ML15085A562

IR 07200046/2014001 & 05000409/2014008; 12/15-18/2014; Lacrosse Boiling Water Reactor Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation-NRC Inspection Report

ML15085A562
Person / Time
Site:	La Crosse  File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png
Issue date:	03/26/2015
From:	Julio Lara Division of Nuclear Materials Safety III
To:	Nick B Dairyland Power Cooperative
References
EA-15-026 IR 2014001, IR 2014008
Download: ML15085A562 (24)

See also: IR 05000409/2014008

Text

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

2443 WARRENVILLE RD. SUITE 210

LISLE, IL 60532-4352

March 26, 2015

EA-15-026

Ms. Barbara A. Nick

President and CEO

Dairyland Power Cooperative

3200 East Avenue S.

P.O. Box 817

La Crosse, WI 54602-0817

SUBJECT: LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL

STORAGE INSTALLATION - NRC INSPECTION REPORT

07200046/2014001(DNMS) AND 05000409/2014008(DNMS)

Dear Ms. Nick:

On December 15, 2014 through December 18, 2014, inspectors from the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission (NRC) conducted a routine inspection at your facility in Genoa,

Wisconsin, with continued in-office review through February 24, 2015. The purpose of the

inspection was to review activities performed under your NRC license to ensure that activities

were being performed in accordance with NRC requirements. The inspection results were

discussed with members of your staff at the conclusion of the site inspection on

December 18, 2014, and during a telephone discussion with members of your staff on

February 24, 2015. The enclosed inspection report presents the results of the inspection.

During this inspection, the NRC staff examined activities conducted under your license related

to public health and safety. Additionally, the staff examined your compliance with the

Commissions rules and regulations as well as the conditions of your license. Within these

areas, the inspection consisted of selected examination of procedures and representative

records, observations of activities, and interviews with personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, three apparent violations of NRC requirements were

identified and are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the

NRC Enforcement Policy. The current Enforcement Policy is included on the NRCs website at

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html. The apparent violations

involved the failure to ensure emergency response staffing levels satisfied the La Crosse

Emergency Plan as required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.54(q)(2),

failure to submit changes to the Emergency Plan that reduced its effectiveness to the NRC for

review prior to implementation as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4), and failure to conduct

emergency drills and exercises at the frequency specified in the La Crosse Emergency Plan as

required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2).

B. Nick

- 2 -

Because the NRC has not made a final determination in this matter, the NRC is not issuing an

enforcement action for these inspection findings at this time. The circumstances surrounding

these apparent violations, the significance of the issues, and the need for lasting and effective

corrective action were discussed with your staff at the inspection exit meeting on

February 24, 2015.

Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, we are providing you an opportunity to either:

(1) respond in writing to the apparent violations addressed in this inspection report within

30 days of the date of this letter; (2) request a Predecisional Enforcement Conference (PEC); or

(3) request Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR). If a PEC is held, it will be open for public

observation and the NRC will issue a press release to announce the time and date of the

conference. Please contact Wayne Slawinski at 630-829-9820 within ten days of the date of

this letter to notify the NRC of your intended response. A PEC should be held within

30 days and an ADR session within 45 days of the date of this letter.

If you choose to provide a written response, it should be clearly marked as Response to the

Apparent Violations in Inspection Report No. 07200046/2014001(DNMS) and

05000409/2014008(DNMS); EA-15-026, and should include, for the apparent violations:

(1) the reason for the apparent violations, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the apparent

violations; (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved; (3) the

corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations; and (4) the date when full

compliance was or will be achieved. In presenting your corrective actions, be aware that the

promptness and comprehensiveness of your actions will be considered in assessing any civil

penalty for the apparent violations. The guidance in NRC Information Notice 96-28, Suggested

Guidance Relating to Development and Implementation of Corrective Action, may be useful in

preparing your response. You can find the information notice on the NRC website at:

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/1996/in96028.html. Your

response may reference or include previously docketed correspondence, if the correspondence

adequately addresses the required response. If an adequate response is not received within

the time specified or an extension of time has not been granted by the NRC, the NRC will

proceed with its enforcement decision or schedule a PEC.

If you choose to request a PEC, the conference will afford you the opportunity to provide your

perspective on the apparent violations and any other information that you believe the NRC

should take into consideration before making an enforcement decision. The decision to hold a

pre-decisional enforcement conference does not mean that the NRC has determined that

violations have occurred or that enforcement action will be taken. This conference would be

conducted to obtain information to assist the NRC in making an enforcement decision. The

topics discussed during the conference may include the following: information to determine

whether a violation occurred, information to determine the significance of a violation, information

related to the identification of a violation, and information related to any corrective actions taken

or planned to be taken.

B. Nick

- 3 -

In lieu of a PEC, you may also request Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) with the NRC in an

attempt to resolve this issue. ADR is a general term encompassing various techniques for

resolving conflicts using a third party neutral. The technique that the NRC has decided to

employ is mediation. Mediation is a voluntary, informal process in which a trained neutral (the

mediator) works with parties to help them reach resolution. If the parties agree to use ADR,

they select a mutually agreeable neutral mediator who has no stake in the outcome and no

power to make decisions. Mediation gives parties an opportunity to discuss issues, clear up

misunderstandings, be creative, find areas of agreement, and reach a final resolution of the

issues. Additional information concerning the NRC's program can be obtained at

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/adr.html. The Institute on Conflict

Resolution (ICR) at Cornell University has agreed to facilitate the NRC's program as a neutral

third party. Please contact ICR at 877-733-9415 within 10 days of the date of this letter if you

are interested in pursuing resolution of this issue through ADR.

Please be advised that the number and characterization of the apparent violations described in

the enclosed inspection report may change as a result of further NRC review. You will be

advised by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.

