ML15232A747: Difference between revisions

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
(Created page by program invented by StriderTol)
(StriderTol Bot change)
 
(One intermediate revision by the same user not shown)
Line 19: Line 19:
=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:September 11, 2015  
{{#Wiki_filter:September 11, 2015  
 
EA-14-230  
EA-14-230  
   
   
Dr. Sean McDeavitt, Director  
Dr. Sean McDeavitt, Director  
Texas A&M University Texas A&M Engineering Experiment Station  
Texas A&M University  
Texas A&M Engineering Experiment Station  
Nuclear Science Center  
Nuclear Science Center  
1095 Nuclear Science Road, M/S 3575  
1095 Nuclear Science Road, M/S 3575  
College Station, TX  77843-3575  
College Station, TX  77843-3575  
 
SUBJECT: TEXAS A&M NUCLEAR SCIENCE CENTER -
SUBJECT:  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION INSPECTION REPORT 50-128/2015-202 AND OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS REPORT NO. 4-2014-010 Dear Dr. McDeavitt:  
TEXAS A&M NUCLEAR SCIENCE CENTER - NUCLEAR REGULATORY  
COMMISSION INSPECTION REPORT 50-128/2015-202 AND OFFICE OF  
INVESTIGATIONS REPORT NO. 4-2014-010  
Dear Dr. McDeavitt:  
This letter presents the results of an investigation completed on December 1, 2014, by the U.S.  
This letter presents the results of an investigation completed on December 1, 2014, by the U.S.  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of In
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (OI) at the Texas A&M Nuclear  
vestigations (OI) at the Texas A&M Nuclear Science Center (Texas A&M NSC), College Station, Texas.  The purpose of the investigation  
Science Center (Texas A&M NSC), College Station, Texas.  The purpose of the investigation  
was to determine whether the reactor operations manager willfully falsified a reactor operations  
was to determine whether the reactor operations manager willfully falsified a reactor operations  
log shutdown checklist.  The investigation examined whether the manager certified the required shutdown procedures were performed, although the manager knew they had not been done.  A  
log shutdown checklist.  The investigation examined whether the manager certified the required  
factual summary of the OI report is provided in Enclosure 1.  The inspector discussed the results of the investigation and inspection with Mr. Jerry Newhouse, the facility Deputy Director, telephonically on July 28, 2015. The investigation examined activities conducted under the Texas A&M NSC license to determine whether safety-related actions violated the Commission's regulations and the  
shutdown procedures were performed, although the manager knew they had not been done.  A  
conditions of the Texas A&M NSC license.  The OI investigation included interviews with Texas A&M NSC personnel, a review of Nuclear Science Center Standard Operating Procedure (NSC Form112, 1-73, "Reactor Shutdown") in effect in May 2013 and the Texas A&M NSC Technical Specifications (TS) and supporting documentation. Information gathered during an inspection conducted from November 4-7, 2013, and the OI investigation provides the basis for two apparent violations (AVs) of NRC requirements.  The  
factual summary of the OI report is provided in Enclosure 1.  The inspector discussed the  
inspection report (Enclosure 2) documents the AVs, which are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy.  The current NRC Enforcement Policy appears on the NRC's website at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html. The first AV involves the reactor operations manager's failure to comply with TS, Appendix A, to License No. R-83, Sections 1.23 and 1.27.  These sections detail the required procedures for securing the reactor console.  The Nuclear Science Center Standard Operating Procedure (i.e., NSC Form- 112, 1-73) was also violated when the manager certified on the Daily Reactor  
results of the investigation and inspection with Mr. Jerry Newhouse, the facility Deputy Director,  
telephonically on July 28, 2015.  
The investigation examined activities conducted under the Texas A&M NSC license to  
determine whether safety-related actions violated the Commissions regulations and the  
conditions of the Texas A&M NSC license.  The OI investigation included interviews with Texas  
A&M NSC personnel, a review of Nuclear Science Center Standard Operating Procedure  
(NSC Form112, 1-73, Reactor Shutdown) in effect in May 2013 and the Texas A&M NSC  
Technical Specifications (TS) and supporting documentation.  
Information gathered during an inspection conducted from November 4-7, 2013, and the OI  
investigation provides the basis for two apparent violations (AVs) of NRC requirements.  The  
inspection report (Enclosure 2) documents the AVs, which are being considered for escalated  
enforcement action in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy.  The current NRC  
Enforcement Policy appears on the NRCs website at http://www.nrc.gov/about-
nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html.  
The first AV involves the reactor operations managers failure to comply with TS, Appendix A, to  
License No. R-83, Sections 1.23 and 1.27.  These sections detail the required procedures for  
securing the reactor console.  The Nuclear Science Center Standard Operating Procedure  
(i.e., NSC Form- 112, 1-73) was also violated when the manager certified on the Daily Reactor  
Shutdown Checkoff section of the reactor operations log that the shutdown procedures had  
Shutdown Checkoff section of the reactor operations log that the shutdown procedures had  
been completed.  The technical specifications are required by Title 10 of the  
been completed.  The technical specifications are required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal  
Code of Federal  
Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.36, Technical specifications, because Texas A&M NSC  
Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.36, "Technical specifications," because Texas A&M NSC
 
S. McDeavitt -2-  
S. McDeavitt  
-2-  
   
   
holds a class 104 license pursuant to 10 CFR 50.21, "Class 104 licenses; for medical therapy and research and development facilities."    
holds a class 104 license pursuant to 10 CFR 50.21, Class 104 licenses; for medical therapy  
and research and development facilities.   
   
   
The Texas A&M NSC staff's actions were not in accordance with 10 CFR, Section 50.5,  
The Texas A&M NSC staffs actions were not in accordance with 10 CFR, Section 50.5,  
"Deliberate misconduct," paragraph (a).  The apparently willful actions put Texas A&M NSC in  
Deliberate misconduct, paragraph (a).  The apparently willful actions put Texas A&M NSC in  
violation of 10 CFR 50.9, "Completeness and accuracy of information," which states, in part, that  
violation of 10 CFR 50.9, Completeness and accuracy of information, which states, in part, that  
 
information required by the Commissions regulations, orders, or license conditions to be  
information required by the Commission's regulations, orders, or license conditions to be maintained shall be accurate in all material respects.  Specifically, on May 15, 2013, the reactor operations manager willfully falsified the reactor operations log shutdown checklist by certifying  
maintained shall be accurate in all material respects.  Specifically, on May 15, 2013, the reactor  
operations manager willfully falsified the reactor operations log shutdown checklist by certifying  
that the required shutdown procedures had been completed when they had not been performed.   
that the required shutdown procedures had been completed when they had not been performed.   
   
   
The inaccurate reactor operations log shutdown checklist was material to the NRC because it provided evidence of completion of a procedure required by Texas A&M NSC's TS.   
The inaccurate reactor operations log shutdown checklist was material to the NRC because it  
provided evidence of completion of a procedure required by Texas A&M NSCs TS.   
   
