ML14079A028: Difference between revisions

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| contact person =  
| contact person =  
| case reference number = 49911
| case reference number = 49911
| document type = Deficiency Correspondence (per 10CFR50.55e and Part 21), Deficiency Report (per 10CFR50.55e and Part 21)
| document type = Deficiency Correspondence (per 10CFR50.55e and Part 21) Deficiency Report (per 10CFR50.55e and Part 21)
| page count = 5
| page count = 5
}}
}}


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:073113120114                                                                                                               Pll !T p 03/13/2014             I~US'. Nucehar Rt'pulaonrv
{{#Wiki_filter:073113120114 Pll !T p 03/13/2014 I~US'.
                                -.--------                J-. Commission   flnerations.Centler Event Rpnnrt
Nucehar Rt'pulaonrv Commission flnerations. Centler Event Rpnnrt Pagop 1 J-.
                                                                      -r-----                                             Pagop 1 Part 21 (PAR)                                                                                         Event#     49911 Rep Org: WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION                               Notification Date I Time: 03/13/2014 14:46   (EDT)
-r-----
Supplier: QUALTECH NP                                                         Event Date I Time: 03/12/2014 16:00   (CDT)
Part 21 (PAR)
Last Modification: 03/13/2014 Region: 4                                                         Docket #:
Event#
City: KILONA                                         Agreement State:                 Yes County:                                                         License #:
49911 Rep Org: WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION Notification Date I Time: 03/13/2014 14:46 (EDT)
State: LA NRC Notified by:   JOHN JARRELL                               Notifications: MARC FERDAS                         R1DO HQ Ops Officer:   DONG HWA PARK                                                   KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE             R2DO Emergency Class:     NON EMERGENCY                                                   DAVE PASSEHL                   R3DO 10 CFR Section:                                                                   THOMAS FARNHOLTZ               R4DO 21.21(d)(3)(i)     DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE                                       PART 21 GROUP                   EMAIL PART 21 - ALLEN BRADLEY TYPE 700RTC RELAY SPURIOUSLY DE-ENERGIZING "This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3 required under 10 CFR PART 21 concerning an apparent deviation from dedicated manufacturing specifications.
Supplier: QUALTECH NP Event Date I Time: 03/12/2014 16:00 (CDT)
  "On 10/17/2013, it was determined that there have been multiple inadvertent actuations of Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signal (ESFAS) equipment over the previous seven months. These equipment inadvertent actuations are occurring due to Allen Bradley type 700RTC relays spuriously de-energizing. The failure mode causes the relays to intermittently de-energize causing the associated equipment to perform its ESFAS function, not adversely impacting steady state plant operations.
Last Modification: 03/13/2014 Region: 4 Docket #:
  "The failed relays have been sent to the qualifying vendor and two other failure analysis laboratories for testing.
City:
KILONA Agreement State:
Yes County:
License #:
State: LA NRC Notified by: JOHN JARRELL Notifications: MARC FERDAS R1DO HQ Ops Officer: DONG HWA PARK KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE R2DO Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY DAVE PASSEHL R3DO 10 CFR Section:
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ R4DO 21.21(d)(3)(i)
DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE PART 21 GROUP EMAIL PART 21 - ALLEN BRADLEY TYPE 700RTC RELAY SPURIOUSLY DE-ENERGIZING "This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3 required under 10 CFR PART 21 concerning an apparent deviation from dedicated manufacturing specifications.
"On 10/17/2013, it was determined that there have been multiple inadvertent actuations of Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signal (ESFAS) equipment over the previous seven months. These equipment inadvertent actuations are occurring due to Allen Bradley type 700RTC relays spuriously de-energizing. The failure mode causes the relays to intermittently de-energize causing the associated equipment to perform its ESFAS function, not adversely impacting steady state plant operations.
"The failed relays have been sent to the qualifying vendor and two other failure analysis laboratories for testing.
The results were reviewed by Waterford 3 engineers and although the failure mode could not be repeated in the laboratory, the laboratories identified less than adequate solder joints on the relay control circuit and a failed capacitor. The cause of the failed capacitor was identified as less than adequate installation practices during manufacturing. Engineering has determined that effects of these deviations, combined with installation in an application near the qualifying vendor's maximum specified environmental conditions, relevant to elevated voltage and ambient temperatures, has resulted in accelerated aging effects on the sub-components of the relays. The failures have been observed on relays that have been in-service greater than three years.
The results were reviewed by Waterford 3 engineers and although the failure mode could not be repeated in the laboratory, the laboratories identified less than adequate solder joints on the relay control circuit and a failed capacitor. The cause of the failed capacitor was identified as less than adequate installation practices during manufacturing. Engineering has determined that effects of these deviations, combined with installation in an application near the qualifying vendor's maximum specified environmental conditions, relevant to elevated voltage and ambient temperatures, has resulted in accelerated aging effects on the sub-components of the relays. The failures have been observed on relays that have been in-service greater than three years.
  "Entergy concluded that for the applications for which the failure mode has been observed, and for other applications where these relays have been installed for more than 3 years, the failures did not result in a substantial safety hazard. However, on 3/12/2014, Entergy completed an evaluation concluding that, had this relay type been installed in other safety related normally energized applications for greater than 3 years, it could have resulted in a substantial safety hazard. Compensatory measures to preclude the malfunction of these relays, until
"Entergy concluded that for the applications for which the failure mode has been observed, and for other applications where these relays have been installed for more than 3 years, the failures did not result in a substantial safety hazard. However, on 3/12/2014, Entergy completed an evaluation concluding that, had this relay type been installed in other safety related normally energized applications for greater than 3 years, it could have resulted in a substantial safety hazard. Compensatory measures to preclude the malfunction of these relays, until


