ML101090509

IR 05000335-10-007 & 05000389-10-007 for St. Lucie, Final Significance Determination of Yellow Finding & Notice of Violation

ML101090509
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	04/19/2010
From:	Reyes L Region 2 Administrator
To:	Nazar M Florida Power & Light Co
References
EA-09-321, IR-10-007 IR-10-007
Download: ML101090509 (10)

See also: IR 05000335/2010007

Text

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

245 PEACHTREE CENTER AVENUE, SUITE 1200

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-1257

April 19, 2010

EA-09-321

Mr. Mano Nazar

Executive Vice President and

Chief Nuclear Officer

Florida Power & Light Company

P.O. Box 14000

Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420

SUBJECT:

FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION OF A YELLOW FINDING AND

NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASES INSPECTION

REPORT 05000335/2010007 AND 05000389/2010007), ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR

PLANT

Dear Mr. Nazar:

The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the disposition and final significance

determination of the two preliminary Greater than Green findings discussed in NRC Inspection

Report No. 05000335/2009006 and 05000389/2009006, dated January 19, 2010,

(ML100210081). The two preliminary findings were related to air intrusion into the Component

Cooling Water (CCW) system that occurred in October 2008, and involved (1) the failure of a

non-safety system that could result in a common cause failure of both trains of the CCW

system, contrary to 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, and (2) the failure to

identify and correct a condition adverse to quality involving the source of the air in-leakage into

the CCW system, contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action. The

NRCs Inspection Report identified two apparent violations corresponding to the two preliminary

findings.

At your request, a Regulatory Conference was held on February 19, 2010, to discuss your views

on these issues. During the conference, your staff described the circumstances surrounding the

October 2008 event, Florida Power and Light Companys (FPLs) assessment of the

significance of the two preliminary findings, its root cause evaluation, and the corrective actions

taken. FPL highlighted several differences between its risk assessment and the NRCs

preliminary risk assessment as documented in our inspection report of January 19, 2010. At the

conference, FPL contested the preliminary finding and apparent violation involving 10 CFR 50,

Appendix B, Criterion III. In summary, FPL concluded that when St. Lucie Unit 1 was licensed,

the facility was not required to incorporate a single failure design capability for a non-safety

system. As such, FPL concluded that a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, did not

occur. Regarding the second preliminary finding involving the failure to identify and correct the

source of air in-leakage into the CCW system, FPL concluded that the significance of the finding

should be characterized as Green. FPL did not contest the validity of the corresponding

10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI violation.

FPL

2

Regarding the preliminary finding involving 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, the NRC

considered the information provided by FPL at the conference, and reviewed available

information to determine the applicability of design control regulations to St. Lucie Unit 1. This

included a review of the requirements at the time St. Lucie Unit 1 was originally licensed, the

Safety Evaluation Report issued by the NRC following the review of St. Lucie Unit 1 design, the

Final Safety Analysis Report, and the single failure analysis associated with the CCW system.

Based on the review, the NRC determined that the Unit 1 CCW system met the design

requirements at the time of licensing and at the time of the October 2008 air intrusion event.

Therefore, this issue does not represent a performance deficiency, and accordingly, a violation

of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III did not occur. Accordingly, Apparent Violation

05000335, 389/2009006-05, Failure to Translate Design Basis Specifications to Prevent Single

Failure of CCW is considered closed.

After considering the information developed during the inspection and information provided by

FPL during and after the conference, the NRC has concluded that the finding involving the

failure to identify and correct the source of the air in-leakage into the CCW system is

characterized as Yellow, i.e., a finding of substantial significance with regard to safety, which will

require additional NRC inspections. The bases for the NRCs significance determination of this

finding, and the differences in the licensees characterization of the findings, are discussed in

Enclosure 2.

You have 30 calendar days from the date of this letter to appeal the staff=s significance

determination for the Yellow finding. Such appeals will be considered to have merit only if they

meet the criteria given in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 2.

The NRC also has determined that the failure to identify and correct the source of the air in-

leakage into the CCW system is a violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, as cited in

the enclosed Notice of Violation (Notice). The circumstances surrounding the violation were

described in detail in NRC Inspection Report No. 05000335/2009006 and 05000389/2009006,

dated January 19, 2010 (ML100210081). In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the

Notice is considered escalated enforcement action because it is associated with a Yellow

finding.

For administrative purposes, this letter is issued as a separate NRC Inspection Report,

No. 05000335/2010007 and 05000389/2010007. Apparent Violation 05000335, 389/2009006-

06, related to the CCW air intrusion event, is now Violation 05000335/2009006-06, Failure to

Identify and Correct a Condition Adverse to Quality. This violation was determined to have a

cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Decision Making, specifically H.1(a).