   
The second AV involves the apparent non-willful failure to meet the minimum facility staffing  
The second AV involves the apparent non-willful failure to meet the minimum facility staffing  
 
requirements on May 1415, 2013, during which time the reactor was not secured.  The staffing  
requirements on May 1415, 2013, during which time the reactor was not secured.  The staffing requirement TS 6.1.3, "Staffing," require that at least two individuals, a senior reactor operator and either a licensed reactor operator or operator trainee, be on duty when the reactor is not secured.  The senior reactor operator and reactor operator left the facility complex without  
requirement TS 6.1.3, Staffing, require that at least two individuals, a senior reactor operator  
and either a licensed reactor operator or operator trainee, be on duty when the reactor is not  
secured.  The senior reactor operator and reactor operator left the facility complex without  
securing the reactor, resulting in a violation of staffing requirements on May 1415, 2013.   
securing the reactor, resulting in a violation of staffing requirements on May 1415, 2013.   
   
   
Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, we are providing you an opportunity to:  (1) respond in writing to either or both AVs addressed in this letter within 30 days of the date of this letter; (2) request a pre-decisional enforcement conference (PEC); or (3) request an alternative dispute resolution (ADR).  You must contact Dr. Kevin Hsueh at (301) 415-7256  
Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, we are providing you an opportunity to:   
(1) respond in writing to either or both AVs addressed in this letter within 30 days of the date of  
this letter; (2) request a pre-decisional enforcement conference (PEC); or (3) request an  
alternative dispute resolution (ADR).  You must contact Dr. Kevin Hsueh at (301) 415-7256  
within 10 days of the date of this letter to notify the NRC of which option you plan to use.  If we  
within 10 days of the date of this letter to notify the NRC of which option you plan to use.  If we  
have not heard from you within this timeframe, we will proceed with our enforcement decision, unless the NRC has granted you an extension time.  
have not heard from you within this timeframe, we will proceed with our enforcement decision,  
  If you choose to provide a written response, it should be clearly marked as a "Response to  
unless the NRC has granted you an extension time.  
Apparent Violations; EA-14-230" and should include for each AV:  (1) the reason for the AV or, if  
   
If you choose to provide a written response, it should be clearly marked as a Response to  
Apparent Violations; EA-14-230 and should include for each AV:  (1) the reason for the AV or, if  
contested, the basis for disputing the AV; (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the  
contested, the basis for disputing the AV; (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the  
results achieved; (3) the corrective steps that will be taken; and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved.  Your written response should be addressed to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:  Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555.  
results achieved; (3) the corrective steps that will be taken; and (4) the date when full  
If a PEC is held, the NRC  
compliance will be achieved.  Your written response should be addressed to the U.S. Nuclear  
will issue a press release to announce the PEC time and date.  However, the PEC will be closed to public observation since information related to an OI report  
Regulatory Commission, ATTN:  Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555.  
If a PEC is held, the NRC will issue a press release to announce the PEC time and date.   
However, the PEC will be closed to public observation since information related to an OI report  
will be discussed and this report has not been made public.  A PEC should be held within  
will be discussed and this report has not been made public.  A PEC should be held within  
30 days of the date of this letter.  If you choose to request a PEC, the conference will afford you  
30 days of the date of this letter.  If you choose to request a PEC, the conference will afford you  
the opportunity to provide your perspective on t
the opportunity to provide your perspective on these matters and any other information that you  
hese matters and any other information that you believe the NRC should take into consideration before making an enforcement decision.  This  
believe the NRC should take into consideration before making an enforcement decision.  This  
conference would be conducted to obtain information to assist the NRC in making an  
conference would be conducted to obtain information to assist the NRC in making an  
enforcement decision.  The topics discussed during the conference may include information to  
enforcement decision.  The topics discussed during the conference may include information to  
determine whether a violation occurred, information to determine the significance of a violation,  
determine whether a violation occurred, information to determine the significance of a violation,  
information related to the identification of a violation, and information related to any corrective actions taken or planned.  
information related to the identification of a violation, and information related to any corrective  
S. McDeavitt -3-  
actions taken or planned.
 
S. McDeavitt  
-3-  
   
   
In lieu of a PEC, you may also request an ADR with the NRC in an attempt to resolve the issues.  ADR is a general term encompassing various techniques for resolving conflicts outside  
In lieu of a PEC, you may also request an ADR with the NRC in an attempt to resolve the  
of court using a neutral third party.  The technique that the NRC has decided to employ is mediation.  Mediation is a voluntary, informal process in which a trained neutral (the "mediator") works with parties to help them reach resolution.  If the parties agree to use ADR, they select a  
issues.  ADR is a general term encompassing various techniques for resolving conflicts outside  
of court using a neutral third party.  The technique that the NRC has decided to employ is  
mediation.  Mediation is a voluntary, informal process in which a trained neutral (the mediator)  
works with parties to help them reach resolution.  If the parties agree to use ADR, they select a  
mutually agreeable neutral mediator who has no stake in the outcome and no power to make  
mutually agreeable neutral mediator who has no stake in the outcome and no power to make  
decisions.  Mediation gives parties an opportunity to discuss issues, clear up misunderstandings, be creative, find areas of agreement, and reach a final resolution of the issues.  Additional information concerning the NRC's ADR program can be obtained at  
decisions.  Mediation gives parties an opportunity to discuss issues, clear up  
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/adr.html
misunderstandings, be creative, find areas of agreement, and reach a final resolution of the  
.  The Institute on Conflict Resolution at Cornell University has agreed to facilitate the NRC's program as a neutral third  
issues.  Additional information concerning the NRC's ADR program can be obtained at  
party.  Please contact the Institute on Conflict Resolution at (877) 733-9415 within 10 days of the date of this letter if you are interested in pursuing resolution of the issues through an ADR.  Additionally, as stated earlier, please contact Dr. Kevin Hsueh at the number given above within 10 days of the date of this letter to notify the NRC of the option you choose.  
http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/adr.html.  The Institute on Conflict  
 
Resolution at Cornell University has agreed to facilitate the NRC's program as a neutral third  
party.  Please contact the Institute on Conflict Resolution at (877) 733-9415 within 10 days of  
the date of this letter if you are interested in pursuing resolution of the issues through an ADR.   
Additionally, as stated earlier, please contact Dr. Kevin Hsueh at the number given above within  
10 days of the date of this letter to notify the NRC of the option you choose.  
   
   
Please be advised that the number and characterization of AVs described in the enclosed inspection report may change as a result of further NRC review.  You will be advised by separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.  
Please be advised that the number and characterization of AVs described in the enclosed  
 
inspection report may change as a result of further NRC review.  You will be advised by  
separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.  
   
