environmental Program Manager City of Phoenix Office of Environmental Programs 200 West Washington Street Phoenix, AZ 85003
Wm Maier - WAM R Barnes, OE Robert Kahler


Randall Matthew Benac Assistant Vice President Nuclear & Generation Services El Paso Electric Company 340 East Palm Lane, Suite 310 Phoenix, AZ 85004 Chief, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Section National Preparedness Directorate Technological Hazards Division Department of Homeland Security 1111 Broadway, Suite 1200 Oakland, CA 94607-4052 Randall Electronic distribution by RIV: Regional Administrator (EEC) DRP Director (ATH) DRS Director (DDC) DRS Deputy Director (RJC1) Senior Resident Inspector (GXW2)
SUNSI Review Completed: __Yes___ ADAMS: U Yes G No Initials: __PJE__
Branch Chief, DRP/D (TWP) Senior Project Engineer, DRP/D (GEW) Team Leader, DRP/TSS (CJP) RITS Coordinator (MSH3) M. Vasquez V. Dricks W. Maier D. Starkey, OE N. Hilton, OE Mary Ann Ashley, NRR R. Kahler, NSIR K. Williams, NSIR
U Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive U Non-Sensitive


SUNSI Review Completed: ___Y___ADAMS: Yes No Initials: _REL_____ Publicly Available Non-Publicly Available Sensitive Non-Sensitive S:DRS\reports\PV white letter.doc C:OB C:PBD NSIR ACES D:DRS RELantz/lmb TPruett KWilliams MVasquez RJCaniano /RA/ /RA/ /RA/ E /RA/ /RA/ 1/15/08 1/17/08 1/28/08 1/25/08 1/29/08 / 2/1/08 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax
SEPI:OB ACES C:OB C:PBD OE ACES D:DRS PJElkmann/lmb MVasquez RELantz MHay JWray KFuller RJCaniano  
/RA/
/RA/  
/RA/  
/RA/  
/RA/  
/RA/  
/RA/
4/17/08 4/22/08 4/22/08 4/24/08 4/29/08 4/22/08 4/30/08 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 16:56, 14 January 2025

IR 05000528-07-012, 05000529-07-012, and 05000530-07-012, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2, and 3, Final Significance Determination for a Preliminary White Finding
ML081230561
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde  Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 04/30/2008
From: Caniano R
Division of Reactor Safety IV
To: Edington R
Arizona Public Service Co
References
EA-08-003 IR-07-012
Download: ML081230561 (6)
v • d • e


Text

April 30, 2008

SUBJECT:

PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION, UNITS 1, 2, AND 3 - NRC INSPECTION REPORT 05000528/2007012, 05000529/2007012, AND 05000530/2007012, FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION FOR A PRELIMINARY WHITE FINDING

Dear Mr. Edington:

The purpose of this letter is to provide you the final results of our significance determination of the preliminary White finding identified in the subject inspection report (ADAMS accession number ML080320562) and by letter dated February 1, 2008 (ADAMS accession number ML080320590). The inspection finding was preliminarily characterized as White (i.e., a finding with low to moderate increased importance to safety that may require additional U. S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspections) using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B, Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process. This preliminary White finding, and associated apparent violation of NRC requirements, involved the failure of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station personnel to correct an identified weakness in the performance of senior reactor operators. Specifically, when evaluated during training evolutions beginning in May 2007, a high percentage of senior operators incorrectly classified a general emergency for simulated plant conditions that required a site area emergency declaration, and corrective actions were not completed until October 2007.

At your request, a Regulatory Conference was held on March 25, 2008, to further discuss your views on this issue. A copy of the presentation you provided at this meeting is attached to the Regulatory Conference Meeting Summary dated April 10, 2008 (ADAMS accession number ML081020348). During the meeting, your staff described your assessment of the significance of the findings and detailed corrective actions to address the failure to correct the weakness in senior reactor operator performance. Specifically,

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION R E GI ON I V 611 RYAN PLAZA DRIV E, SUITE 400 ARLINGTON, TEXAS 76011-4005

Arizona Public Service Company

- 2 -

You agreed that beginning on May 2, 2007, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station personnel identified a knowledge deficiency among senior operators regarding their evaluation of the reactor coolant fission product barrier and knowledge of the definition of prolonged release, that the station corrective action program was not effectively used when the knowledge deficiency was identified, and that the knowledge deficiency was not corrected until October 25, 2007.

  • You discussed your view that the failure by Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station personnel to promptly correct the identified knowledge deficiency had very low safety significance because the knowledge deficiency could not result in an incorrect emergency classification during an actual plant event involving a steam generator tube rupture and use of the atmospheric dump valves for reactor coolant temperature control.
  • You discussed corrective actions that included requiring the operations training department to enter errors discovered in operator examination materials and operator failures on examinations and job performance measures into the corrective action program, initiating routine trending of weaknesses in operator performance during training, and requiring the concurrence of the emergency preparedness department on examinations and job performance measures used to test operator knowledge of emergency preparedness topics.
  • Following the conference you provided additional information (ADAMS accession number ML081130231), in response to our request, describing the simulator scenarios that formed the basis for your determination that the knowledge deficiency could not result in an incorrect classification during a steam generator tube rupture event.

After considering the information you provided during and following the conference, the NRC has concluded that the knowledge deficiency identified among senior operators would not likely result in an incorrect emergency classification during a steam generator tube rupture event.