In addition to the apparent violations for which escalated enforcement action is being

considered, the NRC determined that three Severity Level IV violations of NRC requirements

occurred. The violations were evaluated in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The

violations involved the failure to: submit an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)

decommissioning funding plan timely as required by 10 CFR 72.30(b); have an adequate

program in place to ensure augmentation of emergency response capabilities was available to

implement Emergency Plan actions required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2); and have an emergency

classification system within implementing procedures that adhered to the emergency

classification system within the Emergency Plan as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). These

violations are being treated as non-cited violations, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC

Enforcement Policy.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter, its

enclosure, and your response, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the

NRCs Public Document Room or from the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and

Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRCs website at

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent possible, your response should not

include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards information so that it can be made

publicly available without redaction.

B. Nick

- 4 -

Please feel free to contact Matthew Learn of my staff if you have any questions regarding this

inspection. Mr. Learn can be reached at 630-829-9603.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Julio F. Lara, Acting Director

Division of Nuclear Materials Safety

Docket Nos. 072-00046; 050-00409

License No. DPR-45

Enclosure:

IR Nos. 07200046/2014001(DNMS); 05000409/2014008(DNMS)

cc w/encl: R. Palmberg, Generation Vice President

L. Peters, Genoa Site Manager

D. Egge, Plant/ISFSI Supervisor

W. Trubilowicz, Technical Engineer

R. Grey, Radiation Protection Supervisor

cc w/o encl: T. Zaremba, Wheeler, Van Sickle and Anderson

J. Kitsembel, Chairman, Wisconsin Public Service Commission

S. Burmaster, Coulee Region Energy Coalition

G. Kruck, Chairman, Town of Genoa

P. Schmidt, Manager, Radiation Protection,

Wisconsin Department of Health Services

B. Nick

- 4 -

Please feel free to contact Matthew Learn of my staff if you have any questions regarding this

inspection. Mr. Learn can be reached at 630-829-9603.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Julio F. Lara, Acting Director

Division of Nuclear Materials Safety

Docket Nos. 072-00046; 050-00409

License No. DPR-45

Enclosure:

IR Nos.: 07200046/2014001(DNMS); 05000409/2014008(DNMS)

cc w/encl: R. Palmberg, Generation Vice President

L. Peters, Genoa Site Manager

D. Egge, Plant/ISFSI Supervisor

W. Trubilowicz, Technical Engineer

R. Grey, Radiation Protection Supervisor

cc w/o encl: T. Zaremba, Wheeler, Van Sickle and Anderson

J. Kitsembel, Chairman, Wisconsin Public Service Commission

S. Burmaster, Coulee Region Energy Coalition

G. Kruck, Chairman, Town of Genoa

P. Schmidt, Manager, Radiation Protection,

Wisconsin Department of Health Services

DISTRIBUTION w/encl:

Darrell Roberts

Marlayna Vaaler

Patrick Louden

Jim Clay

Carmen Olteanu

Carol Ariano

Paul Pelke

MCID Branch

ADAMS Accession Number:

DOCUMENT NAME: LACBWR 2014001.docx

Publicly Available

Non-Publicly Available

Sensitive

Non-Sensitive

To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the concurrence box "C" = Copy without attach/encl "E" =

Copy with attach/encl "N" = No copy

OFFICE

RIII-DNMS

C RIII-DNMS

RIII-EICS

RIII-DNMS

NAME

MLearn:ps ML WJS

for

ROrlikowksi WJS for RSkokowski RS *1

JLara

DATE

3/20/2015

3/20/2015

3/26/2015

3/26/2015

• 1 - OE, NMSS & NSIR reviewed and concurred via e-mail from C. Faria on 3/26/2015

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

Enclosure

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket No.:

072-00046; 050-00409

License No.:

DPR-45, General License (ISFSI)

Report No.:

IR 07200046/2014001(DNMS)

IR 05000409/2014008(DNMS)

Licensee:

Dairyland Power Cooperative (DPC)

Facility:

La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (ISFSI)

Location:

Genoa, WI

Dates:

On-site Inspection: December 15-18, 2014

Telephone Exit Meeting: February 24, 2015

Inspectors:

Matthew C. Learn, Reactor Engineer

Wayne J. Slawinski, Senior Health Physicist

Approved by:

Robert J. Orlikowski, Chief

Materials Control, ISFSI, and

Decommissioning Branch

Division of Nuclear Materials Safety

2

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR

NRC INSPECTION REPORT

07200046/2014001(DNMS) AND 05000409/2014008(DNMS)

A routine inspection of licensed activities associated with the storage of spent nuclear fuel at the

La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR) independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI)

was conducted from December 15 through December 18, 2014 including in office review

through February 24, 2015 The inspection consisted of interviews of site personnel, onsite

walkdowns, and reviews of: emergency preparedness and fire protection; surveillance and

maintenance activities; environmental monitoring; and quality assurance activities related to the

ISFSI.

The inspectors identified three apparent violations of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations

(CFR) section 50.54(q) concerning the licensees: failure to ensure emergency response staffing

levels as required by the La Crosse Emergency Plan, failure to submit changes to the

Emergency Plan that reduced its effectiveness to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(NRC) for review prior to implementation, and failure to conduct emergency drills and exercises

in accordance with the frequency specified in the La Crosse Emergency Plan.