   
In accordance with 10 CFR Section 2.390, " Public inspections, exemptions, requests for  
In accordance with 10 CFR Section 2.390, " Public inspections, exemptions, requests for  
withholding," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response, if you choose to provide  
withholding," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response, if you choose to provide  
one, will be made available electronically for pub
one, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document  
lic inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS), accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.  To the extent possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards  
Room or from the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS),  
accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html.  To the extent  
possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards  
information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction.   
information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction.   
If you have any questions, please contact Dr. Kevin Hsueh of my staff at (301) 415-7256.
Sincerely,
/RA/
Lawrence E. Kokajko, Director
Division of Policy and Rulemaking
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Docket No. 50-128
License No. R-83
Enclosures:
1. Factual Summary 
2. Inspection Report 50-128/2015-202


  If you have any questions, please contact Dr. Kevin Hsueh of my staff at (301) 415-7256.
  ML15232A747                                                                                                  *via e-mail
Sincerely,        /RA/
OFFICE
Lawrence E. Kokajko, Director      Division of Policy and Rulemaking
NRR/DPR/PROB
      Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
NRR/DPR/LA
Docket No. 50-128 License No. R-83 Enclosures: 1. Factual Summary 
NRR/DIRS/IPAB *
2. Inspection Report 50-128/2015-202
OGC *
NAME
GMorlang
NParker/
FNestor
PJehle
DATE
8/26/2015
8/26/2015
8/31/2015
8/31/2015
OFFICE
OE/EB
NRR/DPR/PROB/BC
NRR/DPR/DD
NRR/DPR/D
NAME
RFretz *
KHsueh
MGavrilas
LKokajko
DATE
9/1/2015
9/1/2015
9/4/2015
9/11/2015  


ML15232A747                                                                                                  *via e-mail OFFICE NRR/DPR/PROB NRR/DPR/LA NRR/DIRS/IPAB * OGC * NAME GMorlang NParker/ FNestor PJehle DATE 8/26/2015 8/26/2015 8/31/2015 8/31/2015 OFFICE OE/EB NRR/DPR/PROB/BC NRR/DPR/DD NRR/DPR/D NAME RFretz * KHsueh MGavrilas LKokajko DATE 9/1/2015 9/1/2015 9/4/2015 9/11/2015  
   
Enclosure 1 FACTUAL SUMMARY
Enclosure 1  
Office of Investigations Report No. 4-2014-010 On December 16, 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (OI), Region IV Field Office, initiated an investigation at the Texas A&M Nuclear  
FACTUAL SUMMARY  
Office of Investigations Report No. 4-2014-010  
On December 16, 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of  
Investigations (OI), Region IV Field Office, initiated an investigation at the Texas A&M Nuclear  
Science Center (Texas A&M NSC).  The purpose of the investigation was to determine whether  
Science Center (Texas A&M NSC).  The purpose of the investigation was to determine whether  
the reactor operations manager willfully falsified the May 14, 2013, reactor operations log  
the reactor operations manager willfully falsified the May 14, 2013, reactor operations log  
shutdown checklist.  The investigation examined whether the manager certified the required shutdown procedures were performed, and whether the manager knew they had not been done.  The NRC completed its investigation on December 1, 2014. On the night of May 14, 2013, the senior reactor operator (SRO) and the reactor operator (RO) on duty began a shutdown of the Texas A&M NSC reactor following Standard Operating  
shutdown checklist.  The investigation examined whether the manager certified the required  
Procedure NSC Form 112, 1-73, "Reactor Shutdown." The Texas A&M NSC technical  
shutdown procedures were performed, and whether the manager knew they had not been done.   
specifications 6.3.a requires implementation of this procedure at reactor shutdown.  The procedure requires that operators:  
The NRC completed its investigation on December 1, 2014.  
  1. Record the shutdown in the operations log,  
On the night of May 14, 2013, the senior reactor operator (SRO) and the reactor operator (RO)  
on duty began a shutdown of the Texas A&M NSC reactor following Standard Operating  
Procedure NSC Form 112, 1-73, Reactor Shutdown.  The Texas A&M NSC technical  
specifications 6.3.a requires implementation of this procedure at reactor shutdown.  The  
procedure requires that operators:  
   
1. Record the shutdown in the operations log,  
2. Visually verify all control rods are down,  
2. Visually verify all control rods are down,  
3. Complete the 'Daily Reactor Shutdown Checkoff' section of the reactor operations log, following the last shutdown of the day. The Daily Reactor Shutdown Checkoff includes the same check list items.   
3. Complete the Daily Reactor Shutdown Checkoff section of the reactor  
The SRO and RO on duty the night of May 14, 2013, could not visually check that all control rods were down because one rod did not fully insert.  When interviewed by OI, the SRO and RO did not recall completing the reactor operations log shutdown checklist for the May 14, 2013  
operations log, following the last shutdown of the day.  
shift. On the morning of May 15, 2013, the reactor operations manager arrived at the Texas A&M NSC with knowledge of the events of the night of May 14, 2013.  The manager observed that  
The Daily Reactor Shutdown Checkoff includes the same check list items.   
The SRO and RO on duty the night of May 14, 2013, could not visually check that all control  
rods were down because one rod did not fully insert.  When interviewed by OI, the SRO and RO  
did not recall completing the reactor operations log shutdown checklist for the May 14, 2013  
shift.  
On the morning of May 15, 2013, the reactor operations manager arrived at the Texas A&M  
NSC with knowledge of the events of the night of May 14, 2013.  The manager observed that  
the reactor operations log shutdown checklist for the prior night was incomplete.  The reactor  
the reactor operations log shutdown checklist for the prior night was incomplete.  The reactor  
operations manager testified to subsequently completing the form.  One of the checkoff items  
operations manager testified to subsequently completing the form.  One of the checkoff items  
stated, "Visually check all rods down." The manager admitted awareness that one reactor rod was not fully seated in the down position as documented in OI Report No.  4-2014-010.  Based on the information developed during OI investigation 4-2014-010, the evidence indicates that the reactor operations manager willfully falsified the May 14, 2013, reactor operations log  
stated, Visually check all rods down.  The manager admitted awareness that one reactor rod  
shutdown checklist, stating that the required shutdown procedures were performed.
was not fully seated in the down position as documented in OI Report No.  4-2014-010.   
Enclosure 2 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
Based on the information developed during OI investigation 4-2014-010, the evidence indicates  
 
that the reactor operations manager willfully falsified the May 14, 2013, reactor operations log  
Docket No:  50-128
shutdown checklist, stating that the required shutdown procedures were performed.  


