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{{#Wiki_filter:Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_010516)  Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners:  Operators: (SRO)    (RO)    (BOP)  Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The SDAFW Pump is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION A. FI-613, CCW System Flow is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-010-B3, "EDG B START AIR LO PRESS," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).              Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*  Event Description  1 1 I-RO N-BOP I(TS)-SRO Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW 2 2 I-BOP I(TS)-SRO "C" Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW 3  3  R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower  4 4 C-BOP C-SRO CRDM Fan "A" Failure  5 5 C-RO C-SRO Continuous Inward Rod Motion 6 6 M-RO M-BOP M-SRO "C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture 7 7 C-BOP Loss of Off-Site Power  * (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,    (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_010516)  H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #1  The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The SDAFW Pump is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION A. FI-613, CCW System Flow is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-010-B3, "EDG B START AIR LO PRESS," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).
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Shortly after taking the watch, Pressurizer Level Transmitter, LT-459 will fail LOW causing normal letdown to isolate, de-energizing of pressurizer control group heaters and charging pump speed to rise for the pump in AUTO. The operator will respond in accordance APP-003-E8, "PZR CONTROL HI/LO LVL," and AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure."  The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-030, "Pressurizer Level Transmitters."  The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation."    Following this, the controlling steam flow channel for S/G "C", FT-494, will fail LOW, causing FRV-498 to start to CLOSE. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction," and/or AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure."  The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-034, "Steam Flow."  The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation."  Next, a tube leak will develop in Feed Water Heater 4A. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-007-E7, HTR 4A HI/LO LVL, identifying the leak. The operator may enter AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction."  Ultimately, the operator will use OP-407, "Heater Drain and Vents," to remove Feedwater Heaters 5A, 4A, and 3A from Service. This will require a power decrease. The operator will use either AOP-038, "Rapid Downpower," or OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When > 25% Power," and OP-301, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)," to lower plant power. During the downpower, the "A" CRDM Fan will trip. The operator will address APP-010-A6, HVH-5A/B AIR FLOW LOST/OVLD, and manually start the "B" CRDM Fan. Shortly afterwards, a continuous control rod insertion will occur. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-001, "Malfunction of Reactor Control System."  The operator will be unable to control the rod insertion and will manually trip the reactor. On the reactor trip, a 500 gpm Steam Generator Tube Rupture will occur (over 10 minutes) on the "C" Steam Generator. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."  After the Immediate Actions are complete, it is likely that the operator will determine that SI is NOT actuated nor required, and transition to EOP-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response."  While in this procedure the operator will determine that SI is required, manually actuate SI, and return to EOP-E-0. Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture," to isolate the flow into and out of the "C" Steam Generator and then conduct a cooldown of the RCS. Upon transition into EOP-E-3, a Loss of Off-Site Power will occur. Both EDGs will start and re-power Buses E-1 and E-2. With SI previously reset, the operator will need to address a re-Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_010516)  initiation of AFW flow to all Steam Generators, and the restart of the ECCS Pumps. The operator will continue with EOP-E-3 and conduct the RCS cooldown using the "A" and "B" Steam Generator PORVs. During the RCS depressurization, the Pzr Spray Valves will not be available. The operator will be required to conduct the depressurization using an available Pzr PORV. The scenario will terminate at Step 23 of EOP-E-3, after the operator has stopped the SI Pumps. Critical Tasks:  Manually control "C" S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level. Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the "C" S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control. Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. The fact that the operator allows the differential pressure to dissipate and, as a result, are then forced to transition to a contingency procedure constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would unnecessarily complicate the event mitigation strategy. While in EOP-E-3, establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not occur because the RCS temperature is in either (1) Too high to maintain 38°F of RCS Subcooling OR (2) below 295°F (RCS Integrity Red Path Limit) (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency procedure. This failure constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would unnecessarily complicate the event mitigation strategy.
Depressurize the RCS to meet SI termination criteria before Steam Generator Overfill is reached based on Water in the Steam Lines.  (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to stop reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates mitigation of the event. It also constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_011416)  Facility: HB Robinson Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners:  Operators: (SRO)    (RO)    (BOP)  Initial Conditions: The plant is at 75% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "A" SI Pump is OOS. The "B" SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. The "C" Charging Pump is also OOS. LI-928, "C" SI Accumulator Level, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-009-C3, "AIR SIDE SEAL OIL BU PMP OVLD," has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.              Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*  Event Description  1 - R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Raise Power 2 1 I-RO I-SRO VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 fails HIGH 3  2 I-BOP I(TS)-SRO Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW  4 3  C-RO C(TS)-SRO "B" Charging Pump Trip 5 4 C-BOP C-SRO "C" FRV Controller fails HIGH in AUTO 6 5 M-RO M-BOP M-SRO Cold Leg SBLOCA  7 6/7 NA 480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes  8 6 C-RO "C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start  9 7 C-RO CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically  * (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,    (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_011416)  HB Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #2  The plant is at 75% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "A" SI Pump is OOS. The "B" SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. The "C" Charging Pump is also OOS. LI-928, "C" SI Accumulator Level, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-009-C3, "AIR SIDE SEAL OIL BU PMP OVLD," has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.                                Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 100% using OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power," and OP-301, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)."    During the power increase, VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 will fail HIGH causing all letdown to be diverted to the CVCS HUTs. This failure will result in VCT level lowering without automatic makeup. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-003, "Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control."  After this, the power increase will be suspended. Next, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 will fail LOW. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure, and place all Feed Regulating Valves in MANUAL"  The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-033, "First Stage Pressure (FSP)," and restore the Feed Regulating valves to AUTO control. The operator will address 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation," and Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, "Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation."
Following this, the "B" Charging Pump will trip. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-003-F5, CHG PMP MOTOR OVLD/TRIP and raise speed of the "A" Charging Pump. The operator may enter AOP-018, "Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions."  The operator will address 3.4.17, "Chemical and Volume Control System."  Shortly afterwards, the "C" Feed Regulating Valve Controller will fail such that the valve starts to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction," and control the "C" S/G level manually. Subsequently, a Cold Leg Small Break LOCA will occur (over 5 minutes) on the B Loop. The operator will enter AOP-016, "Excessive Primary Plant Leakage."  Ultimately, the operator will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."  When the reactor trips, the normal supply breaker to Bus E-1 will trip OPEN, and the "A" EDG Output Breaker will fail to CLOSE either automatically or manually; and Train "A" equipment will remain unavailable throughout the event. Additionally, the "C" SI Pump will fail to automatically start on SI, and the operator will be required to manually start this pump. Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant," and the break size will become larger. Eventually, Containment pressure will exceed 10 psig creating an Orange Path condition on the Containment Critical Safety Function. When this occurs, the "B" CV Spray will automatically start on HI-HI Containment Pressure, however, both SI-880C&D ("B" CV Spray Pump Discharge Valves) will fail to open automatically, and the operator will be required to manually open these valves.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_011416)  The scenario will terminate in EOP-E-1 after Containment Spray has been initiated, or at Step 9 of FRP-J.1, "Response to High Containment Pressure," after the operator has taken all necessary steps to reduce Containment pressure, or upon transition from either EOP-E-1 or FRP-J.1 to FRP-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock (After all Critical Tasks have been completed). Critical Tasks:  Manually control "C" S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level.
Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the "C" S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control. Trip all RCPs within 6 minutes of meeting the EOP-E-0/E-1 RCP Trip Criteria (Containment Isolation Phase B  ACTUATED, OR BOTH of the following satisfied: SI Pumps  AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW AND RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs  LESS THAN 13°F [32°F]) so that CET temperatures do not become superheated when forced circulation in the RCS stops. (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to trip the RCPs under the postulated plant conditions leads to core uncovery and to fuel cladding temperatures in excess of 2200°F, which is the limit specified in the ECCS acceptance criteria. Thus, failure to perform the task represents mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator has failed to prevent degradation of the fuel cladding barrier to fission product release and which leads to a violation of the facility license condition. Establish flow from at least one high-head SI pump before transition out of E-0. (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to manually start at least one high-head SI pump under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity. In this case, at least one high-head SI pump can be manually started from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.
Additionally, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Finally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump (when it is possible to do so) is a violation of the facility license condition. Manually actuate at least one CV Spray Train before Transitioning to EOP-ES-1.2. (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment under the postulated conditions demonstrates the inability of the crew to "recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_011416)  In this case, the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment can be manually actuated from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent (degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity). Additionally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment (when it is possible to do so) results in a failure to prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_010616)  Facility: H B Robinson Scenari0 No.: 3 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners:  Operators: (SRO)    (RO)    (BOP)  Initial Conditions: The plant is at 68% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The SDAFW Pump is OOS, and has been for 7 days. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION C has just been entered. Maintenance reports that this pump will be OPERABLE in 2 hours, and station management has directed that the initiation of the shutdown be delayed 2 hours. TI-471, PRT Temperature is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-008-C3, "EMERG OIL PMP OVLD," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).              Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*  Event Description  1 1 C-RO C-BOP C(TS)-SRO Loss of Instrument Bus 3 2 2 I-BOP I-SRO "B" Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW 3  NA R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Load Decrease 4 3  C-RO C-SRO Letdown Line Pressure Control Valve Controller fails CLOSED 5 4 I-RO I(TS)-SRO PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE 6 5 M-RO M-BOP M-SRO Inadvertent FWIS 7 6 C-BOP Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate 8 7 NA "A" & "B" MDAFW Pump Trip  * (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,    (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_010616)  H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #3  The plant is at 68% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The SDAFW Pump is OOS, and has been for 7 days. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION C has just been entered. Maintenance reports that this pump will be OPERABLE in 2 hours, and station management has directed that the initiation of the shutdown be delayed 2 hours. TI-471, PRT Temperature is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-008-C3, "EMERG OIL PMP OVLD," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).                                Shortly after taking the watch, Instrument Bus 3 will de-energize. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-024, "Loss of Instrument Bus," and restore power to the Bus. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.8.7, "AC Instrument Bus Sources - Operating," and Technical Specification LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems-Operating."  Following this, the controlling feed flow channel for S/G "B", FT-487, will fail LOW, causing FRV-498 to start to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction," and/or AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure."  The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-026, "Feed Flow (FWF)."
Next, the WCCS will call and inform the operator that it has been determined that the SDAFW Pump will not be restored to OPERABLE status within the next two hours as expected, and that station management has directed that the plant be brought to Mode 3 within the next four hours using AOP-038, "Rapid Downpower."    During the downpower, the Letdown Pressure Control Valve (PCV-145) controller will fail such that the valve will fail closed. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-D6, LP LTDN LN HI PRESS, and ultimately take manual control of the valve. Shortly afterwards, PZR Pressure transmitter PT-444 will fail HIGH causing the Pzr Spray valves and Pzr PORV to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-019, "Malfunction of RCS pressure Control," and/or AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure."  RCS pressure control will remain in MANUAL for the remainder of the scenario. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.4, "Remote Shutdown System," Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, "RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits," and Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11, "Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)."    After the Pressure Transmitter has been removed from service, an inadvertent FWIS will occur. Simultaneously with the Rx Trip, the Turbine will fail to TRIP, the Governor Valves will fail to CLOSE manually, and the Main Steamline Isolation signal will fail to auto actuate. The operator will be required to manually CLOSE the MSIVs. Additionally the "A" and "B" MDAFW Pumps will trip immediately after auto start. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."    Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response." However, this transition will be delayed due to a RED condition on the Heat Sink CSF. The operator will perform FRP-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink."  The operator will direct that AFW Pump "C" be placed in service in accordance with OP-402, "Auxiliary Feedwater System," however, the AFW Pump "C" Diesel will fail to start.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_010616)  The scenario will terminate at Step 7 RNO 2.b of FRP-H.1, after the operator has restored feedwater flow from the Main Feedwater System. Critical Tasks:  Manually control "B" S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level. Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the "B" S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control. Manually close the OPEN Pzr Spray Valve(s) and the Stuck Open PORV Block Valve before the Reactor trips based on low pressurizer pressure. Safety Significance: failure to close the Spray Valves/PORV Block Valve and stop the pressure transient, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the pressure transient. A failure to stabilize the pressure transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS pressure control. Manually Close the MSIVs Before an ORANGE Path Challenge Develops to Either the Subcriticality or the Integrity CSF or Before Transition to ECA-2.1, Whichever Happens First (EOP-Based)
Safety Significance:  Failure to trip the main turbine under the postulated plant conditions causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, such an omission constitutes a failure by the operator to "demonstrate the ability to take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety. The situation described in the plant conditions is effectively a large steamline break downstream of the MSIVs. This "effective steamline break" is also located downstream of the main turbine stop valves, which cannot be closed by manually tripping the turbine. Failure to perform the critical task results in uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs and in uncontrolled cooldown of the RCS, both of which are unnecessary. Establish Feedwater Flow Into at Least One S/G Before RCS Bleed and Feed is Required (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to establish feedwater flow to any SG results in the operator's having to rely upon the lower-priority action of establishing RCS bleed and feed to minimize core uncovery. This constitutes incorrect performance that fails to prevent degradation of any barrier to fission product release.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_011516)  Facility: HB Robinson Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners:  Operators: (SRO)    (RO)    (BOP)  Initial Conditions: The plant is at 25% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "A" SI Pump is OOS. The "B" SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. PI-1616, SW North Header Pressure, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-007-C3, "FW PMP A LO FLOW TRIP," has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.              Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*  Event Description  1 1 C-RO C-SRO "A" Primary Water Pump trips during Dilution 2 NA R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Raise Power  3  2 C-RO C-SRO Letdown Temperature Controller TCV-144 fails CLOSED/Divert Valve TCV-143 Fails to DIVERT 4 3 I-BOP I(TS)-SRO Main Steam Line "C" Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW 5 4  N-BOP I(TS)-SRO Power Range NI-44 Upper Detector fails HIGH 6 5 C-BOP C-SRO Low Turbine Oil Pressure/Failure of Auto Turbine Trip 7 6 M-RO M-BOP M-SRO Power Range NI-41 Control Power Fuse Blows/ATWS 8 7 C-BOP MOV-350 fails to OPEN  9 8 M-RO M-BOP M-SRO "B" SG SLB Inside CV * (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,    (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_011516)  HB Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #4  The plant is at 25% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "A" SI Pump is OOS. The "B" SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. PI-1616, SW North Header Pressure, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-007-C3, "FW PMP A LO FLOW TRIP," has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.
Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will attempt to raise power to 100% using OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power," and OP-301, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)."  During the first dilution, the "A" Primary Water Pump will trip. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-003-E5, "MAKEUP WATER DEV," and/or AOP-003, "Malfunction of Reactor makeup Control."  The operator will place the "B" Primary Water Pump in service and continue with the startup. After this, the operator will raise power to 100% using OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power," and OP-301, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)."  During the power increase Letdown Temperature Controller, TCV-144, will fail CLOSED causing letdown temperature to rise above 135°F. Simultaneously, Divert Valve TCV-143, will fail to divert letdown flow to the VCT. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-A6, "LTDN FLOW HI TEMP DEMIN BYPD," divert letdown flow to the VCT, take MANUAL control of TCV-144 to stabilize letdown temperature, and return letdown to the VCT. Following this, Main Steam Line "C" Pressure Transmitter, PT-495, will fail LOW. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure."  The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-025, "Steam Generator Pressure (SGP)."  The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation," and Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, "Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation."  Next, Power Range, NI-44, Upper Detector will fail HIGH. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-011, "Nuclear Instrumentation (NI)."  The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation."    Shortly afterwards, an oil leak will develop on the Main Turbine. The operator will respond in accordance with various APP-008, SW, CW & TURB GEN AUX, alarms, and ultimately enter AOP-007, "Turbine Trip Below P-8."  When the Main Turbine Trips one Turbine Stop Valve and one Turbine Governor Valve will remain OPEN, and the operator will need to manually TRIP the Turbine. Subsequently, the Control Power fuse for Power Range channel N41 will blow causing an automatic reactor trip signal to be generated, however, the reactor will fail to TRIP both automatically and manually (ATWS). The operator will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and attempt to manually trip the reactor. When this fails, the operator will enter FRP-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation- ATWS."  While in FRP-S.1, Boric Acid to Charging Pump Suction Valve MOV-350 will fail CLOSED. The operator will direct a local trip of the reactor, drive rods in manually, and align the suction of the Charging Pumps to the RWST.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_011516)    Upon completion of FRP-S.1, a "B" Steam Line will rupture inside Containment (over 10 minutes), and the operator will re-enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."  Ultimately, the operator will transition to EOP-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation," to isolate the flow into and out of the "B" Steam Generator and then terminate Safety Injection. However, an Orange and/or Red Path will exist on the RCS Critical Safety Function, and the operator will transition to FRP-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition.
The scenario will terminate at Step 12 of FRP-P.1, when the operator stops SI Pumps. Critical Tasks:  Manually control "C" S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level. Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the "C" S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control. Insert Negative Reactivity into the Core by Inserting Control Rods Manually Prior to Locally Tripping the Reactor (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical or returns to a critical condition. Performance of the critical task would make the reactor subcritical and provide sufficient shutdown margin to prevent (or at least minimize the power excursion associated with) any subsequent return to criticality. Failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance which fails to prevent incorrect reactivity control. In the scenario postulated by the plant conditions, failure to insert negative reactivity by inserting control rods can result in the needless continuation of an extreme or a severe challenge to the subcriticality CSF. Although the challenge was not initiated by the operator (was not initiated by operator error), continuation of the challenge is a result of the operator's failure to insert negative reactivity. Isolate Feedwater Flow Into and Steam Flow From the Faulted S/G Before a Transition Out of E-2 Occurs (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Also, depending upon the plant conditions, it could constitute a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Failure to isolate a faulted SG can result in challenges to the Integrity, Subcriticality and Containment CSFs. Stop the High Head SI Pumps Before a Transition Out of FRP-P.1 Occurs (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to stop the high head SI Pumps results in challenges to the Integrity CSF; and could unnecessarily result in a mechanical failure due to Pressurized Thermal Shock.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111915)  Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 5 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners:  Operators: (SRO)    (RO)    (BOP)  Initial Conditions: The plant is at 3-5% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "B" Condensate Pump is OOS. LI-1417A, Hotwell Level Indication is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-006-F7, "PWST HI/LO LVL," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 30%.              Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*  Event Description  1 NA R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Roll Turbine 2 1 C-BOP C-SRO High Turbine Eccentricity 3  2 I-BOP I(TS)-SRO Loss of Compensation Voltage to Intermediate Range N-35  4 3  I-RO I-SRO VCT Level transmitter LT-112 fails HIGH 5 4 C-RO C(TS)-SRO "B" RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE  6 5 M-RO M-BOP M-SRO Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE 7 6 C-RO Failure of Automatic Rx Trip  * (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,    (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111915)  H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #5  The plant is at 3-5% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "B" Condensate Pump is OOS. LI-1417A, Hotwell Level Indication is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-006-F7, "PWST HI/LO LVL," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 30%.
Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 5-8% and startup the Turbine using GP-005, "Power Operation."  When the Turbine is rolling, a HIGH Eccentricity condition will develop on the Main Turbine. The operator will respond using AOP-006, "Turbine Eccentricity/Vibration," and place the Turbine startup on HOLD. Shortly afterwards, the compensating voltage on Intermediate Range Channel N-35 will fail. The operator will remove the instrument from service using OWP-011, "Nuclear Instrumentation (NI)."  The failed channel will require that the Source Range instruments be manually re-energized in the subsequent post-trip conditions. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," and determine to continue with the power increase. Following this, VCT Level Transmitter LT-112 will fail HIGH causing LCV-115A to divert all letdown flow to the CVCS HUTs and result in an automatic makeup to the VCT. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-003, "Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control."  After this, the power increase will continue. Next, a Thermal barrier leak will develop on the "B" RCP and Flow Control Valve FCV-626 will fail to CLOSE. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-C1, "RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW," and AOP-014, "Component Cooling Water Malfunction."  The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.6.1, "Containment," and Technical Specification LCO 3.6.3, "Containment Isolation Valves."  Subsequently, a Steam Rupture will occur downstream of the MSIVs and the MSIVs will fail to CLOSE automatically and manually. Simultaneously, the Reactor will fail to TRIP automatically. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and manually trip the reactor.      Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation," and then when it is realized that all Steam Generators are faulted, transition to EOP-ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators," and lower AFW flow to each Steam Generator to 60 gpm.
While terminating Safety Injection in EOP-ECA-2.1, the "A" MSIV will close and the "A" S/G pressure is expected to rise higher than that of the "B" and "C" S/G's. Since the crew will be in the process of terminating SI in EOP-ECA-2.1, the crew will continue to complete the SI termination steps before transitioning back to EOP-E-2.
The scenario will terminate at Step 4.c of EOP-E-2, after the operator has closed the AFW Discharge valves to the "B" and "C" Steam Generators. Depending on the timing of the actions Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111915)  taken by the crew when the "A" MSIV is closed, the "A" S/G pressure may not rise significantly higher than that of the "B" and "C" S/Gs, and the crew will remain in EOP-ECA-2.1 past the SI termination steps (i.e. Step 19). If this situation occurs, the scenario will terminate at Step 20 of EOP-ECA-2.1.      Critical Tasks:  Manually trip the reactor from the control room before entry into FRP-S.1  Safety Significance:  Failure to manually trip the reactor causes a challenge to the subcriticality CSF beyond that irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, it constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates the inability of the operator to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. The ERG Background Document for E-0 states that one function of E-0 is to verify that all required automatic protective actions occur before transitioning the crew to the appropriate ORG. The verification is important because the subsequent ORGs are based on the assumption that protective systems will protect all CSFs while the ORG is implemented. Not tripping the reactor when it is possible to do so (as in the postulated conditions) forces an immediate extreme challenge to the subcriticality CSF. Additionally, the incorrect performance of failing to trip the reactor necessitates the operator taking compensating action that seriously complicates the event mitigation strategy. This mis-operation constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.
Control the AFW flow rate to not less than 60 gpm per SG in order to minimize the RCS cooldown rate before an EXTREME (Red Path) challenge develops to the RCS Integrity CSF  Safety Significance:  Failure to control the AFW flow rate to the SGs leads to an unnecessary and avoidable extreme challenge to the integrity CSF. Also, failure to perform the critical task increases the challenges to the subcriticality CSF beyond which is irreparably introduced by the postulated plant conditions. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes a demonstrated inability by the operator to take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety. It also fails to prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. 
 
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_010716)  Facility: HB Robinson Scenario No.: 6 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners:  Operators: (SRO)    (RO)    (BOP)  Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "A" EDG is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 ACTION B.1, B.2, B.3.2.1 and B.3.2.2, and B.4. R-15, Condenser Air Ejector Gas Radiation Monitor is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-002-F8, "STA AIR HDR LO PRESS," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The "B" MFWP has experienced high noise/vibration over the last two hours (Maintenance is investigating).              Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*  Event Description  1 1 C-BOP C-SRO Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN 2 NA R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Lower Power 3  2 C-BOP C(TS)-SRO "C" Service Water Pump Trips  4 3 C-RO C(TS)-SRO DS Bus De-energizes/"C" CCW Pump Trips on Start 5 4 C-RO C-SRO "A" RCP Seal Failure 6 5 M-RO M-BOP M-SRO Loss of Offsite Power 7 5 C-BOP "B" EDG Fails to Start  8 6 NA DSDG Trips  9 7 C-BOP "D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start  * (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,    (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_010716)  HB Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #6  The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "A" EDG is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 ACTION B.1, B.2, B.3.2.1 and B.3.2.2, and B.4. R-15, Condenser Air Ejector Gas Radiation Monitor is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-002-F8, "STA AIR HDR LO PRESS," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The "B" MFWP has experienced high noise/vibration over the last two hours (Maintenance is investigating).                                Shortly after taking the watch, HCV-1459, Heater Bypass Valve will fail OPEN. The crew will implement AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction," and close the valve. After the overpower transient is stabilized, the WCCS will call the control room and direct that reactor power be lowered to 50% for the purpose of removing the "B" Main Feedwater Pump from service. The operator will lower power in accordance with AOP-038, "Rapid Downpower."  After the power reduction is in progress, the "C" Service Water Pump will trip on overload. This will cause the running Service Water Booster Pump to trip as well. The operator will respond in accordance with various APP-008 annunciators and start a standby Service Water Pump; and then respond in accordance with APP-002-A through D8, "HVH WTR OUTLET LO FLOW," and re-start a Service Water Booster Pump. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, "Service Water System (SWS)," and Technical Specification LCO 3.6.6, "Containment Spray and Cooling Systems."    Following this, Breaker 52/32A will Trip de-energizing the DS Bus, and stopping the only running Charging Pump and CCW Pump. The operator may address AOP-018, "Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions," or various APP's to restore Charging and Seal Injection flow; and then APP-001-F5, CCW PMP LO PRESS, and ensure that the standby CCW Pump started. 10 seconds after the Standby CCW Pumps start, the "C" CCW Pump will trip, and only the "B" CCW will be left running. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6, "Component Cooling Water (CCW) System," and Technical Specification LCO 3.4.17, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)."    Next, a #1 Seal Failure will occur on the "A" RCP. The crew will implement AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions," trip the reactor, stop the pump, and three minutes after the pump is stopped, CLOSE the Seal Leakoff Valve. The crew will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."  Simultaneously, a Loss of Offsite Power will occur on the reactor trip, and the "B" Emergency Diesel Generator will fail to automatically start. Additionally, the DS DG will trip.
Upon entry into EOP-E-0, the operator will determine that both ESF buses are de-energized and transition to EOP-ECA-0.0, "Loss of All AC Power." The operator will subsequently start the "B" EDG by depressing the SI Actuate Pushbutton, restore power to Bus E-2, and transition back to EOP-E-0. When Bus E-2 is re-energized, the "D" Service Water Pump will fail to sequence automatically and will need to be manually started. Upon transition back to EOP-E-0, the crew will complete the immediate actions of EOP-E-0, and continue with AOP-018.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_010716)  The scenario will terminate when the crew has terminated Safety Injection and re-established Charging/Seal Injection in Step 6 of ES-1.1. Critical Tasks:  Energize at Least One AC Emergency Bus Before Defeating the Auto Loading of the Safeguards Equipment in EOP-ECA-0.0  Safety Significance:  Failure to energize an ac emergency bus constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency power capacity. Failure to perform the critical task also results in needless degradation of any barrier to fission product release, specifically of the RCS barrier at the point of the RCP seals. Additionally, failure to perform the critical task results in the unnecessary continuation of a situation in which RCS inventory is being lost uncontrollably and cannot be replaced. This situation is equivalent to mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity at a time when a small-break LOCA is in progress. In this case, at least one ac emergency bus can be energized from the control room.
Failure to perform the critical task means that RCS inventory lost through the RCP seals cannot be replaced. It also means that the RCP seals remain without cooling and gradually deteriorate. As the seals deteriorate the rate of RCS inventory loss increases.
Manually Start SW Pump for EDG Cooling within 40 Minutes of starting the "B" EDG  Safety Significance:  Failure to manually start the SW pump under the postulated plant conditions means that the EDG is running without SW cooling. Running the EDG without SW cooling leads to a high-temperature condition that can result in EDG failure due to damage caused by engine overheating. Under the postulated plant conditions, the running EDG is the only operable EDG. The calculated maximum time an EDG may operate without cooling to preclude adverse effects is 40 minutes. Since during the first 40 minutes of EDG operation in this scenario there are two procedural cues to check, and if needed, start a SW Pump, it is believed that failure to perform the critical task constitutes mis-operation or incorrect performance in which the crew does not prevent "degraded- emergency power capacity."     
 
PROGRAM: H B Robinson Operations Training  MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam    Scenario N16-1-1   
 
==REFERENCES:==
: 1. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4, "Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System" (Amendment 203) 2. APP-003, "RCS & Makeup Systems" (Rev 54) 3. AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure" (Rev 24) 4. OWP-030, "Pressurizer Level Transmitters (PLT)" (Rev 11) 5. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation" (Amendment 176) 6. AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction" (Rev 33) 7. OWP-034, "Steam Flow (SF)" (Rev 19)  8. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)
Instrumentation" (Amendment 176) 9. APP-007, "Condensate & Feedwater" (Rev 44) 10. OP-407, "Heater Drain and Vents" (Rev 51) 11. AOP-038, "Rapid Downpower" (Rev 3) 12. OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When > 25% Power" (Rev 62) 13. OP-301, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)" (Rev 112) 14. APP-010, "HVAC-Emerg. Generators & Misc. Systems" (Rev 81) 15. AOP-001, "Malfunction of Reactor Control System" (Rev 33) 16. EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection"  (Rev 6) 17. EOP-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response" (Rev 7) 18. EOP-E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture" (Rev 7)  Validation Time: 144 minutes 
 
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1  Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners:  Operators: (SRO)    (RO)    (BOP)  Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The SDAFW Pump is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION A. FI-613, CCW System Flow is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-010-B3, "EDG B START AIR LO PRESS," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).              Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*  Event Description  1 1 I-RO N-BOP I(TS)-SRO Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW 2 2 I-BOP I(TS)-SRO "C" Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW 3  3  R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower  4 4 C-BOP C-SRO CRDM Fan "A" Failure  5 5 C-RO C-SRO Continuous Inward Rod Motion 6 6 M-RO M-BOP M-SRO "C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture 7 7 C-BOP Loss of Off-Site Power  * (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,    (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1  H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #1  The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The SDAFW Pump is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION A. FI-613, CCW System Flow is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-010-B3, "EDG B START AIR LO PRESS," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).
Shortly after taking the watch, Pressurizer Level Transmitter, LT-459 will fail LOW causing normal letdown to isolate, de-energizing of pressurizer control group heaters and charging pump speed to rise for the pump in AUTO. The operator will respond in accordance APP-003-E8, "PZR CONTROL HI/LO LVL," and AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure."  The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-030, "Pressurizer Level Transmitters."  The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation."    Following this, the controlling steam flow channel for S/G "C", FT-494, will fail LOW, causing FRV-498 to start to CLOSE. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction," and/or AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure."  The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-034, "Steam Flow."  The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation."  Next, a tube leak will develop in Feed Water Heater 4A. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-007-E7, HTR 4A HI/LO LVL, identifying the leak. The operator may enter AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction."  Ultimately, the operator will use OP-407, "Heater Drain and Vents," to remove Feedwater Heaters 5A, 4A, and 3A from Service. This will require a power decrease. The operator will use either AOP-038, "Rapid Downpower," or OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When > 25% Power," and OP-301, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)," to lower plant power.
During the downpower, the "A" CRDM Fan will trip. The operator will address APP-010-A6, HVH-5A/B AIR FLOW LOST/OVLD, and manually start the "B" CRDM Fan. Shortly afterwards, a continuous control rod insertion will occur. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-001, "Malfunction of Reactor Control System."  The operator will be unable to control the rod insertion and will manually trip the reactor. On the reactor trip, a 500 gpm Steam Generator Tube Rupture will occur (over 10 minutes) on the "C" Steam Generator. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."  After the Immediate Actions are complete, it is likely that the operator will determine that SI is NOT actuated nor required, and transition to EOP-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response."  While in this procedure the operator will determine that SI is required, manually actuate SI, and return to EOP-E-0. Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture," to isolate the flow into and out of the "C" Steam Generator and then conduct a cooldown of the RCS. Upon transition into EOP-E-3, a Loss of Off-Site Power will occur. Both EDGs will start and re-power Buses E-1 and E-2. With SI previously reset, the operator will need to address a re-Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1  initiation of AFW flow to all Steam Generators, and the restart of the ECCS Pumps. The operator will continue with EOP-E-3 and conduct the RCS cooldown using the "A" and "B" Steam Generator PORVs. During the RCS depressurization, the Pzr Spray Valves will not be available. The operator will be required to conduct the depressurization using an available Pzr PORV. The scenario will terminate at Step 23 of EOP-E-3, after the operator has stopped the SI Pumps. Critical Tasks:
Manually control "C" S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level. Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the "C" S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control. Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. The fact that the operator allows the differential pressure to dissipate and, as a result, are then forced to transition to a contingency procedure constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would unnecessarily complicate the event mitigation strategy. While in EOP-E-3, establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not occur because the RCS temperature is in either (1) Too high to maintain 38°F of RCS Subcooling OR (2) below 295°F (RCS Integrity Red Path Limit) (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency procedure. This failure constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would unnecessarily complicate the event mitigation strategy.
Depressurize the RCS to meet SI termination criteria before Steam Generator Overfill is reached based on Water in the Steam Lines.  (EOP-Based, if above 100% WR level see Simulator Code "thlecell(193)" to determine)  Safety Significance:  Failure to stop reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates mitigation of the event. It also constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1  SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS              Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  Sim. Setup Reset to Temp IC 608  T = 0 Malfunctions:  SDAFW Pump OOS:  irf EPSMCC5_189 f:RACK_OUT (V1-8A, "A" S/G supply to SDAFW)  irf EPSMCC6_226 f:RACK_OUT (V1-8B, "B" S/G supply to SDAFW)  irf EPSMCC6_227 f:RACK_OUT (V1-8C, "C" S/G supply to SDAFW)  irf EPSMCC10_262 f:RACK_OUT (V2-14A, SDAFW discharge to "A" S/G)  irf EPSMCC9_254 f:RACK_OUT (V2-14B, SDAFW discharge to "B" S/G)  irf EPSMCC10_267 f:RACK_OUT (V2-14C, SDAFW discharge to "C" S/G)  PLACE RED CAPS on the RTGB Control Switches for the Valves ABOVE Place GREEN CAPS on the RTGB Control Switches BELOW (See OMM-048, Attachment 9):  "A" MDAFW RTGB Switch  "B" MDAFW RTGB Switch  AFW Valve V2-16A RTGB Switch  AFW Valve V2-16B RTGB Switch  AFW Valve V2-16C RTGB Switch  AFW Valve V2-20A RTGB Switch  AFW Valve V2-20B RTGB Switch  Protected Switchyard FI-613 CCW System Flow OOS  IOR aoCCWAOD010B f:0 Place WHITE DOT on FI-613 RTGB Annunciator APP-010-B3 failed ON  IMF ANNXN10B03 f:ALARM_ON  Place WHITE DOT on APP-010-B3 Place the Simulator in RUN and ACKNOWLEDGE all alarms. Perform Attachment 2 (Simulator Setup For Exams) of TAP-411.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1    Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  Crew Briefing  1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements  2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew. 3. Provide the crew with the following:  OST-947, Operations Reactivity Plan  Copy of Technical Specifications/Basis  4. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms. T-0 Begin Familiarization Period  At direction of examiner Execute Lesson Plan for Simulator Scenario N16-1-1. At direction of examiner  Event 1  ICO PRSXMTLT_459 r:15 f:0  Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW At direction of examiner  Event 2 ICO SGNXMTFT_494 r:01:00 f:0  "C" Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW  At direction of examiner Event 3  IMF CFW14G r:02:00 f:800000  Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower  At direction of examiner  Event 4 IMF HVA05A f:MOTOR_SHORT  CRDM Fan "A" Failure  At direction of examiner Event 5 IMF CRF06A IMF CRF06B  Continuous Inward Rod Motion  NOTE: This will occur on a Rod Inward signal ($006_RODS_INCRF07 r:5 f:72) At direction of examiner Event 6 IMF SGN02F r:10:00 f:500  "C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture  NOTE: The SGTR will occur on Rx Trip ($006_N16-1-1_SGTR_ON_TRIP)
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1    Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  Post-Rx Trip Upon Transition to EOP-E-3 Event 7 IMF EPS13    Loss of Off-Site Power      Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page  9 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW      Shortly after taking the watch, Pressurizer Level Transmitter, LT-459 will fail LOW causing normal letdown to isolate, de-energizing of pressurizer control group heaters and charging pump speed to rise for the pump in AUTO. The operator will respond in accordance APP-003-E8, "PZR CONTROL HI/LO LVL," and AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure."  The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-030, "Pressurizer Level Transmitters."  The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation." Booth Operator Instructions:    ICO PRSXMTLT_459  r:15 f:0  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-003-F4, CHG PMP HI SPEED  RTGB Annunciator APP-003-E8, PZR CONTROL HI/LO LVL  PZR Level LI-459A lowering  PZR Level LI-460/461 stable  "C" Charging Pump speed rising  Normal Letdown isolates  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    NOTE: The CRS may enter AOP-025 directly. APP-003-E8, PZR CONTROL HI/LO LVL      RO (Step 1) IF Letdown is isolated, THEN ensure one Charging Pump running at minimum. NOTE: The RO will take Charging Pump to MANUAL and adjust to MINIMUM speed.      CRS (Step 2) IF a load rejection has occurred, THEN --      CRS (Step 3) IF excessive RCS leakage exists, THEN-..      RO (Step 4) IF a level controller has failed, THEN manually adjust Charging and/or Letdown to maintain PZR level NOTE: The RO will control Charging flow as needed. The RO will adjust Seal Injection flow by controlling HIC-121.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page  10 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Step 5) IF a level channel failure has occurred, THEN refer to AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure NOTE: The CRS will transition to AOP-025. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE      CRS (Step 1) GO TO Appropriate Section For Failed Instrument: NOTE: The CRS will select Section B of AOP-025. PZR LEVEL (LT-459, 460, 461) - SECTION B      AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION B, PZR LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILURE      RO (Step 1) CHECK Failed Instrument  FAILED LOW      RO (Step 2) PLACE LCV460 A&B Control Switch In CLOSE NOTE: The RO may re-positioned the Control Switch earlier based on Step 5.3.7.5 of OMM-022.      RO (Step 3) CHECK Charging Pumps  ONLY ONE PUMP RUNNING IN MANUAL CONTROL      RO (Step 3 RNO) ENSURE only one charging pump is running in manual control.      RO (Step 4) ADJUST Charging Pump Speed To Control PZR LEVEL Between 22% And 53% NOTE: PZR level will rise, and may exceed TS LCO 3.4.9 (63.3%).      CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using PA System NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page  11 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      RO (Step 6) CHECK RCP Seal Injection Flow  BETWEEN 8 GPM AND 13 GPM      RO (Step 6 RNO) Locally THROTTLE RCP SEAL WATER FLOW CONTROL VALVE(s) to obtain flow to each RCP between 8 gpm and 13 gpm. NOTE:  The BOP may contact the AO to adjust Seal Injection flows. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO; and use: IRF CVC030 f: variable IRF CVC031 f: variable IRF CVC032 f: variable    CVC297A    CVC297B    CVC297C    IF required to maintain 8 GPM flow, THEN THROTTLE HIC121, CHARGING FLOW, while maintaining charging pump discharge pressure less than 2500 psig. REVIEW TS LCO 3.4.17 for applicability.      RO (Step 7) CHECK Controlling Channel  FAILED NOTE: LT-459 has failed LOW.      RO (Step 8) CHECK LT461  OPERABLE      RO (Step 9) PLACE LM459 In 461 REPL 459      RO (Step 10) PLACE LR459 In REC 461      RO (Step 11) CHECK Normal Letdown  IN SERVICE Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page  12 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Step 11 RNO) IF normal letdown is desired, THEN RESTORE normal letdown using Attachment 1, Restoration of Normal Letdown. NOTE: The CRS will hand off the restoration of Letdown to the BOP. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE ATTACHMENT 1, RESTORATION OF NORMAL LETDOWN      BOP (Step 1) ENSURE Normal Charging Flow Through The Regenerative Heat Exchanger Is In Service.      BOP (Step 2) ENSURE Phase A Containment Isolation Signal NOT Present.      BOP (Step 3) NOTIFY RC That Normal Letdown Flow Will Be Restored And The Affected Areas Should Be Monitored For Changing Radiological Conditions. NOTE:  The BOP will call RC to address the potential changing radiological conditions. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as RC.      BOP (Step 4) ENSURE The Following Valves Are Closed:    CVC204A, LETDOWN LINE ISO  CVC204B, LETDOWN LINE ISO  LCV460A, LTDN LINE STOP  LCV460B, LTDN LINE STOP  CVC200A, LETDOWN ORFICE ISOLATION  CVC200B, LETDOWN ORFICE ISOLATION  CVC200C, LETDOWN ORFICE ISOLATION      BOP (Step 5) ENSURE HIC121, CHARGING FLOW, Is Set For Full Open.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page  13 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 6) ENSURE PZR Level Is Greater Than Or Equal To Program Level. NOTE:  PZR Level will likely be above program.      BOP (Step 7) IF Desired, THEN PLACE TCV143, VCT/DEMIN In The VCT Position.      BOP (Step 8) PLACE PCV145, PRESSURE, In MAN.      BOP (Step 9) ADJUST PC145 To Throttle PCV145 To 45% To 55% Open.      BOP (Step 10) OPEN The Following:    CVC204A, LETDOWN LINE ISO    CVC204B, LETDOWN LINE ISO      BOP (Step 11) OPEN LCV460A&B:    PLACE LTDN LINE STOP LCV460 A&B switch to OPEN. PLACE LTDN LINE STOP LCV460 A&B switch to AUTO.      BOP (Step 12) ESTABLISH Cooling To NONREGEN HX:    PLACE TC144, NONREGEN HX OUTLET TEMP in MANUAL. ADJUST TC144 NONREGEN HX OUTLET TEMP as necessary to ensure letdown temperature does not rise above 127°F when letdown is reestablished.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page  14 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 13) While MAINTAINING Charging Pump Discharge Pressure As Indicated On PI121 Less Than 2500 psig, ADJUST Charging Pump Speed To The Expected Letdown Flow To Be Established In The Next Step.      BOP (Step 14) OPEN One LTDN ORIFICE Valve: NOTE:  PZR Level will likely be above program, and the BOP may place a 60 gpm orifice in service. CVC200A, LETDOWN ORFICE ISOLATION    CVC200B, LETDOWN ORFICE ISOLATION    CVC200C, LETDOWN ORFICE ISOLATION      BOP (Step 15) PLACE PC145 In AUTO And CHECK Letdown Pressure As Indicated On PI145, LOW PRESS LTDN PRESS, Is Being Maintained Between 300 Psig And 320 Psig.      BOP (Step 16) PLACE TC144, NONREGEN HX OUTLET TEMP, In AUTO.      BOP (Step 17) IF TCV143 Was Selected To VCT, THEN POSITION TCV143 As Directed By The CRS/SM.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page  15 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 18) IF Charging Flow Is Changed, THEN ESTABLISH RCP Seal injection Flow Between 8 GPM and 13 GPM By Throttling The Following:  CVC297A, RCP A SEAL WATER FLOW CONTROL VALVE  CVC297B, RCP B SEAL WATER FLOW CONTROL VALVE  CVC297C, RCP C SEAL WATER FLOW CONTROL VALVE  NOTE:  The BOP may contact the AO to adjust Seal Injection flows. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO; and use: IRF CVC030 f: variable IRF CVC031 f: variable IRF CVC032 f: variable        BOP (Step 19) IF Additional Letdown Flow Is Desired,-. NOTE:  PZR Level will likely be above program, and the BOP may discuss with the CRS/RO about additional Letdown flow.      BOP (Step 20) NOTIFY Chemistry That Normal Letdown Has Been Restored. NOTE:  The BOP will call Chemistry to notify that normal letdown is back in service. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION B, PZR LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILURE      RO (Step 12) RESTORE PZR Level Control To Automatic: Examiner Note: PZR Level may require additional adjustment prior to restoring the controller to AUTO. The crew may complete the event with Level control still in MANUAL. CHECK PZR level  WITHIN +/- 1% OF PROGRAMMED REFERENCE LEVEL    RESTORE PZR level control to automatic      RO (Step 13) RESET PZR Heaters:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page  16 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    PLACE PZR HTR CONTROL GROUP control switch in OFF and return to ON    PLACE PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP A control switch in OFF and return to AUTO or ON as desired    PLACE PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP B control switch in OFF and return to AUTO or ON as desired      RO (Step 14) CHECK RCP Seal Injection Flow  BETWEEN 8 GPM AND 13 GPM      RO (Step 14 RNO) Locally THROTTLE RCP SEAL WATER FLOW CONTROL VALVE(s) to obtain flow to each RCP between 8 gpm and 13 gpm: NOTE:  The BOP may contact the AO to adjust Seal Injection flows. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO; and use: IRF CVC030 f: variable IRF CVC031 f: variable IRF CVC032 f: variable    CVC297A    CVC297B    CVC297C      CRS (Step 15) REMOVE Failed Transmitter From Service Using OWP030 NOTE:  The CRS will address OWP-030. OWP-030, PRESSURIZER LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (PLT) PLT-1, PRESSURIZR LEVEL TRANSMITTER LT-459      CRS Address PLT-1 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page  17 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP Insert Trip Signals NOTE:  The BOP will enter the Simulator Booth (Simulating the Hagan Room). Booth Instructor coordinate with BOP to insert Trip Signals: OPEN Protection Racks Door: IRF BST101 f:D_OPEN  BST058 TRIP  BST001 TRIP CLOSE Protection Racks Door: IRF BST101 f:D_CLOSED    B/S 459A-1, Hagan Rack #2 (PZR Hi Level) NOTE: B/S Status Light Przr Hi Level LC-459A-1 will ILLUMINATE. B/S 459A-2, Hagan Rack #2 (PZR Lo Level) NOTE: B/S Status Light Przr Lo Level LC-459A-2 will ILLUMINATE. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION B, PZR LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILURE      CRS (Step 16) GO TO Procedure Main Body, Step 2 NOTE:  The CRS will address Technical Specifications. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE      CRS (Step 2) IMPLEMENT EALs NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.      CRS (Step 3) RETURN TO Procedure And Step In Effect      TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) INSTRUMENTATION Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page  18 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      CRS LCO 3.3.1 The RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.      CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.      CRS ACTIONS        CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that Function 8, Pressurizer Water Level - High, is affected and that Action M.1 or M.2 must be entered. M. One channel inoperable. M.1 Place channel in trip. OR M.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER to < P-
: 7. 6 hours  12 hours      TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.9, PRESSURIZER      CRS LCO 3.4.9 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with: a. MODE 1; b. MODES 2 and 3; and c. Pressurizer heaters OPERABLE with a of being powered from an emergency power supply.      CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.      CRS ACTIONS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page  19 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: Due to the loss of Letdown PZR level will continue to rise until normal Letdown is restored. Consequently the crew is expected to be logged in, and then out of TS LCO 3.4.9 A. Pressurizer water level not within limit. A.1 Be in MODE 3 with reactor trip breakers open. AND A.2 Be in MODE 4. 6 hours  12 hours    NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page  20 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW      Following this, the controlling steam flow channel for S/G "C", FT-494, will fail LOW, causing FRV-498 to start to CLOSE. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction," and/or AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure."  The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-034, "Steam Flow."  The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation." Booth Operator Instructions:    ICO SGNXMTFT_494  r:01:00 f:0  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-006-C3, S/G C LVL DEV  Lowering demand on FCV-498 ("C" S/G Feedwater Reg Valve)  Narrow Range Level in "C" S/G lowering  FR-498 indicates that the gap between Feedwater and Steam flow to and from "C" S/G is rising  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Examiner Note: It is most likely that the CRS will respond to the symptoms and enter AOP-010 first. However, the crew may recognize the failure and respond by entering AOP-025 first. If so, proceed to AOP-025 section below. AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION      BOP (Step 1) CHECK FRVs  OPERATING PROPERLY (MANUAL OR AUTO): Immediate Action  NOTE: The BOP will control FCV-498 in MANUAL. FCV478    FCV488    FCV498      RO/ BOP (Step 2) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint  BEING APPROACHED NOTE: A Power Limit Warning is possible during this event which will require a reduction in power.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page  21 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      CRS (Step 2 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is approached, THEN-. GO TO Step 4.      RO (Step 4) CHECK Reactor Power  LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%      Critical Task:  Manually control "C" S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level. Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the "C" S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.      CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      CRS (Step 6) GO TO Appropriate Step From Table Below:    FRV Failure To Control - OBSERVE NOTE 58      BOP (Step 58) CHECK S/G Level  AT OR TRENDING TO PROGRAM NOTE: The CRS will likely transition to AOP-025 based on the Note prior to Step 58. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE      CRS (Step 1) GO TO Appropriate Section For Failed Instrument: NOTE: The CRS will select Section D of AOP-025.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page  22 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    S/G Steam Flow (FT-476, 477, 484, 485, 494, 495) - SECTION D      AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION D, S/G FEED FLOW, STEAM FLOW OR STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE      BOP (Step 1) CHECK Affected FRV In MAN: Immediate Action  NOTE: The BOP will control FCV-498 in MANUAL. FCV478 (FRV "A")    FCV488 (FRV "B")    FCV498 (FRV "C")      BOP (Step 2) RESTORE Affected S/G Level To Program Immediate Action    Critical Tasks:  Manually control "C" S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level. Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the "C" S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.      BOP (Step 3) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint  BEING APPROACHED      CRS (Step 3 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is approached, THEN-. NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. GO TO Step 5.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page  23 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using PA System NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      BOP (Step 6) CHECK Failure  FEED FLOW INSTRUMENT FAILURE      CRS (Step 6 RNO) IF failure was a steam flow instrument, THEN GO TO Step 12.      BOP (Step 12) PLACE Affected S/G Steam Flow Selector Switch To The Alternate Channel:    S/G "C" STEAM FLOW  FR498    Failed Channel FT-494 - Position CH495      BOP (Step 13) RESTORE Affected Controller To Automatic:    CHECK S/G level  WITHIN +/-1% OF PROGRAMMED LEVEL    PLACE affected controller in AUTO      BOP (Step 14) REMOVE Affected Transmitter From Service Using OWP034: NOTE:  The CRS will address OWP-034. Channel FT-494 - OWP SF-5      OWP-034, STEAM FLOW (SF) SF-5, STEAM FLOW TRANSMITTER FT-494      CRS Address SF-5      BOP DELETE INPUT FT-494 (MSF0445A) FROM CALO PROCESSING IAW OMM-007.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page  24 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP Insert Trip Signals NOTE:  The BOP will enter the Simulator Booth (Simulating the Hagan Room). Booth Instructor coordinate with BOP to insert Trip Signals: OPEN Protection Racks Door: IRF BST101 f:D_OPEN  BST020 TRIP CLOSE Protection Racks Door: IRF BST101 f:D_CLOSED    B/S 494, HAGAN RACK #16 (LOOP 3 HI STM FLOW) NOTE: B/S STATUS LIGHT LOOP 3 HI STM FLOW FC-494, and APP-036-L1, APP-006-F4, and APP-006-C2 will ILLUMINATE. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION D, S/G FEED FLOW, STEAM FLOW OR STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE      CRS (Step 15) REVIEW TS LCOs for applicability:    TS LCO 3.3.1    TS LCO 3.3.2      CRS (Step 16) GO TO Procedure Main Body, Step 2      AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE      CRS (Step 2) IMPLEMENT EALs NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.      CRS (Step 3) RETURN TO Procedure And Step In Effect Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page  25 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.2, ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM (ESFAS) INSTRUMENTATION      CRS LCO 3.3.2 The ESFAS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.      CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.2-1.      CRS ACTIONS        CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that Functions 1.f (SI-High Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines), 1.g (SI- High Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines Coincident with Steam Line Pressure Low), 4.d (MSI - High Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines Coincident with Tavg LOW) and 4.e (MSI - High Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines Coincident with Steam Line Pressure Low), are affected; and that Action D.1 of D2.1 and D.2.2 must be entered . D. One channel inoperable NOTE For Function 4.c, a channel may be taken out of the trip condition for 6 hours for maintenance. D.1 Place channel in trip. OR D.2.1 Be in MODE 3. AND  D.2.2 Be in MODE 4.
6 hours 12 hour 18 hours    At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  26 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Next, a tube leak will develop in Feed Water Heater 4A. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-007-E7, HTR 4A HI/LO LVL, identifying the leak. The operator may enter AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction."  Ultimately, the operator will use OP-407, "Heater Drain and Vents," to remove Feedwater Heaters 5A, 4A, and 3A from Service. This will require a power decrease. The operator will use either AOP-038, "Rapid Downpower," or OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When > 25% Power," and OP-301, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)," to lower plant power. Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF CFW14G        r:02:00 f:800000  (NOTE: This Malfunction requires 3 minutes to generate APP-007-E7)  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-007-E7, HTR 4A HI/LO LVL  Feed Flow lowering on all three S/Gs  Narrow Range Level lowering on all three S/Gs  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Examiner Note: When this alarm occurs the crew may address AOP-010 or use APP-007 E7 to direct entry into OP-407. If the crew uses APP-007-E7, continue below. If the crew enters AOP-010, proceed to Step 1 on Page 27. APP-007-E7, HTR 4A HI/LO LVL      CRS (Step 1) IF level alarm is due to low power maneuvering, THEN-..      BOP (Step 2) IF required, THEN dispatch an Operator to check: NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the 4A FWH sightglass is FULL and the LCVs are FULL OPEN. Sightglass level Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  27 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Level Control Valve position      BOP/CRS (Step 3) IF a level control valve has malfunctioned, THEN-.      CRS (Step 4) IF tube leakage is occurring, THEN bypass the affected string of Heaters for repair of defective tubes using OP-407, Heater Drains and Vents Examiner NOTE:  The CRS will transition to OP-407 to remove Heaters 5A, 4A and 3A from service. If so, proceed to OP-407 actions on Page 30. NOTE: During the transient there is a possibility that TS LCO 3.4.1 (DNB) will be entered. AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION      BOP (Step 1) CHECK FRVs  OPERATING PROPERLY (MANUAL OR AUTO): Immediate Action      FCV478    FCV488    FCV498      RO/ BOP (Step 2) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint  BEING APPROACHED      CRS (Step 2 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is approached, THEN-. GO TO Step 4.      RO (Step 4) CHECK Reactor Power  LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  28 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      CRS (Step 6) GO TO Appropriate Step From Table Below: NOTE: The CRS go to Step 33 based on a known tube leak in the A Train FWHs, or Step 35 based on other malfunctions  Known Leak - 33    Other - 35      BOP (Step 33) REDUCE Turbine Load Using Attachment 1 To Match Feedwater And Steam Flows WHILE CONTINUING WITH This Procedure NOTE: The CRS may address Step 33 of AOP-010. Steam flow and Feed flow are matched.      CRS (Step 34) OBSERVE NOTE Prior To Step 41 And GO TO Step 41 NOTE: If the CRS entered at Step 33 of AOP-010, they will move forward to Step 41.      CRS (Step 35) REDUCE Turbine Load Using Attachment 1 To Match Feedwater And Steam Flows WHILE CONTINUING WITH This Procedure NOTE: The CRS may address Step 35 of AOP-010. Steam flow and Feed flow are matched.      CRS/ BOP (Step 36) DISPATCH An Operator To Observe Valve Positions: NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the both valves are operating properly. LCV1530A, HDT LEVEL CONTROL VALVE    LCV1530B, HEATER DRAIN PUMPS SUCTION DUMP TO CONDENSER Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  29 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Step 37) DETERMINE If A Heater Drain Tank Level Control Valve Has Failed:      CHECK HDT level control valve or controller  HAS MALFUNCTIONED      CRS (Step 37.a RNO) IF HDT Level is controlling correctly, THEN OBSERVE NOTE prior to Step 40 and GO TO Step 40.      CRS (Step 40) CHECK For Leak  CAUSING FW TRANSIENT NOTE: The crew may determine that a FWH Tube Leak exists and that the Train A FWH string must be bypassed/isolated. Visual indication of leak    FW Heater level alarms FW Heater normal and alternate drain valve positions level dump valve positions    FW Heater #1 & #2 emergency dump valve positions    Gland Steam Condenser abnormal indications/alarms      CRS (Step 41) ISOLATE Leak:    CONSULT with Operations to determine leak isolation strategy    Isolate in current plant condition    OR    Repair online    OR    Shutdown to repair    OR    Trip Unit Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  30 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Examiner NOTE: The crew should address OP-407 to remove the 5A, 4A, and 3A FWHs from service.
OP-407, HEATER DRAINS AND VENTS SECTION 6.4.5 REMOVING HEATERS 5A, 4A, AND 3A FROM SERVICE      CRS (Step 1) To remove Heater 4A from service, perform the following:    Ensure power is reduced to 659 Mwe gross (maximum of 20% power reduction) Examiner NOTE: The CRS conduct a downpower to 659 MWe using AOP-038 or OP-105. If AOP-038 is selected, continue below. If OP-105 is selected, proceed to Page 35. AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER      CRS (Step 1) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using The Plant Page System NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      RO (Step 2) DETERMINE Corrected Boration And Target Rod Height For Target Power Level Using Most Recently Performed OST947, OPERATIONS REACTIVITY PLAN    Target Load Reduction Rate __%/min    Target Power Level ___    Target Rod Height ___ NOTE: The RO will determine approximately 185 Steps. Corrected Boration ___ NOTE: The RO will determine approximately 70 gallons.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  31 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      CRS (Step 3) PERFORM Brief Of Control Room Personnel To Include The Following:    Reason for downpower    Target Power Level    Target Rod Height    Rate of load reduction    Amount of boric acid addition      RO (Step 4) CHECK Required Power Reduction Rate  LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 5%/MINUTE      RO (Step 5) ENERGIZE All Available PZR Heaters    PZR HTR CONTROL GROUP    PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP A    PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP B      RO (Step 6) CHECK Rod Control  IN AUTO      RO (Step 7) INITIATE Boration Using Attachment 1, RCS Boration, While Continuing With This Procedure    Examiner NOTE:  The CRS will assign the RO to perform this action. RO Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1. Other Examiners follow AOP-038 Actions, Step 8, on Page 32. AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER ATTACHMENT 1, RCS BORATION Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  32 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 1) PLACE The RCS MAKEUP MODE Selector Switch In BORATE      RO (Step 2) IF Frequent Boric Acid Transfer Pump Starts Are Anticipated, THEN PLACE Boric Acid Transfer Pump Switch Aligned To BLEND To ON.      RO (Step 3) SET YIC113, BORIC ACID TOTALIZER to amount determined in Main Body Step 2      RO (Step 4) Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to START      RO (Step 5) IF Boric Acid flow is NOT achieving the desired effect, THEN PLACE FCV113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, in MAN AND manually Adjust controller FCV113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, using the UP and DOWN pushbuttons      RO (Step 6) WHEN the desired amount of Boric Acid has been added to the RCS OR the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Switch is placed in STOP, THEN ENSURE the following:    FCV113A, BA TO BLENDER, closes. FCV113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, closes. IF in AUTO, THEN operating Boric Acid Pump stops. RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF.      AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER    Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/BOP continue HERE.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  33 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 8) INITIATE Turbine Load Reduction While Continuing With This Procedure    CHECK EH Turbine Control  IN OPER AUTO    PREPARE For Turbine Load Reduction As Follows:    CHECK IMP IN  ILLUMINATED    SELECT the desired Load Rate    DEPRESS the GO pushbutton to initiate Turbine Load reduction      BOP (Step 9) ADJUST Turbine Load To Control Tavg Within 5&deg;F Of Tref Using One Of The Following:    ADJUST Load Rate    OR    DEPRESS GO and HOLD pushbuttons      CRS/ BOP (Step 10) INITIATE Notification of The Following: NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM/WCC/Communicator to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge. Load Dispatcher of load reduction    E&C to control secondary chemistry    RC for elevated radiation levels in CV Pump Bays and Pipe Alley    Oncall Duty Manager to activate the Event Response Team    E&C for impending 15% power change for I131 sampling within 2 to 6 hours    E&C for impending power reduction greater than 20% terminate zinc injection    NRC within 4 hours Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  34 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      BOP (Step 11) CHECK Auxiliary Boilers  AT LEAST ONE OPERATING      BOP (Step 11 RNO) IF Plant Shutdown is required, THEN NOTIFY AO to start at least one Auxiliary Boiler per OP401, AUXILIARY HEATING SYSTEM. NOTE: The BOP will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.      RO (Step 12) CHECK Tavg  WITHIN 5&deg;F OF Tref      RO (Step 13) CHECK Axial Flux Distribution  WITHIN TARGET BAND      BOP (Step 14) CHECK APP006F5, STEAM DUMP ARMED  EXTINGUISHED      RO (Step 15) CHECK Any Of The Following Conditions  MET: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. Target load/power has been reached    Load reduction is no longer required    CRS/SM directs termination of load reduction    STOP Rapid Downpower using Attachment 3, Termination Of Rapid Downpower      CRS (Step 15 RNO) WHEN any of the following conditions are met:    Target load/power has been reached NOTE: The target load is 659 MWe. Load reduction is no longer required    CRS/SM directs termination of load reduction Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  35 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    THEN STOP Rapid Downpower using Attachment 3, Termination Of Rapid Downpower. CRS  GO TO Step 16.      RO (Step 16) CHECK Reactor Power  LESS THAN 85%      BOP (Step 17) CHECK Heater Drain Pumps  TWO RUNNING    STOP one Heater Drain Pump      RO (Step 18) CHECK Reactor Power  LESS THAN 70%    Examiner NOTE: If the crew has used AOP-038 to downpower, Lead Examiner move to Event #4. Examiner NOTE: If the crew decides to reduce power using OP-105, Examiners continue HERE. OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER      CRS (Step 6.1.1.1) Check that an EOOS Risk Assessment has been performed      CRS (Step 6.1.1.2) IF an EOOS Risk Assessment has NOT been performed for this Power Reduction, THEN perform one of the following actions:    Direct the STA or the Work Week Coordinator (WWC) to perform an EOOS Risk Assessment NOTE:  The CRS may ask STA to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as STA. OR Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  36 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Perform a qualitative Risk Assessment per OMM-048, Work Coordination and Risk Assessment      BOP (Step 6.1.1.3) Notify the Load Dispatcher that unit load will be reduced. NOTE: The BOP will call Load Dispatcher. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Load Dispatcher      BOP (Step 6.1.1.4) Notify RC that higher radiation levels should be expected in the CV Pump Bays and in Pipe Alley due to normal shutdown crud bursts NOTE: The BOP will call RC. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as RC      BOP (Step 6.1.1.5) IF this is a Power Reduction greater than 20%, THEN notify Chemistry to shutdown the RCS Zinc Injection Skid NOTE: The BOP may call Chemistry. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry      RO (Step 6.1.1.6) Monitor the highest operable Power Range Channel and the highest operable Intermediate Range Channel on NR-45      CRS (Step 6.1.1.7) IF this will be a planned power reduction of greater than 10% power, THEN-..      CRS/BOP (Step 6.1.1.8) IF Reactor Engineering has NOT provided technical guidance, THEN use the most recent OST-947, Operations Reactivity Plan data to determine the reactivity change required      RO (Step 6.1.2.1) IF additional letdown flow is desired, THEN perform the following: NOTE: The RO may place additional Letdown in service.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  37 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Start additional Charging Pumps per OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System    Place additional letdown orifice in service per OP-301      RO (Step 6.1.2.2) IF a significant change in RCS Boron concentration is expected or occurs (10 ppm or more), THEN energize additional PZR heaters      RO (Step 6.1.2.3) Maintain Tave within 5&deg;F of Tref using a combination of Control Rods and Boron Concentration changes. NOTE: The RO will start a boration per Section 8.2.8 of OP-301. Examiner Note: RO Examiner follow actions of OP-301. CRS/BOP Examiners follow OP-105 Actions, Step 6.1.2.4, on Page 39. OP-301, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)      RO (Step 8.2.8.1) This revision has been verified to be the latest revision available.      RO (Step 8.2.8.2) DETERMINE the amount of Boric Acid to add to the RCS and if applicable, the expected change in RCS temperature AND Reactor Power NOTE: The RO will use Attachment 10.4 of OST-947 and determine that the Target Rod Height is 191 and 53.76 gallons of BA will need to be added.      RO (Step 8.2.8.3) OBTAIN an independent check of the volume of Boric Acid required.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  38 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 8.2.8.4) OBTAIN permission from the CRS OR SM to add the amount of boric acid previously determined, including the expected change in RCS temperature AND Reactor Power.      RO (Step 8.2.8.5) PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE selector switch in the BORATE position.      RO (Step 8.2.8.6) SET YIC-113, BORIC ACID TOTALIZER to the desired quantity.      RO (Step 8.2.8.7) IF desired, THEN PLACE FCV-113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, in MAN AND ADJUST controller FCV-113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, using the UP and DOWN pushbuttons flow rate.      RO (Step 8.2.8.8) Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to the START position.      RO (Step 8.2.8.9) IF any of the below conditions occur, THEN momentarily place the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the STOP position:    Rod Motion is blocked    Rod Motion is in the wrong direction    Tavg goes up    Boric Acid addition exceeds the desired value      RO (Step 8.2.8.10) WHEN the desired amount of Boric Acid has been added to the RCS, THEN ENSURE the following:    FCV-113A, BA TO BLENDER, closes.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  39 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    FCV-113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, closes. IF in Auto, THEN the operating Boric Acid Pump stops. The RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF.      RO (Step 8.2.8.11) IF desired, THEN FLUSH the Boric Acid flow-..      RO (Step 8.2.8.12) RETURN the RCS Makeup System to automatic as follows:    ENSURE FCV-114A, PRIMARY WTR FLOW DILUTE MODE is in AUTO. PLACE FCV-114B, BLENDED MU TO VCT to the AUTO position. PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE switch in the AUTO position. ENSURE FCV-113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, is in AUTO. Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the START position.      RO (Step 8.2.8.13) RECORD, in AUTO LOG, as indicated by PRIMARY WATER TOTALIZER, YIC-114 AND Boric Acid TOTALIZER, YIC 113 the total amount of Primary Water AND Boric Acid added during the boration.      RO (Step 8.2.8.14) MONITOR parameters for the expected change in reactivity AND inform the CRS OR SM the results of the boration. Examiner NOTE: If AOP-038 was used to downpower the plant, move forward to Event
: 4. Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/BOP continue HERE. OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  40 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      BOP (Step 6.1.2.4) IF EH Turbine Control is in OPER AUTO, THEN reduce turbine load as follows:    Ensure the EH Turbine Impulse Pressure Control in the desired position using Attachment 6, Transferring Control Mode Between IMP-IN and IMP-OUT: NOTE: The BOP will use Attachment 6 of OP-105 to transfer Turbine Control Mode from IMP OUT to IMP IN    IMP IN (preferred)    OR    IMP OUT (if required for plant conditions)      OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER ATTACHMENT 6, TRANSFERRING CONTROL MODE BETWEEN IMP-IN AND IMP-OUT      BOP (Step 1) Record the Valve Position Limit reading:      BOP (Step 2) Lower the limiter setting until the turbine is on the limiter      BOP (Step 3) Check that the Tracking Meter indicates a nulled condition.  (approximately zero)      BOP (Step 4) Press the appropriate pushbutton to change sensing modes:    IMP IN (preferred for load changes)    OR    IMP Out (preferred for steady state)      BOP (Step 5) Wait for the Tracking Meter to indicate a nulled condition Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  41 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 6) Return the limiter setting to the value recorded in Step 1 or as directed by CRS/SM.      OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER      BOP (Step 6.1.2.4) IF EH Turbine Control is in OPER AUTO, THEN reduce turbine load as follows:    Set the desired load in the SETTER    Select the desired Load Rate NOTE: The BOP will select 1-2%/Minute    Depress the GO pushbutton      BOP (Step 6.1.2.5) IF EH Turbine Control is in TURB MANUAL, THEN-. NOTE: The Turbine is in OPER AUTO.      BOP (Step 6.1.2.6) Maintain Gland Seal Steam Header Pressure (PI-4004, PI-1382 or ERFIS Point GSP2095A) in the normal operating band (3 to 6 psig)      RO (Step 6.1.2.7) WHEN Reactor Power is less than 90% as indicated on NR-45, THEN check that APP-005-D6 is received.      After a load reduction of 15-20 MWe, or at the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page  42 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
CRDM Fan "A" Failure      During the downpower, the "A" CRDM Fan will trip. The operator will address APP-010-A6, HVH-5A/B AIR FLOW LOST/OVLD, and manually start the "B" CRDM Fan. Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF HVA05A f:MOTOR_SHORT            Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator, APP-009-E7, 480V GRD FAULT  RTGB Annunciator, APP-010-A6, HVH-5A/B AIR FLOW LOST/OVLD  CRDM Fan HVH-5A Green status light LIT, Red status light OFF  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    NOTE: The BOP may check APP-009-E7 prior to APP-010-A6. APP-010-A6, HVH-5A/B AIR FLOW LOST/OVLD      BOP (Step 1) EVALUATE CRDM indicating lights to determine affected fan:    HVH-5A, CRDM COOLING FAN    HVH-5B, CRDM COOLING FAN      BOP (Step 2) MONITOR the following ERFIS points to determine if a single-phase open circuit is present:    ERFIS point ELV3020A, BUS E1 VOLTAGE. ERFIS point ELV3021A, BUS E2 VOLTAGE.      CRS (Step 3) IF a single-phase open circuit condition is suspected, THEN GO TO AOP-026, Grid Instability NOTE: This will require additional assessment.      BOP (Step 4) IF a CRDM COOLING FAN has tripped, THEN ENSURE the Standby CRDM COOLING FAN is running. NOTE: The BOP will start HVH-5B.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page  43 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
CRDM Fan "A" Failure      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Step 5) DISPATCH Operator to evaluate affected CRDM COOLING FAN supply breaker status: NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that there was no apparent reason for the Fan failure. Breaker MCC-5(5M), CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISM COOLING FAN, HVH-5A. Breaker MCC-6(4M), CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISM COOLING FAN, HVH-5B.      CRS (Step 6) INITIATE a Work Request to investigate the cause of the affected CRDM COOLING FAN alarm. NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC to address the Fan failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.      CRS (Step 7) IF RCS temperature is greater than or equal to 350&#xba;F AND both CRDM COOLING FANs are unavailable, THEN-.. NOTE: The HVH-5B Fan is running.      At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page  44 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Continuous Inward Rod Motion      Shortly afterwards, a continuous control rod insertion will occur. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-001, "Malfunction of Reactor Control System."  The operator will be unable to control the rod insertion and will manually trip the reactor. Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF CRF06A    IMF CRF06B  Indications Available:    Rod Inward Arrow Indicating Light is LIT  The Tavg-Tref deviation is inconsistent with the control rod movement  Group Steps Counters and IRPI indication inward control rod motion  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    AOP-001, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR CONTROL SYSTEM      RO (Step 1) Check Unexpected Rod Motion  IN PROGRESS Immediate Action      RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Power  GREATER THAN 15% Immediate Action      BOP (Step 3) Check Turbine Load  Immediate Action    CONTROL RODS STEPPING IN    AND    UNEXPECTED LOAD REDUCTION IN PROGRESS    OR    UNEXPECTED LOAD REDUCTION HAS OCCURRED      RO (Step 3 RNO) Attempt To Stop Rod Motion As Follows: Immediate Action    IF ROD BANK SELECTOR Switch position in A (AUTO), THEN Place the ROD BANK SELECTOR Switch in M (Manual) NOTE: When the RO places control rods in MANUAL, the rod motion will continue.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page  45 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Continuous Inward Rod Motion      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    IF ROD BANK SELECTOR Switch in M (Manual) OR Individual Bank Select, THEN Place the ROD BANK SELECTOR Switch in A (Auto). NOTE: Although control rods are expected to be in AUTO, if the control rods are in MANUAL the RO will take this action. IF Rod Motion does NOT stop, THEN Trip the Reactor and Go To EOPE0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. NOTE:The CRS will enter EOP-E-0 Upon Rx Trip, move to Events #6-7.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 46 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      On the reactor trip, a 500 gpm Steam Generator Tube Rupture will occur (over 10 minutes) on the "C" Steam Generator. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."  After the Immediate Actions are complete, it is likely that the operator will determine that SI is NOT actuated nor required, and transition to EOP-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response."  While in this procedure the operator will determine that SI is required, manually actuate SI, and return to EOP-E-0. Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture," to isolate the flow into and out of the "C" Steam Generator and then conduct a cooldown of the RCS. Upon transition into EOP-E-3, a Loss of Off-Site Power will occur. Both EDGs will start and re-power Buses E-1 and E-2. With SI previously reset, the operator will need to address a re-initiation of AFW flow to all Steam Generators, and the restart of the ECCS Pumps. The operator will continue with EOP-E-3 and conduct the RCS cooldown using the "A" and "B" Steam Generator PORVs. During the RCS depressurization, the Pzr Spray Valves will not be available. The operator will be required to conduct the depressurization using an available Pzr PORV. The scenario will terminate at Step 23 of EOP-E-3, after the operator has stopped the SI Pumps. Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF SGN02F  r:10:00 f:500    Indications Available:    All control rods on the bottom  RCS pressure is lowering  RCS Tavg is trending to no load  RTGB Annunciator APP-036-C7, R24 MONITOR HIGH  R24 Leakage Recorder indicating S/G leakage greater than TS Limit  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION      RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action    Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers  OPEN    Rod position indicators  FULLY INSERTED    Rod Bottom Lights  ILLUMINATED    Neutron Flux  LOWERING      BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 47 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Both Turbine Stop Valves  CLOSED    All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power To AC EMERGENCY BUSSES: Immediate Action    CHECK Bus E1 OR E2  AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED    CHECK Bus E1 AND E2  BOTH ENERGIZED      RO (Step 4) CHECK SI Status:  Immediate Action  CHECK if SI is actuated:    SI annunciators  ANY ILLUMINATED    OR    SI equipment  AUTO STARTED      RO (Step 4.a RNO) CHECK if SI is required: Immediate Action    PZR pressure LESS THAN 1715 PSIG    OR    Containment pressure GREATER THAN 4 PSIG    OR    Steam Line P bistables ILLUMINATED    OR    High Steam Flow with Low Tavg OR Low Steam Pressure bistables ILLUMINATED    IF SI is required, THEN manually ACTUATE BOTH Trains of SI. IF SI is NOT required, THEN PERFORM the following:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 48 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    RESET SPDS AND INITIATE monitoring of Critical Safety Functions Status Trees. CRS  GO TO EOPES0.1, Reactor Trip Response, Step 1. NOTE: It is expected that SI will not be required, and the CRS will transition to EOP-ES-0.1 NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief. EOP-ES-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE    Examiner NOTE:  A large SGTR is occurring. It is expected that the crew will transition back to EOP-E-0. Because of this, only 5 steps are scripted. When the crew re-enters EOP-E-0, move forward to EOP-E-0 steps on Page 50. RO/ BOP Foldout Page    SI ACTUATION CRITERIA NOTE: The crew will subsequently transition back to EOP-E-0 based on this criteria. LOSS OF POWER CRITERIA    AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA    DC BUS, INSTRUMENT BUS, OR MCC5 FAILURE CRITERIA    LOSS OF ULTIMATE HEAT SINK CRITERIA      RO (Step 1) CHECK RCS Temperature Control:    CHECK RCPs  ANY RUNNING    CHECK RCS temperatures:    With ANY RCP running, CHECK RCS Average temperature  STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547&deg;F Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 49 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      BOP (Step 2) CHECK Feedwater Status:    CHECK RCS average temperatures  LESS THAN 554&deg;F    CHECK Main Feedwater Reg Valves  CLOSED    CHECK Total feed flow to S/Gs  GREATER THAN 300 gpm (0.2x106 PPH)      BOP (Step 3.a) CHECK S/G Levels:    CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels  GREATER THAN 9%      BOP (Step 3.a RNO) MAINTAIN total feed flow GREATER THAN 300 gpm AFW OR 0.2x106 pph Main Feedwater UNTIL S/G Narrow Range level is GREATER THAN 9% in at least one S/G.      BOP (Step 3.b) CONTROL feed flow to maintain S/G Narrow Range levels BETWEEN 9% AND 50%      BOP (Step 4) CHECK All AC Busses  ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER      RO (Step 5) CHECK PZR Level Control:    CHECK PZR level  GREATER THAN 14%      RO (Step 5 RNO) PERFORM the following:    ISOLATE Letdown by closing the following valves:    CLOSE LCV460 A & B, LETDOWN LINE STOP Valves.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 50 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CLOSE LTDN LINE ISO Valves:    CVC204A    CVC204B    CLOSE LTDN ORIFICE Valves:    CVC200A  45 gpm    CVC200B  60 gpm    CVC200C  60 gpm    CLOSE CVC387, EXCESS LETDOWN STOP Valve. TURN OFF ALL PZR Heaters. WHEN charging is available, THEN CONTROL charging to restore PZR level to GREATER THAN 14%. NOTE: The crew will likely manual actuate SI and the CRS will transition to EOP-E-0. Examiner NOTE:  If the crew proceeds past Step 5 of EOP-ES-0.1, wait here until the crew decides to re-enter EOP-E-0. EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION      RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action    Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers  OPEN    Rod position indicators  FULLY INSERTED    Rod Bottom Lights  ILLUMINATED    Neutron Flux  LOWERING      BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action    Both Turbine Stop Valves  CLOSED    All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves  CLOSED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 51 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power To AC EMERGENCY BUSSES: Immediate Action    CHECK Bus E1 OR E2  AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED    CHECK Bus E1 AND E2  BOTH ENERGIZED      RO (Step 4) CHECK SI Status:  Immediate Action  CHECK if SI is actuated:    SI annunciators  ANY ILLUMINATED    OR    SI equipment  AUTO STARTED    CHECK BOTH trains of SI actuated:    SI Pumps  TWO RUNNING    RHR Pumps  BOTH RUNNING      RO/ BOP Foldout Page:    RCP TRIP CRITERIA    FAULTED S/G AFW ISOLATION CRITERIA    AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA    DC BUS, INSTRUMENT BUS, OR MCC5 FAILURE CRITERIA    SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING CRITERIA      CRS (Step 5) PERFORM Attachment 1, Auto Action Verification, While CONTINUING WITH This Procedure    Examiner NOTE:  The CRS will likely assign the BOP to perform this action. If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1. CRS/RO follow E-0 Actions, Step 6, on Page 55.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 52 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ATTACHMENT 1, AUTO ACTION VERIFICATION      BOP (Step 1) CHECK ECCS Pumps Running:    SI Pumps  TWO RUNNING    RHR Pumps  BOTH RUNNING      BOP (Step 2) CHECK ECCS Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment      BOP (Step 3) CHECK CCW Pumps  AT LEAST ONE RUNNING      BOP (Step 4) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A:    CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A  ACTUATED    CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A Valves  CLOSED    CHECK Excess Letdown  ISOLATED    CVC387, EXCESS LTDN STOP VALVE  CLOSED    HIC137, EXCESS LTDN FLOW CONTROLLER  AT 0% DEMAND      BOP (Step 5) CHECK Feedwater Isolation:    CHECK Main Feed Pumps  BOTH TRIPPED    CHECK Main Feedwater isolated:    Feedwater Reg Valves  CLOSED    Feedwater Reg Bypass Valves  CLOSED    Feedwater Header Section Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 6) CHECK If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 53 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK Main Steam Line Isolation  REQUIRED    CHECK Containment pressure  GREATER THAN 10 PSIG    OR    High steam flow with:    S/G pressure  LESS THAN 614 PSIG    OR    Tavg  LESS THAN 543&deg;F      BOP (Step 6.a RNO) GO TO Step 7.      BOP (Step 7) CHECK Proper Service Water System Operation:    CHECK SW Pumps  ALL RUNNING    CHECK SW Booster Pumps  BOTH RUNNING    CHECK Both SW Header Low Pressure Alarms  EXTINGUISHED    APP008F7,SOUTH SW HDR LO PRESS    APP008F8,NORTH SW HDR LO PRESS      BOP (Step 8) CHECK BOTH EDGs  RUNNING      BOP (Step 9) CHECK ECCS Flow:    CHECK RCS pressure  LESS THAN 1650 PSIG [1725 PSIG]      BOP (Step 9.a RNO) GO TO Step 10.      BOP (Step 10) CHECK CV Recirculation Fans  ALL RUNNING      BOP (Step 11) CHECK IVSW System Actuated:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 54 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    PCV1922A, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE  OPEN    PCV1922B, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE  OPEN      BOP (Step 12) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation:    CV Ventilation Isolation Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 13) CHECK Control Room Ventilation Aligned For Pressurization Mode:    HVA1A OR HVA1B,CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING FAN  RUNNING    HVE19A OR HVE19B,CONTROL ROOM AIR CLEANING FAN  RUNNING    HVE16, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN  STOPPED    Control Room HVAC Outside Air Damper A OR B  OPEN    CRD1ASA, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER  CLOSED    CRD1BSB, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER  CLOSED      BOP (Step 14) CHECK DS Bus  ENERGIZED      BOP (Step 15) CHECK Battery Chargers ENERGIZED:    APP036D1, BATT CHARGER A/A1 TROUBLE Alarm  EXTINGUISHED    APP036D2, BATT CHARGER B/B1 TROUBLE Alarm  EXTINGUISHED      BOP (Step 16) STOP R11/12 Sample Pump Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 55 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 17) Locally RESET AND LOAD Instrument Air Compressor(s) As Necessary (38 KW each): NOTE: The BOP may (If the LOOP has occurred) contact the Inside AO. If so, Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge IRF EPSMCC5_ 187  f: RACK_IN IRF EPSMCC6_ 218  f: RACK_IN    Compressor A (MCC5 CMPT 7M)    Compressor B (MCC6 CMPT 3G)      BOP (Step 18) PERFORM Crew Update To Include The Following:    Attachment completion    Manual actions taken    Failed equipment status    SW status per Step 7.c    If applicable, PERFORM Supplement M, Component Alignment For Loss Of SW To Turbine Building, as time permits    Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE. EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION      RO (Step 6) CHECK AFW Pumps Running:    CHECK Motor Driven AFW Pumps  BOTH RUNNING    CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels  TWO S/Gs LESS THAN 16%    CHECK Steam Driven AFW Pump  RUNNING NOTE:  The SDAFW Pump is OOS.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 56 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 7) CHECK AFW Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment: NOTE:  The RO/BOP may take a Prudent Action (OMM-22) to throttle AFW flow to the "C" S/G and control Narrow Range level between 9-50%. AFW Header Discharge Valves  FULL OPEN    AFW Header Section Valves  FULL OPEN    Steam Driven AFW Pump Discharge Valves  FULL OPEN IF PUMP RUNNING      RO (Step 8) CHECK Total AFW Flow:    RESET SI NOTE:  This action may have been previously performed to allow the RO/BOP to throttle AFW flow to the "C" S/G. CONTROL AFW flow to maintain Intact S/G Narrow Range level between 9%[18%] AND 50%    CHECK total AFW flow  GREATER THAN 300 GPM      RO (Step 9) CHECK CV Spray NOT Required:    CHECK Containment Pressure  HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG    CHECK CV Spray  NOT ACTUATED      RO (Step 10) CHECK RCP Seal Cooling:    CCW flow to RCP(s) Thermal Barriers  NORMAL    APP001C1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW ALARM  EXTINGUISHED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 57 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    APP001D1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR LO FLOW alarm  EXTINGUISHED    OR    Seal Injection flow  ADEQUATE    Seal Injection flow  GREATER THAN 6 GPM PER RCP    OR    Thermal Barrier Ps  GREATER THAN 5 INCHES WATER PER RCP      RO (Step 11) CHECK RCS Temperatures:    With ANY RCP running, RCS average temperature  STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547&deg;F    OR    With NO RCPs running, RCS Cold Leg temperatures  STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547&deg;F      RO (Step 12) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Spray Valves:    CHECK PZR PORVs  CLOSED    CHECK Normal PZR Spray Valves  CLOSED    CHECK Aux PZR Spray Valve  CLOSED      RO (Step 13) CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped:    CHECK RCPs  ANY RUNNING    CHECK SI Pumps  AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 58 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs  LESS THAN 13&deg;F[32&deg;F]      CRS (Step 13.c RNO) GO TO Step 14.      RO (Step 14) CHECK If S/G Secondary Pressure Boundaries Are Intact:    NONE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER    NONE COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED      RO (Step 15) CHECK If S/G Tubes Are Intact:    Secondary Radiation Monitors  HAVE REMAINED NORMAL    R15, CONDENSER AIR EJECTOR GAS    R19s, S/G Blowdown Radiation    R31s, STEAMLINE RADIATION MONITORs    S/G levels  NONE RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER      CRS (Step 15 RNO) PERFORM the following: NOTE: The CRS will transition to EOP-E-3. RESET SPDS AND INITIATE monitoring of Critical Safety Functions Status Trees. GO TO EOPE3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Step 1.      Booth Instructor: Upon transition to EOP-E-3, IMF EPS13 (Loss of Offsite Power)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 59 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Examiner NOTE: The LOOP will cause the AFW valves to fully open and re-initiate AFW flow to all S/Gs. Additionally, the RO will need to restore ECCS Pumps that did not restart if SI has been reset. EOP-E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE      RO/ BOP (Foldout Page)    SI REINITIATION CRITERIA    SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA    MULTIPLE TUBE RUPTURE CRITERIA    COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCHOVER CRITERIA    AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA      RO (Step 1) CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped: NOTE: The RCPs will NOT be running. CHECK RCPs  ANY RUNNING      CRS (Step 1 RNO) GO TO Step 2.      BOP (Step 2) IDENTIFY Ruptured S/G(s): NOTE: The crew will identify the "C" S/G as the ruptured S/G. CHECK for ANY of the following indications:    Unexpected rise in ANY S/G Narrow Range level    OR    R31s Steamline Radiation Monitors  ANY INDICATE HIGH RADIATION Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 60 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  OR    R19s SG Blowdown Radiation  ANY INDICATE HIGH RADIATION    OR    High radiation reported from ANY S/G sample    CONTACT Chemistry to periodically sample ALL S/Gs for activity. NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/Chemistry to address the samples. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/Chemistry.      BOP (Step 3) ISOLATE Flow From Ruptured S/G(s):    ADJUST Ruptured S/G(s)Steam Line PORV Controller to 1060 psig    CHECK Ruptured S/G(s) Steam Line PORV  CLOSED    RV13 NOTE: The crew will ensure that the "C" S/G PORV is CLOSED. CLOSE Ruptured S/G(s) Steam Driven AFW Pump Steam Shutoff Valves:    V18C NOTE: Since the SDAFW Pump is OOS, this valve will already be CLOSED. Locally CLOSE Ruptured S/G(s)Bypass Drn AND Warmup Line To AFW Pump Valve(s)While CONTINUING WITH this procedure:    MS38 (S/G C)(Pipe Jungle above/right of V18C) NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 5 minutes that the MS-38 is CLOSED. IRF MSS051 f:0    CHECK Ruptured S/G(s) S/G Blowdown AND Blowdown Sample Valves  CLOSED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 61 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CLOSE Ruptured S/G(s) MSIV AND MSIV Bypass Valves:    S/G C:    V13C    MS353C      CRS (Caution prior to Step 4) If ANY Ruptured S/G is Faulted, feed flow to that S/G should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions UNLESS needed for RCS cooldown.      BOP (Step 4) CHECK Ruptured S/G    CHECK Ruptured S/G  FAULTED      CRS (Step 4 RNO) GO TO Step 5.      CRS (Caution prior to Step 5) If Offsite Power is lost AFTER SI reset, manual action may be required to restart safeguards equipment.      BOP (Step 5) CHECK Ruptured S/G(s) Level:    CHECK S/G Narrow Range level  GREATER THAN 9% [18%]  RO  RESET SI    STOP feed Flow to ruptured S/G(s):    CLOSE Steam Driven AFW Pump Discharge Valve(s):    V214C NOTE: Since the SDAFW Pump is OOS, this valve will already be CLOSED. CLOSE AFW Header Discharge Valve(s):    V216C Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 62 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    PERFORM Supplement D, Deenergizing AFW Valves For AFFECTED S/G NOTE: The BOP will use Attachment D, and call AO for local Actions. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 10 minutes that actions are complete. IRF EPSMCC9_256 f:0 (Other breakers are already Racked Out)    Critical Task:  Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs  Safety Significance:  Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. The fact that the operator allows the differential pressure to dissipate and, as a result, are then forced to transition to a contingency procedure constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would unnecessarily complicate the event mitigation strategy.      BOP (Step 6) CHECK Ruptured S/G(s) Pressure  GREATER THAN 500 PSIG      BOP (Step 7) CHECK The Following Valves For Ruptured S/G CLOSED    MSIVs    MSIV Bypass Valves    S/G Steam Line PORVs    Steam Driven AFW Pump Steam Shutoff Valves      CRS (Caution prior to Step 8) If RCPs are NOT running, the following steps may cause a false CSF4, Integrity Status Tree, indication for the Ruptured Loop. Disregard the Ruptured Loop Tcold indication UNTIL after performing Step 31. NOTE: An Orange and/or Red Path on RCS Integrity will occur during this event. Based on this caution the CRS will NOT address FRP-P.1.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 63 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      BOP (Step 8) INITIATE RCS Cooldown:    DETERMINE required Core Exit temperature: NOTE: The CRS will determine the Target temperature to 519&deg;F. DUMP steam to Condenser from intact S/G(s) at MAXIMUM rate:    CHECK Condenser  AVAILABLE      BOP (Step 8.b RNO) DUMP steam at MAXIMUM rate from Intact S/G(s) using S/G Steam Line PORV(s). NOTE: The crew will dump steam using the "A" and the "B" S/G PORVs. IF S/G Steam Line PORV(s) can NOT be opened from the Control Room, THEN.... IF NO intact S/G available, THEN...      BOP (Step 8.c-f) CHECK RCS Tavg  LESS THAN 543&deg;F    Momentarily PLACE STEAM DUMP MODE Control Switch to BYPASS TAVG INTLK position    CHECK APP006F5, STEAM DUMP ARMED alarm  ILLUMINATED NOTE: This Annunciator is extinguished (Steam Dumps not available). CHECK Core Exit T/Cs  LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE      BOP (Step 8.f RNO) WHEN Core Exit T/Cs are LESS THAN required temperature, THEN PERFORM Steps 8.g and 8.h. CRS CONTINUE WITH Step 9.      BOP (Step 9) CHECK Intact S/G Levels:    CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels  GREATER THAN 9%[18%] NOTE:  Narrow Range levels may be greater than 9%. If so, perform Step 9.b.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 64 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      BOP (Step 9.a RNO) MAINTAIN total feed flow GREATER THAN 300 gpm UNTIL S/G Narrow Range level is GREATER THAN 9% [18%] in at least one S/G.      BOP (Step 9.b) CONTROL feed flow to maintain S/G Narrow Range levels  BETWEEN 21% [21%] AND 50%      RO (Step 10) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Block Valves:    CHECK Power to PZR PORV Block Valves  AVAILABLE    CHECK PZR PORVs  CLOSED    CHECK PZR PORV Block valves  AT LEAST ONE OPEN      RO (Step 11) RESET SI      RO (Step 12) RESET Containment Isolation Phase A      RO (Step 13) ESTABLISH Instrument Air To CV:    CHECK APP002F7, INSTR AIR HDR LO PRESS alarm  EXTINGUISHED      RO (Step 13 RNO) PERFORM the following:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 65 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Locally RESET AND LOAD Instrument Air Compressor(s)as necessary (38 KW each): NOTE: If not already done, the BOP will contact the Inside AO. Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge IRF EPSMCC5_ 187  f: RACK_IN IRF EPSMCC6_ 218  f: RACK_IN    Compressor A (MCC5 CMPT 7M)    Compressor B (MCC6 CMPT 3G)    WHEN Instrument Air is established, THEN PERFORM Steps 13.b AND 13.c. CRS  CONTINUE WITH Step 14.      RO (Step 13.b-c) RESET IA PCV1716, INSTRUMENT AIR ISOLATION TO CV    CHECK IA PCV1716  OPEN      RO (Step 14) CHECK If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped:    CHECK RHR Pumps  ANY RUNNING WITH SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST    CHECK RCS pressure:    Pressure  GREATER THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG]    Pressure  STABLE OR RISING    STOP RHR Pumps    CHECK RCS pressure remains GREATER THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG]      RO (Step 15) ESTABLISH Charging Flow:    CHECK Charging Pumps  AT LEAST ONE RUNNING NOTE: One Charging Pump may be running. If so, proceed to Step 15.b.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 66 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Step 15.a RNO) IF CCW flow to RCP(s) Thermal Barrier is lost, THEN GO TO Step 16. NOTE: CCW flow was momentarily lost on the LOOP, but exists now.      RO (Step 15.b) ALIGN Charging Pump suction to RWST:    OPEN LCV115B, EMERG MU TO CHG SUCTION    CLOSE LCV115C, VCT OUTLET Valve    PLACE RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Control Switch to STOP    ESTABLISH MAXIMUM charging flow:    START additional Charging Pump(s) as necessary    ADJUST the following as necessary to maintain proper Seal Injection AND MAXIMUM Charging flow:    Charging Pump Speed Controller(s)    HIC121, CHARGING FLOW Controller    Seal Water Flow Control Valves NOTE:  The BOP may contact the AO to adjust Seal Injection flows. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO; and use: IRF CVC030 f: variable IRF CVC031 f: variable IRF CVC032 f: variable    MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 gpm AND 20 gpm per RCP UNLESS Seal Injection isolated      BOP (Step 16) CHECK If RCS Cooldown Should Be Stopped:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 67 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK Core Exit T/Cs  LESS THAN REQUIRED CORE EXIT T/C TEMPERATURE FROM STEP 8    STOP RCS cooldown    MAINTAIN Core Exit T/Cs  LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE      Critical Task:  While in EOP-E-3, establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not occur because the RCS temperature is in either (1) Too high to maintain 38&deg;F of RCS Subcooling OR (2) below 295&deg;F (RCS Integrity Red path Limit)  Safety Significance:  Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency procedure. This failure constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would unnecessarily complicate the event mitigation strategy.      BOP (Step 17) CHECK Ruptured S/G(s) Pressure  STABLE OR RISING      RO (Step 18) CHECK RCS Subcooling Based On Core Exit T/Cs  GREATER THAN 38&deg;F [57&deg;F]      RO (Step 19) DEPRESSURIZE RCS To MINIMIZE Break Flow AND Refill PZR:    CHECK Normal PZR Spray  AVAILABLE      CRS (Step 19.a RNO) OBSERVE CAUTIONS and NOTE prior to Step 20 AND GO TO Step 20.      RO/ BOP (Step 20) DEPRESSURIZE RCS Using PZR PORV To Minimize Break Flow AND Refill PZR:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 68 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK PZR PORV  AT LEAST ONE AVAILABLE    OPEN one PZR PORV until ANY of the following conditions satisfied:    BOTH of the following:    RCS pressure  LESS THAN RUPTURED S/G(s) PRESSURE    PZR level  GREATER THAN 14% [31%]    OR    PZR level  GREATER THAN 73% [66%]    OR    RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs  LESS THAN 18&deg;F [37&deg;F]    CLOSE PZR PORV      RO (Step 21) CHECK RCS Pressure  RISING      RO/ BOP (Step 22) CHECK If ECCS Flow Should Be Terminated:    CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs  GREATER THAN 18&deg;F [37&deg;F]    CHECK Secondary Heat Sink:    Total feed flow to S/G(s)  GREATER THAN 300 GPM AVAILABLE    OR    S/G Narrow Range level in at least one Intact S/G  GREATER THAN 9% [18%]    CHECK RCS pressure  STABLE OR RISING Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 69 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK PZR level  GREATER THAN 14% [31%]      RO (Step 23) STOP SI Pumps      Critical Task:  Depressurize the RCS to meet SI termination criteria before Steam Generator Overfill is reached based on Water in the Steam Lines.  (If above 100% WR level see Simulator Code "thlecell(193)" to determine)  Safety Significance:  Failure to stop reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates mitigation of the event. It also constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.      At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.
NRC SCENARIO N16 1-1 TURNOVER SHEET  1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life:  MOL b) Reactor Power:  100% Mode 1 c) Turbine Load:  770 MWe  d) Boron Concentration:  853 ppm e) Rod Height:  218 CB 'D' f) RCS Pressure:  2235 psig g) PZR Level:  53.3 %  h) Xenon:    Equilibrium  2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. # Description LCO 3.7.4 A Restore AFW pump or flow path(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days AND 8 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO 3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) SDAFW Pump 4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a) None 5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a) "A" MDAFW Pump and flowpath b) "B" MDAFW Pump and flowpath c) "C" AFW Pump 6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a) FI-613, CCW System Flow is OOS (I&C Investigating). b) RTGB Annunciator APP-010-B3, "EDG B START AIR LO PRESS," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). 7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a) PROTECTED 8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a) Maintain Steady-State conditions b) Monitor the completion of Maintenance of the SDAFW Pump 9. TURNOVER INFORMATION  a) The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. 10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a)  Review the OST-947 MOL charts for BA and PW additions 11. RISK  a) GREEN 
 