Specifically, the NRC concluded that, given the identified knowledge weakness, an incorrect classification of a steam generator tube rupture event with atmospheric dump valves in operation can only occur with a concurrent potential loss of the fuel clad barrier, and that under these conditions all credible scenarios resulting in potential losses of the fuel clad barrier also cause loss of the reactor coolant barrier. The combination of a potential loss of the fuel clad barrier, loss of reactor coolant barrier, and the loss of containment barrier which results from operating the atmospheric dump valves, results in a general emergency condition, irrespective of the operators knowledge of whether a prolonged release is occurring. The NRC has determined your analysis of steam generator tube rupture events reasonably bounds the possible scenarios leading to a potential loss of the fuel clad barrier.

Arizona Public Service Company

- 3 -

Because the identified knowledge deficiency among senior operators would not likely result in an incorrect emergency classification during an actual plant event, the NRC has concluded the significance of the inspection finding is appropriately characterized as Green (i.e., a finding of very low safety significance).

The NRC has also determined the failure to correct an identified weakness in emergency preparedness performance with a promptness appropriate to its risk significance is a violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, IV(F)(2)(g). The circumstances surrounding the violation are described in detail in the subject inspection report. This violation is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation (NCV), consistent with Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy. Therefore, no response to this letter is necessary. However, if you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this letter, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-001, with copies to; (1) the Regional Administrator, Region IV; (2) the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-001; and (3) the NRC Resident Inspector at Palo Verde.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response, if you choose to provide one, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room). To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Roy Caniano, Director

Division of Reactor Safety

Dockets: 50-528; 50-529; 50-530 Licenses: NPF-41; NPF-51; NPF-74

cc:

Steve Olea Arizona Corporation Commission 1200 W. Washington Street Phoenix, AZ 85007

Arizona Public Service Company

- 4 -

Douglas K. Porter, Senior Counsel Southern California Edison Company Law Department, Generation Resources P.O. Box 800 Rosemead, CA 91770

Chairman Maricopa County Board of Supervisors 301 W. Jefferson, 10th Floor Phoenix, AZ 85003

Aubrey V. Godwin, Director Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency 4814 South 40 Street Phoenix, AZ 85040

Scott Bauer, Director Regulatory Affairs Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Mail Station 7636 P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, AZ 85072-2034

Mr. Dwight C. Mims Vice President, Regulatory Affairs and Performance Improvement Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Mail Station 7605 P.O. Box 52034 Phoenix, AZ 85072-2034

Jeffrey T. Weikert Assistant General Counsel El Paso Electric Company Mail Location 167 123 W. Mills El Paso, TX 79901

Eric J. Tharp Los Angeles Department of Water & Power Southern California Public Power Authority P.O. Box 51111, Room 1255-C Los Angeles, CA 90051-0100

Arizona Public Service Company

- 5 -

James Ray Public Service Company of New Mexico 2401 Aztec NE, MS Z110 Albuquerque, NM 87107-4224

Geoffrey M. Cook Southern California Edison Company 5000 Pacific Coast Hwy, Bldg. D21 San Clemente, CA 92672

Robert Henry Salt River Project 6504 East Thomas Road Scottsdale, AZ 85251

Brian Almon Public Utility Commission William B. Travis Building P.O. Box 13326 1701 North Congress Avenue Austin, TX 78701-3326

Karen O' Regan Environmental Program Manager City of Phoenix Office of Environmental Programs 200 West Washington Street Phoenix, AZ 85003

Matthew Benac Assistant Vice President Nuclear & Generation Services El Paso Electric Company 340 East Palm Lane, Suite 310 Phoenix, AZ 85004

Chief, Radiological Emergency Preparedness Section National Preparedness Directorate Technological Hazards Division Department of Homeland Security 1111 Broadway, Suite 1200 Oakland, CA 94607-4052

Arizona Public Service Company

- 6 -

Electronic distribution by RIV:

Regional Administrator (Elmo.Collins@nrc.gov)

DRP Director (Dwight.Chamberlain@nrc.gov)

DRS Director (Roy.Caniano@nrc.gov)

DRS Deputy Director (Troy.Pruett@nrc.gov)

Senior Resident Inspector (Greg.Warnick@nrc.gov)

Branch Chief, DRP/D (Michael.Hay@nrc.gov)

Senior Project Engineer, DRP/D (Greg.Werner@nrc.gov)

Senior Project Engineer, DRP/D (Geoff Miller@nrc.gov)

Team Leader, DRP/TSS (Chuck.Paulk@nrc.gov)

RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov)

DISTRIBUTION:

via e-mail:

AHowell - ATH Fuller - KSF

C Maier - MCM1 Vasquez - GMV D Furst, NSIR Vegel - AXV

N Hilton, OE June Cai, OE Lantz - REL John Wray, OE

Warnick - GXW Coleman - PRC

Starkey, OE - DRS Mary Ann Ashley, NRR

M Burrell, OE Dricks - VLD

Wm Maier - WAM R Barnes, OE Robert Kahler

SUNSI Review Completed: __Yes___ ADAMS: U Yes G No Initials: __PJE__

U Publicly Available G Non-Publicly Available G Sensitive U Non-Sensitive

SEPI:OB ACES C:OB C:PBD OE ACES D:DRS PJElkmann/lmb MVasquez RELantz MHay JWray KFuller RJCaniano

/RA/

/RA/

/RA/

/RA/

/RA/

/RA/

/RA/

4/17/08 4/22/08 4/22/08 4/24/08 4/29/08 4/22/08 4/30/08 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY T=Telephone E=E-mail F=Fax

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