Enclosure 2
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
Docket No:
50-128
License No:
R-83
   
   
   
   
License No:  R-83
Report No:  
 
   
Report No:  50-128/2015-202  
50-128/2015-202  
 
Licensee:
Texas A&M University
   
   
Licensee:  Texas A&M University
   
   
Facility:
   
   
Facility:  Texas A&M Engineering Experiment Station  
Texas A&M Engineering Experiment Station  
Nuclear Science Center Reactor  
Nuclear Science Center Reactor  
 
Location: College Station, TX
   
   
   
   
Date: September 11, 2015  
Location:
 
College Station, TX
Inspector: Mike Morlang  
Date:  
September 11, 2015  
Inspector:  
Mike Morlang  
Approved by:
Kevin Hsueh, Chief
Research and Test Reactors Oversight Branch 
Division of Policy and Rulemaking
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation


   
   
Approved by: Kevin Hsueh, Chief Research and Test Reactors Oversight Branch    Division of Policy and Rulemaking
   
  Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation  
Texas A&M University  
  Texas A&M University Texas A&M Engineering Experiment Station  
Texas A&M Engineering Experiment Station  
Nuclear Science Center Inspection Report No. 50-128/2015-202 This inspection report documents the results of a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (OI) investigation of the Texas A&M Nuclear Science Center  
Nuclear Science Center  
Inspection Report No. 50-128/2015-202  
This inspection report documents the results of a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)  
Office of Investigations (OI) investigation of the Texas A&M Nuclear Science Center  
(Texas A&M NSC), College Station, Texas.  The purpose of the investigation was to determine  
(Texas A&M NSC), College Station, Texas.  The purpose of the investigation was to determine  
whether the reactor operations manager willfully falsified the May 14, 2013, reactor operations log shutdown checklist without performing the required shutdown procedures.  The investigation examined activities conducted under the Texas A&M NSC license to determine whether these safety-related actions complied with the Commission's regulations and  
whether the reactor operations manager willfully falsified the May 14, 2013, reactor operations  
log shutdown checklist without performing the required shutdown procedures.   
The investigation examined activities conducted under the Texas A&M NSC license to  
determine whether these safety-related actions complied with the Commissions regulations and  
the conditions of the Texas A&M NSC license.  The information gathered during a  
the conditions of the Texas A&M NSC license.  The information gathered during a  
November 47, 2013, inspection and the OI investigation provides the basis for two apparent violations (AVs) of NRC requirements.  The AVs are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy.  1. Failure to Maintain an Accurate Reactor Operations Log Shutdown Checklist
November 47, 2013, inspection and the OI investigation provides the basis for two apparent  
 
violations (AVs) of NRC requirements.  The AVs are being considered for escalated  
Title 10 of the  
enforcement action in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy.   
Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.9, "Completeness and accuracy of information," paragraph (a) which states, in part, that information required by the Commission's regulations, orders, or license conditions to be maintained shall be complete and accurate in all  
1. Failure to Maintain an Accurate Reactor Operations Log Shutdown Checklist  
material respects. The regulation in 10 CFR 50.21, "Class 104 licenses; for medical therapy and research and development facilities," which states, in part, that a class 104 license will be issued, to a  
production or utilization facility, which is useful in the conduct of research and development activities, for any one or more of the following: to transfer or receive in interstate commerce, manufacture, produce, transfer, acquire, possess, or use. The regulation in 10 CFR 50.36, "Technical specifications," paragraph (b), which states, in part, "Each license authorizing operation of a production or utilization facility of a type described in § 50.21 or § 50.22 will include technical specifications." paragraph (c), which states, in part, "Technical specifications will include items in the following categories:  (1) "Safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings-," (2) "Limiting conditions for operations-," and (5) "Administrative controls..." Texas A&M NSC established Standard Operating Procedure NSC Form 112 1-73, "Reactor Shutdown," as the implementing procedure for reactor shutdown.  Section 2.a of the procedure  
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.9, Completeness and accuracy of  
information, paragraph (a) which states, in part, that information required by the Commissions
regulations, orders, or license conditions to be maintained shall be complete and accurate in all  
material respects.  
The regulation in 10 CFR 50.21, Class 104 licenses; for medical therapy and research and  
development facilities, which states, in part, that a class 104 license will be issued, to a  
production or utilization facility, which is useful in the conduct of research and development  
activities, for any one or more of the following: to transfer or receive in interstate commerce,  
manufacture, produce, transfer, acquire, possess, or use.  
The regulation in 10 CFR 50.36, Technical specifications, paragraph (b), which states, in part,  
Each license authorizing operation of a production or utilization facility of a type described in §  
50.21 or § 50.22 will include technical specifications.  paragraph (c), which states, in part,  
Technical specifications will include items in the following categories:  (1) Safety limits, limiting  
safety system settings, and limiting control settings, (2) Limiting conditions for operations,  
and (5) Administrative controls...  
Texas A&M NSC established Standard Operating Procedure NSC Form 112 1-73, Reactor  
Shutdown, as the implementing procedure for reactor shutdown.  Section 2.a of the procedure  
states, 
a. the SRO will instruct the RO to shut down the reactor, and   
b. the RO record the shutdown in the operations log, and 
c. the RO visually verify all rods are down. 
Section 2.c of the procedure requires, in part, that, the Daily Reactor Shutdown Checkoff
section of the reactor operations log be completed following the last shutdown of the day. 


states,  a. the SRO will instruct the RO to shut down the reactor, and   
- 2 -
b. the RO record the shutdown in the operations log, and  
   
c. the RO visually verify all rods are down. Section 2.c of the procedure requires, in part, that, the Daily Reactor Shutdown Checkoff section of the reactor operations log be completed following the last shutdown of the day. 
   