The inspectors also identified three Severity Level IV non-cited violations concerning the

licensees: failure to submit their ISFSI decommissioning funding plan timely as required by

10 CFR 72.30(b), failure to have an adequate program in place for emergency staff

augmentation to ensure Emergency Plan actions could be accomplished as required by

10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), and failure to have an emergency classification system within their

implementing procedures that adhered to the emergency classification system of the

Emergency Plan as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

3

Report Details

1.0

Away from Reactor Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (IP 60858)

1.1

Review of Emergency Plan Program from ISFSI Activation until Emergency Plan

Revision 34 Issuance (Revisions 31-33)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees compliance with the Emergency Plan and

associated Emergency Planning requirements in 10 CFR Part 50 and 72. The

inspectors reviewed staffing changes following fuel movement to the independent spent

fuel storage installation (ISFSI) pad. The inspectors reviewed changes to the

Emergency Plan Revision 31. The inspectors reviewed adherence to Emergency Plan

requirements for exercises and drills.

b. Observations and Findings

Non-Compliance with Emergency Plan Staffing Requirements

On June 20, 2011, the La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor (LACBWR) Emergency Plan

was updated to Revision 31. The revision to the LACBWR Emergency Plan added

provisions for an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) that had not yet

been loaded with casks containing spent nuclear fuel. The previous revision of the

Emergency Plan (Revision 30) had solely focused on the non-operating reactor plant

and associated spent nuclear fuel that had been contained within the fuel element

storage well.

On July 12, 2012, the licensee moved their first Vertical Concrete Cask (VCC) to the

ISFSI pad. Between June and September 2012, the licensee successfully loaded all fuel

assemblies into dry casks and transferred each of those casks to the ISFSI onsite

storage pad. The fifth and final cask was successfully placed on the pad on

September 19, 2012.

Title 10 CFR 50.54(q) states, in part, a holder of a license under this part shall follow

and maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the requirements in

appendix E of this part...

The LACBWR Emergency Plan, Revision 31 Section 1.1 Plant Emergency Response

Organization provided the authority and responsibility for Emergency Plan activation to

the Operations Shift Supervisor. Section 1.1 defined minimum emergency plan staffing

as an Operations Shift Supervisor, an Operator, a Security Shift Supervisor, and the

security force. Additionally, the LACBWR Emergency Plan, Revision 31 Section A.1.3.8,

Augmented ISFSI Emergency Response Organization, states that On-shift ISFSI

personnel can implement the Emergency Plan without assistance from others.

The licensee maintained continuous operations staff coverage including an Operations

Supervisor and an Operator onsite while fuel was maintained in the Fuel Element

Storage Well (FESW) throughout the spent fuel assembly storage campaign which

culminated on September 19, 2012.

4

On September 20, 2012, the operations department staffing was reduced at the site

without a corresponding change to the Emergency Plan. Specifically, the operations

department was not staffed during backshifts and weekends as required by Emergency

Plan Section 1.1. Moreover, radiation protection technician staffing was not maintained

during backshifts, weekends and whenever radiological work did not occur at the plant.

As a result, backshift and weekend staffing was limited to site security personnel.

The operations personnel were trained to perform radiological surveys whenever health

physics staff were not onsite and consequently provided the emergency plan required

assessment capability while onsite. In contrast, the security staff had not been trained to

conduct radiation surveys. As a result of the staffing changes, radiological assessment

capability was limited only to weekday day shifts. Therefore, radiological assessment

capability required by the Emergency Plan was diminished because radiological survey

qualified staff were not continuously onsite. Consequently, during backshift and

weekends the licensee's ability to assess radiological conditions, evaluate emergency

preparedness event entry criteria (action level thresholds) and declare timely EALs was

degraded. Given their staffing changes, the licensee was unable to implement the

Emergency Plan without offsite assistance from others as required by Emergency Plan

Section A.1.3.8.

Following discussions with NRC staff on October 26, 2012, continuous operations

staffing was reinstated at the site. However, on October 29, 2012, the licensee

implemented Revision 32 to the Emergency Plan following an inadequate effectiveness

review by both the onsite and offsite safety review committees, at which time continuous

operations staff coverage was again terminated for backshifts and weekends. During

the October 26 - 29 transitional period between Revisions 31 and 32, the licensee

trained and qualified its security staff in basic radiological assessment capabilities

related to ISFSI operations, as the revised emergency plan delegated certain emergency

response functions to the Security Shift Supervisor when other qualified staff was not

onsite. The licensee documented this issue in their corrective action program under

CAR 2013-005.

An AV was identified, from September 20 until October 26, 2012, for the failure to

maintain staffing at minimum levels prescribed by the LACBWR Emergency Plan

Revision 31, as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(2). Specifically, the licensee failed to

follow Emergency Plan Section 1.1 and Section A.1.3.8 which specifies minimum

staffing requirements to ensure the Emergency Plan may be implemented without offsite

assistance.

Pending final determination of the safety significance and NRCs enforcement

decision, this issue was identified as an Apparent Violation (AV 07200046/2014001-01;05000409/2014008-01; Non-Compliance with Emergency Plan Staffing Requirements)

Reduction in Effectiveness of Emergency Plan without NRC Approval

10 CFR Part 50.54(q)(3) states that, the licensee may make changes to its emergency

plan without NRC approval only if the licensee performs and retains an analysis

demonstrating that the changes do not reduce the effectiveness of the plan.

5

10 CFR Part 50.54(q)(4) further states that, the changes to a licensee emergency plan

that reduce the effectiveness of the plan may not be implemented without prior

approval by the NRC. A reduction in effectiveness means a change in the emergency

plan that reduces the capability to perform an emergency planning function which

includes assessment capability.

On October 29, 2012, the licensee made changes to their Emergency Plan through

issuance of the LACBWR Emergency Plan, Revision 32. The LACBWR Emergency

Plan, Revision 31 established requirements for emergency response to ISFSI events

while maintaining emergency response to non-operating reactor plant events. The

licensee revised the plan to reduce the emergency response requirements for the

LACBWR plant following movement of all irradiated fuel from the plant facility to the

onsite ISFSI.