03/13/2014                   U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission OperationsCenter Event Report                       Page 2 long-term corrective actions are completed, have been implemented. As an interim measure the installed time for these relays is limited to 3 years or less, The Waterford 3 Site VP was informed the same day, 3/12/2014.
03/13/2014 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Page 2 long-term corrective actions are completed, have been implemented. As an interim measure the installed time for these relays is limited to 3 years or less, The Waterford 3 Site VP was informed the same day, 3/12/2014.
"Waterford 3 has determined that the only other Entergy nuclear facility utilizing these Allen Bradley relay types, possibly in a safety related application, is at James A. Fitzpatrick, to which this condition has been communicated."
"Waterford 3 has determined that the only other Entergy nuclear facility utilizing these Allen Bradley relay types, possibly in a safety related application, is at James A. Fitzpatrick, to which this condition has been communicated."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


03/11/2014           19:54         5647396678                                             VP: OFFICE                                                   PAGE     61 PAGE 1 OF 2 NRC FORM   381                                           REACTOR PLANT                                           U.s. NUCLEAR     REGULATORY COMMISSION (12-2000)
03/11/2014 19:54 5647396678 VP: OFFICE PAGE 61 PAGE 1 OF 2 NRC FORM 381 REACTOR PLANT U.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (12-2000)
OPERATIONS CENTER EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET EN #
OPERATIONS CENTER EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET EN #
NRC OPERATION TELEPHONE NUMBER: PRIMARY - 301-816-5100 or 800-532-346r, BACKUPS - [1st] 301-g51-0550 or 800-449-3694*.
NRC OPERATION TELEPHONE NUMBER: PRIMARY - 301-816-5100 or 800-532-346r, BACKUPS - [1st] 301-g51-0550 or 800-449-3694*.
r2ndi 301-415-0550 and [3rdl 301-415-0553                                 *Licensees who maintain their own ETS ara provided these telephone numbers, NOTIFICATION TIME     FACILITY OR ORGANIZATION                   UNIT               NAME OF CALLER                                 CALL BACK #
r2ndi 301-415-0550 and [3rdl 301-415-0553  
Waterford                                   3                 John Jarrell                                   504-739-6685 EVENT TIME & ZONE     EVENT DATE                     POWER/MODE BEFORE                                       POWER/MODE AFTER 1600 CDT             03/12/2014                     100% / MODE 1                                         100% / MODE 1 EVENT CLASSIFICATIONS                       I-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR S0.72(h)(1)                   (v)(A)_ Safe S/I Capability               AINA GENERAL1EMERGENCY               GEN/AAEC       ED           TS DeMelatoii                     AOEV   U lv(B)       RHR Cpab~llfty                 AINE LU SITE AREA EMERGENCY                 SIT/AAEC       4-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)                     v C)     Cornrol of Rad Releas.         AJNC F
*Licensees who maintain their own ETS ara provided these telephone numbers, NOTIFICATION TIME FACILITY OR ORGANIZATION UNIT NAME OF CALLER CALL BACK #
  .i ALERT, UNUSUAL EVENT ALEIAAEC UNU/AEC ED (1)       TS ReqWred So/
Waterford 3
Ilfv)(A)ECCS DlachO7ge to RCS ASHU ACCOS (v)(O)
John Jarrell 504-739-6685 EVENT TIME & ZONE EVENT DATE POWER/MODE BEFORE POWER/MODE AFTER 1600 CDT 03/12/2014 100% / MODE 1 100% / MODE 1 EVENT CLASSIFICATIONS I-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR S0.72(h)(1)
(xII)
(v)(A)_ Safe S/I Capability AINA GENERAL1EMERGENCY GEN/AAEC ED TS DeMelatoii AOEV U lv(B)