- 2 -  The Daily Reactor Shutdown Checkoff includes the same checklist items that are listed in Section 2.a of Standard Operating Procedure NSC Form 112 1-73.  Texas A&M NSC Technical Specifications (TS) 6.3 requires compliance with Section 2.a of Standard Operating Procedure NSC Form 112, 1-73 during reactor shutdown.  Contrary to the above, on May 15, 2013, the licensee apparently failed to maintain complete and accurate records in all material respects.  The actions of the reactor operations manager on  
The Daily Reactor Shutdown Checkoff includes the same checklist items that are listed in  
May 15, 2013, created an incomplete and inaccurate record and put the licensee in apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.9(a).  The licensee apparently violated 10 CFR 50.9(a) by failing to maintain records that were complete and accurate in all material respects.  The Daily Reactor  
Section 2.a of Standard Operating Procedure NSC Form 112 1-73.   
Texas A&M NSC Technical Specifications (TS) 6.3 requires compliance with Section 2.a of  
Standard Operating Procedure NSC Form 112, 1-73 during reactor shutdown.   
Contrary to the above, on May 15, 2013, the licensee apparently failed to maintain complete  
and accurate records in all material respects.  The actions of the reactor operations manager on  
May 15, 2013, created an incomplete and inaccurate record and put the licensee in apparent  
violation of 10 CFR 50.9(a).  The licensee apparently violated 10 CFR 50.9(a) by failing to  
maintain records that were complete and accurate in all material respects.  The Daily Reactor  
Shutdown Checkoff is a safety record that documents that mandatory procedures for the safe  
Shutdown Checkoff is a safety record that documents that mandatory procedures for the safe  
shutdown of a reactor were performed.  The licensee is required to maintain these records for  
shutdown of a reactor were performed.  The licensee is required to maintain these records for  
inspection by the NRC staff and the completeness and accuracy of this safety information is  
inspection by the NRC staff and the completeness and accuracy of this safety information is  
material to the NRC inspection process. (AV 50-128/2015-202-01, Failure to Maintain an Accurate Reactor Operations Log Shutdown Checklist) 2. Failure to Maintain the Technical Specifications Minimum Facility Complex Staffing
material to the NRC inspection process.  
The regulation in 10 CFR 50.21, which states, in part, that a class 104 license will be issued, to a production or utilization facility, which is useful in the conduct of research and development activities, for any one or more of the following: to transfer or receive in interstate commerce,  
(AV 50-128/2015-202-01, Failure to Maintain an Accurate Reactor Operations Log Shutdown  
manufacture, produce, transfer, acquire, possess, or use. The regulation in 10 CFR 50.36, paragraph (b), which states, in part, "Each license authorizing operation of a production or utilization facility of a type described in § 50.21 or § 50.22 will  
Checklist)  
include technical specifications." paragraph (c), which states, in part, "Technical specifications will include items in the following categories:  (1) "Safety limits, limiting safety system settings, and limiting control settings-," (2) "Limiting conditions for operations-," and (5) "Administrative controls..." TS 1.26, Reactor Secured, states,  A reactor is secured when:  a) It contains insufficient fissile material or moderator present in the reactor and adjacent experiments to attain criticality under optimum  
2. Failure to Maintain the Technical Specifications Minimum Facility Complex Staffing  
available conditions of moderation and reflection, or  b) The reactor console is secured and  1) No work is in progress involving core control, core structure, installed control rods, or control rod drives unless they are physically decoupled from the control rods, and  
The regulation in 10 CFR 50.21, which states, in part, that a class 104 license will be issued, to  
- 3 -  2) No experiments in or near the reactor are being moved or serviced that have, on movement, a reactivity worth exceeding the maximum value of one dollar. TS 1.23, Reactor Console Secured, states "The reactor console is secured whenever all scrammable rods have been fully inserted and verified down and the console key has been
a production or utilization facility, which is useful in the conduct of research and development  
removed from the console."
activities, for any one or more of the following: to transfer or receive in interstate commerce,  
manufacture, produce, transfer, acquire, possess, or use.  
The regulation in 10 CFR 50.36, paragraph (b), which states, in part, Each license authorizing  
operation of a production or utilization facility of a type described in § 50.21 or § 50.22 will  
include technical specifications.  paragraph (c), which states, in part, Technical specifications  
will include items in the following categories:  (1) Safety limits, limiting safety system settings,  
and limiting control settings, (2) Limiting conditions for operations, and (5) Administrative  
controls...  
TS 1.26, Reactor Secured, states,  
   
A reactor is secured when:   
a) It contains insufficient fissile material or moderator present in the  
reactor and adjacent experiments to attain criticality under optimum  
available conditions of moderation and reflection, or   
b) The reactor console is secured and   
1) No work is in progress involving core control, core structure,  
installed control rods, or control rod drives unless they are physically  
decoupled from the control rods, and


  TS 6.1.3(a), Staffing, states, in part, that:   
- 3 -
  The minimum staffing when the reactor is not secured shall be as follows:   
 
1) At least two individuals will be present at the facility complex and will consist of a licensed senior reactor operator and either a licensed reactor operator or operator trainee. . . .   
2) No experiments in or near the reactor are being moved or serviced
that have, on movement, a reactivity worth exceeding the maximum
value of one dollar.
TS 1.23, Reactor Console Secured, states The reactor console is secured whenever all
scrammable rods have been fully inserted and verified down and the console key has been
removed from the console.
   
TS 6.1.3(a), Staffing, states, in part, that:   
   
The minimum staffing when the reactor is not secured shall be as follows:   
1) At least two individuals will be present at the facility complex and will  
consist of a licensed senior reactor operator and either a licensed  
reactor operator or operator trainee. . . .   
   
   
2) A licensed reactor operator or senior reactor operator will be in the  
2) A licensed reactor operator or senior reactor operator will be in the  
control room.  Texas A&M NSC is required by 10 CFR 50.36 to develop and comply with its TS because it holds a class 104 license, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.21. TS 1.26 states, in part, that: "A rector is secured when:  The reactor console is secured . . . ." TS 1.23 states: "The reactor console is secured whenever ALL scrammable rods have been  
control room.   
FULLY inserted and verified". Therefore 6.1.3(a) was deviated from when the operating team  
Texas A&M NSC is required by 10 CFR 50.36 to develop and comply with its TS because it  
left the control room and the Texas A&M NSC.  The requirements of TS 1.26(b) had to be met for the reactor to be secure.  However, TS 1.26(b) was not met because the reactor console was not secured according to the requirements of TS 1.23, because not all scrammable rods  
holds a class 104 license, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.21.  
 
TS 1.26 states, in part, that: A rector is secured when:  The reactor console is secured . . . .   
were fully inserted and verified down.  Important
TS 1.23 states: The reactor console is secured whenever ALL scrammable rods have been  
ly, during the event, there was no elevated risk
FULLY inserted and verified. Therefore 6.1.3(a) was deviated from when the operating team  
to the public or NSC personnel from the reactor.
left the control room and the Texas A&M NSC.  The requirements of TS 1.26(b) had to be met  
1 Contrary to the above, on May 14, 2013, the facility complex apparently did not maintain minimum staffing requirements and failed to have an SRO and either a licensed RO or operator trainee on duty when the reactor was not secured.  Specifically, the reactor was not secured on  
for the reactor to be secure.  However, TS 1.26(b) was not met because the reactor console  
the night of May 14-15, 2013 when the RSO and RO left the facility-in violation of TS 1.26,  
was not secured according to the requirements of TS 1.23, because not all scrammable rods  
were fully inserted and verified down.  Importantly, during the event, there was no elevated risk  
to the public or NSC personnel from the reactor.1
Contrary to the above, on May 14, 2013, the facility complex apparently did not maintain  
minimum staffing requirements and failed to have an SRO and either a licensed RO or operator  
trainee on duty when the reactor was not secured.  Specifically, the reactor was not secured on  
the night of May 14-15, 2013 when the RSO and RO left the facilityin violation of TS 1.26,  
1.23, and 6.1.3(a).  The reactor did not meet the requirements of TS 1.26(a) because it  
1.23, and 6.1.3(a).  The reactor did not meet the requirements of TS 1.26(a) because it  
contained sufficient fissile material to attain criticality under optimum available conditions of  
contained sufficient fissile material to attain criticality under optimum available conditions of  
moderation and reflection.  Therefore, the requirements of TS 1.26(b) had to be met for the reactor to be secure.  However, TS 1.26(b) was not met because the reactor console was not secured according to the requirements of TS 1.23 in that not all scrammable rods were fully  
moderation and reflection.  Therefore, the requirements of TS 1.26(b) had to be met for the  
inserted and verified down.                                                  
reactor to be secure.  However, TS 1.26(b) was not met because the reactor console was not  
1 Although leaving the reactor in a cold shutdown condition did not create an elevated risk in this circumstance, the technical specifications in the license and the operating procedures require a secured reactor console and reactor before facility staff leave.  The NRC considers having an unsecured reactor console and reactor to create a situation that could cause or lead to an unsafe condition.  Therefore, the fact that no further injury or elevated state resulted did not undercut the violation or need to report the  
secured according to the requirements of TS 1.23 in that not all scrammable rods were fully  
event to the NRC.  
inserted and verified down.  
- 4 -   (AV 50-128/2015-202-02, Failure to Maintain the TS Minimum Facility Complex Staffing)  
                                               