PROGRAM: H B Robinson Operations Training  MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam    Scenario N16-1-2   
 
==REFERENCES:==
: 1. Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS - Operating" (Amendment 176) 2. OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power" (Rev 62) 3. OP-301, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)" (Rev 112) 4. AOP-003, "Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control" (Rev 20) 5. AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction" (Rev 33) 6. APP-003, "RCS & Makeup Systems" (Rev 54) 7. APP-001, "Miscellaneous NSSS" (Rev 60) 8. AOP-018, "Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions" (Rev 31) 9. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.17, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)" (Amendment 223) 10. AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure" (Rev 24) 11. OWP-033, "First Stage Pressure (FSP)" (Rev 13) 12. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation" (Amendment 176) 13. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation" (Amendment 176) 14. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, "Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation" (Amendment 176) 15. EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection"  (Rev 6) 16. CSFST, "Critical Safety Function Status Trees" (Rev 7) 17. EOP-E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant" (Rev 4) 18. FRP-J.1, "Response to High Containment Pressure" (Rev 10)  Validation Time: 89 minutes Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2  Facility: HB Robinson Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners:  Operators: (SRO)    (RO)    (BOP)  Initial Conditions: The plant is at 75% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "A" SI Pump is OOS. The "B" SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. The "C" Charging Pump is also OOS. LI-928, "C" SI Accumulator Level, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-009-C3, "AIR SIDE SEAL OIL BU PMP OVLD," has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.              Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*  Event Description  1 - R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Raise Power 2 1 I-RO I-SRO VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 fails HIGH 3  2 I-BOP I(TS)-SRO Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW  4 3  C-RO C(TS)-SRO "B" Charging Pump Trip 5 4 C-BOP C-SRO "C" FRV Controller fails HIGH in AUTO 6 5 M-RO M-BOP M-SRO Cold Leg SBLOCA  7 6/7 NA 480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes  8 6 C-RO "C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start  9 7 C-RO CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically  * (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,    (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2  HB Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #2  The plant is at 75% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "A" SI Pump is OOS. The "B" SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. The "C" Charging Pump is also OOS. LI-928, "C" SI Accumulator Level, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-009-C3, "AIR SIDE SEAL OIL BU PMP OVLD," has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.                                Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 100% using OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power," and OP-301, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)."    During the power increase, VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 will fail HIGH causing all letdown to be diverted to the CVCS HUTs. This failure will result in VCT level lowering without automatic makeup. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-003, "Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control."  After this, the power increase will be suspended.
Next, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 will fail LOW. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure, and place all Feed Regulating Valves in MANUAL"  The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-033, "First Stage Pressure (FSP)," and restore the Feed Regulating valves to AUTO control. The operator will address 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation," and Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, "Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation."  Following this, the "B" Charging Pump will trip. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-003-F5, CHG PMP MOTOR OVLD/TRIP and raise speed of the "A" Charging Pump. The operator may enter AOP-018, "Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions."  The operator will address 3.4.17, "Chemical and Volume Control System."  Shortly afterwards, the "C" Feed Regulating Valve Controller will fail such that the valve starts to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction," and control the "C" S/G level manually. Subsequently, a Cold Leg Small Break LOCA will occur (over 5 minutes) on the B Loop. The operator will enter AOP-016, "Excessive Primary Plant Leakage."  Ultimately, the operator will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."  When the reactor trips, the normal supply breaker to Bus E-1 will trip OPEN, and the "A" EDG Output Breaker will fail to CLOSE either automatically or manually; and Train "A" equipment will remain unavailable throughout the event. Additionally, the "C" SI Pump will fail to automatically start on SI, and the operator will be required to manually start this pump.
Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant," and the break size will become larger. Eventually, Containment pressure will exceed 10 psig creating an Orange Path condition on the Containment Critical Safety Function. When this occurs, the "B" CV Spray will automatically start on HI-HI Containment Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2  Pressure, however, both SI-880C&D ("B" CV Spray Pump Discharge Valves) will fail to open automatically, and the operator will be required to manually open these valves. The scenario will terminate in EOP-E-1 after Containment Spray has been initiated, or at Step 9 of FRP-J.1, "Response to High Containment Pressure," after the operator has taken all necessary steps to reduce Containment pressure, or upon transition from either EOP-E-1 or FRP-J.1 to FRP-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock (After all Critical Tasks have been completed). Critical Tasks:  Manually control "C" S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level. Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the "C" S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control. Trip all RCPs within 6 minutes of meeting the EOP-E-0/E-1 RCP Trip Criteria (Containment Isolation Phase B  ACTUATED, OR BOTH of the following satisfied: SI Pumps  AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW AND RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs  LESS THAN 13&deg;F [32&deg;F]) so that CET temperatures do not become superheated when forced circulation in the RCS stops. (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to trip the RCPs under the postulated plant conditions leads to core uncovery and to fuel cladding temperatures in excess of 2200&deg;F, which is the limit specified in the ECCS acceptance criteria. Thus, failure to perform the task represents mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator has failed to prevent degradation of the fuel cladding barrier to fission product release and which leads to a violation of the facility license condition.
Establish flow from at least one high-head SI pump before transition out of E-0. (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to manually start at least one high-head SI pump under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity. In this case, at least one high-head SI pump can be manually started from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. Additionally, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Finally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump (when it is possible to do so) is a violation of the facility license condition.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2  Manually actuate at least one CV Spray Train before Transitioning to EOP-ES-1.2. (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment under the postulated conditions demonstrates the inability of the crew to "recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
In this case, the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment can be manually actuated from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent (degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity). Additionally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment (when it is possible to do so) results in a failure to prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2  SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS              Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  Sim. Setup Reset to Temp IC 615  T = 0 Malfunctions:  "A" SI Pump OOS:  IRF EPS480E1_130 f: RACK_OUT ("A" SI Pump OOS)  IRF EPS480E1_124 f: RACK_IN ("B" SI Pump Racked IN to E-1)  PLACE Red Cap over "A" SI Pump Control Switch "C" Charging Pump OOS:  IRF EPSV480E2_152 f:RACK_OUT  PLACE Red Cap over "C" Charging Pump Control Switch PLACE Green Cap over "A" and "B" Charging Pump Control Switch  LI-928 "C" SI Accumulator Level indication OOS  IOR aoSISAOD021A f:0 Place WHITE DOT on LI-928 
 
RTGB Annunciator APP-009-C3 failed OFF  IMF ANNXN09C03 f:ALARM_OFF Place WHITE DOT on APP-009-C3  Insert the following:  IRF SIS029 f: NO_AUTO ("C" SI Pumps fails to AUTO start)  IRF CNS010 f:NO-AUTO (SI-880C fails to OPEN in AUTO)  IRF CNS011 f:NO-AUTO (SI-880C fails to OPEN in AUTO)  $006_RTA_TRIP IMF EPS05A (Normal Supply Breaker to E-1 trips on Rx Trip)  $006_RTA_TRIP IMF EDG03A (Diesel Output Breaker to E-1 fails to CLOSE)  Place the Simulator in RUN and ACKNOWLEDGE all alarms. Adjust Steam Dump Potentiometer to 7.28 (Per OP-105)  Ensure "B" Charging Pump operating AUTO, "A" Charging Pump operating in MANUAL  Perform Attachment 2 (Simulator Setup For Exams) of TAP-411.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2    Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  Crew Briefing  1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements  2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew. 3. Provide the crew with the following:  Copy of OP-105 marked up for power increase  Copy of Section 8.2.7 of OP-301  Copy of Technical Specifications/Basis  4. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms. T-0 Begin Familiarization Period  At direction of examiner Execute Lesson Plan for Simulator Scenario N16-1-2. At direction of examiner  Event 1 Raise Power At direction of examiner  Event 2 ICO CVCXMTLT_115 r:00:30 f:60  VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 fails HIGH  At direction of examiner Event 3  ICO TURXMTPT_447 r:30  f:0  Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW  At direction of examiner  Event 4  IMF CVC05B  "B" Charging Pump Trip  At direction of examiner Event 5  IMF CFW17C r:45 f:100  "C" FRV Controller fails HIGH in AUTO  At direction of examiner Event 6 IMF RCS01C r:5:00 f:1000  Cold Leg SBLOCA Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2    Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  Post-Rx Trip  Event 7 IMF EPS05A IMF EDG03A  480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes  NOTE: E-1 will de-energize on Rx Trip $006_RTA_TRIP IMF EPS05A (Normal Supply Breaker to E-1 trips on Rx Trip) $006_RTA_TRIP IMF EDG03A (Diesel Output Breaker to E-1 fails to CLOSE)  Post-Rx Trip  Event 8 IRF SIS029 f:NO_AUTO  "C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start  NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0  Post-Rx Trip  Event 9 IRF CNS010 f:NO_AUTO IRF CNS011 f:NO_AUTO  CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically  NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0      Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page  10 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Raise Power      Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 100% using OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power," and OP-301, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)." Booth Operator Instructions:    NA  Indications Available:  NA    Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER      RO (Step 5) Maintain Tave within 5&deg;F of Tref using a combination of Control Rods and Boron Concentration changes. NOTE:  The RO may withdrawal control rods. OP-301, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS) SECTION 8.2.7, RCS QUICK DILUTION CHECKLIST      RO (Step 1) This revision has been verified to be the latest revision available.      RO (Step 2) DETERMINE the amount of water to add to the RCS and if applicable, the expected change in RCS temperature AND Reactor Power.      RO (Step 3) OBTAIN an independent check of the volume of water required.      RO (Step 4) OBTAIN permission from the CRS OR the SM to add the amount of water previously determined, including the expected change in RCS temperature AND Reactor Power.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page  11 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Raise Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 5) IF flow adjustment is desired, THEN adjust FCV-114A, PRIMARY WTR FLOW DILUTE MODE, potentiometer to obtain desired flow rate.      RO (Step 6) PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE selector switch in the DILUTE position.      RO (Step 7) SET YIC-114, PRIMARY WTR TOTALIZER to the desired quantity.      RO (Step 8) IF two letdown orifices are in service and it is desired to divert flow to the HUT, THEN-      RO (Step 9) Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to the START position.      RO (Step 10) IF LCV-115A is in AUTO, THEN ENSURE proper operation of LCV-115A, VCT/HLDP TK DIV valve.      RO (Step 11) IF any of the following conditions occur, THEN momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the STOP position:    Unanticipated Rod Motion    Primary Water addition exceeds the desired value      RO (Step 12) WHEN the desired amount of Primary Water has been added to the RCS, THEN ENSURE the following:    FCV-114A, PW TO BLENDER, closes. FCV-114B, BLENDED MU TO VCT, closes.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page  12 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Raise Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    IF in Auto, THEN the operating Primary Water Pump stops. The RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF. IF desired, THEN ENSURE LCV-115A, VCT/HLDP TK DIV valve control switch in AUTO.      RO (Step 13) RETURN the RCS Makeup System to automatic as follows:    ENSURE FCV-114A, PRIMARY WTR FLOW DILUTE MODE is in AUTO. PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE switch in the AUTO position. Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the START position.      RO (Step 14) RECORD, in AUTO LOG, as indicated by PRIMARY WATER TOTALIZER, YIC-114 total amount of Primary Water added during the dilution.      RO (Step 15) MONITOR parameters for the expected change in reactivity AND inform the CRS OR the SM the results of the dilution.      OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER      BOP (Step 6) IF EH Turbine Control is in OPER AUTO, THEN raise turbine load as follows: NOTE:  Since power is stabilized at 75%, the BOP will perform Step 6 to initiate the load increase. The next applicable Step in Section 6.2.2 of OP-105 is Step 22. Adjust the SETTER indication using the desired load.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page  13 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Raise Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Use continue the rise in load.      BOP (Step 22) WHEN average Reactor Power crosses greater than 90% by Power Range Indications, THEN check that APP-005-D6 is received. NOTE: The Turbine is in OPER AUTO. After the 1st Dilution and MWe raised by 15-20 MWe, and at the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page  14 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 fails HIGH      During the power increase, VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 will fail HIGH causing all letdown to be diverted to the CVCS HUTs. This failure will result in VCT level lowering without automatic makeup. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-003, "Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control."  After this, the power increase will be suspended. Booth Operator Instructions:    ICO CVCXMTLT_115  r:00:30 f:60  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-003-E3, VCT HI/LO LVL  VCT Level LI-115 indicates HIGH  LCV-115 diverting to CVCS HUT  VCT Level LI-112 on ERFIS indicates lowering VCT Level  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL    NOTE: The crew could refer to APP-003-E3 before entering AOP-003. RO (Step 1) Check For Failure Of A Level Transmitter As Follows:    Obtain a VCT level for LT115 using ERFIS    PT ID CHL0115A    Obtain a VCT level for LT112 using ERFIS    PT ID CHL0112A    Check VCT level indicators  OSCILLATING LEVEL DEVIATION OBSERVED      CRS (Step 1.c RNO) Go To Step 1.e      RO (Step 1.e) Check VCT level deviation between LT-112 and LT-115 - GREATER THAN 8 INCHES (13%) NOTE: LT-115 has failed HIGH.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page  15 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 fails HIGH      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 3) Stabilize The RCS Makeup System As Follows:    Check LT115  FAILED HIGH    Place LCV115A, VCT/HLDP TK DIV, Control Switch to VCT    Obtain Hagan Racks Key number 10    Place VCT Level Transmitter Selector Switch located in Hagan Rack #19, IN LT112 POSITION NOTE:  The CRS will dispatch the BOP to the Hagan Racks. Booth Instructor: use IRF CVC 067 f:LT-112. Check LT115  FAILED HIGH    Place the LCV115A Control Switch to AUTO  CRS  Contact I&C to repair the failed channel NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/I&C to address the VCT Transmitter failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC. CRS  Go To Step 6      CRS (Step 6) Make PA Announcement For Procedure Entry NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      CRS (Step 7) Implement The EALs NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.      RO (Step 8) Check VCT Level  LESS THAN 12.5 INCHES (21%)      RO (Step 8 RNO) IF VCT level lowers to less than 12.5 inches (21%), THEN perform Steps 9 and 10. NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. CRS Go To Step 11.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page  16 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 fails HIGH      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      RO (Step 11) Check VCT Level  LESS THAN 20 INCHES (33%)      CRS (Step 11 RNO) Go To Step 21.      RO (Step 21) Check VCT Level  LESS THAN 51.5 INCHES (86%)      RO (Step 22) Verify Charging And Letdown Flows Are Normal For Plant Conditions      RO (Step 23) Check APP003D5, BA FLOW DEV  ILLUMINATED      CRS (Step 23 RNO) Go To Step 28.      RO (Step 28) Check APP003E5, MAKEUP WATER DEV  ILLUMINATED      CRS (Step 28 RNO) Go To Step 34.      RO (Step 34) Check Boration  REQUIRED      CRS (Step 34 RNO) Go To Step 37.      RO (Step 37) Check Dilution  REQUIRED      CRS (Step 37 RNO) Go To Step 40.      CRS (Step 40) Check Technical Specifications, Section 3.4.17, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS), For Applicable LCO NOTE: Technical Specification LCO 3.4.17 is MET.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page  17 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 fails HIGH      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      CRS (Step 41) Return To Procedure And Step In Effect    NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief. Floor Instructor: As SM, direct CRS to place the plant Startup on HOLD. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page  18 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW      Next, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 will fail LOW. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure, and place all Feed Regulating Valves in MANUAL"  The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-033, "First Stage Pressure (FSP)," and restore the Feed Regulating valves to AUTO control. The operator will address 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation," and Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, "Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation." Booth Operator Instructions:    ICO TURXMTPT_447    r:30  f:0  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-005-F5, AMSAC TROUB/BYPD  PT-447, 1st Stage Pressure starts to lower  PT-446, 1st Stage Pressure remains constant  S/G Narrow Range levels will lower  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE      CRS (Step 1) GO TO Appropriate Section For Failed Instrument: NOTE: The CRS will select Section E of AOP-025. TURBINE FIRST STAGE PRESSURE, (PT-446, 447) - SECTION E      AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION E, TURBINE FIRST STAGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE      BOP (Step 1) CHECK Turbine Load Rejection  Immediate Action    IN PROGRESS    OR    HAS OCCURRED      CRS (Step 1 RNO) GO TO Step 3. Immediate Action Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page  19 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 3) CHECK S/G Level Trend  CONTROLLING IN AUTO TO 39% Immediate Action      RO (Step 4) CONTROL Reactor Power: Immediate Action    PLACE rod bank selector switch in M (Manual)    OPERATE rods to maintain reactor power less than or equal to 100%      CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using PA System NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      BOP (Step 6) PERFORM The Following:    CHECK S/G Level  STABILIZED BETWEEN 39% AND 52%      BOP (Step 6.a RNO) WHEN S/G level is stabilized between 39% and 52%, THEN CONTINUE WITH Step 6.b.      BOP (Step 6.b) CHECK FRV Controllers  ALL IN MAN: NOTE: All FRV controllers are expected to be in AUTO. FCV478    FCV488    FCV498      BOP (Step 6.b RNO) PLACE all FRV controllers in MAN. NOTE: The BOP will place all FRVs in MANUAL.      BOP (Step 7) SELECT Alternate Channel For 1st Stage Pressure Input:    Failed Channel - PT-447, Alternate Channel - PT-446 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page  20 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 8) ADJUST Each S/G Level To Program Level NOTE: The BOP will need to restore S/G levels to 52%.      RO (Step 9) ADJUST Tavg To Within 1.5 TO +1.5&deg;F Of Tref NOTE: The RO may need to adjust control rods and/or boron concentration to restore Tavg-Tref deviation.      RO (Step 10) CHECK Reactor Power  GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 15%      BOP (Step 11) RESTORE Each S/G FRV To Automatic: NOTE: The BOP will need to restore S/G levels to 52%. CHECK S/G level  WITHIN +/-1% OF PROGRAMMED LEVEL      BOP (Step 11 RNO) WHEN S/G level is within +/-1% of programmed level, THEN PLACE affected controller in AUTO. NOTE: The BOP will place all FRVs in AUTO. CRS  GO TO Step 12.      RO (Step 12) RESTORE Rod Control To Automatic: NOTE: Since the power increase is suspended, the RO/CRS may discuss placing the control rods back in AUTO, if not already there. CHECK Tavg  WITHIN 0.5 to +0.5&deg;F OF Tref. Place Rod Control Selector Switch in AUTO      CRS (Step 13) REMOVE Affected Transmitter From Service Using OWP033:    Channel - PT-447, OWP-FSP-2    NOTE: The CRS will address OWP-033.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page  21 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OWP-033, FIRST STAGE PRESSURE (FSP) FSP-2, FIRST STAGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-447      CRS Address FSP-2  RO Place the STEAM DUMP MODE SELECTOR SWITCH in the STEAM PRESSURE CONTROL position. NOTE:  APP-006-F5 STEAM DUMP ARMED will alarm.      BOP Place the 1ST STAGE PRESSURE SELECTOR SWITCH 446/447 in the "446" position.      BOP Insert Trip Signals NOTE:  The CRS will dispatch the BOP to the Hagan Racks. Booth Instructor coordinate with BOP to insert Trip Signals: OPEN Protection Racks Door:
IRF BST101 f:D_OPEN  IRF BST100 f:TRIP  IRF BST092 f:TRIP  IRF BST017 f:TRIP  IRF BST019 f:TRIP  IRF BST021 f:TRIP CLOSE Protection Racks Door: IRF BST101 f:D_CLOSED    B/S 447-2 HAGAN RACK #25 (70% TURBINE LOAD LIMIT) NOTE:  B/S STATUS LIGHT TURB POW LOAD LIMIT PC-447-E2 will ILLUMINATE. B/S 447-1 HAGAN RACK #25 (PERMISSIVE P-7) NOTE:  B/S STATUS LIGHT TURBINE POWER P-7 PC-447-E1 will ILLUMINATE. B/S 475, HAGAN RACK #24 (LOOP 1 HI STM FLOW) NOTE:  B/S STATUS LIGHT LOOP 1 HI STM FLOW FC-475 will ILLUMINATE. B/S 485 HAGAN RACK #25 (LOOP 2 HI STM FLOW) NOTE:  B/S STATUS LIGHT LOOP 2 HI STM FLOW FC-485 will ILLUMINATE.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page  22 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    B/S 495 HAGAN RACK #25 (LOOP 3 HI STM FLOW) NOTE:  B/S STATUS LIGHT LOOP 3 HI STM FLOW FC-495 will ILLUMINATE.      BOP Place AMSAC Bypass Switch POWER 2, PROCESSOR "A", and AMSAC Bypass Switch POWER 2, PROCESSOR "B" in the BYPASSED position. NOTE:  The CRS will dispatch the BOP. Booth Instructor: Coordinate with BOP to re-position switches using: IRF RPS012 f:BYPASS  NOTE:  APP-005-F5, AMSAC TROUB/BYPD will ILLUMINATE. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION E, TURBINE FIRST STAGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE      CRS (Step 14) CHECK TS LCO 3.3.1 And 3.3.2 For Applicability NOTE: The CRS will address Technical Specifications.      CRS (Step 15) GO TO Procedure Main Body, Step 2      TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) INSTRUMENTATION      CRS LCO 3.3.1 The RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.      CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.      CRS ACTIONS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page  23 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that Function 17.e (Turbine Impulse Pressure, P-7 Input is affected; and that Action T.1 or T.2 is required. T. One channel inoperable T.1 Verify interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions.
OR  T.2 Be in MODE 2. 1 hour      7 hours    TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.2, ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM (ESFAS) INSTRUMENTATION      CRS LCO 3.3.2 The ESFAS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.      CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.2-1.      CRS ACTIONS        CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that Functions 1.f (SI-High Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines), 1.g (SI- High Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines Coincident with Steam Line Pressure Low), 4.d (MSI - High Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines Coincident with Tavg LOW) and 4.e (MSI - High Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines Coincident with Steam Line Pressure Low),
are affected; and that Actions D.1, or D.2.1 and D.2.2. D. One channel inoperable NOTE For Function 4.c, a channel may be taken out of the trip condition for 6 hours for maintenance. D.1 Place channel in trip. OR  D.2.1 Be in MODE 3. AND  D.2.2 Be in MODE 4.
6 hours 
 
12 hour 
 
18 hours Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page  24 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.6, CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION      CRS The Containment Ventilation Isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE.      CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.6-1.      CRS ACTIONS        CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that Function 4 (Safety Injection), is affected, which requires the Action of LCO 3.3.2. Refer to LCO 3.3.2, "ESFAS Instrumentation," Function 1, for all initiation functions and requirements. NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, move to Event #4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page  25 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
"B" Charging Pump Trip      Following this, the "B" Charging Pump will trip. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-003-F5, CHG PMP MOTOR OVLD/TRIP and raise speed of the "A" Charging Pump. The operator may enter AOP-018, "Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions."  The operator will address 3.4.17, "Chemical and Volume Control System." Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF CVC05B  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-003-F5, CHG PMP MOTOR OVLD/TRIP  RTGB Annunciator APP-001-B4, RCP SEAL INJ HI/LO FLOW  "B" Charging Pump Green status light LIT  FR-124 RCP Seal Injection Flow has lowered to less than Tech Spec value  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    APP-003-F5, CHG PMP MOTOR OVLD/TRIP      RO (Step 1) Ensure at least one Charging Pump running supplying adequate RCP Seal Injection flow. NOTE: The RO will raise the speed of the "A" Charging Pump.      CRS (Step 2) Dispatch Operator to check the Charging Pump breaker(s): NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge and report within 1 minute that "there is an acrid odor at E-1."    Dispatch Operator to check the Charging Pump(s).      CRS (Step 3) Dispatch Operator to check the Charging Pump(s). NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge and report within 1 minute that "the "A" Charging Pump is operating normally."      RO (Step 4) IF Seal Injection is lost to any RCP, THEN-..
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page  26 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
"B" Charging Pump Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      RO (Step 5) IF a single-phase open circuit condition is suspected, THEN-.. NOTE: The CRS will address the Technical Specifications. NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/I&C to address the Charging Pump Trip. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC. If asked, report that the "C" Charging Pump will be restored in 12 hours. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.17, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)      CRS LCO 3.4.17 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal injection shall be OPERABLE with: NOTE: TS LCO will NOT be met if Seal Injection flow is < 6 gpm to each RCP. Two Charging Pumps shall be OPERABLE; and    Two makeup water pathways from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) shall be OPERABLE.      CRS APPLICABILITY: Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4      CRS ACTIONS        CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that the "B" Charging Pump is one of the two required to be OPERABLE, and enter Condition A. A. One required charging pump inoperable. A.1 Restore required charging pump to OPERABLE status. 24 hours      NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page  27 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" FRV Controller fails HIGH in AUTO      Shortly afterwards, the "C" Feed Regulating Valve Controller will fail such that the valve starts to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction," and control the "C" S/G level manually. Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF CFW17C        r:45 f:100  Indications Available:    "C" S/G Narrow Range level is rising on FR-498  "C" S/G Feed Flow level is rising on FR-498  FCV-498 Controller Output is rising  RTGB Annunciator APP-006-C1, S/G C FW > STM FLOW  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION      BOP (Step 1) CHECK FRVs  OPERATING PROPERLY (MANUAL OR AUTO): Immediate Action NOTE: FCV-498 in NOT operating properly in AUTO. FCV478    FCV488    FCV498      BOP (Step 1 RNO) PERFORM the following: Immediate Action NOTE: The BOP will control FCV-498 in MANUAL. ENSURE FRV for affected S/G(s) in manual control. ATTEMPT to stabilize S/G level using FRV and/or FRV Bypass Valves by matching steam flow with feed flow. STOP any load change in progress. If unable to control S/G level, THEN--
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page  28 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" FRV Controller fails HIGH in AUTO      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:  Manually control "C" S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level. Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the "C" S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.      RO/ BOP (Step 2) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint  BEING APPROACHED      CRS (Step 2 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is approached, THEN-. NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. GO TO Step 4.      RO (Step 4) CHECK Reactor Power  LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%      CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      CRS (Step 6) GO TO Appropriate Step From Table Below:    FRV Failure To Control - OBSERVE NOTE 58      BOP (Step 58) CHECK S/G Level  AT OR TRENDING TO PROGRAM      RO (Step 59) CHECK Tavg  AT OR TRENDING TO Tref Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page  29 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" FRV Controller fails HIGH in AUTO      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      CRS (Step 60) CONTACT Maintenance To Troubleshoot And Correct The Feedwater Problem NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/I&C to address the FRV Controller failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.      CRS (Step 61) IMPLEMENT EALs NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.      CRS (Step 62) CHECK Total Reactor Power Change  LESS THAN 15% NOTE:  The power change associated with the FRV Failure is less than 15%.      RO (Step 63) CHECK APP005B5, ROD BANKS A/B/C/D LO LIMIT  EXTINGUISHED      RO (Step 64) MONITOR Axial Flux Difference To Ensure Compliance With TS 3.2.3      BOP (Step 65) NOTIFY Load Dispatcher Of Unit's Load Capability NOTE: The CRS/BOP will contact the Load Dispatcher. Booth Instructor acknowledge as Load Dispatcher.      CRS (Step 66) RETURN TO Procedure And Step In Effect    NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #6-9.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 30 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Subsequently, a Cold Leg Small Break LOCA will occur (over 5 minutes) on the B Loop. The operator will enter AOP-016, "Excessive Primary Plant Leakage."  Ultimately, the operator will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."  When the reactor trips, the normal supply breaker to Bus E-1 will trip OPEN, and the "A" EDG Output Breaker will fail to CLOSE either automatically or manually; and Train "A" equipment will remain unavailable throughout the event. Additionally, the "C" SI Pump will fail to automatically start on SI, and the operator will be required to manually start this pump. Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant," and the break size will become larger. Eventually, Containment pressure will exceed 10 psig creating an Orange Path condition on the Containment Critical Safety Function. When this occurs, the "B" CV Spray will automatically start on HI-HI Containment Pressure, however, both SI-880C&D ("B" CV Spray Pump Discharge Valves) will fail to open automatically, and the operator will be required to manually open these valves. The scenario will terminate in EOP-E-1 after Containment pressure has been lowered to less than 10 psig, or at Step 9 of FRP-J.1, "Response to High Containment Pressure," after the operator has taken all necessary steps to reduce Containment pressure. Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF RCS01C  r:5:00 f:1000    Indications Available:    Pressurizer level is lowering  Pressurizer pressure is lowering  Charging Pump speed is rising  Containment pressure is rising  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Examiner NOTE: If a reactor trip occurs move forward to EOP-E-0 actions on Page 34. AOP-016, EXCESSIVE PRIMARY PLANT LEAKAGE      RO (Step 1) DETERMINE If Reactor Trip Needed As Follows:    CHECK RCS Pressure  GREATER THAN 1000 PSIG    CHECK the following:    PZR Level  LESS THAN 14% AND LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 31 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  OR    RCS Subcooling  LESS THAN 18&deg;F      RO (Step 1.b RNO) IF PZR Level can NOT be maintained greater than 14% OR Subcooling can NOT be maintained greater than 18&deg;F, THEN trip the Reactor and GO TO EOPE0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. CRS  GO TO Step 2.      CRS (Step 2) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      RO (Step 3 RNO) CONTROL Charging Flow To Maintain Desired RCS Level. NOTE: The "A" Charging Pump is running at maximum speed.      RO (Step 4) CHECK VCT Level  LESS THAN 12.5 INCHES      RO (Step 4 RNO) IF VCT level lowers to less than 12.5 inches, THEN OBSERVE the Note prior to Step 5 AND PERFORM Step 5. NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. CRS  GO TO Step 6.      RO (Step 6) CHECK Charging Pump Status  LESS THAN TWO RUNNING NOTE: Only one Charging Pump is available.      RO (Step 7) CHECK Charging Pump Status  NONE RUNNING      RO (Step 7 RNO) IF an additional Charging Pump is available, THEN-.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 32 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS  GO TO Step 11.      RO (Step 11) PLACE Running Charging Pump Speed Controller(s) In MAN AND ADJUST Output To Maximum        RO (Step 12) CHECK RCS Level  LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER      RO (Step 13) CHECK Any Letdown  IN SERVICE      RO (Step 14) ENSURE All Letdown Flowpaths Isolated As Follows:    LCV460A & B, LTDN LINE STOP Valves  CLOSED    HIC142, PURIFICATION FLOW Controller  ADJUSTED TO 0%    HIC137, EXCESS LTDN FLOW Controller  ADJUSTED TO 0%    CVC387, EXCESS LTDN STOP  CLOSED      RO (Step 15) CHECK RCS Level  LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER NOTE: By this time it is likely that Przr level is lowering uncontrollably.      RO (Step 16) CHECK RCS Pressure  GREATER THAN 1000 PSIG      RO/ CRS (Step 17) TRIP The Reactor AND GO TO EOPE0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 33 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION      RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action    Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers  OPEN    Rod position indicators  FULLY INSERTED    Rod Bottom Lights  ILLUMINATED    Neutron Flux  LOWERING      BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action    Both Turbine Stop Valves  CLOSED    All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power To AC EMERGENCY BUSSES: Immediate Action NOTE:  Bus E-1 is NOT energized. CHECK Bus E1 OR E2  AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED    CHECK Bus E1 AND E2  BOTH ENERGIZED      BOP (Step 3) WHEN time permits, THEN TRY to restore power to deenergized AC Emergency Bus. Immediate Action      RO (Step 4) CHECK SI Status:  Immediate Action  CHECK if SI is actuated:    SI annunciators  ANY ILLUMINATED    OR    SI equipment  AUTO STARTED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 34 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      CHECK BOTH trains of SI actuated:    SI Pumps  TWO RUNNING NOTE:  The operator has to manually start the "C" SI Pump. RHR Pumps  BOTH RUNNING      RO/ BOP Foldout Page:    RCP TRIP CRITERIA NOTE:  The RCP Trip Criteria will apply in this event. FAULTED S/G AFW ISOLATION CRITERIA    AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA    DC BUS, INSTRUMENT BUS, OR MCC5 FAILURE CRITERIA NOTE:  The Instrument Bus/MCC-5 Criteria will apply in this event requiring performance of Attachment 2, and will likely be performed prior to Attachment 1. SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING CRITERIA    Examiner NOTE:  The CRS will likely assign the BOP to perform Attachment 2 with the AO, and then perform Attachment 1. If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 2 and 1. CRS/RO follow E-0 Actions, Step 6, on Page 42. EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ATTACHMENT 2, DC BUS OR INSTRUMENT BUS FAILURE      BOP (Step 1) IF DC Bus Failure Has Occurred, THEN- NOTE: A DC Bus failure has NOT occurred.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 35 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 2) IF MCC5 Is NOT Energized, THEN PERFORM The Following: NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO, and direct that the AO perform Step 2 of Attachment 2 of EOP-E-0. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 2 minutes that this action is complete. IRF EPSL005 f:SHDN_BUS IRF EPMSMCC5_187 f: RACK_IN    ENSURE DS Bus is ENERGIZED    TRANSFER power source to DS Bus using the posted instructions at the Kirk Key Interlocked Breakers    Locally RESET AND LOAD Instrument Air Compressor A (MCC5 CMPT 7M)      BOP (Step 3) IF Instrument Bus Failure Has Occurred,-.. NOTE: The failure of Instrument Bus 1 will be resolved with the restoration of power to MCC-5 (Step 2). EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION      CRS (Step 5) PERFORM Attachment 1, Auto Action Verification, While CONTINUING WITH This Procedure    Examiner NOTE:  The CRS will likely assign the BOP to perform this action. If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1. CRS/RO follow E-0 Actions, Step 6, on Page 42. EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ATTACHMENT 1, AUTO ACTION VERIFICATION Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 36 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 1) CHECK ECCS Pumps Running:    SI Pumps  TWO RUNNING    RHR Pumps  BOTH RUNNING      BOP (Step 1 RNO) Manually START pump(s) as necessary. NOTE:  There is no power to the "A" SI Pump, and the "C" SI had to be started manually. Critical Task:  Establish flow from at least one high-head SI pump before transition out of E-0  Safety Significance:  Failure to manually start at least one high-head SI pump under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity. In this case, at least one high-head SI pump can be manually started from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. Additionally, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Finally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump (when it is possible to do so) is a violation of the facility license condition.      BOP (Step 2) CHECK ECCS Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment      BOP (Step 3) CHECK CCW Pumps  AT LEAST ONE RUNNING      BOP (Step 4) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A:    CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A  ACTUATED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 37 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A Valves  CLOSED NOTE: Some valves may not have power if this is performed prior to Attachment 2. The BOP may dispatch an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.      BOP (Step 4.b RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as necessary. NOTE:  Some valves will NOT have power to CLOSE, however all CV penetrations will be isolated. IF ANY Containment penetration can NOT be isolated, THEN...      BOP  CHECK Excess Letdown  ISOLATED    CVC387, EXCESS LTDN STOP VALVE  CLOSED    HIC137, EXCESS LTDN FLOW CONTROLLER  AT 0% DEMAND      BOP (Step 5) CHECK Feedwater Isolation:    CHECK Main Feed Pumps  BOTH TRIPPED    CHECK Main Feedwater isolated:    Feedwater Reg Valves  CLOSED    Feedwater Reg Bypass Valves  CLOSED    Feedwater Header Section Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 6) CHECK If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated:    CHECK Main Steam Line Isolation  REQUIRED    CHECK Containment pressure  GREATER THAN 10 PSIG    OR    High steam flow with:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 38 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    S/G pressure  LESS THAN 614 PSIG    OR    Tavg  LESS THAN 543&deg;F      BOP (Step 6.b) CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 7) CHECK Proper Service Water System Operation:    CHECK SW Pumps  ALL RUNNING      BOP (Step 7.a RNO) Manually START pump(s) as necessary. NOTE:  The "C" and "D" SW Pumps will be running. The "A" and "B" SW Pumps do NOT have power.      BOP (Step 7.b) CHECK SW Booster Pumps  BOTH RUNNING      BOP  (Step 7.b RNO) Manually START pump(s) as necessary. NOTE:  The "B" SW Booster Pump will be running. The "A" SW Pump does NOT have power.      BOP (Step 7.c) CHECK Both SW Header Low Pressure Alarms  EXTINGUISHED    APP008F7,SOUTH SW HDR LO PRESS    APP008F8,NORTH SW HDR LO PRESS      BOP (Step 8) CHECK BOTH EDGs  RUNNING NOTE:  BOTH EDGs are running however, the "A" EDG Output Breaker cannot be CLOSED.      BOP (Step 9) CHECK ECCS Flow:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 39 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK RCS pressure  LESS THAN 1650 PSIG [1725 PSIG]    CHECK SI Pumps - FLOW INDICATED    CHECK RCS pressure - LESS THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG]      BOP (Step 9.c RNO) GO TO Step 10.      BOP (Step 10) CHECK CV Recirculation Fans  ALL RUNNING NOTE:  The "3" and "4" CV Recirc Fans will be running. The "1" and "2" CV Fans do NOT have power.      BOP (Step 11) CHECK IVSW System Actuated:    PCV1922A, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE  OPEN    PCV1922B, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE  OPEN      BOP (Step 12) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation:    CV Ventilation Isolation Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 12 RNO) DEPRESS H.V. OFF on R11 OR R12 to initiate Containment Ventilation Isolation. IF ANY Containment Ventilation Isolation valve does NOT close, THEN manually OR locally ISOLATE AFFECTED penetration outside Containment while CONTINUING WITH this procedure. NOTE: The BOP may contact an AO to locally close valves. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 5 minutes that all valves are CLOSED.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 40 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 13) CHECK Control Room Ventilation Aligned For Pressurization Mode: NOTE: If the AO has restored power to Instrument Bus 1 (Via restoration of MCC-5), each of these valves will be CLOSED. HVA1A OR HVA1B,CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING FAN  RUNNING    HVE19A OR HVE19B,CONTROL ROOM AIR CLEANING FAN  RUNNING    HVE16, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN  STOPPED    Control Room HVAC Outside Air Damper A OR B  OPEN    CRD1ASA, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER  CLOSED    CRD1BSB, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER  CLOSED      BOP (Step 14) CHECK DS Bus  ENERGIZED      BOP (Step 15) CHECK Battery Chargers ENERGIZED: NOTE: If the AO has restored power to MCC-5, each of these will be extinguished. APP036D1, BATT CHARGER A/A1 TROUBLE Alarm  EXTINGUISHED    APP036D2, BATT CHARGER B/B1 TROUBLE Alarm  EXTINGUISHED      BOP (Step 16) STOP R11/12 Sample Pump Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 41 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 17) Locally RESET AND LOAD Instrument Air Compressor(s) As Necessary (38 KW each): NOTE: The BOP may contact the Inside AO. Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge and report that the "B" IA Compressor is running, and the "A" IA Compressor is NOT running. Compressor A (MCC5 CMPT 7M)    Compressor B (MCC6 CMPT 3G)      BOP (Step 18) PERFORM Crew Update To Include The Following:    Attachment completion    Manual actions taken    Failed equipment status    SW status per Step 7.c    If applicable, PERFORM Supplement M, Component Alignment For Loss Of SW To Turbine Building, as time permits    Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE. EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION    Examiner NOTE: RCS Subcooling will be lost on this event. The six minute Clock to stop the RCPs will start WHEN subcooling is 13&deg;F and the "C" SI Pump is running. Record Time:  __________  RO (Step 6) CHECK AFW Pumps Running:    CHECK Motor Driven AFW Pumps  BOTH RUNNING Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 42 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  (Step 6.a) Manually START pump(s). NOTE:  The "B" MDAFW Pump will be running. The "A" MDAFW Pump does NOT have power.        CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels  TWO S/Gs LESS THAN 16%    CHECK Steam Driven AFW Pump  RUNNING NOTE:  The SDAFW Pump is running.      RO (Step 7) CHECK AFW Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment:    AFW Header Discharge Valves  FULL OPEN    AFW Header Section Valves  FULL OPEN    Steam Driven AFW Pump Discharge Valves  FULL OPEN IF PUMP RUNNING NOTE:  The "A" and "C" valves are CLOSED, the "B" Valve is OPEN.      RO (Step 8) CHECK Total AFW Flow:    RESET SI    CONTROL AFW flow to maintain Intact S/G Narrow Range level between 9%[18%] AND 50%    CHECK total AFW flow  GREATER THAN 300 GPM      RO (Step 9) CHECK CV Spray NOT Required:    CHECK Containment Pressure  HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG NOTE:  Containment pressure has remained < 10 psig. CHECK CV Spray  NOT ACTUATED      RO (Step 10) CHECK RCP Seal Cooling:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 43 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CCW flow to RCP(s) Thermal Barriers  NORMAL    APP001C1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW ALARM  EXTINGUISHED    APP001D1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR LO FLOW alarm  EXTINGUISHED    OR    Seal Injection flow  ADEQUATE    Seal Injection flow  GREATER THAN 6 GPM PER RCP    OR    Thermal Barrier Ps  GREATER THAN 5 INCHES WATER PER RCP      RO (Step 11) CHECK RCS Temperatures: NOTE:  The LOCA may be causing a cooldown. If so, the RNO will be performed. Otherwise proceed to Step 12. With ANY RCP running, RCS average temperature  STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547&deg;F    OR    With NO RCPs running, RCS Cold Leg temperatures  STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547&deg;F      RO (Step 11 RNO) IF temperature is LESS THAN 547&deg;F AND lowering, THEN PERFORM the following:    STOP dumping steam. IF RCS cooldown continues, THEN REDUCE total AFW flow to minimum for decay heat removal.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 44 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    MAINTAIN total AFW flow GREATER THAN 300 gpm UNTIL S/G Narrow Range level is GREATER THAN 9%[18%] in at least one S/G. IF RCS cooldown continues, THEN CLOSE MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves.      RO (Step 12) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Spray Valves:    CHECK PZR PORVs  CLOSED    CHECK Normal PZR Spray Valves  CLOSED    CHECK Aux PZR Spray Valve  CLOSED      RO (Step 13) CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped:    CHECK RCPs  ANY RUNNING    CHECK SI Pumps  AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW    CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs  LESS THAN 13&deg;F[32&deg;F] . STOP ALL RCPs NOTE: Depending on the timing of mitigation actions, the RCP trip criteria may or may not be met. If the criteria is NOT met here, the leak degrades after entry into EOP-E-1.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 45 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:  Trip all RCPs within 6 minutes of meeting the EOP-E-0/E-1 RCP Trip Criteria (Containment Isolation Phase B  ACTUATED, OR BOTH of the following satisfied: SI Pumps  AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW AND RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs  LESS THAN 13&deg;F [32&deg;F]) so that CET temperatures do not become superheated when forced circulation in the RCS stops. Safety Significance:  Failure to trip the RCPs under the postulated plant conditions leads to core uncovery and to fuel cladding temperatures in excess of 2200&deg;F, which is the limit specified in the ECCS acceptance criteria. Thus, failure to perform the task represents mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator has failed to prevent degradation of the fuel cladding barrier to fission product release and which leads to a violation of the facility license condition. Record Pump Stop Time:  __________  Subtract time recorded at time of the SI Pump running/loss SCM on Page 42 _____ = _____ minutes.      RO (Step 14) CHECK If S/G Secondary Pressure Boundaries Are Intact:    NONE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER    NONE COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED      RO (Step 15) CHECK If S/G Tubes Are Intact:    Secondary Radiation Monitors  HAVE REMAINED NORMAL    R15, CONDENSER AIR EJECTOR GAS    R19s, S/G Blowdown Radiation    R31s, STEAMLINE RADIATION MONITORs Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 46 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    S/G levels  NONE RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER      CRS (Step 16) PERFORM the following:    CHECK If RCS Is Intact:    CV radiation  NORMAL    R2, CV AREA    R32A, CV HIGH RANGE    R32B, CV HIGH RANGE    CV pressure  NORMAL    CV Sump level  NORMAL NOTE: The CRS will transition to EOP-E-1. Booth Instructor: The Cold Leg break will degrade IMF RCS01C r:2:00 f:3    Examiner NOTE: Shortly after entry into EOP-E-1, it is expected that an Orange path will occur on the Containment CSFST. When this occurs, the CRS may transition to FRP-J.1, or remain in EOP-E-1 and take the continuous actions of EOP-E-0 to initiate CV Spray.
If the CRS transitions to FRP-J.1, move forward to Page 55. If the CRS remains in EOP-E-1 continue below. EOP-E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT      RO/ BOP FOLDOUT PAGE:    RCP TRIP CRITERIA Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 47 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  SI TERMINATION CRITERIA    SI REINITIATION CRITERIA    SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA    EOPE3 TRANSITION CRITERIA    COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCHOVER CRITERIA    AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA      RO (Step 1) CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped: Examiner NOTE:  The RCPs are likely OFF. If they are not, and stopped here, record the time on Critical Task on Page 46. CHECK RCPs  ANY RUNNING      CRS (Step 1.a RNO) GO TO Step 2.      BOP (Step 2) CHECK If S/G Secondary Pressure Boundaries Are Intact:    NONE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER    NONE COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED      BOP (Step 3) CHECK Intact S/G Levels: NOTE: Adverse Containment Numbers will be required when CV pressure rises to greater than 4 psig. CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels  GREATER THAN 9% [18%]    CONTROL feed flow to maintain S/G Narrow Range levels  BETWEEN 9% [18%] AND 50%      RO (Step 4) RESET SI Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 48 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      RO (Step 5) RESET Containment Isolation Phase A    Examiner NOTE:  The CRS may transition to FRP-J.1 when the Orange path on the Containment CSF occurs. If so, move forward to Page 55. BOP (Step 6) CHECK Secondary Radiation:    CHECK Secondary Radiation Monitors  HAVE REMAINED NORMAL    R15, CONDENSER AIR EJECTOR GAS    R19s, S/G Blowdown Radiation    R31s, STEAMLINE RADIATION MONITORs    PERFORM the following: NOTE:  The CRS may call Chemistry to address the samples. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry. REQUEST Chemistry periodically sample ALL S/Gs for activity. Secondary sample results  NORMAL (WHEN RESULTS AVAILABLE)      RO (Step 7) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Block Valves:    CHECK Power to PZR PORV Block Valves  AVAILABLE    CHECK PZR PORVs  CLOSED    CHECK PZR PORV Block valves  AT LEAST ONE OPEN Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 49 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 8) ESTABLISH Instrument Air To CV:    CHECK APP002F7, INSTR AIR HDR LO PRESS alarm  EXTINGUISHED    RESET IA PCV1716,INSTRUMENT AIR ISOLATION TO CV    CHECK IA PCV1716  OPEN      BOP (Step 9) CHECK Power Supply To Charging Pumps  OFFSITE POWER AVAILABLE      RO (Step 10) CHECK If Charging Flow Has Been Established:    CHECK Charging Pumps  AT LEAST ONE RUNNING NOTE:  The "A" Charging Pump is the only Charging Pump available. ESTABLISH desired Charging flow:    START additional Charging Pump(s) as necessary    ADJUST the following as necessary to maintain proper Seal Injection AND desired Charging flow:    Charging Pump Speed Controller(s)    HIC121, CHARGING FLOW Controller    Seal Water Flow Control Valves NOTE:  The BOP may contact the AO to adjust Seal Injection flows. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO; and use: IRF CVC030 f: variable IRF CVC031 f: variable IRF CVC032 f: variable    MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 gpm AND 20 gpm per RCP UNLESS Seal Injection isolated Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 50 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 11) CHECK If ECCS Flow Should Be Terminated:    CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs  GREATER THAN 18&deg;F [37&deg;F] NOTE: Adverse Containment Numbers will be required.      CRS (Step 11 RNO) GO TO Step 12.      RO (Step 12) CHECK If Containment Spray Should Be Stopped:    CHECK CV Spray Pumps  ANY RUNNING    CHECK Containment pressure  LESS THAN 4 PSIG NOTE:  CV pressure will likely be lowering, and may be below 4 psig. If so, move forward to Step 13.      CRS (Step 12.b) WHEN Containment pressure is LESS THAN 4 psig, THEN PERFORM Steps 12.e. NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. OBSERVE CAUTION prior to Step 13 AND CONTINUE WITH Step 13.      RO (Step 13) CHECK If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. CHECK RCS pressure:    Pressure  GREATER THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG] NOTE: Adverse Containment Numbers will be required.      CRS (Step 13.a RNO) GO TO Step 15.      BOP (Step 15) CHECK If Diesel Generators Should Be Stopped:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 51 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK AC Emergency Busses  ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER    Bus E1,BKR 52/18B CLOSED NOTE: Bus E-1 is de-energized. The CRS may stop here and address the possibility of restoring power to Bus E-1. Bus E2,BKR 52/28B CLOSED    CHECK Emergency Diesel Generator(s) Starting Air annunciators  EXTINGUISHED    APP010B2, EDG A START AIR LO PRESS    APP010B3, EDG B START AIR LO PRESS    STOP ANY unloaded Emergency Diesel Generator(s)      CRS (Step 16) INITIATE Evaluation Of Plant Status:    CHECK Cold Leg Recirculation capability:    Train A:    CHECK the following pumps  AVAILABLE    RHR Pump A    ANY CCW Pump    ANY two SW Pumps    CHECK the following valves  AVAILABLE    SI860A, CV SUMP TO RHR    SI861A, CV SUMP TO RHR    SI862A, RWST TO RHR Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 52 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CC749A, CCW FROM RHR HX    Train B:    CHECK the following pumps  AVAILABLE    RHR Pump B    ANY CCW Pump    ANY two SW Pumps    CHECK the following valves  AVAILABLE    SI860B, CV SUMP TO RHR    SI861B, CV SUMP TO RHR    SI862B, RWST TO RHR    CC749B, CCW FROM RHR HX    CHECK Auxiliary Building Conditions  NORMAL    R3, PASS PANEL AREA    R4, CHARGING PUMP ROOM    R6, SAMPLING ROOM    RI14C, Plant Effluent NGLO    LI615A, RHR PIT "A" LEVEL INDICATOR    LI615B, RHR PIT "B" LEVEL INDICATOR    Aux Bldg Sump Tank "A" level    Aux Bldg Sump Tank "B" level    OBTAIN samples:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 53 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CONTACT Chemistry to obtain the following samples: NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/Chemistry to address the sampling requirements. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/Chemistry. RCS boron concentration    RCS activity    CV atmosphere    CONSULT Plant Operations Staff as necessary to assess additional sampling requirements for fuel damage NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/Plant Management to address the sampling requirements. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/ Plant Management. EVALUATE plant equipment to support long term recovery:    RHR Pumps    SI Pumps    CV Spray Pumps    CV Fans    AFW Pumps    SW System    CCW System    IVSW System    EDG Fuel and Auxiliaries    START additional plant equipment to assist in recovery as necessary:    Aux Boiler NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO to start the Aux Boiler. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 54 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Other plant equipment needed during RCS cooldown to Cold Shutdown      RO (Step 17) CHECK If RCS Cooldown AND Depressurization Is Required:    CHECK RCS pressure  GREATER THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG] NOTE: Adverse Containment Numbers will be required.      RO (Step 17.a RNO) IF RHR Pump flow is GREATER THAN 1500 gpm, THEN ... IF RHR Pump flow is LESS THAN 1500 gpm, THEN PERFORM the following:    RESET SPDS. GO TO EOPES1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown And Depressurization, Step 1. Examiner NOTE: If the CRS enters FRP-J.1, continue HERE. FRP-J.1, RESPONSE TO HIGH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE      CRS (Step 1) CHECK CV Spray Operation  CONTROLLED BY EOPECA1.1, Loss Of Emergency Coolant Recirculation      CRS (Step 1 RNO) GO TO Step 2.      RO (Step 2.a) CHECK Containment Spray Status: NOTE:  The "A" CV Spray Pump has no power. CHECK CV Spray pumps  BOTH RUNNING      RO (Step 2.a RNO) PERFORM the following:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 55 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    ENSURE CV Spray Pump Inlet Valves are OPEN:    SI844A    SI844B    Manually START CV Spray Pump(s). NOTE:  The "A" CV Spray Pump has no power.      RO (Step 2.b.1) CHECK CV Spray System  PROPER VALVE ALIGNMENT    CHECK CV Spray Pump Discharge valves  OPEN    SI880A NOTE:  SI-880A and B may be opened, however the "A" CV Spray Pump has no power. SI880B NOTE:  If the crew attempts to close SI-880A and B due the "A" CV Spray Pump not running, the valves will not close until CV Spray and Phase B CV Isolation is reset. SI880C NOTE:  SI-880C and D have failed to Auto Open. SI880D      RO (Step 2.b.1 RNO) Manually OPEN valve(s) as necessary.      RO (Step 2.b.2) CHECK CV Spray Additive Tank Discharge Valves  OPEN    SI845A    SI845B      RO (Step 2.b.3) CHECK Spray Additive Tank flow  APPROXIMATELY 12 GPM Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 56 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 2.b.3 RNO) IF Spray Additive Tank level is GREATER THAN 0%, THEN ADJUST SI845C, SAT THROTTLING VALVE, as necessary. NOTE:  SI-845C will be adjusted such that flow is 12 gpm. Critical Task:  Manually actuate at least one CV Spray Train before Transitioning to EOP-ES-1.2  Safety Significance:  Failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment under the postulated conditions demonstrates the inability of the crew to "recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. In this case, the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment can be manually actuated from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent (degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity). Additionally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment (when it is possible to do so) results in a failure to prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. Examiner NOTE: An Orange/Red Path may occur on RCS Integrity causing the CRS to transition to FRP-P.1. If so, and all Critical Tasks have been completed, terminate the exam. RO (Step 2.c) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase B Valves  CLOSED NOTE:  Some valves will NOT have power.      RO (Step 2.c RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as necessary. NOTE: The RO may dispatch an AO to locally check the position of the "A" Train valves. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 57 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    IF ANY Containment Isolation Phase B valve can NOT be closed, THEN locally ISOLATE AFFECTED penetration outside Containment while CONTINUING WITH this procedure.      RO (Step 2.d) STOP ALL RCPs      RO (Step 3) MONITOR Spray Additive Tank level  GREATER THAN 0%      BOP (Step 4) CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves  CLOSE NOTE: depending on the timing of mitigation actions, the MSIVs may be open or closed. If the MSIVs are OPEN, the BOP will perform the Step 4 RNO.      BOP (Step 4 RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as necessary.      RO (Step 5) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A Valves  CLOSED NOTE:  Some valves will NOT have power to CLOSE, however all CV penetrations will either be isolated, or in the process of being isolated from the performance of Attachment 1 of EOP-E-0.      RO (Step 5 RNO) IF valve(s) are NOT CLOSED AND associated flow path(s) are NOT necessary, THEN manually CLOSE AFFECTED valve(s). IF AFFECTED valve(s) can NOT be CLOSED, THEN locally ISOLATE affected penetration outside Containment while CONTINUING WITH this procedure.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 58 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 6) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation  VALVES CLOSED NOTE:  Some valves will NOT have power.      BOP (Step 6 RNO) DEPRESS H.V. OFF on R11 OR R12 to initiate Containment Ventilation Isolation. IF ANY Containment Ventilation Isolation Valve does NOT CLOSE, THEN manually OR locally ISOLATE AFFECTED penetration outside Containment while CONTINUING WITH this procedure. NOTE: The BOP may dispatch an AO to locally check the position of the "A" Train valves. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.      RO (Step 7) CHECK CV Recirculation Fans  ALL RUNNING NOTE: The "A' Train HVH Fans do not have power.      RO (Step 7 RNO) Manually START fan(s) as necessary.      BOP (Step 8) CHECK If Feed Flow Should Be Isolated To ANY S/G:    CHECK pressures in ALL S/Gs:    ANY S/G pressure lowering in an uncontrolled manner    OR    ANY S/G completely depressurized      CRS (Step 8 RNO) GO TO Step 9.      CRS (Step 9) PERFORM The Following:    RESET SPDS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 59 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    RETURN TO Procedure AND Step In Effect Examiner NOTE: The CRS will transition back to EOP-E-1 (Go to step that was in effect at the time that FRP-J.1 was entered). At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.
NRC SCENARIO N16 1-2 TURNOVER SHEET  1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life: BOL b) Reactor Power: 75% c) Turbine Load: 543 MWe  d) Boron Concentration: 1248 ppm e) Rod Height: 177 CB 'D' f) RCS Pressure: 2235 psig g) PZR Level: 44.2%  h) Xenon: Equilibrium  2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. # Description None    3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) The "A" SI Pump is OOS. The "B" SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. b) The "C" Charging Pump is also OOS. 4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a) None 5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a) "A" Charging Pump b) "B" Charging Pump  6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a) LI-928, "C" SI Accumulator Level, is OOS (I&C Investigating). b) RTGB Annunciator APP-009-C3, "AIR SIDE SEAL OIL BU PMP OVLD," has failed to the EXTINGUISHED (i.e. OFF) condition (I&C is investigating). 7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a) Unrestricted 8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a) Raise power to 100% in accordance with Reactivity Plan 9. TURNOVER INFORMATION  a) The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. 10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a) The Reactor Engineer (RE) will be available in the Control Room b) The RE recommends a 2100 gallon dilution, made in several 200-300 gallon batch dilutions using Section 8.2.7, RCS Quick Dilution Checklist, of OP-301. c) The RE recommends that Control Bank D be approximately 200 steps upon achieving 100% power 11. RISK  a) Yellow (Planned Power Increase) 
 