Accident Mitgatin Ofmslte Medical AIND AMED 50,72 NON-EMERGENCY         (see next columnns) [] (ivXB)     RPS Atuti.on (scram)             ARPS       (xii)     L.e Comn/'At/Re.p               ACOM
RHR Cpab~llfty AINE LU SITE AREA EMERGENCY SIT/AAEC 4-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) v C)
[     PHYSICAL SECURITY (73.71)         DODD         0i (xi)       Offltle Notificbaon             APRE         50-Day Optional I1 CFR 50.73(a)(1)
Cornrol of Rad Releas.
Ul MATERIAL/EXPOSURE                   B???         8-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50,72(b)(3)                 U   Invalid Specified System Actuation       AINV Q     FITNESS FOR DUTY               HFIT         U   (OiXA)     Degraded CondItion             ADEG     Other Unspecified Requirement (Identffy)
AJNC
OTHER UNSPECIFIED REOMT.     (see last olurnn) Ii (jl)(B) Unanalyzed Condition               AUNA   Z 10 CFR 21.21(dX3Xi) Defect                 NONR INFORMATION ONLY                 NNF         1   (ivXA)   Specified Semrn Actuation         AESF   UQ                                           NONR DESCRIPTION This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3 required under 10 CFR PART 21 concerning an apparent deviation from dedicated manufacturing specifications.
: ALERT, ALEIAAEC ED (1)
TS ReqWred So/
ASHU (v)(O)
Accident Mitgatin AIND F
UNUSUAL EVENT UNU/AEC Ilfv)(A) ECCS DlachO7ge to RCS ACCOS (xII)
Ofmslte Medical AMED
.i 50,72 NON-EMERGENCY (see next columnns) [] (ivXB)
RPS Atuti.on (scram)
ARPS (xii)
L.e Comn/'At/Re.p ACOM
[
PHYSICAL SECURITY (73.71)
DODD 0i (xi)
Offltle Notificbaon APRE 50-Day Optional I1 CFR 50.73(a)(1)
Ul MATERIAL/EXPOSURE B???
8-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50,72(b)(3)
U Invalid Specified System Actuation AINV Q
FITNESS FOR DUTY HFIT U (OiXA)
Degraded CondItion ADEG Other Unspecified Requirement (Identffy)
OTHER UNSPECIFIED REOMT.
(see last olurnn) Ii (jl)(B) Unanalyzed Condition AUNA Z
10 CFR 21.21(dX3Xi) Defect NONR INFORMATION ONLY NNF 1
(ivXA)
Specified Semrn Actuation AESF UQ NONR DESCRIPTION This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3 required under 10 CFR PART 21 concerning an apparent deviation from dedicated manufacturing specifications.
On 10117/2013, it was determined that there have been multiple inadvertent actuations of Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signal (ESFAS) equipment over the previous seven months, These equipment inadvertent actuations are occurring due to Allen Bradley type 700RTC relays spuriously de-energizing. The failure mode causes the relays to intermittently de-energize causing the associated equipment to perform its ESFAS function, not adversely impacting steady state plant operations.
On 10117/2013, it was determined that there have been multiple inadvertent actuations of Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signal (ESFAS) equipment over the previous seven months, These equipment inadvertent actuations are occurring due to Allen Bradley type 700RTC relays spuriously de-energizing. The failure mode causes the relays to intermittently de-energize causing the associated equipment to perform its ESFAS function, not adversely impacting steady state plant operations.
The failed relays have been sent to the qualifying vendor and two other failure analysis laboratories for testing. The results were reviewed by Waterford 3 engineers and although the failure mode could not be repeated in the laboratory, the laboratories identified less than adequate solder joints on the relay control circuit and a failed capacitor. The cause of the failed Capacitor was identified as less than adequate installation practices during manufacturing. Engineering has determined that effects of these deviations, combined with installation in an application near the qualifying vendors maximum specified environmental conditions, relevant to elevated voltage and ambient temperatures, has resulted in accelerated aging effects on the sub-components of the relays. The failures have been observed on relays that have been in-service greater than three years.