Specifically, among other changes, the revised Emergency Plan removed twelve plant

related events and retained three ISFSI related events. Additionally, the revision

eliminated the Alert classification, reduced the frequency of emergency exercises from

annually to biennially, and eliminated 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> staff augmentations requirements. The

licensee evaluated the change against the standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b) and the

requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E and determined that the changes did not

decrease the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan.

During the NRC review of Revision 32, NRC staff identified that the changes made in

Revision 32 reduced the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan, as defined

by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4). The licensee eliminated plant EAL events related to radiological

releases including effluent releases because they reasoned that spent fuel was removed

from the plant and therefore the radiological source term that remained at the plant could

not create a significant consequence to the public. The licensee acknowledged in their

evaluation that, although the spent fuel was moved to the ISFSI, a potential for adverse

radiological conditions during plant decommissioning and dismantlement activities

existed. Since there were ongoing decommissioning and dismantlement operations

periodically conducted in the plant and liquid collection systems and the plant ventilation

systems remained in operation, the NRC determined that releases of radioactive

materials were possible. Therefore, the removal of these event types equated to a

reduction in effectiveness which required NRC approval.

The NRC staff also identified that an adequate technical evaluation or basis was not

provided by the licensee to eliminate the Alert classification, reduce exercise

frequencies, and reduce staffing augmentation times.

NRC staff identified that the licensee removed reactor plant related requirements from its

Emergency Plan although decommissioning was not complete and licensed radioactive

material was present in the plant.

The NRC communicated to the licensee in telephone conversations on

December 19, 2012, and January 24, 2013, that Revision 32 of the Emergency Plan

reduced its effectiveness and that the changes made by the licensee to the plan were

not consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4). The licensee documented

the issue in their corrective action program under CAR 2013-004 on January 24, 2013.

6

As part of their corrective actions, the licensee performed a quantitative analysis of the

dispersion of the remaining LACBWR plant nuclide inventory in order to justify the

changes made in Revision 32. Following the completion of the analysis, the licensee

submitted Revision 33 of the Emergency Plan for NRC approval on August 6, 2013. On

April 14, 2014, Revision 34 was submitted for approval in response to NRCs inquiry

about the elimination of the Alert classification. NRC staff found that the licensee had

not justified removal of the Alert classification in Revision 32 and 33. Revision 34 was

subsequently approved by the NRC on September 18, 2014.

During the period of December 19, 2012 through September 18, 2014, the licensee

failed to implement corrective actions to regain compliance with Revision 31. Instead,

the licensee continued to implement Revision 32 even though it had not been approved

in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4). The NRC discussed the need to restore

compliance with an acceptable Emergency Plan in telephone conversations with the

licensee on December 19, 2012, January 24, 2013, August 20, 2013, and

December 4, 2013. The licensee documented the issue in CAR 2013-004 dated

January 24, 2013, and CAR 2013-022 dated December 27, 2013, and initiated actions

for approval of the Emergency Plan by the NRC as discussed above. Actions were not

taken by the licensee in the interim nearly two year period between Revision 31 and

Revision 34 to fully restore compliance with Revision 31. The corrective actions were

closed following the submission of Revision 34 for NRC approval.

An AV was identified, because the license made changes to their emergency plan that

reduced the effectiveness of the plan and implemented these changes on

October 29, 2012, without prior approval by the NRC as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4).

Pending final determination of the safety significance and NRCs enforcement

decision, this issue was identified as an Apparent Violation (AV 072000046/2014001-02;05000409/2014008-02; Reduction in Effectiveness of Emergency Plan without NRC

Approval)

Title 10 CFR 50.54(q), "Emergency Plans" - Failure to Perform Drills and Exercises as

Required by the Emergency Plan

10 CFR 50.54(q) states, in part, a holder of a license under this part shall follow and

maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the requirements in

appendix E of this part...

Revision 31 of the LACBWR Emergency Plan, Section E.2.2.1, Plant Emergency Plan

Exercises, states that to ascertain the necessary level of familiarity with emergency

plan and procedures and to demonstrate the effectiveness of the plan, plant exercises

will be conducted annually to evaluate the overall response and emergency capability of

the LACBWR/DPC. Additionally, Section E.2.3 Drills, states that A drill is a

supervised instruction aimed at testing, developing, and maintaining skills in a particular

operation. Drills may be conducted as part of an exercise. Drills will be evaluated as

described in Subsection 2.5 of this Section. The types and frequency of drills is as

follows: fire drills will be conducted annually medical emergency drills will be

conducted annually health physics drills will be conducted annually.

7

The inspectors identified that the licensee conducted a plant emergency exercise in

2010, however, failed to perform a plant emergency exercise in 2011, 2012, and 2013.

The inspectors also identified that the licensee failed to perform fire drills in 2011 and

2012; a medical drill in 2013; and a valid health physics drill in 2012. The health physics

activity in 2012 credited as a drill was not a supervised instruction that tested, developed

and maintained skills because it did not involve radiological conditions that necessitated

an action, did require emergency plan implementation, and was not observed or

critiqued.

An AV was identified, in that between 2011 and 2013, the licensee failed to follow their

Emergency Plan in accordance with 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4). Specifically, the licensee failed

to perform emergency exercises and drills in accordance with the LACBWR Emergency

Plan, Revision 31 Sections E.2.2.1 and E.2.3 respectively.