  3. Telephone Discussion Summary
1 Although leaving the reactor in a cold shutdown condition did not create an elevated risk in this  
 
circumstance, the technical specifications in the license and the operating procedures require a secured  
reactor console and reactor before facility staff leave.  The NRC considers having an unsecured reactor  
console and reactor to create a situation that could cause or lead to an unsafe condition.  Therefore, the  
fact that no further injury or elevated state resulted did not undercut the violation or need to report the  
event to the NRC.  
 
- 4 -  
(AV 50-128/2015-202-02, Failure to Maintain the TS Minimum Facility Complex Staffing)  
   
3. Telephone Discussion Summary  
The inspector discussed the identification of AVs documented in the inspection report with  
The inspector discussed the identification of AVs documented in the inspection report with  
Mr. Jerry Newhouse, the facility Deputy Director, Nuclear Science Center telephonically on  
Mr. Jerry Newhouse, the facility Deputy Director, Nuclear Science Center telephonically on  
July 28, 2015.  Mr. Newhouse acknowledged the findings presented in the report.
July 28, 2015.  Mr. Newhouse acknowledged the findings presented in the report.
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 09:22, 10 January 2025

IR 05000128/2015-202 -12/01/14, Texas A&M Nuclear Science Center - NRC Inspection Report 50-128/2015-202 and Results of NRC Office of Investigations Report No. 4-2014-010
ML15232A747
Person / Time
Site: 05000128
Issue date: 09/11/2015
From: Kokajko L
Division of Policy and Rulemaking
To: Mcdeavitt S
Texas A&M Univ
References
4-2014-010, EA-14-230 IR 2015202
Download: ML15232A747 (10)


See also: IR 05000128/2015202

Text

September 11, 2015

EA-14-230

Dr. Sean McDeavitt, Director

Texas A&M University

Texas A&M Engineering Experiment Station

Nuclear Science Center

1095 Nuclear Science Road, M/S 3575

College Station, TX 77843-3575

SUBJECT:

TEXAS A&M NUCLEAR SCIENCE CENTER - NUCLEAR REGULATORY

COMMISSION INSPECTION REPORT 50-128/2015-202 AND OFFICE OF

INVESTIGATIONS REPORT NO. 4-2014-010

Dear Dr. McDeavitt:

This letter presents the results of an investigation completed on December 1, 2014, by the U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of Investigations (OI) at the Texas A&M Nuclear

Science Center (Texas A&M NSC), College Station, Texas. The purpose of the investigation

was to determine whether the reactor operations manager willfully falsified a reactor operations

log shutdown checklist. The investigation examined whether the manager certified the required

shutdown procedures were performed, although the manager knew they had not been done. A

factual summary of the OI report is provided in Enclosure 1. The inspector discussed the

results of the investigation and inspection with Mr. Jerry Newhouse, the facility Deputy Director,

telephonically on July 28, 2015.

The investigation examined activities conducted under the Texas A&M NSC license to

determine whether safety-related actions violated the Commissions regulations and the

conditions of the Texas A&M NSC license. The OI investigation included interviews with Texas

A&M NSC personnel, a review of Nuclear Science Center Standard Operating Procedure

(NSC Form112, 1-73, Reactor Shutdown) in effect in May 2013 and the Texas A&M NSC

Technical Specifications (TS) and supporting documentation.

Information gathered during an inspection conducted from November 4-7, 2013, and the OI

investigation provides the basis for two apparent violations (AVs) of NRC requirements. The

inspection report (Enclosure 2) documents the AVs, which are being considered for escalated

enforcement action in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The current NRC

Enforcement Policy appears on the NRCs website at http://www.nrc.gov/about-

nrc/regulatory/enforcement/enforce-pol.html.

The first AV involves the reactor operations managers failure to comply with TS, Appendix A, to

License No. R-83, Sections 1.23 and 1.27. These sections detail the required procedures for

securing the reactor console. The Nuclear Science Center Standard Operating Procedure

(i.e., NSC Form- 112, 1-73) was also violated when the manager certified on the Daily Reactor

Shutdown Checkoff section of the reactor operations log that the shutdown procedures had

been completed. The technical specifications are required by Title 10 of the Code of Federal

Regulations (10 CFR), Section 50.36, Technical specifications, because Texas A&M NSC

S. McDeavitt

-2-

holds a class 104 license pursuant to 10 CFR 50.21, Class 104 licenses; for medical therapy

and research and development facilities.

The Texas A&M NSC staffs actions were not in accordance with 10 CFR, Section 50.5,

Deliberate misconduct, paragraph (a). The apparently willful actions put Texas A&M NSC in

violation of 10 CFR 50.9, Completeness and accuracy of information, which states, in part, that

information required by the Commissions regulations, orders, or license conditions to be

maintained shall be accurate in all material respects. Specifically, on May 15, 2013, the reactor

operations manager willfully falsified the reactor operations log shutdown checklist by certifying

that the required shutdown procedures had been completed when they had not been performed.

The inaccurate reactor operations log shutdown checklist was material to the NRC because it

provided evidence of completion of a procedure required by Texas A&M NSCs TS.

The second AV involves the apparent non-willful failure to meet the minimum facility staffing

requirements on May 1415, 2013, during which time the reactor was not secured. The staffing

requirement TS 6.1.3, Staffing, require that at least two individuals, a senior reactor operator

and either a licensed reactor operator or operator trainee, be on duty when the reactor is not

secured. The senior reactor operator and reactor operator left the facility complex without

securing the reactor, resulting in a violation of staffing requirements on May 1415, 2013.

