IR 05000335/2009002

Errata - IR 05000335-09-002, 05000389-09-002, 05000335-09-501, 05000389-09-501, on January 1 to March 31, 2009, St. Lucie Units 1 & 2 - NRC Integrated Inspection Report

ML092430406
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	04/30/2009
From:	Marvin Sykes NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB3
To:	Nazar M Florida Power & Light Co
References
IR-09-002, IR-09-501
Download: ML092430406 (10)

Text

April 30, 2009

SUBJECT:

ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000335/2009002, 05000389/2009002

Dear Mr. Nazar:

March 31, 2009

SUBJECT:

ERRATA - ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 05000335/2009002, 05000389/2009002 AND 5000335/2009501, 05000389/2009501

Dear Mr. Nazar:

On March 31, 2009, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your St. Lucie Plant. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on April 2, 2009, with Mr. Johnston and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they related to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

This report documents three NRC identified findings and one self-revealing finding, all of very low safety significance (Green). Additionally, one licensee-identified violation which was determined to be of very low safety significance is listed in Section 4OA7 of this report. These findings were determined to involve violations of NRC requirements. However, because of the very low safety significance and because they are entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating the findings as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. If you contest any NCV or disagree with an assigned cross-cutting aspect in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial or disagreement, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator, Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the St. Lucie facility. In addition, if you disagree with the characterization of any finding in this report, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and the NRC Resident Inspector at the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant. The information you provide will be considered in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter 0305

FP&L

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRCs document system (ADAMS). Adams is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Marvin D. Sykes, Chief

Rector Projects Branch 3

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-335, 50-389 License Nos.: DPR-67, NPF-16

Enclosure:

Inspection Report 05000335/2009002, 05000389/2009002

w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket Nos:

50-335, 50-389

License Nos:

DPR-67, NPF-16

Report No:

05000335/2009002, 05000389/2009002

Licensee:

Florida Power & Light Company (FP&L)

Facility:

St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2

Location:

6351 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach, FL 34957

Dates:

January 1 to March 31, 2009

Inspectors:

T. Hoeg, Senior Resident Inspector

S. Sanchez, Resident Inspector

S. Ninh, Senior Project Engineer

L. Miller, Senior Reactor Inspector

R. Bernhard, Senior Reactor Analyst

Approved by:

M. Sykes, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket Nos:

50-335, 50-389

License Nos:

DPR-67, NPF-16

Report No:

05000335/2009002, 05000389/2009002 and

05000335/2009501, 05000389/2009501

Licensee:

Florida Power & Light Company (FP&L)

Facility:

St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2

Location:

6351 South Ocean Drive Jensen Beach, FL 34957

Dates:

January 1 to March 31, 2009

Inspectors:

T. Hoeg, Senior Resident Inspector

S. Sanchez, Resident Inspector

S. Ninh, Senior Project Engineer

L. Miller, Senior Reactor Inspector

R. Bernhard, Senior Reactor Analyst

Approved by:

M. Sykes, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000335/2009-002, 05000389/2009-002; 01/01/2009 - 3/31/2009; St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2; Event Follow-up, Other Activities, Surveillance Testing, Identification and Resolution of Problems.

The report covered a three month period of inspection by resident inspectors and several region based inspectors. The significance of most findings is identified by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, and Revision 4, dated December 2006.

A.

Inspector Identified & Self-Revealing Findings

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

Green. A self-revealing finding was identified for failure to implement adequate process controls to minimize risk during maintenance on the Unit 2, 5B feedwater heater high level limit switch resulting in a manual reactor trip on June 4, 2008. No violations of NRC requirements were identified because the feedwater heater drain system is non-safety related. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as condition report (CR) 2008-18858. Corrective actions included development of specific procedural direction for controlling and insulating energized control circuit leads during work evolutions using the risk management process, design modifications to address vulnerability when performing maintenance on level switches, and evaluation of industry best practices for training and handling of energized leads.

The finding was more than minor because it resulted in a manual reactor trip. The finding was associated with the human performance attribute and affected the Initiating Events cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as at power operations. Using the NRC Manual Chapter 0609, ASignificance Determination Process,@ Attachment 609.04, Phase 1 screening worksheet, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it was a transient initiator but did not increase the likelihood that mitigation equipment would not be available. The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, with a work control component. Specifically, the licensee did not adequately plan work activities to minimize the risk of grounding the energized leads (H.3(a)). (Section 4OA3).

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green. The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of Technical Specifications 3.8.1, AC Sources, for failure to perform a required monthly surveillance test in its entirety. Specifically, the inspectors identified that St. Lucie has not performed Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) technical specification (TS) surveillance requirement 4.8.1.1.2 as written to verify the fuel oil transfer pumps will transfer fuel from

Enclosure SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000335/2009-002, 05000389/2009-002; 01/01/2009 - 3/31/2009; and IR 05000335/2009-501, 05000389/2009-501; 02/09/2009 - 02/13/2009, St. Lucie Nuclear Plant, Units 1 & 2; Event Follow-up, Other Activities, Surveillance Testing, Identification and Resolution of Problems.

The report covered a three month period of inspection by resident inspectors and several region based inspectors. The significance of most findings is identified by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, and Revision 4, dated December 2006.

B.

Inspector Identified & Self-Revealing Findings

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

Green. A self-revealing finding was identified for failure to implement adequate process controls to minimize risk during maintenance on the Unit 2, 5B feedwater heater high level limit switch resulting in a manual reactor trip on June 4, 2008. No violations of NRC requirements were identified because the feedwater heater drain system is non-safety related. The licensee entered the issue into the corrective action program as condition report (CR) 2008-18858. Corrective actions included development of specific procedural direction for controlling and insulating energized control circuit leads during work evolutions using the risk management process, design modifications to address vulnerability when performing maintenance on level switches, and evaluation of industry best practices for training and handling of energized leads.

The finding was more than minor because it resulted in a manual reactor trip. The finding was associated with the human performance attribute and affected the Initiating Events cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as at power operations. Using the NRC Manual Chapter 0609, ASignificance Determination Process,@ Attachment 609.04, Phase 1 screening worksheet, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it was a transient initiator but did not increase the likelihood that mitigation equipment would not be available. The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, with a work control component. Specifically, the licensee did not adequately plan work activities to minimize the risk of grounding the energized leads (H.3(a)). (Section 4OA3).

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

Green. The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of Technical Specifications 3.8.1, AC Sources, for failure to perform a required monthly surveillance test in its entirety. Specifically, the inspectors identified that St. Lucie has not performed Unit 1 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) technical specification (TS) surveillance requirement 4.8.1.1.2 as written to verify the fuel oil transfer pumps will transfer fuel from