The failed relays have been sent to the qualifying vendor and two other failure analysis laboratories for testing. The results were reviewed by Waterford 3 engineers and although the failure mode could not be repeated in the laboratory, the laboratories identified less than adequate solder joints on the relay control circuit and a failed capacitor. The cause of the failed Capacitor was identified as less than adequate installation practices during manufacturing.
Engineering has determined that effects of these deviations, combined with installation in an application near the qualifying vendors maximum specified environmental conditions, relevant to elevated voltage and ambient temperatures, has resulted in accelerated aging effects on the sub-components of the relays. The failures have been observed on relays that have been in-service greater than three years.
Entergy concluded that for the applications for which the failure mode has been observed, and for other applications where these relays have been installed for more than 3 years, the failures did not result in a substantial safety hazard. However, on 3/12/2014, Entergy completed an evaluation concluding that, had this relay type been installed in other safety related normally energized applications for greater than 3 years, it could have resulted in a substantial safety hazard. Compensatory measures to preclude the maffunction of these relays, until long-term corrective actions are completed, have been implemented. As an interim measure the installed time for these relays is limited to 3 years or less. The Waterford 3 Site VP was informed the same day, 3/12/2014.
Entergy concluded that for the applications for which the failure mode has been observed, and for other applications where these relays have been installed for more than 3 years, the failures did not result in a substantial safety hazard. However, on 3/12/2014, Entergy completed an evaluation concluding that, had this relay type been installed in other safety related normally energized applications for greater than 3 years, it could have resulted in a substantial safety hazard. Compensatory measures to preclude the maffunction of these relays, until long-term corrective actions are completed, have been implemented. As an interim measure the installed time for these relays is limited to 3 years or less. The Waterford 3 Site VP was informed the same day, 3/12/2014.
Waterford 3 has determined that the only other Entergy nuclear facility utilizing these Allen Bradley relay types, possibly in a safety related application, is at James A. Fitzpatrick, to which this condition has been communicated.
Waterford 3 has determined that the only other Entergy nuclear facility utilizing these Allen Bradley relay types, possibly in a safety related application, is at James A. Fitzpatrick, to which this condition has been communicated.
NOTIFICATIONS                 YES NO WILL BE ANYTHING UNUSUAL OR                                 El YES (Explain above)             [ NO NRC RESIDENT                           UEl U                 NOT UNDERSTOOD?                             YES STAT ;          "                            U               D ALL SYSTEMS                           ES                                 NO (Explain above)
NOTIFICATIONS YES NO WILL BE ANYTHING UNUSUAL OR El YES (Explain above)
LOC L                                                       FUNCTION AS REQUIRED?
[
NO NRC RESIDENT El U U NOT UNDERSTOOD?
YES STAT U
D ALL SYSTEMS ES NO (Explain above)
LOC L FUNCTION AS REQUIRED?