Before the NRC makes its enforcement decision, we are providing you an opportunity to:

(1) respond in writing to either or both AVs addressed in this letter within 30 days of the date of

this letter; (2) request a pre-decisional enforcement conference (PEC); or (3) request an

alternative dispute resolution (ADR). You must contact Dr. Kevin Hsueh at (301) 415-7256

within 10 days of the date of this letter to notify the NRC of which option you plan to use. If we

have not heard from you within this timeframe, we will proceed with our enforcement decision,

unless the NRC has granted you an extension time.

If you choose to provide a written response, it should be clearly marked as a Response to

Apparent Violations; EA-14-230 and should include for each AV: (1) the reason for the AV or, if

contested, the basis for disputing the AV; (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the

results achieved; (3) the corrective steps that will be taken; and (4) the date when full

compliance will be achieved. Your written response should be addressed to the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, D.C. 20555.

If a PEC is held, the NRC will issue a press release to announce the PEC time and date.

However, the PEC will be closed to public observation since information related to an OI report

will be discussed and this report has not been made public. A PEC should be held within

30 days of the date of this letter. If you choose to request a PEC, the conference will afford you

the opportunity to provide your perspective on these matters and any other information that you

believe the NRC should take into consideration before making an enforcement decision. This

conference would be conducted to obtain information to assist the NRC in making an

enforcement decision. The topics discussed during the conference may include information to

determine whether a violation occurred, information to determine the significance of a violation,

information related to the identification of a violation, and information related to any corrective

actions taken or planned.

S. McDeavitt

-3-

In lieu of a PEC, you may also request an ADR with the NRC in an attempt to resolve the

issues. ADR is a general term encompassing various techniques for resolving conflicts outside

of court using a neutral third party. The technique that the NRC has decided to employ is

mediation. Mediation is a voluntary, informal process in which a trained neutral (the mediator)

works with parties to help them reach resolution. If the parties agree to use ADR, they select a

mutually agreeable neutral mediator who has no stake in the outcome and no power to make

decisions. Mediation gives parties an opportunity to discuss issues, clear up

misunderstandings, be creative, find areas of agreement, and reach a final resolution of the

issues. Additional information concerning the NRC's ADR program can be obtained at

http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/adr.html. The Institute on Conflict

Resolution at Cornell University has agreed to facilitate the NRC's program as a neutral third

party. Please contact the Institute on Conflict Resolution at (877) 733-9415 within 10 days of

the date of this letter if you are interested in pursuing resolution of the issues through an ADR.

Additionally, as stated earlier, please contact Dr. Kevin Hsueh at the number given above within

10 days of the date of this letter to notify the NRC of the option you choose.

Please be advised that the number and characterization of AVs described in the enclosed

inspection report may change as a result of further NRC review. You will be advised by

separate correspondence of the results of our deliberations on this matter.

In accordance with 10 CFR Section 2.390, " Public inspections, exemptions, requests for

withholding," a copy of this letter, its enclosures, and your response, if you choose to provide

one, will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document

Room or from the NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS),

accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To the extent

possible, your response should not include any personal privacy, proprietary, or safeguards

information so that it can be made available to the public without redaction.

If you have any questions, please contact Dr. Kevin Hsueh of my staff at (301) 415-7256.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Lawrence E. Kokajko, Director

Division of Policy and Rulemaking

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Docket No. 50-128

License No. R-83

Enclosures:

1. Factual Summary

2. Inspection Report 50-128/2015-202

ML15232A747 *via e-mail

OFFICE

NRR/DPR/PROB

NRR/DPR/LA

NRR/DIRS/IPAB *

OGC *

NAME

GMorlang

NParker/

FNestor

PJehle

DATE

8/26/2015

8/26/2015

8/31/2015

8/31/2015

OFFICE

OE/EB

NRR/DPR/PROB/BC

NRR/DPR/DD

NRR/DPR/D

NAME

RFretz *

KHsueh

MGavrilas

LKokajko

DATE

9/1/2015

9/1/2015

9/4/2015

9/11/2015

Enclosure 1

FACTUAL SUMMARY

Office of Investigations Report No. 4-2014-010

On December 16, 2013, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Office of

Investigations (OI), Region IV Field Office, initiated an investigation at the Texas A&M Nuclear

Science Center (Texas A&M NSC). The purpose of the investigation was to determine whether

the reactor operations manager willfully falsified the May 14, 2013, reactor operations log

shutdown checklist. The investigation examined whether the manager certified the required

shutdown procedures were performed, and whether the manager knew they had not been done.

The NRC completed its investigation on December 1, 2014.

On the night of May 14, 2013, the senior reactor operator (SRO) and the reactor operator (RO)

on duty began a shutdown of the Texas A&M NSC reactor following Standard Operating

Procedure NSC Form 112, 1-73, Reactor Shutdown. The Texas A&M NSC technical

specifications 6.3.a requires implementation of this procedure at reactor shutdown. The

procedure requires that operators:

1. Record the shutdown in the operations log,

2. Visually verify all control rods are down,

3. Complete the Daily Reactor Shutdown Checkoff section of the reactor

operations log, following the last shutdown of the day.

The Daily Reactor Shutdown Checkoff includes the same check list items.

The SRO and RO on duty the night of May 14, 2013, could not visually check that all control

rods were down because one rod did not fully insert. When interviewed by OI, the SRO and RO

did not recall completing the reactor operations log shutdown checklist for the May 14, 2013

shift.

On the morning of May 15, 2013, the reactor operations manager arrived at the Texas A&M

NSC with knowledge of the events of the night of May 14, 2013. The manager observed that

the reactor operations log shutdown checklist for the prior night was incomplete. The reactor

operations manager testified to subsequently completing the form. One of the checkoff items

stated, Visually check all rods down. The manager admitted awareness that one reactor rod

was not fully seated in the down position as documented in OI Report No. 4-2014-010.

Based on the information developed during OI investigation 4-2014-010, the evidence indicates

that the reactor operations manager willfully falsified the May 14, 2013, reactor operations log

shutdown checklist, stating that the required shutdown procedures were performed.

Enclosure 2

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

Docket No:

50-128

License No:

R-83

Report No:

50-128/2015-202

Licensee:

Texas A&M University

Facility:

Texas A&M Engineering Experiment Station

Nuclear Science Center Reactor

Location:

College Station, TX

Date:

September 11, 2015

Inspector:

Mike Morlang

Approved by:

Kevin Hsueh, Chief

Research and Test Reactors Oversight Branch

Division of Policy and Rulemaking

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Texas A&M University

Texas A&M Engineering Experiment Station

Nuclear Science Center

Inspection Report No. 50-128/2015-202

This inspection report documents the results of a U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

Office of Investigations (OI) investigation of the Texas A&M Nuclear Science Center

(Texas A&M NSC), College Station, Texas. The purpose of the investigation was to determine

whether the reactor operations manager willfully falsified the May 14, 2013, reactor operations

log shutdown checklist without performing the required shutdown procedures.