PROGRAM: H B Robinson Operations Training  MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam    Scenario N16-1-3   
 
==REFERENCES:==
: 1. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4, "Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System" (Amendment 203) 2. AOP-024, "Loss of Instrument Bus" (Rev 41) 3. Technical Specification LCO 3.8.7, "AC Instrument Bus Sources - Operating" (Amendment 176) 4. Technical Specification LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution System - Operating" (Amendment 176) 5. AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction" (Rev 33) 6. AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure" (Rev 24) 7. OWP-026, "Feed Flow (FWF)" (Rev 14) 8. AOP-038, "Rapid Downpower" (Rev 3) 9. APP-001 "Miscellaneous NSSS" (Rev 60) 10. AOP-019, "Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control" (Rev 20) 11. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.4, "Remote Shutdown System" (Amendment 203) 12. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, "RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure From Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits" (Amendment 176) 13. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11, "Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORVs)" (Amendment 203) 14. EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection"  (Rev 6) 15. EOP-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response" (Rev 7) 16. CSFST, "Critical Safety Function Status Trees" (Rev 7) 17. FRP-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink" (Rev 29) 18. OP-402, "Auxiliary Feedwater System" (Rev 96)
Validation Time: 92 minutes 
 
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3  Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners:  Operators: (SRO)    (RO)    (BOP)  Initial Conditions: The plant is at 68% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The SDAFW Pump is OOS, and has been for 7 days. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION C has just been entered. Maintenance reports that this pump will be OPERABLE in 2 hours, and station management has directed that the initiation of the shutdown be delayed 2 hours. TI-471, PRT Temperature is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-008-C3, "EMERG OIL PMP OVLD," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).              Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*  Event Description  1 1 C-RO C-BOP C(TS)-SRO Loss of Instrument Bus 3 2 2 I-BOP I-SRO "B" Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW 3  NA R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Load Decrease 4 3  C-RO C-SRO Letdown Line Pressure Control Valve Controller fails CLOSED 5 4 I-RO I(TS)-SRO PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE 6 5 M-RO M-BOP M-SRO Inadvertent FWIS 7 6 C-BOP Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate 8 7 NA "A" & "B" MDAFW Pump Trip  * (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,    (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3  H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #3  The plant is at 68% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The SDAFW Pump is OOS, and has been for 7 days. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION C has just been entered. Maintenance reports that this pump will be OPERABLE in 2 hours, and station management has directed that the initiation of the shutdown be delayed 2 hours. TI-471, PRT Temperature is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-008-C3, "EMERG OIL PMP OVLD," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).                                Shortly after taking the watch, Instrument Bus 3 will de-energize. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-024, "Loss of Instrument Bus," and restore power to the Bus. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.8.7, "AC Instrument Bus Sources - Operating," and Technical Specification LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems-Operating."  Following this, the controlling feed flow channel for S/G "B", FT-487, will fail LOW, causing FRV-498 to start to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction," and/or AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure."  The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-026, "Feed Flow (FWF)."  Next, the WCCS will call and inform the operator that it has been determined that the SDAFW Pump will not be restored to OPERABLE status within the next two hours as expected, and that station management has directed that the plant be brought to Mode 3 within the next four hours using AOP-038, "Rapid Downpower."    During the downpower, the Letdown Pressure Control Valve (PCV-145) controller will fail such that the valve will fail closed. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-D6, LP LTDN LN HI PRESS, and ultimately take manual control of the valve.
Shortly afterwards, PZR Pressure transmitter PT-444 will fail HIGH causing the Pzr Spray valves and Pzr PORV to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-019, "Malfunction of RCS pressure Control," and/or AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure."  RCS pressure control will remain in MANUAL for the remainder of the scenario. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.4, "Remote Shutdown System," Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, "RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits," and Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11, "Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)."    After the Pressure Transmitter has been removed from service, an inadvertent FWIS will occur. Simultaneously with the Rx Trip, the Turbine will fail to TRIP, the Governor Valves will fail to CLOSE manually, and the Main Steamline Isolation signal will fail to auto actuate. The operator will be required to manually CLOSE the MSIVs. Additionally the "A" and "B" MDAFW Pumps will trip immediately after auto start. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."
Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response." However, this transition will be delayed due to a RED condition on the Heat Sink CSF. The operator will perform FRP-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink."  The Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3  operator will direct that AFW Pump "C" be placed in service in accordance with OP-402, "Auxiliary Feedwater System," however, the AFW Pump "C" Diesel will fail to start. The scenario will terminate at Step 7 RNO 2.b of FRP-H.1, after the operator has restored feedwater flow from the Main Feedwater System.
Critical Tasks:  Manually control "B" S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level. Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the "B" S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control. Manually close the OPEN Pzr Spray Valve(s) and the Block Valve for the Stuck Open PORV before the Reactor trips based on low pressurizer pressure. Safety Significance: failure to close the Spray Valves/PORV Block Valve and stop the pressure transient, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the pressure transient. A failure to stabilize the pressure transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS pressure control.
Manually Close the MSIVs Before an ORANGE Path Challenge Develops to Either the Subcriticality or the Integrity CSF or Before Transition to ECA-2.1, Whichever Happens First (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to trip the main turbine under the postulated plant conditions causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, such an omission constitutes a failure by the operator to "demonstrate the ability to take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety. The situation described in the plant conditions is effectively a large steamline break downstream of the MSIVs. This "effective steamline break" is also located downstream of the main turbine stop valves, which cannot be closed by manually tripping the turbine. Failure to perform the critical task results in uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs and in uncontrolled cooldown of the RCS, both of which are unnecessary. Establish Feedwater Flow Into at Least One S/G Before RCS Bleed and Feed is Required (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to establish feedwater flow to any SG results in the operator's having to rely upon the lower-priority action of establishing RCS bleed and feed to minimize core uncovery. This constitutes incorrect performance that fails to prevent degradation of any barrier to fission product release.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3  SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS              Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  Sim. Setup Reset to Temp IC 610  T = 0 Malfunctions:  SDAFW Pump OOS:  irf EPSMCC5_189 f: RACK_OUT (V1-8A, A S/G supply to SDAFW)  irf EPSMCC6_226 f: RACK_OUT (V1-8B, B S/G supply to SDAFW)  irf EPSMCC6_227 f: RACK_OUT (V1-8C, C S/G supply to SDAFW)  irf EPSMCC10_262 f: RACK_OUT (V2-14A, SDAFW discharge to A S/G)  irf EPSMCC9_254 f: RACK_OUT (V2-14B, SDAFW discharge to B S/G)  irf EPSMCC10_267 f: RACK_OUT (V2-14C, SDAFW discharge to C S/G)  PLACE RED CAPS on the RTGB Control Switches for the Valves ABOVE Place GREEN CAPS on the RTGB Control Switches BELOW (See OMM-048, Attachment 9):  A MDAFW RTGB Switch  B MDAFW RTGB Switch  AFW Valve V2-16A RTGB Switch  AFW Valve V2-16B RTGB Switch  AFW Valve V2-16C RTGB Switch  AFW Valve V2-20A RTGB Switch  AFW Valve V2-20B RTGB Switch  Protected Switchyard TI-471 PRT Temperature indication OOS  IOR aoPRTAOD30A f:50 Place WHITE DOT on TI-471 RTGB Annunciator APP-008-C3 failed on  IMF ANNXN08C03 f:ALARM_ON Place WHITE DOT on APP-008-C3  Insert the following:  IMF TUR02A (Turbine fails to AUTO Trip)  IMF TUR02B (Turbine fails to AUTO Trip)  IMF TUR02C (Turbine fails to AUTO Trip)  $006_RTA_TRIP IOR diTUREHI029 f:AS-IS (Turbine Fails to Runback on Reactor Trip)  IRF SGN023 f:NO_AUTO (Auto MSI Fails)  IRF SGN024 f:NO_AUTO (Auto MSI Fails)  IRF SGN025 f:NO_AUTO (Auto MSI Fails)  $006_RTA_TRIP IMF CFW1A d:45 (A MDAFW Pump Trips after Auto Start)  $006_RTA_TRIP IMF CFW1B d:45 (B MDAFW Pump Trips after Auto Start)  Place the Simulator in RUN and ACKNOWLEDGE all alarms. Perform Attachment 2 (Simulator Setup For Exams) of TAP-411.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3    Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  Crew Briefing  1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements  2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew. 3. Provide the crew with the following:  OST-947, Operations Reactivity Plan  Copy of Technical Specifications/Basis  4. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms. T-0 Begin Familiarization Period  At direction of examiner Execute Lesson Plan for Simulator Scenario N16-1-3. At direction of examiner  Event 1  IRF EPSIB3_600 f:OPEN  Loss of Instrument Bus 3 At direction of examiner  Event 2 ICO CFWXMTFT_487 r:00:30 f:0  "B" Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW  At direction of examiner Event 3  NA Load Decrease  NOTE: to initiate this event, the WCCS will call and inform the operator that "It has been determined that the SDAFW Pump will not be restored to OPERABLE status within the next two hours as expected, and that station management has directed that the plant be brought to Mode 3 within the next four hours using AOP-038, "Rapid Downpower."  At direction of examiner  Event 4 IMF CVC07 r:2:00 f:100 IOR aoCVCAAD046A r:2:00 f:100 $006_PCV-145_MAN DMF CVC07 $006_PCV-145_MAN DOR aoCVCAAD046A  Letdown Line Pressure Control Valve Controller fails CLOSED Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3    Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  At direction of examiner Event 5  ICO RPSXMTPT_444 r:01:00 f:2500  IMF PRS03D f:10 when $006_PCV-455C_OPEN  PZR Pressure transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE At direction of examiner Event 6 IMF CFW20A c:20 IMF CFW20B c:20 IMF CFW20C c:20 Inadvertent FWIS    Post-Rx Trip  Event 7  Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate  NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0  Post-Rx Trip  Event 8  A & B MDAFW Pump Trip NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0      Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page  9 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Instrument Bus 3      Shortly after taking the watch, Instrument Bus 3 will de-energize. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-024, "Loss of Instrument Bus," and restore power to the Bus. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.8.7, "AC Instrument Bus Sources - Operating," and Technical Specification LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems-Operating." Booth Operator Instructions:    IRF EPSIB3_600    f:OPEN  Indications Available:    "C" Feed Regulating Valve Controller in MANUAL  FR-498 Stem/Feed Flow Recorder for "C" S/G is de-energized  Bistable Panel "A" is de-energized  PT-445, Pzr Pressure has failed LOW  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    AOP-024, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT BUS      BOP (Step 1) Place The Main Turbine in Manual Immediate Action      BOP (Step 2) Verify S/G(s) Maintained At Program Level Immediate Action      RO (Step 3) Place Rods in M (Manual) Immediate Action      RO (Step 4) Maintain Reactor Power Less Than OR Equal To 100%      RO (Step 5) Determine If RCS Makeup Needs To Be Stopped:    Check Auto Makeup, Boration OR Dilution  IN PROGRESS    OR    Check Instrument Bus 2 AND Instrument Bus 7  DEENERGIZED      RO (Step 5 RNO) IF Auto Makeup is received, THEN Check Auto Makeup, Boration Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page  10 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Instrument Bus 3      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS  Go To Step 7      RO (Step 7) Control PZR Heaters And Sprays To Restore RCS Pressure To The Desired Control Band      CRS (Step 8) Make PA Announcement For Procedure Entry NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      RO (Step 9) Control Charging And Letdown Flow To Maintain PZR Level      RO (Step 10) Check RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 GPM and 13 GPM      BOP (Step 11) Determine Failed Instrument Bus (IB) From Any Of The Following:    Available indications    OR    Table Below    3, FR-498, "C" S/G Level      BOP (Step 12) Check Emergency Busses E1 AND E2  ENERGIZED FROM THE 4160V  BUSSES      RO/ BOP (Step 13) Check Affected Instrument Bus  ENERGIZED      CRS (Step 13 RNO) WHEN affected Instrument Bus is Energized, THEN observe the NOTE prior to Step 14 and perform Step 14 NOTE: Step 14 will be performed when power to IB-3 is restored. CRS  Go To Step 15.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page  11 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Instrument Bus 3      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Note prior to Step 14) When a manual/auto control station is reenergized, 15 to 20 sec. is needed for the AUTO light to go out and the manual/auto station to revert to the manual mode.      BOP (Step 14) Restore Affected Controllers On The RTGB To AUTO Mode As Follows: NOTE: This step will be performed AFTER IB-3 is re-energized. Check the affected controller REVERTED TO MANUAL    Depress and release the AUTO pushbutton on the affected controller. NOTE: The BOP may need to manually control S/G levels, and the RO/BOP will need to reset the Steam Dump controller.      RO (Step 15) Check LCV460A & B, LTDN LINE STOP  CLOSED      CRS (Step 15 RNO) IF Instrument Bus 9 is Failed, THEN Go To Step 16. NOTE: Instrument Bus 9 is energized. Observe the NOTE prior to Step 19 and Go To Step 19.      RO/ BOP (Step 19) Check Affected Instrument Bus  ENERGIZED      RO/ BOP (Step 19 RNO) Locally perform the applicable step below:  NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the IB-3 Feeder breaker was tripped inadvertently due to Building Maintenance personnel cleaning in the area. IB1 through IB4 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page  12 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Instrument Bus 3      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    IF the cause is known OR NOT a fault OR suspected damage, THEN attempt to reset and close the open NOTE: The CRS will direct the AO to attempt to re-close the IB-3 Feeder Breaker. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, use: IRF EPSIB3_600 f:CLOSE and report after 1 minute that the IB-3 is re-energized.      BOP (Step 20) Stop All Radioactive Batch Releases      CRS (Step 21) Check Status Of Local Actions:    Check Local Actions Of Step 19 RNO  REQUIRED    Check Local Actions Of Step 19 RNO  ATTEMPTED      RO/ BOP (Step 22) Check Affected Instrument Bus  ENERGIZED NOTE:  IB-3 is energized.      RO (Step 23) Restore RCS Makeup Control To AUTO    Place the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Switch in STOP    Verify the RCS MAKEUP MODE Switch in AUTO    Momentarily place the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Switch to START      RO (Step 24) Restore Rod Control To Automatic As Follows:    Check Power  GREATER THAN 15%    Check Automatic Rod Control  AVAILABLE    Check Tavg  WITHIN 1.5 TO +1.5&deg;F OF TREF Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page  13 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Instrument Bus 3      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Place the Rod Control Selector Switch to A (Automatic)      BOP (Step 25) Check Emergency Busses E1 AND E2  ENERGIZED      BOP (Step 26) Check Emergency Busses E1 AND E2  ENERGIZED FROM THEIR 4160V BUSSES      CRS (Step 27) Implement The EALs NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.      RO/ BOP (Step 28) Check Status Of Instrument Bus 4  ENERGIZED:      BOP (Step 29) Place Turbine Controls In Automatic      RO (Step 30) Determine CCW Pump Status As Follows:    Check CCW Pumps  MORE THAN ONE RUNNING    Check CCW Pumps  MORE THAN ONE REQUIRED    Stop CCW Pumps as necessary using OP306 Section, Operating CCW Pumps, to obtain desired CCW pump status      BOP (Step 31) Check RMS1, RMS2, RMS3, AND RMS4  ALL OPEN Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page  14 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Instrument Bus 3      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 32) Check Affected Instrument Bus  ENERGIZED      RO (Step 33) Check PZR Heater Status  DEENERGIZED      RO (Step 33 RNO) Go To Step 35.      RO (Step 35) Check Normal Letdown  ISOLATED      CRS (Step 35 RNO) Go To Step 37.      BOP (Step 37) Check All Radiation Monitor Alarms  EXTINGUISHED NOTE:  The BOP may implement AOP-005 as time permits, and affect whether or not the RNO is performed.      BOP (Step 37 RNO) Reset Radiation Monitor alarms that are illuminated due to loss of Instrument Bus as follows:    For RMS 1112, 1518, OR 2031, momentarily depress ALARM/RESET Pushbutton. For RMS 19 OR 33, momentarily depress the RESET Pushbutton.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page  15 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Instrument Bus 3      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    For RMS 14 OR 19, contact E&C personnel to reset the monitor(s). NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/Chemistry to address resetting R-14s. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/Chemistry and use: IRF RMS067 f:RESET IRF RMS068 f:RESET IRF RMS069 f:RESET And report that the R-14 monitors have been reset. For RMS32, momentarily depress SAFE/RESET Pushbutton.      BOP (Step 38) Check R11 OR R12  IN SERVICE    RMS1, RMS2, RMS3, and RMS4  OPEN    AND    R11 and R12 Vacuum Pump Operating      BOP (Step 39) Check R20, Fuel Handling Bldg Lower Level Low Range  IN SERVICE      BOP (Step 40) Check R21, Fuel Handling Bldg Upper Level  IN SERVICE      BOP (Step 41) Check Control Room Ventilation  ALIGNED FOR PRESSURIZATION MODE      CRS (Step 41 RNO) Go To Step 43.        RO (Step 43) Check PZR PRV Safety Acoustic Monitor Lights  ILLUMINATED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page  16 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Instrument Bus 3      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      CRS (Step 43 RNO) Go To Step 45.      RO/ BOP (Step 45) Check Instrument Busses 1, 2, 3, AND 4  ENERGIZED FROM THEIR NORMAL SOURCE (As Indicated Below):    IB1: MCC5 (Via E1)    IB2: INVERTER A    IB3: INVERTER B    IB4: MCC6      BOP (Step 46) Check Status of EDGs  START SIGNAL RECEIVED      CRS (Step 46 RNO) Observe the NOTE prior to Step 65 and Go To Step 65.      BOP (Step 65) Check ALL Safety Related Electrical Buses  ENERGIZED      CRS (Step 66) Check Technical Specifications For Applicable LCOs NOTE:  The CRS will address the Technical Specifications. ITS LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources  Operating    ITS LCO 3.8.7, AC Instrument Bus Sources  Operating    ITS LCO 3.8.9, Distribution Systems  Operating      RO (Step 67) Check Annunciator APP005A3, PR DROP ROD  ILLUMINATED      RO (Step 68) Reset Dropped Rod Alarm By Performing The Following:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page  17 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Instrument Bus 3      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Place DROPPED ROD MODE switch for the affected Power Range Drawer to RESET Position    Place DROPPED ROD MODE switch for the affected Power Range Drawer to NORMAL Position    Check Annunciator APP005A3, PR DROP ROD  EXTINGUISHED      RO (Step 69) Check APP006F5, STEAM DUMP ARMED  ILLUMINATED      CRS (Step 69 RNO) Go To Step 71      RO (Step 71) Check APP005F5, AMSAC TROUB/BYPD  ILLUMINATED      BOP (Step 72) Reset AMSAC TROUB/BYPD Alarm By Depressing The SYSTEM RESET Pushbutton On AMSAC Front Panel. NOTE:  The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor use: IRF RPS005 f:RESET      (Step 73) Return To Procedure And Step In Effect      TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.7, AC INSTRUMENT BUS SOURCES - OPERATING      CRS LCO 3.8.7 The following AC Instrument Bus Power Sources shall be OPERABLE:  Inverters A and B, and  Constant Voltage Transformers (CVT) 1 and 2.      CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page  18 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Instrument Bus 3      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS ACTIONS        CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION A.1 is required (When Inverter is NOT powering IB-3). A. One AC Instrument Bus power source inoperable. NOTE: Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems - Operating" with any instrument bus de-energized. A.1 Restore AC Instrument Bus Power Source to OPERABLE status. 24 hours      TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.9, DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS - OPERATING      CRS LCO 3.8.9 Train A and Train B AC, DC, and AC instrument bus electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE.      CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.      CRS ACTIONS        CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION B.1 is required (When IB-3 is de-energized). B. One AC instrument bus subsystem inoperable. B.1 Restore AC instrument bus subsystem to OPERABLE status. 2 hours AND 16 hour from discovery of failure to meet LCO    At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page  19 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
"B" Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW      Following this, the controlling feed flow channel for S/G "B", FT-487, will fail LOW, causing FRV-498 to start to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction," and/or AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure."  The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-026, "Feed Flow (FWF)." Booth Operator Instructions:    ICO CFWXMTFT_487        r:00:30 f:0  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-006-B1, S/G B FW > STM FLOW  RTGB Annunciator APP-006-B2, S/G B STM > FW FLOW  "B" S/G Feed flow lower than Steam flow on FR-488  FRV-488 controller output at 100%  FRV-488 Red status light is LIT, Green status light is OFF  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    NOTE: It is likely that the CRS will place the Turbine in HOLD. Examiner Note: It is possible that the CRS will respond to the symptoms and enter AOP-010 first. However, the crew may recognize the failure and respond by entering AOP-025 first. If so, proceed to AOP-025 section below. AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION    NOTE: The BOP will take Immediate Actions to control FCV-488 in MANUAL prior to procedure implementation. BOP (Step 1) CHECK FRVs  OPERATING PROPERLY (MANUAL OR AUTO): Immediate Action  NOTE: The BOP will control FCV-488 in MANUAL. FCV478    FCV488    FCV498 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page  20 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
"B" Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      BOP (Step 1 RNO) PERFORM the following: Immediate Action    ENSURE FRV for affected S/G(s) in manual control. ATTEMPT to stabilize S/G level using FRV and/or FRV Bypass Valves by matching steam flow with feed flow. STOP any load change in progress. If unable to control S/G level, THEN-..      Critical Task:  Manually control "B" S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level. Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the "B" S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.      RO/ BOP (Step 2) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint  BEING APPROACHED      CRS (Step 2 RNO) IF a Reactor Trip Setpoint is approached, THEN-. GO TO Step 4.      RO (Step 4) CHECK Reactor Power  LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%      CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page  21 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
"B" Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Step 6) GO TO Appropriate Step From Table Below:    FRV Failure To Control - OBSERVE NOTE 58      BOP (Step 58) CHECK S/G Level  AT OR TRENDING TO PROGRAM NOTE: The CRS will likely transition to AOP-025 based on the Note prior to Step 58. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE    NOTE: The BOP will take Immediate Actions to control FCV-488 in MANUAL prior to procedure implementation. CRS (Step 1) GO TO Appropriate Section For Failed Instrument: NOTE: The CRS will select Section D of AOP-025. S/G Feed Flow (FT-487) - SECTION D        (Step 2) IMPLEMENT EALs NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.      (Step 3) RETURN TO Procedure and Step in Effect      AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION D, S/G FEED FLOW, STEAM FLOW OR STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE      BOP (Step 1) CHECK Affected FRV In MAN: Immediate Action  NOTE: The BOP will control FCV-488 in MANUAL. FCV488 (FRV "B")
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page  22 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
"B" Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 1 RNO) PLACE affected FRV in manual. Immediate Action      BOP (Step 2) RESTORE Affected S/G Level To Program Immediate Action    Critical Task:  Manually control "B" S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level. Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the "B" S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.      BOP (Step 3) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint  BEING APPROACHED      CRS (Step 3 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is approached, THEN TRIP the reactor, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. GO TO Step 5.      CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using PA System NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      BOP (Step 6) CHECK Failure  FEED FLOW INSTRUMENT FAILURE      CRS (Step 7) PLACE Affected S/G Feed Flow Selector Switch to the Alternate Channel:    S/G "B" FEED FLOW - FR-488 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page  23 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
"B" Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Failed Channel FT-487 - Position CH486      BOP (Step 8) RESTORE Affected Controller to Automatic:    CHECK S/G level - WITHIN +/-1% OF PROGRAMMED LEVEL NOTE:  The BOP may not have S/G level at programmed, and perform the RNO (Placing affected controller in AUTO when at programmed level). PLACE affected controller in AUTO.      BOP (Step 9) REMOVE Affected Transmitter from Servicing Using OWP-026: NOTE:  The CRS will address OWP-026. CHANNEL FT-487 - OWP FWF-4      OWP-026, FEEDWATER FLOW (FWF) FWF-4, STEAM GENERATOR "B" FEEDWATER FLOW TRANSMITTER FT-487      CRS Address FWF-4      BOP FR-488 FEEDWATER FLOW SELECTOR SWITCH - Selected to 486      BOP DELETE INPUT FT-487 FROM CALO PROCESSING. (FWF0424A)    NOTE:  The CRS will return to AOP-025, Section D. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION D, S/G FEED FLOW, STEAM FLOW OR STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE      BOP (Step 10) REVIEW TS LCOs for applicability:    TS LCO 3.3.1    TS LCO 3.3.2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page  24 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
"B" Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      CRS (Step 11) GO TO Procedure Main Body, Step 2    NOTE:  The CRS will return to the main body of AOP-025. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE      CRS (Step 2) IMPLEMENT EALs NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.      CRS  (Step 3) RETURN TO Procedure And Step In Effect NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page  25 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Load Decrease      Next, the WCCS will call and inform the operator that it has been determined that the SDAFW Pump will not be restored to OPERABLE status within the next two hours as expected, and that station management has directed that the plant be brought to Mode 3 within the next four hours using AOP-038, "Rapid Downpower." Booth Operator Instructions:    Call as the WCCS and state "It has been determined that the SDAFW Pump will not be restored to OPERABLE status within the next two hours as expected, and station management has directed that the plant be brought to Mode 3 within the next four hours using AOP-038, "Rapid Downpower.""  Indications Available:  NA  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER      BOP (Step 1) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using The Plant Page System      RO (Step 2) DETERMINE Corrected Boration And Target Rod Height For Target Power Level Using Most Recently Performed OST947, OPERATIONS REACTIVITY PLAN    Target Load Reduction Rate __%/min    Target Power Level ___    Target Rod Height ___ NOTE: The RO will determine approximately 130 Steps. Corrected Boration ___ NOTE: The RO will determine approximately 350 gallons.      RO (Step 3) CHECK Required Power Reduction Rate  LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 5%/MINUTE      CRS (Step 4) PERFORM Brief Of Control Room Personnel To Include The Following:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page  26 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Load Decrease      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Reason for downpower    Target Power Level    Target Rod Height    Rate of load reduction    Amount of boric acid addition      RO (Step 5) ENERGIZE All Available PZR Heaters    PZR HTR CONTROL GROUP    PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP A    PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP B      RO (Step 6) CHECK Rod Control  IN AUTO      RO (Step 7) INITIATE Boration Using Attachment 1, RCS Boration, While Continuing With This Procedure    Examiner NOTE:  The CRS will assign the RO to perform this action. RO Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1. Other Examiners follow AOP-038 Actions, Step 8, on Page 27. AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER ATTACHMENT 1, RCS BORATION      RO (Step 1) PLACE The RCS MAKEUP MODE Selector Switch In BORATE      RO (Step 2) IF Frequent Boric Acid Transfer Pump Starts Are Anticipated, THEN PLACE Boric Acid Transfer Pump Switch Aligned To BLEND To ON.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page  27 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Load Decrease      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 3) SET YIC113, BORIC ACID TOTALIZER to amount determined in Main Body Step 2      RO (Step 4) Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to START      RO (Step 5) IF Boric Acid flow is NOT achieving the desired effect, THEN PLACE FCV113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, in MAN AND manually Adjust controller FCV113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, using the UP and DOWN pushbuttons      RO (Step 6) WHEN the desired amount of Boric Acid has been added to the RCS OR the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Switch is placed in STOP, THEN ENSURE the following:    FCV113A, BA TO BLENDER, closes. FCV113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, closes. IF in AUTO, THEN operating Boric Acid Pump stops. RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF.      AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER    Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/BOP continue HERE. BOP (Step 8) INITIATE Turbine Load Reduction While Continuing With This Procedure    CHECK EH Turbine Control  IN OPER AUTO    PREPARE For Turbine Load Reduction As Follows:    CHECK IMP IN  ILLUMINATED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page  28 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Load Decrease      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 8.b.1 RNO 1) IF Turbine Load reduction is available using IMP IN, THEN PERFORM the following:    DEPRESS IMP IN pushbutton    CHECK IMP IN light illuminated    CHECK IMP OUT light extinguished      BOP (Step 8.b) SET desired load in the SETTER    SELECT the desired Load Rate    DEPRESS the GO pushbutton to initiate Turbine Load reduction      BOP (Step 9) ADJUST Turbine Load To Control Tavg Within 5&deg;F Of Tref Using One Of The Following:    ADJUST Load Rate    OR    DEPRESS GO and HOLD pushbuttons      CRS/ BOP (Step 10) INITIATE Notification of The Following: NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM/WCC/Communicator to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge. Load Dispatcher of load reduction    E&C to control secondary chemistry    RC for elevated radiation levels in CV Pump Bays and Pipe Alley    Oncall Duty Manager to activate the Event Response Team    E&C for impending 15% power change for I131 sampling within 2 to 6 hours    E&C for impending power reduction greater than 20% terminate zinc injection Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page  29 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Load Decrease      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    NRC within 4 hours      BOP (Step 11) CHECK Auxiliary Boilers  AT LEAST ONE OPERATING      BOP (Step 11 RNO) IF Plant Shutdown is required, THEN NOTIFY AO to start at least one Auxiliary Boiler per OP401, AUXILIARY HEATING SYSTEM. NOTE: The BOP will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.      RO (Step 12) CHECK Tavg  WITHIN 5&deg;F OF Tref      RO (Step 13) CHECK Axial Flux Distribution  WITHIN TARGET BAND      BOP (Step 14) CHECK APP006F5, STEAM DUMP ARMED  EXTINGUISHED      RO (Step 15) CHECK Any Of The Following Conditions  MET:    Target load/power has been reached    Load reduction is no longer required    CRS/SM directs termination of load reduction    STOP Rapid Downpower using Attachment 3, Termination Of Rapid Downpower      At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page  30 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Letdown Line Pressure Control Valve Controller fails CLOSED      During the downpower, the Letdown Pressure Control Valve (PCV-145) controller will fail such that the valve will fail closed. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-D6, LP LTDN LN HI PRESS, and ultimately take manual control of the valve. Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF CVC07 r:2:00 f:100        IOR aoCVCAAD046A r:2:00 f:100        $006_PCV-145_MAN DMF CVC07        $006_PCV-145_MAN DOR aoCVCAAD046A Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-001-D6, LP LTDN LN HI PRESS  RTGB Annunciator APP-001-E6, LP LTDN RELIEF HI TEMP (Subesequent)  PCV-145 CLOSES  Normal Letdown flow indicates "0"  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    NOTE: It is likely that the CRS will place the Turbine in HOLD. APP-001-D6, LP LTDN LN HI PRESS      RO (Step 1) IF controller PC-145 has malfunctioned, THEN TAKE manual control of PC-145. NOTE: The RO will take Manual control of PC-145 and control letdown pressure manually.      RO (Step 2) IF PT-145 has failed, THEN -... NOTE: PT-145 has NOT failed.      RO (Step 3) IF PCV-145 failed, THEN --. NOTE: PCV-145 has NOT failed.      RO (Step 4) IF Letdown is required AND PCV-145 failed, THEN --. NOTE: PCV-145 has NOT failed.      RO (Step 5) IF too many orifices are in service, THEN --.      NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page  31 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE      Shortly afterwards, PZR Pressure transmitter PT-444 will fail HIGH causing the Pzr Spray valves and Pzr PORV to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-019, "Malfunction of RCS pressure Control," and/or AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure."  RCS pressure control will remain in MANUAL for the remainder of the scenario. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.4, "Remote Shutdown System," Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, "RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits," and Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11, "Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)." Booth Operator Instructions:    ICO RPSXMTPT_444          r:01:00 f:2500  IMF PRS03D f:10 when $006_PCV-455C_OPEN  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-003-C7, PZR PRESS CONTROLLER HI OUTPUT  Narrow Range Pressurizer Pressure rising on PR-444  Master Pressure controller PC-444J demand rising to 100%  Both Pressurizer Spray valves indicate fully OPEN  Pressurizer PORV PCV-455C Red status light is LIT  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    NOTE: It is likely that the CRS will place the Turbine in HOLD. Examiner Note: It is possible that the CRS will respond to the symptoms and enter AOP-019 first. However, the crew may recognize the failure and respond by entering AOP-025 first. If so, proceed to AOP-025 , Step 1, actions on Page 33. NOTE: The RO will likely take action, including closing the PORV Block before the CRS enters the procedure. AOP-019, MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE CONTROL Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page  32 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 1) CHECK Both LTOPP Arming Switches Selected to NORMAL Immediate Action      RO (Step 2) Determine If PZR PORVs should be closed: Immediate Action    Check PZR pressure - LESS THAN 2335 PSIG    ENSURE both PZR PORVs - CLOSED      RO (Step2b RNO) IF any PZR PORV can NOT be closed THEN close its PORV BLOCK Valve. Immediate Action NOTE: PCV-455C will OPEN in about 1 minute.      RO (Step 3) Control the Normal PZR Spray Valves AND PZR Heaters to Restore RCS Pressure to the desired control Band. Immediate Action      CRS (Step 4) Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      RO (Step 5) Check PZR Pressure - UNDER OPERATOR CONTROL      Critical Task:  Manually close the OPEN Pzr Spray Valve(s) and the Block Valve for the Stuck Open PORV before the Reactor trips based on low pressurizer pressure. Safety Significance: failure to close the Spray Valves/PORV Block Valve and stop the pressure transient, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the pressure transient. A failure to stabilize the pressure transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS pressure control.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page  33 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 6) Check Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter PT-444 OR PT-445 - FAILED.      CRS (Step 7) Go To AOP025, RTGB Instrument Failure NOTE: The CRS will transition to AOP-025. Examiner Note: If the CRS addresses AOP-025 rather than AOP-019, follow actions here. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE      CRS (Step 1) GO TO Appropriate Section For Failed Instrument:    PZR PRESSURE (PT-444) - Section C NOTE: The CRS will transition to Section C of AOP-025. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION C, PZR PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE      RO (Step 1) CHECK Both LTOPP Arming Switches - SELECTED TO NORMAL Immediate Action      RO (Step 2) DETERMINE If PZR PORVs should be closed: Immediate Action    CHECK PZR pressure - LESS THAN 2335 PSIG    CHECK both PZR PORVs CLOSED      RO (Step 2b RNO) IF any PZR PORV can NOT be closed, THEN CLOSE associated PORV BLOCK valve. Immediate Action  NOTE: The RO will have previously determined that PCV-455C has failed to CLOSE, and Close the Block Valve.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page  34 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 3) CONTROL PZR Heaters and Spray to restore RCS Pressure to desired Control Band Immediate Action      CRS (Step 4) NOTIFY Plant Personnel of Procedure Entry Using PA System NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      RO (Step 5) CHECK PT-445 - FAILED      RO (Step 5 RNO) PERFORM the following:    ENSURE PC-444J in MAN. ENSURE PZR SPRAY VALVEs are in AUTO. CONTROL PZR pressure with PC-444J.      Critical Task:  Manually close the OPEN Pzr Spray Valve(s) and the Block Valve for the Stuck Open PORV before the Reactor trips based on low pressurizer pressure. Safety Significance: failure to close the Spray Valves/PORV Block Valve and stop the pressure transient, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the pressure transient. A failure to stabilize the pressure transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS pressure control.      RO (Step 6) CHECK Selector Switch PM-444 - SELECTED TO THE OPERABLE CHANNEL    REC 445      RO (Step 6 RNO) SELECT operable channel Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page  35 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Step 7) REVIEW TS LCOs for applicability: NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/I&C to address the instrument failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/I&C. TS LCO 3.3.4    TS LCO 3.4.1    TS LCO 3.4.11      CRS (Step 8) GO TO Procedure Main Body, Step 2 NOTE:  The CRS will return to the main body of AOP-025. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE      CRS (Step 2) IMPLEMENT EALs NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.      CRS (Step 3) RETURN TO Procedure and Step in Effect    NOTE:  The CRS will address Technical Specifications. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.4, REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM      CRS LCO 3.3.4 The Remote Shutdown System Function shall be OPERABLE.      CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3. NOTE: The CRS will determine that only one Pressurizer Pressure instrument is required, and that the other channel is OPERABLE.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page  36 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1, RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE AND FLOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING (DNB) LIMITS      CRS LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for pressurizer pressure, RCS average temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be within the limits specified below:  Pressurizer Pressure 2205 psig      CRS APPLICABILITY: Mode 1      CRS ACTIONS        CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: If RCS pressure lowered to less than 2205 psig, the CRS will determine that ACTION A.1 is required. If so, the operator will likely gallons, followed by a flush of 15 gallons. A. One or more RCS DNB parameters not within limits. B. A.1 Restore RCS DNB parameter(s) to within limit. 2 hours    TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.11, PRESSURIZER POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES (PORVS)      CRS LCO 3.4.11 Each PORV and associated block valve shall be OPERABLE      CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.      CRS ACTIONS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page  37 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION B.1, B.2 and B.3 is required. C. One PORV inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled. B.1 Close associated block valve. AND  B.2 Remove power from associated bock valves. AND  B.3 Restore PORV to OPERABLE status. 1 hour 
 
1 hour 72 hours    NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, move to Events #6-8.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 38 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip      After the Pressure Transmitter has been removed from service, an inadvertent FWIS will occur. Simultaneously with the Rx Trip, the Turbine will fail to TRIP, the Governor Valves will fail to CLOSE manually, and the Main Steamline Isolation signal will fail to auto actuate. The operator will be required to manually CLOSE the MSIVs. Additionally the "A" and "B" MDAFW Pumps will trip immediately after auto start. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."  Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response." However, this transition will be delayed due to a RED condition on the Heat Sink CSF. The operator will perform FRP-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink."  The operator will direct that AFW Pump "C" be placed in service in accordance with OP-402, "Auxiliary Feedwater System," however, the AFW Pump "C" Diesel will fail to start. The scenario will terminate at Step 7 RNO 2.b of FRP-H.1, after the operator has restored feedwater flow from the Main Feedwater System. Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF CFW20A c:20 IMF CFW20B c:20 IMF CFW20C c:20  Indications Available:    All Feed Regulating Valves have CLOSED  The "A" and "B" Main Feedwater Pumps have tripped  The AFW Pumps have started  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION      RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action    Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers - OPEN    Rod position indicators - FULLY INSERTED    Rod Bottom Lights - ILLUMINATED    Neutron Flux - LOWERING      BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action    Both Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED      BOP (Step 2a RNO) Manually TRIP Turbine. Immediate Action Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 39 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    IF Turbine will NOT trip, THEN manually RUNBACK Turbine at maximum rate UNTIL ALL Governor valves are CLOSED. IF Turbine can NOT be runback, THEN manually CLOSE MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves.      BOP (Step 2.b) All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves - CLOSED      Critical Task:  Manually Close the MSIVs Before an ORANGE Path Challenge Develops to Either the Subcriticality or the Integrity CSF or Before Transition to ECA-2.1, Whichever Happens First  Safety Significance:  Failure to trip the main turbine under the postulated plant conditions causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, such an omission constitutes a failure by the operator to "demonstrate the ability to take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety. The situation described in the plant conditions is effectively a large steamline break downstream of the MSIVs. This "effective steamline break" is also located downstream of the main turbine stop valves, which cannot be closed by manually tripping the turbine. Failure to perform the critical task results in uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs and in uncontrolled cooldown of the RCS, both of which are unnecessary.      BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power to AC EMERGENCY BUSSES: Immediate Action    CHECK Bus E-1 OR E AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED    CHECK Bus E-1 AND E BOTH ENERGIZED      RO/ BOP (Step 4) CHECK SI Status: Immediate Action    CHECK if SI is actuated:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 40 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    SI annunciator - ANY ILLUMINATED    OR    SI equipment - AUTO STARTED        (Step 4a RNO) CHECK if SI is required: Immediate Action    PZR pressure LESS THAN 1715 PSIG    OR    Containment pressure GREATER THAN 4 PSIG    OR    Steam Line P bistables ILLUMINATED    OR    High Steam Flow with Low Tavg OR Low Steam Pressure bistables ILLUMINATED    IF SI is required, THEN manually ACUTATE BOTH Trains of SI. IF SI is NOT required, THEN PERFORM the following:    RESET SPDS AND INITIATE monitoring of Critical Safety Function Status Trees. GO TO EOP-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, Step 1. NOTE: The CRS will transition to FRP-H.1 due to the Red Path on Heat Sink. FRP-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK      RO/ BOP (Step 1) CHECK If Secondary Heat Sink is required:    CHECK RCS pressure - GREATER THAN ANY NON-FAULTED S/G PRESSURE    CHECK RCS Hot Leg temperatures - GREATER THAN 350&deg;F Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 41 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      RO/ BOP (Step 2) CHECK If RCS Bleed AND Feed is required:    CHECK S/G Wide Range level in ANY TWO S/Gs -LESS THAN 13% [16%]      CRS (Step 2a RNO) OBSERVE CAUTION prior to Step 3 AND GO TO Step 3.      BOP (Step 3) TRY to establish AFW Flow to at least one S/G:    CHECK S/G(s) Blowdown AND Blowdown Sample Valves - CLOSED    CHECK Control Room indications for cause of AFW failure:    CST level    Steam Driven AFW pump, Steam Shutoff valves    Motor Driven AFW pump    AFW valve alignment  BOP (Step 3.c) TRY to restore AFW flow:    CHECK CST level - AVAILABLE AND GREATER THAN 13%    CHECK Steam Driven AFW Pump - RUNNING NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO. The SDAFW Pump will NOT be restored. Provide cues as required.      BOP (Step 3.c.2 RNO) Manually OPEN Steam Driven AFW Pump Steam Shutoff valve(s):    V1-8A    V1-8B Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 42 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    V1-8C    If Steam Driven AFW Pump Steam Shutoff valves can NOT be opened manually, THEN locally OPEN valves while CONTINUING WITH this procedure.      BOP (Step 3.c.3) CHECK Motor Driven AFW Pump(s) - RUNNING      BOP (Step 3.c.3 RNO) IF power is available, THEN PERFORM the following:    RESET SI. IF SI will NOT RESET, THEN- NOTE: SI will RESET. PLACE available Motor Driven AFW Pump control switch(es) to STOP. START available Motor Driven AFW Pump(s). IF available Motor Driven AFW Pump(s) is NOT running, THEN DISPATCH Operator to perform Attachment 2, Local Start of Motor Driven AFW Pump. NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO. The MDAFW Pump will NOT be restored. Provide cues as required. IF pump(s) NOT available, THEN TRY to restore Motor Driven AFW Pump(s) while CONTINUING WITH this procedure.      BOP (Step 3.c.4) CHECK AFW Valves - PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT    AFW Header Discharge valves - FULL OPEN    AFW Header Section valves - FULL OPEN    Steam Driven AFW pump Discharge valves - FULL OPEN IF PUMP RUNNING Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 43 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      BOP (Step 3.c.5) CHECK total feed flow to S/Gs - GREATER THAN 300 GPM      CRS (Step 3.c.5 RNO) GO TO Step 3.c.7      CRS/BOP (Step 3.c.7) PLACE AFW Train C in service using OP-402, Auxiliary Feedwater System, Section titled Rapid Alignment of AFW Pump C as Directed by FRP-H.1 NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO. Wait 5 minutes and report that the Train C AFW Diesel Generator will NOT start.      BOP (Step 3.d) CHECK total feed flow to S/Gs - GREATER THAN 300 GPM      BOP (Step 3.d RNO) IF ANY feed flow to at least one S/G is verified, THEN-. CRS IF feed flow is NOT verified, THEN GO TO Step 4.      RO (Step 4) STOP ALL RCPs      RO (Step 5) ESTABLISH Instrument Air to CV:    CHECK APP-002-F7, INSTR AIR HDR LO PRESS alarm - EXTINGUISHED    RESET IA PCV-1716, INSTRUMENT AIR ISO TO CV    CHECK IA PCV-1716 - OPEN      BOP (Step 6) TRY to establish Main Feedwater Flow to at least one S/G:    CHECK Condensate System - IN SERVICE Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 44 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK Feed Reg Bypass Valves - OPEN    FCV-479    FCV-489    FCV-499      BOP (Step 6.b RNO) PERFORM the following:    RESET Feedwater Isolation:    RESET SI. NOTE: SI will RESET. IF SI will NOT RESET, THEN-    PLACE ALL Feedwater Isolation Key Switches to OVRD/RESET. OPEN Feed Reg Bypass Valves:    FCV-479    FCV-489    FCV-499      BOP (Step 6.c) ESTABLISH Main Feedwater flow:    CHECK FW HDR SECTION valves - CLOSED    V2-6A    V2-6B    V2-6C      BOP (Step 6.c.1 RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as necessary.      BOP (Step 6.c.2) START one Main Feedwater Pump    CHECK Feedwater Flow - ESTABLISHED TO AT LEAST ONE S/G Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 45 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      BOP (Step 7) CHECK S/G Levels:    CHECK S/G Narrow Range level in at least one S/G - GREATER THAN 9% [18%]      BOP (Step 7.a RNO) IF feed flow to at least on S/G is established, THEN PERFORM the following:    MAINTAIN feed flow to restore S/G Narrow Range level to GREATER THAN 9% [18%]. PERFORM the following:    RESET SPDS. RETURN TO procedure AND step in effect.      Critical Task:  Establish Feedwater Flow Into at Least One S/G Before RCS Bleed and Feed is Required  Safety Significance:  Failure to establish feedwater flow to any SG results in the operator's having to rely upon the lower-priority action of establishing RCS bleed and feed to minimize core uncovery. This constitutes incorrect performance that fails to prevent degradation of any barrier to fission product release. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.
NRC SCENARIO N16-1-3 TURNOVER SHEET  1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life: EOL b) Reactor Power: 68% for the past 13 hours c) Turbine Load: 502 MWe  d) Boron Concentration: 144 ppm e) Rod Height: 135 CB 'D' f) RCS Pressure: 2235 psig g) PZR Level: 41.8%  h) Xenon: Peak  2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. # Description LCO 3.7.4 Condition C  3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) The SDAFW Pump is OOS. Maintenance reports that this pump will be OPERABLE in 2 hours, and station management has directed that the initiation of the shutdown be delayed 2 hours. 4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a) None 5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a) "A" & "B" MDAFW pump 6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a) TI-471, PRT Temperature is OOS (I&C Investigating). b) RTGB Annunciator APP-008-C3, "EMERG OIL PMP OVLD," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). 7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a) PROTECTED 8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a) Maintain Steady-State conditions b) Monitor the completion of Maintenance of the SDAFW Pump 9. TURNOVER INFORMATION  a) The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. 10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a) IAW OST-947 data 11. RISK  a) GREEN 
 
PROGRAM: Robinson Operations Training  MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam    Scenario N16-1-4   
 