VP: OFFICE                                                      PAGE    02 03/11/2014           19:54         5847396676 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION                                                           PAGE 2 OF 2 I   DAflifl nemm-AL FECAOi flfl-   C  UV       flD FIL INIii    AnAlira 3
03/11/2014 19:54 5847396676 VP: OFFICE PAGE 02 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PAGE 2 OF 2 I DAflifl nemm-AL FE CAOi C
                                                                *-ýanfrwnuwc. PTUWu    An.a         .W~~A..#                   J-L         ý   I-5           ~~pm
flfl-UV flD FIL IN Iii AnAl 3
[] LIQUID RELEASE       fIGASEOUS RELEASE               L] UNPLANNED RELEASE []               PLANNED RELEASE j]       ONGOING       [3     TERMINATED
ira PTU Wu An.a  
[7 MONITORED             []UNMONITORED                   []   OFFSITE RELEASE           []   T. S. EXCEEDED     []   RM ALARMS     [3     AREAS EVACUATED
.W~~A..#
[3PERSONNEL EXPOSED OR CONTAMINATED                       []   OFFSITE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS RECOMMENDED                   -slate release path indewepdfon Release Rate (Ci/sec)           % T. S, UMIT HOD GUIDE           Total Activity CI)       % T. S. LIMIT   HOO GUIDE Noble Gas                                                                               0.1 Cilsec                                                 1000 C0 Iodine                                                                                   10 uClc                                   _            _  0.01 Ci Particulate                                                                               I uCi/sec                                                 I mCi Liquid (excluding &M num and dissolved noble gases)                                                                   10 uCimin                                                 0.I Cl Liquid (trifium)                                                                         0.2 Ci/min                                         ,,      S Ci Total Activity                                                                       , ,_._J PLANT STACK               CONDENSERIAIR EJECTOR               MAIN STEAM UNE         SG SLOWDOWN               OTHER RAO MONITOR READINGS ALARM SETPOINTS
J-L  
      % T. S. UMIT (7f avlcahle)
ý I-5  
*-ýanfrwnuwc.
~~pm
[]
LIQUID RELEASE fIGASEOUS RELEASE L] UNPLANNED RELEASE []
PLANNED RELEASE j]
ONGOING
[3 TERMINATED
[7 MONITORED
[]UNMONITORED
[]
OFFSITE RELEASE
[] T. S. EXCEEDED
[] RM ALARMS [3 AREAS EVACUATED
[3PERSONNEL EXPOSED OR CONTAMINATED [] OFFSITE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS RECOMMENDED  
-slate release path in dewepdfon Release Rate (Ci/sec)  
% T. S, UMIT HOD GUIDE Total Activity CI)  
% T. S. LIMIT HOO GUIDE Noble Gas 0.1 Cilsec 1000 C0 Iodine 10 uClc 0.01 Ci Particulate I uCi/sec I mCi Liquid (excluding &M num and dissolved noble gases) 10 uCimin 0.I Cl Liquid (trifium) 0.2 Ci/min S Ci Total Activity  
,,_._J PLANT STACK CONDENSERIAIR EJECTOR MAIN STEAM UNE SG SLOWDOWN OTHER RAO MONITOR READINGS ALARM SETPOINTS
% T. S. UMIT (7f avlcahle)
RCS OR SG TUBE LEAKS: CHECK OR FILL IN APPLICABLE ITEMS: (spec/fi de&aiWL/expwanatons should be covered in event descpilpion)
RCS OR SG TUBE LEAKS: CHECK OR FILL IN APPLICABLE ITEMS: (spec/fi de&aiWL/expwanatons should be covered in event descpilpion)
LOCATION OF THE LEAK fe,g.. So 4t valve, pi, etc.)
LOCATION OF THE LEAK fe,g.. So 4t valve, pi, etc.)
LEAK RATE                             UNITS: gpm/gpd             T. S. LIMITS                         SUDDEN OR LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT LEAK START DATE                     TIME                       COOLANT ACTIVITY           PRIMARY                               SECONDARY AND UNITS:
LEAK RATE UNITS: gpm/gpd T. S. LIMITS SUDDEN OR LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT LEAK START DATE TIME COOLANT ACTIVITY PRIMARY SECONDARY AND UNITS:
LIST OF SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT NOT OPERATIONAL EVENT DESCRIPTION (Contned from front)
LIST OF SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT NOT OPERATIONAL EVENT DESCRIPTION (Contned from front)