The investigation examined activities conducted under the Texas A&M NSC license to

determine whether these safety-related actions complied with the Commissions regulations and

the conditions of the Texas A&M NSC license. The information gathered during a

November 47, 2013, inspection and the OI investigation provides the basis for two apparent

violations (AVs) of NRC requirements. The AVs are being considered for escalated

enforcement action in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy.

1. Failure to Maintain an Accurate Reactor Operations Log Shutdown Checklist

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.9, Completeness and accuracy of

information, paragraph (a) which states, in part, that information required by the Commissions

regulations, orders, or license conditions to be maintained shall be complete and accurate in all

material respects.

The regulation in 10 CFR 50.21, Class 104 licenses; for medical therapy and research and

development facilities, which states, in part, that a class 104 license will be issued, to a

production or utilization facility, which is useful in the conduct of research and development

activities, for any one or more of the following: to transfer or receive in interstate commerce,

manufacture, produce, transfer, acquire, possess, or use.

The regulation in 10 CFR 50.36, Technical specifications, paragraph (b), which states, in part,

Each license authorizing operation of a production or utilization facility of a type described in §

50.21 or § 50.22 will include technical specifications. paragraph (c), which states, in part,

Technical specifications will include items in the following categories: (1) Safety limits, limiting

safety system settings, and limiting control settings, (2) Limiting conditions for operations,

and (5) Administrative controls...

Texas A&M NSC established Standard Operating Procedure NSC Form 112 1-73, Reactor

Shutdown, as the implementing procedure for reactor shutdown. Section 2.a of the procedure

states,

a. the SRO will instruct the RO to shut down the reactor, and

b. the RO record the shutdown in the operations log, and

c. the RO visually verify all rods are down.

Section 2.c of the procedure requires, in part, that, the Daily Reactor Shutdown Checkoff

section of the reactor operations log be completed following the last shutdown of the day.

- 2 -

The Daily Reactor Shutdown Checkoff includes the same checklist items that are listed in

Section 2.a of Standard Operating Procedure NSC Form 112 1-73.

Texas A&M NSC Technical Specifications (TS) 6.3 requires compliance with Section 2.a of

Standard Operating Procedure NSC Form 112, 1-73 during reactor shutdown.

Contrary to the above, on May 15, 2013, the licensee apparently failed to maintain complete

and accurate records in all material respects. The actions of the reactor operations manager on

May 15, 2013, created an incomplete and inaccurate record and put the licensee in apparent

violation of 10 CFR 50.9(a). The licensee apparently violated 10 CFR 50.9(a) by failing to

maintain records that were complete and accurate in all material respects. The Daily Reactor

Shutdown Checkoff is a safety record that documents that mandatory procedures for the safe

shutdown of a reactor were performed. The licensee is required to maintain these records for

inspection by the NRC staff and the completeness and accuracy of this safety information is

material to the NRC inspection process.

(AV 50-128/2015-202-01, Failure to Maintain an Accurate Reactor Operations Log Shutdown

Checklist)

2. Failure to Maintain the Technical Specifications Minimum Facility Complex Staffing

The regulation in 10 CFR 50.21, which states, in part, that a class 104 license will be issued, to

a production or utilization facility, which is useful in the conduct of research and development

activities, for any one or more of the following: to transfer or receive in interstate commerce,

manufacture, produce, transfer, acquire, possess, or use.

The regulation in 10 CFR 50.36, paragraph (b), which states, in part, Each license authorizing

operation of a production or utilization facility of a type described in § 50.21 or § 50.22 will

include technical specifications. paragraph (c), which states, in part, Technical specifications

will include items in the following categories: (1) Safety limits, limiting safety system settings,

and limiting control settings, (2) Limiting conditions for operations, and (5) Administrative

controls...

TS 1.26, Reactor Secured, states,

A reactor is secured when:

a) It contains insufficient fissile material or moderator present in the

reactor and adjacent experiments to attain criticality under optimum

available conditions of moderation and reflection, or

b) The reactor console is secured and

1) No work is in progress involving core control, core structure,

installed control rods, or control rod drives unless they are physically

decoupled from the control rods, and

- 3 -

2) No experiments in or near the reactor are being moved or serviced

that have, on movement, a reactivity worth exceeding the maximum

value of one dollar.

TS 1.23, Reactor Console Secured, states The reactor console is secured whenever all

scrammable rods have been fully inserted and verified down and the console key has been

removed from the console.

TS 6.1.3(a), Staffing, states, in part, that:

The minimum staffing when the reactor is not secured shall be as follows:

1) At least two individuals will be present at the facility complex and will

consist of a licensed senior reactor operator and either a licensed

reactor operator or operator trainee. . . .

2) A licensed reactor operator or senior reactor operator will be in the

control room.

Texas A&M NSC is required by 10 CFR 50.36 to develop and comply with its TS because it

holds a class 104 license, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.21.

TS 1.26 states, in part, that: A rector is secured when: The reactor console is secured . . . .

TS 1.23 states: The reactor console is secured whenever ALL scrammable rods have been

FULLY inserted and verified. Therefore 6.1.3(a) was deviated from when the operating team

left the control room and the Texas A&M NSC. The requirements of TS 1.26(b) had to be met

for the reactor to be secure. However, TS 1.26(b) was not met because the reactor console

was not secured according to the requirements of TS 1.23, because not all scrammable rods

were fully inserted and verified down. Importantly, during the event, there was no elevated risk

to the public or NSC personnel from the reactor.1

Contrary to the above, on May 14, 2013, the facility complex apparently did not maintain

minimum staffing requirements and failed to have an SRO and either a licensed RO or operator

trainee on duty when the reactor was not secured. Specifically, the reactor was not secured on

the night of May 14-15, 2013 when the RSO and RO left the facilityin violation of TS 1.26,

1.23, and 6.1.3(a). The reactor did not meet the requirements of TS 1.26(a) because it

contained sufficient fissile material to attain criticality under optimum available conditions of

moderation and reflection. Therefore, the requirements of TS 1.26(b) had to be met for the

reactor to be secure. However, TS 1.26(b) was not met because the reactor console was not

secured according to the requirements of TS 1.23 in that not all scrammable rods were fully

inserted and verified down.

1 Although leaving the reactor in a cold shutdown condition did not create an elevated risk in this

circumstance, the technical specifications in the license and the operating procedures require a secured

reactor console and reactor before facility staff leave. The NRC considers having an unsecured reactor

console and reactor to create a situation that could cause or lead to an unsafe condition. Therefore, the

fact that no further injury or elevated state resulted did not undercut the violation or need to report the

event to the NRC.

- 4 -

(AV 50-128/2015-202-02, Failure to Maintain the TS Minimum Facility Complex Staffing)

3. Telephone Discussion Summary

The inspector discussed the identification of AVs documented in the inspection report with

Mr. Jerry Newhouse, the facility Deputy Director, Nuclear Science Center telephonically on

July 28, 2015. Mr. Newhouse acknowledged the findings presented in the report.