==REFERENCES:==
: 1. APP-003, "RCS & Makeup Systems" (Rev 54) 2. AOP-003, "Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control" (Rev 20) 3. OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power" (Rev 62) 4. OP-301, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)" (Rev 112) 5. APP-001, "Miscellaneous NSSS" (Rev 60) 6. AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure" (Rev 24) 7. OWP-025, "Steam Generator Pressure (SGP)" (Rev 15) 8. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation" (Amendment 176) 9. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.3, "Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation" (Amendment 203) 10. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, "Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation" (Amendment 176) 11. OWP-011, "Nuclear Instrumentation (NI)"  (Rev 24) 12. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation" (Amendment 176) 13. AOP-007, "Turbine Trip Below P-8" (Rev 16) 14. EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection"  (Rev 6) 15. CSFST, "Critical Safety Function Status Trees" (Rev 7) 16. FRP-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Power generation- ATWS" (Rev 22) 17. EOP-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation" (Rev 3) 18. FRP-P.1, "Response to  Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock" (Rev 19)  Validation Time: 105 minutes Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4  Facility: HB Robinson Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners:  Operators: (SRO)    (RO)    (BOP)  Initial Conditions: The plant is at 25% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "A" SI Pump is OOS. The "B" SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. PI-1616, SW North Header Pressure, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-007-C3, "FW PMP A LO FLOW TRIP," has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.              Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*  Event Description  1 1 C-RO C-SRO "A" Primary Water Pump trips during Dilution 2 NA R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Raise Power  3  2 C-RO C-SRO Letdown Temperature Controller TCV-144 fails CLOSED/Divert Valve TCV-143 Fails to DIVERT 4 3 I-BOP I(TS)-SRO Main Steam Line "C" Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW 5 4  N-BOP I(TS)-SRO Power Range NI-44 Upper Detector fails HIGH 6 5 C-BOP C-SRO Low Turbine Oil Pressure/Failure of Auto Turbine Trip 7 6 M-RO M-BOP M-SRO Power Range NI-41 Control Power Fuse Blows/ATWS 8 7 C-BOP MOV-350 fails to OPEN  9 8 M-RO M-BOP M-SRO "B" SG SLB Inside CV * (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,    (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4  HB Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #4  The plant is at 25% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "A" SI Pump is OOS. The "B" SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. PI-1616, SW North Header Pressure, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-007-C3, "FW PMP A LO FLOW TRIP," has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.                                Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will attempt to raise power to 100% using OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power," and OP-301, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)."  During the first dilution, the "A" Primary Water Pump will trip. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-003-E5, "MAKEUP WATER DEV," and/or AOP-003, "Malfunction of Reactor makeup Control."  The operator will place the "B" Primary Water Pump in service and continue with the startup. After this, the operator will raise power to 100% using OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power," and OP-301, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)."  During the power increase Letdown Temperature Controller, TCV-144, will fail CLOSED causing letdown temperature to rise above 135&deg;F. Simultaneously, Divert Valve TCV-143, will fail to divert letdown flow to the VCT. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-A6, "LTDN FLOW HI TEMP DEMIN BYPD," divert letdown flow to the VCT, take MANUAL control of TCV-144 to stabilize letdown temperature, and return letdown to the VCT.
Following this, Main Steam Line "C" Pressure Transmitter, PT-495, will fail LOW. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure."  The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-025, "Steam Generator Pressure (SGP)."  The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation," and Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, "Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation."  Next, Power Range, NI-44, Upper Detector will fail HIGH. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-011, "Nuclear Instrumentation (NI)."  The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation."    Shortly afterwards, an oil leak will develop on the Main Turbine. The operator will respond in accordance with various APP-008, SW, CW & TURB GEN AUX, alarms, and ultimately enter AOP-007, "Turbine Trip Below P-8."  When the Main Turbine Trips one Turbine Stop Valve and one Turbine Governor Valve will remain OPEN, and the operator will need to manually TRIP the Turbine. Subsequently, the Control Power fuse for Power Range channel N41 will blow causing an automatic reactor trip signal to be generated, however, the reactor will fail to TRIP both automatically and manually (ATWS). The operator will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and attempt to manually trip the reactor. When this fails, the operator will enter FRP-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation- ATWS."  While in FRP-S.1, Boric Acid to Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4  Charging Pump Suction Valve MOV-350 will fail CLOSED. The operator will direct a local trip of the reactor, drive rods in manually, and align the suction of the Charging Pumps to the RWST. Upon completion of FRP-S.1, a "B" Steam Line will rupture inside Containment (over 10 minutes), and the operator will re-enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."  Ultimately, the operator will transition to EOP-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation," to isolate the flow into and out of the "B" Steam Generator and then terminate Safety Injection. However, an Orange and/or Red Path will exist on the RCS Critical Safety Function, and the operator will transition to FRP-P.1, "Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition."
The scenario will terminate at Step 12 of FRP-P.1, when the operator stops SI Pumps. Critical Tasks:  Manually control "C" S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level.
Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the "C" S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control. Insert Negative Reactivity into the Core by Inserting Control Rods Manually Prior to Locally Tripping the Reactor (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical or returns to a critical condition. Performance of the critical task would make the reactor subcritical and provide sufficient shutdown margin to prevent (or at least minimize the power excursion associated with) any subsequent return to criticality. Failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance which fails to prevent incorrect reactivity control. In the scenario postulated by the plant conditions, failure to insert negative reactivity by inserting control rods can result in the needless continuation of an extreme or a severe challenge to the subcriticality CSF. Although the challenge was not initiated by the operator (was not initiated by operator error), continuation of the challenge is a result of the operator's failure to insert negative reactivity. Isolate Feedwater Flow Into and Steam Flow From the Faulted S/G Before a Transition Out of E-2 Occurs (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Also, depending upon the plant conditions, it could constitute a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Failure to isolate a faulted SG can result in challenges to the Integrity, Subcriticality and Containment CSFs. Stop the High Head SI Pumps Before a Transition Out of FRP-P.1 Occurs (EOP-Based)
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4  Safety Significance:  Failure to stop the high head SI Pumps results in challenges to the Integrity CSF; and could unnecessarily result in a mechanical failure due to Pressurized Thermal Shock.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4  SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS              Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  Sim. Setup Reset to Temp IC 611  T = 0 Malfunctions:  "A" SI Pump Pump OOS:  IRF EPS480E1_130 f: RACK_OUT ("A" SI Pump OOS)  IRF EPS480E1_124 f: RACK_IN ("B" SI Pump Racked IN to E-1)  PLACE CAPs as follows:  RED Cap over "A" SI Control Switch  PI-1616 SW North Header Pressure indication OOS  IOR aoSWSDOD024A f:0  Place WHITE DOT on PI-1616  RTGB Annunciator APP-007-C3 failed OFF  IMF ANNXN07C03 f:ALARM_OFF  Place WHITE DOT on APP-007-C3 Insert the following:  $006_MANUAL_TURB_TRIP  DMF TUR05B (Stop Valve closes on Manual Turb Trip)  $006_MANUAL_TURB_TRIP  DMF TUR05C (Gov Valve closes on Manual Turb Trip)  $006_TURBINE_TRIP IMF CRF02 (Rods Fail in AUTO on Turbine Trip)  IMF ANNXN05E02 f:ALARM_OFF (Rods Fail in AUTO on Turbine Trip)  $006_RODS_IN_MAN DMF CRF02 (Rods Fail in AUTO on Turbine Trip)  $006_RODS_IN_MAN IOR diRPSBOI063 c:1 f:DE_PRSSD (Rods Fail in AUTO on Turbine Trip)  IMF RPS01A f:FAILURE_TO_OPEN, BOTH (ATWS on SLB)  IMF RPS01B f:FAILURE_TO_OPEN, BOTH (ATWS on SLB)  IOR diCVCAOI731 f:AS-IS (MOV-350 fails to OPEN)  Place the Simulator in RUN and ACKNOWLEDGE all alarms. Perform Attachment 2 (Simulator Setup For Exams) of TAP-411.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4    Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  Crew Briefing  1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements  2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew. 3. Provide the crew with the following:  Copy of OP-105 marked up for power increase  Copy of Section 8.2.7 of OP-301  Copy of Technical Specifications/Basis  4. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms. T-0 Begin Familiarization Period  At direction of examiner Execute Lesson Plan for Simulator Scenario N16-1-4. At direction of examiner  Event 1 IMF CVC06A "A" Primary Water Pump trips during Dilution  The crew will initiate upon restoration of dilution capability  Event 2 Raise Power At direction of examiner  Event 3 IMF CCW08 r:01:00 f:85 IOR diCVCAAI047 f:DEMIN $006_TC-144_MAN DMF CCW08  Letdown Temperature Controller TCV-144 fails CLOSED/Divert Valve TCV-143 Fails to DIVERT  Note: The Booth Instructor will need to DOR diCVCAAI047 when the operator places TCV-143 Control Switch to VCT. At direction of examiner Event 4  ICO SGNXMTPT_495 r:01:15 f:0  Main Steam Line "C" Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW  At direction of examiner  Event 5  IMF NIS07G f:70  Power Range NI-44 Upper Detector fails HIGH Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4    Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  At direction of examiner Event 6  IMF TUR14  r:01:00  f:100 IMF TUR05B f:100 IMF TUR05C f:AS-IS  Low Turbine Oil Pressure/Failure of Auto Turbine Trip At direction of examiner Event 7 IMF NIS12A f:CONTROL  Power Range NI-41 Control Power Fuse Blows/ATWS  NOTE: The ATWS is inserted at T=0  Post-Rx Trip  Event 8 IOR diCVCAOI731 f:AS-IS  MOV-350 fails to OPEN  NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0  Post-Rx Trip  Event 9 IMF MSS01B r:10:00 f:9.95E6  "B" SG SLB Inside CV NOTE: Inserted when the crew exits FRP-S.1 and transitions to EOP-E-0.      Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page  10 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
"A" Primary Water Pump trips during Dilution      Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will attempt to raise power to 100% using OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power," and OP-301, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)."  During the first dilution, the "A" Primary Water Pump will trip. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-003-E5, "MAKEUP WATER DEV," and/or AOP-003, "Malfunction of Reactor makeup Control."  The operator will place the "B" Primary Water Pump in service and continue with the startup. Booth Operator Instructions:    After 10 gallons of Primary Water has been added to the RCS IMF CVC06A  Indications Available:    "A" PW Pump Red status light is OFF, Green status light is LIT  Primary Water Totalizer YIC-114 stops beeping during a dilution  Primary Water Totalizer YIC-114 stops digitally counting during a dilution    RTGB Annunciator APP-003-E5, MAKEUP WATER DEV, alarms within 45 seconds  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    NOTE: The crew will initiate a Turbine Load Increase. OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER      RO (Step 5) Maintain Tave within 5&deg;F of Tref using a combination of Control Rods and Boron Concentration changes. NOTE: The RO will likely place Control Rods in MANUAL. OP-301, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS) SECTION 8.2.7, RCS QUICK DILUTION CHECKLIST      RO (Step 1) This revision has been verified to be the latest revision available.      RO (Step 2) DETERMINE the amount of water to add to the RCS and if applicable, the expected change in RCS temperature AND Reactor Power. NOTE: The RO will determine that several 200-300 gallon batches of water must be added.      RO (Step 3) OBTAIN an independent check of the volume of water required.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page  11 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
"A" Primary Water Pump trips during Dilution      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 4) OBTAIN permission from the CRS OR the SM to add the amount of water previously determined, including the expected change in RCS temperature AND Reactor Power.      RO (Step 5) IF flow adjustment is desired, THEN adjust FCV-114A, PRIMARY WTR FLOW DILUTE MODE, potentiometer to obtain desired flow rate.      RO (Step 6) PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE selector switch in the DILUTE position.      RO (Step 7) SET YIC-114, PRIMARY WTR TOTALIZER to the desired quantity.      RO (Step 8) IF two letdown orifices are in service and it is desired to divert flow to the HUT, THEN- NOTE: Two orifices will be in service.      RO (Step 9) Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to the START position. Booth Instructor : After 10 gallons of Primary Water has been added to the RCS IMF CVC06A    Examiner NOTE: The CRS may enter AOP-003 directly. If so, move forward to Page 12. APP-003-E5, MAKEUP WATER DEV      RO (Step 1) IF alarm is due to intentional operator action, THEN-.. NOTE: The alarm is NOT due to intentional operator action.      RO (Step 2) IF alarm is due to Primary Water Pump Trip, THEN perform the following:    Start the Primary Water Pump currently selected to STOP Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page  12 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
"A" Primary Water Pump trips during Dilution      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Place the control switch for the Primary Water Pump that tripped to STOP NOTE: Once the "B" PW Pump is started, the RO will need to reset the Makeup System to restart the dilution.      RO (Step 3) IF the alarm is due to a Malfunction of Makeup Control, THEN refer to AOP-003, Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control. Examiner NOTE: The CRS may not address AOP-003 if APP-003-E5 is used to place the "B" PW in service. If so, the crew will continue to load increase (Event 2). NOTE:  The CRS may dispatch an AO to check the "A" PW Pump. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and after 1 minute report that the "A" PW Pump Breaker has tripped - There is an acrid odor near the breaker. AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL    NOTE: This AOP-003 script is written assuming the "B" PW Pump is started upon entry. If not, the AOP will start the "B" PW Pump. RO (Step 1) Check For Failure Of A Level Transmitter As Follows: NOTE: There is no VCT Level Transmitter failure. Obtain a VCT level for LT115 using ERFIS    PT ID CHL0115A    Obtain a VCT level for LT112 using ERFIS    PT ID CHL0112A    Check VCT level indicators  OSCILLATING LEVEL DEVIATION OBSERVED      CRS (Step 1.c RNO) Go To Step 1.e Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page  13 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
"A" Primary Water Pump trips during Dilution      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 1.e) Check VCT level deviation between LT112 and LT115  GREATER THAN 8 INCHES (13%)      RO (Step 1.e RNO) Go To Step 6.      CRS (Step 6) Make PA Announcement For Procedure Entry NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      CRS (Step 7) Implement The EALs NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.      RO (Step 8) Check VCT Level  LESS THAN 12.5 INCHES (21%)      RO (Step 8 RNO) IF VCT level lowers to less than 12.5 inches (21%), THEN perform Steps 9 and 10. NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.      CRS Go To Step 11.      RO (Step 11) Check VCT Level  LESS THAN 20 INCHES (33%)      CRS (Step 11 RNO) Go To Step 21.      RO (Step 21) Check VCT Level  LESS THAN 51.5 INCHES (86%)      RO (Step 22) Verify Charging And Letdown Flows Are Normal For Plant Conditions      RO (Step 23) Check APP003D5, BA FLOW DEV  ILLUMINATED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page  14 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
"A" Primary Water Pump trips during Dilution      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Step 23 RNO) Go To Step 28.      RO (Step 28) Check APP003E5, MAKEUP WATER DEV  ILLUMINATED NOTE: If the Makeup System has not been reset, APP-003-E5 will be ILLUMINATED.      RO (Step 29) Check Cause Of Alarm  DUE TO INTENTIONAL OPERATOR ACTION      RO (Step 29 RNO) Perform the following:    Verify CLOSED FCV113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT    Verify CLOSED FCV114B, BLENDED MU TO VCT. Go To ATTACHMENT 4, PRIMARY WATER DEVIATION. NOTE: The CRS will transition to Attachment 4 of AOP-003. AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL ATTACHMENT 4, PRIMARY WATER DEVIATION      RO (Step 1) Check Primary Water Flow Demand Signal  EXISTS      RO (Step 2) Check Primary Water Pump Selected To Auto  RUNNING NOTE: The "B" PW Pump may be running if started using APP-003-E5. If so, it is selected for AUTO, and it is running prompting the CRS to move to Step 3 on next page. The "B" PW Pump may be stopped. If so, the Step 2 RNO will be performed.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page  15 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
"A" Primary Water Pump trips during Dilution      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 2 RNO) Perform the following: Examiner NOTE: This step will be performed if the "A" PW Pump is selected for Auto. If the "B" PW is selected for AUTO and running, the crew will perform a slightly different path through Attachment 4, and return to the main body of AOP-003 at Step 36 instead of Step 37. Place control switch for the selected Primary Water Pump to START. NOTE: The crew will likely not attempt to start the "A" PW Pump. IF Primary Water Pump starts, THEN-.. IF Primary Water Pump did NOT start, THEN perform the following:    Momentarily place the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Switch to STOP. Place the alternate Primary Water Pump Control Switch to AUTO. NOTE: The crew will start the "B" PW Pump. Verify FCV113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, Control Switch in AUTO. Verify FCV114B, BLENDED MU TO VCT, Control Switch in AUTO. Momentarily place the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Switch to START. Contact I&C to investigate and repair failure of Primary Water Pump to start. Go To the Main Body, Step 37, of this procedure. Examiner NOTE: Move forward to Step 37 on Page 16.      RO (Step 3) Check Primary Water Flow Indicated On One Of The Following: NOTE: The crew will perform this step if the "B" PW Pump is already running. Flow Recorder FR113    OR    Primary Water Totalizer YIC114      CRS (Step 3 RNO) Go To Step 12.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page  16 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
"A" Primary Water Pump trips during Dilution      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 12) Check FCV114A, PW TO BLENDER  CLOSED NOTE: FCV-114A is OPEN.      CRS (Step 12 RNO) Go To Step 19.      RO (Step 19) Place FCV114B, BLENDED MU TO VCT, Control Switch in OPEN      RO (Step 20) Check FCV114B, BLENDED MU TO VCT  OPEN      BOP (Step 21) Locally Check Primary Water Pump Discharge Pressure  GREATER THAN 80 PSIG      CRS (Step 22) Contact Plant Operations Staff For Guidance In Determining The Cause Of The Primary Water Deviation      CRS (Step 23) Go To The Main Body, Step 36, Of This Procedure      AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL      RO (Step 36) Borate The RCS As Required Using OP301, Chemical And Volume Control System (CVCS), section titled Operation of RCS Makeup System for Automatic Makeup, Dilution, Boration, and Alternate Dilute. NOTE: The crew will return from Attachment 4 here if the "B" PW Pump was running upon entry into Attachment 4.      RO (Step 37) Check Dilution  REQUIRED NOTE: The crew will return from Attachment 4 here if the "B" PW Pump was started in Attachment 4.      CRS (Step 37 RNO) Go To Step 40.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page  17 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
"A" Primary Water Pump trips during Dilution      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Step 40) Check Technical Specifications, Section 3.4.17, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS), For Applicable LCO NOTE: Technical Specification LCO 3.4.17 is MET.      CRS (Step 41) Return To Procedure And Step In Effect    NOTE: The dilution should be restored or re-initiated. When the dilution is re-initiated move to Event #2.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page  18 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Raise Power      After this, the operator will raise power to 100% using OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power," and OP-301, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)." Booth Operator Instructions:    NA  Indications Available:  NA    Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER      RO (Step 5) Maintain Tave within 5&deg;F of Tref using a combination of Control Rods and Boron Concentration changes. NOTE:  The RO may withdrawal control rods. OP-301, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS) SECTION 8.2.7, RCS QUICK DILUTION CHECKLIST    NOTE: The RO may perform this section more than once during the power ascension. RO (Step 1) This revision has been verified to be the latest revision available.      RO (Step 2) DETERMINE the amount of water to add to the RCS and if applicable, the expected change in RCS temperature AND Reactor Power. NOTE: The RO will determine that several 200-300 gallon batches of water must be added.      RO (Step 3) OBTAIN an independent check of the volume of water required.      RO (Step 4) OBTAIN permission from the CRS OR the SM to add the amount of water previously determined, including the expected change in RCS temperature AND Reactor Power.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page  19 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Raise Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 5) IF flow adjustment is desired, THEN adjust FCV-114A, PRIMARY WTR FLOW DILUTE MODE, potentiometer to obtain desired flow rate.      RO (Step 6) PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE selector switch in the DILUTE position.      RO (Step 7) SET YIC-114, PRIMARY WTR TOTALIZER to the desired quantity.      RO (Step 8) IF two letdown orifices are in service and it is desired to divert flow to the HUT, THEN- NOTE: Two orifices will be in service.      RO (Step 9) Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to the START position.      RO (Step 10) IF LCV-115A is in AUTO, THEN ENSURE proper operation of LCV-115A, VCT/HLDP TK DIV valve.      RO (Step 11) IF any of the following conditions occur, THEN momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the STOP position:    Unanticipated Rod Motion    Primary Water addition exceeds the desired value      RO (Step 12) WHEN the desired amount of Primary Water has been added to the RCS, THEN ENSURE the following:    FCV-114A, PW TO BLENDER, closes. FCV-114B, BLENDED MU TO VCT, closes.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page  20 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Raise Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    IF in Auto, THEN the operating Primary Water Pump stops. The RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF. IF desired, THEN ENSURE LCV-115A, VCT/HLDP TK DIV valve control switch in AUTO.      RO (Step 13) RETURN the RCS Makeup System to automatic as follows:    ENSURE FCV-114A, PRIMARY WTR FLOW DILUTE MODE is in AUTO. PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE switch in the AUTO position. Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the START position.      RO (Step 14) RECORD, in AUTO LOG, as indicated by PRIMARY WATER TOTALIZER, YIC-114 total amount of Primary Water added during the dilution.      RO (Step 15) MONITOR parameters for the expected change in reactivity AND inform the CRS OR the SM the results of the dilution.      OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER      BOP (Step 6) IF EH Turbine Control is in OPER AUTO, THEN raise turbine load as follows:    Adjust the SETTER indication using the desired load. Use continue the rise in load.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page  21 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Raise Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 7) IF EH Turbine Control is in TURB MANUAL, THEN-.. NOTE: The Turbine is in OPER AUTO.      CRS (Step 8) IF Heater Drain Tank suspended solids are greater than 25 ppb, THEN-.. NOTE: From Turnover it is noted that HDT Suspended Solids are < 25 ppb.      CRS (Step 9) WHEN Heater Drain Tank suspended solids are less than or equal to 25 ppb, THEN perform the following while continuing with this procedure:  BOP  Start a Heater Drain Pump. NOTE: The BOP will start one HDP. Ensure Quenching Valve control switches on QUENCHING VALVES CONTROL PANEL are placed in AUTO: NOTE: The CRS/BOP may contact an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, use IRF CFW102 f:AUTO and report after 1 minute that the BOTH valves are in AUTO. FCV-1597    FCV-1596    Locally check Quenching Valves are CLOSED: NOTE: The CRS/BOP may contact an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the BOTH valves are CLOSED. FCV-1597    FCV-1596    Check proper operation of the following: NOTE: The CRS/BOP may contact an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the ALL valves are operating properly. LC-1530    LCV-1530A Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page  22 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Raise Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    LCV-1530B      After the 1st Dilution and MWe raised by 15-20 MWe, and at the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page  23 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Letdown Temperature Controller TCV-144 fails CLOSED/Divert Valve TCV-143 Fails to DIVERT      During the power increase Letdown Temperature Controller, TCV-144, will fail CLOSED causing letdown temperature to rise above 135&deg;F. Simultaneously, Divert Valve TCV-143, will fail to divert letdown flow to the VCT. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-A6, "LTDN FLOW HI TEMP DEMIN BYPD," divert letdown flow to the VCT, take MANUAL control of TCV-144 to stabilize letdown temperature, and return letdown to the VCT. Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF CCW08 r:01:00 f:85 IOR diCVCAAI047 f:DEMIN $006_TC-144_MAN DMF CCW08  NOTE: The malfunction takes 2-3 minutes to fully develop  NOTE: The Booth Instructor will need to DOR diCVCAAI047 when the operator places TCV-143 Control Switch to VCT. Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-001-A6, LTDN FLOW HI TEMP DEMIN BYPD  TCV-144 Controller demand is rising  NRHX Outlet Temperature (TI-144) is rising  TCV-143 Red status light is LIT with Control Switch in AUTO  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    NOTE: It is likely that the BOP will go to HOLD on the Turbine. APP-001-A6, LTDN FLOW HI TEMP DEMIN BYPD      RO (Step 1) IF Letdown Temperature is greater than 135&deg;F, THEN ENSURE controller TC-143 is diverted to the VCT. NOTE: The RO will divert TCV-143 to the VCT. Booth Instructor use DOR diCVCAAI047 WHEN the operator places TCV-143 Control Switch to VCT.      RO (Step 2) IF CCW flow to the Non-regenerative Heat Exchanger is low, THEN RAISE Component Cooling Water flow using TC-144. NOTE: The RO will manually adjust controller to maintain temperature at 100-130&deg;F on TI-143.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page  24 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Letdown Temperature Controller TCV-144 fails CLOSED/Divert Valve TCV-143 Fails to DIVERT      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 3) IF letdown flow is high, THEN REDUCE Letdown flow. NOTE: It is likely that control of TCV-144 will stabilize the event, and Letdown will NOT need to be reduced.        NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/Chemistry to request a Demin effluent sample prior to placing TCV-143 back to the DEMIN position. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/CHEMISTRY, wait 20 minutes and report that the Demin effluent is acceptable to be placed in operation.        NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/I&C to address the Controller failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/I&C.        NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief, and THEN re-commence the up-power. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page  25 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Main Steam Line "C" Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW      Following this, Main Steam Line "C" Pressure Transmitter, PT-495, will fail LOW. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure."  The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-025, "Steam Generator Pressure (SGP)."  The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation," and Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, "Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation." Booth Operator Instructions:    ICO SGNXMTPT_495 r:01:15 f:0  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-006-A4, STM LINE HI P  Main Steam Pressure indicator PI-495 is lowering  "C" FRV controller output is lowering  Feed Flow to "C" S/G is lowering  Steam Flow to "C" S/G is lowering  "C" S/G Narrow Range Level is lowering  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    NOTE: It is likely that the BOP will go to HOLD on the Turbine. AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION    Examiner NOTE: The CRS may go to AOP-025 directly. If so, go to AOP-025 Step 1 actions on Page 27. BOP (Step 1) CHECK FRVs  OPERATING PROPERLY (MANUAL OR AUTO): Immediate Action NOTE: FCV-498 in NOT operating properly in AUTO. FCV478    FCV488    FCV498      BOP (Step 1 RNO) PERFORM the following: Immediate Action NOTE: The BOP will control FCV-498 in MANUAL. ENSURE FRV for affected S/G(s) in manual control.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page  26 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Main Steam Line "C" Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    ATTEMPT to stabilize S/G level using FRV and/or FRV Bypass Valves by matching steam flow with feed flow. STOP any load change in progress. If unable to control S/G level, THEN--      Critical Task:  Manually control "C" S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level. Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the "C" S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.      RO/ BOP (Step 2) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint  BEING APPROACHED      CRS (Step 2 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is approached, THEN-. GO TO Step 4.      RO (Step 4) CHECK Reactor Power  LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%      CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      CRS (Step 6) GO TO Appropriate Step From Table Below:    FRV Failure To Control - OBSERVE NOTE 58 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page  27 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Main Steam Line "C" Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 58) CHECK S/G Level  AT OR TRENDING TO PROGRAM NOTE: The CRS go to AOP-025 based on the Note prior to Step 58. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE      CRS (Step 1) GO TO Appropriate Section For Failed Instrument: NOTE: The CRS will select Section D of AOP-025. S/G STEAM PRESSURE, (PT-495) - SECTION D      AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION D, S/G FEED FLOW, STEAM FLOW OR STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE      BOP (Step 1) CHECK affected FRV in MAN: Immediate Action NOTE: FCV-498 will likely be in MANUAL by this Step. FCV-498 (FRV "C")      BOP (Step 2) RESTORE affected S/G level to program Immediate Action      Critical Task:  Manually control "C" S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level. Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the "C" S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page  28 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Main Steam Line "C" Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP/CRS (Step 3) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint - BEING APPROACHED NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.      CRS (Step 3 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is approached, THEN-    GO TO Step 5      CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel of Procedure Entry Using PA System NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      BOP (Step 6) CHECK Failure - FEED FLOW INSTRUMENT FAILURE      BOP (Step 6 RNO) IF failure was a steam flow instrument, THEN- NOTE: The BOP/CRS could go to Step 12 incorrectly believing that it is the Steam Flow instrument that has failed. CRS IF failure was a steam pressure instrument, THEN GO TO Step 17.      BOP (Step 17) PLACE S/G Steam Flow Selector Switch affected by Failed Pressure Instrument to Alternate Channel Below:    S/G "C" STEAM FLOW - FR-498    FAILED CHANNEL (PT-495) AFFECTED CHANNEL (FI-494) SELECTED POSITION (CH 495)      BOP (Step 18) RESTORE affected Controller to Automatic:    CHECK S/G level - WITHIN +/-1% OF PROGRAMMED LEVEL    PLACE affected controller in AUTO Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page  29 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Main Steam Line "C" Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 19) REMOVE affected Transmitter from Servicing Using OWP-025:    CHANNEL (PT-495) OWP (SGP-12) NOTE: The CRS will address OWP-025. OWP-025, STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE (SGP) SGP-11, MAIN STEAM LINE "C" PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-495      BOP FR-498 (STM) - SELECTED TO 495      BOP DELETE INPUT PT-495 FROM CALO PROCESSING. (MSP0441A)      BOP BISTABLE SWITCH B/S 495 RACK #17 NOTE:  The will enter the Simulator Booth (Simulating the Hagan Room). Booth Instructor coordinate with BOP to insert Trip Signals: OPEN Protection Racks Door: IRF BST101 f:D_OPEN  IRF BST014 f:TRIP CLOSE Protection Racks Door: IRF BST101 f:D_CLOSED  BISTABLE LIGHT LOOP 3 PH-P3 HI PC-495 will ILLUMINATE. NOTE: The CRS will return to Section D of AOP-025. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION D, S/G FEED FLOW, STEAM FLOW OR STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE      CRS (Step 20) REVIEW TS LCOs for applicability: NOTE: The CRS will address Technical Specifications.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page  30 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Main Steam Line "C" Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    TS LCO 3.3.1    TS LCO 3.3.2    TS LCO 3.3.3    TS LCO 3.3.4      CRS (Step 21) GO TO Procedure Main Body, Step 2      TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.2, ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM (ESFAS) INSTRUMENTATION      CRS LCO 3.3.2 The ESFAS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.      CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.2-1.      CRS ACTIONS        CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that Function 1.e (Steam Line High Differential Pressure Between Steam Header and Steam Lines) is affected, and ACTION D.1 or D.2 and D.3 are required. D. One channel inoperable NOTE For Function 4.c, a channel may be taken out of the trip condition for 6 hours for maintenance.
D.1 Place channel in trip. OR D.2.1 Be in MODE 3.
AND  D.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 6 hours    12 hour    18 hours Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page  31 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Main Steam Line "C" Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.6, CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION      CRS The Containment Ventilation Isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE.      CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.6-1.      CRS ACTIONS        CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that Function 4 (Safety Injection), is affected. Refer to LCO 3.3.2, "ESFAS Instrumentation," Function 1, for all initiation functions and requirements.      TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1, RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE AND FLOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING (DNB) LIMITS      CRS LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for pressurizer pressure, RCS average temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be within the limits specified below:  Pressurizer Pressure 2205 psig      CRS APPLICABILITY: Mode 1      CRS ACTIONS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page  32 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Main Steam Line "C" Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: If RCS pressure lowered to less than 2205 psig, the CRS will determine that ACTION A.1 is required. A. One or more RCS DNB parameters not within limits. A.1 Restore RCS DNB parameter(s) to within limit. 2 hours    NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief, and THEN re-commence the up-power. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page  33 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Power Range NI-44 Upper Detector fails HIGH      Next, Power Range, NI-44, Upper Detector will fail HIGH. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-011, "Nuclear Instrumentation (NI)."  The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation." Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF NIS07G f:70  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-005-C3, PR CHANNEL DEV  Power Range N44 is indicating Off-Scale HIGH  Delta-Flux Power Range N44 is Off-Scale HIGH  RTGB Annunciator APP-005- (30 seconds delayed)  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    NOTE: It is likely that the BOP will go to HOLD on the Turbine. APP-005-C3, PR CHANNEL DEV      RO (Step 1) MONITOR the following parameters:    Reactor power    Control rod position      RO (Step 2) IF a Control Rod is misaligned, THEN-. NOTE: There is NO misaligned Control Rod.      RO (Step 3) IF indications of a radial flux tilt are present, THEN PERFORM a Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio per FMP-007, Quadrant Power Tilt.      RO/ CRS (Step 4) IF a Power Range detector has failed, THEN REMOVE failed Power Range Detector from service per OWP-011, Nuclear Instrumentation (NI).      CRS (Step 5) REFER TO TS:    3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) .
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page  34 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Power Range NI-44 Upper Detector fails HIGH      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Table 3.3.1-1, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation. NOTE: The CRS will address OWP-011. NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/I&C to address the PR instrument failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/I&C. OWP-011, NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION (NI) NI-4, N-44, POWER RANGE      BOP REMOVE NI-44 from ERFIS SCAN: NIN0044A      BOP DROPPED ROD MODE Switch (BYPASS)      BOP NI-44 OUT OF SERVICE TRIP SWITCH (TRIP)      BOP ROD STOP BYPASS Switch (BYPASS N44)      BOP COMPARATOR CHANNEL DEFEAT Switch (PR44)        BOP DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR  Drawer:    UPPER SECTION Switch (PR44)    LOWER SECTION Switch (PR44)    NOTE: The CRS will address the Technical Specifications. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) INSTRUMENTATION      CRS LCO 3.3.1, The RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page  35 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Power Range NI-44 Upper Detector fails HIGH      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.      CRS ACTIONS    NOTE: Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page  36 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Power Range NI-44 Upper Detector fails HIGH      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that Functions 2 (Power Range Neutron Flux, a. High, b. Low), 17.c (RPS Interlocks - P8) and 17.d (RPS Interlocks - P10) are affected, and: ACTION D.1.1 and D.1.2 or D.2.1 and D.2.2 or D.3 are required;  ACTION E.1 or E.2 is required; ACTION S.1 or S.2 is required; ACTION T.1 or T.2 is required. D. One Power Range Neutron Flux-High channel inoperable. D.1.1 Place channel in trip. AND D.1.2 Reduce THERMAL RTP. OR D.2.1 Place channel in trip.
AND  NOTE: Only required to be performed when the Power Range Neutron Flux input to QPTR is inoperable. D.2.2 Perform SR 3.2.4.2. OR D.3 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours  12 hours    6 hours Once per 12 hours 12 hours  E. One channel inoperable. E.1 Place channel in trip. OR E.2 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours  12 hours    S. One channel inoperable. S.1 Verify interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions. OR S.2 Be in MODE
: 3. 1 hour    7 hours    T. One channel inoperable. T.1 Verify interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions. OR T.2 Be in MODE 2. 1 hour    7 hours    NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #6.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page  37 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Low Turbine Oil Pressure/Failure of Auto Turbine Trip      Shortly afterwards, an oil leak will develop on the Main Turbine. The operator will respond in accordance with various APP-008, SW, CW & TURB GEN AUX, alarms, and ultimately enter AOP-007, "Turbine Trip Below P-8."  When the Main Turbine Trips one Turbine Stop Valve and one Turbine Governor Valve will remain OPEN, and the operator will need to manually TRIP the Turbine. Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF TUR14 r:01:00  f:100 IMF TUR05B f:100 IMF TUR05C f:AS-IS NOTE: The malfunction takes 1 minute to fully develop  Indications Available:    Turbine Bearing Oil pressure is lowering  RTGB Annunciator APP-008-A4, TURB BRG OIL LO PRESS  RTGB Annunciator APP-008-B4, LO BRG OIL PRESS TURB TRIP  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    AOP-007, TURBINE TRIP BELOW P-8      BOP (Step 1) CHECK turbine stop valves - CLOSED    BOTH turbine stop valves - CLOSED    OR    ALL governor valves - CLOSED      BOP (Step 1 RNO) PERFORM the following:    Manually TRIP the turbine by simultaneously depressing the THINK and TURBINE TRIP pushbuttons.      BOP (Step 2) CHECK MSR PURGE and SHUTOFF VALVES - CLOSED      BOP (Step 3) CHECK Steam Dump Control - IN PRESSURE MODE Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page  38 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Low Turbine Oil Pressure/Failure of Auto Turbine Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 3 RNO) PLACE steam dumps in pressure control mode:    ENSURE STEAM HEADER PRESS Controller PC-464B is in AUTO. ENSURE PC-464B pot setting is 7.28. IF PC-464B has a demand output greater than 0, THEN PERFORM the following:    PLACE PC-464B in MAN. SET PC-464B demand output to 0. PLACE PC-464B in AUTO. SELECT STEAM DUMP MODE Switch to STEAM PRESS. Slowly ADJUST PC-464B pot setting to 7.17.      BOP (Step 4) CHECK Steam Dump Operation - STEAM DUMP OPEN      RO (Step 5) ENERGIZE All Available PZR Heaters      RO (Step 6) CHECK Control Rods - INSERTING IN AUTO      RO (Step 6 RNO) Manually INSERT control rods to achieve Tavg between 547&deg;F and 551&deg;F AND reactor power between 5 and 10%. NOTE: The RO may take the control rods to AUTO. If the plant trips due to the Turbine Trip transient, or when power is between 5-10%, move to Events #7-9.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 39 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Subsequently, the Control Power fuse for Power Range channel N41 will blow causing an automatic reactor trip signal to be generated, however, the reactor will fail to TRIP both automatically and manually (ATWS). The operator will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and attempt to manually trip the reactor. When this fails, the operator will enter FRP-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation- ATWS."  While in FRP-S.1, Boric Acid to Charging Pump Suction Valve MOV-350 will fail CLOSED. The operator will direct a local trip of the reactor, drive rods in manually, and align the suction of the Charging Pumps to the RWST. Upon completion of FRP-S.1, a "B" Steam Line will rupture inside Containment (over 10 minutes), and the operator will re-enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."  Ultimately, the operator will transition to EOP-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation," to isolate the flow into and out of the "B" Steam Generator and then terminate Safety Injection. However, an Orange and/or Red Path will exist on the RCS Critical Safety Function, and the operator will transition to FRP-P.1, "Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition." The scenario will terminate at Step 12 of FRP-P.1, when the operator stops SI Pumps. Booth Operator Instructions:  IMF NIS12A f:CONTROL    Indications Available:    Rx Trip First Out LIT, without Rx Trip  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION      RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action    Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers  OPEN    Rod position indicators  FULLY INSERTED    Rod Bottom Lights  ILLUMINATED      RO (Step 1 RNO) Manually TRIP Reactor Immediate Action  IF reactor power is GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 5% OR Intermediate Range SUR is positive, THEN GO TO FRP-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation 0 ATWS, Step 1. NOTE: The CRS will transition to FRP-S.1. FRP-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION-ATWS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 40 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action    Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers  OPEN    Rod position indicators  FULLY INSERTED    Rod Bottom Lights  ILLUMINATED    Neutron flux - LOWERING      RO (Step 1 RNO) PERFORM the following: Immediate Action    Manually TRIP Reactor. IF Reactor will NOT trip, THEN INSERT Control Rods.      Critical Task:  Insert Negative Reactivity into the Core by Inserting Control Rods Manually Prior to Locally Tripping the Reactor (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical or returns to a critical condition. Performance of the critical task would make the reactor subcritical and provide sufficient shutdown margin to prevent (or at least minimize the power excursion associated with) any subsequent return to criticality. Failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance which fails to prevent incorrect reactivity control. In the scenario postulated by the plant conditions, failure to insert negative reactivity by inserting control rods can result in the needless continuation of an extreme or a severe challenge to the subcriticality CSF. Although the challenge was not initiated by the operator (was not initiated by operator error), continuation of the challenge is a result of the operator's failure to insert negative reactivity.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 41 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    DISPATCH operator to locally open the following breakers: NOTE: The CRS will dispatch both the Inside and Outside AO. Booth Instructor:
Acknowledge as each AO, and report after 2 minutes use: IRF EPSV480B3_104 f:RACK_OUT IRF EPSV480B2B_097 f:RACK_OUT and report that the Rx has been locally tripped. Reactor Trip breakers    Reactor Trip Bypass breakers    BOTH MG Set Generator Output breakers    BOTH MG Set Motor Input breakers      BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action    Both Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED    CLOSE MSR Purge and Shutoff valves      BOP (Step 3) CHECK AFW Pumps Running:    CHECK Motor Driven AFW Pumps - BOTH RUNNING    CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels - TWO S/Gs LESS THAN 16%      BOP/CRS (Step 3b RNO) IF S/G Narrow Range level lowers to less than 16% on two S/Gs THEN PERFORM Step3.c. CONTINUE WITH Step 4.      BOP/ RO (Step 4) INITIATE Emergency Boration:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 42 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    START two Charging Pumps at maximum speed    ALIGN Boration Flow Path:    OPEN MOV-350, BA TO CHARGING PMP SUCT NOTE: MOV-350 will not OPEN.      BOP/ RO (Step 4.b.1 RNO) ALIGN suction from RWST:    OPEN LCV-115B, EMERG MU TO CHG SUCT. IF LCV-115B can NOT be opened THEN-    CLOSE LCV-115C, VCT OUTLET Valve.      BOP/ RO (Step 4.b.2) START Boric Acid Pump ALIGNED for BLEND      BOP/ RO (Step 4.b.3) CHECK for Boric Acid flow on FI-110 NOTE: There should be no indicated flow.      BOP/ RO (Step 4.c) ALIGN Charging flow path:    OPEN CVC-310B, LOOP 2 COLD LEG CHG Valve    ADJUST the following as necessary to maintain proper Seal Injection and MAXIMUM Charging flow:    Charging Pump Speed Controller(s)    HIC-121, CHARGING FLOW Controller    Seal Water Flow Control Valves    MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 gpm and 20 gpm per RCP UNLESS Seal Injection isolated    MAINTAIN Charging flow on FI-122A - GREATER THAN BORIC ACID FLOW Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 43 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK PZR pressure - LESS THAN 2335 PSIG      BOP/ RO (Step 5) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation Valves - CLOSED      BOP/ RO (Step 6) CHECK NO SI Signal Exists      RO (Step 7) CHECK IF the Following Trips Have Occurred:    Reactor - TRIPPED    Turbine - TRIPPED      RO (Step 8) CHECK IF Reactor is Subcritical:    Power Range channels - LESS THAN 5%    Intermediate Range channels - NEGATIVE STARTUP RATE    OBSERVE CAUTION prior to Step 18 and GO TO Step 18      RO (Step 18) CHECK ARPI - LESS THAN TWO RODS STUCK OUT      RO (Step 19) STOP RCS Boration:    CHECK MOV-350, BA TO CHARGING PMP SUCT - CLOSED    CHECK Boric Acid Pump Control Switch aligned for blend - IN AUTO    CHECK Emergency Boration - PERFORMED USING MOV-350 FLOWPATH      CRS (Step 19.c RNO) GO TO Step 19.e Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 44 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      RO (Step 19.e) CHECK BOTH of the following conditions - EXIST:    Emergency Boration performed using RWST flowpath    AND    Charging Pump suction aligned to the VCT is desired    CHECK VCT Level - GREATER THAN 20 INCHES    OPEN LCV-115C, VCT OUTLET    CLOSE the RWST supply valve previously opened:    LCV-115B, EMERG TO CHG SUCT    REDUCE Charging Pump speed as desired      RO/ CRS (Step 20) PERFORM the following:    RESET SPDS    RETURN TO Procedure AND Step in Effect      BOOTH INSTRUCTOR:  When the CRS is directing the RO to check the Reactor subcritical, IMF MSS01B r:10:00 f:9.95E6    NOTE: The CRS will transition to EOP-E-0. EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION      RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action    Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers  OPEN    Rod position indicators  FULLY INSERTED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 45 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Rod Bottom Lights  ILLUMINATED    Neutron Flux  LOWERING      BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action    Both Turbine Stop Valves  CLOSED    All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power To AC EMERGENCY BUSSES: Immediate Action    CHECK Bus E1 OR E2  AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED    CHECK Bus E1 AND E2  BOTH ENERGIZED      RO (Step 4) CHECK SI Status:  Immediate Action  RO CHECK if SI is actuated:    SI annunciators  ANY ILLUMINATED    OR    SI equipment  AUTO STARTED      RO CHECK BOTH trains of SI actuated:    SI Pumps  TWO RUNNING    RHR Pumps  BOTH RUNNING      RO/ BOP Foldout Page:    RCP TRIP CRITERIA    FAULTED S/G AFW ISOLATION CRITERIA NOTE:  The condition will be MET.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 46 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    PERFORM Supplement D, De-energizing AFW Valves For AFFECTED S/G. NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use: IRF EPSMCC9_254  f: RACKED_OUT IRF EPSMCC10_266 f: RACKED_OUT As AO, report after 3 minutes that the Supplement D is complete. AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA    DC BUS, INSTRUMENT BUS, OR MCC5 FAILURE CRITERIA    SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING CRITERIA      CRS (Step 5) PERFORM Attachment 1, Auto Action Verification, While CONTINUING WITH This Procedure Examiner NOTE:  The CRS may assign the BOP to perform this action. If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1. Other Examiners follow EOP-E-0 Actions, Step 6, on Page 52. EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ATTACHMENT 1, AUTO ACTION VERIFICATION      BOP (Step 1) CHECK ECCS Pumps Running:    SI Pumps  TWO RUNNING    RHR Pumps  BOTH RUNNING      BOP (Step 2) CHECK ECCS Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment      BOP (Step 3) CHECK CCW Pumps  AT LEAST ONE RUNNING      BOP (Step 4) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 47 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A  ACTUATED    CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A Valves  CLOSED    CHECK Excess Letdown  ISOLATED    CVC387, EXCESS LTDN STOP VALVE  CLOSED    HIC137, EXCESS LTDN FLOW CONTROLLER  AT 0% DEMAND      BOP (Step 5) CHECK Feedwater Isolation:    CHECK Main Feed Pumps  BOTH TRIPPED    CHECK Main Feedwater isolated:    Feedwater Reg Valves  CLOSED    Feedwater Reg Bypass Valves  CLOSED    Feedwater Header Section Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 6) CHECK If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated:    CHECK Main Steam Line Isolation  REQUIRED    CHECK Containment pressure  GREATER THAN 10 PSIG    CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 7) CHECK Proper Service Water System Operation:    CHECK SW Pumps  ALL RUNNING    CHECK SW Booster Pumps - BOTH RUNNING    CHECK Both SW Header Low Pressure Alarms  EXTINGUISHED    APP008F7,SOUTH SW HDR LO PRESS    APP008F8,NORTH SW HDR LO PRESS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 48 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 8) CHECK BOTH EDGs  RUNNING      BOP (Step 9) CHECK ECCS Flow:    CHECK RCS pressure  LESS THAN 1650 PSIG [1725 PSIG] NOTE: Adverse Containment Numbers will be required. CHECK SI Pumps - FLOW INDICATED    CHECK RCS pressure - LESS THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG] NOTE: Adverse Containment Numbers will be required.      BOP (Step 9.c RNO) GO TO Step 10.      BOP (Step 10) CHECK CV Recirculation Fans  ALL RUNNING      BOP (Step 11) CHECK IVSW System Actuated:    PCV1922A, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE  OPEN    PCV1922B, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE  OPEN      BOP (Step 12) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation:    CV Ventilation Isolation Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 13) CHECK Control Room Ventilation Aligned For Pressurization Mode:    HVA1A OR HVA1B,CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING FAN  RUNNING    HVE19A OR HVE19B,CONTROL ROOM AIR CLEANING FAN  RUNNING    HVE16, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN  STOPPED    Control Room HVAC Outside Air Damper A OR B  OPEN Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 49 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CRD1ASA, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER  CLOSED    CRD1BSB, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER  CLOSED      BOP (Step 14) CHECK DS Bus  ENERGIZED      BOP (Step 15) CHECK Battery Chargers ENERGIZED:    APP036D1, BATT CHARGER A/A1 TROUBLE Alarm  EXTINGUISHED    APP036D2, BATT CHARGER B/B1 TROUBLE Alarm  EXTINGUISHED      BOP (Step 16) STOP R11/12 Sample Pump      BOP (Step 17) Locally RESET AND LOAD Instrument Air Compressor(s) As Necessary (38 KW each): NOTE: The BOP may contact the Inside AO. Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge and report that the "B" IA Compressor is running, and the "A" IA Compressor is NOT running. Compressor A (MCC5 CMPT 7M)    Compressor B (MCC6 CMPT 3G)      BOP (Step 18) PERFORM Crew Update To Include The Following:    Attachment completion    Manual actions taken    Failed equipment status    SW status per Step 7.c      EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 50 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE. RO (Step 6) CHECK AFW Pumps Running:    CHECK Motor Driven AFW Pumps  BOTH RUNNING    CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels - TWO S/Gs LESS THAN 16%      BOP (Step 6b RNO) IF S/G Narrow Range level lowers to LESS THAN 16% on Two S/Gs, THEN PERFORM Step 6.c. CRS CONTINUE WITH Step 7      RO (Step 7) CHECK AFW Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment:    AFW Header Discharge Valves  FULL OPEN    AFW Header Section Valves  FULL OPEN    Steam Driven AFW Pump Discharge Valves  FULL OPEN IF PUMP RUNNING      RO (Step 8) CHECK Total AFW Flow:    RESET SI    CONTROL AFW flow to maintain Intact S/G Narrow Range level between 9%[18%] AND 50% NOTE: Adverse Containment Numbers will be required. CHECK total AFW flow  GREATER THAN 300 GPM      RO (Step 9) CHECK CV Spray NOT Required:    CHECK Containment Pressure  HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 51 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 9 RNO) PERFORM the following:    CHECK CV Spray actuated. IF CV Spray is NOT actuated, THEN-. ENSURE BOTH CV Spray Pumps are running. ENSURE CV Spray Pump Discharge Valves are OPEN:    SI880A    SI880B    SI880C    SI880D    ENSURE CV Spray Additive Tank Discharge Valves are OPEN:    SI845A    SI845B    ADJUST Spray Additive Tank flow using SI845C,SAT THROTTLING VALVE to approximately 12 gpm. ENSURE Containment Isolation Phase B Valves are closed. STOP ALL RCPs. CRS  OBSERVE CAUTION prior to Step 10 AND GO TO Step 10. Examiner NOTE: it is expected that an Orange/Red Path will occur on RCS Integrity. When this occurs the CRS will transition to FRP-P.1. When this occurs move forward to actions on Page 56. RO (Step 10) CHECK RCP Seal Cooling:    CCW flow to RCP(s) Thermal Barriers  NORMAL    APP001C1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW ALARM  EXTINGUISHED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 52 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    APP001D1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR LO FLOW alarm  EXTINGUISHED      RO (Step 10 RNO) IF CCW to ANY RCP Motor OR ALL Seal Cooling to ANY RCP has been lost, THEN-    IF ALL Charging Pumps are STOPPED, THEN-      RO (Step 11) CHECK RCS Temperatures:    With ANY RCP running,-.. OR    With NO RCPs running, RCS Cold Leg temperatures  STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547&deg;F      RO (Step 11 RNO) IF temperature is LESS THAN 547&deg;F AND lowering, THEN PERFORM the following:    STOP dumping steam. IF RCS cooldown continues, THEN REDUCE total AFW flow to minimum for decay heat removal. MAINTAIN total AFW flow GREATER THAN 300 gpm UNTIL S/G Narrow Range level is GREATER THAN 9%[18%] in at least one S/G. NOTE: Adverse Containment Numbers will be required. IF RCS cooldown continues, THEN CLOSE MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves.      RO (Step 12) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Spray Valves:    CHECK PZR PORVs  CLOSED    CHECK Normal PZR Spray Valves  CLOSED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 53 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK Aux PZR Spray Valve  CLOSED      RO (Step 13) CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped: NOTE:  It is likely that the RCPs are already OFF. CHECK RCPs  ANY RUNNING      CRS (Step 13.c RNO) GO TO Step 14.      RO (Step 14) CHECK If S/G Secondary Pressure Boundaries Are Intact:    NONE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER    NONE COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED      CRS (Step 14 RNO) PERFORM the following:    RESET SPDS AND INITIATE monitoring of Critical Safety Functions Status Trees. GO TO EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, Step 1.      FRP-P.1, RESPONSE TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK      BOP (Step 1) CHECK CST Level  GREATER THAN 13%      RO (Step 2) CHECK RCS Pressure  GREATER THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG] NOTE: Adverse Containment Numbers will be required.      RO (Step 3) CHECK RCS Cold Leg Temperatures  STABLE OR RISING      BOP (Step 3 RNO) TRY to stop RCS cooldown:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 54 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP  ENSURE S/G Steam Line PORVs are CLOSED. ENSURE Condenser Steam Dumps are CLOSED. IF RHR is in service, THEN-.. CONTROL feed flow to Intact S/G(s) to stop RCS cooldown:    MAINTAIN total feed flow GREATER THAN 300 gpm (0.2x106 pph) UNTIL S/G Narrow Range level is GREATER THAN 9% [18%] in at least one Intact S/G. MINIMIZE cooldown from Faulted S/G(s):    RESET SI. IF SI will NOT reset, THEN-.. ENSURE Main Steamline Isolation AND Bypass Valves for each Faulted S/G are CLOSED. CLOSE STEAM SHUTOFF valve(s) from Faulted S/G(s) to Steam Driven AFW Pump. V18B    IF ALL S/Gs are Faulted, THEN-. NOTE: Only the "B" S/G is faulted. IF a Faulted S/G is necessary for RCS Temperature Control, THEN-. CLOSE Feed REG AND Bypass, FW HDR Section, AND AFW Discharge Valves to Faulted S/G(s). S/G B:    FCV488    FCV489    V26B    V214B    V216B Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 55 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    IF ANY valve can NOT be closed, THEN--      Critical Task:  Isolate Feedwater Flow Into and Steam Flow From the Faulted S/G Before a Transition Out of FRP-P.1 Occurs (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Also, depending upon the plant conditions, it could constitute a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Failure to isolate a faulted SG can result in challenges to the Integrity, Subcriticality and Containment CSFs; and result in a mechanical failure due to Pressurized Thermal Shock.      RO (Step 4) CHECK PZR PORV Block Valves:    Power to PZR PORV Block Valves  AVAILABLE    PZR PORV Block Valves  AT LEAST ONE OPEN      RO (Step 5.a) CHECK If PZR PORVs Should Be Closed:    CHECK LTOPP  IN SERVICE      CRS (Step 5.a RNO) GO TO Step 5.d.      RO (Step 5.d) CHECK PZR pressure  LESS THAN 2335 PSIG      RO (Step 5.e) PZR PORVs  CLOSED      RO (Step 6) CHECK SI Pumps  ANY RUNNING Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 56 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 7) CHECK If SI Can Be Terminated:    RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs  GREATER THAN 68&deg;F [87&deg;F] NOTE: Adverse Containment Numbers will be required. RVLIS indication  GREATER THAN REQUIRED VALUE FROM TABLE NOTE: With all RCPs off, 65% is required in RVLIS Full Range.      RO (Step 8) RESET SI      RO (Step 9) RESET Containment Isolation Phase A      RO (Step 10) RESET Containment Spray Signal:    PLACE CONTAINMENT SPRAY Key Switch to OVRD/RESET and RETURN to NORMAL NOTE: If CV pressure is > 10 psig, CV Spray and Phase B Containment Isolation will NOT be able to be reset. RESET Containment Isolation Phase B      RO (Step 11) ESTABLISH Instrument Air To CV:    CHECK APP002F7, INSTR AIR HDR LO PRESS alarm  EXTINGUISHED    RESET IA PCV1716, INSTRUMENT AIR ISOLATION TO CV    CHECK IA PCV1716  OPEN      RO (Step 12) STOP ECCS Pumps:    RHR Pumps    SI Pumps Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 57 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:  Stop the High Head SI Pumps Before a Transition Out of FRP-P.1 Occurs (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to stop the high head SI Pumps results in challenges to the Integrity CSF; and could unnecessarily result in a mechanical failure due to Pressurized Thermal Shock. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.
NRC SCENARIO N16-1-4 TURNOVER SHEET  1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life: BOL b) Reactor Power: 25%  c) Turbine Load: 129 MWe  d) Boron Concentration: 1462 ppm e) Rod Height: 147 CB 'D' f) RCS Pressure: 2235 psig g) PZR Level: 28.5%  h) Xenon: Equilibrium  2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. # Description None    3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) The "A" SI Pump is OOS. The "B" SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. 4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a) None 5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a) None 6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a) PI-1616, SW North Header Pressure, is OOS (I&C Investigating). b) RTGB Annunciator APP-007-C3, "FW PMP A LO FLOW TRIP," has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). 7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a) Unrestricted (NOT-PROTECTED) 8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a) Raise power to 100% at 1%/minute. 9. TURNOVER INFORMATION  a) The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. b) Chemistry reports that Heater Drains tank suspended solids is < 25 ppb. 10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a) The Reactor Engineer (RE) is available in the Control Room b) The RE recommends a 6300 gallon dilution, made in several 200-300 gallon batch additions using Section 8.2.7, RCS Quick Dilution Checklist, of OP-301 c) The RE recommends that Control Bank D be at approximately 200 steps upon achieving 100% 11. RISK  a) YELLOW (Planned Power Increase)   
 
PROGRAM: H B Robinson Operations Training  MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam    Scenario N16-1-5   
 
==REFERENCES:==
: 1. GP-005, "Power Operation" (Rev 128) 2. AOP-006, "Turbine Eccentricity/Vibration" (Rev 21) 3. APP-005, "NIS & Reactor Control" (Rev 39) 4. OWP-011, "Nuclear Instrumentation (NI)" (Rev 24) 5. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation" (Amendment 176) 6. AOP-003, "Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control" (Rev 20) 7. APP-001, "Miscellaneous NSSS" (Rev 60) 8. AOP-014, "Component Cooling Water Malfunction" (Rev 37) 9. Technical Specification LCO 3.6.1, "Containment" (Amendment 176) 10. Technical Specification LCO 3.6.3, "Containment Isolation Valves" (Amendment 176) 11. OMM-001, "RNP Conduct of Operations" (Rev 67) 12. EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection"  (Rev 6) 13. EOP-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation" (Rev 3) 14. EOP-ECA-2.1, "Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators" (Rev 1)  Validation Time: 136 minutes Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5  Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 5 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners:  Operators: (SRO)    (RO)    (BOP)  Initial Conditions: The plant is at 3-5% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "B" Condensate Pump is OOS. LI-1417A, Hotwell Level Indication is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-006-F7, "PWST HI/LO LVL," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 30%.              Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*  Event Description  1 NA R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Roll Turbine 2 1 C-BOP C-SRO High Turbine Eccentricity 3  2 I-BOP I(TS)-SRO Loss of Compensation Voltage to Intermediate Range N-35  4 3  I-RO I-SRO VCT Level transmitter LT-112 fails HIGH 5 4 C-RO C(TS)-SRO "B" RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE  6 5 M-RO M-BOP M-SRO Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE 7 6 C-RO Failure of Automatic Rx Trip  * (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,    (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5  H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #5  The plant is at 3-5% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "B" Condensate Pump is OOS. LI-1417A, Hotwell Level Indication is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-006-F7, "PWST HI/LO LVL," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 30%.                                Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 5-8% and startup the Turbine using GP-005, "Power Operation."
When the Turbine is rolling, a HIGH Eccentricity condition will develop on the Main Turbine. The operator will respond using AOP-006, "Turbine Eccentricity/Vibration," and place the Turbine startup on HOLD. Shortly afterwards, the compensating voltage on Intermediate Range Channel N-35 will fail. The operator will remove the instrument from service using OWP-011, "Nuclear Instrumentation (NI)."  The failed channel will require that the Source Range instruments be manually re-energized in the subsequent post-trip conditions. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," and determine to continue with the power increase.
Following this, VCT Level Transmitter LT-112 will fail HIGH causing LCV-115A to divert all letdown flow to the CVCS HUTs and result in an automatic makeup to the VCT. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-003, "Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control."  After this, the power increase will continue. Next, a Thermal barrier leak will develop on the "B" RCP and Flow Control Valve FCV-626 will fail to CLOSE. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-C1, "RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW," and AOP-014, "Component Cooling Water Malfunction."  The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.6.1, "Containment," and Technical Specification LCO 3.6.3, "Containment Isolation Valves."  Subsequently, a Steam Rupture will occur downstream of the MSIVs and the MSIVs will fail to CLOSE automatically and manually. Simultaneously, the Reactor will fail to TRIP automatically. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and manually trip the reactor.      Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation," and then when it is realized that all Steam Generators are faulted, transition to EOP-ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators," and lower AFW flow to each Steam Generator to 60 gpm.
While terminating Safety Injection in EOP-ECA-2.1, the "A" MSIV will close and the "A" S/G pressure is expected to rise higher than that of the "B" and "C" S/G's. Since the crew will be in the process of terminating SI in EOP-ECA-2.1, the crew will continue to complete the SI termination steps before transitioning back to EOP-E-2.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5  The scenario will terminate at Step 4.c of EOP-E-2, after the operator has closed the AFW Discharge valves to the "B" and "C" Steam Generators. Depending on the timing of the actions taken by the crew when the "A" MSIV is closed, the "A" S/G pressure may not rise significantly higher than that of the "B" and "C" S/Gs, and the crew will remain in EOP-ECA-2.1 past the SI termination steps (i.e. Step 19). If this situation occurs, the scenario will terminate at Step 20 of EOP-ECA-2.1.      Critical Tasks:  Manually trip the reactor from the control room before entry into FRP-S.1  Safety Significance:  Failure to manually trip the reactor causes a challenge to the subcriticality CSF beyond that irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, it constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates the inability of the operator to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. The ERG Background Document for E-0 states that one function of E-0 is to verify that all required automatic protective actions occur before transitioning the crew to the appropriate ORG. The verification is important because the subsequent ORGs are based on the assumption that protective systems will protect all CSFs while the ORG is implemented. Not tripping the reactor when it is possible to do so (as in the postulated conditions) forces an immediate extreme challenge to the subcriticality CSF. Additionally, the incorrect performance of failing to trip the reactor necessitates the operator taking compensating action that seriously complicates the event mitigation strategy. This mis-operation constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. Control the AFW flow rate to not less than 60 gpm per SG in order to minimize the RCS cooldown rate before an EXTREME (Red Path) challenge develops to the RCS Integrity CSF  Safety Significance:  Failure to control the AFW flow rate to the SGs leads to an unnecessary and avoidable extreme challenge to the integrity CSF. Also, failure to perform the critical task increases the challenges to the subcriticality CSF beyond which is irreparably introduced by the postulated plant conditions. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes a demonstrated inability by the operator to take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety. It also fails to prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5  SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS              Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  Sim. Setup Reset to Temp IC 612  T = 0 Malfunctions:  "B" Condensate Pump OOS:  IRF EPSV4160B4_069 f: RACK_OUT ("B" Condensate Pump Breaker Racked Out)  PLACE RED CAP on the RTGB Control Switch for the "B" Condensate Pump PLACE GREEN CAP on the RTGB Control Switch for the "A" Condensate Pump  LI-1417A Hotwell Level Indication OOS  IOR aoCFWDOD035B f:2 Place WHITE DOT on LI-1417A  RTGB Annunciator APP-006-F7 failed ON  IMF ANNXN06f07 f:ALARM_ON Place WHITE DOT on APP-006-F7 Insert the following:  $006_FCV_626_TRIP IOR diCVCAAI103 d:9 f:OPEN (FCV-626 fails to auto CLOSE)  $006_FCV_626_TRIP IOR doCVCAAO103O d:10 f:ON (FCV-626 fails to auto CLOSE)  $006_FCV_626_TRIP IOR doCVCAAO103S d:10 f:ON (FCV-626 fails to auto CLOSE)  $006_FCV_626_TRIP IRF EPSMCC6_221 d:11 f:RACK_OUT (FCV-626 fails to auto CLOSE)  IMF MSS03A f:FAIL_TO_CLOSE ("A" MSIV fails to CLOSE)  IMF MSS03B f:FAIL_TO_CLOSE ("B" MSIV fails to CLOSE)  IMF MSS03C f:FAIL_TO_CLOSE ("C" MSIV fails to CLOSE)  IOR diMSSDDI049 f:OPEN ("A" MSIV fails to CLOSE)  IOR diMSSDDI050 f:OPEN ("B" MSIV fails to CLOSE)  IOR diMSSDDI051 f:OPEN ("C" MSIV fails to CLOSE)  IMF RPS01A f:FAILURE_TO_OPEN, AUTO  IMF RPS01B f:FAILURE_TO_OPEN, AUTO  Place the Simulator in RUN and ACKNOWLEDGE all alarms. Perform Attachment 2 (Simulator Setup For Exams) of TAP-411.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5    Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  Crew Briefing  1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements  2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew. 3. Provide the crew with the following:  Copy of OP-105 marked up for power increase  Attachment 8, Turbine Recommended Start-Up and Loading Times, of GP-005  Attachment 10, Condenser Backpressure Limit Curve, of GP-005  Copy of Technical Specifications/Basis  4. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms. T-0 Begin Familiarization Period  At direction of examiner Execute Lesson Plan for Simulator Scenario N16-1-5. At direction of examiner  Event 1 Roll Turbine Turbine RPM reaches 150 RPM  Event 2  $006_ECC-RPM ICO TURXMTET_HP r:15 F:3.3  High Turbine Eccentricity  NOTE: This Malfunction will occur when the Turbine speed reaches 150 RPM At direction of examiner  Event 3  IMF NIS06A f:4.4E-7  Loss of Compensation Voltage to Intermediate Range N-35  At direction of examiner Event 4 ICO CVCXMTLT_112 r:01:00 f:100  VCT Level transmitter LT-112 fails HIGH  At direction of examiner  Event 5  IMF RCS12B r: 01:00 f:40  "B" RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5    Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION At direction of examiner Event 6 IMF MSS09 f:855700  Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE    Post-Rx Trip Signal Event 7 IMF RPS01A f:FAILURE_TO_OPEN, AUTO IMF RPS01B f:FAILURE_TO_OPEN, AUTO    Failure of Automatic Rx Trip  NOTE: These malfunctions are inserted at T=0      Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page  9 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Roll Turbine      Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 5-8% and startup the Turbine using GP-005, "Power Operation." Booth Operator Instructions:    NA  Indications Available:  NA    Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    GP-005, POWER OPERATION SECTION 6.3, ROLLING THE TURBINE    Examiner NOTE: Procedure Steps are NOT numbered in a continuous manner because some Steps in GP-005 have been previously signed off/completed. RO (Step 8) WHEN Reactor Power approaches 5% THEN perform the following:    Make a plant announcement that MODE 1 has been entered    Record time MODE 1 entered    Change ERFIS Mode Indication to display MODE 1      RO (Step 9) Adjust Control Rods to maintain Reactor Power between 5% and 8% while continuing with this procedure      RO/ BOP (Step 10) Ensure the ERFIS Calorimetric (CALO) program is properly configured for the current plant operation:    Current Excess Letdown operation    Current AFW Pump operation    Current Steam Generator Blowdown (SGBD) operation.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page  10 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Roll Turbine      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 11) Ensure cooling water is being supplied to the following components per OP-903, Placing Secondary Coolers in Service: NOTE: The BOP will contact the AO and direct that the Secondary coolers placed in service. Booth Instructor  acknowledge as AO, and report after 3 minutes that all secondary coolers have been placed in service. Generator Hydrogen Coolers. H2 Seal Oil Coolers. Turbine Lube Oil Coolers. Exciter Air Coolers.      BOP (Step 12) Equalize hydrogen and air side seal oil temperatures per OP-505, Hydrogen Seal Oil System, Section titled "Equalizing Hydrogen Side and Air Side Seal Oil Temperatures Prior to Rolling Turbine".      BOP (Step 13) IF the Generator Temperature Recorder is shutdown, THEN-..      BOP (Step 14) Ensure the following recorders and associated instruments monitoring the Turbine Generator are energized and functional to the point necessary to support Turbine operation:    Turbine Generator Supervisory Recorder. Turbine MSR Temperature Recorder (MSR-TEMP-REC). Turbine Supervisory Alarm Mimic Display. Generator Temperature Recorder.      BOP (step 15) Record the As Found turbine eccentricity (ECC) as indicated on the Turbine Supervisory Instrument Recorder.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page  11 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Roll Turbine      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      BOP (Step 16) IF turbine rotor eccentricity (ECC) is greater than or equal to three mils (0.003 inches) as indicated on the Turbine Supervisory Instrument Recorder OR is in alarm on the RTGB Mimic Display, THEN--      BOP (Step 17) Using Curve 7.8 or Attachment 8, Turbine Recommended Start-Up And Loading Times, determine the Time Required to Accelerate to Sync Speed based on point TC-MTL-IMP-CHMBR indicated temperature and record.      BOP (Step 18) Depress the Valve Position Limit  (lower) pushbutton until the Valve Position Limit indicator registers 0% Valve Limit Position.      BOP (Step 19) IF this is a turbine startup following replacement OR repair of any turbine shaft components or bearings, THEN-..      BOP (Step 20) IF AT ANY TIME during turbine startup it is required to stop turbine rolling activities, THEN perform Attachment 6, Securing Turbine During Startup. NOTE: This Attachment provides steps for securing the Turbine Startup.      BOP (Step 21) Monitor EH oil pressure during latching using ERFIS      BOP (Step 22) Latch the Turbine using one of the following methods:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page  12 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Roll Turbine      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Depress and hold the Turbine pushbutton until local indication PI-63ASO (Auto Stop Oil Press) is greater than 80 psig NOTE: The BOP will contact the AO at the Turbine Standard, and direct that pressure on PI-63ASO be reported. Booth Instructor  acknowledge as AO, and report > 80 psig.      BOP (Step 23) WHEN PI-63ASO (Auto Stop Oil Press) is greater than 80 psig, THEN perform the following:    Ensure SL and SR Turbine Stop Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel    Ensure 1RL, 2RL, 1RR, 2RR, Reheat Stop Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel    Ensure 1IL, 2IL, 1IR, 2IR, Intercept  Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel    Ensure GLU, GLL GRU, GRL Governor Valves indicate CLOSED on the EH Turbine Control Panel    Check green Latch Light is ILLUMINATED    Ensure Unit Trip Light is EXTINGUISHED      BOP (Step 24) Record the following data from the EH Pump (Governor Fluid Pump) local flow indications NOTE: The BOP will contact the AO, and direct that the EH Pump local flow indications be reported. Booth Instructor  acknowledge as AO, and report: FI-4428A - 5 gpm FI-4427A - 3 gpm FI-4428B - 5 gpm FI-4427B - 3 gpm Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page  13 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Roll Turbine      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      BOP (Step 25) IF either EH Pump Discharge Flow reads greater than 6 gpm OR IF either EH Pump Drain Flow indicated greater that 4 gpm, THEN- NOTE: No EH Pump Discharge Flow is greater than 6 gpm and no EH Pump Drain Flow is greater than 4 gpm.      BOP (Step 26) IF the Turbine has rolled off the Turning Gear AND it is desired to place the Turbine back on the Turning Gear, THEN- NOTE: The Turbine has NOT rolled off the Turning Gear.      BOP (Step 27) PERFORM the Turbine Valve/Trip Test    Trip the Turbine by simultaneously depressing the Think and Turbine Trip pushbuttons    CHECK the following Valves:    SL and SR, Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED    1RL, 2RL, 1RR, 2RR, Reheat Stop Valves - CLOSED    1IL, 2IL, 1IR, 2IR, Intercept Valves - CLOSED    Monitor EH pressure during latching using ERFIS    Latch the Turbine using one of the following methods:    Depress and hold the Turbine Latch pushbutton until local indication PI-63ASO (Auto Stop Oil Press) is greater than 80 psig NOTE: The BOP will contact the AO at the Turbine Standard, and direct that pressure on PI-63ASO be reported. Booth Instructor  acknowledge as AO, and report > 80 psig. WHEN PI-63ASO (Auto Stop Oil Press) is greater than 80 psig THEN perform the following:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page  14 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Roll Turbine      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Ensure SL and SR, Turbine Stop Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel    Ensure 1RL, 2RL, 1RR, 2RR, Reheat Stop Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel    Ensure 1IL, 2IL, 1IR, 2IR, Intercept  Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel    Ensure GLU, GLL GRU, GRL Governor Valves indicate CLOSED on the EH Turbine Control Panel    Check green Latch Light is ILLUMINATED    Ensure Unit Trip Light is EXTINGUISHED    Direct an Operator to trip the Turbine locally at the Turbine Front Standard by positioning the Turbine Trip Lever to the TRIP Position NOTE: The BOP will contact the AO at the Turbine Standard, and direct that the Turbine be tripped. Booth Instructor  acknowledge as AO, and use: IRF TUR004 f:TRIPPED and report that the Turbine has been tripped. Check the following:    SL and SR, Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED    1RL, 2RL, 1RR, 2RR, Reheat Stop Valves - CLOSED    1IL, 2IL, 1IR, 2IR, Intercept Valves - CLOSED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page  15 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Roll Turbine      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Direct the Operator at the Turbine Front Standard to reset the Turbine locally by placing the Turbine Trip Lever to RESET and holding (lever will be released in Section 6.3 Step 27.j) NOTE: The BOP will contact the AO at the Turbine Standard, and direct that the Turbine be latched. Booth Instructor  acknowledge as AO, and use: IRF TUR004 f:RESET_HOLD And report that the Turbine has been reset. Check the following:    Ensure SL and SR, Turbine Stop Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel    Ensure 1RL, 2RL, 1RR, 2RR, Reheat Stop Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel    Ensure 1IL, 2IL, 1IR, 2IR, Intercept  Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel    Ensure GLU, GLL GRU, GRL Governor Valves indicate CLOSED on the EH Turbine Control Panel    Check green Latch Light is ILLUMINATED    Ensure Unit Trip Light is EXTINGUISHED    (Operator at the Front Standard) WHEN PI-63ASO (Auto Stop Oil Press) indicates greater than 80 psig, THEN position the Turbine Trip Lever to NORMAL. NOTE: The BOP will contact the AO at the Turbine Standard, and direct that the Turbine Trip Lever to Normal when PI-63ASO is greater than 80 psig. Booth Instructor  acknowledge as AO, and use: IRF TUR004 f:NORMAL And report the Turbine Trip Lever has been returned to Normal.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page  16 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Roll Turbine      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (raise) pushbutton until the Valve Position Limit indicator stops rising.      BOP (Step 31) Depress the Oper Auto pushbutton      BOP (Step 32) At the E-H Cabinet, check the AVP cards are in AUTOMATIC. NOTE: The CRS will contact an AO and direct this action. Floor Instructor respond as the AO and after taking direction and receiving Key #17 and Attachment 9, wait 30 seconds (Out of sight of CRS), initial Attachment 9, and return to CRS.      BOP (Step 33) Set a speed of 490 rpm to 510 rpm in the Setter display using the REF and/or REF        BOP (Step 34) Set the Acceleration Rate thumbwheel to 50 rpm/minute      BOP (Step 35) Record steam inlet pressure as indicated on PI-1304 (HP Turb Throttle Press)      BOP (Step 36) Record Condenser back pressure as indicated on PI-1310 (LP Turb A Cond Press Indicator) and PI-1311 (LP Turb B Cond Press Indicator)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page  17 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Roll Turbine      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 37) WHEN steam inlet pressure is at least 600 psig as indicated on PI-1304 (HP Turb Throttle Press) [Step 35] AND Condenser back pressure is less than or equal to 3.8 inches Hg Abs on PI-1310 (LP Turb 'A' Cond Press Indicator) and PI-1311 (LP Turb 'B' Cond Press Indicator) [Step 36]
THEN depress the Go pushbutton to raise speed.      BOP (Step 38) Perform the following as turbine speed raises;    Ensure turning gear disengages    IF governor valve leakage is causing turbine speed to raise above the speed into the Setter, THEN-    IF Turbine speed stabilizes in  resonant speed range, THEN-    IF Turbine speed exceeds 1395 rpm AND is NOT under positive control of the Operator, THEN-      When the Turbine Eccentricity Alarms move to Event #2.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page  18 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
High Turbine Eccentricity      When the Turbine is rolling, a HIGH Eccentricity condition will develop on the Main Turbine. The operator will respond using AOP-006, "Turbine Eccentricity/Vibration," and place the Turbine startup on HOLD. Booth Operator Instructions:    $006_ECC_RPM ICO          TURXMTET_HP r:15 f:3.3  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-008-B4, TURBINE SUPERVISORY INSTRUMENT  Red ECC status light on Turbine Status Light Panel is LIT  Turbine Supervisory Instrumentation Recorder indicates Turbine Eccentricity at 3.3 mils (If/When selected)  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    APP-008-A8, TURBINE SUPERVISORY INSTRUMENT      BOP (Step 1) IF caused by High Rotor Eccentricity, THEN REFER TO AOP-006      AOP-006, TURBINE ECCENTRICITY/VIBRATION      BOP (Step 1) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System      BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Speed  LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 600 RPM      BOP (Step 3) CHECK Turbine Eccentricity On TURBINE SUPERVISORY INSTRUMENT RECORDER  LESS THAN 3 MILS      BOP (Step 3 RNO) PERFORM the following:    DEPRESS turbine HOLD pushbutton. CONTACT Engineering to evaluate conditions and to provide recommended actions.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page  19 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
High Turbine Eccentricity      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    MAINTAIN turbine speed less than 600 rpm until Engineering provides recommended actions. NOTE: The BOP will suspend the Turbine Startup. NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC to address the abnormal Turbine condition. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page  20 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Compensation Voltage to Intermediate Range N-35      Shortly afterwards, the compensating voltage on Intermediate Range Channel N-35 will fail. The operator will remove the instrument from service using OWP-011, "Nuclear Instrumentation (NI)."  The failed channel will require that the Source Range instruments be manually re-energized in the subsequent post-trip conditions. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," and determine to continue with the power increase. Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF NIS06A  f:4.4E-7  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-005-B2, N-35 LOSS OF COMP VOLT  N35 indication changed slightly on NR-45  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    APP-005-B2, N-35 LOSS OF COMP VOLT      RO (Step 1) MONITOR Intermediate Range amps.      RO (Step 2) IF NI-35 has failed, THEN REMOVE NI-35 from service per OWP-011, Nuclear Instrumentation (NI). NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/I&C to address the failed IR Channel. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/I&C and after 2 minutes call as WCCS/I&C and direct that the channel be removed from service.      RO (Step 3) IF a Reactor shutdown occurs, THEN manually ACTIVATE Source Range NIS. NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.      CRS (Step 4) REFER TO TS Table 3.3.1-1, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation.      OWP-011, NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION (NI) NI-7, NI-35 INTERMEDIATE RANGE Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page  21 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Compensation Voltage to Intermediate Range N-35      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      BOP REMOVE NI-35 from ERFIS SCAN: NIN0035A      BOP START UP RATE CHANNEL SELECT Switch - N36      BOP LEVEL TRIP Switch - Bypass      TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) INSTRUMENTATION      CRS LCO 3.3.1: The RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.        CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.      CRS NOTE: Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.      CRS ACTIONS        CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION F.1or F.2 must be entered. F. THERMAL POWER > P-6 and < P-10, one Intermediate Range Neutron Flux channel inoperable. F.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER to < P-6. OR F.2 Increase THERMAL POWER to > P-10. 2 hours 2 hours 
 
NOTE: The CRS will likely perform an Alignment Brief. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page  22 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
VCT Level transmitter LT-112 fails HIGH      Following this, VCT Level Transmitter LT-112 will fail HIGH causing LCV-115A to divert all letdown flow to the CVCS HUTs and result in an automatic makeup to the VCT. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-003, "Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control."  After this, the power increase will continue. Booth Operator Instructions:    ICO CVCXMTLT_112        r:01:00 f:100  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-003-E3, VCT HI/LO LVL  LT-112 indicates HIGH on ERFIS  LCV-115 Amber status light is LIT (indicating full divert to CVC HUT)  Auto Makeup occurs  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL      RO (Step 1) Check for Failure of A Level Transmitter as follows: NOTE: An Auto Makeup is likely to occur due to Letdown being diverted to the radwaste system. Obtain a VCT level for LT-115 using ERFIS    PT ID CHL0115A    Obtain a VCT level for LT-112 using ERFIS    PT ID CHL0112A    Check VCT level indicator - OSCILLATING LEVEL DEVIATION OBSERVED      CRS (Step 1.c RNO) GO to Step 1.e      RO  CHECK VCT level deviation between LT-112 and LT-115 - GREATER THAN 8 INCHES (13%)      CRS (Step 2) CHECK LT-115 - FAILED NOTE: LT-115 is NOT failed.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page  23 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
VCT Level transmitter LT-112 fails HIGH      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      CRS (Step 2 RNO) GO to Step 4      RO (Step 4) CHECK LT-112 - FAILED      RO (Step 5) Stabilize the RCS Makeup System as follows:    Check LT-112 - FAILED HIGH    Place LCV-115A, VCT/HLDP TK DIV, Control Switch to VCT    Obtain Hagan Racks Key number 10    Place VCT Level Transmitter Selector Switch located in Hagan Rack #19, IN LT-115 POSITION NOTE: The BOP will go to the Hagan Room. Booth Instructor use IRF CVC067 f:LT-115. Place the LCV-115A Control Switch to AUTO    Contact I&C to repair failed channel NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/I&C to address the failed channel. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/I&C.      CRS (Step 6) Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      CRS (Step 7)  Implement the EALs NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.      RO (Step 8) Check VCT Level - LESS THAN 12.5 INCHES (21%) Examiner NOTE:  All required actions have been completed for this failure. Move to the next event as desired.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page  24 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
VCT Level transmitter LT-112 fails HIGH      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 8 RNO) IF VCT level lowers to less than 12.5 inches (21%) THEN perform Steps 9 and 10. CRS  Go to Step 11.      RO (Step 11) Check VCT Level - LESS THAN 20 INCHES (33%)      CRS (Step 11 RNO) Go to Step 21      RO (Step 21) Check VCT Level - LESS THAN 51.5 INCHES (86%)      RO (Step 22) Verify Charging and Letdown Flows are Normal for Plant Conditions      RO (Step 23) Check APP-003-D5, BA FLOW DEV - ILLUMINATED      CRS (Step 23 RNO) Go to Step 28.      RO (Step 28) Check APP-003-E5, MAKEUP WATER DEV - ILLUMINATED      CRS (Step 28 RNO) Go to Step 34      RO (Step 34) Check Boration - REQUIRED      CRS (Step 34 RNO) GO to Step 37      RO (Step 37) Check Dilution - REQUIRED      CRS (Step 37 RNO) Go to Step 40.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page  25 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
VCT Level transmitter LT-112 fails HIGH      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      CRS (Step 40) Check Technical Specifications, Section 3.4.17, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS), For Applicable LCO      CRS (Step 41) Return to Procedure and Step in Effect      At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page  26 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
"B" RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE      Next, a Thermal barrier leak will develop on the "B" RCP and Flow Control Valve FCV-626 will fail to CLOSE. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-C1, "RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW," and AOP-014, "Component Cooling Water Malfunction."  The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.6.1, "Containment," and Technical Specification LCO 3.6.3, "Containment Isolation Valves." Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF RCS12B          r: 01:00 f:40  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-001-C1, RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW  RTGB Annunciator APP-001-B2,  Seal Injection flow on "B" RCP rising  -123A indicating 0"  CCW Surge Tank Level rising  RTGB Annunciator APP-036-D8, PROCESS MONITOR HI RAD  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    APP-001-C1, RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW      RO (Step 1) IF CCW AND Seal Injection are lost to any RCP, THEN-      RO (Step 2) IF result of CCW Pump start only, THEN-      CRS (Step 3) IF a failure of an RCP Thermal Barrier has occurred, THEN REFER to AOP-014. NOTE: The CRS will transition to AOP-014.      RO (Step 4) IF a RCP Number 1 Seal failure has occurred, THEN-    NOTE: The BOP may address AOP-005 as time permits. AOP-014, COMPONENT COOLING WATER MALFUNCTION Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page  27 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
"B" RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Step 1) IMPLEMENT The EALs NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.      CRS (Step 2) NOTIFY Plant Personnel of Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      CRS (Step 3) GO TO Appropriate Section for Indicated Malfunction:    Rising CCW inventory OR R-17 Alarming - Go to Section B NOTE:  The CRS will address Section B of AOP-014. AOP-014, COMPONENT COOLING WATER MALFUNCTION SECTION B, RISING CCW INVENTORY OR R-17 ALARMING      RO (Step 1) CHECK FCV-626, THERM BAR FLOW CONT - AUTO CLOSED      RO (Step 1 RNO) PERFORM the following:    IF APP-001-C1, RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW, is ILLUMINATED, THEN PERFORM ONE of the following:    ENSURE FV-626 is CLOSED AND GO TO Step 2. (RTGB) NOTE: FCV-626 will fail to CLOSE. OR    IF FCV-626 will NOT close, THEN CLOSE CC-735, THERM BAR OUT ISO, AND GO TO Step 2. NOTE: The operator will close CC-735.      RO (Step 2) CHECK RCP Seal Leakoff - ANY GREATER THAN 5 GPM      CRS (Step 2 RNO) GO TO Step 4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page  28 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
"B" RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      RO (Step 4) CHECK the following indications of an RCP Thermal Barrier Failure - BOTH EXIST    RCP Thermal Barrier Cooling - ISOLATED DUE TO HIGH FLOW NOTE: Thermal Barrier is isolated by CC-735. AND    R-17, COMPONENT COOLING WATER RADIOACTIVE LIQUID - RISING TREND OR ALARM NOTE: R-17 is in alarm.      RO (Step 5) CHECK Seal Injection Flow to the Affected RCP(s) - LOST      CRS (Step 5 RNO) GO TO Step 7.      CRS (Step 7)  DISPATCH Operator to Containment to Perform Attachment 6, RCP Thermal Barrier Isolation NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC to address the performance of Attachment 6. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.      RO (Step 8) CHECK RCP Status as follows:    CHECK RCP B OR C - RUNNING    CHECK RCP B - RUNNING    CHECK RCP C - RUNNING      CRS (Step 9)  WHEN Attachment 6 is completed, THEN GO TO Step 23 NOTE:  This Attachment will require a Containment Entry, and will not be completed within the remainder of the Scenario.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page  29 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
"B" RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Examiner NOTE:  Because of the dynamic nature of this event, and the response, the CRS may NOT check the Tech Specs. If not, evaluate the Technical Specification after the Scenario is complete. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.13, RCS OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE      CRS LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to: 1 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE      CRS APPLICABILITY:MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4      CRS ACTIONS        CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION A.1 must be entered until FCV-626 is isolated (CC-735 Closed). A. RCS operational LEAKAGE not within limits for reasons other than pressure boundary LEAKAGE or primary to secondary LEAKAGE A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE to within limits 4 hours          TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.3, CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES      CRS LCO 3.6.3  Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE      CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 AND 4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page  30 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
"B" RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      CRS ACTIONS        NOTES    1. Penetration flow path(s) may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. 2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. 3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by containment isolation valves. 4. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1, "Containment", when isolation valve leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria. NOTE: When FCV-626 is unisolated and failed OPEN, Technical Specification LCO 3.6.1 is NOT met. 5. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.8, "Isolation Valve seal Water (IVSW) System" when required IVSW supply to a penetration flowpath is isolated.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page  31 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
"B" RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION A.1, and A.2 must be entered. A. One or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable. A.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured. AND  A.2 NOTE: Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means. Verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated. 4 hours       
 
Once per 31 days for isolation devices outside containment AND Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days for isolation devices inside containment. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.1, CONTAINMENT      CRS LCO 3.6.1: Containment shall be OPERABLE.        CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.      CRS ACTIONS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page  32 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
"B" RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION A.1 must be entered until FCV-626 is isolated (CC-735 closed and deactivated). A. Containment inoperable. A.1 Restore containment to OPERABLE status. 1 hour        At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #6-7.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 33 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Subsequently, a Steam Rupture will occur downstream of the MSIVs and the MSIVs will fail to CLOSE automatically and manually. Simultaneously, the Reactor will fail to TRIP automatically. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and manually trip the reactor. Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation," and then when it is realized that all Steam Generators are faulted, transition to EOP-ECA-2.1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant," and lower AFW flow to each Steam Generator to 60 gpm. While terminating Safety Injection in EOP-ECA-2.1, the "A" MSIV will close and the "A" S/G pressure will rise higher than that of the "B" and "C" S/G's. Since the crew will be in the process of terminating SI in EOP-ECA-2.1, the crew will continue to complete the SI termination steps before transitioning back to EOP-E-2. The scenario will terminate at Step 4.c of EOP-E-2, after the operator has closed the AFW Discharge valves to the "B" and "C" Steam Generators. Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF MSS09  f:855700    Indications Available:    Steam noise heard in the Control Room  Lowering pressure in all Steam Generators  Rising level in all Steam Generators  Rising steam flowing all Steam Generators  RCS pressure is lowering  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION      RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action    Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers  OPEN NOTE: The operator will need to trip the Reactor Manually. Rod position indicators  FULLY INSERTED    Rod Bottom Lights  ILLUMINATED    Neutron Flux  LOWERING Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 34 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:  Manually trip the reactor from the control room before entry into FRP-S.1  Safety Significance:  Failure to manually trip the reactor causes a challenge to the subcriticality CSF beyond that irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, it constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates the inability of the operator to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. The ERG Background Document for E-0 states that one function of E-0 is to verify that all required automatic protective actions occur before transitioning the crew to the appropriate ORG. The verification is important because the subsequent ORGs are based on the assumption that protective systems will protect all CSFs while the ORG is implemented. Not tripping the reactor when it is possible to do so (as in the postulated conditions) forces an immediate extreme challenge to the subcriticality CSF. Additionally, the incorrect performance of failing to trip the reactor necessitates the operator taking compensating action that seriously complicates the event mitigation strategy. This mis-operation constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.      BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action    Both Turbine Stop Valves  CLOSED    All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power To AC EMERGENCY BUSSES: Immediate Action    CHECK Bus E1 OR E2  AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED    CHECK Bus E1 AND E2  BOTH ENERGIZED      RO/ BOP (Step 4) CHECK SI Status:  Immediate Action  CHECK if SI is actuated:    SI annunciators  ANY ILLUMINATED    OR Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 35 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    SI equipment  AUTO STARTED        CHECK BOTH trains of SI actuated:    SI Pumps  TWO RUNNING    RHR Pumps  BOTH RUNNING    Examiner NOTE:  The crew may transition to EOP-ES-0.1. If so, wait here until they return to EOP-E-0 on the Foldout Page, and proceed. RO/ BOP Foldout Page:    RCP TRIP CRITERIA    FAULTED S/G AFW ISOLATION CRITERIA    AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA    DC BUS, INSTRUMENT BUS, OR MCC5 FAILURE CRITERIA    SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING CRITERIA      CRS (Step 5) PERFORM Attachment 1, Auto Action Verification, While CONTINUING WITH This Procedure        Examiner NOTE:  The CRS will likely assign the BOP to perform this action. If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1. CRS/RO follow E-0 Actions, Step 6, on Page 37. EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ATTACHMENT 1, AUTO ACTION VERIFICATION      BOP (Step 1) CHECK ECCS Pumps Running:    SI Pumps  TWO RUNNING Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 36 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    RHR Pumps  BOTH RUNNING      BOP (Step 2) CHECK ECCS Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment      BOP (Step 3) CHECK CCW Pumps  AT LEAST ONE RUNNING NOTE: The "A" CCW Pump is running.      BOP (Step 4) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A:    CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A  ACTUATED    CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A Valves  CLOSED      BOP  CHECK Excess Letdown  ISOLATED    CVC387, EXCESS LTDN STOP VALVE  CLOSED    HIC137, EXCESS LTDN FLOW CONTROLLER  AT 0% DEMAND      BOP (Step 5) CHECK Feedwater Isolation:    CHECK Main Feed Pumps  BOTH TRIPPED    CHECK Main Feedwater isolated:    Feedwater Reg Valves  CLOSED    Feedwater Reg Bypass Valves  CLOSED    Feedwater Header Section Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 6) CHECK If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated:    CHECK Main Steam Line Isolation  REQUIRED    High steam flow with: NOTE: The High Steam Flow criteria will be met. S/G pressure  LESS THAN 614 PSIG Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 37 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  OR    Tavg  LESS THAN 543&deg;F      BOP (Step 6.b) CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves  CLOSED NOTE: The valves have failed OPEN and cannot be CLOSED from the RTGB.      BOP (Step 6.b RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as necessary.      BOP (Step 7) CHECK Proper Service Water System Operation:    CHECK SW Pumps  ALL RUNNING    CHECK SW Booster Pumps  BOTH RUNNING    CHECK Both SW Header Low Pressure Alarms  EXTINGUISHED    APP008F7,SOUTH SW HDR LO PRESS    APP008F8,NORTH SW HDR LO PRESS      BOP (Step 8) CHECK BOTH EDGs  RUNNING      BOP (Step 9) CHECK ECCS Flow:    CHECK RCS pressure  LESS THAN 1650 PSIG [1725 PSIG]    CHECK SI Pumps - FLOW INDICATED NOTE:  Based on event timing the SI Pumps may or may not be indicating flow. CHECK RCS pressure - LESS THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG]      BOP (Step 9.c RNO) GO TO Step 10.      BOP (Step 10) CHECK CV Recirculation Fans  ALL RUNNING Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 38 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 11) CHECK IVSW System Actuated:    PCV1922A, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE  OPEN    PCV1922B, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE  OPEN      BOP (Step 12) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation:    CV Ventilation Isolation Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 13) CHECK Control Room Ventilation Aligned For Pressurization Mode:    HVA1A OR HVA1B,CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING FAN  RUNNING    HVE19A OR HVE19B,CONTROL ROOM AIR CLEANING FAN  RUNNING    HVE16, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN  STOPPED    Control Room HVAC Outside Air Damper A OR B  OPEN    CRD1ASA, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER  CLOSED    CRD1BSB, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER  CLOSED      BOP (Step 14) CHECK DS Bus  ENERGIZED      BOP (Step 15) CHECK Battery Chargers ENERGIZED:    APP036D1, BATT CHARGER A/A1 TROUBLE Alarm  EXTINGUISHED    APP036D2, BATT CHARGER B/B1 TROUBLE Alarm  EXTINGUISHED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 39 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 16) STOP R11/12 Sample Pump      BOP (Step 17) Locally RESET AND LOAD Instrument Air Compressor(s) As Necessary (38 KW each): NOTE: This step is NOT necessary.      BOP (Step 18) PERFORM Crew Update To Include The Following:    Attachment completion    Manual actions taken    Failed equipment status    SW status per Step 7.c    If applicable, PERFORM Supplement M, Component Alignment For Loss Of SW To Turbine Building, as time permits    Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE. EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION    NOTE: Due to a previous malfunction on IR N-35, the RO will need to manually re-energize the Source Ranges when < P-6. RO (Step 6) CHECK AFW Pumps Running: NOTE: Based on timing of events, and response actions to these events, the operator may not perform the RNO.      CHECK Motor Driven AFW Pumps - BOTH RUNNING    CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels - TWO S/Gs LESS THAN 16%      RO (Step 6b RNO) IF S/G Narrow Range level lowers to LESS THAN 16% on Two S/Gs, THEN PERFORM Step 6.c. CONTINUE WITH Step 7. NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 40 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      RO (Step 7) CHECK AFW Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment:    AFW Header Discharge Valves  FULL OPEN    AFW Header Section Valves  FULL OPEN    Steam Driven AFW Pump Discharge Valves  FULL OPEN IF PUMP RUNNING NOTE: it is likely that the SDAFW Pump is running.      RO (Step 8) CHECK Total AFW Flow:    RESET SI    CONTROL AFW flow to maintain Intact S/G Narrow Range level between 9%[18%] AND 50%    CHECK total AFW flow  GREATER THAN 300 GPM      RO (Step 9) CHECK CV Spray NOT Required:    CHECK Containment Pressure  HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG    CHECK CV Spray - NOT ACTUATED      RO (Step 10) CHECK RCP Seal Cooling:    CCW flow to RCP(s) Thermal Barriers  NORMAL    APP001C1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW ALARM  EXTINGUISHED    APP001D1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR LO FLOW alarm  EXTINGUISHED NOTE: APP-001-D1 is LIT because CC-735 is CLOSED. OR    Seal Injection flow  ADEQUATE Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 41 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Seal Injection flow  GREATER THAN 6 GPM PER RCP      RO (Step 11) CHECK RCS Temperatures:    With ANY RCP running, RCS average temperature  STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547&deg;F      RO (Step 11 RNO) IF temperature is LESS THAN 547&deg;F AND lowering, THEN PERFORM the following: NOTE:  Due to the unisolable Steam Rupture the RCS temperature is lowering. STOP dumping steam. IF RCS cooldown continues, THEN REDUCE total AFW flow to minimum for decay heat removal. MAINTAIN total AFW flow GREATER THAN 300 gpm UNTIL S/G Narrow Range level is GREATER THAN 9%[18%] in at least one S/G. IF RCS cooldown continues, THEN CLOSE MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves. NOTE: The valves have failed OPEN and cannot be CLOSED from the RTGB.      RO (Step 12) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Spray Valves:    CHECK PZR PORVs  CLOSED    CHECK Normal PZR Spray Valves  CLOSED    CHECK Aux PZR Spray Valve  CLOSED      RO (Step 13) CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped:    CHECK RCPs  ANY RUNNING Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 42 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK SI Pumps  AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW    CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs  LESS THAN 13&deg;F[32&deg;F]      CRS (Step 13.c RNO) GO TO Step 14.      RO (Step 14) CHECK If S/G Secondary Pressure Boundaries Are Intact: NOTE: All Steam Generator pressures are lowering uncontrollably. NONE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER    NONE COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED      CRS (Step 14 RNO) PERFORM the following:    RESET SPDS AND INITIATE monitoring of Critical Safety Functions Status Trees. GO TO EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, Step 1. NOTE: The CRS will transition to EOP-E-2. EOP-E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION      BOP (Step 1) CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass valves For Faulted S/G(s) CLOSED:    S/G A:    V13A    MS353A    S/G B:    V13B    MS353B    S/G C:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 43 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    V13C    MS353C      BOP (Step 1 RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as necessary. NOTE: The valves have failed OPEN and cannot be CLOSED from the RTGB.      BOP (Step 2) CHECK If ANY S/G Secondary Pressure Boundary Is Intact    CHECK pressures in ALL S/Gs  ANY STABLE OR RISING NOTE: All Steam Generator pressures are lowering uncontrollably.      BOP (Step 2 RNO) IF ALL S/G pressures are lowering in an uncontrolled manner, THEN PERFORM the following:    RESET SPDS. GO TO EOPECA2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization Of All Steam Generators, Step 1. NOTE: The CRS will transition to EOP-ECA-2.1. EOP-ECA-2.1, UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS      RO/ BOP Foldout Page:    SI REINITIATION CRITERIA    EOP-E-2 TRANSITION CRITERIA    IF ANY S/G pressure rises at ANYTIME, EXCEPT while performing SI Termination in Steps 10 THROUGH 19, THEN GO TO EOPE2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, Step 1. NOTE: This criteria is expected to be applicable while in EOP-ECA-2.1. EOP-E-3 TRANSITION CRITERIA Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 44 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCHOVER CRITERIA    AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA      BOP (Step 1) CHECK Secondary Pressure Boundary: NOTE: The valves have failed OPEN and cannot be CLOSED from the RTGB. CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves - CLOSED      BOP/ CRS (Step 1.a RNO) Manually OR locally CLOSE valve(s) as necessary, ONE S/G loop at a time:    S/G A NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO. This action will NOT be taken until Step 11 of EOP-ECA-2.1, AFTER Phase "A" Containment Isolation is RESET. V1-3A    MS-353A    S/G B    V1-3B    MS-353B    S/G C    V1-3C    MS-353C  BOP  CHECK Feedwater Isolation:    FW Reg valves - CLOSED    FW Reg Bypass valves - CLOSED    FW Header Section valves - CLOSED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 45 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP  CHECK Steam Driven AFW Pump Steam Shutoff Valves - CLOSED: NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use codes listed BELOW. V1-8A, SDAFW PUMP STEAM ISOLATION (MCC-5, CMPT-16F) IRF EPSMCC5_189 f:RACK_OUT    V1-8B, SDAFW PUMP STEAM ISOLATION (MCC-6, CMPT-16M) IRF EPSMCC6_226 f:RACK_OUT    V1-8C, SDAFW PUMP STEAM ISOLATION (MCC-6, CMPT-18M) IRF EPSMCC6_227 f:RACK_OUT  BOP  CHECK S/G Steam Line PORVs - CLOSED  BOP  CHECK Faulted S/G(s) Blowdown AND Blowdown Sample Valves - CLOSED    CHECK valve status using ERFIS/SPDS. BOP  Locally ENSURE the following valves CLOSED: (pipe jungle above/right of associated V1-8 valves): NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the area has too much steam, and that entry cannot be made. BYPASS DRN & WARM-UP LINE TO AFW PUMP    MS-20    MS-29    MS-38    STEAM LINE BEFORE SEAT DRAIN ROOT ISOL    MS-19    MS-28    MS-37    STEAM LINE AFTER SEAT DRAIN ROOT ISOL Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 46 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    MS-21    MS-30    MS-39      BOP/ CRS (Step 2) CHECK for adequate Shutdown Margin: NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/Chemistry to address the samples. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/Chemistry. SAMPLE RCS for boron    SAMPLE PZR for boron    CHECK Shutdown Margin - ADEQUATED FOR COLD SHUTDOWN (When results available)      RO/ BOP (Step 3) CONTROL Feed Flow to MINIMIZE RCS Cooldown:    CHECK cooldown rate in RCS Cold Legs - LESS THAN 100&deg;F in the last 60 minutes      BOP (Step 3.a RNO) LOWER feed flow to 60 gpm to each S/G. NOTE: The crew may take various actions to reduce FW flow to 60 gpm to each S/G, including stopping AFW Pump(s), adjusting Pump discharge valves and/or directing that the AO locally adjust flow (If so, Booth Instructor use codes listed BELOW).      BOP (Step 3.b) CHECK S/G Narrow Range level in ALL S/Gs - LESS THAN 50%    CHECK RCS Hot Leg temperatures - STABLE OR LOWERING Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 47 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK ANY S/G Narrow Range Level - LESS THAN 9% [18%]  BOP/ CRS  OPEN MDAFW HEADER DISCHARGE Valve breakers: NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use codes listed BELOW. V2-16A, MCC-9, CMPT-2ML IRF EPSMCC9_255 f:RACK_OUT    V2-16C, MCC-9, CMPT-3J IRF EPSMCC9_256 f:RACK_OUT    V2-16A, MCC-10, CMPT-4C IRF EPSMCC10_264 f:RACK_OUT    V2-16B,MCC-10, CMPT-4F IRF EPSMCC10_266 f:RACK_OUT  BOP/ CRS  THROTTLE AFFECTED S/G MDAFW HDR DISCH valve to establish a MINIMUM of 60 gpm  to the AFFECTED S/G NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. S/G A - V2-16A IRF CFW009 r: 35 f:2.2    S/G B - V2-16B IRF CFW010 r: 33 f:2    S/G C - V2-16C IRF CFW011 r: 31 f:2    Examiner NOTE: When AFW flow is throttled to 60 gpm to each S/G a Red Path will exist on the HEAT SINK CSFST. The operator will address FRP-H.1 and immediately return to EOP-ECA-2.1.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 48 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:  Control the AFW flow rate to not less than 60 gpm per SG in order to minimize the RCS cooldown rate before an EXTREME (Red Path) challenge develops to the RCS Integrity CSF  Safety Significance:  Failure to control the AFW flow rate to the SGs leads to an unnecessary and avoidable extreme challenge to the integrity CSF. Also, failure to perform the critical task increases the challenges to the subcriticality CSF beyond which is irreparably introduced by the postulated plant conditions. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes a demonstrated inability by the operator to take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety. It also fails to prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.      RO (Step 4) CHECK if RCPs Should be Stopped:    CHECK RCPs - ANY RUNNING    CHECK SI Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE Of DELIVERING FLOW    CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs - LESS THAN 13&deg;F [32&deg;F]      CRS (Step 4.c RNO) OBSERVE CAUTION prior to Step 5 AND GO TO Step 5      RO (Step 5) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Block Valves:    CHECK power to PORV Block Valves - AVAILABLE    CHECK PORVs - CLOSED    CHECK PORV Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN      BOP (Step 6) Check Secondary Radiation:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 49 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    REQUEST periodic activity samples of ALL S/Gs NOTE:  The CRS may call RP/Chemistry to address the samples. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as RP/Chemistry. CHECK unisolated secondary radiation monitors - HAVE REMAINED NORMAL    R-15, CONDENSER AIR EJECTOR GAS    R-19s S/G Blowdown Radiation    R-31s, STEAMLINE RADIATION MONITORS  CRS  CHECK secondary sample results - NORMAL (When results available)      RO (Step 7) CHECK If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped:    CHECK RHR pumps - ANY RUNNING WITH SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST    CHECK RCS pressure:    Pressure - GREATER THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG]    Pressure - STABLE OR RISING    RESET SI    STOP RHR pumps    CHECK RCS pressure remains - GREATER THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG]      RO (Step 8) CHECK IF CV Spray Should Be Stopped:    CHECK CV Spray Pumps - ANY RUNNING      CRS (Step 8.a RNO) GO TO Step 9.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 50 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      RO (Step 9) CHECK RWST Level - GREATER THAN 27%      RO (Step 10) RESET SI      RO (Step 11) RESET Containment Isolation:    PHASE A NOTE: The CRS has previously dispatched an AO to locally CLOSE an MSIV. Booth Instructor: AFTER Phase "A" Containment Isolation is RESET in Step 11, use: DMF MSS03A DOR diMSSDDI049 To locally CLOSE the "A" MSIV. 30 seconds later report that the "A" MSIV has been CLOSED. NOTE: The "A' S/G will rise in comparison to the "B" and "C" S/G's and the criteria for item #2 on the Foldout Page will be met. However, the transition back to EOP-E-2 cannot take place until the SI Termination Step is complete (Step 19). PHASE B Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 51 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 12) RESET IVSW System: NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use: IRF SIS026 f:RESET IRF SIS027 f:RESET and report after 1 minute that the IVSW System has been reset. IVSW RESET PCV-1922A (In Relay Cabinet ARP-1)    IVSW RESET PCV-1922B (In Relay Cabinet ARP-2)      RO (Step 13) ESTABLISH Instrument Air To CV:    CHECK APP-002-F7, INSTR AIR HDR O PRESS alarm - EXTINGUISHED    RESET IA PCV-1716, INSTRUMENT AIR ISOLATION TO CV    CHECK IA PCV-1716 - OPEN      RO (Step 14) CHECK if SI Accumulators Should Be Isolated:    CHECK at least two RCS Hot Leg temperatures -LESS THAN 430&deg;F    CHECK power to Accumulator Discharge Valves - ENERGIZED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 52 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 14.b RNO) RESTORE power to Accumulator Discharge Valves by closing the following: NOTE: The CRS/RO will dispatch an AO to CLOSE the Accumulator Isolation Valve motor breakers. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use: IRF EPSMCC5_204 f:RACK_IN IRF EPSMCC5_205 f:RACK_IN IRF EPSMCC6_232 f:RACK_IN report after 2 minutes that the breakers are CLOSED. MCC-5 CMPT 9F (SI-865C)    MCC-5 CMPT 14F (SI-865A)    MCC-6 CMPT 10J (SI-865B)    CLOSE ALL Accumulator Discharge Valves      BOP (Step 15) CHECK Power Supply to Charging Pumps -  OFFSITE POWER AVAILABLE      RO (Step 16) ESTABLISH Charging Flow:    CHECK Charging Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING    ESTABLISH desired charging flow:    START additional Charging Pump(s) as necessary    ADJUST the following as necessary to maintain proper Seal Injection AND desired Charging flow:    Charging Pump Speed Controller(s)    HIC-121, CHARGING FLOW Controller Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 53 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Seal Water Flow Control Valves    MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 gpm AND 20 gpm per RCP UNLESS Seal Injection isolated      RO (Step 17) CHECK If ECCS Flow Should Be Terminated:    CHECK SI pumps - ANY RUNNING    CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs - GREATER THAN 18&deg;F [37&deg;F]    Pressure - GREATER THAN 1650 PSIG      CRS (Step 17.c RNO) OBSERVE CAUTION prior to STEP 3 AND RETURN TO Step 3. NOTE: Based on the EOP-ECA-2.1 Foldout Page criteria being met, the CRS may transition back to EOP-E-2, and isolate the "B" and "C" S/G's. If not, continue. Pressure  STABLE OR RISING    PZR level  GREATER THAN 14% [31%]        (Step 18) STOP ECCS Pumps:    STOP SI pumps    CHECK RHR Pumps  ANY RUNNING WITH SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST    STOP RHR Pumps        (Step 19) CHECK ECCS Flow Not Required:    CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs  GREATER THAN 18&deg;F [37&deg;F]
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 54 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK PZR level  GREATER THAN 14% [31%]          EOP-E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION      BOP (Step 1) CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass valves For Faulted S/G(s) CLOSED:    S/G A: NOTE: The "A" MSIV and Bypass Valves are CLOSED. V13A    MS353A    S/G B: NOTE: The "B" MSIV is failed OPEN. V13B    MS353B    S/G C: NOTE: The "C" MSIV is failed OPEN. V13C    MS353C      BOP (Step 1 RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as necessary. NOTE: The valves have failed OPEN and cannot be CLOSED from the RTGB. The CRS may dispatch an AO to locally CLOSE one of the two failed OPEN MSIVs. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO. BOP (Step 2) CHECK If ANY S/G Secondary Pressure Boundary Is Intact    CHECK pressures in ALL S/Gs  ANY STABLE OR RISING NOTE: The "A" S/G pressure is stable for plant conditions.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 55 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 3) IDENTIFY Faulted S/G(s):    CHECK pressures in ALL S/Gs      ANY S/G PRESSURE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER NOTE: The "B" and "C" S/Gs are still faulted. OR    ANY S/G COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED      BOP (Step 4) ISOLATE Faulted S/G(s):    CHECK Main Feedwater Reg Valve, Reg Bypass Valve AND Header Section Valve to Faulted S/G(s) shut:    S/G B valves  CLOSED    FCV488    FCV489    V26B    S/G C valves  CLOSED    FCV498    FCV499    V26C    RESET SI    CLOSE AFW Discharge Valve(s) to Faulted S/G(s):    S/G B valves  CLOSED    V214B    V216B NOTE: The BOP will contact the AO and direct that V2-16B be locally CLOSED. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use IRF CFW010 f:0. S/G C valves  CLOSED    V214C Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 56 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    V216C NOTE: The BOP will contact the AO and direct that V2-16C be locally CLOSED. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use IRF CFW011 f:0. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.
NRC SCENARIO N16-1-5 TURNOVER SHEET  1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life: EOL b) Reactor Power: 4.5% c) Turbine Load: 0 MWe  d) Boron Concentration: 511 ppm e) Rod Height: 148 CB 'D' f) RCS Pressure: 2235 psig g) PZR Level: 26.4%  h) Xenon: Equilibrium  2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. # Description None    3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) The "B" Condensate Pump is OOS. 4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a) None 5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a) "A" Condensate Pump 6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a) LI-1417A, Hotwell Level Indication is OOS (I&C Investigating). b) RTGB Annunciator APP-006-F7, "PWST HI/LO LVL," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). 7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a) Unrestricted (NOT-PROTECTED) 8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a) Raise power to 30% IAW GP-005 starting with Section 6.3 9. TURNOVER INFORMATION  a) The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. 10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a) The Reactor Engineer (RE) is available in the Control Room b) The RE recommends a 7,485 gallon dilution, made in several 200-300 gallon batch additions c) The RE recommends that Control Bank D be at approximately 160 steps upon achieving 30% 11. RISK  a) YELLOW (Planned power increase)   
 