03/11/2014       19:54       5047396678                   VP: OFFICE                           PAGE     63 OTHER SOV AGENCIES         El   0Z 0] MODE OF OPERATION         ESTIMATED       ADDITIONAL INFO ON BACK MEDINPFRESS RELEASE         ]UNTIL         CORRECTED: N/A       RESTART DATE. N/ IES     ONO NRC FORM 361 (1 2-2000)}}
03/11/2014 19:54 5047396678 VP: OFFICE PAGE 63 OTHER SOV AGENCIES El 0Z 0]
MODE OF OPERATION ESTIMATED ADDITIONAL INFO ON BACK MEDINPFRESS RELEASE  
]UNTIL CORRECTED: N/A RESTART DATE. N/
IES ONO NRC FORM 361 (1 2-2000)}}

Latest revision as of 22:37, 10 January 2025

Part 21 - Allen Bradley Type 700RTC Relay Spuriously De-Energizing
ML14079A028
Person / Time
Site: Waterford, FitzPatrick  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 03/13/2014
From: Jarrell J
Entergy Operations
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
49911
Download: ML14079A028 (5)
v • d • e


Text

073113120114 Pll !T p 03/13/2014 I~US'.

Nucehar Rt'pulaonrv Commission flnerations. Centler Event Rpnnrt Pagop 1 J-.

-r-----

Part 21 (PAR)

Event#

49911 Rep Org: WATERFORD STEAM ELECTRIC STATION Notification Date I Time: 03/13/2014 14:46 (EDT)

Supplier: QUALTECH NP Event Date I Time: 03/12/2014 16:00 (CDT)

Last Modification: 03/13/2014 Region: 4 Docket #:

City:

KILONA Agreement State:

Yes County:

License #:

State: LA NRC Notified by: JOHN JARRELL Notifications: MARC FERDAS R1DO HQ Ops Officer: DONG HWA PARK KATHLEEN O'DONOHUE R2DO Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY DAVE PASSEHL R3DO 10 CFR Section:

THOMAS FARNHOLTZ R4DO 21.21(d)(3)(i)

DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE PART 21 GROUP EMAIL PART 21 - ALLEN BRADLEY TYPE 700RTC RELAY SPURIOUSLY DE-ENERGIZING "This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3 required under 10 CFR PART 21 concerning an apparent deviation from dedicated manufacturing specifications.

"On 10/17/2013, it was determined that there have been multiple inadvertent actuations of Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signal (ESFAS) equipment over the previous seven months. These equipment inadvertent actuations are occurring due to Allen Bradley type 700RTC relays spuriously de-energizing. The failure mode causes the relays to intermittently de-energize causing the associated equipment to perform its ESFAS function, not adversely impacting steady state plant operations.

"The failed relays have been sent to the qualifying vendor and two other failure analysis laboratories for testing.

The results were reviewed by Waterford 3 engineers and although the failure mode could not be repeated in the laboratory, the laboratories identified less than adequate solder joints on the relay control circuit and a failed capacitor. The cause of the failed capacitor was identified as less than adequate installation practices during manufacturing. Engineering has determined that effects of these deviations, combined with installation in an application near the qualifying vendor's maximum specified environmental conditions, relevant to elevated voltage and ambient temperatures, has resulted in accelerated aging effects on the sub-components of the relays. The failures have been observed on relays that have been in-service greater than three years.