Because plant performance for this issue has been determined to be beyond the licensee

response band of the NRC Action Matrix, we will use the Action Matrix to determine the most

appropriate NRC response for this event. We will notify you, by separate correspondence, of

that determination.

The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violation, the corrective

actions taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent recurrence and the date when full

compliance will be achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket in the St. Lucie

FPL

3

Meeting Summary, dated February 26, 2010 (ML100601170). Therefore, you are not required

to respond to this letter unless the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective

actions or your position. However, you are required to submit a written statement or explanation

pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201 if the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective

actions or your position. In that case, please follow the instructions specified in the Notice of

Violation, Enclosure 1.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter,

Enclosures 1 and 2, and your response, if any, will be made available electronically for public

inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC=s document system (ADAMS),

accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent

possible, your response, if any, should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or

safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction. If

personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response,

please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that should be

protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you request

withholding of such information, you must specifically identify the portions of your response that

you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g.,

explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal

privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for

withholding confidential commercial or financial information). The NRC also includes significant

enforcement actions on its Web site at

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/enforcement/actions/).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Luis A. Reyes

Regional Administrator

Docket Nos.: 50-335, 50-389

License Nos.: DPR-67 and NPF-16

Enclosures: 1. Notice of Violation

2. NRC Bases for Final Significance Determination

cc w/encls: (See page 4)

_________________________

G SUNSI REVIEW COMPLETE

OFFICE

RII:ORA

RII:DRS

RII:DRS

RII:DRS

RII:DRP

RII:DRS

RII:ORA

SIGNATURE

RA

RA

RA

VIA EMAIL

RA

RA

RA

NAME

CEvans

WRogers

BDesai

KKennedy

LWert

JLubinski

VMcCree

DATE

4/7/2010

4/5/2010

3/31/2010

4/14/2010

4/14/20104/

/2010

4/13/20104/

/2010

4/15/2010

E-MAIL COPY?

YES

NO YES

NO YES

NO YES

NO YES

NO YES

NO YES

NO

OFFICE

OE

NRR

SIGNATURE

email

Email

NAME

RZimmerman

MCUNNINGHAM

DATE

4/14/2010

4/8/2010

4/ /2010

4/ /2010

4/ /2010

4/ /2010

4/ /2010

E-MAIL COPY?

YES

NO YES

NO YES

NO YES

NO YES

NO YES

NO YES

NO

FPL

4

cc w/encl:

Richard L. Anderson

Site Vice President

St. Lucie Nuclear Plant

Electronic Mail Distribution

Robert J. Hughes

Plant General Manager

St. Lucie Nuclear Plant

Electronic Mail Distribution

Gene St. Pierre

Vice President, Fleet Support

Florida Power & Light Company

Electronic Mail Distribution

Ronnie Lingle

Operations Manager

St. Lucie Nuclear Plant

Electronic Mail Distribution

Eric Katzman

Licensing Manager

St. Lucie Nuclear Plant

Electronic Mail Distribution

Abdy Khanpour

Vice President

Engineering Support

Florida Power and Light Company

P.O. Box 14000

Juno Beach, FL 33408-0420

Larry Nicholson

Director

Licensing

Florida Power & Light Company

Electronic Mail Distribution

Alison Brown

Nuclear Licensing

Florida Power & Light Company

Electronic Mail Distribution

Mitch S. Ross

Vice President and Associate General

Counsel

Florida Power & Light Company

Electronic Mail Distribution

Marjan Mashhadi

Senior Attorney

Florida Power & Light Company

Electronic Mail Distribution

William A. Passetti

Chief

Florida Bureau of Radiation Control

Department of Health

Electronic Mail Distribution

Ruben D. Almaguer

Director

Division of Emergency Preparedness

Department of Community Affairs

Electronic Mail Distribution

J. Kammel

Radiological Emergency Planning

Administrator

Department of Public Safety

Electronic Mail Distribution

Mano Nazar

Executive Vice President and Chief Nuclear

Officer

Florida Power & Light Company

P. O. Box 14000

Juno Beach, FL 33408

(Vacant)

Vice President

Nuclear Plant Support

Florida Power & Light Company

Electronic Mail Distribution

Seth B. Dunston

Training Manager

St. Lucie Nuclear Plant

Electronic Mail Distribution

Faye Outlaw

County Administrator

St. Lucie County

Electronic Mail Distribution

Jack Southard

Director

Public Safety Department

St. Lucie County

Electronic Mail Distribution

FPL

5

Letter to Mano Nazar from Luis A. Reyes dated April xx, 2010

SUBJECT:

FINAL SIGNIFICANCE DETERMINATION FOR A YELLOW FINDING AND

NOTICE OF VIOLATION (NRC COMPONENT DESIGN BASES INSPECTION

REPORT 05000335/2010007 AND 05000389/2010007), ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR

PLANT

Distribution w/encls:

C. Evans, RII

L. Slack, RII

OE Mail

RIDSNRRDIRS

PUBLIC

RidsNrrPMStLucie Resource

R. Borchardt, OEDO

R. Zimmerman, OE

E. Julian, SECY

B. Keeling, OCA

Enforcement Coordinators, RI, RIII, RIV

E. Hayden, OPA

C. McCrary, OI

H. Bell, OIG

E. Leeds, NRR

M. Ashley, NRR

B. Mozafari, NRR

C. Scott, OGC

D. Decker, OCA

G. Gulla, OE

J. Circle, NRR

L. Reyes, RII

V. McCree, RII

K. Kennedy, RII

J. Lubinski, RII

L. Wert, RII

B. Desai, RII

M. Sykes, RII

R. Nease, RII

W. Rogers, RII

S. Sparks, RII

Enclosure 1

NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Florida Power and Light

Docket No. 50-335

St. Lucie Nuclear Plant

DPR-67

Unit 1

EA-09-321

During an inspection completed by the NRC on December 10, 2009, a violation of NRC

requirements was identified. The circumstances surrounding the violation were described in

detail in NRC Inspection Report No. 05000335/2009006 and 05000389/2009006, dated January

19, 2010 (ML100210081). In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the violation is

listed below:

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, states that measures shall

be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as deficiencies,

deviations, and non-conformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of

significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the

condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition.

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to identify and correct a significant condition

adverse to quality affecting the Component Cooling Water (CCW) system. Specifically,

in October 2008, air intrusion from the containment instrument air (IA) system into the

CCW system occurred which affected both redundant trains of the CCW system. The

troubleshooting and subsequent corrective actions that were implemented by the

licensee failed to identify the source of the air in-leakage and ensure that the CCW

system remained capable of delivering adequate cooling to essential equipment used to

mitigate design bases accidents. In addition, the corrective actions failed to preclude a

similar air intrusion event into the CCW system in November 2009.

This violation is associated with a Yellow Significance Determination Process finding for

Unit 1 in the Initiating Events cornerstone.

The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violation, the corrective

actions taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent recurrence and the date when full

compliance will be achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket in the St. Lucie

Meeting Summary, dated February 26, 2010 (ML100601170). Therefore, you are not required

to respond to this letter unless the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective

actions or your position. However, you are required to submit a written statement or explanation

pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201 if the description therein does not accurately reflect your corrective

actions or your position. In that case, or if you choose to respond, clearly mark your response

as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation," include the EA number, and send it to the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001 with a

copy to the Regional Administrator, Region II, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the

facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this

Notice of Violation (Notice).

NOV

2

Enclosure 1

If you choose to respond, your response will be made available electronically for public

inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC=s document system (ADAMS),

accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. Therefore, to

the extent possible, the response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or

safeguards information so that it can be made available to the Public without redaction. If

personal privacy or proprietary information is necessary to provide an acceptable response,

then please provide a bracketed copy of your response that identifies the information that

should be protected and a redacted copy of your response that deletes such information. If you

request withholding of such material, you must specifically identify the portions of your response

that you seek to have withheld and provide in detail the bases for your claim of withholding (e.g.,

explain why the disclosure of information will create an unwarranted invasion of personal

privacy or provide the information required by 10 CFR 2.390(b) to support a request for

withholding confidential commercial or financial information). If safeguards information is

necessary to provide an acceptable response, please provide the level of protection described

in 10 CFR 73.21.

If you contest this enforcement action, you should also provide a copy of your response, with

the basis for your denial, to the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001.

In accordance with 10 CFR 19.11, you may be required to post this Notice within two working

days.

Dated this 19th day of April 2010.

Enclosure 2

EA-09-321

NRC Bases for Final Significance Determination

On February 19, 2010, the NRC held a regulatory conference with representatives of FPL, St.

Lucie Nuclear Plant, to discuss two preliminary Greater than Green inspection findings

documented in NRC Inspection Report 05000335, 389/2009006 (ML100210081). These

findings concerned issues associated with an October 8, 2008, air intrusion event from the Unit

1 containment instrument air system into the CCW system.