PROGRAM: H B Robinson Operations Training  MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam    Scenario N16-1-6   
 
==REFERENCES:==
: 1. Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating" (Amendment 203) 2. AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction" (Rev 33) 3. OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When Greater Than 25% Power" (Rev 62) 4. OP-301, "Chemical And Volume Control System" (Rev 112) 5. APP-008 "SW, CW, & TURB GEN AUX" (Rev 67) 6. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, "Service Water System (SWS)" (Amendment 176) 7. Technical Specification LCO 3.6.6, "Containment Spray and Cooling Systems" (Amendment 176) 8. AOP-018, "Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions" (Rev 31) 9. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6, "Component Cooling Water (CCW) System" (Amendment 176) 10. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.17, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)" (Amendment 223) 11. EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection"  (Rev 6) 12. EOP-ECA-0.0, "Loss of All AC Power" (Rev 4) 13. EOP-ES-1.1, SI Termination" (Rev 2) 14. EOP-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response" (Rev 7)  Validation Time: 100 minutes Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6  Facility: HB Robinson Scenario No.: 6 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners:  Operators: (SRO)    (RO)    (BOP)  Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "A" EDG is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 ACTION B.1, B.2, B.3.2.1 and B.3.2.2, and B.4. R-15, Condenser Air Ejector Gas Radiation Monitor is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-002-F8, "STA AIR HDR LO PRESS," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The "B" MFWP has experienced high noise/vibration over the last two hours (Maintenance is investigating).              Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*  Event Description  1 1 C-BOP C-SRO Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN 2 NA R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Lower Power 3  2 C-BOP C(TS)-SRO "C" Service Water Pump Trips  4 3 C-RO C(TS)-SRO DS Bus De-energizes/"C" CCW Pump Trips on Start 5 4 C-RO C-SRO "A" RCP Seal Failure 6 5 M-RO M-BOP M-SRO Loss of Offsite Power 7 5 C-BOP "B" EDG Fails to Start  8 6 NA DSDG Trips  9 7 C-BOP "D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start  * (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,    (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6  H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #6  The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "A" EDG is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 ACTION B.1, B.2, B.3.2.1 and B.3.2.2, and B.4. R-15, Condenser Air Ejector Gas Radiation Monitor is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-002-F8, "STA AIR HDR LO PRESS," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The "B" MFWP has experienced high noise/vibration over the last two hours (Maintenance is investigating).                                Shortly after taking the watch, HCV-1459, Heater Bypass Valve will fail OPEN. The crew will implement AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction," and close the valve. After the overpower transient is stabilized, the WCCS will call the control room and direct that reactor power be lowered to 50% for the purpose of removing the "B" Main Feedwater Pump from service. The operator will lower power in accordance with AOP-038, "Rapid Downpower."
After the power reduction is in progress, the "C" Service Water Pump will trip on overload. This will cause the running Service Water Booster Pump to trip as well. The operator will respond in accordance with various APP-008 annunciators and start a standby Service Water Pump; and then respond in accordance with APP-002-A through D8, "HVH WTR OUTLET LO FLOW," and re-start a Service Water Booster Pump. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, "Service Water System (SWS)," and Technical Specification LCO 3.6.6, "Containment Spray and Cooling Systems."    Following this, Breaker 52/32A will Trip de-energizing the DS Bus, and stopping the only running Charging Pump and CCW Pump. The operator may address AOP-018, "Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions," or various APP's to restore Charging and Seal Injection flow; and then APP-001-F5, CCW PMP LO PRESS, and ensure that the standby CCW Pump started. 10 seconds after the Standby CCW Pumps start, the "C" CCW Pump will trip, and only the "B" CCW will be left running. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6, "Component Cooling Water (CCW) System," and Technical Specification LCO 3.4.17, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)."    Next, a #1 Seal Failure will occur on the "A" RCP. The crew will implement AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions," trip the reactor, stop the pump, and three minutes after the pump is stopped, CLOSE the Seal Leakoff Valve. The crew will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."  Simultaneously, a Loss of Offsite Power will occur on the reactor trip, and the "B" Emergency Diesel Generator will fail to automatically start. Additionally, the DS DG will trip.      Upon entry into EOP-E-0, the operator will determine that both ESF buses are de-energized and transition to EOP-ECA-0.0, "Loss of All AC Power." The operator will subsequently start the "B" EDG by depressing the SI Actuate Pushbutton, restore power to Bus E-2, and transition back to EOP-E-0. When Bus E-2 is re-energized, the "D" Service Water Pump will fail to sequence automatically and will need to be manually started. Upon transition back to EOP-E-0, the crew will complete the immediate actions of EOP-E-0, and continue with AOP-018.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6  The scenario will terminate when the crew has terminated Safety Injection and re-established Charging/Seal Injection in Step 6 of ES-1.1. Critical Tasks:  Energize at Least One AC Emergency Bus Before Defeating the Auto Loading of the Safeguards Equipment in EOP-ECA-0.0  Safety Significance:  Failure to energize an ac emergency bus constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency power capacity. Failure to perform the critical task also results in needless degradation of any barrier to fission product release, specifically of the RCS barrier at the point of the RCP seals. Additionally, failure to perform the critical task results in the unnecessary continuation of a situation in which RCS inventory is being lost uncontrollably and cannot be replaced. This situation is equivalent to mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity at a time when a small-break LOCA is in progress. In this case, at least one ac emergency bus can be energized from the control room. Failure to perform the critical task means that RCS inventory lost through the RCP seals cannot be replaced. It also means that the RCP seals remain without cooling and gradually deteriorate. As the seals deteriorate the rate of RCS inventory loss increases. Manually Start SW Pump for EDG Cooling within 40 Minutes of starting the "B" EDG  Safety Significance:  Failure to manually start the SW pump under the postulated plant conditions means that the EDG is running without SW cooling. Running the EDG without SW cooling leads to a high-temperature condition that can result in EDG failure due to damage caused by engine overheating. Under the postulated plant conditions, the running EDG is the only operable EDG. The calculated maximum time an EDG may operate without cooling to preclude adverse effects is 40 minutes. Since during the first 40 minutes of EDG operation in this scenario there are two procedural cues to check, and if needed, start a SW Pump, it is believed that failure to perform the critical task constitutes mis-operation or incorrect performance in which the crew does not prevent "degraded- emergency power capacity."
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6  SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS              Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  Sim. Setup Reset to Temp IC 613  T = 0 Malfunctions:  EDG "A" OOS:  IRF EPSV480E1_120, d:0 f: RACK_OUT (EDG BKR Racked Out)  IRF EDG01A, d:0 (EDG "A" OOS)  IRF EDG003, d:0 f: Local (EDG "A" OOS)  PLACE RED CAP on the RTGB Control Switch for  EDG "A" & 52/17B  Place GREEN CAPS on the RTGB Control Switches BELOW (See OMM-048, Attachment 9):  HVS-5 RTGB Switch  HVE-17 RTGB Switch  52/27B RTGB Switch  52/28B RTGB Switch  "B" EDG RTGB Switch  V1-8A RTGB Switch  V1-8B RTGB Switch  V1-8C RTGB Switch  V2-14A RTGB Switch  V2-14B RTGB Switch  V2-14C RTGB Switch  Protected Switchyard  Place GREEN DOT on APP-010-D2  R-15 OOS  IRF RMS049 f:PWR_OFF Place WHITE DOT on R-15 Place GREEN DOT on APP-036-D8 Place GREEN DOT on APP-036-E7  RTGB Annunciator APP-002-F8 failed ON  IMF ANNXN02F08 f:ALARM_ON Place WHITE DOT on APP-002-F8  Insert the following:  $006_RTA_TRIP IMF EDG01B ("B" EDG fails to START on Rx Trip)  IMF EDG04E f:TRAIN_B ("D" SW Pump fails to Sequence ON when E-2 re-energized)  Verify that the "A" Charging Pump is RUNNING and the "B" and "C" Charging Pumps are OFF.
Place the Simulator in RUN and ACKNOWLEDGE all alarms. Perform Attachment 2 (Simulator Setup For Exams) of TAP-411.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6    Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  Crew Briefing  1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements  2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew. 3. Provide the crew with the following:  Copy of Technical Specifications/Basis  4. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms. T-0 Begin Familiarization Period  At direction of examiner Execute Lesson Plan for Simulator Scenario N16-1-6. At direction of examiner  Event 1 IMF CFW36  Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN At direction of examiner  Event 2 Lower Power  NOTE: to initiate this event, the WCCS will call and inform the operator that reactor power be lowered to 50% for the purpose of removing the "B" Main Feedwater Pump from service. At direction of examiner Event 3  IMF SWS01C  "C" Service Water Pump Trips At direction of examiner  Event 4 IRF EPSV480DS_063  f:TRIP  IMF CCW01C d:10  DS Bus De-energizes/"C" CCW Pump Trips on Start  At direction of examiner Event 5  IMF RCS13A r:2:00 f:50  "A" RCP Seal Failure Post-Rx Trip Event 6 IMF EPS13  Loss of Offsite Power  NOTE: This event occurs on the Rx Trip Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6    Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  Post-Rx Trip  Event 7  "B" EDG Fails to Start  NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0  Post-Rx Trip  Event 8 IMF EDG01C d:2 DSDG Trips NOTE: This event occurs on the Rx Trip  Post-Rx Trip  Event 9  "D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start  NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0      Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page  9 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN      Shortly after taking the watch, HCV-1459, Heater Bypass Valve will fail OPEN. The crew will implement AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction," and close the valve. Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF CFW36  Indications Available:    Rx Power starts to RISE  RTGB Annunciator APP-007-D7, HTR 3A HI/LO LVL  RTGB Annunciator APP-007-D8, HTR 3B HI/LO LVL  HCV-1459 Red and Green status lights are LIT  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    NOTE: The crew may enter and exit TS LCO 3.4.1 (DNB) one or more times during this event. AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION      BOP (Step 1) CHECK FRVs  OPERATING PROPERLY (MANUAL OR AUTO):    FCV478    FCV488    FCV498      RO/ BOP (Step 2) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint  BEING APPROACHED NOTE: A Power Limit Warning is possible during this event which will require a reduction in power.      CRS (Step 2 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is approached, THEN TRIP the reactor and GO TO EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection. NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. GO TO Step 4.      RO (Step 4) CHECK Reactor Power  LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page  10 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO/ BOP (Step 4 RNO) IF reactor power exceeds 100%, THEN REDUCE turbine load as necessary using turbine valve limiter to maintain reactor power less than or equal to 100%.      CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      CRS (Step 6) GO TO Appropriate Step From Table Below:    Other -Step 35      BOP (Step 35) REDUCE Turbine Load Using Attachment 1 to Match Feedwater And Steam Flows WHILE CONTINUING WITH This Procedure. NOTE:  The CRS may assign the BOP to perform this action. BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1. Other Examiners follow AOP-010 Actions, Step 36, on Page 12. AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION ATTACHMENT 1, REDUCING TURBINE LOAD      BOP (Step 1) REDUCE Turbine Load at 1%/MIN to 5%/ MIN to achieve Goal Specified in Procedure Body:    CHECK control rods - IN AUTOMATIC    CHECK turbine mode - AUTOMATIC    DEPRESS IMP IN pushbutton    SET desired load rate    DEPRESS GO or HOLD pushbutton as needed to reduce turbine load    BORATE using OP-301, RCS Boration Quick Checklist, as necessary to maintain AFD within the operating band Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page  11 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      BOP (Step 2) CHECK Goal of Load Reduction -  REACHED    To achieve a target power level    OR    To match steam flow with feed flow    OR    To raise MFP suction pressure      BOP (Step 3) CHECK Current Loading for the following Pumps - LESS THAN MAXIMUM NOTE: The BOP will contact the Outside AO to check associated parameters. Booth Instructor report data from Attachment 10.2 of OST-013 (See Below). MFP - 0.710 KILOAMPS "A" MFP - .60 KAMPs "B" MFP - .59 KAMPs    Condensate Pump - 370 AMPS "A" MCP -  360 AMPs "B" MCP - 350 AMPs    HDP - 90 AMPS "A" HDP -  79 AMPs "B" HDP - 78 AMPs      BOP (Step 4) Stop Load Reduction      BOP (Step 5) NOTIFY CRS/SM that Load Reduction is Complete       
 
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page  12 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION    Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE. CRS (Step 36) DISPATCH an Operator to Observe Valve positions: NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the LCV-1530A and B are operating normally. LCV-1530A, HDT LEVEL CONTROL VALVE    LCV-1530B, HEATER DRAIN PUMPS SUCTION DUMP TO CONDENSER      BOP (Step 37) DETERMINE If a Heater Drain Tank Level Control Valve has Failed:    CHECK HDT level control valve or controller - HAS MALFUNCTIONED      CRS (Step 37.a RNO) IF HDT Level is controlling correctly, THEN OBSERVE NOTE prior to Step 40 and GO TO Step 40.      CRS (Step 40 ) CHECK for Leak - CAUSING FW TRANSIENT NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO to look for leaks, however, the reason for being in the AOP is because the Heater Bypass valve has opened. Visual indication of leak    FW Heater level alarms    FW Heater normal and alternate drain valve positions level dump valve positions    FW Heater #1 & #2 emergency dump valve positions Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page  13 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Gland Steam Condenser abnormal indications/alarms      CRS (Step 40 RNO) OBSERVE NOTE prior to Step 43 and GO TO Step 43.      CRS (Step 43) DETERMINE If a HDP has malfunctioned:    DISPATCH an operator to evaluate HDPs for damage: NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the HDPs are operating normally. LISTEN for unusual noise    OBSERVE pump shaft for breakage    OBSERVE for abnormal running current:    A - 4KV Bus 1 CMPT-5    B - 4KV Bus 4 CMPT-25    CHECK pump damage - INDICATED      CRS (Step 43.b RNO) OBSERVE NOTE prior to Step 46 and GO TO Step 46.      CRS (Step 46) DETERMINE if a Condensate Pump has malfunctioned:    DISPATCH an operator to evaluate Condensate Pumps for damage: NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the Condensate Pumps are operating normally. LISTEN for unusual noise    OBSERVE pump shaft for breakage Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page  14 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    OBSERVE for abnormal running current:    A - 4KV Bus 1 CMPT-6    B - 4KV Bus 4 CMPT-22    CHECK pump damage - INDICATED      CRS (Step 46.b RNO) OBSERVE CAUTION and NOTE prior to Step 49 and GO TO Step 49.      BOP (Step 49) CHECK for HCV-1459 Failure:    CHECK HCV-1459, LP HEATERS BYP - OPEN      CRS/ BOP (Step 50) DISPATCH an Operator to monitor MFP Suction Pressures: NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute the suction pressure for both pumps. Use actual indications from  Simulator P&ID screen CFW3. PI-1433 - "A" FW PUMP SUCTION PRESSURE    PI-1434 - "B" FW PUMP SUCTION PRESSURE      CRS/ BOP (Step 51) CHECK MFP Suction Pressures - LESS THAN 400 PSIG      CRS (Step 51 RNO) GO TO Step 54.      BOP (Step 54) CLOSE HCV-1459 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page  15 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Step 55) CONTACT I&C to Troubleshoot and Correct HCV-1459 Problem NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/I&C to address the Valve failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/I&C.      CRS (Step 56) GO TO Step 58      BOP (Step 58) CHECK S/G Level - AT OR TRENDING TO PROGRAM      RO (Step 59) CHECK Tavg - AT OR TRENDING TO Tref      CRS (Step 60) CONTACT Maintenance to Troubleshoot and Correct the Feedwater Problem NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/I&C to address the Valve failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/I&C.      CRS (Step 61) IMPLEMENT EALs NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.      RO (Step 62) CHECK Total Reactor Power Change - LESS THAN 15%      RO (Step 63) CHECK APP-005-B5, ROD BANDS A/B/C/D LO LIMIT - EXTINGUISHED      RO (Step 64) MONITOR Axial Flux Difference to Ensure Compliance with TS 3.2.3 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page  16 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 65) NOTIFY Load Dispatcher of Unit's Load Capability NOTE: The BOP will call Load Dispatcher. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Load Dispatcher.      CRS (Step 66) RETURN TO Procedure and Step In Effect    NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 2 Page  17 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Lower Power      After the overpower transient is stabilized, the WCCS will call the control room and direct that reactor power be lowered to 50% for the purpose of removing the "B" Main Feedwater Pump from service. The operator will lower power in accordance with AOP-038, "Rapid Downpower." Booth Operator Instructions:    As WCCS, call Control Room and state the following:        "A step change has occurred on the "B" Main Feedwater Pump vibrations, and station management has directed that reactor power be lowered to 50% using AOP-038 at 1-2%/minute for the purpose of removing the "B" Main Feedwater Pump from service. Indications Available:    NA    Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER      BOP (Step 1) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using The Plant Page System      RO (Step 2) DETERMINE Corrected Boration And Target Rod Height For Target Power Level Using Most Recently Performed OST947, OPERATIONS REACTIVITY PLAN    Target Load Reduction Rate __%/min    Target Power Level ___    Target Rod Height ___ NOTE: The RO will determine approximately 144 Steps (2%/minute). Corrected Boration ___ NOTE: The RO will determine approximately 146 gallons (2%/minute).      RO (Step 3) CHECK Required Power Reduction Rate  LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 5%/MINUTE Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 2 Page  18 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Lower Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Step 4) PERFORM Brief Of Control Room Personnel To Include The Following:    Reason for downpower    Target Power Level    Target Rod Height    Rate of load reduction    Amount of boric acid addition      RO (Step 5) ENERGIZE All Available PZR Heaters    PZR HTR CONTROL GROUP    PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP A    PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP B      RO (Step 6) CHECK Rod Control  IN AUTO      RO (Step 7) INITIATE Boration Using Attachment 1, RCS Boration, While Continuing With This Procedure    Examiner NOTE:  The CRS will assign the RO to perform this action. RO Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1. Other Examiners follow AOP-038 Actions, Step 8, on Page 19. AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER ATTACHMENT 1, RCS BORATION      RO (Step 1) PLACE The RCS MAKEUP MODE Selector Switch In BORATE Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 2 Page  19 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Lower Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 2) IF Frequent Boric Acid Transfer Pump Starts Are Anticipated, THEN PLACE Boric Acid Transfer Pump Switch Aligned To BLEND To ON.      RO (Step 3) SET YIC113, BORIC ACID TOTALIZER to amount determined in Main Body Step 2      RO (Step 4) Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to START      RO (Step 5) IF Boric Acid flow is NOT achieving the desired effect, THEN PLACE FCV113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, in MAN AND manually Adjust controller FCV113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, using the UP and DOWN pushbuttons      RO (Step 6) WHEN the desired amount of Boric Acid has been added to the RCS OR the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Switch is placed in STOP, THEN ENSURE the following:    FCV113A, BA TO BLENDER, closes. FCV113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, closes. IF in AUTO, THEN operating Boric Acid Pump stops. RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF.      AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER    Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/BOP continue HERE. BOP (Step 8) INITIATE Turbine Load Reduction While Continuing With This Procedure    CHECK EH Turbine Control  IN OPER AUTO Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 2 Page  20 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Lower Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    PREPARE For Turbine Load Reduction As Follows:    CHECK IMP IN  ILLUMINATED      BOP (Step 8.b.1 RNO 1) IF Turbine Load reduction is available using IMP IN, THEN PERFORM the following:    DEPRESS IMP IN pushbutton    CHECK IMP IN light illuminated    CHECK IMP OUT light extinguished      BOP (Step 8.b) SET desired load in the SETTER    SELECT the desired Load Rate    DEPRESS the GO pushbutton to initiate Turbine Load reduction      BOP (Step 9) ADJUST Turbine Load To Control Tavg Within 5&deg;F Of Tref Using One Of The Following:    ADJUST Load Rate    OR    DEPRESS GO and HOLD pushbuttons      CRS/ BOP (Step 10) INITIATE Notification of The Following: NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM/WCC/Communicator to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge. Load Dispatcher of load reduction    E&C to control secondary chemistry    RC for elevated radiation levels in CV Pump Bays and Pipe Alley    Oncall Duty Manager to activate the Event Response Team Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 2 Page  21 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Lower Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    E&C for impending 15% power change for I131 sampling within 2 to 6 hours    E&C for impending power reduction greater than 20% terminate zinc injection    NRC within 4 hours      BOP (Step 11) CHECK Auxiliary Boilers  AT LEAST ONE OPERATING      BOP (Step 11 RNO) IF Plant Shutdown is required, THEN NOTIFY AO to start at least one Auxiliary Boiler per OP401, AUXILIARY HEATING SYSTEM. NOTE: The BOP will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.      RO (Step 12) CHECK Tavg  WITHIN 5&deg;F OF Tref      RO (Step 13) CHECK Axial Flux Distribution  WITHIN TARGET BAND      BOP (Step 14) CHECK APP006F5, STEAM DUMP ARMED  EXTINGUISHED      RO (Step 15) CHECK Any Of The Following Conditions  MET:    Target load/power has been reached    Load reduction is no longer required    CRS/SM directs termination of load reduction    STOP Rapid Downpower using Attachment 3, Termination Of Rapid Downpower      At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 3 Page  22 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Service Water Pump Trips      After the power reduction is in progress, the "C" Service Water Pump will trip on overload. This will cause the running Service Water Booster Pump to trip as well. The operator will respond in accordance with various APP-008 annunciators and start a standby Service Water Pump; and then respond in accordance with APP-002-A through D8, "HVH WTR OUTLET LO FLOW," and re-start a Service Water Booster Pump. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, "Service Water System (SWS)," and Technical Specification LCO 3.6.6, "Containment Spray and Cooling Systems." Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF SWS01C  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-008-F4, SW PMP A/B/C/D OVLD  RTGB Annunciator APP-008-F7, SOUTH SW HDR LO PRESS  RTGB Annunciator APP-008-F8, NORTH SW HDR LO PRESS  SW North Header Pressure PI-1616 indicating 12 psig  SW South Header Pressure PI-1684 indicating 13 psig  "C" SW Pump Green and Red status lights LIT  "A' SW Booster Pump trips  RTGB Annunciator APP-002-A8 THROUGH D8, HVH-1(2-4) WTR OUTLET LO FLOW  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    NOTE: The crew will likely place the Turbine in HOLD. APP-008-F4, SW PMP A/B/C/D OVLD      BOP (Step 1) IF an operating SW Pump has tripped, THEN PERFORM the following:    START a Standby Pump. DISPATCH operator to check breaker(s) AND Current Limiter Fuses: SW Pump C - 480V Bus E2 (CMP 24A) NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 10 minutes that the "C" SW Pump motor is "Hot to the touch."    THROTTLE CCW Heat Exchanger Return Valves, as necessary, to maintain 40 to 50 psig in the SW Headers. NOTE: This action is NOT needed (Starting the "D" SW Pump will restore system pressure).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 3 Page  23 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Service Water Pump Trips      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Step 2) IF a single-phase open circuit condition is suspected ENTER AOP-026. NOTE: This action will need further investigation. APP-002-A8, HVH-1 WTR OUTLET LO FLOW      BOP (Step 1) IF the operating Service Water Booster Pump has tripped, THEN start Standby Service Water Booster Pump.      BOP (Step 2) IF no Service Water Booster Pump can be started, THEN-.. NOTE: The Standby SW Booster Pump will start.      BOP (Step 3) IF V6-33A (SW Booster Pump 'A' Supply to HVH-1) has closed, THEN-. NOTE: V6-33A has NOT CLOSED.      BOP (Step 4) IF a Service Water rupture outside of the HVH boundaries is indicated, THEN-.. NOTE: There is no SW Piping Rupture.      BOP (Step 5) IF required, THEN dispatch personnel to check local indications: NOTE: The CRS/BOP may dispatch an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the system flows/pressures are normal and that the standby SW Booster Pump is NOT rotating in reverse. FI-1698A (HVH-1 Outlet Flow). PI-1646A (HVH-1 Outlet Pressure). Standby Service Water Booster Pump rotation.      BOP (Step 6) IF standby Service Water Booster Pump check valve is stuck open, THEN-.. NOTE: The standby SW Booster Pump Check Valve is NOT stuck OPEN.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 3 Page  24 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Service Water Pump Trips      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 7) IF a SW leak exists inside the CV, THEN-.. NOTE: There is no SW leak in the CV.      CRS (Step 8) IF at least 800 gpm flow through HVH-1 can NOT be established, THEN declare HVH-1 inoperable and refer to ITS LCO 3.6.6. NOTE: Once the standby SW Booster Pump is started LCO 3.6.6 will be met.      BOP (Step 9) IF required, THEN ensure correct valve alignment in accordance with OP-903, Service Water System. NOTE: This action will not be required.      BOP (Step 10) IF alarm is invalid, THEN -. NOTE: The alarm is valid. NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC to address the "C" SW Pump failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.        NOTE:  The CRS may address Technical Specifications. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.7, SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (SWS)      CRS LCO 3.7.7: Two SWS trains and the Turbine Building loop isolation valves shall be OPERABLE.      CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.      CRS ACTIONS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 3 Page  25 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Service Water Pump Trips      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION A.1 must be entered. NOTE: The "A" and "B" SW Pumps must declared inoperable within 4 hours because the "A" EDG is inoperable. A. One SWS train inoperable. A.1 NOTES: Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources- Operating," for emergency diesel generator made inoperable by SWS. Restore SWS train to OPERABLE status.
72 hours    TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.6, CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS      CRS LCO 3.6.6: Two containment spray trains and two containment cooling trains shall be OPERABLE.      CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.      CRS ACTIONS        CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION D.1 must be entered (Until SWBP is restarted). D. Two containment cooling trains inoperable. D.1 Restore one containment cooling train to OPERABLE status. 72 hours    NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief. NOTE: The crew will likely continue to down power. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 4 Page  26 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
DS Bus De-energizes/"C" CCW Pump Trips on Start      Following this, Breaker 52/32A will Trip de-energizing the DS Bus, and stopping the only running Charging Pump and CCW Pump. The operator may address AOP-018, "Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions," or various APP's to restore Charging and Seal Injection flow; and then APP-001-F5, CCW PMP LO PRESS, and ensure that the standby CCW Pump started. 10 seconds after the Standby CCW Pumps start, the "C" CCW Pump will trip, and only the "B" CCW will be left running. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6, "Component Cooling Water (CCW) System," and Technical Specification LCO 3.4.17, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)." Booth Operator Instructions:    IRF EPSV480DS_063 f:TRIP          IMF CCW01C d:10  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-001-B4, RCP SEAL INJ HI/LO FLOW  "A" Charging Pump trips  FR-124 indicates no Seal Injection flow  RTGB Annunciator APP-001-F4, CCW PMP MOTOR OVLD/TRIP  "A" CCW Pump trips  "B" and "C" CCW Pump auto start  "C" CCW Pump trips 10 seconds after start (Green and Red status lights are LIT)  RTGB Annunciator APP-036-H6, DS BUS SUPPLY BKR 52/32A TRIP  RTGB Annunciator APP-036-H8, DS BUS UNDER VOLT  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    NOTE: The RO may start a Charging Pump using the APP, and bypass AOP-018. APP-001-B4, RCP SEAL INJ HI/LO FLOW  RO (Step 1) DETERMINE if alarm is High or Low flow condition.      RO (Step 2) IF Number 1 Seal failure OR Loss of Seal Injection has occurred, THEN-. NOTE: A Number 1 Seal Failure has NOT occurred.      RO (Step 3) IF FR-124 is NOT available, THEN-. NOTE: FR-124 is available.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 4 Page  27 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
DS Bus De-energizes/"C" CCW Pump Trips on Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 4) PERFORM any of the following to establish adequate seal injection flow: Examiner NOTE: The crew may address AOP-018. If so, continue below. If not, proceed to Page 30 to address the CCW Pump failure. ADJUST position of HCV-121, Charging Flow    ADJUST Charging Pump speed    START additional Charging Pumps      RO (Step 5) IF required, THEN DISPATCH an operator to adjust RCP SEAL WATER FLOW CONTROL VALVE CVC-297A, CVC-297B OR CVC-297C IAW OP-301.      RO (Step 6) IF Seal Injection flow can NOT be maintained greater than 6 gpm, THEN REFER to ITS SR 3.4.17.1. NOTE: The CRS may enter AOP-018. AOP-018, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS      CRS (Step 1) MAKE PA announcement for Procedure Entry NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      CRS (Step 2) EVALUATE Plant Conditions AND GO to the Appropriate Section for RCP Malfunction Not Yet Addressed:    Loss of Seal Injection - Section C NOTE: The CRS will transition to Section C of AOP-018. AOP-018, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS SECTION C, LOSS OF SEAL INJECTION Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 4 Page  28 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
DS Bus De-energizes/"C" CCW Pump Trips on Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    NOTE: Power will be automatically restored to the DS Bus in 95 seconds. RO (Step 1) CHECK APP-001-D1, RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR LO FLOW alarm - ILLUMINATED      RO (Step 1 RNO) IF APP-001-D1 ILLUMINATES, THEN GO TO Step 2. NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. CRS  OBSERVE the NOTE prior to Step 11 AND GO TO Step 11.      RO (Step 11) DETERMINE if a Charging Pump Can be Started:    CHECK Charging System Piping - RUPTURED      CRS (Step 11.a RNO) GO TO Step 12      RO (Step 12) CHECK SI - INITIATED      CRS (Step 12 RNO) GO TO Step 14      RO (Step 14) ENSURE at Least ONE Charging Pump - RUNNING NOTE:  The RO will start the "B" and/or the "C" Charging Pump.      RO (Step 15) CHECK Seal Injection to RCPs:    ANY Seal Injection flow - LESS THAN 6 GPM    AND    ANY Thermal Barrier P - LESS THAN 5 inches Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 4 Page  29 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
DS Bus De-energizes/"C" CCW Pump Trips on Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Step 15 RNO) GO TO Step 47        (Step 47) ESTABLISH Charging Flow on FI-122A, CHARGING LINE FLOW- GREATER THAN 40 GPM      RO (Step 48) CHECK Normal Letdown - IN SERVICE      RO (Step 49) CONTROL charging and Letdown Flow to Maintain Pressurizer Level as follows:    Within +/- 5% Of Reference Level      RO (Step 50) ESTABLISH Normal Seal Injection    CHECK RCP Seal Injection - ALIGNED    CHECK RCP Seal Injection Flow - BETWEEN 8 GPM AND 13 GPM      RO (Step 51) CHECK Seal Injection Flow - ESTABLISH TO ALL RCPs      CRS (Step 52) IMPLEMENT the EALs NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.      CRS (Step 53) REFER to Technical Specification for any applicable LCOs    3.4.13 - RCS Operational Leakage    3.4.17 - CVCS    3.4.9 - PZR Level    3.4.4, 3.4.5, & 3.4.6 - RCS Loops Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 4 Page  30 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
DS Bus De-energizes/"C" CCW Pump Trips on Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 54) CHECK RCP Seal Cooling - ISOLATED      CRS (Step 54 RNO) OBSERVE the NOTE prior to Step 2 AND GO To the Main Body, Step 2 of this procedure.      AOP-018, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS      CRS (Step 2) EVALUATE Plant Conditions AND GO to the Appropriate Section for RCP Malfunction Not Yet Addressed:      CRS (Step 2 RNO) RETURN TO procedure and step in effect. NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC to address the failure of the DS Bus normal supply breaker. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC. NOTE: While both the "B" and the "C" CCW Pump started on low system pressure, the "C" CCW Pump has tripped shortly after start. The CRS will address the APP. APP-001-F4, CCW PMP MOTOR OVLD/TRIP      RO (Step 1) IF alarm is due to intentional operator action, THEN-      RO (Step 2) IF the running CCW Pump has tripped, THEN ENSURE Standby CCW Pump STARTED NOTE: Both the "B" and the "C" CCW Pump started on low system pressure, however, the "C" CCW Pump has tripped shortly after start.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 4 Page  31 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
DS Bus De-energizes/"C" CCW Pump Trips on Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      RO (Step 3) IF Standby CCW Pump can NOT be started, THEN-      RO (Step 4) IF FCV-626, THERM BAR FLOW CONT, closes due to pump start, THEN- NOTE: FCV-626 is OPEN.      (Step 5) IF CCW Pump tripped due to electrical fault, THEN DISPATCH an operator to check breaker and Current Limiter Fuses (E-1/E-2 breakers only) NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the "C" CCW Pump motor has an acrid smell.      CRS (Step 6) IF a single phase open circuit condition is suspected ENTER AOP-026 NOTE: This action will need further investigation. NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC to address the "C" CCW Pump failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.6, COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW) SYSTEM      CRS LCO 3.7.6 Two CCW trains powered from emergency power supplies shall be OPERABLE      CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.      CRS ACTIONS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 4 Page  32 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
DS Bus De-energizes/"C" CCW Pump Trips on Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION A.1 must be entered. NOTE: The "B" CCW Pump must declared inoperable within 4 hours because the "A" EDG is inoperable. A. One required CCW train inoperable. NOTE: Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops - MODE 4, for residual heat removal loops made inoperable by CCW. A.1 Restore required CCW train to OPERABLE status.
72 hours    TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.17, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)      CRS LCO 3.4.17 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal injection shall be OPERABLE, with :  Two charging pumps shall be OPERABLE  Two Makeup Water Pathways from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) shall be OPERABLE      CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4      CRS ACTIONS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 4 Page  33 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
DS Bus De-energizes/"C" CCW Pump Trips on Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that because all Charging Pumps were OFF, ACTION E.1, E.2 and E.3 were entered; and that these ACTIONS were exited upon restoration of Seal Injection Flow. E. Seal injection to any RCP not within limit. AND At least one charging pump OPERABLE. E.1 Initiate action to restore seal injection to affected RCP(s)  AND  E.2 Be in MODE 3. AND  E.3 Be in MODE 5. Immediately 6 hours    36 hours    NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 5 Page  34 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
"A" RCP Seal Failure      Next, a #1 Seal Failure will occur on the "A" RCP. The crew will implement AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions," trip the reactor, stop the pump, and three minutes after the pump is stopped, CLOSE the Seal Leakoff Valve. The crew will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."  Simultaneously, a Loss of Offsite Power will occur on the reactor trip, and the "B" Emergency Diesel Generator will fail to automatically start. Additionally, the DS DG will trip. Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF RCS13A r:2:00  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-001-B4, RCP SEAL INJ HI/LO FLOW  RTGB Annunciator APP-001-D2, RCP #1 SEAL LEAKOFF HI FLOW  FR-124 indicates that "A" RCP Seal injection flow is rising  FR-124 indicates that "B" and "C" RCP Seal injection flow is lowering  FR-154 indicates that "A" RCP seal leakoff flow is rising  Charging Pump speed is increasing  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    AOP-018, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS      CRS (Step 1) MAKE PA announcement for Procedure Entry NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      CRS (Step 2) EVALUATE Plant Conditions AND GO to the Appropriate Section for RCP Malfunction Not Yet Addressed:    Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Failure - Section A NOTE: The CRS will transition to Section A of AOP-018. AOP-018, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS SECTION A, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEAL FAILURE      RO (Step 1) CHECK Any RCP #1 Seal Leakoff Flow - GREATER THAN 5.7 GPM      RO (Step 2) CHECK Either of the following Conditions Exist:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 5 Page  35 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
"A" RCP Seal Failure      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    RCP #1 Seal Leakoff Flow On Unaffected RCP(s) - REDUCED    OR    RCP(s) - REDUCED      RO (Step 3) CHECK Plant Status - MODE 1 OR MODE 2      RO (Step 4) PERFORM the following:    TRIP the reactor    TRIP the affected RCP(s)    GO TO EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, while continuing with this procedure.      RO (Step 5) CHECK Time Elapsed Since Stopping the Affected RCP(s) - GREATER THAN 3 MINUTES. NOTE:  This action will be taken post-reactor trip.      RO (Step 6) CLOSE Seal Leakoff Valve(s) for Affected RCP(s):    RCP - A, VALVE - CVC-303A      RO (Step 7) CHECK SI ACTUATED      CRS (Step 7 RNO) GO TO Step 30 NOTE:  The CRS will likely perform this procedure concurrently with the EOPs. When the Operator Trips the Reactor, move to Events #6-9.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 36 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Upon entry into EOP-E-0, the operator will determine that both ESF buses are de-energized and transition to EOP-ECA-0.0, "Loss of All AC Power." The operator will subsequently start the "B" EDG by depressing the SI Actuate Pushbutton, restore power to Bus E-2, and transition back to EOP-E-0. When Bus E-2 is re-energized, the "D" Service Water Pump will fail to sequence automatically and will need to be manually started. Upon transition back to EOP-E-0, the crew will complete the immediate actions of EOP-E-0, and continue with AOP-018. The scenario will terminate when the crew has terminated Safety Injection and re-established Charging/Seal Injection in Step 6 of ES-1.1. Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF EPS13          IMF EDG01C d:2          (Occurs on Rx Trip)  Indications Available:    Indications of Reactor Trip  Control Room lights dim  Bus E-1 is de-energized  Bus E-2 is de-energized  DS Bus is de-energized  "B" EDG RUNNING  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION      RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action    Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers  OPEN    Rod position indicators  FULLY INSERTED    Rod Bottom Lights  ILLUMINATED    Neutron Flux  LOWERING      BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action    Both Turbine Stop Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 2.a RNO) Manually TRIP Turbine. Immediate Action NOTE: No power to the Turbine Control status lights.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 37 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    IF Turbine will NOT trip, THEN manually RUNBACK Turbine at maximum rate UNTIL ALL Governor valves are CLOSED. IF Turbine can NOT be runback, THEN manually CLOSE MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves.      BOP (Step 2.b) All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves  CLOSED Immediate Action      BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power To AC EMERGENCY BUSSES: Immediate Action    CHECK Bus E1 OR E2  AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED    CHECK Bus E1 AND E2  BOTH ENERGIZED      CRS (Step 3 RNO) GO TO EOP-ECA-0.0, Loss Of All AC Power, Step 1 Immediate Action    WHEN time permits, THEN TRY to restore power to de-energized AC Emergency Bus. NOTE: The CRS will transition to EOP-ECA-0.0. EOP-ECA-0.0, TOTAL LOSS OF AC POWER      RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action    Reactor Trip AND Bypass breakers - OPEN    Neutron flux - LOWERING      BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action    BOTH Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED    MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves - CLOSED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 38 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      BOP (Step 2 RNO) Manually TRIP Turbine. Immediate Action NOTE: No power to the Turbine Control status lights. If Turbine will NOT trip, THEN CLOSE MSIV AND MSIV Bypass Valves.      CRS/BOP (Step 3) DISPATCH an Operator to Perform Attachment 1, Restoring AC Power From The DSDG Immediate Action NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 5 minutes that the DSDG will NOT start.      RO (Step 4) CHECK if RCS is isolated:    CHECK LTDN LINE STOP Valves - CLOSED    LCV-460A    LCV-460B    CHECK PRZR PORVs - CLOSED    CHECK CVC-387, EXCESS LTDN STOP Valve - CLOSED    CHECK RCS Vent System Valves - CLOSED OR DEENERGIZED    RC-567, HEAD VENT    RC-568, HEAD VENT    RC-569, PZR VENT    RC-570, PZR VENT    RC-571, PRT ISO    RC-572, CV ATMOS      RO (Step 5) CHECK CCW Pump Running for RCP Seal Cooling Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 39 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      RO (Step 5 RNO) IF LESS THAN 15 minutes elapsed since RCP SEAL Cooling lost, THEN START CCW Pump A. NOTE: The DS Bus is de-energized. IF RCP SEAL Cooling can NOT be restored WITHIN 15 minutes, THEN PERFORM the following prior to starting a CCW Pump    OPEN breaker for FCV-626, THERM BAR FLOW CONT Valve (MCC-6 CMPT 8F)    Locally CLOSE FCV-626, THERM BAR FLOW CONT Valve.      BOP (Step 6) CHECK AFW Flow    CHECK AFW flow- GREATER THAN 300 GPM    DISPATCH an Operator to locally perform Attachment 4, Local Control Of S/G Level and Pressure NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use: IRF CFW 012, f:100 IRF CFW 013, f:100 IRF CFW 014, f:100 And report after 5 minutes that the Attachment 4 is complete. CONTROL S/G WR level BETWEEN 60% and 67%      BOP (Step 7) TRY To Restore Power to ANY AC Emergency Bus:    Energize AC Emergency Bus with EDG:    CHECK EDG-A AND EDG-B - RUNNING NOTE: The "A" EDG is OOS. The "B" EDG is NOT running.      BOP (Step 7.a.1 RNO) DEPRESS BOTH SAFETY INJECTION pushbuttons Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 40 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    If NO EDG started, THEN--    IF ANY EDG is running AND its output breaker is open, THEN -- NOTE: The "B" EDG will start and close in on Bus E-2.      BOP (Step 7.a.2) CHECK BOTH AC Emergency Busses  AUTOMATICALLY ENERGIZED NOTE: Bus E-2 is energized. E-1    E-2      BOP (Step 7.a.2 RNO) IF ANY EDG is running AND its output breaker is open, THEN--    If ANY EDG is running AND its output breaker can NOT be closed from the Control Room, THEN-    If an AC Emergency Bus can NOT be energized OR SW Cooling is NOT available to ANY running EDG, THEN-. NOTE: The "D' SW Pump has failed to auto-start; and the BOP will need to start this pump manually.      BOP  CHECK AC Emergency Busses - AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED    E-1    OR    E-2 NOTE: E-2 is energized.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 41 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:  Energize at Least One AC Emergency Bus Before Defeating the Auto Loading of the Safeguards Equipment in EOP-ECA-0.0  Safety Significance:  Failure to energize an ac emergency bus constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency power capacity. Failure to perform the critical task also results in needless degradation of any barrier to fission product release, specifically of the RCS barrier at the point of the RCP seals. Additionally, failure to perform the critical task results in the unnecessary continuation of a situation in which RCS inventory is being lost uncontrollably and cannot be replaced. This situation is equivalent to mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity at a time when a small-break LOCA is in progress. In this case, at least one ac emergency bus can be energized from the control room. Failure to perform the critical task means that RCS inventory lost through the RCP seals cannot be replaced. It also means that the RCP seals remain without cooling and gradually deteriorate. As the seals deteriorate the rate of RCS inventory loss increases.      RO  Establish Seal Injection flow    CHECK adequate DSDG OR EDG capacity to run one Charging Pump (108 KW each) (DSDG preferred)    RESET SI    ESTABLISH Charging flow NOTE: The RO will start the "C" Charging Pump. CHECK Charging Pumps - ANY RUNNING      RO (Step 7.c.3.a RNO) IF RCP Seal Cooling has been lost for LESS THAN 15 minutes, THEN START Charging Pumps as necessary NOTE: It is expected that RCP Seal Cooling will be lost for less than 15 minutes. If ALL Seal Cooling to ANY RCP can NOT be restored within 15 minutes, THEN-      RO (Step 7.c.3.b) DISPATCH an operator to perform the following: NOTE: These valves can be controlled from the RTGB.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 42 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    OPEN CVC-358, RWST TO CHARGING PUMP SUCTION Valve NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, use: IRF CVC048 f:100 IRF CVC059 f:0 and report after 3 minutes that the Charging Pump suction is aligned to the RWST. CLOSE LCV-115C, VCT OUTLET Valve      RO (Step 7.c.3.c) ADJUST the following as necessary to maintain proper Seal Injection AND Charging flow:    Charging Pump Speed Controller(s)    HIC-121, CHARGING FLOW Controller    Seal Water Flow Control Valves      RO/ BOP (Step 7.c.3.d) MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 gpm AND 20 gpm per RCP UNLESS Seal Injection isolated CHECK the applicable EDG has loaded required equipment    SW Pumps NOTE: The "D" SW Pump has to be manually started, if not previously started. MDAFW Pump NOTE: The "B" MDAFW Pump is running. CCW Pump (as needed) NOTE: The "C" CCW Pump has previously failed. SW Booster Pump NOTE: The "B" SW Booster Pump has started on the SI.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 43 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:  Manually Start SW Pump for EDG Cooling within 40 Minutes of starting the "B" EDG  Safety Significance:  Failure to manually start the SW pump under the postulated plant conditions means that the EDG is running without SW cooling. Running the EDG without SW cooling leads to a high-temperature condition that can result in EDG failure due to damage caused by engine overheating. Under the postulated plant conditions, the running EDG is the only operable EDG. The calculated maximum time an EDG may operate without cooling to preclude adverse effects is 40 minutes. Since during the first 40 minutes of EDG operation in this scenario there are two procedural cues to check, and if needed, start a SW Pump, it is believed that failure to perform the critical task constitutes mis-operation or incorrect performance in which the crew does not prevent "degraded- emergency power capacity."      RO (Step 7.c.3.e) PERFORM the following:    RESET SPDS AND Initiate MONITORING Critical Safety Function Status Trees. IMPLEMENT FRPs as necessary  CRS  RETURN TO procedure AND step in effect NOTE: The CRS will transition to EOP-E-0. NOTE: The CRS may assign the RO or the BOP to continue with AOP-018 actions, while the crew continues with EOP-E-0. EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION      RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action    Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers  OPEN    Rod position indicators  FULLY INSERTED    Rod Bottom Lights  ILLUMINATED    Neutron Flux  LOWERING Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 44 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action    Both Turbine Stop Valves  CLOSED    All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power To AC EMERGENCY BUSSES: Immediate Action    CHECK Bus E1 OR E2  AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED NOTE: Bus E-2 is energized. CHECK Bus E1 AND E2  BOTH ENERGIZED      CRS (Step 3 RNO) WHEN time permits, THEN TRY to restore power to de-energized AC Emergency Bus.      RO (Step 4) CHECK SI Status:  Immediate Action  CHECK if SI is actuated: NOTE: SI was manually actuated in EOP-ECA-0.0. SI annunciators  ANY ILLUMINATED    OR    SI equipment  AUTO STARTED      RO CHECK BOTH trains of SI actuated:    SI Pumps  TWO RUNNING    RHR Pumps  BOTH RUNNING      RO (Step 4.b) Manually ACTUATE SI by depressing BOTH SI pushbuttons. NOTE: Bus E-1 is de-energized and the "A" Train ECCS Pumps cannot be started.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 45 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO/ BOP Foldout Page:    RCP TRIP CRITERIA    FAULTED S/G AFW ISOLATION CRITERIA    AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA    DC BUS, INSTRUMENT BUS, OR MCC5 FAILURE CRITERIA    SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING CRITERIA      CRS (Step 5) PERFORM Attachment 1, Auto Action Verification, While CONTINUING WITH This Procedure    Examiner NOTE:  The CRS will likely assign the BOP to perform this action. If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1. CRS/RO follow E-0 Actions, Step 6, on Page 51. EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ATTACHMENT 1, AUTO ACTION VERIFICATION      BOP (Step 1) CHECK ECCS Pumps Running:    SI Pumps  TWO RUNNING      BOP (Step 1 RNO) Manually START pump(s) as necessary NOTE: Bus E-1 is de-energized and the "A" Train ECCS Pumps cannot be started.      BOP (Step 2) CHECK ECCS Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment      BOP (Step 2 RNO) Manually ALIGN valve(s) as necessary. NOTE: "A" Train valves cannot be aligned from the RTGB.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 46 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 3) CHECK CCW Pumps  AT LEAST ONE RUNNING NOTE: The only available CCW Pump has previously tripped.      BOP (Step 3 RNO) PERFORM the following:    IF NO CCW Pump is RUNNING AND CV Spray is NOT actuated, THEN START one CCW Pump on Emergency Bus energized by EDG (246 Kw)    IF NO CCW Pump can be started, THEN TRIP ALL RCPs.      BOP (Step 4) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A:    CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A  ACTUATED    CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 4.b RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as necessary NOTE:  Some valves will need to be closed manually.      BOP (Step 4.c) CHECK Excess Letdown  ISOLATED    CVC387, EXCESS LTDN STOP VALVE  CLOSED    HIC137, EXCESS LTDN FLOW CONTROLLER  AT 0% DEMAND      BOP (Step 5) CHECK Feedwater Isolation:    CHECK Main Feed Pumps  BOTH TRIPPED    CHECK Main Feedwater isolated:    Feedwater Reg Valves  CLOSED    Feedwater Reg Bypass Valves  CLOSED    Feedwater Header Section Valves  CLOSED NOTE:  V2-6A has no indication no power.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 47 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 5.b RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as necessary      BOP (Step 6) CHECK If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated:    CHECK Main Steam Line Isolation  REQUIRED    High steam flow with:    S/G pressure  LESS THAN 614 PSIG    OR    Tavg  LESS THAN 543&deg;F    CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves - CLOSED NOTE:  The MSIVs are already CLOSED.      BOP (Step 7) CHECK Proper Service Water System Operation:    CHECK SW Pumps  ALL RUNNING NOTE:  The "A" and "B" SW Pumps have no power, the "C" Pump has previously tripped, and the "D" SW Pump has failed to auto start.      BOP (Step 7.a RNO) Manually START pump(s) as necessary NOTE:  If the "D" SW Pump has NOT been manually started, it will be started here.      BOP (Step 7.b) CHECK SW Booster Pumps  BOTH RUNNING NOTE:  The "B" SW Booster Pump has started on the SI, the "A" SW Booster Pump has no power.      BOP (Step 7.b RNO) Manually START pump(s) as necessary    CHECK Both SW Header Low Pressure Alarms  EXTINGUISHED NOTE:  BOTH alarms will be LIT. APP008F7,SOUTH SW HDR LO PRESS    APP008F8,NORTH SW HDR LO PRESS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 48 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      BOP (Step 7.c RNO) PERFORM the following:    ISOLATE SW to the Turbine Building: NOTE:  BOTH valves are already CLOSED. CLOSE V6-16C, SW Turbine Building Isolation valve. OR    CLOSE V6-16A and V6-16B, SW Turbine Building Supply valves    WHEN this Attachment is complete, THEN PERFORM Supplement M, Component Alignment For Loss Of SW To Turbine Building, as time permits. NOTE: The BOP will contact an AO and direct performance of Supplement M. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.      BOP (Step 8) CHECK BOTH EDGs  RUNNING NOTE: The "B" EDG is running.      BOP (Step 8 RNO) Manually START Emergency Diesel(s) as necessary. NOTE: The "A" EDG is OOS.      BOP (Step 9) CHECK ECCS Flow:    CHECK RCS pressure  LESS THAN 1650 PSIG [1725 PSIG]      BOP (Step 9.a RNO) GO TO Step 10.      BOP (Step 10) CHECK CV Recirculation Fans  ALL RUNNING NOTE: The "3" and "4" HVH Fans are running (With Hi Vibration).      BOP (Step 10 RNO) Manually START fan(s). NOTE: The "1" and "2" HVH Fans are unavailable (No power).      BOP (Step 11) CHECK IVSW System Actuated:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 49 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    PCV1922A, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE  OPEN    PCV1922B, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE  OPEN      BOP (Step 12) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation:    CV Ventilation Isolation Valves  CLOSED NOTE: The "A" Train valves have no power or indication.      BOP (Step 12 RNO) DEPRESS H.V. OFF on R-11 OR R-12 to initiate Containment Ventilation Isolation. IF ANY Containment Ventilation Isolation valve does NOT close, THEN manually OR locally ISOLATE AFFECTED penetration outside Containment while CONTINUING WITH this procedure. NOTE: The BOP will contact an AO and direct local action. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.      BOP (Step 13) CHECK Control Room Ventilation Aligned For Pressurization Mode:    HVA1A OR HVA1B,CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING FAN  RUNNING    HVE19A OR HVE19B,CONTROL ROOM AIR CLEANING FAN  RUNNING    HVE16, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN  STOPPED NOTE: No Indication. The BOP will take the Control Switch to STOP    Control Room HVAC Outside Air Damper A OR B  OPEN    CRD1ASA, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER  CLOSED    CRD1BSB, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER CLOSED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 50 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 14) CHECK DS Bus  ENERGIZED NOTE: The DS Bus is NOT energized. An attempt has already been made to start the DSDG and re-energize the DS Bus.      BOP (Step 14 RNO) Locally PLACE DSDG in service using EPP-25, Energizing Supplemental Plant Equipment Using the DSDG.      BOP (Step 15) CHECK Battery Chargers ENERGIZED:    APP036D1, BATT CHARGER A/A1 TROUBLE Alarm  EXTINGUISHED NOTE: The "A" Train DC Bus is on the Battery. APP036D2, BATT CHARGER B/B1 TROUBLE Alarm  EXTINGUISHED      BOP (Step 15 RNO) RESTART Battery Chargers within 30 minutes of power loss using OP-601, DC Supply System. (46 KW each) NOTE: The "B" Train DC Bus is on the Battery Chargers.      BOP (Step 16) STOP R11/12 Sample Pump      BOP (Step 17) Locally RESET AND LOAD Instrument Air Compressor(s) As Necessary (38 KW each): NOTE: The BOP will contact the Inside AO about locally resetting and starting the "B" IA Compressor. Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge IRF EPSMCC6_ 218  f: RACK_IN    Compressor A (MCC5 CMPT 7M)    Compressor B (MCC6 CMPT 3G)      BOP (Step 18) PERFORM Crew Update To Include The Following:    Attachment completion Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 51 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Manual actions taken    Failed equipment status    SW status per Step 7.c    If applicable, PERFORM Supplement M, Component Alignment For Loss Of SW To Turbine Building, as time permits    Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE. EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION      RO (Step 6) CHECK AFW Pumps Running:    CHECK Motor Driven AFW Pumps  BOTH RUNNING NOTE: The "B" MDAFW Pump is likely running.      (Step 6.a RNO) Manually START pump(s). NOTE: The "A" MDAFW Pump is unavailable (No power).      RO (Step 6.b) CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels  TWO S/Gs LESS THAN 16%      RO (Step 6.b RNO) IF S/G Narrow Range level lowers to LESS THAN 16% on Two S/Gs, THEN PERFORM Step 6.c NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. CRS  CONTINUE WITH Step 7.      RO (Step 7) CHECK AFW Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment: NOTE:  These valves are under local control. The crew may elect to restore control of these valves to the RTGB. AFW Header Discharge Valves  FULL OPEN    AFW Header Section Valves  FULL OPEN Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 52 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Steam Driven AFW Pump Discharge Valves  FULL OPEN IF PUMP RUNNING NOTE:  The SDAFW Pump is likely to be NOT running.      RO (Step 8) CHECK Total AFW Flow:    RESET SI    CONTROL AFW flow to maintain Intact S/G Narrow Range level between 9%[18%] AND 50%    CHECK total AFW flow  GREATER THAN 300 GPM NOTE:  It is likely the S/G levels are high, and that AFW flow has been throttled to little or no flow.      RO (Step 8.c RNO) IF S/G Narrow Range level is GREATER THAN 9% [18%] in ANY S/G, THEN CONTROL AFW flow to maintain S/G Narrow Range level. NOTE:  S/G levels are likely high in the band, but under operator control. IF S/G Narrow Range level is LESS THAN 9% [18%] in ALL S/Gs, THEN-      RO (Step 9) CHECK CV Spray NOT Required:    CHECK Containment Pressure  HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG    CHECK CV Spray  NOT ACTUATED      RO (Step 10) CHECK RCP Seal Cooling:    CCW flow to RCP(s) Thermal Barriers  NORMAL    APP001C1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW ALARM  EXTINGUISHED    APP001D1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR LO FLOW alarm  EXTINGUISHED NOTE:  The LO Flow alarm will be LIT. OR Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 53 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Seal Injection flow  ADEQUATE    Seal Injection flow  GREATER THAN 6 GPM PER RCP NOTE:  It is likely that Seal Injection flow is > 6 to each RCP. OR    Thermal Barrier Ps  GREATER THAN 5 INCHES WATER PER RCP      RO (Step 11) CHECK RCS Temperatures:    With NO RCPs running, RCS Cold Leg temperatures  STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547&deg;F NOTE:  It is likely that Tcolds are >547&deg;F.      RO (Step 11 RNO) IF temperature is LESS THAN 547&deg;F AND lowering, THEN-    IF temperature is GREATER THAN 547&deg;F AND rising THEN- NOTE:  Although Tcolds are >547&deg;F, they are most likely stable. If Tcolds are rising, the CRS will contact the AO to locally dump steam steam using the S/G Steam Line PORVs. If so, Booth Instructor use: IRF MSS097 f:15:00 IRF MSS091 f:DEFEAT IRF MSS094 f:MANUAL IRF MSS098 f:15:00  IRF MSS092 f:DEFEAT IRF MSS095 f:MANUAL IRF MSS099 f:15:00 IRF MSS093 f:DEFEAT IRF MSS096 f:MANUAL IRF AIR027 f:N2_SUPPLY IRF MSS099 r:25 f:1022 IRF MSS098 r:25 f:1022 IRF MSS097 r:25 f:1022 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 54 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 12) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Spray Valves:    CHECK PZR PORVs  CLOSED    CHECK Normal PZR Spray Valves  CLOSED    CHECK Aux PZR Spray Valve  CLOSED      RO (Step 13) CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped:    CHECK RCPs  ANY RUNNING NOTE:  All RCPs are OFF.      CRS (Step 13.a RNO) GO TO Step 14.      RO (Step 14) CHECK If S/G Secondary Pressure Boundaries Are Intact:    NONE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER    NONE COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED      RO (Step 15) CHECK If S/G Tubes Are Intact:    Secondary Radiation Monitors  HAVE REMAINED NORMAL    R15, CONDENSER AIR EJECTOR GAS NOTE:  R-15 is OOS. R19s, S/G Blowdown Radiation NOTE:  R-19 is de-energized. R31s, STEAMLINE RADIATION MONITORs    S/G levels  NONE RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER      RO (Step 16) CHECK if RCS is Intact:    CV radiation - NORMAL Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 55 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    R-2,CV AREA    R-32A, CV HIGH RANGE    R-32B, CV HIGH RANGE    CV pressure - NORMAL    CV Sump level - NORMAL      RO/ BOP (Step 17) CHECK If ECCS Flow Should Be Terminated:    CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs - GREATER THAN 18&deg;F    CHECK Secondary Heat Sink level    Total AFW flow to S/G(s) - GREATER THAN 300 GPM    OR    S/G Narrow Range level in at least one S/G - GREATER THAN 9% NOTE:  It is likely that all S/G Narrow Range levels are > 9%. CHECK RCS pressure:    Pressure - GREATER THAN 1650 PSIG    Pressure - STABLE OR RISING    CHECK PZR level - GREATER THAN 14%    RESET SPDS AND INITIATE monitoring of Critical Safety Functions Status Trees. GO TO EOP-ES-1.1, SI Termination, Step 1 NOTE: The CRS will transition to EOP-ES-1.1. EOP-ES-1.1, SI TERMINATION      RO/ BOP Foldout Page:    SI REINITIATION CRITERIA    SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 56 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA      RO (Step 1) RESET SI      RO (Step 2) RESET Containment Isolation PHASE A      RO (Step 3) ESTABLISH Instrument Air To CV:    CHECK APP002F7, INSTR AIR HDR LO PRESS alarm  EXTINGUISHED NOTE: If not previously done, the BOP will contact the Inside AO about locally resetting and starting the "B" IA Compressor. Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge IRF EPSMCC6_ 218  f: RACK_IN    RESET IA PCV1716, INSTRUMENT AIR ISOLATION TO CV    CHECK IA PCV1716  OPEN      BOP (Step 4) CHECK DC Busses A AND B  ENERGIZED NOTE: Both DC Busses are energized, although the "A" DC Bus is on the Battery.      RO (Step 5) STOP ECCS Pumps:    STOP SI Pumps    CHECK RHR Pumps  ANY RUNNING WITH SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST    STOP RHR Pumps      RO (Step 6) CHECK Charging Flow Has Been  ESTABLISHED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 57 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK Charging Pumps  AT LEAST ONE RUNNING    ESTABLISH desired Charging flow:    START additional Charging Pump(s) as necessary    ADJUST the following as necessary to maintain Charging flow AND Seal Injection:    Charging Pump speed controller    HIC121, CHARGING FLOW Controller    RCP Seal Water Flow Control Valve NOTE:  The RO may contact the AO to adjust Seal Injection flows. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO; and use: IRF CVC030 f: 100 IRF CVC031 f: 100 IRF CVC032 f: 100    MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 gpm AND 20 gpm per RCP UNLESS Seal Injection isolated      At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.
NRC SCENARIO N16-1-6 TURNOVER SHEET  1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life: MOL b) Reactor Power: 100% c) Turbine Load: 770.3 MWe  d) Boron Concentration: 853 ppm e) Rod Height: 218 CB 'D' f) RCS Pressure: 2235 psig g) PZR Level: 53.3%  h) Xenon: Equilibrium  2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. # Description LCO 3.8.1 Condition B1, B.2, B.3.2.2 and B4  3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) The "A" EDG is OOS. 4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a) None 5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a) "B" EDG b) DSDG c) DS Bus d) 4KV Bus 3 e) Bus E-2 f) SDAFW Pump 6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a) R-15, Condenser Air Ejector Gas Radiation Monitor is OOS (I&C Investigating). b) RTGB Annunciator APP-002-F8, "STA AIR HDR LO PRESS," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).                  7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a) PROTECTED 8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a) Maintain Steady-State conditions 9. TURNOVER INFORMATION  a) The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. b) The "B" MFWP has experienced high noise/vibration over the last two hours (Maintenance is investigating). c) SR 3.8.1.1, Offsite Power Checks were last completed 2 hours ago. 10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a) IAW OST-947 data 11. RISK  a) GREEN Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_010516)  Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners:  Operators: (SRO)    (RO)    (BOP)  Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The SDAFW Pump is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION A. FI-613, CCW System Flow is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-010-B3, "EDG B START AIR LO PRESS," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).              Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*  Event Description  1 1 I-RO N-BOP I(TS)-SRO Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW 2 2 I-BOP I(TS)-SRO "C" Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW 3  3  R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower  4 4 C-BOP C-SRO CRDM Fan "A" Failure  5 5 C-RO C-SRO Continuous Inward Rod Motion 6 6 M-RO M-BOP M-SRO "C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture 7 7 C-BOP Loss of Off-Site Power  * (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,    (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_010516)  H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #1  The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The SDAFW Pump is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION A. FI-613, CCW System Flow is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-010-B3, "EDG B START AIR LO PRESS," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).
Shortly after taking the watch, Pressurizer Level Transmitter, LT-459 will fail LOW causing normal letdown to isolate, de-energizing of pressurizer control group heaters and charging pump speed to rise for the pump in AUTO. The operator will respond in accordance APP-003-E8, "PZR CONTROL HI/LO LVL," and AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure."  The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-030, "Pressurizer Level Transmitters."  The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation."    Following this, the controlling steam flow channel for S/G "C", FT-494, will fail LOW, causing FRV-498 to start to CLOSE. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction," and/or AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure."  The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-034, "Steam Flow."  The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation."  Next, a tube leak will develop in Feed Water Heater 4A. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-007-E7, HTR 4A HI/LO LVL, identifying the leak. The operator may enter AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction."  Ultimately, the operator will use OP-407, "Heater Drain and Vents," to remove Feedwater Heaters 5A, 4A, and 3A from Service. This will require a power decrease. The operator will use either AOP-038, "Rapid Downpower," or OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When > 25% Power," and OP-301, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)," to lower plant power. During the downpower, the "A" CRDM Fan will trip. The operator will address APP-010-A6, HVH-5A/B AIR FLOW LOST/OVLD, and manually start the "B" CRDM Fan. Shortly afterwards, a continuous control rod insertion will occur. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-001, "Malfunction of Reactor Control System."  The operator will be unable to control the rod insertion and will manually trip the reactor. On the reactor trip, a 500 gpm Steam Generator Tube Rupture will occur (over 10 minutes) on the "C" Steam Generator. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."  After the Immediate Actions are complete, it is likely that the operator will determine that SI is NOT actuated nor required, and transition to EOP-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response."  While in this procedure the operator will determine that SI is required, manually actuate SI, and return to EOP-E-0. Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture," to isolate the flow into and out of the "C" Steam Generator and then conduct a cooldown of the RCS. Upon transition into EOP-E-3, a Loss of Off-Site Power will occur. Both EDGs will start and re-power Buses E-1 and E-2. With SI previously reset, the operator will need to address a re-Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_010516)  initiation of AFW flow to all Steam Generators, and the restart of the ECCS Pumps. The operator will continue with EOP-E-3 and conduct the RCS cooldown using the "A" and "B" Steam Generator PORVs. During the RCS depressurization, the Pzr Spray Valves will not be available. The operator will be required to conduct the depressurization using an available Pzr PORV. The scenario will terminate at Step 23 of EOP-E-3, after the operator has stopped the SI Pumps. Critical Tasks:  Manually control "C" S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level. Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the "C" S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control. Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. The fact that the operator allows the differential pressure to dissipate and, as a result, are then forced to transition to a contingency procedure constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would unnecessarily complicate the event mitigation strategy. While in EOP-E-3, establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not occur because the RCS temperature is in either (1) Too high to maintain 38&deg;F of RCS Subcooling OR (2) below 295&deg;F (RCS Integrity Red Path Limit) (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency procedure. This failure constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would unnecessarily complicate the event mitigation strategy.
Depressurize the RCS to meet SI termination criteria before Steam Generator Overfill is reached based on Water in the Steam Lines.  (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to stop reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates mitigation of the event. It also constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_011416)  Facility: HB Robinson Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners:  Operators: (SRO)    (RO)    (BOP)  Initial Conditions: The plant is at 75% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "A" SI Pump is OOS. The "B" SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. The "C" Charging Pump is also OOS. LI-928, "C" SI Accumulator Level, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-009-C3, "AIR SIDE SEAL OIL BU PMP OVLD," has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.              Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*  Event Description  1 - R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Raise Power 2 1 I-RO I-SRO VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 fails HIGH 3  2 I-BOP I(TS)-SRO Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW  4 3  C-RO C(TS)-SRO "B" Charging Pump Trip 5 4 C-BOP C-SRO "C" FRV Controller fails HIGH in AUTO 6 5 M-RO M-BOP M-SRO Cold Leg SBLOCA  7 6/7 NA 480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes  8 6 C-RO "C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start  9 7 C-RO CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically  * (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,    (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_011416)  HB Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #2  The plant is at 75% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "A" SI Pump is OOS. The "B" SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. The "C" Charging Pump is also OOS. LI-928, "C" SI Accumulator Level, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-009-C3, "AIR SIDE SEAL OIL BU PMP OVLD," has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.                                Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 100% using OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power," and OP-301, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)."    During the power increase, VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 will fail HIGH causing all letdown to be diverted to the CVCS HUTs. This failure will result in VCT level lowering without automatic makeup. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-003, "Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control."  After this, the power increase will be suspended. Next, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 will fail LOW. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure, and place all Feed Regulating Valves in MANUAL"  The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-033, "First Stage Pressure (FSP)," and restore the Feed Regulating valves to AUTO control. The operator will address 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation," and Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, "Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation."
Following this, the "B" Charging Pump will trip. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-003-F5, CHG PMP MOTOR OVLD/TRIP and raise speed of the "A" Charging Pump. The operator may enter AOP-018, "Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions."  The operator will address 3.4.17, "Chemical and Volume Control System."  Shortly afterwards, the "C" Feed Regulating Valve Controller will fail such that the valve starts to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction," and control the "C" S/G level manually. Subsequently, a Cold Leg Small Break LOCA will occur (over 5 minutes) on the B Loop. The operator will enter AOP-016, "Excessive Primary Plant Leakage."  Ultimately, the operator will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."  When the reactor trips, the normal supply breaker to Bus E-1 will trip OPEN, and the "A" EDG Output Breaker will fail to CLOSE either automatically or manually; and Train "A" equipment will remain unavailable throughout the event. Additionally, the "C" SI Pump will fail to automatically start on SI, and the operator will be required to manually start this pump. Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant," and the break size will become larger. Eventually, Containment pressure will exceed 10 psig creating an Orange Path condition on the Containment Critical Safety Function. When this occurs, the "B" CV Spray will automatically start on HI-HI Containment Pressure, however, both SI-880C&D ("B" CV Spray Pump Discharge Valves) will fail to open automatically, and the operator will be required to manually open these valves.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_011416)  The scenario will terminate in EOP-E-1 after Containment Spray has been initiated, or at Step 9 of FRP-J.1, "Response to High Containment Pressure," after the operator has taken all necessary steps to reduce Containment pressure, or upon transition from either EOP-E-1 or FRP-J.1 to FRP-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock (After all Critical Tasks have been completed). Critical Tasks:  Manually control "C" S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level.
Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the "C" S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control. Trip all RCPs within 6 minutes of meeting the EOP-E-0/E-1 RCP Trip Criteria (Containment Isolation Phase B  ACTUATED, OR BOTH of the following satisfied: SI Pumps  AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW AND RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs  LESS THAN 13&deg;F [32&deg;F]) so that CET temperatures do not become superheated when forced circulation in the RCS stops. (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to trip the RCPs under the postulated plant conditions leads to core uncovery and to fuel cladding temperatures in excess of 2200&deg;F, which is the limit specified in the ECCS acceptance criteria. Thus, failure to perform the task represents mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator has failed to prevent degradation of the fuel cladding barrier to fission product release and which leads to a violation of the facility license condition. Establish flow from at least one high-head SI pump before transition out of E-0. (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to manually start at least one high-head SI pump under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity. In this case, at least one high-head SI pump can be manually started from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.
Additionally, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Finally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump (when it is possible to do so) is a violation of the facility license condition. Manually actuate at least one CV Spray Train before Transitioning to EOP-ES-1.2. (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment under the postulated conditions demonstrates the inability of the crew to "recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_011416)  In this case, the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment can be manually actuated from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent (degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity). Additionally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment (when it is possible to do so) results in a failure to prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_010616)  Facility: H B Robinson Scenari0 No.: 3 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners:  Operators: (SRO)    (RO)    (BOP)  Initial Conditions: The plant is at 68% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The SDAFW Pump is OOS, and has been for 7 days. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION C has just been entered. Maintenance reports that this pump will be OPERABLE in 2 hours, and station management has directed that the initiation of the shutdown be delayed 2 hours. TI-471, PRT Temperature is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-008-C3, "EMERG OIL PMP OVLD," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).              Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*  Event Description  1 1 C-RO C-BOP C(TS)-SRO Loss of Instrument Bus 3 2 2 I-BOP I-SRO "B" Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW 3  NA R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Load Decrease 4 3  C-RO C-SRO Letdown Line Pressure Control Valve Controller fails CLOSED 5 4 I-RO I(TS)-SRO PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE 6 5 M-RO M-BOP M-SRO Inadvertent FWIS 7 6 C-BOP Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate 8 7 NA "A" & "B" MDAFW Pump Trip  * (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,    (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_010616)  H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #3  The plant is at 68% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The SDAFW Pump is OOS, and has been for 7 days. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION C has just been entered. Maintenance reports that this pump will be OPERABLE in 2 hours, and station management has directed that the initiation of the shutdown be delayed 2 hours. TI-471, PRT Temperature is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-008-C3, "EMERG OIL PMP OVLD," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).                                Shortly after taking the watch, Instrument Bus 3 will de-energize. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-024, "Loss of Instrument Bus," and restore power to the Bus. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.8.7, "AC Instrument Bus Sources - Operating," and Technical Specification LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems-Operating."  Following this, the controlling feed flow channel for S/G "B", FT-487, will fail LOW, causing FRV-498 to start to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction," and/or AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure."  The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-026, "Feed Flow (FWF)."
Next, the WCCS will call and inform the operator that it has been determined that the SDAFW Pump will not be restored to OPERABLE status within the next two hours as expected, and that station management has directed that the plant be brought to Mode 3 within the next four hours using AOP-038, "Rapid Downpower."    During the downpower, the Letdown Pressure Control Valve (PCV-145) controller will fail such that the valve will fail closed. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-D6, LP LTDN LN HI PRESS, and ultimately take manual control of the valve. Shortly afterwards, PZR Pressure transmitter PT-444 will fail HIGH causing the Pzr Spray valves and Pzr PORV to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-019, "Malfunction of RCS pressure Control," and/or AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure."  RCS pressure control will remain in MANUAL for the remainder of the scenario. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.4, "Remote Shutdown System," Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, "RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits," and Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11, "Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)."    After the Pressure Transmitter has been removed from service, an inadvertent FWIS will occur. Simultaneously with the Rx Trip, the Turbine will fail to TRIP, the Governor Valves will fail to CLOSE manually, and the Main Steamline Isolation signal will fail to auto actuate. The operator will be required to manually CLOSE the MSIVs. Additionally the "A" and "B" MDAFW Pumps will trip immediately after auto start. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."    Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response." However, this transition will be delayed due to a RED condition on the Heat Sink CSF. The operator will perform FRP-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink."  The operator will direct that AFW Pump "C" be placed in service in accordance with OP-402, "Auxiliary Feedwater System," however, the AFW Pump "C" Diesel will fail to start.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_010616)  The scenario will terminate at Step 7 RNO 2.b of FRP-H.1, after the operator has restored feedwater flow from the Main Feedwater System. Critical Tasks:  Manually control "B" S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level. Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the "B" S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control. Manually close the OPEN Pzr Spray Valve(s) and the Stuck Open PORV Block Valve before the Reactor trips based on low pressurizer pressure. Safety Significance: failure to close the Spray Valves/PORV Block Valve and stop the pressure transient, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the pressure transient. A failure to stabilize the pressure transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS pressure control. Manually Close the MSIVs Before an ORANGE Path Challenge Develops to Either the Subcriticality or the Integrity CSF or Before Transition to ECA-2.1, Whichever Happens First (EOP-Based)
Safety Significance:  Failure to trip the main turbine under the postulated plant conditions causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, such an omission constitutes a failure by the operator to "demonstrate the ability to take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety. The situation described in the plant conditions is effectively a large steamline break downstream of the MSIVs. This "effective steamline break" is also located downstream of the main turbine stop valves, which cannot be closed by manually tripping the turbine. Failure to perform the critical task results in uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs and in uncontrolled cooldown of the RCS, both of which are unnecessary. Establish Feedwater Flow Into at Least One S/G Before RCS Bleed and Feed is Required (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to establish feedwater flow to any SG results in the operator's having to rely upon the lower-priority action of establishing RCS bleed and feed to minimize core uncovery. This constitutes incorrect performance that fails to prevent degradation of any barrier to fission product release.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_011516)  Facility: HB Robinson Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners:  Operators: (SRO)    (RO)    (BOP)  Initial Conditions: The plant is at 25% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "A" SI Pump is OOS. The "B" SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. PI-1616, SW North Header Pressure, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-007-C3, "FW PMP A LO FLOW TRIP," has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.              Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*  Event Description  1 1 C-RO C-SRO "A" Primary Water Pump trips during Dilution 2 NA R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Raise Power  3  2 C-RO C-SRO Letdown Temperature Controller TCV-144 fails CLOSED/Divert Valve TCV-143 Fails to DIVERT 4 3 I-BOP I(TS)-SRO Main Steam Line "C" Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW 5 4  N-BOP I(TS)-SRO Power Range NI-44 Upper Detector fails HIGH 6 5 C-BOP C-SRO Low Turbine Oil Pressure/Failure of Auto Turbine Trip 7 6 M-RO M-BOP M-SRO Power Range NI-41 Control Power Fuse Blows/ATWS 8 7 C-BOP MOV-350 fails to OPEN  9 8 M-RO M-BOP M-SRO "B" SG SLB Inside CV * (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,    (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_011516)  HB Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #4  The plant is at 25% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "A" SI Pump is OOS. The "B" SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. PI-1616, SW North Header Pressure, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-007-C3, "FW PMP A LO FLOW TRIP," has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.
Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will attempt to raise power to 100% using OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power," and OP-301, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)."  During the first dilution, the "A" Primary Water Pump will trip. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-003-E5, "MAKEUP WATER DEV," and/or AOP-003, "Malfunction of Reactor makeup Control."  The operator will place the "B" Primary Water Pump in service and continue with the startup. After this, the operator will raise power to 100% using OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power," and OP-301, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)."  During the power increase Letdown Temperature Controller, TCV-144, will fail CLOSED causing letdown temperature to rise above 135&deg;F. Simultaneously, Divert Valve TCV-143, will fail to divert letdown flow to the VCT. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-A6, "LTDN FLOW HI TEMP DEMIN BYPD," divert letdown flow to the VCT, take MANUAL control of TCV-144 to stabilize letdown temperature, and return letdown to the VCT. Following this, Main Steam Line "C" Pressure Transmitter, PT-495, will fail LOW. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure."  The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-025, "Steam Generator Pressure (SGP)."  The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation," and Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, "Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation."  Next, Power Range, NI-44, Upper Detector will fail HIGH. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-011, "Nuclear Instrumentation (NI)."  The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation."    Shortly afterwards, an oil leak will develop on the Main Turbine. The operator will respond in accordance with various APP-008, SW, CW & TURB GEN AUX, alarms, and ultimately enter AOP-007, "Turbine Trip Below P-8."  When the Main Turbine Trips one Turbine Stop Valve and one Turbine Governor Valve will remain OPEN, and the operator will need to manually TRIP the Turbine. Subsequently, the Control Power fuse for Power Range channel N41 will blow causing an automatic reactor trip signal to be generated, however, the reactor will fail to TRIP both automatically and manually (ATWS). The operator will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and attempt to manually trip the reactor. When this fails, the operator will enter FRP-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation- ATWS."  While in FRP-S.1, Boric Acid to Charging Pump Suction Valve MOV-350 will fail CLOSED. The operator will direct a local trip of the reactor, drive rods in manually, and align the suction of the Charging Pumps to the RWST.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_011516)    Upon completion of FRP-S.1, a "B" Steam Line will rupture inside Containment (over 10 minutes), and the operator will re-enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."  Ultimately, the operator will transition to EOP-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation," to isolate the flow into and out of the "B" Steam Generator and then terminate Safety Injection. However, an Orange and/or Red Path will exist on the RCS Critical Safety Function, and the operator will transition to FRP-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition.
The scenario will terminate at Step 12 of FRP-P.1, when the operator stops SI Pumps. Critical Tasks:  Manually control "C" S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level. Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the "C" S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control. Insert Negative Reactivity into the Core by Inserting Control Rods Manually Prior to Locally Tripping the Reactor (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical or returns to a critical condition. Performance of the critical task would make the reactor subcritical and provide sufficient shutdown margin to prevent (or at least minimize the power excursion associated with) any subsequent return to criticality. Failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance which fails to prevent incorrect reactivity control. In the scenario postulated by the plant conditions, failure to insert negative reactivity by inserting control rods can result in the needless continuation of an extreme or a severe challenge to the subcriticality CSF. Although the challenge was not initiated by the operator (was not initiated by operator error), continuation of the challenge is a result of the operator's failure to insert negative reactivity. Isolate Feedwater Flow Into and Steam Flow From the Faulted S/G Before a Transition Out of E-2 Occurs (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Also, depending upon the plant conditions, it could constitute a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Failure to isolate a faulted SG can result in challenges to the Integrity, Subcriticality and Containment CSFs. Stop the High Head SI Pumps Before a Transition Out of FRP-P.1 Occurs (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to stop the high head SI Pumps results in challenges to the Integrity CSF; and could unnecessarily result in a mechanical failure due to Pressurized Thermal Shock.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111915)  Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 5 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners:  Operators: (SRO)    (RO)    (BOP)  Initial Conditions: The plant is at 3-5% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "B" Condensate Pump is OOS. LI-1417A, Hotwell Level Indication is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-006-F7, "PWST HI/LO LVL," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 30%.              Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*  Event Description  1 NA R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Roll Turbine 2 1 C-BOP C-SRO High Turbine Eccentricity 3  2 I-BOP I(TS)-SRO Loss of Compensation Voltage to Intermediate Range N-35  4 3  I-RO I-SRO VCT Level transmitter LT-112 fails HIGH 5 4 C-RO C(TS)-SRO "B" RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE  6 5 M-RO M-BOP M-SRO Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE 7 6 C-RO Failure of Automatic Rx Trip  * (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,    (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111915)  H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #5  The plant is at 3-5% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.
The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "B" Condensate Pump is OOS. LI-1417A, Hotwell Level Indication is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-006-F7, "PWST HI/LO LVL," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 30%.
Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 5-8% and startup the Turbine using GP-005, "Power Operation."  When the Turbine is rolling, a HIGH Eccentricity condition will develop on the Main Turbine. The operator will respond using AOP-006, "Turbine Eccentricity/Vibration," and place the Turbine startup on HOLD. Shortly afterwards, the compensating voltage on Intermediate Range Channel N-35 will fail. The operator will remove the instrument from service using OWP-011, "Nuclear Instrumentation (NI)."  The failed channel will require that the Source Range instruments be manually re-energized in the subsequent post-trip conditions. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," and determine to continue with the power increase. Following this, VCT Level Transmitter LT-112 will fail HIGH causing LCV-115A to divert all letdown flow to the CVCS HUTs and result in an automatic makeup to the VCT. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-003, "Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control."  After this, the power increase will continue. Next, a Thermal barrier leak will develop on the "B" RCP and Flow Control Valve FCV-626 will fail to CLOSE. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-C1, "RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW," and AOP-014, "Component Cooling Water Malfunction."  The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.6.1, "Containment," and Technical Specification LCO 3.6.3, "Containment Isolation Valves."  Subsequently, a Steam Rupture will occur downstream of the MSIVs and the MSIVs will fail to CLOSE automatically and manually. Simultaneously, the Reactor will fail to TRIP automatically. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and manually trip the reactor.      Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation," and then when it is realized that all Steam Generators are faulted, transition to EOP-ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators," and lower AFW flow to each Steam Generator to 60 gpm.
While terminating Safety Injection in EOP-ECA-2.1, the "A" MSIV will close and the "A" S/G pressure is expected to rise higher than that of the "B" and "C" S/G's. Since the crew will be in the process of terminating SI in EOP-ECA-2.1, the crew will continue to complete the SI termination steps before transitioning back to EOP-E-2.
The scenario will terminate at Step 4.c of EOP-E-2, after the operator has closed the AFW Discharge valves to the "B" and "C" Steam Generators. Depending on the timing of the actions Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111915)  taken by the crew when the "A" MSIV is closed, the "A" S/G pressure may not rise significantly higher than that of the "B" and "C" S/Gs, and the crew will remain in EOP-ECA-2.1 past the SI termination steps (i.e. Step 19). If this situation occurs, the scenario will terminate at Step 20 of EOP-ECA-2.1.      Critical Tasks:  Manually trip the reactor from the control room before entry into FRP-S.1  Safety Significance:  Failure to manually trip the reactor causes a challenge to the subcriticality CSF beyond that irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, it constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates the inability of the operator to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. The ERG Background Document for E-0 states that one function of E-0 is to verify that all required automatic protective actions occur before transitioning the crew to the appropriate ORG. The verification is important because the subsequent ORGs are based on the assumption that protective systems will protect all CSFs while the ORG is implemented. Not tripping the reactor when it is possible to do so (as in the postulated conditions) forces an immediate extreme challenge to the subcriticality CSF. Additionally, the incorrect performance of failing to trip the reactor necessitates the operator taking compensating action that seriously complicates the event mitigation strategy. This mis-operation constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.
Control the AFW flow rate to not less than 60 gpm per SG in order to minimize the RCS cooldown rate before an EXTREME (Red Path) challenge develops to the RCS Integrity CSF  Safety Significance:  Failure to control the AFW flow rate to the SGs leads to an unnecessary and avoidable extreme challenge to the integrity CSF. Also, failure to perform the critical task increases the challenges to the subcriticality CSF beyond which is irreparably introduced by the postulated plant conditions. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes a demonstrated inability by the operator to take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety. It also fails to prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. 
 