Pending final determination of the safety significance and NRCs enforcement

decision, this issue was identified as an Apparent Violation (AV 07200046/2014001-03;05000409/2014008-03; Failure to Perform Drills and Exercises as Required by the

Emergency Plan)

The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program under CAR 2013-

002. Following the issuance of Revision 34 to emergency plan, the licensee was no

longer required by its plan to conduct plant (non-ISFSI) emergency exercises. The

licensee performed ISFSI facility related emergency exercises in 2012 and 2014, in

accordance with the Emergency Plan.

c. Conclusion

The inspectors identified three apparent violations of 10 CFR 50.54(q) for the licensee's

failure to maintain Emergency Plan staffing, submit changes to the Emergency Plan that

reduced its effectiveness to the NRC for review prior to implementation, and conduct

emergency drills and exercises in accordance with the frequency specified in the

Emergency Plan.

1.2

Review of Emergency Plan Program since Emergency Plan Revision 34 Issuance

a. Inspection Scope

On September 18, 2014, the NRC approved the LACBWR Emergency Plan,

Revision 34. The revision removed all event types associated with the plant (Non-ISFSI)

and associated processes and programs supporting these event types. The licensee

revised their implementing procedures, processes, and programs following the approval

of Revision 34.

The inspectors observed and evaluated the conduct of the ISFSI biennial emergency

preparedness exercise. The inspectors reviewed the Emergency Plan, implementing

procedures, and the exercise scenario with the exercise objectives and expected

sequence of events. The inspectors reviewed the proposed exercise scenario to

understand its scope and evaluate its adequacy to ensure the licensee could

demonstrate their emergency response capabilities. The inspectors observed the pre-

exercise briefing, the exercise, and the licensees formal post-exercise self-assessment.

8

Through document reviews and walkdowns, the inspectors also assessed the licensees

fire protection program for its effectiveness to support safe storage of spent nuclear fuel.

b. Observations and Findings

Review of 2014 ISFSI Emergency Exercise Performance

Section 8.3 of the LACBWR ISFSI Emergency Plan requires the licensee to perform a

biennial exercise to demonstrate emergency response capabilities and effectiveness of

the licensees Emergency Plan. The scenario for the December 16, 2014, exercise

involved a simulated tornado striking the ISFSI. Following an initiating event, the cask

was simulated to be damaged creating potential for a damaged confinement boundary.

The licensee implemented appropriate, timely, and necessary actions to address the

simulated event. The licensee correctly classified the event, made timely notifications,

augmented personnel onsite as needed, conducted adequate radiological monitoring,

and ensured the safety of personnel. Exercise participants maintained control

throughout the scenario, starting with a prompt recognition of the initiating event and

through recovery discussions. Throughout the exercise, the licensees staff

communicated well with all involved parties and demonstrated knowledge of the

Emergency Plan. During the post-exercise critique, the licensee adequately evaluated

its emergency response and management capability.

The licensees fire protection program was assessed through reviews of periodic fire drill

records and applicable fire protection program documents. The scenarios were

reviewed to determine whether they were realistic and met drill objectives. The

inspectors did not identify any un-analyzed combustibles stored or located within the

ISFSI.

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures not in accordance with Emergency Plan

10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) states, in part, A standard emergency classification and action level

scheme is used by the nuclear facility.

The inspectors reviewed EPP-20.01, ISFSI Emergency Conditions, Revision 3. The

procedure defines conditions that constitute an emergency at the ISFSI and provides

guidance for determining when emergency conditions at the ISFSI should be classified

as an ALERT which would require activation of the Emergency Plan and implementation

of Emergency Plan Procedures. Within the procedures an emergency is classified

based on specific information contained in Attachment 1, ISFSI Emergency Events.

Specifically, Attachment 1 provides both quantitative and qualitative criteria requiring

declaration of an Alert under the event type Potential Damage to Loaded Cask

Confinement Boundary. Specifically, Attachment 1 required declaration of an Alert

when any one of the following qualitative conditions are observed: A VCC has moved

out of its normal position on the ISFSI Pad, or VCC damage to the top or sides of cask

with concrete debris found nearby, or tornado driven missile has impacted a VCC, or a

VCC has tipped over on the ISFSI Pad or has fallen off the ISFSI Pad, or 50% of VCC

inlets and outlets are blocked. Additionally Attachment 1 required declaration of an Alert

when any one of the following quantitative conditions are observed: >500R/hr before

reaching the Isolation Zone Fence, or Measured dose rate at the Isolation Zone Fence

9

exceeds the tag value in EPP-20.04 or 40 mRem/hr on side of VCC, or 50 mRem/hr

on top of VCC, or 200 mRem/hr average of measurements at eight air inlets and

outlets of VCC.

The inspectors reviewed the Emergency Plan, Revision 34, Table 4.1 ISFSI Emergency

Events, and identified that the Emergency Plan only contained quantitative criteria

requiring declarations of an Alert under the event type Potential Damage to Loaded

Cask Confinement Boundary. Specifically, Table 4.1 requires declaration of an Alert

when any one of the following quantitative (measured) conditions are identified:

40 mRem/hr on side of VCC, OR 50 mRem/hr on top of VCC, OR 200 mRem/hr

average of measurements at eight air inlets and outlets of VCC.

The inspectors determined that the licensees implementing procedures and associated

emergency action level scheme were not in alignment with the licensees Emergency

Plan emergency action level scheme. Specifically, the implementing procedures

contained qualitative criteria that would require declaration of an Alert that are not

contained within the Emergency Plan. The inspectors noted that while most of the

qualitative criteria was indicative of a potential event at the ISFSI which could lead to the

quantitative criteria being exceeded, there was potential for an over classification of an

event. For example, during a heavy snow fall, the lower vents of the VCC could be

blocked by snow, which would require declaration of an Alert according to the licensees

implementing procedures. In contrast the licensees design basis evaluation

demonstrates that the lower vents can be blocked for an indefinite amount of time

without any safety impact or associated increase in dose rate.