At the regulatory conference, FPL highlighted their assumptions in determining the risk

associated with the air intrusion event as Green. These assumptions differed in some instances

with those used by the NRC in the preliminary significance determination. In determining the

final significance, NRC considered FPL assumptions and factored them into the significance

determination process when appropriate. A number of FPLs assumptions were fully accepted

and integrated into the NRC final significance determination. These assumptions included: the

most probable outcome of air intrusion into the CCW system would be operators terminating the

event by isolating the air intrusion source; the dominant accident sequence was operators failing

to stop the air intrusion prior to CCW failure followed by operators failing to trip the reactor

coolant pumps (RCPs) upon a loss of CCW; and, operators would follow established

procedures to the best of their abilities. Also, based upon FPLs input, the final NRC

significance determination assumed that operators had time to stop the air intrusion before

CCW system failure.

There were several differences between NRC and FPL in NRCs final significance

determination. The paragraphs below provide a summary of the differences and the bases for

the NRCs final significance determination.

FPL assumed that due to the preponderance of alarms available to the operators, it was highly

likely that the operators would trip the reactor and stop the RCPs before CCW system failure

would occur. The NRC did not consider these actions in the preliminary significance

determination. However, based upon FPLs input, it was included in the final significance

determination. The NRC recognized that available alarms would indicate irregular flow in the

CCW system and that some of these alarms would direct operators to stop the RCPs and trip

the reactor. However, the NRC assumed that the collective set of alarms and indications would

provide for competing actions to trip the CCW pumps and/or trip the RCPs. Further, some of

the alarms would occur either after CCW failure or at imminent failure. Therefore, assigning a

probability to the actions to trip the reactor and stopping the RCPs prior to CCW failure as highly

likely was not used. Instead, as an assumption for the final significance determination, a less

likely probability than assumed by FPL was assigned by the NRC. Specifically, the NRC

assigned a 50/50 probability that operators would trip the reactor and stop the RCPs prior to

CCW failure in the final significance determination as compared to FPL, which did not present

specific numbers at the conference but, indicated a significantly high probability for operators

succeeding in this action.

EA-09-321

2

Enclosure 2

According to FPLs calculations, the conditional core damage probability associated with the air

intrusion event, based upon the latest plant specific PRA and the NRCs SPAR model, varied

between 1E-4 & 6E-4. The NRC used the latest available information regarding the RCP seals,

the procedures associated with the RCPs, and operator training in updating the NRCs SPAR

model of St. Lucie. Further, the NRC, in contrast to FPL, used an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> versus 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />

exposure time for RCP seal failure in the final conditional core damage probability calculation to

account for a standard reactor shutdown.

As a result, the NRC determined that the conditional core damage probability associated with

this event was 5.6E-4. Although the NRC applied a different methodology, this numerical result

was consistent with the licensees input and had no affect on the final significance

determination.

FPL did not present specific numbers but assumed that the probability of operators failing to

recognize and mitigate the air intrusion before CCW pump failure was two to three orders of

magnitude less than 1E-1, the number assigned by the NRC, in the preliminary significance

determination.

The failure probability used by the NRC for the final significance determination, like FPL,

included a dependency, since different crews would be involved in the recognition and

mitigation of the air intrusion event. The NRC used a standard Human Reliability Assessment

(HRA) protocol in determining the assumption for this operator failure probability in the final

significance determination. Like FPL, the performance shaping factors used in the final HRA

included 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for operators to recognize and mitigate air intrusion before CCW failure.

However, NRC differed from FPL in the performance shaping factor contributions due to the fact

that no specific procedure existed to direct operators in diagnosing air intrusion into the CCW

system, the high level of complexity associated with diagnosing the source of air intrusion, and

limited operator training/experience associated with CCW events of this nature. In its final

significance determination, the NRC, after factoring in all the performance shaping factors, used

6.58 E-2 as the probability that operators would not stop the air intrusion into the CCW system

prior to pump failure. While FPL did not present specific numbers, their assumptions differed by

approximately two to three magnitudes from the NRC. This difference in performance shaping

factor assumptions was effectively the most significant difference between the NRC and FPL in

determining the final significance associated with the event.

In conclusion, FPL determined, based on best-estimate assumptions, that the delta core

damage frequency (CDF) increase was less than 1E-6. The NRC did not agree with FPLs

determination of delta CDF being less than 1E-6. Even after factoring in numerous FPL

assumptions, NRC determined the delta CDF for the CCW air intrusion performance deficiency

to be approximately 2E-5. With this delta CDF being greater than 1E-5, the performance

deficiency was classified as Yellow.