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_010716)  Facility: HB Robinson Scenario No.: 6 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners:  Operators: (SRO)    (RO)    (BOP)  Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "A" EDG is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 ACTION B.1, B.2, B.3.2.1 and B.3.2.2, and B.4. R-15, Condenser Air Ejector Gas Radiation Monitor is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-002-F8, "STA AIR HDR LO PRESS," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The "B" MFWP has experienced high noise/vibration over the last two hours (Maintenance is investigating).              Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*  Event Description  1 1 C-BOP C-SRO Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN 2 NA R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Lower Power 3  2 C-BOP C(TS)-SRO "C" Service Water Pump Trips  4 3 C-RO C(TS)-SRO DS Bus De-energizes/"C" CCW Pump Trips on Start 5 4 C-RO C-SRO "A" RCP Seal Failure 6 5 M-RO M-BOP M-SRO Loss of Offsite Power 7 5 C-BOP "B" EDG Fails to Start  8 6 NA DSDG Trips  9 7 C-BOP "D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start  * (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,    (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_010716)  HB Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #6  The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "A" EDG is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 ACTION B.1, B.2, B.3.2.1 and B.3.2.2, and B.4. R-15, Condenser Air Ejector Gas Radiation Monitor is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-002-F8, "STA AIR HDR LO PRESS," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The "B" MFWP has experienced high noise/vibration over the last two hours (Maintenance is investigating).                                Shortly after taking the watch, HCV-1459, Heater Bypass Valve will fail OPEN. The crew will implement AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction," and close the valve. After the overpower transient is stabilized, the WCCS will call the control room and direct that reactor power be lowered to 50% for the purpose of removing the "B" Main Feedwater Pump from service. The operator will lower power in accordance with AOP-038, "Rapid Downpower."  After the power reduction is in progress, the "C" Service Water Pump will trip on overload. This will cause the running Service Water Booster Pump to trip as well. The operator will respond in accordance with various APP-008 annunciators and start a standby Service Water Pump; and then respond in accordance with APP-002-A through D8, "HVH WTR OUTLET LO FLOW," and re-start a Service Water Booster Pump. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, "Service Water System (SWS)," and Technical Specification LCO 3.6.6, "Containment Spray and Cooling Systems."    Following this, Breaker 52/32A will Trip de-energizing the DS Bus, and stopping the only running Charging Pump and CCW Pump. The operator may address AOP-018, "Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions," or various APP's to restore Charging and Seal Injection flow; and then APP-001-F5, CCW PMP LO PRESS, and ensure that the standby CCW Pump started. 10 seconds after the Standby CCW Pumps start, the "C" CCW Pump will trip, and only the "B" CCW will be left running. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6, "Component Cooling Water (CCW) System," and Technical Specification LCO 3.4.17, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)."    Next, a #1 Seal Failure will occur on the "A" RCP. The crew will implement AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions," trip the reactor, stop the pump, and three minutes after the pump is stopped, CLOSE the Seal Leakoff Valve. The crew will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."  Simultaneously, a Loss of Offsite Power will occur on the reactor trip, and the "B" Emergency Diesel Generator will fail to automatically start. Additionally, the DS DG will trip.
Upon entry into EOP-E-0, the operator will determine that both ESF buses are de-energized and transition to EOP-ECA-0.0, "Loss of All AC Power." The operator will subsequently start the "B" EDG by depressing the SI Actuate Pushbutton, restore power to Bus E-2, and transition back to EOP-E-0. When Bus E-2 is re-energized, the "D" Service Water Pump will fail to sequence automatically and will need to be manually started. Upon transition back to EOP-E-0, the crew will complete the immediate actions of EOP-E-0, and continue with AOP-018.
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_010716)  The scenario will terminate when the crew has terminated Safety Injection and re-established Charging/Seal Injection in Step 6 of ES-1.1. Critical Tasks:  Energize at Least One AC Emergency Bus Before Defeating the Auto Loading of the Safeguards Equipment in EOP-ECA-0.0  Safety Significance:  Failure to energize an ac emergency bus constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency power capacity. Failure to perform the critical task also results in needless degradation of any barrier to fission product release, specifically of the RCS barrier at the point of the RCP seals. Additionally, failure to perform the critical task results in the unnecessary continuation of a situation in which RCS inventory is being lost uncontrollably and cannot be replaced. This situation is equivalent to mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity at a time when a small-break LOCA is in progress. In this case, at least one ac emergency bus can be energized from the control room.
Failure to perform the critical task means that RCS inventory lost through the RCP seals cannot be replaced. It also means that the RCP seals remain without cooling and gradually deteriorate. As the seals deteriorate the rate of RCS inventory loss increases.
Manually Start SW Pump for EDG Cooling within 40 Minutes of starting the "B" EDG  Safety Significance:  Failure to manually start the SW pump under the postulated plant conditions means that the EDG is running without SW cooling. Running the EDG without SW cooling leads to a high-temperature condition that can result in EDG failure due to damage caused by engine overheating. Under the postulated plant conditions, the running EDG is the only operable EDG. The calculated maximum time an EDG may operate without cooling to preclude adverse effects is 40 minutes. Since during the first 40 minutes of EDG operation in this scenario there are two procedural cues to check, and if needed, start a SW Pump, it is believed that failure to perform the critical task constitutes mis-operation or incorrect performance in which the crew does not prevent "degraded- emergency power capacity."     
 
PROGRAM: H B Robinson Operations Training  MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam    Scenario N16-1-1   
 
==REFERENCES:==
: 1. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4, "Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System" (Amendment 203) 2. APP-003, "RCS & Makeup Systems" (Rev 54) 3. AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure" (Rev 24) 4. OWP-030, "Pressurizer Level Transmitters (PLT)" (Rev 11) 5. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation" (Amendment 176) 6. AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction" (Rev 33) 7. OWP-034, "Steam Flow (SF)" (Rev 19)  8. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)
Instrumentation" (Amendment 176) 9. APP-007, "Condensate & Feedwater" (Rev 44) 10. OP-407, "Heater Drain and Vents" (Rev 51) 11. AOP-038, "Rapid Downpower" (Rev 3) 12. OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When > 25% Power" (Rev 62) 13. OP-301, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)" (Rev 112) 14. APP-010, "HVAC-Emerg. Generators & Misc. Systems" (Rev 81) 15. AOP-001, "Malfunction of Reactor Control System" (Rev 33) 16. EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection"  (Rev 6) 17. EOP-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response" (Rev 7) 18. EOP-E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture" (Rev 7)  Validation Time: 144 minutes 
 
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1  Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners:  Operators: (SRO)    (RO)    (BOP)  Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The SDAFW Pump is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION A. FI-613, CCW System Flow is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-010-B3, "EDG B START AIR LO PRESS," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).              Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*  Event Description  1 1 I-RO N-BOP I(TS)-SRO Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW 2 2 I-BOP I(TS)-SRO "C" Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW 3  3  R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower  4 4 C-BOP C-SRO CRDM Fan "A" Failure  5 5 C-RO C-SRO Continuous Inward Rod Motion 6 6 M-RO M-BOP M-SRO "C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture 7 7 C-BOP Loss of Off-Site Power  * (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,    (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1  H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #1  The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The SDAFW Pump is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION A. FI-613, CCW System Flow is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-010-B3, "EDG B START AIR LO PRESS," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).
Shortly after taking the watch, Pressurizer Level Transmitter, LT-459 will fail LOW causing normal letdown to isolate, de-energizing of pressurizer control group heaters and charging pump speed to rise for the pump in AUTO. The operator will respond in accordance APP-003-E8, "PZR CONTROL HI/LO LVL," and AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure."  The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-030, "Pressurizer Level Transmitters."  The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation."    Following this, the controlling steam flow channel for S/G "C", FT-494, will fail LOW, causing FRV-498 to start to CLOSE. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction," and/or AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure."  The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-034, "Steam Flow."  The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation."  Next, a tube leak will develop in Feed Water Heater 4A. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-007-E7, HTR 4A HI/LO LVL, identifying the leak. The operator may enter AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction."  Ultimately, the operator will use OP-407, "Heater Drain and Vents," to remove Feedwater Heaters 5A, 4A, and 3A from Service. This will require a power decrease. The operator will use either AOP-038, "Rapid Downpower," or OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When > 25% Power," and OP-301, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)," to lower plant power.
During the downpower, the "A" CRDM Fan will trip. The operator will address APP-010-A6, HVH-5A/B AIR FLOW LOST/OVLD, and manually start the "B" CRDM Fan. Shortly afterwards, a continuous control rod insertion will occur. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-001, "Malfunction of Reactor Control System."  The operator will be unable to control the rod insertion and will manually trip the reactor. On the reactor trip, a 500 gpm Steam Generator Tube Rupture will occur (over 10 minutes) on the "C" Steam Generator. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."  After the Immediate Actions are complete, it is likely that the operator will determine that SI is NOT actuated nor required, and transition to EOP-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response."  While in this procedure the operator will determine that SI is required, manually actuate SI, and return to EOP-E-0. Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture," to isolate the flow into and out of the "C" Steam Generator and then conduct a cooldown of the RCS. Upon transition into EOP-E-3, a Loss of Off-Site Power will occur. Both EDGs will start and re-power Buses E-1 and E-2. With SI previously reset, the operator will need to address a re-Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1  initiation of AFW flow to all Steam Generators, and the restart of the ECCS Pumps. The operator will continue with EOP-E-3 and conduct the RCS cooldown using the "A" and "B" Steam Generator PORVs. During the RCS depressurization, the Pzr Spray Valves will not be available. The operator will be required to conduct the depressurization using an available Pzr PORV. The scenario will terminate at Step 23 of EOP-E-3, after the operator has stopped the SI Pumps. Critical Tasks:
Manually control "C" S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level. Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the "C" S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control. Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. The fact that the operator allows the differential pressure to dissipate and, as a result, are then forced to transition to a contingency procedure constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would unnecessarily complicate the event mitigation strategy. While in EOP-E-3, establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not occur because the RCS temperature is in either (1) Too high to maintain 38&deg;F of RCS Subcooling OR (2) below 295&deg;F (RCS Integrity Red Path Limit) (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency procedure. This failure constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would unnecessarily complicate the event mitigation strategy.
Depressurize the RCS to meet SI termination criteria before Steam Generator Overfill is reached based on Water in the Steam Lines.  (EOP-Based, if above 100% WR level see Simulator Code "thlecell(193)" to determine)  Safety Significance:  Failure to stop reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates mitigation of the event. It also constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1  SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS              Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  Sim. Setup Reset to Temp IC 608  T = 0 Malfunctions:  SDAFW Pump OOS:  irf EPSMCC5_189 f:RACK_OUT (V1-8A, "A" S/G supply to SDAFW)  irf EPSMCC6_226 f:RACK_OUT (V1-8B, "B" S/G supply to SDAFW)  irf EPSMCC6_227 f:RACK_OUT (V1-8C, "C" S/G supply to SDAFW)  irf EPSMCC10_262 f:RACK_OUT (V2-14A, SDAFW discharge to "A" S/G)  irf EPSMCC9_254 f:RACK_OUT (V2-14B, SDAFW discharge to "B" S/G)  irf EPSMCC10_267 f:RACK_OUT (V2-14C, SDAFW discharge to "C" S/G)  PLACE RED CAPS on the RTGB Control Switches for the Valves ABOVE Place GREEN CAPS on the RTGB Control Switches BELOW (See OMM-048, Attachment 9):  "A" MDAFW RTGB Switch  "B" MDAFW RTGB Switch  AFW Valve V2-16A RTGB Switch  AFW Valve V2-16B RTGB Switch  AFW Valve V2-16C RTGB Switch  AFW Valve V2-20A RTGB Switch  AFW Valve V2-20B RTGB Switch  Protected Switchyard FI-613 CCW System Flow OOS  IOR aoCCWAOD010B f:0 Place WHITE DOT on FI-613 RTGB Annunciator APP-010-B3 failed ON  IMF ANNXN10B03 f:ALARM_ON  Place WHITE DOT on APP-010-B3 Place the Simulator in RUN and ACKNOWLEDGE all alarms. Perform Attachment 2 (Simulator Setup For Exams) of TAP-411.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1    Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  Crew Briefing  1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements  2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew. 3. Provide the crew with the following:  OST-947, Operations Reactivity Plan  Copy of Technical Specifications/Basis  4. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms. T-0 Begin Familiarization Period  At direction of examiner Execute Lesson Plan for Simulator Scenario N16-1-1. At direction of examiner  Event 1  ICO PRSXMTLT_459 r:15 f:0  Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW At direction of examiner  Event 2 ICO SGNXMTFT_494 r:01:00 f:0  "C" Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW  At direction of examiner Event 3  IMF CFW14G r:02:00 f:800000  Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower  At direction of examiner  Event 4 IMF HVA05A f:MOTOR_SHORT  CRDM Fan "A" Failure  At direction of examiner Event 5 IMF CRF06A IMF CRF06B  Continuous Inward Rod Motion  NOTE: This will occur on a Rod Inward signal ($006_RODS_INCRF07 r:5 f:72) At direction of examiner Event 6 IMF SGN02F r:10:00 f:500  "C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture  NOTE: The SGTR will occur on Rx Trip ($006_N16-1-1_SGTR_ON_TRIP)
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1    Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  Post-Rx Trip Upon Transition to EOP-E-3 Event 7 IMF EPS13    Loss of Off-Site Power      Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page  9 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW      Shortly after taking the watch, Pressurizer Level Transmitter, LT-459 will fail LOW causing normal letdown to isolate, de-energizing of pressurizer control group heaters and charging pump speed to rise for the pump in AUTO. The operator will respond in accordance APP-003-E8, "PZR CONTROL HI/LO LVL," and AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure."  The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-030, "Pressurizer Level Transmitters."  The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation." Booth Operator Instructions:    ICO PRSXMTLT_459  r:15 f:0  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-003-F4, CHG PMP HI SPEED  RTGB Annunciator APP-003-E8, PZR CONTROL HI/LO LVL  PZR Level LI-459A lowering  PZR Level LI-460/461 stable  "C" Charging Pump speed rising  Normal Letdown isolates  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    NOTE: The CRS may enter AOP-025 directly. APP-003-E8, PZR CONTROL HI/LO LVL      RO (Step 1) IF Letdown is isolated, THEN ensure one Charging Pump running at minimum. NOTE: The RO will take Charging Pump to MANUAL and adjust to MINIMUM speed.      CRS (Step 2) IF a load rejection has occurred, THEN --      CRS (Step 3) IF excessive RCS leakage exists, THEN-..      RO (Step 4) IF a level controller has failed, THEN manually adjust Charging and/or Letdown to maintain PZR level NOTE: The RO will control Charging flow as needed. The RO will adjust Seal Injection flow by controlling HIC-121.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page  10 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Step 5) IF a level channel failure has occurred, THEN refer to AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure NOTE: The CRS will transition to AOP-025. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE      CRS (Step 1) GO TO Appropriate Section For Failed Instrument: NOTE: The CRS will select Section B of AOP-025. PZR LEVEL (LT-459, 460, 461) - SECTION B      AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION B, PZR LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILURE      RO (Step 1) CHECK Failed Instrument  FAILED LOW      RO (Step 2) PLACE LCV460 A&B Control Switch In CLOSE NOTE: The RO may re-positioned the Control Switch earlier based on Step 5.3.7.5 of OMM-022.      RO (Step 3) CHECK Charging Pumps  ONLY ONE PUMP RUNNING IN MANUAL CONTROL      RO (Step 3 RNO) ENSURE only one charging pump is running in manual control.      RO (Step 4) ADJUST Charging Pump Speed To Control PZR LEVEL Between 22% And 53% NOTE: PZR level will rise, and may exceed TS LCO 3.4.9 (63.3%).      CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using PA System NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page  11 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      RO (Step 6) CHECK RCP Seal Injection Flow  BETWEEN 8 GPM AND 13 GPM      RO (Step 6 RNO) Locally THROTTLE RCP SEAL WATER FLOW CONTROL VALVE(s) to obtain flow to each RCP between 8 gpm and 13 gpm. NOTE:  The BOP may contact the AO to adjust Seal Injection flows. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO; and use: IRF CVC030 f: variable IRF CVC031 f: variable IRF CVC032 f: variable    CVC297A    CVC297B    CVC297C    IF required to maintain 8 GPM flow, THEN THROTTLE HIC121, CHARGING FLOW, while maintaining charging pump discharge pressure less than 2500 psig. REVIEW TS LCO 3.4.17 for applicability.      RO (Step 7) CHECK Controlling Channel  FAILED NOTE: LT-459 has failed LOW.      RO (Step 8) CHECK LT461  OPERABLE      RO (Step 9) PLACE LM459 In 461 REPL 459      RO (Step 10) PLACE LR459 In REC 461      RO (Step 11) CHECK Normal Letdown  IN SERVICE Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page  12 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Step 11 RNO) IF normal letdown is desired, THEN RESTORE normal letdown using Attachment 1, Restoration of Normal Letdown. NOTE: The CRS will hand off the restoration of Letdown to the BOP. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE ATTACHMENT 1, RESTORATION OF NORMAL LETDOWN      BOP (Step 1) ENSURE Normal Charging Flow Through The Regenerative Heat Exchanger Is In Service.      BOP (Step 2) ENSURE Phase A Containment Isolation Signal NOT Present.      BOP (Step 3) NOTIFY RC That Normal Letdown Flow Will Be Restored And The Affected Areas Should Be Monitored For Changing Radiological Conditions. NOTE:  The BOP will call RC to address the potential changing radiological conditions. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as RC.      BOP (Step 4) ENSURE The Following Valves Are Closed:    CVC204A, LETDOWN LINE ISO  CVC204B, LETDOWN LINE ISO  LCV460A, LTDN LINE STOP  LCV460B, LTDN LINE STOP  CVC200A, LETDOWN ORFICE ISOLATION  CVC200B, LETDOWN ORFICE ISOLATION  CVC200C, LETDOWN ORFICE ISOLATION      BOP (Step 5) ENSURE HIC121, CHARGING FLOW, Is Set For Full Open.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page  13 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 6) ENSURE PZR Level Is Greater Than Or Equal To Program Level. NOTE:  PZR Level will likely be above program.      BOP (Step 7) IF Desired, THEN PLACE TCV143, VCT/DEMIN In The VCT Position.      BOP (Step 8) PLACE PCV145, PRESSURE, In MAN.      BOP (Step 9) ADJUST PC145 To Throttle PCV145 To 45% To 55% Open.      BOP (Step 10) OPEN The Following:    CVC204A, LETDOWN LINE ISO    CVC204B, LETDOWN LINE ISO      BOP (Step 11) OPEN LCV460A&B:    PLACE LTDN LINE STOP LCV460 A&B switch to OPEN. PLACE LTDN LINE STOP LCV460 A&B switch to AUTO.      BOP (Step 12) ESTABLISH Cooling To NONREGEN HX:    PLACE TC144, NONREGEN HX OUTLET TEMP in MANUAL. ADJUST TC144 NONREGEN HX OUTLET TEMP as necessary to ensure letdown temperature does not rise above 127&deg;F when letdown is reestablished.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page  14 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 13) While MAINTAINING Charging Pump Discharge Pressure As Indicated On PI121 Less Than 2500 psig, ADJUST Charging Pump Speed To The Expected Letdown Flow To Be Established In The Next Step.      BOP (Step 14) OPEN One LTDN ORIFICE Valve: NOTE:  PZR Level will likely be above program, and the BOP may place a 60 gpm orifice in service. CVC200A, LETDOWN ORFICE ISOLATION    CVC200B, LETDOWN ORFICE ISOLATION    CVC200C, LETDOWN ORFICE ISOLATION      BOP (Step 15) PLACE PC145 In AUTO And CHECK Letdown Pressure As Indicated On PI145, LOW PRESS LTDN PRESS, Is Being Maintained Between 300 Psig And 320 Psig.      BOP (Step 16) PLACE TC144, NONREGEN HX OUTLET TEMP, In AUTO.      BOP (Step 17) IF TCV143 Was Selected To VCT, THEN POSITION TCV143 As Directed By The CRS/SM.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page  15 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 18) IF Charging Flow Is Changed, THEN ESTABLISH RCP Seal injection Flow Between 8 GPM and 13 GPM By Throttling The Following:  CVC297A, RCP A SEAL WATER FLOW CONTROL VALVE  CVC297B, RCP B SEAL WATER FLOW CONTROL VALVE  CVC297C, RCP C SEAL WATER FLOW CONTROL VALVE  NOTE:  The BOP may contact the AO to adjust Seal Injection flows. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO; and use: IRF CVC030 f: variable IRF CVC031 f: variable IRF CVC032 f: variable        BOP (Step 19) IF Additional Letdown Flow Is Desired,-. NOTE:  PZR Level will likely be above program, and the BOP may discuss with the CRS/RO about additional Letdown flow.      BOP (Step 20) NOTIFY Chemistry That Normal Letdown Has Been Restored. NOTE:  The BOP will call Chemistry to notify that normal letdown is back in service. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION B, PZR LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILURE      RO (Step 12) RESTORE PZR Level Control To Automatic: Examiner Note: PZR Level may require additional adjustment prior to restoring the controller to AUTO. The crew may complete the event with Level control still in MANUAL. CHECK PZR level  WITHIN +/- 1% OF PROGRAMMED REFERENCE LEVEL    RESTORE PZR level control to automatic      RO (Step 13) RESET PZR Heaters:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page  16 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    PLACE PZR HTR CONTROL GROUP control switch in OFF and return to ON    PLACE PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP A control switch in OFF and return to AUTO or ON as desired    PLACE PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP B control switch in OFF and return to AUTO or ON as desired      RO (Step 14) CHECK RCP Seal Injection Flow  BETWEEN 8 GPM AND 13 GPM      RO (Step 14 RNO) Locally THROTTLE RCP SEAL WATER FLOW CONTROL VALVE(s) to obtain flow to each RCP between 8 gpm and 13 gpm: NOTE:  The BOP may contact the AO to adjust Seal Injection flows. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO; and use: IRF CVC030 f: variable IRF CVC031 f: variable IRF CVC032 f: variable    CVC297A    CVC297B    CVC297C      CRS (Step 15) REMOVE Failed Transmitter From Service Using OWP030 NOTE:  The CRS will address OWP-030. OWP-030, PRESSURIZER LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (PLT) PLT-1, PRESSURIZR LEVEL TRANSMITTER LT-459      CRS Address PLT-1 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page  17 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP Insert Trip Signals NOTE:  The BOP will enter the Simulator Booth (Simulating the Hagan Room). Booth Instructor coordinate with BOP to insert Trip Signals: OPEN Protection Racks Door: IRF BST101 f:D_OPEN  BST058 TRIP  BST001 TRIP CLOSE Protection Racks Door: IRF BST101 f:D_CLOSED    B/S 459A-1, Hagan Rack #2 (PZR Hi Level) NOTE: B/S Status Light Przr Hi Level LC-459A-1 will ILLUMINATE. B/S 459A-2, Hagan Rack #2 (PZR Lo Level) NOTE: B/S Status Light Przr Lo Level LC-459A-2 will ILLUMINATE. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION B, PZR LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILURE      CRS (Step 16) GO TO Procedure Main Body, Step 2 NOTE:  The CRS will address Technical Specifications. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE      CRS (Step 2) IMPLEMENT EALs NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.      CRS (Step 3) RETURN TO Procedure And Step In Effect      TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) INSTRUMENTATION Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page  18 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      CRS LCO 3.3.1 The RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.      CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.      CRS ACTIONS        CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that Function 8, Pressurizer Water Level - High, is affected and that Action M.1 or M.2 must be entered. M. One channel inoperable. M.1 Place channel in trip. OR M.2 Reduce THERMAL POWER to < P-
: 7. 6 hours  12 hours      TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.9, PRESSURIZER      CRS LCO 3.4.9 The pressurizer shall be OPERABLE with: a. MODE 1; b. MODES 2 and 3; and c. Pressurizer heaters OPERABLE with a of being powered from an emergency power supply.      CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.      CRS ACTIONS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page  19 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: Due to the loss of Letdown PZR level will continue to rise until normal Letdown is restored. Consequently the crew is expected to be logged in, and then out of TS LCO 3.4.9 A. Pressurizer water level not within limit. A.1 Be in MODE 3 with reactor trip breakers open. AND A.2 Be in MODE 4. 6 hours  12 hours    NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page  20 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW      Following this, the controlling steam flow channel for S/G "C", FT-494, will fail LOW, causing FRV-498 to start to CLOSE. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction," and/or AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure."  The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-034, "Steam Flow."  The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation." Booth Operator Instructions:    ICO SGNXMTFT_494  r:01:00 f:0  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-006-C3, S/G C LVL DEV  Lowering demand on FCV-498 ("C" S/G Feedwater Reg Valve)  Narrow Range Level in "C" S/G lowering  FR-498 indicates that the gap between Feedwater and Steam flow to and from "C" S/G is rising  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Examiner Note: It is most likely that the CRS will respond to the symptoms and enter AOP-010 first. However, the crew may recognize the failure and respond by entering AOP-025 first. If so, proceed to AOP-025 section below. AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION      BOP (Step 1) CHECK FRVs  OPERATING PROPERLY (MANUAL OR AUTO): Immediate Action  NOTE: The BOP will control FCV-498 in MANUAL. FCV478    FCV488    FCV498      RO/ BOP (Step 2) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint  BEING APPROACHED NOTE: A Power Limit Warning is possible during this event which will require a reduction in power.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page  21 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      CRS (Step 2 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is approached, THEN-. GO TO Step 4.      RO (Step 4) CHECK Reactor Power  LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%      Critical Task:  Manually control "C" S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level. Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the "C" S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.      CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      CRS (Step 6) GO TO Appropriate Step From Table Below:    FRV Failure To Control - OBSERVE NOTE 58      BOP (Step 58) CHECK S/G Level  AT OR TRENDING TO PROGRAM NOTE: The CRS will likely transition to AOP-025 based on the Note prior to Step 58. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE      CRS (Step 1) GO TO Appropriate Section For Failed Instrument: NOTE: The CRS will select Section D of AOP-025.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page  22 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    S/G Steam Flow (FT-476, 477, 484, 485, 494, 495) - SECTION D      AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION D, S/G FEED FLOW, STEAM FLOW OR STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE      BOP (Step 1) CHECK Affected FRV In MAN: Immediate Action  NOTE: The BOP will control FCV-498 in MANUAL. FCV478 (FRV "A")    FCV488 (FRV "B")    FCV498 (FRV "C")      BOP (Step 2) RESTORE Affected S/G Level To Program Immediate Action    Critical Tasks:  Manually control "C" S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level. Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the "C" S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.      BOP (Step 3) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint  BEING APPROACHED      CRS (Step 3 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is approached, THEN-. NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. GO TO Step 5.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page  23 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using PA System NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      BOP (Step 6) CHECK Failure  FEED FLOW INSTRUMENT FAILURE      CRS (Step 6 RNO) IF failure was a steam flow instrument, THEN GO TO Step 12.      BOP (Step 12) PLACE Affected S/G Steam Flow Selector Switch To The Alternate Channel:    S/G "C" STEAM FLOW  FR498    Failed Channel FT-494 - Position CH495      BOP (Step 13) RESTORE Affected Controller To Automatic:    CHECK S/G level  WITHIN +/-1% OF PROGRAMMED LEVEL    PLACE affected controller in AUTO      BOP (Step 14) REMOVE Affected Transmitter From Service Using OWP034: NOTE:  The CRS will address OWP-034. Channel FT-494 - OWP SF-5      OWP-034, STEAM FLOW (SF) SF-5, STEAM FLOW TRANSMITTER FT-494      CRS Address SF-5      BOP DELETE INPUT FT-494 (MSF0445A) FROM CALO PROCESSING IAW OMM-007.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page  24 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP Insert Trip Signals NOTE:  The BOP will enter the Simulator Booth (Simulating the Hagan Room). Booth Instructor coordinate with BOP to insert Trip Signals: OPEN Protection Racks Door: IRF BST101 f:D_OPEN  BST020 TRIP CLOSE Protection Racks Door: IRF BST101 f:D_CLOSED    B/S 494, HAGAN RACK #16 (LOOP 3 HI STM FLOW) NOTE: B/S STATUS LIGHT LOOP 3 HI STM FLOW FC-494, and APP-036-L1, APP-006-F4, and APP-006-C2 will ILLUMINATE. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION D, S/G FEED FLOW, STEAM FLOW OR STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE      CRS (Step 15) REVIEW TS LCOs for applicability:    TS LCO 3.3.1    TS LCO 3.3.2      CRS (Step 16) GO TO Procedure Main Body, Step 2      AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE      CRS (Step 2) IMPLEMENT EALs NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.      CRS (Step 3) RETURN TO Procedure And Step In Effect Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page  25 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.2, ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM (ESFAS) INSTRUMENTATION      CRS LCO 3.3.2 The ESFAS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.      CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.2-1.      CRS ACTIONS        CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that Functions 1.f (SI-High Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines), 1.g (SI- High Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines Coincident with Steam Line Pressure Low), 4.d (MSI - High Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines Coincident with Tavg LOW) and 4.e (MSI - High Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines Coincident with Steam Line Pressure Low), are affected; and that Action D.1 of D2.1 and D.2.2 must be entered . D. One channel inoperable NOTE For Function 4.c, a channel may be taken out of the trip condition for 6 hours for maintenance. D.1 Place channel in trip. OR D.2.1 Be in MODE 3. AND  D.2.2 Be in MODE 4.
6 hours 12 hour 18 hours    At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  26 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Next, a tube leak will develop in Feed Water Heater 4A. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-007-E7, HTR 4A HI/LO LVL, identifying the leak. The operator may enter AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction."  Ultimately, the operator will use OP-407, "Heater Drain and Vents," to remove Feedwater Heaters 5A, 4A, and 3A from Service. This will require a power decrease. The operator will use either AOP-038, "Rapid Downpower," or OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When > 25% Power," and OP-301, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)," to lower plant power. Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF CFW14G        r:02:00 f:800000  (NOTE: This Malfunction requires 3 minutes to generate APP-007-E7)  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-007-E7, HTR 4A HI/LO LVL  Feed Flow lowering on all three S/Gs  Narrow Range Level lowering on all three S/Gs  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Examiner Note: When this alarm occurs the crew may address AOP-010 or use APP-007 E7 to direct entry into OP-407. If the crew uses APP-007-E7, continue below. If the crew enters AOP-010, proceed to Step 1 on Page 27. APP-007-E7, HTR 4A HI/LO LVL      CRS (Step 1) IF level alarm is due to low power maneuvering, THEN-..      BOP (Step 2) IF required, THEN dispatch an Operator to check: NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the 4A FWH sightglass is FULL and the LCVs are FULL OPEN. Sightglass level Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  27 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Level Control Valve position      BOP/CRS (Step 3) IF a level control valve has malfunctioned, THEN-.      CRS (Step 4) IF tube leakage is occurring, THEN bypass the affected string of Heaters for repair of defective tubes using OP-407, Heater Drains and Vents Examiner NOTE:  The CRS will transition to OP-407 to remove Heaters 5A, 4A and 3A from service. If so, proceed to OP-407 actions on Page 30. NOTE: During the transient there is a possibility that TS LCO 3.4.1 (DNB) will be entered. AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION      BOP (Step 1) CHECK FRVs  OPERATING PROPERLY (MANUAL OR AUTO): Immediate Action      FCV478    FCV488    FCV498      RO/ BOP (Step 2) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint  BEING APPROACHED      CRS (Step 2 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is approached, THEN-. GO TO Step 4.      RO (Step 4) CHECK Reactor Power  LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  28 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      CRS (Step 6) GO TO Appropriate Step From Table Below: NOTE: The CRS go to Step 33 based on a known tube leak in the A Train FWHs, or Step 35 based on other malfunctions  Known Leak - 33    Other - 35      BOP (Step 33) REDUCE Turbine Load Using Attachment 1 To Match Feedwater And Steam Flows WHILE CONTINUING WITH This Procedure NOTE: The CRS may address Step 33 of AOP-010. Steam flow and Feed flow are matched.      CRS (Step 34) OBSERVE NOTE Prior To Step 41 And GO TO Step 41 NOTE: If the CRS entered at Step 33 of AOP-010, they will move forward to Step 41.      CRS (Step 35) REDUCE Turbine Load Using Attachment 1 To Match Feedwater And Steam Flows WHILE CONTINUING WITH This Procedure NOTE: The CRS may address Step 35 of AOP-010. Steam flow and Feed flow are matched.      CRS/ BOP (Step 36) DISPATCH An Operator To Observe Valve Positions: NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the both valves are operating properly. LCV1530A, HDT LEVEL CONTROL VALVE    LCV1530B, HEATER DRAIN PUMPS SUCTION DUMP TO CONDENSER Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  29 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Step 37) DETERMINE If A Heater Drain Tank Level Control Valve Has Failed:      CHECK HDT level control valve or controller  HAS MALFUNCTIONED      CRS (Step 37.a RNO) IF HDT Level is controlling correctly, THEN OBSERVE NOTE prior to Step 40 and GO TO Step 40.      CRS (Step 40) CHECK For Leak  CAUSING FW TRANSIENT NOTE: The crew may determine that a FWH Tube Leak exists and that the Train A FWH string must be bypassed/isolated. Visual indication of leak    FW Heater level alarms FW Heater normal and alternate drain valve positions level dump valve positions    FW Heater #1 & #2 emergency dump valve positions    Gland Steam Condenser abnormal indications/alarms      CRS (Step 41) ISOLATE Leak:    CONSULT with Operations to determine leak isolation strategy    Isolate in current plant condition    OR    Repair online    OR    Shutdown to repair    OR    Trip Unit Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  30 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Examiner NOTE: The crew should address OP-407 to remove the 5A, 4A, and 3A FWHs from service.
OP-407, HEATER DRAINS AND VENTS SECTION 6.4.5 REMOVING HEATERS 5A, 4A, AND 3A FROM SERVICE      CRS (Step 1) To remove Heater 4A from service, perform the following:    Ensure power is reduced to 659 Mwe gross (maximum of 20% power reduction) Examiner NOTE: The CRS conduct a downpower to 659 MWe using AOP-038 or OP-105. If AOP-038 is selected, continue below. If OP-105 is selected, proceed to Page 35. AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER      CRS (Step 1) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using The Plant Page System NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      RO (Step 2) DETERMINE Corrected Boration And Target Rod Height For Target Power Level Using Most Recently Performed OST947, OPERATIONS REACTIVITY PLAN    Target Load Reduction Rate __%/min    Target Power Level ___    Target Rod Height ___ NOTE: The RO will determine approximately 185 Steps. Corrected Boration ___ NOTE: The RO will determine approximately 70 gallons.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  31 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      CRS (Step 3) PERFORM Brief Of Control Room Personnel To Include The Following:    Reason for downpower    Target Power Level    Target Rod Height    Rate of load reduction    Amount of boric acid addition      RO (Step 4) CHECK Required Power Reduction Rate  LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 5%/MINUTE      RO (Step 5) ENERGIZE All Available PZR Heaters    PZR HTR CONTROL GROUP    PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP A    PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP B      RO (Step 6) CHECK Rod Control  IN AUTO      RO (Step 7) INITIATE Boration Using Attachment 1, RCS Boration, While Continuing With This Procedure    Examiner NOTE:  The CRS will assign the RO to perform this action. RO Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1. Other Examiners follow AOP-038 Actions, Step 8, on Page 32. AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER ATTACHMENT 1, RCS BORATION Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  32 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 1) PLACE The RCS MAKEUP MODE Selector Switch In BORATE      RO (Step 2) IF Frequent Boric Acid Transfer Pump Starts Are Anticipated, THEN PLACE Boric Acid Transfer Pump Switch Aligned To BLEND To ON.      RO (Step 3) SET YIC113, BORIC ACID TOTALIZER to amount determined in Main Body Step 2      RO (Step 4) Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to START      RO (Step 5) IF Boric Acid flow is NOT achieving the desired effect, THEN PLACE FCV113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, in MAN AND manually Adjust controller FCV113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, using the UP and DOWN pushbuttons      RO (Step 6) WHEN the desired amount of Boric Acid has been added to the RCS OR the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Switch is placed in STOP, THEN ENSURE the following:    FCV113A, BA TO BLENDER, closes. FCV113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, closes. IF in AUTO, THEN operating Boric Acid Pump stops. RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF.      AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER    Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/BOP continue HERE.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  33 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 8) INITIATE Turbine Load Reduction While Continuing With This Procedure    CHECK EH Turbine Control  IN OPER AUTO    PREPARE For Turbine Load Reduction As Follows:    CHECK IMP IN  ILLUMINATED    SELECT the desired Load Rate    DEPRESS the GO pushbutton to initiate Turbine Load reduction      BOP (Step 9) ADJUST Turbine Load To Control Tavg Within 5&deg;F Of Tref Using One Of The Following:    ADJUST Load Rate    OR    DEPRESS GO and HOLD pushbuttons      CRS/ BOP (Step 10) INITIATE Notification of The Following: NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM/WCC/Communicator to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge. Load Dispatcher of load reduction    E&C to control secondary chemistry    RC for elevated radiation levels in CV Pump Bays and Pipe Alley    Oncall Duty Manager to activate the Event Response Team    E&C for impending 15% power change for I131 sampling within 2 to 6 hours    E&C for impending power reduction greater than 20% terminate zinc injection    NRC within 4 hours Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  34 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      BOP (Step 11) CHECK Auxiliary Boilers  AT LEAST ONE OPERATING      BOP (Step 11 RNO) IF Plant Shutdown is required, THEN NOTIFY AO to start at least one Auxiliary Boiler per OP401, AUXILIARY HEATING SYSTEM. NOTE: The BOP will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.      RO (Step 12) CHECK Tavg  WITHIN 5&deg;F OF Tref      RO (Step 13) CHECK Axial Flux Distribution  WITHIN TARGET BAND      BOP (Step 14) CHECK APP006F5, STEAM DUMP ARMED  EXTINGUISHED      RO (Step 15) CHECK Any Of The Following Conditions  MET: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. Target load/power has been reached    Load reduction is no longer required    CRS/SM directs termination of load reduction    STOP Rapid Downpower using Attachment 3, Termination Of Rapid Downpower      CRS (Step 15 RNO) WHEN any of the following conditions are met:    Target load/power has been reached NOTE: The target load is 659 MWe. Load reduction is no longer required    CRS/SM directs termination of load reduction Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  35 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    THEN STOP Rapid Downpower using Attachment 3, Termination Of Rapid Downpower. CRS  GO TO Step 16.      RO (Step 16) CHECK Reactor Power  LESS THAN 85%      BOP (Step 17) CHECK Heater Drain Pumps  TWO RUNNING    STOP one Heater Drain Pump      RO (Step 18) CHECK Reactor Power  LESS THAN 70%    Examiner NOTE: If the crew has used AOP-038 to downpower, Lead Examiner move to Event #4. Examiner NOTE: If the crew decides to reduce power using OP-105, Examiners continue HERE. OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER      CRS (Step 6.1.1.1) Check that an EOOS Risk Assessment has been performed      CRS (Step 6.1.1.2) IF an EOOS Risk Assessment has NOT been performed for this Power Reduction, THEN perform one of the following actions:    Direct the STA or the Work Week Coordinator (WWC) to perform an EOOS Risk Assessment NOTE:  The CRS may ask STA to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as STA. OR Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  36 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Perform a qualitative Risk Assessment per OMM-048, Work Coordination and Risk Assessment      BOP (Step 6.1.1.3) Notify the Load Dispatcher that unit load will be reduced. NOTE: The BOP will call Load Dispatcher. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Load Dispatcher      BOP (Step 6.1.1.4) Notify RC that higher radiation levels should be expected in the CV Pump Bays and in Pipe Alley due to normal shutdown crud bursts NOTE: The BOP will call RC. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as RC      BOP (Step 6.1.1.5) IF this is a Power Reduction greater than 20%, THEN notify Chemistry to shutdown the RCS Zinc Injection Skid NOTE: The BOP may call Chemistry. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry      RO (Step 6.1.1.6) Monitor the highest operable Power Range Channel and the highest operable Intermediate Range Channel on NR-45      CRS (Step 6.1.1.7) IF this will be a planned power reduction of greater than 10% power, THEN-..      CRS/BOP (Step 6.1.1.8) IF Reactor Engineering has NOT provided technical guidance, THEN use the most recent OST-947, Operations Reactivity Plan data to determine the reactivity change required      RO (Step 6.1.2.1) IF additional letdown flow is desired, THEN perform the following: NOTE: The RO may place additional Letdown in service.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  37 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Start additional Charging Pumps per OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System    Place additional letdown orifice in service per OP-301      RO (Step 6.1.2.2) IF a significant change in RCS Boron concentration is expected or occurs (10 ppm or more), THEN energize additional PZR heaters      RO (Step 6.1.2.3) Maintain Tave within 5&deg;F of Tref using a combination of Control Rods and Boron Concentration changes. NOTE: The RO will start a boration per Section 8.2.8 of OP-301. Examiner Note: RO Examiner follow actions of OP-301. CRS/BOP Examiners follow OP-105 Actions, Step 6.1.2.4, on Page 39. OP-301, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)      RO (Step 8.2.8.1) This revision has been verified to be the latest revision available.      RO (Step 8.2.8.2) DETERMINE the amount of Boric Acid to add to the RCS and if applicable, the expected change in RCS temperature AND Reactor Power NOTE: The RO will use Attachment 10.4 of OST-947 and determine that the Target Rod Height is 191 and 53.76 gallons of BA will need to be added.      RO (Step 8.2.8.3) OBTAIN an independent check of the volume of Boric Acid required.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  38 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 8.2.8.4) OBTAIN permission from the CRS OR SM to add the amount of boric acid previously determined, including the expected change in RCS temperature AND Reactor Power.      RO (Step 8.2.8.5) PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE selector switch in the BORATE position.      RO (Step 8.2.8.6) SET YIC-113, BORIC ACID TOTALIZER to the desired quantity.      RO (Step 8.2.8.7) IF desired, THEN PLACE FCV-113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, in MAN AND ADJUST controller FCV-113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, using the UP and DOWN pushbuttons flow rate.      RO (Step 8.2.8.8) Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to the START position.      RO (Step 8.2.8.9) IF any of the below conditions occur, THEN momentarily place the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the STOP position:    Rod Motion is blocked    Rod Motion is in the wrong direction    Tavg goes up    Boric Acid addition exceeds the desired value      RO (Step 8.2.8.10) WHEN the desired amount of Boric Acid has been added to the RCS, THEN ENSURE the following:    FCV-113A, BA TO BLENDER, closes.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  39 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    FCV-113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, closes. IF in Auto, THEN the operating Boric Acid Pump stops. The RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF.      RO (Step 8.2.8.11) IF desired, THEN FLUSH the Boric Acid flow-..      RO (Step 8.2.8.12) RETURN the RCS Makeup System to automatic as follows:    ENSURE FCV-114A, PRIMARY WTR FLOW DILUTE MODE is in AUTO. PLACE FCV-114B, BLENDED MU TO VCT to the AUTO position. PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE switch in the AUTO position. ENSURE FCV-113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, is in AUTO. Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the START position.      RO (Step 8.2.8.13) RECORD, in AUTO LOG, as indicated by PRIMARY WATER TOTALIZER, YIC-114 AND Boric Acid TOTALIZER, YIC 113 the total amount of Primary Water AND Boric Acid added during the boration.      RO (Step 8.2.8.14) MONITOR parameters for the expected change in reactivity AND inform the CRS OR SM the results of the boration. Examiner NOTE: If AOP-038 was used to downpower the plant, move forward to Event
: 4. Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/BOP continue HERE. OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  40 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      BOP (Step 6.1.2.4) IF EH Turbine Control is in OPER AUTO, THEN reduce turbine load as follows:    Ensure the EH Turbine Impulse Pressure Control in the desired position using Attachment 6, Transferring Control Mode Between IMP-IN and IMP-OUT: NOTE: The BOP will use Attachment 6 of OP-105 to transfer Turbine Control Mode from IMP OUT to IMP IN    IMP IN (preferred)    OR    IMP OUT (if required for plant conditions)      OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER ATTACHMENT 6, TRANSFERRING CONTROL MODE BETWEEN IMP-IN AND IMP-OUT      BOP (Step 1) Record the Valve Position Limit reading:      BOP (Step 2) Lower the limiter setting until the turbine is on the limiter      BOP (Step 3) Check that the Tracking Meter indicates a nulled condition.  (approximately zero)      BOP (Step 4) Press the appropriate pushbutton to change sensing modes:    IMP IN (preferred for load changes)    OR    IMP Out (preferred for steady state)      BOP (Step 5) Wait for the Tracking Meter to indicate a nulled condition Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page  41 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 6) Return the limiter setting to the value recorded in Step 1 or as directed by CRS/SM.      OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER      BOP (Step 6.1.2.4) IF EH Turbine Control is in OPER AUTO, THEN reduce turbine load as follows:    Set the desired load in the SETTER    Select the desired Load Rate NOTE: The BOP will select 1-2%/Minute    Depress the GO pushbutton      BOP (Step 6.1.2.5) IF EH Turbine Control is in TURB MANUAL, THEN-. NOTE: The Turbine is in OPER AUTO.      BOP (Step 6.1.2.6) Maintain Gland Seal Steam Header Pressure (PI-4004, PI-1382 or ERFIS Point GSP2095A) in the normal operating band (3 to 6 psig)      RO (Step 6.1.2.7) WHEN Reactor Power is less than 90% as indicated on NR-45, THEN check that APP-005-D6 is received.      After a load reduction of 15-20 MWe, or at the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page  42 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
CRDM Fan "A" Failure      During the downpower, the "A" CRDM Fan will trip. The operator will address APP-010-A6, HVH-5A/B AIR FLOW LOST/OVLD, and manually start the "B" CRDM Fan. Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF HVA05A f:MOTOR_SHORT            Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator, APP-009-E7, 480V GRD FAULT  RTGB Annunciator, APP-010-A6, HVH-5A/B AIR FLOW LOST/OVLD  CRDM Fan HVH-5A Green status light LIT, Red status light OFF  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    NOTE: The BOP may check APP-009-E7 prior to APP-010-A6. APP-010-A6, HVH-5A/B AIR FLOW LOST/OVLD      BOP (Step 1) EVALUATE CRDM indicating lights to determine affected fan:    HVH-5A, CRDM COOLING FAN    HVH-5B, CRDM COOLING FAN      BOP (Step 2) MONITOR the following ERFIS points to determine if a single-phase open circuit is present:    ERFIS point ELV3020A, BUS E1 VOLTAGE. ERFIS point ELV3021A, BUS E2 VOLTAGE.      CRS (Step 3) IF a single-phase open circuit condition is suspected, THEN GO TO AOP-026, Grid Instability NOTE: This will require additional assessment.      BOP (Step 4) IF a CRDM COOLING FAN has tripped, THEN ENSURE the Standby CRDM COOLING FAN is running. NOTE: The BOP will start HVH-5B.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page  43 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
CRDM Fan "A" Failure      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Step 5) DISPATCH Operator to evaluate affected CRDM COOLING FAN supply breaker status: NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that there was no apparent reason for the Fan failure. Breaker MCC-5(5M), CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISM COOLING FAN, HVH-5A. Breaker MCC-6(4M), CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISM COOLING FAN, HVH-5B.      CRS (Step 6) INITIATE a Work Request to investigate the cause of the affected CRDM COOLING FAN alarm. NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC to address the Fan failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.      CRS (Step 7) IF RCS temperature is greater than or equal to 350&#xba;F AND both CRDM COOLING FANs are unavailable, THEN-.. NOTE: The HVH-5B Fan is running.      At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page  44 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Continuous Inward Rod Motion      Shortly afterwards, a continuous control rod insertion will occur. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-001, "Malfunction of Reactor Control System."  The operator will be unable to control the rod insertion and will manually trip the reactor. Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF CRF06A    IMF CRF06B  Indications Available:    Rod Inward Arrow Indicating Light is LIT  The Tavg-Tref deviation is inconsistent with the control rod movement  Group Steps Counters and IRPI indication inward control rod motion  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    AOP-001, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR CONTROL SYSTEM      RO (Step 1) Check Unexpected Rod Motion  IN PROGRESS Immediate Action      RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Power  GREATER THAN 15% Immediate Action      BOP (Step 3) Check Turbine Load  Immediate Action    CONTROL RODS STEPPING IN    AND    UNEXPECTED LOAD REDUCTION IN PROGRESS    OR    UNEXPECTED LOAD REDUCTION HAS OCCURRED      RO (Step 3 RNO) Attempt To Stop Rod Motion As Follows: Immediate Action    IF ROD BANK SELECTOR Switch position in A (AUTO), THEN Place the ROD BANK SELECTOR Switch in M (Manual) NOTE: When the RO places control rods in MANUAL, the rod motion will continue.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page  45 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
Continuous Inward Rod Motion      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    IF ROD BANK SELECTOR Switch in M (Manual) OR Individual Bank Select, THEN Place the ROD BANK SELECTOR Switch in A (Auto). NOTE: Although control rods are expected to be in AUTO, if the control rods are in MANUAL the RO will take this action. IF Rod Motion does NOT stop, THEN Trip the Reactor and Go To EOPE0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. NOTE:The CRS will enter EOP-E-0 Upon Rx Trip, move to Events #6-7.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 46 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      On the reactor trip, a 500 gpm Steam Generator Tube Rupture will occur (over 10 minutes) on the "C" Steam Generator. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."  After the Immediate Actions are complete, it is likely that the operator will determine that SI is NOT actuated nor required, and transition to EOP-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response."  While in this procedure the operator will determine that SI is required, manually actuate SI, and return to EOP-E-0. Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-3, "Steam Generator Tube Rupture," to isolate the flow into and out of the "C" Steam Generator and then conduct a cooldown of the RCS. Upon transition into EOP-E-3, a Loss of Off-Site Power will occur. Both EDGs will start and re-power Buses E-1 and E-2. With SI previously reset, the operator will need to address a re-initiation of AFW flow to all Steam Generators, and the restart of the ECCS Pumps. The operator will continue with EOP-E-3 and conduct the RCS cooldown using the "A" and "B" Steam Generator PORVs. During the RCS depressurization, the Pzr Spray Valves will not be available. The operator will be required to conduct the depressurization using an available Pzr PORV. The scenario will terminate at Step 23 of EOP-E-3, after the operator has stopped the SI Pumps. Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF SGN02F  r:10:00 f:500    Indications Available:    All control rods on the bottom  RCS pressure is lowering  RCS Tavg is trending to no load  RTGB Annunciator APP-036-C7, R24 MONITOR HIGH  R24 Leakage Recorder indicating S/G leakage greater than TS Limit  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION      RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action    Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers  OPEN    Rod position indicators  FULLY INSERTED    Rod Bottom Lights  ILLUMINATED    Neutron Flux  LOWERING      BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 47 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Both Turbine Stop Valves  CLOSED    All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power To AC EMERGENCY BUSSES: Immediate Action    CHECK Bus E1 OR E2  AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED    CHECK Bus E1 AND E2  BOTH ENERGIZED      RO (Step 4) CHECK SI Status:  Immediate Action  CHECK if SI is actuated:    SI annunciators  ANY ILLUMINATED    OR    SI equipment  AUTO STARTED      RO (Step 4.a RNO) CHECK if SI is required: Immediate Action    PZR pressure LESS THAN 1715 PSIG    OR    Containment pressure GREATER THAN 4 PSIG    OR    Steam Line P bistables ILLUMINATED    OR    High Steam Flow with Low Tavg OR Low Steam Pressure bistables ILLUMINATED    IF SI is required, THEN manually ACTUATE BOTH Trains of SI. IF SI is NOT required, THEN PERFORM the following:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 48 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    RESET SPDS AND INITIATE monitoring of Critical Safety Functions Status Trees. CRS  GO TO EOPES0.1, Reactor Trip Response, Step 1. NOTE: It is expected that SI will not be required, and the CRS will transition to EOP-ES-0.1 NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief. EOP-ES-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE    Examiner NOTE:  A large SGTR is occurring. It is expected that the crew will transition back to EOP-E-0. Because of this, only 5 steps are scripted. When the crew re-enters EOP-E-0, move forward to EOP-E-0 steps on Page 50. RO/ BOP Foldout Page    SI ACTUATION CRITERIA NOTE: The crew will subsequently transition back to EOP-E-0 based on this criteria. LOSS OF POWER CRITERIA    AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA    DC BUS, INSTRUMENT BUS, OR MCC5 FAILURE CRITERIA    LOSS OF ULTIMATE HEAT SINK CRITERIA      RO (Step 1) CHECK RCS Temperature Control:    CHECK RCPs  ANY RUNNING    CHECK RCS temperatures:    With ANY RCP running, CHECK RCS Average temperature  STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547&deg;F Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 49 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      BOP (Step 2) CHECK Feedwater Status:    CHECK RCS average temperatures  LESS THAN 554&deg;F    CHECK Main Feedwater Reg Valves  CLOSED    CHECK Total feed flow to S/Gs  GREATER THAN 300 gpm (0.2x106 PPH)      BOP (Step 3.a) CHECK S/G Levels:    CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels  GREATER THAN 9%      BOP (Step 3.a RNO) MAINTAIN total feed flow GREATER THAN 300 gpm AFW OR 0.2x106 pph Main Feedwater UNTIL S/G Narrow Range level is GREATER THAN 9% in at least one S/G.      BOP (Step 3.b) CONTROL feed flow to maintain S/G Narrow Range levels BETWEEN 9% AND 50%      BOP (Step 4) CHECK All AC Busses  ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER      RO (Step 5) CHECK PZR Level Control:    CHECK PZR level  GREATER THAN 14%      RO (Step 5 RNO) PERFORM the following:    ISOLATE Letdown by closing the following valves:    CLOSE LCV460 A & B, LETDOWN LINE STOP Valves.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 50 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CLOSE LTDN LINE ISO Valves:    CVC204A    CVC204B    CLOSE LTDN ORIFICE Valves:    CVC200A  45 gpm    CVC200B  60 gpm    CVC200C  60 gpm    CLOSE CVC387, EXCESS LETDOWN STOP Valve. TURN OFF ALL PZR Heaters. WHEN charging is available, THEN CONTROL charging to restore PZR level to GREATER THAN 14%. NOTE: The crew will likely manual actuate SI and the CRS will transition to EOP-E-0. Examiner NOTE:  If the crew proceeds past Step 5 of EOP-ES-0.1, wait here until the crew decides to re-enter EOP-E-0. EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION      RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action    Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers  OPEN    Rod position indicators  FULLY INSERTED    Rod Bottom Lights  ILLUMINATED    Neutron Flux  LOWERING      BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action    Both Turbine Stop Valves  CLOSED    All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves  CLOSED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 51 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power To AC EMERGENCY BUSSES: Immediate Action    CHECK Bus E1 OR E2  AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED    CHECK Bus E1 AND E2  BOTH ENERGIZED      RO (Step 4) CHECK SI Status:  Immediate Action  CHECK if SI is actuated:    SI annunciators  ANY ILLUMINATED    OR    SI equipment  AUTO STARTED    CHECK BOTH trains of SI actuated:    SI Pumps  TWO RUNNING    RHR Pumps  BOTH RUNNING      RO/ BOP Foldout Page:    RCP TRIP CRITERIA    FAULTED S/G AFW ISOLATION CRITERIA    AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA    DC BUS, INSTRUMENT BUS, OR MCC5 FAILURE CRITERIA    SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING CRITERIA      CRS (Step 5) PERFORM Attachment 1, Auto Action Verification, While CONTINUING WITH This Procedure    Examiner NOTE:  The CRS will likely assign the BOP to perform this action. If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1. CRS/RO follow E-0 Actions, Step 6, on Page 55.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 52 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ATTACHMENT 1, AUTO ACTION VERIFICATION      BOP (Step 1) CHECK ECCS Pumps Running:    SI Pumps  TWO RUNNING    RHR Pumps  BOTH RUNNING      BOP (Step 2) CHECK ECCS Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment      BOP (Step 3) CHECK CCW Pumps  AT LEAST ONE RUNNING      BOP (Step 4) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A:    CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A  ACTUATED    CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A Valves  CLOSED    CHECK Excess Letdown  ISOLATED    CVC387, EXCESS LTDN STOP VALVE  CLOSED    HIC137, EXCESS LTDN FLOW CONTROLLER  AT 0% DEMAND      BOP (Step 5) CHECK Feedwater Isolation:    CHECK Main Feed Pumps  BOTH TRIPPED    CHECK Main Feedwater isolated:    Feedwater Reg Valves  CLOSED    Feedwater Reg Bypass Valves  CLOSED    Feedwater Header Section Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 6) CHECK If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 53 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK Main Steam Line Isolation  REQUIRED    CHECK Containment pressure  GREATER THAN 10 PSIG    OR    High steam flow with:    S/G pressure  LESS THAN 614 PSIG    OR    Tavg  LESS THAN 543&deg;F      BOP (Step 6.a RNO) GO TO Step 7.      BOP (Step 7) CHECK Proper Service Water System Operation:    CHECK SW Pumps  ALL RUNNING    CHECK SW Booster Pumps  BOTH RUNNING    CHECK Both SW Header Low Pressure Alarms  EXTINGUISHED    APP008F7,SOUTH SW HDR LO PRESS    APP008F8,NORTH SW HDR LO PRESS      BOP (Step 8) CHECK BOTH EDGs  RUNNING      BOP (Step 9) CHECK ECCS Flow:    CHECK RCS pressure  LESS THAN 1650 PSIG [1725 PSIG]      BOP (Step 9.a RNO) GO TO Step 10.      BOP (Step 10) CHECK CV Recirculation Fans  ALL RUNNING      BOP (Step 11) CHECK IVSW System Actuated:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 54 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    PCV1922A, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE  OPEN    PCV1922B, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE  OPEN      BOP (Step 12) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation:    CV Ventilation Isolation Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 13) CHECK Control Room Ventilation Aligned For Pressurization Mode:    HVA1A OR HVA1B,CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING FAN  RUNNING    HVE19A OR HVE19B,CONTROL ROOM AIR CLEANING FAN  RUNNING    HVE16, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN  STOPPED    Control Room HVAC Outside Air Damper A OR B  OPEN    CRD1ASA, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER  CLOSED    CRD1BSB, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER  CLOSED      BOP (Step 14) CHECK DS Bus  ENERGIZED      BOP (Step 15) CHECK Battery Chargers ENERGIZED:    APP036D1, BATT CHARGER A/A1 TROUBLE Alarm  EXTINGUISHED    APP036D2, BATT CHARGER B/B1 TROUBLE Alarm  EXTINGUISHED      BOP (Step 16) STOP R11/12 Sample Pump Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 55 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 17) Locally RESET AND LOAD Instrument Air Compressor(s) As Necessary (38 KW each): NOTE: The BOP may (If the LOOP has occurred) contact the Inside AO. If so, Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge IRF EPSMCC5_ 187  f: RACK_IN IRF EPSMCC6_ 218  f: RACK_IN    Compressor A (MCC5 CMPT 7M)    Compressor B (MCC6 CMPT 3G)      BOP (Step 18) PERFORM Crew Update To Include The Following:    Attachment completion    Manual actions taken    Failed equipment status    SW status per Step 7.c    If applicable, PERFORM Supplement M, Component Alignment For Loss Of SW To Turbine Building, as time permits    Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE. EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION      RO (Step 6) CHECK AFW Pumps Running:    CHECK Motor Driven AFW Pumps  BOTH RUNNING    CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels  TWO S/Gs LESS THAN 16%    CHECK Steam Driven AFW Pump  RUNNING NOTE:  The SDAFW Pump is OOS.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 56 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 7) CHECK AFW Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment: NOTE:  The RO/BOP may take a Prudent Action (OMM-22) to throttle AFW flow to the "C" S/G and control Narrow Range level between 9-50%. AFW Header Discharge Valves  FULL OPEN    AFW Header Section Valves  FULL OPEN    Steam Driven AFW Pump Discharge Valves  FULL OPEN IF PUMP RUNNING      RO (Step 8) CHECK Total AFW Flow:    RESET SI NOTE:  This action may have been previously performed to allow the RO/BOP to throttle AFW flow to the "C" S/G. CONTROL AFW flow to maintain Intact S/G Narrow Range level between 9%[18%] AND 50%    CHECK total AFW flow  GREATER THAN 300 GPM      RO (Step 9) CHECK CV Spray NOT Required:    CHECK Containment Pressure  HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG    CHECK CV Spray  NOT ACTUATED      RO (Step 10) CHECK RCP Seal Cooling:    CCW flow to RCP(s) Thermal Barriers  NORMAL    APP001C1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW ALARM  EXTINGUISHED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 57 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    APP001D1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR LO FLOW alarm  EXTINGUISHED    OR    Seal Injection flow  ADEQUATE    Seal Injection flow  GREATER THAN 6 GPM PER RCP    OR    Thermal Barrier Ps  GREATER THAN 5 INCHES WATER PER RCP      RO (Step 11) CHECK RCS Temperatures:    With ANY RCP running, RCS average temperature  STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547&deg;F    OR    With NO RCPs running, RCS Cold Leg temperatures  STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547&deg;F      RO (Step 12) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Spray Valves:    CHECK PZR PORVs  CLOSED    CHECK Normal PZR Spray Valves  CLOSED    CHECK Aux PZR Spray Valve  CLOSED      RO (Step 13) CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped:    CHECK RCPs  ANY RUNNING    CHECK SI Pumps  AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 58 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs  LESS THAN 13&deg;F[32&deg;F]      CRS (Step 13.c RNO) GO TO Step 14.      RO (Step 14) CHECK If S/G Secondary Pressure Boundaries Are Intact:    NONE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER    NONE COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED      RO (Step 15) CHECK If S/G Tubes Are Intact:    Secondary Radiation Monitors  HAVE REMAINED NORMAL    R15, CONDENSER AIR EJECTOR GAS    R19s, S/G Blowdown Radiation    R31s, STEAMLINE RADIATION MONITORs    S/G levels  NONE RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER      CRS (Step 15 RNO) PERFORM the following: NOTE: The CRS will transition to EOP-E-3. RESET SPDS AND INITIATE monitoring of Critical Safety Functions Status Trees. GO TO EOPE3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Step 1.      Booth Instructor: Upon transition to EOP-E-3, IMF EPS13 (Loss of Offsite Power)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 59 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Examiner NOTE: The LOOP will cause the AFW valves to fully open and re-initiate AFW flow to all S/Gs. Additionally, the RO will need to restore ECCS Pumps that did not restart if SI has been reset. EOP-E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE      RO/ BOP (Foldout Page)    SI REINITIATION CRITERIA    SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA    MULTIPLE TUBE RUPTURE CRITERIA    COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCHOVER CRITERIA    AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA      RO (Step 1) CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped: NOTE: The RCPs will NOT be running. CHECK RCPs  ANY RUNNING      CRS (Step 1 RNO) GO TO Step 2.      BOP (Step 2) IDENTIFY Ruptured S/G(s): NOTE: The crew will identify the "C" S/G as the ruptured S/G. CHECK for ANY of the following indications:    Unexpected rise in ANY S/G Narrow Range level    OR    R31s Steamline Radiation Monitors  ANY INDICATE HIGH RADIATION Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 60 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  OR    R19s SG Blowdown Radiation  ANY INDICATE HIGH RADIATION    OR    High radiation reported from ANY S/G sample    CONTACT Chemistry to periodically sample ALL S/Gs for activity. NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/Chemistry to address the samples. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/Chemistry.      BOP (Step 3) ISOLATE Flow From Ruptured S/G(s):    ADJUST Ruptured S/G(s)Steam Line PORV Controller to 1060 psig    CHECK Ruptured S/G(s) Steam Line PORV  CLOSED    RV13 NOTE: The crew will ensure that the "C" S/G PORV is CLOSED. CLOSE Ruptured S/G(s) Steam Driven AFW Pump Steam Shutoff Valves:    V18C NOTE: Since the SDAFW Pump is OOS, this valve will already be CLOSED. Locally CLOSE Ruptured S/G(s)Bypass Drn AND Warmup Line To AFW Pump Valve(s)While CONTINUING WITH this procedure:    MS38 (S/G C)(Pipe Jungle above/right of V18C) NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 5 minutes that the MS-38 is CLOSED. IRF MSS051 f:0    CHECK Ruptured S/G(s) S/G Blowdown AND Blowdown Sample Valves  CLOSED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 61 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CLOSE Ruptured S/G(s) MSIV AND MSIV Bypass Valves:    S/G C:    V13C    MS353C      CRS (Caution prior to Step 4) If ANY Ruptured S/G is Faulted, feed flow to that S/G should remain isolated during subsequent recovery actions UNLESS needed for RCS cooldown.      BOP (Step 4) CHECK Ruptured S/G    CHECK Ruptured S/G  FAULTED      CRS (Step 4 RNO) GO TO Step 5.      CRS (Caution prior to Step 5) If Offsite Power is lost AFTER SI reset, manual action may be required to restart safeguards equipment.      BOP (Step 5) CHECK Ruptured S/G(s) Level:    CHECK S/G Narrow Range level  GREATER THAN 9% [18%]  RO  RESET SI    STOP feed Flow to ruptured S/G(s):    CLOSE Steam Driven AFW Pump Discharge Valve(s):    V214C NOTE: Since the SDAFW Pump is OOS, this valve will already be CLOSED. CLOSE AFW Header Discharge Valve(s):    V216C Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 62 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    PERFORM Supplement D, Deenergizing AFW Valves For AFFECTED S/G NOTE: The BOP will use Attachment D, and call AO for local Actions. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 10 minutes that actions are complete. IRF EPSMCC9_256 f:0 (Other breakers are already Racked Out)    Critical Task:  Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs  Safety Significance:  Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. The fact that the operator allows the differential pressure to dissipate and, as a result, are then forced to transition to a contingency procedure constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would unnecessarily complicate the event mitigation strategy.      BOP (Step 6) CHECK Ruptured S/G(s) Pressure  GREATER THAN 500 PSIG      BOP (Step 7) CHECK The Following Valves For Ruptured S/G CLOSED    MSIVs    MSIV Bypass Valves    S/G Steam Line PORVs    Steam Driven AFW Pump Steam Shutoff Valves      CRS (Caution prior to Step 8) If RCPs are NOT running, the following steps may cause a false CSF4, Integrity Status Tree, indication for the Ruptured Loop. Disregard the Ruptured Loop Tcold indication UNTIL after performing Step 31. NOTE: An Orange and/or Red Path on RCS Integrity will occur during this event. Based on this caution the CRS will NOT address FRP-P.1.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 63 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      BOP (Step 8) INITIATE RCS Cooldown:    DETERMINE required Core Exit temperature: NOTE: The CRS will determine the Target temperature to 519&deg;F. DUMP steam to Condenser from intact S/G(s) at MAXIMUM rate:    CHECK Condenser  AVAILABLE      BOP (Step 8.b RNO) DUMP steam at MAXIMUM rate from Intact S/G(s) using S/G Steam Line PORV(s). NOTE: The crew will dump steam using the "A" and the "B" S/G PORVs. IF S/G Steam Line PORV(s) can NOT be opened from the Control Room, THEN.... IF NO intact S/G available, THEN...      BOP (Step 8.c-f) CHECK RCS Tavg  LESS THAN 543&deg;F    Momentarily PLACE STEAM DUMP MODE Control Switch to BYPASS TAVG INTLK position    CHECK APP006F5, STEAM DUMP ARMED alarm  ILLUMINATED NOTE: This Annunciator is extinguished (Steam Dumps not available). CHECK Core Exit T/Cs  LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE      BOP (Step 8.f RNO) WHEN Core Exit T/Cs are LESS THAN required temperature, THEN PERFORM Steps 8.g and 8.h. CRS CONTINUE WITH Step 9.      BOP (Step 9) CHECK Intact S/G Levels:    CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels  GREATER THAN 9%[18%] NOTE:  Narrow Range levels may be greater than 9%. If so, perform Step 9.b.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 64 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      BOP (Step 9.a RNO) MAINTAIN total feed flow GREATER THAN 300 gpm UNTIL S/G Narrow Range level is GREATER THAN 9% [18%] in at least one S/G.      BOP (Step 9.b) CONTROL feed flow to maintain S/G Narrow Range levels  BETWEEN 21% [21%] AND 50%      RO (Step 10) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Block Valves:    CHECK Power to PZR PORV Block Valves  AVAILABLE    CHECK PZR PORVs  CLOSED    CHECK PZR PORV Block valves  AT LEAST ONE OPEN      RO (Step 11) RESET SI      RO (Step 12) RESET Containment Isolation Phase A      RO (Step 13) ESTABLISH Instrument Air To CV:    CHECK APP002F7, INSTR AIR HDR LO PRESS alarm  EXTINGUISHED      RO (Step 13 RNO) PERFORM the following:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 65 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Locally RESET AND LOAD Instrument Air Compressor(s)as necessary (38 KW each): NOTE: If not already done, the BOP will contact the Inside AO. Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge IRF EPSMCC5_ 187  f: RACK_IN IRF EPSMCC6_ 218  f: RACK_IN    Compressor A (MCC5 CMPT 7M)    Compressor B (MCC6 CMPT 3G)    WHEN Instrument Air is established, THEN PERFORM Steps 13.b AND 13.c. CRS  CONTINUE WITH Step 14.      RO (Step 13.b-c) RESET IA PCV1716, INSTRUMENT AIR ISOLATION TO CV    CHECK IA PCV1716  OPEN      RO (Step 14) CHECK If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped:    CHECK RHR Pumps  ANY RUNNING WITH SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST    CHECK RCS pressure:    Pressure  GREATER THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG]    Pressure  STABLE OR RISING    STOP RHR Pumps    CHECK RCS pressure remains GREATER THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG]      RO (Step 15) ESTABLISH Charging Flow:    CHECK Charging Pumps  AT LEAST ONE RUNNING NOTE: One Charging Pump may be running. If so, proceed to Step 15.b.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 66 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Step 15.a RNO) IF CCW flow to RCP(s) Thermal Barrier is lost, THEN GO TO Step 16. NOTE: CCW flow was momentarily lost on the LOOP, but exists now.      RO (Step 15.b) ALIGN Charging Pump suction to RWST:    OPEN LCV115B, EMERG MU TO CHG SUCTION    CLOSE LCV115C, VCT OUTLET Valve    PLACE RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Control Switch to STOP    ESTABLISH MAXIMUM charging flow:    START additional Charging Pump(s) as necessary    ADJUST the following as necessary to maintain proper Seal Injection AND MAXIMUM Charging flow:    Charging Pump Speed Controller(s)    HIC121, CHARGING FLOW Controller    Seal Water Flow Control Valves NOTE:  The BOP may contact the AO to adjust Seal Injection flows. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO; and use: IRF CVC030 f: variable IRF CVC031 f: variable IRF CVC032 f: variable    MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 gpm AND 20 gpm per RCP UNLESS Seal Injection isolated      BOP (Step 16) CHECK If RCS Cooldown Should Be Stopped:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 67 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK Core Exit T/Cs  LESS THAN REQUIRED CORE EXIT T/C TEMPERATURE FROM STEP 8    STOP RCS cooldown    MAINTAIN Core Exit T/Cs  LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE      Critical Task:  While in EOP-E-3, establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not occur because the RCS temperature is in either (1) Too high to maintain 38&deg;F of RCS Subcooling OR (2) below 295&deg;F (RCS Integrity Red path Limit)  Safety Significance:  Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency procedure. This failure constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would unnecessarily complicate the event mitigation strategy.      BOP (Step 17) CHECK Ruptured S/G(s) Pressure  STABLE OR RISING      RO (Step 18) CHECK RCS Subcooling Based On Core Exit T/Cs  GREATER THAN 38&deg;F [57&deg;F]      RO (Step 19) DEPRESSURIZE RCS To MINIMIZE Break Flow AND Refill PZR:    CHECK Normal PZR Spray  AVAILABLE      CRS (Step 19.a RNO) OBSERVE CAUTIONS and NOTE prior to Step 20 AND GO TO Step 20.      RO/ BOP (Step 20) DEPRESSURIZE RCS Using PZR PORV To Minimize Break Flow AND Refill PZR:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 68 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK PZR PORV  AT LEAST ONE AVAILABLE    OPEN one PZR PORV until ANY of the following conditions satisfied:    BOTH of the following:    RCS pressure  LESS THAN RUPTURED S/G(s) PRESSURE    PZR level  GREATER THAN 14% [31%]    OR    PZR level  GREATER THAN 73% [66%]    OR    RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs  LESS THAN 18&deg;F [37&deg;F]    CLOSE PZR PORV      RO (Step 21) CHECK RCS Pressure  RISING      RO/ BOP (Step 22) CHECK If ECCS Flow Should Be Terminated:    CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs  GREATER THAN 18&deg;F [37&deg;F]    CHECK Secondary Heat Sink:    Total feed flow to S/G(s)  GREATER THAN 300 GPM AVAILABLE    OR    S/G Narrow Range level in at least one Intact S/G  GREATER THAN 9% [18%]    CHECK RCS pressure  STABLE OR RISING Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6 & 7 Page 69 of 70          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK PZR level  GREATER THAN 14% [31%]      RO (Step 23) STOP SI Pumps      Critical Task:  Depressurize the RCS to meet SI termination criteria before Steam Generator Overfill is reached based on Water in the Steam Lines.  (If above 100% WR level see Simulator Code "thlecell(193)" to determine)  Safety Significance:  Failure to stop reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates mitigation of the event. It also constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.      At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.
NRC SCENARIO N16 1-1 TURNOVER SHEET  1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life:  MOL b) Reactor Power:  100% Mode 1 c) Turbine Load:  770 MWe  d) Boron Concentration:  853 ppm e) Rod Height:  218 CB 'D' f) RCS Pressure:  2235 psig g) PZR Level:  53.3 %  h) Xenon:    Equilibrium  2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. # Description LCO 3.7.4 A Restore AFW pump or flow path(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days AND 8 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO 3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) SDAFW Pump 4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a) None 5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a) "A" MDAFW Pump and flowpath b) "B" MDAFW Pump and flowpath c) "C" AFW Pump 6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a) FI-613, CCW System Flow is OOS (I&C Investigating). b) RTGB Annunciator APP-010-B3, "EDG B START AIR LO PRESS," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). 7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a) PROTECTED 8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a) Maintain Steady-State conditions b) Monitor the completion of Maintenance of the SDAFW Pump 9. TURNOVER INFORMATION  a) The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. 10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a)  Review the OST-947 MOL charts for BA and PW additions 11. RISK  a) GREEN 
 