The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to have an emergency classification

system within their implementing procedures that adhered to the emergency

classification system within their Emergency Plan, and therefore this was a violation of

10 CFR 50.47(b)(4).

The licensee documented this issue within their corrective action program under

CAR 2014-022 and initiated actions for revision of the procedure.

The inspectors determined that this was a performance deficiency that warranted

screening for enforcement. The inspectors determined that the failure to have an

emergency classification system within their implementing procedures that adhered to

the emergency classification system within their Emergency Plan was a violation of more

than minor significance using Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples

of Minor Issues, example 4h.

The inspectors utilized Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix B, Emergency

Preparedness Significance Determination Process, in conjunction with NRC

Enforcement Policy to make a significance determination. The inspectors determined

that requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) Emergency Classification System is a

Planning Standard. The inspectors determined that the violation was similar to the

Green Finding example in IMC 0609 Table 5.4-1, The EAL classification process would

result in an over-classification causing an unnecessary emergency declaration.

Specifically, the licensees implementing procedures contained additional qualitative

criteria that would require declaration of an Alert for a Potential Damage to Loaded

Cask Confinement Boundary when not required by the emergency plan.

10

The inspectors determined that this similar Green Finding example for a Planning

Standard Function for a Non-Risk Significant Planning Standard could be correlated to

Enforcement Policy example 6.6.d.1, in that a licensee ability to meet or implement any

regulatory requirement not related to assessment or notification such that the

effectiveness of the emergency plan decreases. The inspectors determined that the

violation could be evaluated using example 6.6.d.1 as a Severity Level IV violation.

10 CFR 50.47(b)(4) states, in part, A standard emergency classification and action level

scheme is used by the nuclear facility.

Contrary to the above, on December 15, 2014, the licensee failed to utilize a standard

classification and action level scheme. Specifically, the inspectors identified that the

licensee failed to have an emergency classification system within their implementing

procedures that adhered to the emergency classification system within their Emergency

Plan.

Because this violation was of very low safety significance, Severity Level IV, and was

entered into the licensees corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a

NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

(NCV 07200046/2014001-04;05000409/2014008-04; Emergency Plan Implementing

Procedures not in accordance with Emergency Plan)

Staff Augmentation Capability not in accordance with Emergency Plan

10 CFR 50.54(q) states, in part, a holder of a license under this part shall follow and

maintain the effectiveness of an emergency plan that meets the requirements in

appendix E of this part...

10 CFR 50.47 states, in part, On-shift facility licensee responsibilities for emergency

response are unambiguously defined, adequate staffing to provide initial facility accident

response in key functional areas is maintained at all times, timely augmentation of

response capabilities is available and the interfaces among various onsite response

activities and offsite support and response activities are specified.

The LACBWR Emergency Plan, Revision 34, Section 3.3, ISFSI Event Response

Surveillance states: A Response Surveillance is required following off-normal, accident

or natural phenomena events. The NAC-MPC Systems in use at an ISFSI shall be

inspected within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after the occurrence of an off-normal, accident or natural

phenomena event in the area of the ISFSI. Following a natural phenomena event, the

ISFSI shall be inspected to determine if movement or damage to the CONCRETE

CASKS has resulted in unacceptable site boundary dose rates."

Through interviews with licensee staff, the inspectors identified that the licensee failed to

have a staffing augmentation program in place to ensure that the actions specified in

Emergency Plan Section 3.3 could be met. Specifically, the inspectors identified that the

licensee did not have a staffing mechanism in place to ensure that radiological protection

staff could respond to the site within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of an event to adequately characterize the

site boundary dose rates.

11

The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to have an adequate program in place

to ensure augmentation of response capabilities is available to ensure Emergency Plan

actions could be accomplished as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2).

The licensee documented this issue within their corrective action program under

CAR 2014-025 and initiated actions to implement a staffing augmentation program.

The inspectors determined that this was a performance deficiency that warranted

screening for enforcement. The inspectors determined that the failure to have a staffing

mechanism in place to ensure emergency plan compliance was a violation of more than

minor significance using Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Examples of

Minor Issues, example 4h.

The inspectors utilized IMC 0609, Appendix B, Emergency Preparedness Significance

Determination Process, in conjunction with NRC Enforcement Policy to risk inform the

significance determination. The inspectors determined that the violation was similar to

the Degraded Planning Standard Function example in IMC 0609 Table 5.2-1, Staffing

processes would permit a shift to go below Emergency Plan minimum staffing

requirements, but there were no actual instances in which such shortage occurred.

Specifically, the licensees staffing program could not ensure response capabilities were

available to timely implement Emergency Plan actions; however, there were no actual

instances of emergencies where this occurred.

The inspectors determined that this similar Green Finding example for a Planning

Standard Function for a Non-Risk Significant Planning Standard could be correlated to

Enforcement Policy example 6.6.d.1, in that a licensee ability to meet or implement any

regulatory requirement not related to assessment or notification such that the

effectiveness of the emergency plan decreases. The inspectors determined that the

violation could be evaluated using example 6.6.d.1 as a Severity Level IV violation of

10 CFR 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2).

10 CFR 50.47 states, in part, On-shift facility licensee responsibilities for emergency

response are unambiguously defined, adequate staffing to provide initial facility accident

response in key functional areas is maintained at all times, timely augmentation of

response capabilities is available and the interfaces among various onsite response

activities and offsite support and response activities are specified.

Contrary to the above, on December 15, 2014, the licensee failed to ensure timely

augmentation of response capabilities is available. Specifically, the inspectors identified

that the licensee did not have a staffing mechanism in place to ensure that radiological

protection staff could respond to the site within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of an event to adequately

characterize the site boundary dose rates.