"Entergy concluded that for the applications for which the failure mode has been observed, and for other applications where these relays have been installed for more than 3 years, the failures did not result in a substantial safety hazard. However, on 3/12/2014, Entergy completed an evaluation concluding that, had this relay type been installed in other safety related normally energized applications for greater than 3 years, it could have resulted in a substantial safety hazard. Compensatory measures to preclude the malfunction of these relays, until

03/13/2014 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Operations Center Event Report Page 2 long-term corrective actions are completed, have been implemented. As an interim measure the installed time for these relays is limited to 3 years or less, The Waterford 3 Site VP was informed the same day, 3/12/2014.

"Waterford 3 has determined that the only other Entergy nuclear facility utilizing these Allen Bradley relay types, possibly in a safety related application, is at James A. Fitzpatrick, to which this condition has been communicated."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

03/11/2014 19:54 5647396678 VP: OFFICE PAGE 61 PAGE 1 OF 2 NRC FORM 381 REACTOR PLANT U.s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (12-2000)

OPERATIONS CENTER EVENT NOTIFICATION WORKSHEET EN #

NRC OPERATION TELEPHONE NUMBER: PRIMARY - 301-816-5100 or 800-532-346r, BACKUPS - [1st] 301-g51-0550 or 800-449-3694*.

r2ndi 301-415-0550 and [3rdl 301-415-0553

  • Licensees who maintain their own ETS ara provided these telephone numbers, NOTIFICATION TIME FACILITY OR ORGANIZATION UNIT NAME OF CALLER CALL BACK #

Waterford 3

John Jarrell 504-739-6685 EVENT TIME & ZONE EVENT DATE POWER/MODE BEFORE POWER/MODE AFTER 1600 CDT 03/12/2014 100% / MODE 1 100% / MODE 1 EVENT CLASSIFICATIONS I-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR S0.72(h)(1)

(v)(A)_ Safe S/I Capability AINA GENERAL1EMERGENCY GEN/AAEC ED TS DeMelatoii AOEV U lv(B)

RHR Cpab~llfty AINE LU SITE AREA EMERGENCY SIT/AAEC 4-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) v C)

Cornrol of Rad Releas.

AJNC

ALERT, ALEIAAEC ED (1)

TS ReqWred So/

ASHU (v)(O)

Accident Mitgatin AIND F

UNUSUAL EVENT UNU/AEC Ilfv)(A) ECCS DlachO7ge to RCS ACCOS (xII)

Ofmslte Medical AMED

.i 50,72 NON-EMERGENCY (see next columnns) [] (ivXB)

RPS Atuti.on (scram)

ARPS (xii)

L.e Comn/'At/Re.p ACOM

[

PHYSICAL SECURITY (73.71)

DODD 0i (xi)

Offltle Notificbaon APRE 50-Day Optional I1 CFR 50.73(a)(1)

Ul MATERIAL/EXPOSURE B???

8-Hr. Non-Emergency 10 CFR 50,72(b)(3)

U Invalid Specified System Actuation AINV Q

FITNESS FOR DUTY HFIT U (OiXA)

Degraded CondItion ADEG Other Unspecified Requirement (Identffy)

OTHER UNSPECIFIED REOMT.

(see last olurnn) Ii (jl)(B) Unanalyzed Condition AUNA Z

10 CFR 21.21(dX3Xi) Defect NONR INFORMATION ONLY NNF 1

(ivXA)

Specified Semrn Actuation AESF UQ NONR DESCRIPTION This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3 required under 10 CFR PART 21 concerning an apparent deviation from dedicated manufacturing specifications.

On 10117/2013, it was determined that there have been multiple inadvertent actuations of Engineered Safety Features Actuation Signal (ESFAS) equipment over the previous seven months, These equipment inadvertent actuations are occurring due to Allen Bradley type 700RTC relays spuriously de-energizing. The failure mode causes the relays to intermittently de-energize causing the associated equipment to perform its ESFAS function, not adversely impacting steady state plant operations.