PROGRAM: H B Robinson Operations Training  MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam    Scenario N16-1-2   
 
==REFERENCES:==
: 1. Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS - Operating" (Amendment 176) 2. OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power" (Rev 62) 3. OP-301, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)" (Rev 112) 4. AOP-003, "Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control" (Rev 20) 5. AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction" (Rev 33) 6. APP-003, "RCS & Makeup Systems" (Rev 54) 7. APP-001, "Miscellaneous NSSS" (Rev 60) 8. AOP-018, "Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions" (Rev 31) 9. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.17, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)" (Amendment 223) 10. AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure" (Rev 24) 11. OWP-033, "First Stage Pressure (FSP)" (Rev 13) 12. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation" (Amendment 176) 13. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation" (Amendment 176) 14. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, "Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation" (Amendment 176) 15. EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection"  (Rev 6) 16. CSFST, "Critical Safety Function Status Trees" (Rev 7) 17. EOP-E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant" (Rev 4) 18. FRP-J.1, "Response to High Containment Pressure" (Rev 10)  Validation Time: 89 minutes Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2  Facility: HB Robinson Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners:  Operators: (SRO)    (RO)    (BOP)  Initial Conditions: The plant is at 75% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "A" SI Pump is OOS. The "B" SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. The "C" Charging Pump is also OOS. LI-928, "C" SI Accumulator Level, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-009-C3, "AIR SIDE SEAL OIL BU PMP OVLD," has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.              Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*  Event Description  1 - R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Raise Power 2 1 I-RO I-SRO VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 fails HIGH 3  2 I-BOP I(TS)-SRO Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW  4 3  C-RO C(TS)-SRO "B" Charging Pump Trip 5 4 C-BOP C-SRO "C" FRV Controller fails HIGH in AUTO 6 5 M-RO M-BOP M-SRO Cold Leg SBLOCA  7 6/7 NA 480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes  8 6 C-RO "C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start  9 7 C-RO CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically  * (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,    (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2  HB Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #2  The plant is at 75% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "A" SI Pump is OOS. The "B" SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. The "C" Charging Pump is also OOS. LI-928, "C" SI Accumulator Level, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-009-C3, "AIR SIDE SEAL OIL BU PMP OVLD," has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.                                Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 100% using OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power," and OP-301, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)."    During the power increase, VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 will fail HIGH causing all letdown to be diverted to the CVCS HUTs. This failure will result in VCT level lowering without automatic makeup. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-003, "Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control."  After this, the power increase will be suspended.
Next, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 will fail LOW. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure, and place all Feed Regulating Valves in MANUAL"  The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-033, "First Stage Pressure (FSP)," and restore the Feed Regulating valves to AUTO control. The operator will address 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation," and Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, "Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation."  Following this, the "B" Charging Pump will trip. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-003-F5, CHG PMP MOTOR OVLD/TRIP and raise speed of the "A" Charging Pump. The operator may enter AOP-018, "Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions."  The operator will address 3.4.17, "Chemical and Volume Control System."  Shortly afterwards, the "C" Feed Regulating Valve Controller will fail such that the valve starts to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction," and control the "C" S/G level manually. Subsequently, a Cold Leg Small Break LOCA will occur (over 5 minutes) on the B Loop. The operator will enter AOP-016, "Excessive Primary Plant Leakage."  Ultimately, the operator will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."  When the reactor trips, the normal supply breaker to Bus E-1 will trip OPEN, and the "A" EDG Output Breaker will fail to CLOSE either automatically or manually; and Train "A" equipment will remain unavailable throughout the event. Additionally, the "C" SI Pump will fail to automatically start on SI, and the operator will be required to manually start this pump.
Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant," and the break size will become larger. Eventually, Containment pressure will exceed 10 psig creating an Orange Path condition on the Containment Critical Safety Function. When this occurs, the "B" CV Spray will automatically start on HI-HI Containment Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2  Pressure, however, both SI-880C&D ("B" CV Spray Pump Discharge Valves) will fail to open automatically, and the operator will be required to manually open these valves. The scenario will terminate in EOP-E-1 after Containment Spray has been initiated, or at Step 9 of FRP-J.1, "Response to High Containment Pressure," after the operator has taken all necessary steps to reduce Containment pressure, or upon transition from either EOP-E-1 or FRP-J.1 to FRP-P.1, Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock (After all Critical Tasks have been completed). Critical Tasks:  Manually control "C" S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level. Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the "C" S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control. Trip all RCPs within 6 minutes of meeting the EOP-E-0/E-1 RCP Trip Criteria (Containment Isolation Phase B  ACTUATED, OR BOTH of the following satisfied: SI Pumps  AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW AND RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs  LESS THAN 13&deg;F [32&deg;F]) so that CET temperatures do not become superheated when forced circulation in the RCS stops. (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to trip the RCPs under the postulated plant conditions leads to core uncovery and to fuel cladding temperatures in excess of 2200&deg;F, which is the limit specified in the ECCS acceptance criteria. Thus, failure to perform the task represents mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator has failed to prevent degradation of the fuel cladding barrier to fission product release and which leads to a violation of the facility license condition.
Establish flow from at least one high-head SI pump before transition out of E-0. (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to manually start at least one high-head SI pump under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity. In this case, at least one high-head SI pump can be manually started from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. Additionally, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Finally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump (when it is possible to do so) is a violation of the facility license condition.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2  Manually actuate at least one CV Spray Train before Transitioning to EOP-ES-1.2. (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment under the postulated conditions demonstrates the inability of the crew to "recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.
In this case, the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment can be manually actuated from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent (degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity). Additionally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment (when it is possible to do so) results in a failure to prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2  SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS              Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  Sim. Setup Reset to Temp IC 615  T = 0 Malfunctions:  "A" SI Pump OOS:  IRF EPS480E1_130 f: RACK_OUT ("A" SI Pump OOS)  IRF EPS480E1_124 f: RACK_IN ("B" SI Pump Racked IN to E-1)  PLACE Red Cap over "A" SI Pump Control Switch "C" Charging Pump OOS:  IRF EPSV480E2_152 f:RACK_OUT  PLACE Red Cap over "C" Charging Pump Control Switch PLACE Green Cap over "A" and "B" Charging Pump Control Switch  LI-928 "C" SI Accumulator Level indication OOS  IOR aoSISAOD021A f:0 Place WHITE DOT on LI-928 
 
RTGB Annunciator APP-009-C3 failed OFF  IMF ANNXN09C03 f:ALARM_OFF Place WHITE DOT on APP-009-C3  Insert the following:  IRF SIS029 f: NO_AUTO ("C" SI Pumps fails to AUTO start)  IRF CNS010 f:NO-AUTO (SI-880C fails to OPEN in AUTO)  IRF CNS011 f:NO-AUTO (SI-880C fails to OPEN in AUTO)  $006_RTA_TRIP IMF EPS05A (Normal Supply Breaker to E-1 trips on Rx Trip)  $006_RTA_TRIP IMF EDG03A (Diesel Output Breaker to E-1 fails to CLOSE)  Place the Simulator in RUN and ACKNOWLEDGE all alarms. Adjust Steam Dump Potentiometer to 7.28 (Per OP-105)  Ensure "B" Charging Pump operating AUTO, "A" Charging Pump operating in MANUAL  Perform Attachment 2 (Simulator Setup For Exams) of TAP-411.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2    Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  Crew Briefing  1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements  2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew. 3. Provide the crew with the following:  Copy of OP-105 marked up for power increase  Copy of Section 8.2.7 of OP-301  Copy of Technical Specifications/Basis  4. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms. T-0 Begin Familiarization Period  At direction of examiner Execute Lesson Plan for Simulator Scenario N16-1-2. At direction of examiner  Event 1 Raise Power At direction of examiner  Event 2 ICO CVCXMTLT_115 r:00:30 f:60  VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 fails HIGH  At direction of examiner Event 3  ICO TURXMTPT_447 r:30  f:0  Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW  At direction of examiner  Event 4  IMF CVC05B  "B" Charging Pump Trip  At direction of examiner Event 5  IMF CFW17C r:45 f:100  "C" FRV Controller fails HIGH in AUTO  At direction of examiner Event 6 IMF RCS01C r:5:00 f:1000  Cold Leg SBLOCA Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2    Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  Post-Rx Trip  Event 7 IMF EPS05A IMF EDG03A  480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes  NOTE: E-1 will de-energize on Rx Trip $006_RTA_TRIP IMF EPS05A (Normal Supply Breaker to E-1 trips on Rx Trip) $006_RTA_TRIP IMF EDG03A (Diesel Output Breaker to E-1 fails to CLOSE)  Post-Rx Trip  Event 8 IRF SIS029 f:NO_AUTO  "C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start  NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0  Post-Rx Trip  Event 9 IRF CNS010 f:NO_AUTO IRF CNS011 f:NO_AUTO  CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically  NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0      Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page  10 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Raise Power      Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 100% using OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power," and OP-301, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)." Booth Operator Instructions:    NA  Indications Available:  NA    Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER      RO (Step 5) Maintain Tave within 5&deg;F of Tref using a combination of Control Rods and Boron Concentration changes. NOTE:  The RO may withdrawal control rods. OP-301, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS) SECTION 8.2.7, RCS QUICK DILUTION CHECKLIST      RO (Step 1) This revision has been verified to be the latest revision available.      RO (Step 2) DETERMINE the amount of water to add to the RCS and if applicable, the expected change in RCS temperature AND Reactor Power.      RO (Step 3) OBTAIN an independent check of the volume of water required.      RO (Step 4) OBTAIN permission from the CRS OR the SM to add the amount of water previously determined, including the expected change in RCS temperature AND Reactor Power.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page  11 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Raise Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 5) IF flow adjustment is desired, THEN adjust FCV-114A, PRIMARY WTR FLOW DILUTE MODE, potentiometer to obtain desired flow rate.      RO (Step 6) PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE selector switch in the DILUTE position.      RO (Step 7) SET YIC-114, PRIMARY WTR TOTALIZER to the desired quantity.      RO (Step 8) IF two letdown orifices are in service and it is desired to divert flow to the HUT, THEN-      RO (Step 9) Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to the START position.      RO (Step 10) IF LCV-115A is in AUTO, THEN ENSURE proper operation of LCV-115A, VCT/HLDP TK DIV valve.      RO (Step 11) IF any of the following conditions occur, THEN momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the STOP position:    Unanticipated Rod Motion    Primary Water addition exceeds the desired value      RO (Step 12) WHEN the desired amount of Primary Water has been added to the RCS, THEN ENSURE the following:    FCV-114A, PW TO BLENDER, closes. FCV-114B, BLENDED MU TO VCT, closes.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page  12 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Raise Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    IF in Auto, THEN the operating Primary Water Pump stops. The RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF. IF desired, THEN ENSURE LCV-115A, VCT/HLDP TK DIV valve control switch in AUTO.      RO (Step 13) RETURN the RCS Makeup System to automatic as follows:    ENSURE FCV-114A, PRIMARY WTR FLOW DILUTE MODE is in AUTO. PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE switch in the AUTO position. Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the START position.      RO (Step 14) RECORD, in AUTO LOG, as indicated by PRIMARY WATER TOTALIZER, YIC-114 total amount of Primary Water added during the dilution.      RO (Step 15) MONITOR parameters for the expected change in reactivity AND inform the CRS OR the SM the results of the dilution.      OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER      BOP (Step 6) IF EH Turbine Control is in OPER AUTO, THEN raise turbine load as follows: NOTE:  Since power is stabilized at 75%, the BOP will perform Step 6 to initiate the load increase. The next applicable Step in Section 6.2.2 of OP-105 is Step 22. Adjust the SETTER indication using the desired load.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page  13 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Raise Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Use continue the rise in load.      BOP (Step 22) WHEN average Reactor Power crosses greater than 90% by Power Range Indications, THEN check that APP-005-D6 is received. NOTE: The Turbine is in OPER AUTO. After the 1st Dilution and MWe raised by 15-20 MWe, and at the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page  14 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 fails HIGH      During the power increase, VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 will fail HIGH causing all letdown to be diverted to the CVCS HUTs. This failure will result in VCT level lowering without automatic makeup. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-003, "Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control."  After this, the power increase will be suspended. Booth Operator Instructions:    ICO CVCXMTLT_115  r:00:30 f:60  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-003-E3, VCT HI/LO LVL  VCT Level LI-115 indicates HIGH  LCV-115 diverting to CVCS HUT  VCT Level LI-112 on ERFIS indicates lowering VCT Level  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL    NOTE: The crew could refer to APP-003-E3 before entering AOP-003. RO (Step 1) Check For Failure Of A Level Transmitter As Follows:    Obtain a VCT level for LT115 using ERFIS    PT ID CHL0115A    Obtain a VCT level for LT112 using ERFIS    PT ID CHL0112A    Check VCT level indicators  OSCILLATING LEVEL DEVIATION OBSERVED      CRS (Step 1.c RNO) Go To Step 1.e      RO (Step 1.e) Check VCT level deviation between LT-112 and LT-115 - GREATER THAN 8 INCHES (13%) NOTE: LT-115 has failed HIGH.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page  15 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 fails HIGH      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 3) Stabilize The RCS Makeup System As Follows:    Check LT115  FAILED HIGH    Place LCV115A, VCT/HLDP TK DIV, Control Switch to VCT    Obtain Hagan Racks Key number 10    Place VCT Level Transmitter Selector Switch located in Hagan Rack #19, IN LT112 POSITION NOTE:  The CRS will dispatch the BOP to the Hagan Racks. Booth Instructor: use IRF CVC 067 f:LT-112. Check LT115  FAILED HIGH    Place the LCV115A Control Switch to AUTO  CRS  Contact I&C to repair the failed channel NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/I&C to address the VCT Transmitter failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC. CRS  Go To Step 6      CRS (Step 6) Make PA Announcement For Procedure Entry NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      CRS (Step 7) Implement The EALs NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.      RO (Step 8) Check VCT Level  LESS THAN 12.5 INCHES (21%)      RO (Step 8 RNO) IF VCT level lowers to less than 12.5 inches (21%), THEN perform Steps 9 and 10. NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. CRS Go To Step 11.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page  16 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 fails HIGH      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      RO (Step 11) Check VCT Level  LESS THAN 20 INCHES (33%)      CRS (Step 11 RNO) Go To Step 21.      RO (Step 21) Check VCT Level  LESS THAN 51.5 INCHES (86%)      RO (Step 22) Verify Charging And Letdown Flows Are Normal For Plant Conditions      RO (Step 23) Check APP003D5, BA FLOW DEV  ILLUMINATED      CRS (Step 23 RNO) Go To Step 28.      RO (Step 28) Check APP003E5, MAKEUP WATER DEV  ILLUMINATED      CRS (Step 28 RNO) Go To Step 34.      RO (Step 34) Check Boration  REQUIRED      CRS (Step 34 RNO) Go To Step 37.      RO (Step 37) Check Dilution  REQUIRED      CRS (Step 37 RNO) Go To Step 40.      CRS (Step 40) Check Technical Specifications, Section 3.4.17, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS), For Applicable LCO NOTE: Technical Specification LCO 3.4.17 is MET.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page  17 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 fails HIGH      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      CRS (Step 41) Return To Procedure And Step In Effect    NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief. Floor Instructor: As SM, direct CRS to place the plant Startup on HOLD. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page  18 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW      Next, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 will fail LOW. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure, and place all Feed Regulating Valves in MANUAL"  The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-033, "First Stage Pressure (FSP)," and restore the Feed Regulating valves to AUTO control. The operator will address 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation," and Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, "Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation." Booth Operator Instructions:    ICO TURXMTPT_447    r:30  f:0  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-005-F5, AMSAC TROUB/BYPD  PT-447, 1st Stage Pressure starts to lower  PT-446, 1st Stage Pressure remains constant  S/G Narrow Range levels will lower  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE      CRS (Step 1) GO TO Appropriate Section For Failed Instrument: NOTE: The CRS will select Section E of AOP-025. TURBINE FIRST STAGE PRESSURE, (PT-446, 447) - SECTION E      AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION E, TURBINE FIRST STAGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE      BOP (Step 1) CHECK Turbine Load Rejection  Immediate Action    IN PROGRESS    OR    HAS OCCURRED      CRS (Step 1 RNO) GO TO Step 3. Immediate Action Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page  19 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 3) CHECK S/G Level Trend  CONTROLLING IN AUTO TO 39% Immediate Action      RO (Step 4) CONTROL Reactor Power: Immediate Action    PLACE rod bank selector switch in M (Manual)    OPERATE rods to maintain reactor power less than or equal to 100%      CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using PA System NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      BOP (Step 6) PERFORM The Following:    CHECK S/G Level  STABILIZED BETWEEN 39% AND 52%      BOP (Step 6.a RNO) WHEN S/G level is stabilized between 39% and 52%, THEN CONTINUE WITH Step 6.b.      BOP (Step 6.b) CHECK FRV Controllers  ALL IN MAN: NOTE: All FRV controllers are expected to be in AUTO. FCV478    FCV488    FCV498      BOP (Step 6.b RNO) PLACE all FRV controllers in MAN. NOTE: The BOP will place all FRVs in MANUAL.      BOP (Step 7) SELECT Alternate Channel For 1st Stage Pressure Input:    Failed Channel - PT-447, Alternate Channel - PT-446 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page  20 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 8) ADJUST Each S/G Level To Program Level NOTE: The BOP will need to restore S/G levels to 52%.      RO (Step 9) ADJUST Tavg To Within 1.5 TO +1.5&deg;F Of Tref NOTE: The RO may need to adjust control rods and/or boron concentration to restore Tavg-Tref deviation.      RO (Step 10) CHECK Reactor Power  GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 15%      BOP (Step 11) RESTORE Each S/G FRV To Automatic: NOTE: The BOP will need to restore S/G levels to 52%. CHECK S/G level  WITHIN +/-1% OF PROGRAMMED LEVEL      BOP (Step 11 RNO) WHEN S/G level is within +/-1% of programmed level, THEN PLACE affected controller in AUTO. NOTE: The BOP will place all FRVs in AUTO. CRS  GO TO Step 12.      RO (Step 12) RESTORE Rod Control To Automatic: NOTE: Since the power increase is suspended, the RO/CRS may discuss placing the control rods back in AUTO, if not already there. CHECK Tavg  WITHIN 0.5 to +0.5&deg;F OF Tref. Place Rod Control Selector Switch in AUTO      CRS (Step 13) REMOVE Affected Transmitter From Service Using OWP033:    Channel - PT-447, OWP-FSP-2    NOTE: The CRS will address OWP-033.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page  21 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OWP-033, FIRST STAGE PRESSURE (FSP) FSP-2, FIRST STAGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-447      CRS Address FSP-2  RO Place the STEAM DUMP MODE SELECTOR SWITCH in the STEAM PRESSURE CONTROL position. NOTE:  APP-006-F5 STEAM DUMP ARMED will alarm.      BOP Place the 1ST STAGE PRESSURE SELECTOR SWITCH 446/447 in the "446" position.      BOP Insert Trip Signals NOTE:  The CRS will dispatch the BOP to the Hagan Racks. Booth Instructor coordinate with BOP to insert Trip Signals: OPEN Protection Racks Door:
IRF BST101 f:D_OPEN  IRF BST100 f:TRIP  IRF BST092 f:TRIP  IRF BST017 f:TRIP  IRF BST019 f:TRIP  IRF BST021 f:TRIP CLOSE Protection Racks Door: IRF BST101 f:D_CLOSED    B/S 447-2 HAGAN RACK #25 (70% TURBINE LOAD LIMIT) NOTE:  B/S STATUS LIGHT TURB POW LOAD LIMIT PC-447-E2 will ILLUMINATE. B/S 447-1 HAGAN RACK #25 (PERMISSIVE P-7) NOTE:  B/S STATUS LIGHT TURBINE POWER P-7 PC-447-E1 will ILLUMINATE. B/S 475, HAGAN RACK #24 (LOOP 1 HI STM FLOW) NOTE:  B/S STATUS LIGHT LOOP 1 HI STM FLOW FC-475 will ILLUMINATE. B/S 485 HAGAN RACK #25 (LOOP 2 HI STM FLOW) NOTE:  B/S STATUS LIGHT LOOP 2 HI STM FLOW FC-485 will ILLUMINATE.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page  22 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    B/S 495 HAGAN RACK #25 (LOOP 3 HI STM FLOW) NOTE:  B/S STATUS LIGHT LOOP 3 HI STM FLOW FC-495 will ILLUMINATE.      BOP Place AMSAC Bypass Switch POWER 2, PROCESSOR "A", and AMSAC Bypass Switch POWER 2, PROCESSOR "B" in the BYPASSED position. NOTE:  The CRS will dispatch the BOP. Booth Instructor: Coordinate with BOP to re-position switches using: IRF RPS012 f:BYPASS  NOTE:  APP-005-F5, AMSAC TROUB/BYPD will ILLUMINATE. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION E, TURBINE FIRST STAGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE      CRS (Step 14) CHECK TS LCO 3.3.1 And 3.3.2 For Applicability NOTE: The CRS will address Technical Specifications.      CRS (Step 15) GO TO Procedure Main Body, Step 2      TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) INSTRUMENTATION      CRS LCO 3.3.1 The RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.      CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.      CRS ACTIONS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page  23 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that Function 17.e (Turbine Impulse Pressure, P-7 Input is affected; and that Action T.1 or T.2 is required. T. One channel inoperable T.1 Verify interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions.
OR  T.2 Be in MODE 2. 1 hour      7 hours    TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.2, ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM (ESFAS) INSTRUMENTATION      CRS LCO 3.3.2 The ESFAS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.      CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.2-1.      CRS ACTIONS        CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that Functions 1.f (SI-High Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines), 1.g (SI- High Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines Coincident with Steam Line Pressure Low), 4.d (MSI - High Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines Coincident with Tavg LOW) and 4.e (MSI - High Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines Coincident with Steam Line Pressure Low),
are affected; and that Actions D.1, or D.2.1 and D.2.2. D. One channel inoperable NOTE For Function 4.c, a channel may be taken out of the trip condition for 6 hours for maintenance. D.1 Place channel in trip. OR  D.2.1 Be in MODE 3. AND  D.2.2 Be in MODE 4.
6 hours 
 
12 hour 
 
18 hours Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page  24 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.6, CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION      CRS The Containment Ventilation Isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE.      CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.6-1.      CRS ACTIONS        CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that Function 4 (Safety Injection), is affected, which requires the Action of LCO 3.3.2. Refer to LCO 3.3.2, "ESFAS Instrumentation," Function 1, for all initiation functions and requirements. NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, move to Event #4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page  25 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
"B" Charging Pump Trip      Following this, the "B" Charging Pump will trip. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-003-F5, CHG PMP MOTOR OVLD/TRIP and raise speed of the "A" Charging Pump. The operator may enter AOP-018, "Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions."  The operator will address 3.4.17, "Chemical and Volume Control System." Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF CVC05B  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-003-F5, CHG PMP MOTOR OVLD/TRIP  RTGB Annunciator APP-001-B4, RCP SEAL INJ HI/LO FLOW  "B" Charging Pump Green status light LIT  FR-124 RCP Seal Injection Flow has lowered to less than Tech Spec value  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    APP-003-F5, CHG PMP MOTOR OVLD/TRIP      RO (Step 1) Ensure at least one Charging Pump running supplying adequate RCP Seal Injection flow. NOTE: The RO will raise the speed of the "A" Charging Pump.      CRS (Step 2) Dispatch Operator to check the Charging Pump breaker(s): NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge and report within 1 minute that "there is an acrid odor at E-1."    Dispatch Operator to check the Charging Pump(s).      CRS (Step 3) Dispatch Operator to check the Charging Pump(s). NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge and report within 1 minute that "the "A" Charging Pump is operating normally."      RO (Step 4) IF Seal Injection is lost to any RCP, THEN-..
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page  26 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
"B" Charging Pump Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      RO (Step 5) IF a single-phase open circuit condition is suspected, THEN-.. NOTE: The CRS will address the Technical Specifications. NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/I&C to address the Charging Pump Trip. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC. If asked, report that the "C" Charging Pump will be restored in 12 hours. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.17, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)      CRS LCO 3.4.17 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal injection shall be OPERABLE with: NOTE: TS LCO will NOT be met if Seal Injection flow is < 6 gpm to each RCP. Two Charging Pumps shall be OPERABLE; and    Two makeup water pathways from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) shall be OPERABLE.      CRS APPLICABILITY: Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4      CRS ACTIONS        CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that the "B" Charging Pump is one of the two required to be OPERABLE, and enter Condition A. A. One required charging pump inoperable. A.1 Restore required charging pump to OPERABLE status. 24 hours      NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page  27 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" FRV Controller fails HIGH in AUTO      Shortly afterwards, the "C" Feed Regulating Valve Controller will fail such that the valve starts to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction," and control the "C" S/G level manually. Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF CFW17C        r:45 f:100  Indications Available:    "C" S/G Narrow Range level is rising on FR-498  "C" S/G Feed Flow level is rising on FR-498  FCV-498 Controller Output is rising  RTGB Annunciator APP-006-C1, S/G C FW > STM FLOW  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION      BOP (Step 1) CHECK FRVs  OPERATING PROPERLY (MANUAL OR AUTO): Immediate Action NOTE: FCV-498 in NOT operating properly in AUTO. FCV478    FCV488    FCV498      BOP (Step 1 RNO) PERFORM the following: Immediate Action NOTE: The BOP will control FCV-498 in MANUAL. ENSURE FRV for affected S/G(s) in manual control. ATTEMPT to stabilize S/G level using FRV and/or FRV Bypass Valves by matching steam flow with feed flow. STOP any load change in progress. If unable to control S/G level, THEN--
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page  28 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" FRV Controller fails HIGH in AUTO      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:  Manually control "C" S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level. Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the "C" S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.      RO/ BOP (Step 2) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint  BEING APPROACHED      CRS (Step 2 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is approached, THEN-. NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. GO TO Step 4.      RO (Step 4) CHECK Reactor Power  LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%      CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      CRS (Step 6) GO TO Appropriate Step From Table Below:    FRV Failure To Control - OBSERVE NOTE 58      BOP (Step 58) CHECK S/G Level  AT OR TRENDING TO PROGRAM      RO (Step 59) CHECK Tavg  AT OR TRENDING TO Tref Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page  29 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" FRV Controller fails HIGH in AUTO      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      CRS (Step 60) CONTACT Maintenance To Troubleshoot And Correct The Feedwater Problem NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/I&C to address the FRV Controller failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.      CRS (Step 61) IMPLEMENT EALs NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.      CRS (Step 62) CHECK Total Reactor Power Change  LESS THAN 15% NOTE:  The power change associated with the FRV Failure is less than 15%.      RO (Step 63) CHECK APP005B5, ROD BANKS A/B/C/D LO LIMIT  EXTINGUISHED      RO (Step 64) MONITOR Axial Flux Difference To Ensure Compliance With TS 3.2.3      BOP (Step 65) NOTIFY Load Dispatcher Of Unit's Load Capability NOTE: The CRS/BOP will contact the Load Dispatcher. Booth Instructor acknowledge as Load Dispatcher.      CRS (Step 66) RETURN TO Procedure And Step In Effect    NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #6-9.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 30 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Subsequently, a Cold Leg Small Break LOCA will occur (over 5 minutes) on the B Loop. The operator will enter AOP-016, "Excessive Primary Plant Leakage."  Ultimately, the operator will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."  When the reactor trips, the normal supply breaker to Bus E-1 will trip OPEN, and the "A" EDG Output Breaker will fail to CLOSE either automatically or manually; and Train "A" equipment will remain unavailable throughout the event. Additionally, the "C" SI Pump will fail to automatically start on SI, and the operator will be required to manually start this pump. Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-1, "Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant," and the break size will become larger. Eventually, Containment pressure will exceed 10 psig creating an Orange Path condition on the Containment Critical Safety Function. When this occurs, the "B" CV Spray will automatically start on HI-HI Containment Pressure, however, both SI-880C&D ("B" CV Spray Pump Discharge Valves) will fail to open automatically, and the operator will be required to manually open these valves. The scenario will terminate in EOP-E-1 after Containment pressure has been lowered to less than 10 psig, or at Step 9 of FRP-J.1, "Response to High Containment Pressure," after the operator has taken all necessary steps to reduce Containment pressure. Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF RCS01C  r:5:00 f:1000    Indications Available:    Pressurizer level is lowering  Pressurizer pressure is lowering  Charging Pump speed is rising  Containment pressure is rising  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Examiner NOTE: If a reactor trip occurs move forward to EOP-E-0 actions on Page 34. AOP-016, EXCESSIVE PRIMARY PLANT LEAKAGE      RO (Step 1) DETERMINE If Reactor Trip Needed As Follows:    CHECK RCS Pressure  GREATER THAN 1000 PSIG    CHECK the following:    PZR Level  LESS THAN 14% AND LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 31 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  OR    RCS Subcooling  LESS THAN 18&deg;F      RO (Step 1.b RNO) IF PZR Level can NOT be maintained greater than 14% OR Subcooling can NOT be maintained greater than 18&deg;F, THEN trip the Reactor and GO TO EOPE0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. CRS  GO TO Step 2.      CRS (Step 2) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      RO (Step 3 RNO) CONTROL Charging Flow To Maintain Desired RCS Level. NOTE: The "A" Charging Pump is running at maximum speed.      RO (Step 4) CHECK VCT Level  LESS THAN 12.5 INCHES      RO (Step 4 RNO) IF VCT level lowers to less than 12.5 inches, THEN OBSERVE the Note prior to Step 5 AND PERFORM Step 5. NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. CRS  GO TO Step 6.      RO (Step 6) CHECK Charging Pump Status  LESS THAN TWO RUNNING NOTE: Only one Charging Pump is available.      RO (Step 7) CHECK Charging Pump Status  NONE RUNNING      RO (Step 7 RNO) IF an additional Charging Pump is available, THEN-.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 32 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS  GO TO Step 11.      RO (Step 11) PLACE Running Charging Pump Speed Controller(s) In MAN AND ADJUST Output To Maximum        RO (Step 12) CHECK RCS Level  LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER      RO (Step 13) CHECK Any Letdown  IN SERVICE      RO (Step 14) ENSURE All Letdown Flowpaths Isolated As Follows:    LCV460A & B, LTDN LINE STOP Valves  CLOSED    HIC142, PURIFICATION FLOW Controller  ADJUSTED TO 0%    HIC137, EXCESS LTDN FLOW Controller  ADJUSTED TO 0%    CVC387, EXCESS LTDN STOP  CLOSED      RO (Step 15) CHECK RCS Level  LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER NOTE: By this time it is likely that Przr level is lowering uncontrollably.      RO (Step 16) CHECK RCS Pressure  GREATER THAN 1000 PSIG      RO/ CRS (Step 17) TRIP The Reactor AND GO TO EOPE0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 33 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION      RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action    Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers  OPEN    Rod position indicators  FULLY INSERTED    Rod Bottom Lights  ILLUMINATED    Neutron Flux  LOWERING      BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action    Both Turbine Stop Valves  CLOSED    All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power To AC EMERGENCY BUSSES: Immediate Action NOTE:  Bus E-1 is NOT energized. CHECK Bus E1 OR E2  AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED    CHECK Bus E1 AND E2  BOTH ENERGIZED      BOP (Step 3) WHEN time permits, THEN TRY to restore power to deenergized AC Emergency Bus. Immediate Action      RO (Step 4) CHECK SI Status:  Immediate Action  CHECK if SI is actuated:    SI annunciators  ANY ILLUMINATED    OR    SI equipment  AUTO STARTED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 34 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      CHECK BOTH trains of SI actuated:    SI Pumps  TWO RUNNING NOTE:  The operator has to manually start the "C" SI Pump. RHR Pumps  BOTH RUNNING      RO/ BOP Foldout Page:    RCP TRIP CRITERIA NOTE:  The RCP Trip Criteria will apply in this event. FAULTED S/G AFW ISOLATION CRITERIA    AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA    DC BUS, INSTRUMENT BUS, OR MCC5 FAILURE CRITERIA NOTE:  The Instrument Bus/MCC-5 Criteria will apply in this event requiring performance of Attachment 2, and will likely be performed prior to Attachment 1. SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING CRITERIA    Examiner NOTE:  The CRS will likely assign the BOP to perform Attachment 2 with the AO, and then perform Attachment 1. If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 2 and 1. CRS/RO follow E-0 Actions, Step 6, on Page 42. EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ATTACHMENT 2, DC BUS OR INSTRUMENT BUS FAILURE      BOP (Step 1) IF DC Bus Failure Has Occurred, THEN- NOTE: A DC Bus failure has NOT occurred.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 35 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 2) IF MCC5 Is NOT Energized, THEN PERFORM The Following: NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO, and direct that the AO perform Step 2 of Attachment 2 of EOP-E-0. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 2 minutes that this action is complete. IRF EPSL005 f:SHDN_BUS IRF EPMSMCC5_187 f: RACK_IN    ENSURE DS Bus is ENERGIZED    TRANSFER power source to DS Bus using the posted instructions at the Kirk Key Interlocked Breakers    Locally RESET AND LOAD Instrument Air Compressor A (MCC5 CMPT 7M)      BOP (Step 3) IF Instrument Bus Failure Has Occurred,-.. NOTE: The failure of Instrument Bus 1 will be resolved with the restoration of power to MCC-5 (Step 2). EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION      CRS (Step 5) PERFORM Attachment 1, Auto Action Verification, While CONTINUING WITH This Procedure    Examiner NOTE:  The CRS will likely assign the BOP to perform this action. If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1. CRS/RO follow E-0 Actions, Step 6, on Page 42. EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ATTACHMENT 1, AUTO ACTION VERIFICATION Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 36 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 1) CHECK ECCS Pumps Running:    SI Pumps  TWO RUNNING    RHR Pumps  BOTH RUNNING      BOP (Step 1 RNO) Manually START pump(s) as necessary. NOTE:  There is no power to the "A" SI Pump, and the "C" SI had to be started manually. Critical Task:  Establish flow from at least one high-head SI pump before transition out of E-0  Safety Significance:  Failure to manually start at least one high-head SI pump under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity. In this case, at least one high-head SI pump can be manually started from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. Additionally, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Finally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump (when it is possible to do so) is a violation of the facility license condition.      BOP (Step 2) CHECK ECCS Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment      BOP (Step 3) CHECK CCW Pumps  AT LEAST ONE RUNNING      BOP (Step 4) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A:    CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A  ACTUATED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 37 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A Valves  CLOSED NOTE: Some valves may not have power if this is performed prior to Attachment 2. The BOP may dispatch an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.      BOP (Step 4.b RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as necessary. NOTE:  Some valves will NOT have power to CLOSE, however all CV penetrations will be isolated. IF ANY Containment penetration can NOT be isolated, THEN...      BOP  CHECK Excess Letdown  ISOLATED    CVC387, EXCESS LTDN STOP VALVE  CLOSED    HIC137, EXCESS LTDN FLOW CONTROLLER  AT 0% DEMAND      BOP (Step 5) CHECK Feedwater Isolation:    CHECK Main Feed Pumps  BOTH TRIPPED    CHECK Main Feedwater isolated:    Feedwater Reg Valves  CLOSED    Feedwater Reg Bypass Valves  CLOSED    Feedwater Header Section Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 6) CHECK If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated:    CHECK Main Steam Line Isolation  REQUIRED    CHECK Containment pressure  GREATER THAN 10 PSIG    OR    High steam flow with:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 38 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    S/G pressure  LESS THAN 614 PSIG    OR    Tavg  LESS THAN 543&deg;F      BOP (Step 6.b) CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 7) CHECK Proper Service Water System Operation:    CHECK SW Pumps  ALL RUNNING      BOP (Step 7.a RNO) Manually START pump(s) as necessary. NOTE:  The "C" and "D" SW Pumps will be running. The "A" and "B" SW Pumps do NOT have power.      BOP (Step 7.b) CHECK SW Booster Pumps  BOTH RUNNING      BOP  (Step 7.b RNO) Manually START pump(s) as necessary. NOTE:  The "B" SW Booster Pump will be running. The "A" SW Pump does NOT have power.      BOP (Step 7.c) CHECK Both SW Header Low Pressure Alarms  EXTINGUISHED    APP008F7,SOUTH SW HDR LO PRESS    APP008F8,NORTH SW HDR LO PRESS      BOP (Step 8) CHECK BOTH EDGs  RUNNING NOTE:  BOTH EDGs are running however, the "A" EDG Output Breaker cannot be CLOSED.      BOP (Step 9) CHECK ECCS Flow:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 39 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK RCS pressure  LESS THAN 1650 PSIG [1725 PSIG]    CHECK SI Pumps - FLOW INDICATED    CHECK RCS pressure - LESS THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG]      BOP (Step 9.c RNO) GO TO Step 10.      BOP (Step 10) CHECK CV Recirculation Fans  ALL RUNNING NOTE:  The "3" and "4" CV Recirc Fans will be running. The "1" and "2" CV Fans do NOT have power.      BOP (Step 11) CHECK IVSW System Actuated:    PCV1922A, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE  OPEN    PCV1922B, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE  OPEN      BOP (Step 12) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation:    CV Ventilation Isolation Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 12 RNO) DEPRESS H.V. OFF on R11 OR R12 to initiate Containment Ventilation Isolation. IF ANY Containment Ventilation Isolation valve does NOT close, THEN manually OR locally ISOLATE AFFECTED penetration outside Containment while CONTINUING WITH this procedure. NOTE: The BOP may contact an AO to locally close valves. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 5 minutes that all valves are CLOSED.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 40 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 13) CHECK Control Room Ventilation Aligned For Pressurization Mode: NOTE: If the AO has restored power to Instrument Bus 1 (Via restoration of MCC-5), each of these valves will be CLOSED. HVA1A OR HVA1B,CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING FAN  RUNNING    HVE19A OR HVE19B,CONTROL ROOM AIR CLEANING FAN  RUNNING    HVE16, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN  STOPPED    Control Room HVAC Outside Air Damper A OR B  OPEN    CRD1ASA, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER  CLOSED    CRD1BSB, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER  CLOSED      BOP (Step 14) CHECK DS Bus  ENERGIZED      BOP (Step 15) CHECK Battery Chargers ENERGIZED: NOTE: If the AO has restored power to MCC-5, each of these will be extinguished. APP036D1, BATT CHARGER A/A1 TROUBLE Alarm  EXTINGUISHED    APP036D2, BATT CHARGER B/B1 TROUBLE Alarm  EXTINGUISHED      BOP (Step 16) STOP R11/12 Sample Pump Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 41 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 17) Locally RESET AND LOAD Instrument Air Compressor(s) As Necessary (38 KW each): NOTE: The BOP may contact the Inside AO. Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge and report that the "B" IA Compressor is running, and the "A" IA Compressor is NOT running. Compressor A (MCC5 CMPT 7M)    Compressor B (MCC6 CMPT 3G)      BOP (Step 18) PERFORM Crew Update To Include The Following:    Attachment completion    Manual actions taken    Failed equipment status    SW status per Step 7.c    If applicable, PERFORM Supplement M, Component Alignment For Loss Of SW To Turbine Building, as time permits    Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE. EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION    Examiner NOTE: RCS Subcooling will be lost on this event. The six minute Clock to stop the RCPs will start WHEN subcooling is 13&deg;F and the "C" SI Pump is running. Record Time:  __________  RO (Step 6) CHECK AFW Pumps Running:    CHECK Motor Driven AFW Pumps  BOTH RUNNING Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 42 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  (Step 6.a) Manually START pump(s). NOTE:  The "B" MDAFW Pump will be running. The "A" MDAFW Pump does NOT have power.        CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels  TWO S/Gs LESS THAN 16%    CHECK Steam Driven AFW Pump  RUNNING NOTE:  The SDAFW Pump is running.      RO (Step 7) CHECK AFW Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment:    AFW Header Discharge Valves  FULL OPEN    AFW Header Section Valves  FULL OPEN    Steam Driven AFW Pump Discharge Valves  FULL OPEN IF PUMP RUNNING NOTE:  The "A" and "C" valves are CLOSED, the "B" Valve is OPEN.      RO (Step 8) CHECK Total AFW Flow:    RESET SI    CONTROL AFW flow to maintain Intact S/G Narrow Range level between 9%[18%] AND 50%    CHECK total AFW flow  GREATER THAN 300 GPM      RO (Step 9) CHECK CV Spray NOT Required:    CHECK Containment Pressure  HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG NOTE:  Containment pressure has remained < 10 psig. CHECK CV Spray  NOT ACTUATED      RO (Step 10) CHECK RCP Seal Cooling:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 43 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CCW flow to RCP(s) Thermal Barriers  NORMAL    APP001C1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW ALARM  EXTINGUISHED    APP001D1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR LO FLOW alarm  EXTINGUISHED    OR    Seal Injection flow  ADEQUATE    Seal Injection flow  GREATER THAN 6 GPM PER RCP    OR    Thermal Barrier Ps  GREATER THAN 5 INCHES WATER PER RCP      RO (Step 11) CHECK RCS Temperatures: NOTE:  The LOCA may be causing a cooldown. If so, the RNO will be performed. Otherwise proceed to Step 12. With ANY RCP running, RCS average temperature  STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547&deg;F    OR    With NO RCPs running, RCS Cold Leg temperatures  STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547&deg;F      RO (Step 11 RNO) IF temperature is LESS THAN 547&deg;F AND lowering, THEN PERFORM the following:    STOP dumping steam. IF RCS cooldown continues, THEN REDUCE total AFW flow to minimum for decay heat removal.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 44 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    MAINTAIN total AFW flow GREATER THAN 300 gpm UNTIL S/G Narrow Range level is GREATER THAN 9%[18%] in at least one S/G. IF RCS cooldown continues, THEN CLOSE MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves.      RO (Step 12) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Spray Valves:    CHECK PZR PORVs  CLOSED    CHECK Normal PZR Spray Valves  CLOSED    CHECK Aux PZR Spray Valve  CLOSED      RO (Step 13) CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped:    CHECK RCPs  ANY RUNNING    CHECK SI Pumps  AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW    CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs  LESS THAN 13&deg;F[32&deg;F] . STOP ALL RCPs NOTE: Depending on the timing of mitigation actions, the RCP trip criteria may or may not be met. If the criteria is NOT met here, the leak degrades after entry into EOP-E-1.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 45 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:  Trip all RCPs within 6 minutes of meeting the EOP-E-0/E-1 RCP Trip Criteria (Containment Isolation Phase B  ACTUATED, OR BOTH of the following satisfied: SI Pumps  AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW AND RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs  LESS THAN 13&deg;F [32&deg;F]) so that CET temperatures do not become superheated when forced circulation in the RCS stops. Safety Significance:  Failure to trip the RCPs under the postulated plant conditions leads to core uncovery and to fuel cladding temperatures in excess of 2200&deg;F, which is the limit specified in the ECCS acceptance criteria. Thus, failure to perform the task represents mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator has failed to prevent degradation of the fuel cladding barrier to fission product release and which leads to a violation of the facility license condition. Record Pump Stop Time:  __________  Subtract time recorded at time of the SI Pump running/loss SCM on Page 42 _____ = _____ minutes.      RO (Step 14) CHECK If S/G Secondary Pressure Boundaries Are Intact:    NONE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER    NONE COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED      RO (Step 15) CHECK If S/G Tubes Are Intact:    Secondary Radiation Monitors  HAVE REMAINED NORMAL    R15, CONDENSER AIR EJECTOR GAS    R19s, S/G Blowdown Radiation    R31s, STEAMLINE RADIATION MONITORs Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 46 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    S/G levels  NONE RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER      CRS (Step 16) PERFORM the following:    CHECK If RCS Is Intact:    CV radiation  NORMAL    R2, CV AREA    R32A, CV HIGH RANGE    R32B, CV HIGH RANGE    CV pressure  NORMAL    CV Sump level  NORMAL NOTE: The CRS will transition to EOP-E-1. Booth Instructor: The Cold Leg break will degrade IMF RCS01C r:2:00 f:3    Examiner NOTE: Shortly after entry into EOP-E-1, it is expected that an Orange path will occur on the Containment CSFST. When this occurs, the CRS may transition to FRP-J.1, or remain in EOP-E-1 and take the continuous actions of EOP-E-0 to initiate CV Spray.
If the CRS transitions to FRP-J.1, move forward to Page 55. If the CRS remains in EOP-E-1 continue below. EOP-E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT      RO/ BOP FOLDOUT PAGE:    RCP TRIP CRITERIA Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 47 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  SI TERMINATION CRITERIA    SI REINITIATION CRITERIA    SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA    EOPE3 TRANSITION CRITERIA    COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCHOVER CRITERIA    AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA      RO (Step 1) CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped: Examiner NOTE:  The RCPs are likely OFF. If they are not, and stopped here, record the time on Critical Task on Page 46. CHECK RCPs  ANY RUNNING      CRS (Step 1.a RNO) GO TO Step 2.      BOP (Step 2) CHECK If S/G Secondary Pressure Boundaries Are Intact:    NONE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER    NONE COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED      BOP (Step 3) CHECK Intact S/G Levels: NOTE: Adverse Containment Numbers will be required when CV pressure rises to greater than 4 psig. CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels  GREATER THAN 9% [18%]    CONTROL feed flow to maintain S/G Narrow Range levels  BETWEEN 9% [18%] AND 50%      RO (Step 4) RESET SI Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 48 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      RO (Step 5) RESET Containment Isolation Phase A    Examiner NOTE:  The CRS may transition to FRP-J.1 when the Orange path on the Containment CSF occurs. If so, move forward to Page 55. BOP (Step 6) CHECK Secondary Radiation:    CHECK Secondary Radiation Monitors  HAVE REMAINED NORMAL    R15, CONDENSER AIR EJECTOR GAS    R19s, S/G Blowdown Radiation    R31s, STEAMLINE RADIATION MONITORs    PERFORM the following: NOTE:  The CRS may call Chemistry to address the samples. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry. REQUEST Chemistry periodically sample ALL S/Gs for activity. Secondary sample results  NORMAL (WHEN RESULTS AVAILABLE)      RO (Step 7) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Block Valves:    CHECK Power to PZR PORV Block Valves  AVAILABLE    CHECK PZR PORVs  CLOSED    CHECK PZR PORV Block valves  AT LEAST ONE OPEN Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 49 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 8) ESTABLISH Instrument Air To CV:    CHECK APP002F7, INSTR AIR HDR LO PRESS alarm  EXTINGUISHED    RESET IA PCV1716,INSTRUMENT AIR ISOLATION TO CV    CHECK IA PCV1716  OPEN      BOP (Step 9) CHECK Power Supply To Charging Pumps  OFFSITE POWER AVAILABLE      RO (Step 10) CHECK If Charging Flow Has Been Established:    CHECK Charging Pumps  AT LEAST ONE RUNNING NOTE:  The "A" Charging Pump is the only Charging Pump available. ESTABLISH desired Charging flow:    START additional Charging Pump(s) as necessary    ADJUST the following as necessary to maintain proper Seal Injection AND desired Charging flow:    Charging Pump Speed Controller(s)    HIC121, CHARGING FLOW Controller    Seal Water Flow Control Valves NOTE:  The BOP may contact the AO to adjust Seal Injection flows. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO; and use: IRF CVC030 f: variable IRF CVC031 f: variable IRF CVC032 f: variable    MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 gpm AND 20 gpm per RCP UNLESS Seal Injection isolated Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 50 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 11) CHECK If ECCS Flow Should Be Terminated:    CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs  GREATER THAN 18&deg;F [37&deg;F] NOTE: Adverse Containment Numbers will be required.      CRS (Step 11 RNO) GO TO Step 12.      RO (Step 12) CHECK If Containment Spray Should Be Stopped:    CHECK CV Spray Pumps  ANY RUNNING    CHECK Containment pressure  LESS THAN 4 PSIG NOTE:  CV pressure will likely be lowering, and may be below 4 psig. If so, move forward to Step 13.      CRS (Step 12.b) WHEN Containment pressure is LESS THAN 4 psig, THEN PERFORM Steps 12.e. NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. OBSERVE CAUTION prior to Step 13 AND CONTINUE WITH Step 13.      RO (Step 13) CHECK If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped: NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. CHECK RCS pressure:    Pressure  GREATER THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG] NOTE: Adverse Containment Numbers will be required.      CRS (Step 13.a RNO) GO TO Step 15.      BOP (Step 15) CHECK If Diesel Generators Should Be Stopped:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 51 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK AC Emergency Busses  ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER    Bus E1,BKR 52/18B CLOSED NOTE: Bus E-1 is de-energized. The CRS may stop here and address the possibility of restoring power to Bus E-1. Bus E2,BKR 52/28B CLOSED    CHECK Emergency Diesel Generator(s) Starting Air annunciators  EXTINGUISHED    APP010B2, EDG A START AIR LO PRESS    APP010B3, EDG B START AIR LO PRESS    STOP ANY unloaded Emergency Diesel Generator(s)      CRS (Step 16) INITIATE Evaluation Of Plant Status:    CHECK Cold Leg Recirculation capability:    Train A:    CHECK the following pumps  AVAILABLE    RHR Pump A    ANY CCW Pump    ANY two SW Pumps    CHECK the following valves  AVAILABLE    SI860A, CV SUMP TO RHR    SI861A, CV SUMP TO RHR    SI862A, RWST TO RHR Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 52 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CC749A, CCW FROM RHR HX    Train B:    CHECK the following pumps  AVAILABLE    RHR Pump B    ANY CCW Pump    ANY two SW Pumps    CHECK the following valves  AVAILABLE    SI860B, CV SUMP TO RHR    SI861B, CV SUMP TO RHR    SI862B, RWST TO RHR    CC749B, CCW FROM RHR HX    CHECK Auxiliary Building Conditions  NORMAL    R3, PASS PANEL AREA    R4, CHARGING PUMP ROOM    R6, SAMPLING ROOM    RI14C, Plant Effluent NGLO    LI615A, RHR PIT "A" LEVEL INDICATOR    LI615B, RHR PIT "B" LEVEL INDICATOR    Aux Bldg Sump Tank "A" level    Aux Bldg Sump Tank "B" level    OBTAIN samples:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 53 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CONTACT Chemistry to obtain the following samples: NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/Chemistry to address the sampling requirements. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/Chemistry. RCS boron concentration    RCS activity    CV atmosphere    CONSULT Plant Operations Staff as necessary to assess additional sampling requirements for fuel damage NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/Plant Management to address the sampling requirements. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/ Plant Management. EVALUATE plant equipment to support long term recovery:    RHR Pumps    SI Pumps    CV Spray Pumps    CV Fans    AFW Pumps    SW System    CCW System    IVSW System    EDG Fuel and Auxiliaries    START additional plant equipment to assist in recovery as necessary:    Aux Boiler NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO to start the Aux Boiler. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 54 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Other plant equipment needed during RCS cooldown to Cold Shutdown      RO (Step 17) CHECK If RCS Cooldown AND Depressurization Is Required:    CHECK RCS pressure  GREATER THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG] NOTE: Adverse Containment Numbers will be required.      RO (Step 17.a RNO) IF RHR Pump flow is GREATER THAN 1500 gpm, THEN ... IF RHR Pump flow is LESS THAN 1500 gpm, THEN PERFORM the following:    RESET SPDS. GO TO EOPES1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown And Depressurization, Step 1. Examiner NOTE: If the CRS enters FRP-J.1, continue HERE. FRP-J.1, RESPONSE TO HIGH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE      CRS (Step 1) CHECK CV Spray Operation  CONTROLLED BY EOPECA1.1, Loss Of Emergency Coolant Recirculation      CRS (Step 1 RNO) GO TO Step 2.      RO (Step 2.a) CHECK Containment Spray Status: NOTE:  The "A" CV Spray Pump has no power. CHECK CV Spray pumps  BOTH RUNNING      RO (Step 2.a RNO) PERFORM the following:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 55 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    ENSURE CV Spray Pump Inlet Valves are OPEN:    SI844A    SI844B    Manually START CV Spray Pump(s). NOTE:  The "A" CV Spray Pump has no power.      RO (Step 2.b.1) CHECK CV Spray System  PROPER VALVE ALIGNMENT    CHECK CV Spray Pump Discharge valves  OPEN    SI880A NOTE:  SI-880A and B may be opened, however the "A" CV Spray Pump has no power. SI880B NOTE:  If the crew attempts to close SI-880A and B due the "A" CV Spray Pump not running, the valves will not close until CV Spray and Phase B CV Isolation is reset. SI880C NOTE:  SI-880C and D have failed to Auto Open. SI880D      RO (Step 2.b.1 RNO) Manually OPEN valve(s) as necessary.      RO (Step 2.b.2) CHECK CV Spray Additive Tank Discharge Valves  OPEN    SI845A    SI845B      RO (Step 2.b.3) CHECK Spray Additive Tank flow  APPROXIMATELY 12 GPM Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 56 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 2.b.3 RNO) IF Spray Additive Tank level is GREATER THAN 0%, THEN ADJUST SI845C, SAT THROTTLING VALVE, as necessary. NOTE:  SI-845C will be adjusted such that flow is 12 gpm. Critical Task:  Manually actuate at least one CV Spray Train before Transitioning to EOP-ES-1.2  Safety Significance:  Failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment under the postulated conditions demonstrates the inability of the crew to "recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. In this case, the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment can be manually actuated from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent (degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity). Additionally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment (when it is possible to do so) results in a failure to prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. Examiner NOTE: An Orange/Red Path may occur on RCS Integrity causing the CRS to transition to FRP-P.1. If so, and all Critical Tasks have been completed, terminate the exam. RO (Step 2.c) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase B Valves  CLOSED NOTE:  Some valves will NOT have power.      RO (Step 2.c RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as necessary. NOTE: The RO may dispatch an AO to locally check the position of the "A" Train valves. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 57 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    IF ANY Containment Isolation Phase B valve can NOT be closed, THEN locally ISOLATE AFFECTED penetration outside Containment while CONTINUING WITH this procedure.      RO (Step 2.d) STOP ALL RCPs      RO (Step 3) MONITOR Spray Additive Tank level  GREATER THAN 0%      BOP (Step 4) CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves  CLOSE NOTE: depending on the timing of mitigation actions, the MSIVs may be open or closed. If the MSIVs are OPEN, the BOP will perform the Step 4 RNO.      BOP (Step 4 RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as necessary.      RO (Step 5) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A Valves  CLOSED NOTE:  Some valves will NOT have power to CLOSE, however all CV penetrations will either be isolated, or in the process of being isolated from the performance of Attachment 1 of EOP-E-0.      RO (Step 5 RNO) IF valve(s) are NOT CLOSED AND associated flow path(s) are NOT necessary, THEN manually CLOSE AFFECTED valve(s). IF AFFECTED valve(s) can NOT be CLOSED, THEN locally ISOLATE affected penetration outside Containment while CONTINUING WITH this procedure.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 58 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 6) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation  VALVES CLOSED NOTE:  Some valves will NOT have power.      BOP (Step 6 RNO) DEPRESS H.V. OFF on R11 OR R12 to initiate Containment Ventilation Isolation. IF ANY Containment Ventilation Isolation Valve does NOT CLOSE, THEN manually OR locally ISOLATE AFFECTED penetration outside Containment while CONTINUING WITH this procedure. NOTE: The BOP may dispatch an AO to locally check the position of the "A" Train valves. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.      RO (Step 7) CHECK CV Recirculation Fans  ALL RUNNING NOTE: The "A' Train HVH Fans do not have power.      RO (Step 7 RNO) Manually START fan(s) as necessary.      BOP (Step 8) CHECK If Feed Flow Should Be Isolated To ANY S/G:    CHECK pressures in ALL S/Gs:    ANY S/G pressure lowering in an uncontrolled manner    OR    ANY S/G completely depressurized      CRS (Step 8 RNO) GO TO Step 9.      CRS (Step 9) PERFORM The Following:    RESET SPDS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 59 of 60          Event
 