Because this violation was of very low safety significance, Severity Level IV, and was

entered into the licensees corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a

NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

(NCV 07200046/2014001-05;05000409/2014008-05; Staff Augmentation Capability not

in accordance with Emergency Plan)

12

c. Conclusion

The inspectors identified two severity level IV violations of 10 CFR 50.54(q) for the

licensee's failure to have an emergency classification system within their implementing

procedures that adhered to the emergency classification system within their Emergency

Plan in accordance with 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4), and failed to have adequate staffing

programs to ensure compliance with requirements contained within the Emergency Plan

and therefore this was a violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2).

The licensee demonstrated the ability to conduct an emergency exercise and assess

their performance during a formal critique. Fire protection requirements were met

regarding the conduct of drills and controlling combustibles in and around the ISFSI.

1.3

Surveillance and Maintenance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees surveillance and maintenance program

associated with dry fuel storage to verify compliance with the applicable regulations, the

License, and TS. The inspectors walked down the ISFSI pad, observed daily

surveillance activities, interviewed personnel, and reviewed select documents. The

inspectors reviewed several records of daily temperature checks and radiological

surveys performed since the last NRC inspection.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors conducted a walk down of the ISFSI pad and observed qualified

licensee staff perform daily surveillances of the casks including temperature

monitoring and inlet and outlet vent screen checks to ensure they were free of

significant blockage or damage. The inspectors also evaluated the general condition

of the ISFSI pad. The inspectors noted that temperature logs indicated that the

casks operated as designed with no abnormalities. The inspectors found that the

licensee performed and documented the surveillance activities as required by TS and

site procedures. In addition, the inspectors performed independent radiation surveys

of the casks, and general ISFSI area. The results were bounded by the radiological

postings and consistent with the licensee's radiological surveys.

No findings of significance were identified.

c. Conclusion

The licensee implemented its surveillance and maintenance program in accordance with

applicable regulations, the License, and TS.

1.4

Environmental Monitoring

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees annual Radioactive Effluent Release Reports for

2012 and 2013. The inspectors also reviewed semi-annual radiological survey results

13

performed by the licensee in 2013 and 2014. This review evaluated whether the

licensee complied with the off-site dose requirements prescribed by 10 CFR 72.104.

b. Observations and Findings

The licensee performed environmental radiological monitoring as required for the ISFSI.

The survey results indicated that the licensee was well under the limits of

10 CFR 72.104. These results were verified by the inspectors performing independent

radiation surveys of the ISFSI

No findings of significance were identified.

c. Conclusion

The licensee established and maintained its environmental monitoring program in

accordance with applicable 10 CFR Part 20, 50, and 72 regulations, the License, and

TS.

1.5

Quality Assurance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified through document reviews and conduct of interviews whether

changes were appropriately controlled and done in accordance with QA requirements.

Corrective action reports from 2013 and 2014 were reviewed to determine whether the

licensee effectively identified, resolved, and prevented problems. Additionally, the

inspectors reviewed safety review committee and operations review committee

documents to assess the onsite safety culture and whether issues were being identified

and addressed. The inspectors reviewed the timeliness of financial assurance

documentation that is required to be submitted to the NRC.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors reviewed 10 CFR 72.48 evaluations performed during 2012, 2013, and

2014. A review of CRs written during 2012, 2013, and 2014 indicated that the licensee

was effectively identifying and correcting facility issues. Safety review committee and

operations review committee meetings were conducted at regular intervals since the

previous inspection and issues were being addressed through the Corrective Action

Program (CAP).

Failure to Submit Decommissioning Funding Plan

Federal Register Notice 76FR35512, dated June 17, 2011, included a new rulemaking

requirement that affected Part 72 licensees. The Federal Register documented a

change to 72.30(b) which required Part 72 licensees to submit to the NRC for review and

approval an ISFSI decommissioning funding plan. The final rule made changes to the

financial assurance requirements for Part 72 licensees to provide greater consistency

with similar decommissioning requirements in the 10 CFR Part 50 regulations. Financial

assurances are financial arrangements provided by the licensee to ensure funds for

14

decommissioning will be available when needed. The effective date of the new rule was

December 17, 2012. The new rule required licensees to submit a decommissioning

funding plan to the NRC by the effective date of the rule. Contrary to this, LACBWR had

not submitted their ISFSI decommissioning funding plan until March 23, 2013.

10 CFR 72.30(b), Financial Assurance and recordkeeping for decommissioning, states

that, Each holder of of a license under this part must submit for NRC review and

approval a decommissioning funding plan

Contrary to the above, LACBWR had not submitted their ISFSI decommissioning funding

plan by December 17, 2012.

Because this violation was of very low safety significance, Severity Level IV, and was

entered into the licensees corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a

NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

(NCV 07200046/2014001-06;05000409/2014008-06; Failure to Submit Decommissioning

Funding Plan)

The licensee submitted the ISFSI Decommissioning Funding Report on March 23, 2013.