The failed relays have been sent to the qualifying vendor and two other failure analysis laboratories for testing. The results were reviewed by Waterford 3 engineers and although the failure mode could not be repeated in the laboratory, the laboratories identified less than adequate solder joints on the relay control circuit and a failed capacitor. The cause of the failed Capacitor was identified as less than adequate installation practices during manufacturing.

Engineering has determined that effects of these deviations, combined with installation in an application near the qualifying vendors maximum specified environmental conditions, relevant to elevated voltage and ambient temperatures, has resulted in accelerated aging effects on the sub-components of the relays. The failures have been observed on relays that have been in-service greater than three years.

Entergy concluded that for the applications for which the failure mode has been observed, and for other applications where these relays have been installed for more than 3 years, the failures did not result in a substantial safety hazard. However, on 3/12/2014, Entergy completed an evaluation concluding that, had this relay type been installed in other safety related normally energized applications for greater than 3 years, it could have resulted in a substantial safety hazard. Compensatory measures to preclude the maffunction of these relays, until long-term corrective actions are completed, have been implemented. As an interim measure the installed time for these relays is limited to 3 years or less. The Waterford 3 Site VP was informed the same day, 3/12/2014.

Waterford 3 has determined that the only other Entergy nuclear facility utilizing these Allen Bradley relay types, possibly in a safety related application, is at James A. Fitzpatrick, to which this condition has been communicated.

NOTIFICATIONS YES NO WILL BE ANYTHING UNUSUAL OR El YES (Explain above)

[

NO NRC RESIDENT El U U NOT UNDERSTOOD?

YES STAT U

D ALL SYSTEMS ES NO (Explain above)

LOC L FUNCTION AS REQUIRED?

03/11/2014 19:54 5847396676 VP: OFFICE PAGE 02 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PAGE 2 OF 2 I DAflifl nemm-AL FE CAOi C

flfl-UV flD FIL IN Iii AnAl 3

ira PTU Wu An.a

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[]

LIQUID RELEASE fIGASEOUS RELEASE L] UNPLANNED RELEASE []

PLANNED RELEASE j]

ONGOING

[3 TERMINATED

[7 MONITORED

[]UNMONITORED

[]

OFFSITE RELEASE

[] T. S. EXCEEDED

[] RM ALARMS [3 AREAS EVACUATED

[3PERSONNEL EXPOSED OR CONTAMINATED [] OFFSITE PROTECTIVE ACTIONS RECOMMENDED

-slate release path in dewepdfon Release Rate (Ci/sec)

% T. S, UMIT HOD GUIDE Total Activity CI)

% T. S. LIMIT HOO GUIDE Noble Gas 0.1 Cilsec 1000 C0 Iodine 10 uClc 0.01 Ci Particulate I uCi/sec I mCi Liquid (excluding &M num and dissolved noble gases) 10 uCimin 0.I Cl Liquid (trifium) 0.2 Ci/min S Ci Total Activity

,,_._J PLANT STACK CONDENSERIAIR EJECTOR MAIN STEAM UNE SG SLOWDOWN OTHER RAO MONITOR READINGS ALARM SETPOINTS

% T. S. UMIT (7f avlcahle)

RCS OR SG TUBE LEAKS: CHECK OR FILL IN APPLICABLE ITEMS: (spec/fi de&aiWL/expwanatons should be covered in event descpilpion)

LOCATION OF THE LEAK fe,g.. So 4t valve, pi, etc.)

LEAK RATE UNITS: gpm/gpd T. S. LIMITS SUDDEN OR LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT LEAK START DATE TIME COOLANT ACTIVITY PRIMARY SECONDARY AND UNITS:

LIST OF SAFETY RELATED EQUIPMENT NOT OPERATIONAL EVENT DESCRIPTION (Contned from front)

03/11/2014 19:54 5047396678 VP: OFFICE PAGE 63 OTHER SOV AGENCIES El 0Z 0]

MODE OF OPERATION ESTIMATED ADDITIONAL INFO ON BACK MEDINPFRESS RELEASE

]UNTIL CORRECTED: N/A RESTART DATE. N/

IES ONO NRC FORM 361 (1 2-2000)

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