(NCV 07200046/2014001-06;05000409/2014008-06; Failure to Submit

Decommissioning Funding Plan)

c. Conclusion

The licensee implemented its CAP in accordance with the applicable regulations and site

QA requirements. Through the CAP, issues were effectively identified and corrected by

the licensee. A violation of very low safety significance was identified for the licensees

failure to submit their ISFSI decommissioning funding plan timely as required by

10 CFR 72.30(b).

2.0

Exit Meeting

The inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. L. Peters and other members of

your staff at the conclusion of the site inspection on December 18, 2014, and during a

teleconference on February 24, 2015. The licensee acknowledged the results presented

and did not identify any of the potential report input as proprietary in nature.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Attachment

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

PARTIAL LIST OF PEOPLE CONTACTED

• L. Peters, Genoa Manager

• D. Egge, Plant/ISFSI Supervisor

• J. Henkelman, Quality Assurance Specialist

• R. Grey, Radiation Protection Supervisor

• E. Martin, QA Manager

• W. Trubilowicz, Technical Engineer

• M. Mo, Security Manager

• Persons present at the exit meeting on February 24, 2015

INSPECTION PROCEDURE USED

60858

Away From Reactor ISFSI Inspection Guidance

ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

07200046/2014001-01;05000409/2014008-01

AV

Non-Compliance with Emergency Plan Staffing

Requirements

07200046/2014001-02;05000409/2014008-02

AV

Reduction in Effectiveness of Emergency Plan Without

NRC Approval

07200046/2014001-03;05000409/2014008-03

AV

Failure to Perform Drills and Exercises as Required by the

Emergency Plan

07200046/2014001-04;05000409/2014008-04

NCV

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures not in

accordance with Emergency Plan

07200046/2014001-05;05000409/2014008-05

NCV

Staff Augmentation Capability not in Accordance with

Emergency Plan

07200046/2014001-06;05000409/2014008-06

NCV

Failure to Submit Decommissioning Funding Plan

2

Closed

07200046/2014001-04;05000409/2014008-04

NCV

Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures not in

Accordance with Emergency Plan

07200046/2014001-05;05000409/2014008-05

NCV

Staff Augmentation Capability not in Accordance with

Emergency Plan

07200046/2014001-06;05000409/2014008-06

NCV

Failure to Submit Decommissioning Funding Plan

3

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ADAMS

Agencywide Documents Access and Management System

ADR

Alternate Dispute Resolution

AV

Apparent Violation

CAP

Corrective Action Program

CAR

Corrective Action Report

CFR

Code of Federal Regulations

CoC

Certificate of Compliance

DNMS

Division of Nuclear Materials Safety

EA

Enforcement Action

EAL

Emergency Action Level

FESW

Fuel Element Storage Well

ICR

Institute of Conflict Resolution

IMC

Inspection Manual Chapter

IR

Inspection Report

ISFSI

Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation

LACBWR

La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor

NRC

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

PEC

Predecisional Enforcement Conference

TS

Technical Specification

VCC

Vertical Concrete Cask

4

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a partial list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list

does not imply that the NRC inspectors reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather that

selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection

effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or

any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.

10 CFR 72.212 Report; Revision 4

2014 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Package

72.48-OP-99-5.01; ISFSI VCC heat Removal Monitoring System; Revision 0

72.48-RE-13-01; revise ISFSI Fire Protection Procedures; Revision 0

72.48-RE-2013-05; ACP-12.03, ISFSI VCC Heat Removal System; Revision 0

ACP-02.13; Operations Safety Review Committee; Revision 20

ACP-02.14; Safety Review Committee; Revision 18

ACP-07.06; 10 CFR 72.48 Evaluations

ACP-12.03; ISFSI VCC Heat Removal System Monitoring; Revision 1

ACP-16.0; Corrective Action Program; Revision 24

CAR 2013-004; Emergency Plan Submittal to USNRC; dated January 24, 2013

CAR 2013-005; EAL Responses at ISFSI; dated January 24, 2013

CAR 2013-007; ISFSI Decommissioning Funding Plan; dated February 25, 2013

CAR 2013-021; Emergency Plan Exercise; dated November 20, 2013

CAR 2013-022; Emergency Plan Audit Issues; dated December 27, 2013

CAR 2014-022; Action Level is not Consistent for EPP Declaration; dated December 18, 2014

CAR 2014-023; EAL Entry Basis not Clear; dated December 18, 2014

CAR 2014-024; Subjective Deactivation Criteria; dated December 18, 2014

CAR 2014-025; Process or Program to Ensure 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> RPT Response Time; dated

December 18, 2014

CAR 2014-026; SRC Membership did not Include Off-Site Individual; dated December 18, 2014

Decommissioning Funding Plan for ISFSI; March 12, 2013

Emergency Exercise and Drill Records; 2011-2012

Environmental Dosimetry Data; 2013-2014

EPP-20.01; ISFSI Emergency Conditions; Revision 3

EPP-20.02; ISFSI Organization and Operations during Emergencies; Revision 4

EPP-20.03; ISFSI Communications Systems; Revision 3A

EPP-20.04; ISFSI Emergency Dose Rate Assessment and Survey; Revision 2A

EPP-20.06; ISFSI Emergency Radiation Monitoring; Revision 3

Fire Protection Training and Drill Records; 2012-2014

FPP-20.04; ISFSI Monthly Fire Prevention Inspection; Revision 3

HSP-20.06; Radiation Surveys; Revision 33

ISFSI Emergency Preparedness Training Slides

ISFSI Fire Protection Training Slides

ISFSI Outer Isolation Zone Fence Surveys; 2013-2014

ISFSI Quality Assurance Training Slides

LACBWR Emergency Plan; Revision 31

LACBWR ISFSI Emergency Plan; Revision 32

LACBWR ISFSI Emergency Plan; Revision 33

LACBWR ISFSI Emergency Plan; Revision 34

5

LACBWR Possession Only License; Amendment 72

Operations Safety Review Committee Minutes; 2012-2014

Quality Assurance Program Description; Revision 27

Radiation Protection Orientation Slides

Retrievability Strategy

Safety Review Committee Minutes; 2012-2014

TPP-08; Fire Protection Training Procedure; Revision 14

TPP-20; ISFSI General Employee Training; Revision 0

VCC Dose Surveys; 2013-2014