== Description:==
Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /"C" SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    RETURN TO Procedure AND Step In Effect Examiner NOTE: The CRS will transition back to EOP-E-1 (Go to step that was in effect at the time that FRP-J.1 was entered). At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.
NRC SCENARIO N16 1-2 TURNOVER SHEET  1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life: BOL b) Reactor Power: 75% c) Turbine Load: 543 MWe  d) Boron Concentration: 1248 ppm e) Rod Height: 177 CB 'D' f) RCS Pressure: 2235 psig g) PZR Level: 44.2%  h) Xenon: Equilibrium  2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. # Description None    3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) The "A" SI Pump is OOS. The "B" SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. b) The "C" Charging Pump is also OOS. 4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a) None 5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a) "A" Charging Pump b) "B" Charging Pump  6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a) LI-928, "C" SI Accumulator Level, is OOS (I&C Investigating). b) RTGB Annunciator APP-009-C3, "AIR SIDE SEAL OIL BU PMP OVLD," has failed to the EXTINGUISHED (i.e. OFF) condition (I&C is investigating). 7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a) Unrestricted 8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a) Raise power to 100% in accordance with Reactivity Plan 9. TURNOVER INFORMATION  a) The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. 10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a) The Reactor Engineer (RE) will be available in the Control Room b) The RE recommends a 2100 gallon dilution, made in several 200-300 gallon batch dilutions using Section 8.2.7, RCS Quick Dilution Checklist, of OP-301. c) The RE recommends that Control Bank D be approximately 200 steps upon achieving 100% power 11. RISK  a) Yellow (Planned Power Increase) 
 
PROGRAM: H B Robinson Operations Training  MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam    Scenario N16-1-3   
 
==REFERENCES:==
: 1. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4, "Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System" (Amendment 203) 2. AOP-024, "Loss of Instrument Bus" (Rev 41) 3. Technical Specification LCO 3.8.7, "AC Instrument Bus Sources - Operating" (Amendment 176) 4. Technical Specification LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution System - Operating" (Amendment 176) 5. AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction" (Rev 33) 6. AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure" (Rev 24) 7. OWP-026, "Feed Flow (FWF)" (Rev 14) 8. AOP-038, "Rapid Downpower" (Rev 3) 9. APP-001 "Miscellaneous NSSS" (Rev 60) 10. AOP-019, "Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control" (Rev 20) 11. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.4, "Remote Shutdown System" (Amendment 203) 12. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, "RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure From Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits" (Amendment 176) 13. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11, "Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORVs)" (Amendment 203) 14. EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection"  (Rev 6) 15. EOP-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response" (Rev 7) 16. CSFST, "Critical Safety Function Status Trees" (Rev 7) 17. FRP-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink" (Rev 29) 18. OP-402, "Auxiliary Feedwater System" (Rev 96)
Validation Time: 92 minutes 
 
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3  Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners:  Operators: (SRO)    (RO)    (BOP)  Initial Conditions: The plant is at 68% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The SDAFW Pump is OOS, and has been for 7 days. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION C has just been entered. Maintenance reports that this pump will be OPERABLE in 2 hours, and station management has directed that the initiation of the shutdown be delayed 2 hours. TI-471, PRT Temperature is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-008-C3, "EMERG OIL PMP OVLD," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).              Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*  Event Description  1 1 C-RO C-BOP C(TS)-SRO Loss of Instrument Bus 3 2 2 I-BOP I-SRO "B" Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW 3  NA R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Load Decrease 4 3  C-RO C-SRO Letdown Line Pressure Control Valve Controller fails CLOSED 5 4 I-RO I(TS)-SRO PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE 6 5 M-RO M-BOP M-SRO Inadvertent FWIS 7 6 C-BOP Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate 8 7 NA "A" & "B" MDAFW Pump Trip  * (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,    (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3  H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #3  The plant is at 68% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The SDAFW Pump is OOS, and has been for 7 days. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION C has just been entered. Maintenance reports that this pump will be OPERABLE in 2 hours, and station management has directed that the initiation of the shutdown be delayed 2 hours. TI-471, PRT Temperature is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-008-C3, "EMERG OIL PMP OVLD," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).                                Shortly after taking the watch, Instrument Bus 3 will de-energize. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-024, "Loss of Instrument Bus," and restore power to the Bus. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.8.7, "AC Instrument Bus Sources - Operating," and Technical Specification LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems-Operating."  Following this, the controlling feed flow channel for S/G "B", FT-487, will fail LOW, causing FRV-498 to start to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction," and/or AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure."  The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-026, "Feed Flow (FWF)."  Next, the WCCS will call and inform the operator that it has been determined that the SDAFW Pump will not be restored to OPERABLE status within the next two hours as expected, and that station management has directed that the plant be brought to Mode 3 within the next four hours using AOP-038, "Rapid Downpower."    During the downpower, the Letdown Pressure Control Valve (PCV-145) controller will fail such that the valve will fail closed. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-D6, LP LTDN LN HI PRESS, and ultimately take manual control of the valve.
Shortly afterwards, PZR Pressure transmitter PT-444 will fail HIGH causing the Pzr Spray valves and Pzr PORV to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-019, "Malfunction of RCS pressure Control," and/or AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure."  RCS pressure control will remain in MANUAL for the remainder of the scenario. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.4, "Remote Shutdown System," Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, "RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits," and Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11, "Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)."    After the Pressure Transmitter has been removed from service, an inadvertent FWIS will occur. Simultaneously with the Rx Trip, the Turbine will fail to TRIP, the Governor Valves will fail to CLOSE manually, and the Main Steamline Isolation signal will fail to auto actuate. The operator will be required to manually CLOSE the MSIVs. Additionally the "A" and "B" MDAFW Pumps will trip immediately after auto start. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."
Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response." However, this transition will be delayed due to a RED condition on the Heat Sink CSF. The operator will perform FRP-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink."  The Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3  operator will direct that AFW Pump "C" be placed in service in accordance with OP-402, "Auxiliary Feedwater System," however, the AFW Pump "C" Diesel will fail to start. The scenario will terminate at Step 7 RNO 2.b of FRP-H.1, after the operator has restored feedwater flow from the Main Feedwater System.
Critical Tasks:  Manually control "B" S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level. Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the "B" S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control. Manually close the OPEN Pzr Spray Valve(s) and the Block Valve for the Stuck Open PORV before the Reactor trips based on low pressurizer pressure. Safety Significance: failure to close the Spray Valves/PORV Block Valve and stop the pressure transient, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the pressure transient. A failure to stabilize the pressure transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS pressure control.
Manually Close the MSIVs Before an ORANGE Path Challenge Develops to Either the Subcriticality or the Integrity CSF or Before Transition to ECA-2.1, Whichever Happens First (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to trip the main turbine under the postulated plant conditions causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, such an omission constitutes a failure by the operator to "demonstrate the ability to take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety. The situation described in the plant conditions is effectively a large steamline break downstream of the MSIVs. This "effective steamline break" is also located downstream of the main turbine stop valves, which cannot be closed by manually tripping the turbine. Failure to perform the critical task results in uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs and in uncontrolled cooldown of the RCS, both of which are unnecessary. Establish Feedwater Flow Into at Least One S/G Before RCS Bleed and Feed is Required (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to establish feedwater flow to any SG results in the operator's having to rely upon the lower-priority action of establishing RCS bleed and feed to minimize core uncovery. This constitutes incorrect performance that fails to prevent degradation of any barrier to fission product release.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3  SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS              Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  Sim. Setup Reset to Temp IC 610  T = 0 Malfunctions:  SDAFW Pump OOS:  irf EPSMCC5_189 f: RACK_OUT (V1-8A, A S/G supply to SDAFW)  irf EPSMCC6_226 f: RACK_OUT (V1-8B, B S/G supply to SDAFW)  irf EPSMCC6_227 f: RACK_OUT (V1-8C, C S/G supply to SDAFW)  irf EPSMCC10_262 f: RACK_OUT (V2-14A, SDAFW discharge to A S/G)  irf EPSMCC9_254 f: RACK_OUT (V2-14B, SDAFW discharge to B S/G)  irf EPSMCC10_267 f: RACK_OUT (V2-14C, SDAFW discharge to C S/G)  PLACE RED CAPS on the RTGB Control Switches for the Valves ABOVE Place GREEN CAPS on the RTGB Control Switches BELOW (See OMM-048, Attachment 9):  A MDAFW RTGB Switch  B MDAFW RTGB Switch  AFW Valve V2-16A RTGB Switch  AFW Valve V2-16B RTGB Switch  AFW Valve V2-16C RTGB Switch  AFW Valve V2-20A RTGB Switch  AFW Valve V2-20B RTGB Switch  Protected Switchyard TI-471 PRT Temperature indication OOS  IOR aoPRTAOD30A f:50 Place WHITE DOT on TI-471 RTGB Annunciator APP-008-C3 failed on  IMF ANNXN08C03 f:ALARM_ON Place WHITE DOT on APP-008-C3  Insert the following:  IMF TUR02A (Turbine fails to AUTO Trip)  IMF TUR02B (Turbine fails to AUTO Trip)  IMF TUR02C (Turbine fails to AUTO Trip)  $006_RTA_TRIP IOR diTUREHI029 f:AS-IS (Turbine Fails to Runback on Reactor Trip)  IRF SGN023 f:NO_AUTO (Auto MSI Fails)  IRF SGN024 f:NO_AUTO (Auto MSI Fails)  IRF SGN025 f:NO_AUTO (Auto MSI Fails)  $006_RTA_TRIP IMF CFW1A d:45 (A MDAFW Pump Trips after Auto Start)  $006_RTA_TRIP IMF CFW1B d:45 (B MDAFW Pump Trips after Auto Start)  Place the Simulator in RUN and ACKNOWLEDGE all alarms. Perform Attachment 2 (Simulator Setup For Exams) of TAP-411.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3    Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  Crew Briefing  1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements  2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew. 3. Provide the crew with the following:  OST-947, Operations Reactivity Plan  Copy of Technical Specifications/Basis  4. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms. T-0 Begin Familiarization Period  At direction of examiner Execute Lesson Plan for Simulator Scenario N16-1-3. At direction of examiner  Event 1  IRF EPSIB3_600 f:OPEN  Loss of Instrument Bus 3 At direction of examiner  Event 2 ICO CFWXMTFT_487 r:00:30 f:0  "B" Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW  At direction of examiner Event 3  NA Load Decrease  NOTE: to initiate this event, the WCCS will call and inform the operator that "It has been determined that the SDAFW Pump will not be restored to OPERABLE status within the next two hours as expected, and that station management has directed that the plant be brought to Mode 3 within the next four hours using AOP-038, "Rapid Downpower."  At direction of examiner  Event 4 IMF CVC07 r:2:00 f:100 IOR aoCVCAAD046A r:2:00 f:100 $006_PCV-145_MAN DMF CVC07 $006_PCV-145_MAN DOR aoCVCAAD046A  Letdown Line Pressure Control Valve Controller fails CLOSED Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3    Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  At direction of examiner Event 5  ICO RPSXMTPT_444 r:01:00 f:2500  IMF PRS03D f:10 when $006_PCV-455C_OPEN  PZR Pressure transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE At direction of examiner Event 6 IMF CFW20A c:20 IMF CFW20B c:20 IMF CFW20C c:20 Inadvertent FWIS    Post-Rx Trip  Event 7  Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate  NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0  Post-Rx Trip  Event 8  A & B MDAFW Pump Trip NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0      Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page  9 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Instrument Bus 3      Shortly after taking the watch, Instrument Bus 3 will de-energize. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-024, "Loss of Instrument Bus," and restore power to the Bus. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.8.7, "AC Instrument Bus Sources - Operating," and Technical Specification LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems-Operating." Booth Operator Instructions:    IRF EPSIB3_600    f:OPEN  Indications Available:    "C" Feed Regulating Valve Controller in MANUAL  FR-498 Stem/Feed Flow Recorder for "C" S/G is de-energized  Bistable Panel "A" is de-energized  PT-445, Pzr Pressure has failed LOW  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    AOP-024, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT BUS      BOP (Step 1) Place The Main Turbine in Manual Immediate Action      BOP (Step 2) Verify S/G(s) Maintained At Program Level Immediate Action      RO (Step 3) Place Rods in M (Manual) Immediate Action      RO (Step 4) Maintain Reactor Power Less Than OR Equal To 100%      RO (Step 5) Determine If RCS Makeup Needs To Be Stopped:    Check Auto Makeup, Boration OR Dilution  IN PROGRESS    OR    Check Instrument Bus 2 AND Instrument Bus 7  DEENERGIZED      RO (Step 5 RNO) IF Auto Makeup is received, THEN Check Auto Makeup, Boration Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page  10 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Instrument Bus 3      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS  Go To Step 7      RO (Step 7) Control PZR Heaters And Sprays To Restore RCS Pressure To The Desired Control Band      CRS (Step 8) Make PA Announcement For Procedure Entry NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      RO (Step 9) Control Charging And Letdown Flow To Maintain PZR Level      RO (Step 10) Check RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 GPM and 13 GPM      BOP (Step 11) Determine Failed Instrument Bus (IB) From Any Of The Following:    Available indications    OR    Table Below    3, FR-498, "C" S/G Level      BOP (Step 12) Check Emergency Busses E1 AND E2  ENERGIZED FROM THE 4160V  BUSSES      RO/ BOP (Step 13) Check Affected Instrument Bus  ENERGIZED      CRS (Step 13 RNO) WHEN affected Instrument Bus is Energized, THEN observe the NOTE prior to Step 14 and perform Step 14 NOTE: Step 14 will be performed when power to IB-3 is restored. CRS  Go To Step 15.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page  11 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Instrument Bus 3      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Note prior to Step 14) When a manual/auto control station is reenergized, 15 to 20 sec. is needed for the AUTO light to go out and the manual/auto station to revert to the manual mode.      BOP (Step 14) Restore Affected Controllers On The RTGB To AUTO Mode As Follows: NOTE: This step will be performed AFTER IB-3 is re-energized. Check the affected controller REVERTED TO MANUAL    Depress and release the AUTO pushbutton on the affected controller. NOTE: The BOP may need to manually control S/G levels, and the RO/BOP will need to reset the Steam Dump controller.      RO (Step 15) Check LCV460A & B, LTDN LINE STOP  CLOSED      CRS (Step 15 RNO) IF Instrument Bus 9 is Failed, THEN Go To Step 16. NOTE: Instrument Bus 9 is energized. Observe the NOTE prior to Step 19 and Go To Step 19.      RO/ BOP (Step 19) Check Affected Instrument Bus  ENERGIZED      RO/ BOP (Step 19 RNO) Locally perform the applicable step below:  NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the IB-3 Feeder breaker was tripped inadvertently due to Building Maintenance personnel cleaning in the area. IB1 through IB4 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page  12 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Instrument Bus 3      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    IF the cause is known OR NOT a fault OR suspected damage, THEN attempt to reset and close the open NOTE: The CRS will direct the AO to attempt to re-close the IB-3 Feeder Breaker. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, use: IRF EPSIB3_600 f:CLOSE and report after 1 minute that the IB-3 is re-energized.      BOP (Step 20) Stop All Radioactive Batch Releases      CRS (Step 21) Check Status Of Local Actions:    Check Local Actions Of Step 19 RNO  REQUIRED    Check Local Actions Of Step 19 RNO  ATTEMPTED      RO/ BOP (Step 22) Check Affected Instrument Bus  ENERGIZED NOTE:  IB-3 is energized.      RO (Step 23) Restore RCS Makeup Control To AUTO    Place the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Switch in STOP    Verify the RCS MAKEUP MODE Switch in AUTO    Momentarily place the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Switch to START      RO (Step 24) Restore Rod Control To Automatic As Follows:    Check Power  GREATER THAN 15%    Check Automatic Rod Control  AVAILABLE    Check Tavg  WITHIN 1.5 TO +1.5&deg;F OF TREF Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page  13 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Instrument Bus 3      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Place the Rod Control Selector Switch to A (Automatic)      BOP (Step 25) Check Emergency Busses E1 AND E2  ENERGIZED      BOP (Step 26) Check Emergency Busses E1 AND E2  ENERGIZED FROM THEIR 4160V BUSSES      CRS (Step 27) Implement The EALs NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.      RO/ BOP (Step 28) Check Status Of Instrument Bus 4  ENERGIZED:      BOP (Step 29) Place Turbine Controls In Automatic      RO (Step 30) Determine CCW Pump Status As Follows:    Check CCW Pumps  MORE THAN ONE RUNNING    Check CCW Pumps  MORE THAN ONE REQUIRED    Stop CCW Pumps as necessary using OP306 Section, Operating CCW Pumps, to obtain desired CCW pump status      BOP (Step 31) Check RMS1, RMS2, RMS3, AND RMS4  ALL OPEN Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page  14 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Instrument Bus 3      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 32) Check Affected Instrument Bus  ENERGIZED      RO (Step 33) Check PZR Heater Status  DEENERGIZED      RO (Step 33 RNO) Go To Step 35.      RO (Step 35) Check Normal Letdown  ISOLATED      CRS (Step 35 RNO) Go To Step 37.      BOP (Step 37) Check All Radiation Monitor Alarms  EXTINGUISHED NOTE:  The BOP may implement AOP-005 as time permits, and affect whether or not the RNO is performed.      BOP (Step 37 RNO) Reset Radiation Monitor alarms that are illuminated due to loss of Instrument Bus as follows:    For RMS 1112, 1518, OR 2031, momentarily depress ALARM/RESET Pushbutton. For RMS 19 OR 33, momentarily depress the RESET Pushbutton.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page  15 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Instrument Bus 3      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    For RMS 14 OR 19, contact E&C personnel to reset the monitor(s). NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/Chemistry to address resetting R-14s. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/Chemistry and use: IRF RMS067 f:RESET IRF RMS068 f:RESET IRF RMS069 f:RESET And report that the R-14 monitors have been reset. For RMS32, momentarily depress SAFE/RESET Pushbutton.      BOP (Step 38) Check R11 OR R12  IN SERVICE    RMS1, RMS2, RMS3, and RMS4  OPEN    AND    R11 and R12 Vacuum Pump Operating      BOP (Step 39) Check R20, Fuel Handling Bldg Lower Level Low Range  IN SERVICE      BOP (Step 40) Check R21, Fuel Handling Bldg Upper Level  IN SERVICE      BOP (Step 41) Check Control Room Ventilation  ALIGNED FOR PRESSURIZATION MODE      CRS (Step 41 RNO) Go To Step 43.        RO (Step 43) Check PZR PRV Safety Acoustic Monitor Lights  ILLUMINATED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page  16 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Instrument Bus 3      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      CRS (Step 43 RNO) Go To Step 45.      RO/ BOP (Step 45) Check Instrument Busses 1, 2, 3, AND 4  ENERGIZED FROM THEIR NORMAL SOURCE (As Indicated Below):    IB1: MCC5 (Via E1)    IB2: INVERTER A    IB3: INVERTER B    IB4: MCC6      BOP (Step 46) Check Status of EDGs  START SIGNAL RECEIVED      CRS (Step 46 RNO) Observe the NOTE prior to Step 65 and Go To Step 65.      BOP (Step 65) Check ALL Safety Related Electrical Buses  ENERGIZED      CRS (Step 66) Check Technical Specifications For Applicable LCOs NOTE:  The CRS will address the Technical Specifications. ITS LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources  Operating    ITS LCO 3.8.7, AC Instrument Bus Sources  Operating    ITS LCO 3.8.9, Distribution Systems  Operating      RO (Step 67) Check Annunciator APP005A3, PR DROP ROD  ILLUMINATED      RO (Step 68) Reset Dropped Rod Alarm By Performing The Following:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page  17 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Instrument Bus 3      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Place DROPPED ROD MODE switch for the affected Power Range Drawer to RESET Position    Place DROPPED ROD MODE switch for the affected Power Range Drawer to NORMAL Position    Check Annunciator APP005A3, PR DROP ROD  EXTINGUISHED      RO (Step 69) Check APP006F5, STEAM DUMP ARMED  ILLUMINATED      CRS (Step 69 RNO) Go To Step 71      RO (Step 71) Check APP005F5, AMSAC TROUB/BYPD  ILLUMINATED      BOP (Step 72) Reset AMSAC TROUB/BYPD Alarm By Depressing The SYSTEM RESET Pushbutton On AMSAC Front Panel. NOTE:  The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor use: IRF RPS005 f:RESET      (Step 73) Return To Procedure And Step In Effect      TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.7, AC INSTRUMENT BUS SOURCES - OPERATING      CRS LCO 3.8.7 The following AC Instrument Bus Power Sources shall be OPERABLE:  Inverters A and B, and  Constant Voltage Transformers (CVT) 1 and 2.      CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page  18 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Instrument Bus 3      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS ACTIONS        CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION A.1 is required (When Inverter is NOT powering IB-3). A. One AC Instrument Bus power source inoperable. NOTE: Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems - Operating" with any instrument bus de-energized. A.1 Restore AC Instrument Bus Power Source to OPERABLE status. 24 hours      TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.9, DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS - OPERATING      CRS LCO 3.8.9 Train A and Train B AC, DC, and AC instrument bus electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE.      CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.      CRS ACTIONS        CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION B.1 is required (When IB-3 is de-energized). B. One AC instrument bus subsystem inoperable. B.1 Restore AC instrument bus subsystem to OPERABLE status. 2 hours AND 16 hour from discovery of failure to meet LCO    At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page  19 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
"B" Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW      Following this, the controlling feed flow channel for S/G "B", FT-487, will fail LOW, causing FRV-498 to start to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction," and/or AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure."  The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-026, "Feed Flow (FWF)." Booth Operator Instructions:    ICO CFWXMTFT_487        r:00:30 f:0  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-006-B1, S/G B FW > STM FLOW  RTGB Annunciator APP-006-B2, S/G B STM > FW FLOW  "B" S/G Feed flow lower than Steam flow on FR-488  FRV-488 controller output at 100%  FRV-488 Red status light is LIT, Green status light is OFF  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    NOTE: It is likely that the CRS will place the Turbine in HOLD. Examiner Note: It is possible that the CRS will respond to the symptoms and enter AOP-010 first. However, the crew may recognize the failure and respond by entering AOP-025 first. If so, proceed to AOP-025 section below. AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION    NOTE: The BOP will take Immediate Actions to control FCV-488 in MANUAL prior to procedure implementation. BOP (Step 1) CHECK FRVs  OPERATING PROPERLY (MANUAL OR AUTO): Immediate Action  NOTE: The BOP will control FCV-488 in MANUAL. FCV478    FCV488    FCV498 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page  20 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
"B" Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      BOP (Step 1 RNO) PERFORM the following: Immediate Action    ENSURE FRV for affected S/G(s) in manual control. ATTEMPT to stabilize S/G level using FRV and/or FRV Bypass Valves by matching steam flow with feed flow. STOP any load change in progress. If unable to control S/G level, THEN-..      Critical Task:  Manually control "B" S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level. Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the "B" S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.      RO/ BOP (Step 2) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint  BEING APPROACHED      CRS (Step 2 RNO) IF a Reactor Trip Setpoint is approached, THEN-. GO TO Step 4.      RO (Step 4) CHECK Reactor Power  LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%      CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page  21 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
"B" Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Step 6) GO TO Appropriate Step From Table Below:    FRV Failure To Control - OBSERVE NOTE 58      BOP (Step 58) CHECK S/G Level  AT OR TRENDING TO PROGRAM NOTE: The CRS will likely transition to AOP-025 based on the Note prior to Step 58. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE    NOTE: The BOP will take Immediate Actions to control FCV-488 in MANUAL prior to procedure implementation. CRS (Step 1) GO TO Appropriate Section For Failed Instrument: NOTE: The CRS will select Section D of AOP-025. S/G Feed Flow (FT-487) - SECTION D        (Step 2) IMPLEMENT EALs NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.      (Step 3) RETURN TO Procedure and Step in Effect      AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION D, S/G FEED FLOW, STEAM FLOW OR STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE      BOP (Step 1) CHECK Affected FRV In MAN: Immediate Action  NOTE: The BOP will control FCV-488 in MANUAL. FCV488 (FRV "B")
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page  22 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
"B" Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 1 RNO) PLACE affected FRV in manual. Immediate Action      BOP (Step 2) RESTORE Affected S/G Level To Program Immediate Action    Critical Task:  Manually control "B" S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level. Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the "B" S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.      BOP (Step 3) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint  BEING APPROACHED      CRS (Step 3 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is approached, THEN TRIP the reactor, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. GO TO Step 5.      CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using PA System NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      BOP (Step 6) CHECK Failure  FEED FLOW INSTRUMENT FAILURE      CRS (Step 7) PLACE Affected S/G Feed Flow Selector Switch to the Alternate Channel:    S/G "B" FEED FLOW - FR-488 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page  23 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
"B" Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Failed Channel FT-487 - Position CH486      BOP (Step 8) RESTORE Affected Controller to Automatic:    CHECK S/G level - WITHIN +/-1% OF PROGRAMMED LEVEL NOTE:  The BOP may not have S/G level at programmed, and perform the RNO (Placing affected controller in AUTO when at programmed level). PLACE affected controller in AUTO.      BOP (Step 9) REMOVE Affected Transmitter from Servicing Using OWP-026: NOTE:  The CRS will address OWP-026. CHANNEL FT-487 - OWP FWF-4      OWP-026, FEEDWATER FLOW (FWF) FWF-4, STEAM GENERATOR "B" FEEDWATER FLOW TRANSMITTER FT-487      CRS Address FWF-4      BOP FR-488 FEEDWATER FLOW SELECTOR SWITCH - Selected to 486      BOP DELETE INPUT FT-487 FROM CALO PROCESSING. (FWF0424A)    NOTE:  The CRS will return to AOP-025, Section D. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION D, S/G FEED FLOW, STEAM FLOW OR STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE      BOP (Step 10) REVIEW TS LCOs for applicability:    TS LCO 3.3.1    TS LCO 3.3.2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page  24 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
"B" Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      CRS (Step 11) GO TO Procedure Main Body, Step 2    NOTE:  The CRS will return to the main body of AOP-025. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE      CRS (Step 2) IMPLEMENT EALs NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.      CRS  (Step 3) RETURN TO Procedure And Step In Effect NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page  25 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Load Decrease      Next, the WCCS will call and inform the operator that it has been determined that the SDAFW Pump will not be restored to OPERABLE status within the next two hours as expected, and that station management has directed that the plant be brought to Mode 3 within the next four hours using AOP-038, "Rapid Downpower." Booth Operator Instructions:    Call as the WCCS and state "It has been determined that the SDAFW Pump will not be restored to OPERABLE status within the next two hours as expected, and station management has directed that the plant be brought to Mode 3 within the next four hours using AOP-038, "Rapid Downpower.""  Indications Available:  NA  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER      BOP (Step 1) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using The Plant Page System      RO (Step 2) DETERMINE Corrected Boration And Target Rod Height For Target Power Level Using Most Recently Performed OST947, OPERATIONS REACTIVITY PLAN    Target Load Reduction Rate __%/min    Target Power Level ___    Target Rod Height ___ NOTE: The RO will determine approximately 130 Steps. Corrected Boration ___ NOTE: The RO will determine approximately 350 gallons.      RO (Step 3) CHECK Required Power Reduction Rate  LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 5%/MINUTE      CRS (Step 4) PERFORM Brief Of Control Room Personnel To Include The Following:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page  26 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Load Decrease      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Reason for downpower    Target Power Level    Target Rod Height    Rate of load reduction    Amount of boric acid addition      RO (Step 5) ENERGIZE All Available PZR Heaters    PZR HTR CONTROL GROUP    PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP A    PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP B      RO (Step 6) CHECK Rod Control  IN AUTO      RO (Step 7) INITIATE Boration Using Attachment 1, RCS Boration, While Continuing With This Procedure    Examiner NOTE:  The CRS will assign the RO to perform this action. RO Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1. Other Examiners follow AOP-038 Actions, Step 8, on Page 27. AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER ATTACHMENT 1, RCS BORATION      RO (Step 1) PLACE The RCS MAKEUP MODE Selector Switch In BORATE      RO (Step 2) IF Frequent Boric Acid Transfer Pump Starts Are Anticipated, THEN PLACE Boric Acid Transfer Pump Switch Aligned To BLEND To ON.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page  27 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Load Decrease      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 3) SET YIC113, BORIC ACID TOTALIZER to amount determined in Main Body Step 2      RO (Step 4) Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to START      RO (Step 5) IF Boric Acid flow is NOT achieving the desired effect, THEN PLACE FCV113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, in MAN AND manually Adjust controller FCV113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, using the UP and DOWN pushbuttons      RO (Step 6) WHEN the desired amount of Boric Acid has been added to the RCS OR the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Switch is placed in STOP, THEN ENSURE the following:    FCV113A, BA TO BLENDER, closes. FCV113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, closes. IF in AUTO, THEN operating Boric Acid Pump stops. RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF.      AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER    Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/BOP continue HERE. BOP (Step 8) INITIATE Turbine Load Reduction While Continuing With This Procedure    CHECK EH Turbine Control  IN OPER AUTO    PREPARE For Turbine Load Reduction As Follows:    CHECK IMP IN  ILLUMINATED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page  28 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Load Decrease      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 8.b.1 RNO 1) IF Turbine Load reduction is available using IMP IN, THEN PERFORM the following:    DEPRESS IMP IN pushbutton    CHECK IMP IN light illuminated    CHECK IMP OUT light extinguished      BOP (Step 8.b) SET desired load in the SETTER    SELECT the desired Load Rate    DEPRESS the GO pushbutton to initiate Turbine Load reduction      BOP (Step 9) ADJUST Turbine Load To Control Tavg Within 5&deg;F Of Tref Using One Of The Following:    ADJUST Load Rate    OR    DEPRESS GO and HOLD pushbuttons      CRS/ BOP (Step 10) INITIATE Notification of The Following: NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM/WCC/Communicator to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge. Load Dispatcher of load reduction    E&C to control secondary chemistry    RC for elevated radiation levels in CV Pump Bays and Pipe Alley    Oncall Duty Manager to activate the Event Response Team    E&C for impending 15% power change for I131 sampling within 2 to 6 hours    E&C for impending power reduction greater than 20% terminate zinc injection Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page  29 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Load Decrease      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    NRC within 4 hours      BOP (Step 11) CHECK Auxiliary Boilers  AT LEAST ONE OPERATING      BOP (Step 11 RNO) IF Plant Shutdown is required, THEN NOTIFY AO to start at least one Auxiliary Boiler per OP401, AUXILIARY HEATING SYSTEM. NOTE: The BOP will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.      RO (Step 12) CHECK Tavg  WITHIN 5&deg;F OF Tref      RO (Step 13) CHECK Axial Flux Distribution  WITHIN TARGET BAND      BOP (Step 14) CHECK APP006F5, STEAM DUMP ARMED  EXTINGUISHED      RO (Step 15) CHECK Any Of The Following Conditions  MET:    Target load/power has been reached    Load reduction is no longer required    CRS/SM directs termination of load reduction    STOP Rapid Downpower using Attachment 3, Termination Of Rapid Downpower      At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page  30 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Letdown Line Pressure Control Valve Controller fails CLOSED      During the downpower, the Letdown Pressure Control Valve (PCV-145) controller will fail such that the valve will fail closed. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-D6, LP LTDN LN HI PRESS, and ultimately take manual control of the valve. Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF CVC07 r:2:00 f:100        IOR aoCVCAAD046A r:2:00 f:100        $006_PCV-145_MAN DMF CVC07        $006_PCV-145_MAN DOR aoCVCAAD046A Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-001-D6, LP LTDN LN HI PRESS  RTGB Annunciator APP-001-E6, LP LTDN RELIEF HI TEMP (Subesequent)  PCV-145 CLOSES  Normal Letdown flow indicates "0"  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    NOTE: It is likely that the CRS will place the Turbine in HOLD. APP-001-D6, LP LTDN LN HI PRESS      RO (Step 1) IF controller PC-145 has malfunctioned, THEN TAKE manual control of PC-145. NOTE: The RO will take Manual control of PC-145 and control letdown pressure manually.      RO (Step 2) IF PT-145 has failed, THEN -... NOTE: PT-145 has NOT failed.      RO (Step 3) IF PCV-145 failed, THEN --. NOTE: PCV-145 has NOT failed.      RO (Step 4) IF Letdown is required AND PCV-145 failed, THEN --. NOTE: PCV-145 has NOT failed.      RO (Step 5) IF too many orifices are in service, THEN --.      NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page  31 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE      Shortly afterwards, PZR Pressure transmitter PT-444 will fail HIGH causing the Pzr Spray valves and Pzr PORV to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-019, "Malfunction of RCS pressure Control," and/or AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure."  RCS pressure control will remain in MANUAL for the remainder of the scenario. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.4, "Remote Shutdown System," Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, "RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits," and Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11, "Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs)." Booth Operator Instructions:    ICO RPSXMTPT_444          r:01:00 f:2500  IMF PRS03D f:10 when $006_PCV-455C_OPEN  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-003-C7, PZR PRESS CONTROLLER HI OUTPUT  Narrow Range Pressurizer Pressure rising on PR-444  Master Pressure controller PC-444J demand rising to 100%  Both Pressurizer Spray valves indicate fully OPEN  Pressurizer PORV PCV-455C Red status light is LIT  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    NOTE: It is likely that the CRS will place the Turbine in HOLD. Examiner Note: It is possible that the CRS will respond to the symptoms and enter AOP-019 first. However, the crew may recognize the failure and respond by entering AOP-025 first. If so, proceed to AOP-025 , Step 1, actions on Page 33. NOTE: The RO will likely take action, including closing the PORV Block before the CRS enters the procedure. AOP-019, MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE CONTROL Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page  32 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 1) CHECK Both LTOPP Arming Switches Selected to NORMAL Immediate Action      RO (Step 2) Determine If PZR PORVs should be closed: Immediate Action    Check PZR pressure - LESS THAN 2335 PSIG    ENSURE both PZR PORVs - CLOSED      RO (Step2b RNO) IF any PZR PORV can NOT be closed THEN close its PORV BLOCK Valve. Immediate Action NOTE: PCV-455C will OPEN in about 1 minute.      RO (Step 3) Control the Normal PZR Spray Valves AND PZR Heaters to Restore RCS Pressure to the desired control Band. Immediate Action      CRS (Step 4) Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      RO (Step 5) Check PZR Pressure - UNDER OPERATOR CONTROL      Critical Task:  Manually close the OPEN Pzr Spray Valve(s) and the Block Valve for the Stuck Open PORV before the Reactor trips based on low pressurizer pressure. Safety Significance: failure to close the Spray Valves/PORV Block Valve and stop the pressure transient, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the pressure transient. A failure to stabilize the pressure transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS pressure control.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page  33 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 6) Check Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter PT-444 OR PT-445 - FAILED.      CRS (Step 7) Go To AOP025, RTGB Instrument Failure NOTE: The CRS will transition to AOP-025. Examiner Note: If the CRS addresses AOP-025 rather than AOP-019, follow actions here. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE      CRS (Step 1) GO TO Appropriate Section For Failed Instrument:    PZR PRESSURE (PT-444) - Section C NOTE: The CRS will transition to Section C of AOP-025. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION C, PZR PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE      RO (Step 1) CHECK Both LTOPP Arming Switches - SELECTED TO NORMAL Immediate Action      RO (Step 2) DETERMINE If PZR PORVs should be closed: Immediate Action    CHECK PZR pressure - LESS THAN 2335 PSIG    CHECK both PZR PORVs CLOSED      RO (Step 2b RNO) IF any PZR PORV can NOT be closed, THEN CLOSE associated PORV BLOCK valve. Immediate Action  NOTE: The RO will have previously determined that PCV-455C has failed to CLOSE, and Close the Block Valve.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page  34 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 3) CONTROL PZR Heaters and Spray to restore RCS Pressure to desired Control Band Immediate Action      CRS (Step 4) NOTIFY Plant Personnel of Procedure Entry Using PA System NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      RO (Step 5) CHECK PT-445 - FAILED      RO (Step 5 RNO) PERFORM the following:    ENSURE PC-444J in MAN. ENSURE PZR SPRAY VALVEs are in AUTO. CONTROL PZR pressure with PC-444J.      Critical Task:  Manually close the OPEN Pzr Spray Valve(s) and the Block Valve for the Stuck Open PORV before the Reactor trips based on low pressurizer pressure. Safety Significance: failure to close the Spray Valves/PORV Block Valve and stop the pressure transient, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the pressure transient. A failure to stabilize the pressure transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS pressure control.      RO (Step 6) CHECK Selector Switch PM-444 - SELECTED TO THE OPERABLE CHANNEL    REC 445      RO (Step 6 RNO) SELECT operable channel Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page  35 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Step 7) REVIEW TS LCOs for applicability: NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/I&C to address the instrument failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/I&C. TS LCO 3.3.4    TS LCO 3.4.1    TS LCO 3.4.11      CRS (Step 8) GO TO Procedure Main Body, Step 2 NOTE:  The CRS will return to the main body of AOP-025. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE      CRS (Step 2) IMPLEMENT EALs NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.      CRS (Step 3) RETURN TO Procedure and Step in Effect    NOTE:  The CRS will address Technical Specifications. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.4, REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM      CRS LCO 3.3.4 The Remote Shutdown System Function shall be OPERABLE.      CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3. NOTE: The CRS will determine that only one Pressurizer Pressure instrument is required, and that the other channel is OPERABLE.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page  36 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1, RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE AND FLOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING (DNB) LIMITS      CRS LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for pressurizer pressure, RCS average temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be within the limits specified below:  Pressurizer Pressure 2205 psig      CRS APPLICABILITY: Mode 1      CRS ACTIONS        CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: If RCS pressure lowered to less than 2205 psig, the CRS will determine that ACTION A.1 is required. If so, the operator will likely gallons, followed by a flush of 15 gallons. A. One or more RCS DNB parameters not within limits. B. A.1 Restore RCS DNB parameter(s) to within limit. 2 hours    TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.11, PRESSURIZER POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES (PORVS)      CRS LCO 3.4.11 Each PORV and associated block valve shall be OPERABLE      CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.      CRS ACTIONS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page  37 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION B.1, B.2 and B.3 is required. C. One PORV inoperable and not capable of being manually cycled. B.1 Close associated block valve. AND  B.2 Remove power from associated bock valves. AND  B.3 Restore PORV to OPERABLE status. 1 hour 
 
1 hour 72 hours    NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, move to Events #6-8.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 38 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip      After the Pressure Transmitter has been removed from service, an inadvertent FWIS will occur. Simultaneously with the Rx Trip, the Turbine will fail to TRIP, the Governor Valves will fail to CLOSE manually, and the Main Steamline Isolation signal will fail to auto actuate. The operator will be required to manually CLOSE the MSIVs. Additionally the "A" and "B" MDAFW Pumps will trip immediately after auto start. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."  Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response." However, this transition will be delayed due to a RED condition on the Heat Sink CSF. The operator will perform FRP-H.1, "Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink."  The operator will direct that AFW Pump "C" be placed in service in accordance with OP-402, "Auxiliary Feedwater System," however, the AFW Pump "C" Diesel will fail to start. The scenario will terminate at Step 7 RNO 2.b of FRP-H.1, after the operator has restored feedwater flow from the Main Feedwater System. Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF CFW20A c:20 IMF CFW20B c:20 IMF CFW20C c:20  Indications Available:    All Feed Regulating Valves have CLOSED  The "A" and "B" Main Feedwater Pumps have tripped  The AFW Pumps have started  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION      RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action    Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers - OPEN    Rod position indicators - FULLY INSERTED    Rod Bottom Lights - ILLUMINATED    Neutron Flux - LOWERING      BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action    Both Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED      BOP (Step 2a RNO) Manually TRIP Turbine. Immediate Action Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 39 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    IF Turbine will NOT trip, THEN manually RUNBACK Turbine at maximum rate UNTIL ALL Governor valves are CLOSED. IF Turbine can NOT be runback, THEN manually CLOSE MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves.      BOP (Step 2.b) All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves - CLOSED      Critical Task:  Manually Close the MSIVs Before an ORANGE Path Challenge Develops to Either the Subcriticality or the Integrity CSF or Before Transition to ECA-2.1, Whichever Happens First  Safety Significance:  Failure to trip the main turbine under the postulated plant conditions causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, such an omission constitutes a failure by the operator to "demonstrate the ability to take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety. The situation described in the plant conditions is effectively a large steamline break downstream of the MSIVs. This "effective steamline break" is also located downstream of the main turbine stop valves, which cannot be closed by manually tripping the turbine. Failure to perform the critical task results in uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs and in uncontrolled cooldown of the RCS, both of which are unnecessary.      BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power to AC EMERGENCY BUSSES: Immediate Action    CHECK Bus E-1 OR E AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED    CHECK Bus E-1 AND E BOTH ENERGIZED      RO/ BOP (Step 4) CHECK SI Status: Immediate Action    CHECK if SI is actuated:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 40 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    SI annunciator - ANY ILLUMINATED    OR    SI equipment - AUTO STARTED        (Step 4a RNO) CHECK if SI is required: Immediate Action    PZR pressure LESS THAN 1715 PSIG    OR    Containment pressure GREATER THAN 4 PSIG    OR    Steam Line P bistables ILLUMINATED    OR    High Steam Flow with Low Tavg OR Low Steam Pressure bistables ILLUMINATED    IF SI is required, THEN manually ACUTATE BOTH Trains of SI. IF SI is NOT required, THEN PERFORM the following:    RESET SPDS AND INITIATE monitoring of Critical Safety Function Status Trees. GO TO EOP-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response, Step 1. NOTE: The CRS will transition to FRP-H.1 due to the Red Path on Heat Sink. FRP-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK      RO/ BOP (Step 1) CHECK If Secondary Heat Sink is required:    CHECK RCS pressure - GREATER THAN ANY NON-FAULTED S/G PRESSURE    CHECK RCS Hot Leg temperatures - GREATER THAN 350&deg;F Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 41 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      RO/ BOP (Step 2) CHECK If RCS Bleed AND Feed is required:    CHECK S/G Wide Range level in ANY TWO S/Gs -LESS THAN 13% [16%]      CRS (Step 2a RNO) OBSERVE CAUTION prior to Step 3 AND GO TO Step 3.      BOP (Step 3) TRY to establish AFW Flow to at least one S/G:    CHECK S/G(s) Blowdown AND Blowdown Sample Valves - CLOSED    CHECK Control Room indications for cause of AFW failure:    CST level    Steam Driven AFW pump, Steam Shutoff valves    Motor Driven AFW pump    AFW valve alignment  BOP (Step 3.c) TRY to restore AFW flow:    CHECK CST level - AVAILABLE AND GREATER THAN 13%    CHECK Steam Driven AFW Pump - RUNNING NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO. The SDAFW Pump will NOT be restored. Provide cues as required.      BOP (Step 3.c.2 RNO) Manually OPEN Steam Driven AFW Pump Steam Shutoff valve(s):    V1-8A    V1-8B Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 42 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    V1-8C    If Steam Driven AFW Pump Steam Shutoff valves can NOT be opened manually, THEN locally OPEN valves while CONTINUING WITH this procedure.      BOP (Step 3.c.3) CHECK Motor Driven AFW Pump(s) - RUNNING      BOP (Step 3.c.3 RNO) IF power is available, THEN PERFORM the following:    RESET SI. IF SI will NOT RESET, THEN- NOTE: SI will RESET. PLACE available Motor Driven AFW Pump control switch(es) to STOP. START available Motor Driven AFW Pump(s). IF available Motor Driven AFW Pump(s) is NOT running, THEN DISPATCH Operator to perform Attachment 2, Local Start of Motor Driven AFW Pump. NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO. The MDAFW Pump will NOT be restored. Provide cues as required. IF pump(s) NOT available, THEN TRY to restore Motor Driven AFW Pump(s) while CONTINUING WITH this procedure.      BOP (Step 3.c.4) CHECK AFW Valves - PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT    AFW Header Discharge valves - FULL OPEN    AFW Header Section valves - FULL OPEN    Steam Driven AFW pump Discharge valves - FULL OPEN IF PUMP RUNNING Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 43 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      BOP (Step 3.c.5) CHECK total feed flow to S/Gs - GREATER THAN 300 GPM      CRS (Step 3.c.5 RNO) GO TO Step 3.c.7      CRS/BOP (Step 3.c.7) PLACE AFW Train C in service using OP-402, Auxiliary Feedwater System, Section titled Rapid Alignment of AFW Pump C as Directed by FRP-H.1 NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO. Wait 5 minutes and report that the Train C AFW Diesel Generator will NOT start.      BOP (Step 3.d) CHECK total feed flow to S/Gs - GREATER THAN 300 GPM      BOP (Step 3.d RNO) IF ANY feed flow to at least one S/G is verified, THEN-. CRS IF feed flow is NOT verified, THEN GO TO Step 4.      RO (Step 4) STOP ALL RCPs      RO (Step 5) ESTABLISH Instrument Air to CV:    CHECK APP-002-F7, INSTR AIR HDR LO PRESS alarm - EXTINGUISHED    RESET IA PCV-1716, INSTRUMENT AIR ISO TO CV    CHECK IA PCV-1716 - OPEN      BOP (Step 6) TRY to establish Main Feedwater Flow to at least one S/G:    CHECK Condensate System - IN SERVICE Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 44 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK Feed Reg Bypass Valves - OPEN    FCV-479    FCV-489    FCV-499      BOP (Step 6.b RNO) PERFORM the following:    RESET Feedwater Isolation:    RESET SI. NOTE: SI will RESET. IF SI will NOT RESET, THEN-    PLACE ALL Feedwater Isolation Key Switches to OVRD/RESET. OPEN Feed Reg Bypass Valves:    FCV-479    FCV-489    FCV-499      BOP (Step 6.c) ESTABLISH Main Feedwater flow:    CHECK FW HDR SECTION valves - CLOSED    V2-6A    V2-6B    V2-6C      BOP (Step 6.c.1 RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as necessary.      BOP (Step 6.c.2) START one Main Feedwater Pump    CHECK Feedwater Flow - ESTABLISHED TO AT LEAST ONE S/G Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 45 of 46          Event
 
== Description:==
Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      BOP (Step 7) CHECK S/G Levels:    CHECK S/G Narrow Range level in at least one S/G - GREATER THAN 9% [18%]      BOP (Step 7.a RNO) IF feed flow to at least on S/G is established, THEN PERFORM the following:    MAINTAIN feed flow to restore S/G Narrow Range level to GREATER THAN 9% [18%]. PERFORM the following:    RESET SPDS. RETURN TO procedure AND step in effect.      Critical Task:  Establish Feedwater Flow Into at Least One S/G Before RCS Bleed and Feed is Required  Safety Significance:  Failure to establish feedwater flow to any SG results in the operator's having to rely upon the lower-priority action of establishing RCS bleed and feed to minimize core uncovery. This constitutes incorrect performance that fails to prevent degradation of any barrier to fission product release. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.
NRC SCENARIO N16-1-3 TURNOVER SHEET  1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life: EOL b) Reactor Power: 68% for the past 13 hours c) Turbine Load: 502 MWe  d) Boron Concentration: 144 ppm e) Rod Height: 135 CB 'D' f) RCS Pressure: 2235 psig g) PZR Level: 41.8%  h) Xenon: Peak  2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. # Description LCO 3.7.4 Condition C  3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) The SDAFW Pump is OOS. Maintenance reports that this pump will be OPERABLE in 2 hours, and station management has directed that the initiation of the shutdown be delayed 2 hours. 4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a) None 5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a) "A" & "B" MDAFW pump 6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a) TI-471, PRT Temperature is OOS (I&C Investigating). b) RTGB Annunciator APP-008-C3, "EMERG OIL PMP OVLD," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). 7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a) PROTECTED 8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a) Maintain Steady-State conditions b) Monitor the completion of Maintenance of the SDAFW Pump 9. TURNOVER INFORMATION  a) The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. 10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a) IAW OST-947 data 11. RISK  a) GREEN 
 
PROGRAM: Robinson Operations Training  MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam    Scenario N16-1-4   
 
==REFERENCES:==
: 1. APP-003, "RCS & Makeup Systems" (Rev 54) 2. AOP-003, "Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control" (Rev 20) 3. OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power" (Rev 62) 4. OP-301, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)" (Rev 112) 5. APP-001, "Miscellaneous NSSS" (Rev 60) 6. AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure" (Rev 24) 7. OWP-025, "Steam Generator Pressure (SGP)" (Rev 15) 8. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation" (Amendment 176) 9. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.3, "Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation" (Amendment 203) 10. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, "Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation" (Amendment 176) 11. OWP-011, "Nuclear Instrumentation (NI)"  (Rev 24) 12. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation" (Amendment 176) 13. AOP-007, "Turbine Trip Below P-8" (Rev 16) 14. EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection"  (Rev 6) 15. CSFST, "Critical Safety Function Status Trees" (Rev 7) 16. FRP-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Power generation- ATWS" (Rev 22) 17. EOP-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation" (Rev 3) 18. FRP-P.1, "Response to  Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock" (Rev 19)  Validation Time: 105 minutes Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4  Facility: HB Robinson Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners:  Operators: (SRO)    (RO)    (BOP)  Initial Conditions: The plant is at 25% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "A" SI Pump is OOS. The "B" SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. PI-1616, SW North Header Pressure, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-007-C3, "FW PMP A LO FLOW TRIP," has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.              Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*  Event Description  1 1 C-RO C-SRO "A" Primary Water Pump trips during Dilution 2 NA R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Raise Power  3  2 C-RO C-SRO Letdown Temperature Controller TCV-144 fails CLOSED/Divert Valve TCV-143 Fails to DIVERT 4 3 I-BOP I(TS)-SRO Main Steam Line "C" Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW 5 4  N-BOP I(TS)-SRO Power Range NI-44 Upper Detector fails HIGH 6 5 C-BOP C-SRO Low Turbine Oil Pressure/Failure of Auto Turbine Trip 7 6 M-RO M-BOP M-SRO Power Range NI-41 Control Power Fuse Blows/ATWS 8 7 C-BOP MOV-350 fails to OPEN  9 8 M-RO M-BOP M-SRO "B" SG SLB Inside CV * (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,    (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4  HB Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #4  The plant is at 25% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "A" SI Pump is OOS. The "B" SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. PI-1616, SW North Header Pressure, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-007-C3, "FW PMP A LO FLOW TRIP," has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.                                Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will attempt to raise power to 100% using OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power," and OP-301, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)."  During the first dilution, the "A" Primary Water Pump will trip. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-003-E5, "MAKEUP WATER DEV," and/or AOP-003, "Malfunction of Reactor makeup Control."  The operator will place the "B" Primary Water Pump in service and continue with the startup. After this, the operator will raise power to 100% using OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power," and OP-301, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)."  During the power increase Letdown Temperature Controller, TCV-144, will fail CLOSED causing letdown temperature to rise above 135&deg;F. Simultaneously, Divert Valve TCV-143, will fail to divert letdown flow to the VCT. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-A6, "LTDN FLOW HI TEMP DEMIN BYPD," divert letdown flow to the VCT, take MANUAL control of TCV-144 to stabilize letdown temperature, and return letdown to the VCT.
Following this, Main Steam Line "C" Pressure Transmitter, PT-495, will fail LOW. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure."  The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-025, "Steam Generator Pressure (SGP)."  The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation," and Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, "Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation."  Next, Power Range, NI-44, Upper Detector will fail HIGH. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-011, "Nuclear Instrumentation (NI)."  The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation."    Shortly afterwards, an oil leak will develop on the Main Turbine. The operator will respond in accordance with various APP-008, SW, CW & TURB GEN AUX, alarms, and ultimately enter AOP-007, "Turbine Trip Below P-8."  When the Main Turbine Trips one Turbine Stop Valve and one Turbine Governor Valve will remain OPEN, and the operator will need to manually TRIP the Turbine. Subsequently, the Control Power fuse for Power Range channel N41 will blow causing an automatic reactor trip signal to be generated, however, the reactor will fail to TRIP both automatically and manually (ATWS). The operator will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and attempt to manually trip the reactor. When this fails, the operator will enter FRP-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation- ATWS."  While in FRP-S.1, Boric Acid to Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4  Charging Pump Suction Valve MOV-350 will fail CLOSED. The operator will direct a local trip of the reactor, drive rods in manually, and align the suction of the Charging Pumps to the RWST. Upon completion of FRP-S.1, a "B" Steam Line will rupture inside Containment (over 10 minutes), and the operator will re-enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."  Ultimately, the operator will transition to EOP-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation," to isolate the flow into and out of the "B" Steam Generator and then terminate Safety Injection. However, an Orange and/or Red Path will exist on the RCS Critical Safety Function, and the operator will transition to FRP-P.1, "Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition."
The scenario will terminate at Step 12 of FRP-P.1, when the operator stops SI Pumps. Critical Tasks:  Manually control "C" S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level.
Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the "C" S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control. Insert Negative Reactivity into the Core by Inserting Control Rods Manually Prior to Locally Tripping the Reactor (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical or returns to a critical condition. Performance of the critical task would make the reactor subcritical and provide sufficient shutdown margin to prevent (or at least minimize the power excursion associated with) any subsequent return to criticality. Failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance which fails to prevent incorrect reactivity control. In the scenario postulated by the plant conditions, failure to insert negative reactivity by inserting control rods can result in the needless continuation of an extreme or a severe challenge to the subcriticality CSF. Although the challenge was not initiated by the operator (was not initiated by operator error), continuation of the challenge is a result of the operator's failure to insert negative reactivity. Isolate Feedwater Flow Into and Steam Flow From the Faulted S/G Before a Transition Out of E-2 Occurs (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Also, depending upon the plant conditions, it could constitute a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Failure to isolate a faulted SG can result in challenges to the Integrity, Subcriticality and Containment CSFs. Stop the High Head SI Pumps Before a Transition Out of FRP-P.1 Occurs (EOP-Based)
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4  Safety Significance:  Failure to stop the high head SI Pumps results in challenges to the Integrity CSF; and could unnecessarily result in a mechanical failure due to Pressurized Thermal Shock.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4  SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS              Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  Sim. Setup Reset to Temp IC 611  T = 0 Malfunctions:  "A" SI Pump Pump OOS:  IRF EPS480E1_130 f: RACK_OUT ("A" SI Pump OOS)  IRF EPS480E1_124 f: RACK_IN ("B" SI Pump Racked IN to E-1)  PLACE CAPs as follows:  RED Cap over "A" SI Control Switch  PI-1616 SW North Header Pressure indication OOS  IOR aoSWSDOD024A f:0  Place WHITE DOT on PI-1616  RTGB Annunciator APP-007-C3 failed OFF  IMF ANNXN07C03 f:ALARM_OFF  Place WHITE DOT on APP-007-C3 Insert the following:  $006_MANUAL_TURB_TRIP  DMF TUR05B (Stop Valve closes on Manual Turb Trip)  $006_MANUAL_TURB_TRIP  DMF TUR05C (Gov Valve closes on Manual Turb Trip)  $006_TURBINE_TRIP IMF CRF02 (Rods Fail in AUTO on Turbine Trip)  IMF ANNXN05E02 f:ALARM_OFF (Rods Fail in AUTO on Turbine Trip)  $006_RODS_IN_MAN DMF CRF02 (Rods Fail in AUTO on Turbine Trip)  $006_RODS_IN_MAN IOR diRPSBOI063 c:1 f:DE_PRSSD (Rods Fail in AUTO on Turbine Trip)  IMF RPS01A f:FAILURE_TO_OPEN, BOTH (ATWS on SLB)  IMF RPS01B f:FAILURE_TO_OPEN, BOTH (ATWS on SLB)  IOR diCVCAOI731 f:AS-IS (MOV-350 fails to OPEN)  Place the Simulator in RUN and ACKNOWLEDGE all alarms. Perform Attachment 2 (Simulator Setup For Exams) of TAP-411.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4    Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  Crew Briefing  1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements  2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew. 3. Provide the crew with the following:  Copy of OP-105 marked up for power increase  Copy of Section 8.2.7 of OP-301  Copy of Technical Specifications/Basis  4. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms. T-0 Begin Familiarization Period  At direction of examiner Execute Lesson Plan for Simulator Scenario N16-1-4. At direction of examiner  Event 1 IMF CVC06A "A" Primary Water Pump trips during Dilution  The crew will initiate upon restoration of dilution capability  Event 2 Raise Power At direction of examiner  Event 3 IMF CCW08 r:01:00 f:85 IOR diCVCAAI047 f:DEMIN $006_TC-144_MAN DMF CCW08  Letdown Temperature Controller TCV-144 fails CLOSED/Divert Valve TCV-143 Fails to DIVERT  Note: The Booth Instructor will need to DOR diCVCAAI047 when the operator places TCV-143 Control Switch to VCT. At direction of examiner Event 4  ICO SGNXMTPT_495 r:01:15 f:0  Main Steam Line "C" Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW  At direction of examiner  Event 5  IMF NIS07G f:70  Power Range NI-44 Upper Detector fails HIGH Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4    Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  At direction of examiner Event 6  IMF TUR14  r:01:00  f:100 IMF TUR05B f:100 IMF TUR05C f:AS-IS  Low Turbine Oil Pressure/Failure of Auto Turbine Trip At direction of examiner Event 7 IMF NIS12A f:CONTROL  Power Range NI-41 Control Power Fuse Blows/ATWS  NOTE: The ATWS is inserted at T=0  Post-Rx Trip  Event 8 IOR diCVCAOI731 f:AS-IS  MOV-350 fails to OPEN  NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0  Post-Rx Trip  Event 9 IMF MSS01B r:10:00 f:9.95E6  "B" SG SLB Inside CV NOTE: Inserted when the crew exits FRP-S.1 and transitions to EOP-E-0.      Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page  10 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
"A" Primary Water Pump trips during Dilution      Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will attempt to raise power to 100% using OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power," and OP-301, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)."  During the first dilution, the "A" Primary Water Pump will trip. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-003-E5, "MAKEUP WATER DEV," and/or AOP-003, "Malfunction of Reactor makeup Control."  The operator will place the "B" Primary Water Pump in service and continue with the startup. Booth Operator Instructions:    After 10 gallons of Primary Water has been added to the RCS IMF CVC06A  Indications Available:    "A" PW Pump Red status light is OFF, Green status light is LIT  Primary Water Totalizer YIC-114 stops beeping during a dilution  Primary Water Totalizer YIC-114 stops digitally counting during a dilution    RTGB Annunciator APP-003-E5, MAKEUP WATER DEV, alarms within 45 seconds  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    NOTE: The crew will initiate a Turbine Load Increase. OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER      RO (Step 5) Maintain Tave within 5&deg;F of Tref using a combination of Control Rods and Boron Concentration changes. NOTE: The RO will likely place Control Rods in MANUAL. OP-301, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS) SECTION 8.2.7, RCS QUICK DILUTION CHECKLIST      RO (Step 1) This revision has been verified to be the latest revision available.      RO (Step 2) DETERMINE the amount of water to add to the RCS and if applicable, the expected change in RCS temperature AND Reactor Power. NOTE: The RO will determine that several 200-300 gallon batches of water must be added.      RO (Step 3) OBTAIN an independent check of the volume of water required.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page  11 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
"A" Primary Water Pump trips during Dilution      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 4) OBTAIN permission from the CRS OR the SM to add the amount of water previously determined, including the expected change in RCS temperature AND Reactor Power.      RO (Step 5) IF flow adjustment is desired, THEN adjust FCV-114A, PRIMARY WTR FLOW DILUTE MODE, potentiometer to obtain desired flow rate.      RO (Step 6) PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE selector switch in the DILUTE position.      RO (Step 7) SET YIC-114, PRIMARY WTR TOTALIZER to the desired quantity.      RO (Step 8) IF two letdown orifices are in service and it is desired to divert flow to the HUT, THEN- NOTE: Two orifices will be in service.      RO (Step 9) Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to the START position. Booth Instructor : After 10 gallons of Primary Water has been added to the RCS IMF CVC06A    Examiner NOTE: The CRS may enter AOP-003 directly. If so, move forward to Page 12. APP-003-E5, MAKEUP WATER DEV      RO (Step 1) IF alarm is due to intentional operator action, THEN-.. NOTE: The alarm is NOT due to intentional operator action.      RO (Step 2) IF alarm is due to Primary Water Pump Trip, THEN perform the following:    Start the Primary Water Pump currently selected to STOP Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page  12 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
"A" Primary Water Pump trips during Dilution      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Place the control switch for the Primary Water Pump that tripped to STOP NOTE: Once the "B" PW Pump is started, the RO will need to reset the Makeup System to restart the dilution.      RO (Step 3) IF the alarm is due to a Malfunction of Makeup Control, THEN refer to AOP-003, Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control. Examiner NOTE: The CRS may not address AOP-003 if APP-003-E5 is used to place the "B" PW in service. If so, the crew will continue to load increase (Event 2). NOTE:  The CRS may dispatch an AO to check the "A" PW Pump. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and after 1 minute report that the "A" PW Pump Breaker has tripped - There is an acrid odor near the breaker. AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL    NOTE: This AOP-003 script is written assuming the "B" PW Pump is started upon entry. If not, the AOP will start the "B" PW Pump. RO (Step 1) Check For Failure Of A Level Transmitter As Follows: NOTE: There is no VCT Level Transmitter failure. Obtain a VCT level for LT115 using ERFIS    PT ID CHL0115A    Obtain a VCT level for LT112 using ERFIS    PT ID CHL0112A    Check VCT level indicators  OSCILLATING LEVEL DEVIATION OBSERVED      CRS (Step 1.c RNO) Go To Step 1.e Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page  13 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
"A" Primary Water Pump trips during Dilution      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 1.e) Check VCT level deviation between LT112 and LT115  GREATER THAN 8 INCHES (13%)      RO (Step 1.e RNO) Go To Step 6.      CRS (Step 6) Make PA Announcement For Procedure Entry NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      CRS (Step 7) Implement The EALs NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.      RO (Step 8) Check VCT Level  LESS THAN 12.5 INCHES (21%)      RO (Step 8 RNO) IF VCT level lowers to less than 12.5 inches (21%), THEN perform Steps 9 and 10. NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.      CRS Go To Step 11.      RO (Step 11) Check VCT Level  LESS THAN 20 INCHES (33%)      CRS (Step 11 RNO) Go To Step 21.      RO (Step 21) Check VCT Level  LESS THAN 51.5 INCHES (86%)      RO (Step 22) Verify Charging And Letdown Flows Are Normal For Plant Conditions      RO (Step 23) Check APP003D5, BA FLOW DEV  ILLUMINATED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page  14 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
"A" Primary Water Pump trips during Dilution      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Step 23 RNO) Go To Step 28.      RO (Step 28) Check APP003E5, MAKEUP WATER DEV  ILLUMINATED NOTE: If the Makeup System has not been reset, APP-003-E5 will be ILLUMINATED.      RO (Step 29) Check Cause Of Alarm  DUE TO INTENTIONAL OPERATOR ACTION      RO (Step 29 RNO) Perform the following:    Verify CLOSED FCV113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT    Verify CLOSED FCV114B, BLENDED MU TO VCT. Go To ATTACHMENT 4, PRIMARY WATER DEVIATION. NOTE: The CRS will transition to Attachment 4 of AOP-003. AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL ATTACHMENT 4, PRIMARY WATER DEVIATION      RO (Step 1) Check Primary Water Flow Demand Signal  EXISTS      RO (Step 2) Check Primary Water Pump Selected To Auto  RUNNING NOTE: The "B" PW Pump may be running if started using APP-003-E5. If so, it is selected for AUTO, and it is running prompting the CRS to move to Step 3 on next page. The "B" PW Pump may be stopped. If so, the Step 2 RNO will be performed.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page  15 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
"A" Primary Water Pump trips during Dilution      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 2 RNO) Perform the following: Examiner NOTE: This step will be performed if the "A" PW Pump is selected for Auto. If the "B" PW is selected for AUTO and running, the crew will perform a slightly different path through Attachment 4, and return to the main body of AOP-003 at Step 36 instead of Step 37. Place control switch for the selected Primary Water Pump to START. NOTE: The crew will likely not attempt to start the "A" PW Pump. IF Primary Water Pump starts, THEN-.. IF Primary Water Pump did NOT start, THEN perform the following:    Momentarily place the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Switch to STOP. Place the alternate Primary Water Pump Control Switch to AUTO. NOTE: The crew will start the "B" PW Pump. Verify FCV113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, Control Switch in AUTO. Verify FCV114B, BLENDED MU TO VCT, Control Switch in AUTO. Momentarily place the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Switch to START. Contact I&C to investigate and repair failure of Primary Water Pump to start. Go To the Main Body, Step 37, of this procedure. Examiner NOTE: Move forward to Step 37 on Page 16.      RO (Step 3) Check Primary Water Flow Indicated On One Of The Following: NOTE: The crew will perform this step if the "B" PW Pump is already running. Flow Recorder FR113    OR    Primary Water Totalizer YIC114      CRS (Step 3 RNO) Go To Step 12.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page  16 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
"A" Primary Water Pump trips during Dilution      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 12) Check FCV114A, PW TO BLENDER  CLOSED NOTE: FCV-114A is OPEN.      CRS (Step 12 RNO) Go To Step 19.      RO (Step 19) Place FCV114B, BLENDED MU TO VCT, Control Switch in OPEN      RO (Step 20) Check FCV114B, BLENDED MU TO VCT  OPEN      BOP (Step 21) Locally Check Primary Water Pump Discharge Pressure  GREATER THAN 80 PSIG      CRS (Step 22) Contact Plant Operations Staff For Guidance In Determining The Cause Of The Primary Water Deviation      CRS (Step 23) Go To The Main Body, Step 36, Of This Procedure      AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL      RO (Step 36) Borate The RCS As Required Using OP301, Chemical And Volume Control System (CVCS), section titled Operation of RCS Makeup System for Automatic Makeup, Dilution, Boration, and Alternate Dilute. NOTE: The crew will return from Attachment 4 here if the "B" PW Pump was running upon entry into Attachment 4.      RO (Step 37) Check Dilution  REQUIRED NOTE: The crew will return from Attachment 4 here if the "B" PW Pump was started in Attachment 4.      CRS (Step 37 RNO) Go To Step 40.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page  17 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
"A" Primary Water Pump trips during Dilution      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Step 40) Check Technical Specifications, Section 3.4.17, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS), For Applicable LCO NOTE: Technical Specification LCO 3.4.17 is MET.      CRS (Step 41) Return To Procedure And Step In Effect    NOTE: The dilution should be restored or re-initiated. When the dilution is re-initiated move to Event #2.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page  18 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Raise Power      After this, the operator will raise power to 100% using OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power," and OP-301, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)." Booth Operator Instructions:    NA  Indications Available:  NA    Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER      RO (Step 5) Maintain Tave within 5&deg;F of Tref using a combination of Control Rods and Boron Concentration changes. NOTE:  The RO may withdrawal control rods. OP-301, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS) SECTION 8.2.7, RCS QUICK DILUTION CHECKLIST    NOTE: The RO may perform this section more than once during the power ascension. RO (Step 1) This revision has been verified to be the latest revision available.      RO (Step 2) DETERMINE the amount of water to add to the RCS and if applicable, the expected change in RCS temperature AND Reactor Power. NOTE: The RO will determine that several 200-300 gallon batches of water must be added.      RO (Step 3) OBTAIN an independent check of the volume of water required.      RO (Step 4) OBTAIN permission from the CRS OR the SM to add the amount of water previously determined, including the expected change in RCS temperature AND Reactor Power.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page  19 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Raise Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 5) IF flow adjustment is desired, THEN adjust FCV-114A, PRIMARY WTR FLOW DILUTE MODE, potentiometer to obtain desired flow rate.      RO (Step 6) PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE selector switch in the DILUTE position.      RO (Step 7) SET YIC-114, PRIMARY WTR TOTALIZER to the desired quantity.      RO (Step 8) IF two letdown orifices are in service and it is desired to divert flow to the HUT, THEN- NOTE: Two orifices will be in service.      RO (Step 9) Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to the START position.      RO (Step 10) IF LCV-115A is in AUTO, THEN ENSURE proper operation of LCV-115A, VCT/HLDP TK DIV valve.      RO (Step 11) IF any of the following conditions occur, THEN momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the STOP position:    Unanticipated Rod Motion    Primary Water addition exceeds the desired value      RO (Step 12) WHEN the desired amount of Primary Water has been added to the RCS, THEN ENSURE the following:    FCV-114A, PW TO BLENDER, closes. FCV-114B, BLENDED MU TO VCT, closes.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page  20 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Raise Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    IF in Auto, THEN the operating Primary Water Pump stops. The RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF. IF desired, THEN ENSURE LCV-115A, VCT/HLDP TK DIV valve control switch in AUTO.      RO (Step 13) RETURN the RCS Makeup System to automatic as follows:    ENSURE FCV-114A, PRIMARY WTR FLOW DILUTE MODE is in AUTO. PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE switch in the AUTO position. Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the START position.      RO (Step 14) RECORD, in AUTO LOG, as indicated by PRIMARY WATER TOTALIZER, YIC-114 total amount of Primary Water added during the dilution.      RO (Step 15) MONITOR parameters for the expected change in reactivity AND inform the CRS OR the SM the results of the dilution.      OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER      BOP (Step 6) IF EH Turbine Control is in OPER AUTO, THEN raise turbine load as follows:    Adjust the SETTER indication using the desired load. Use continue the rise in load.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page  21 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Raise Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 7) IF EH Turbine Control is in TURB MANUAL, THEN-.. NOTE: The Turbine is in OPER AUTO.      CRS (Step 8) IF Heater Drain Tank suspended solids are greater than 25 ppb, THEN-.. NOTE: From Turnover it is noted that HDT Suspended Solids are < 25 ppb.      CRS (Step 9) WHEN Heater Drain Tank suspended solids are less than or equal to 25 ppb, THEN perform the following while continuing with this procedure:  BOP  Start a Heater Drain Pump. NOTE: The BOP will start one HDP. Ensure Quenching Valve control switches on QUENCHING VALVES CONTROL PANEL are placed in AUTO: NOTE: The CRS/BOP may contact an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, use IRF CFW102 f:AUTO and report after 1 minute that the BOTH valves are in AUTO. FCV-1597    FCV-1596    Locally check Quenching Valves are CLOSED: NOTE: The CRS/BOP may contact an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the BOTH valves are CLOSED. FCV-1597    FCV-1596    Check proper operation of the following: NOTE: The CRS/BOP may contact an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the ALL valves are operating properly. LC-1530    LCV-1530A Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page  22 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Raise Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    LCV-1530B      After the 1st Dilution and MWe raised by 15-20 MWe, and at the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page  23 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Letdown Temperature Controller TCV-144 fails CLOSED/Divert Valve TCV-143 Fails to DIVERT      During the power increase Letdown Temperature Controller, TCV-144, will fail CLOSED causing letdown temperature to rise above 135&deg;F. Simultaneously, Divert Valve TCV-143, will fail to divert letdown flow to the VCT. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-A6, "LTDN FLOW HI TEMP DEMIN BYPD," divert letdown flow to the VCT, take MANUAL control of TCV-144 to stabilize letdown temperature, and return letdown to the VCT. Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF CCW08 r:01:00 f:85 IOR diCVCAAI047 f:DEMIN $006_TC-144_MAN DMF CCW08  NOTE: The malfunction takes 2-3 minutes to fully develop  NOTE: The Booth Instructor will need to DOR diCVCAAI047 when the operator places TCV-143 Control Switch to VCT. Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-001-A6, LTDN FLOW HI TEMP DEMIN BYPD  TCV-144 Controller demand is rising  NRHX Outlet Temperature (TI-144) is rising  TCV-143 Red status light is LIT with Control Switch in AUTO  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    NOTE: It is likely that the BOP will go to HOLD on the Turbine. APP-001-A6, LTDN FLOW HI TEMP DEMIN BYPD      RO (Step 1) IF Letdown Temperature is greater than 135&deg;F, THEN ENSURE controller TC-143 is diverted to the VCT. NOTE: The RO will divert TCV-143 to the VCT. Booth Instructor use DOR diCVCAAI047 WHEN the operator places TCV-143 Control Switch to VCT.      RO (Step 2) IF CCW flow to the Non-regenerative Heat Exchanger is low, THEN RAISE Component Cooling Water flow using TC-144. NOTE: The RO will manually adjust controller to maintain temperature at 100-130&deg;F on TI-143.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page  24 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Letdown Temperature Controller TCV-144 fails CLOSED/Divert Valve TCV-143 Fails to DIVERT      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 3) IF letdown flow is high, THEN REDUCE Letdown flow. NOTE: It is likely that control of TCV-144 will stabilize the event, and Letdown will NOT need to be reduced.        NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/Chemistry to request a Demin effluent sample prior to placing TCV-143 back to the DEMIN position. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/CHEMISTRY, wait 20 minutes and report that the Demin effluent is acceptable to be placed in operation.        NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/I&C to address the Controller failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/I&C.        NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief, and THEN re-commence the up-power. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page  25 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Main Steam Line "C" Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW      Following this, Main Steam Line "C" Pressure Transmitter, PT-495, will fail LOW. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-025, "RTGB Instrument Failure."  The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-025, "Steam Generator Pressure (SGP)."  The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation," and Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, "Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation." Booth Operator Instructions:    ICO SGNXMTPT_495 r:01:15 f:0  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-006-A4, STM LINE HI P  Main Steam Pressure indicator PI-495 is lowering  "C" FRV controller output is lowering  Feed Flow to "C" S/G is lowering  Steam Flow to "C" S/G is lowering  "C" S/G Narrow Range Level is lowering  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    NOTE: It is likely that the BOP will go to HOLD on the Turbine. AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION    Examiner NOTE: The CRS may go to AOP-025 directly. If so, go to AOP-025 Step 1 actions on Page 27. BOP (Step 1) CHECK FRVs  OPERATING PROPERLY (MANUAL OR AUTO): Immediate Action NOTE: FCV-498 in NOT operating properly in AUTO. FCV478    FCV488    FCV498      BOP (Step 1 RNO) PERFORM the following: Immediate Action NOTE: The BOP will control FCV-498 in MANUAL. ENSURE FRV for affected S/G(s) in manual control.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page  26 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Main Steam Line "C" Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    ATTEMPT to stabilize S/G level using FRV and/or FRV Bypass Valves by matching steam flow with feed flow. STOP any load change in progress. If unable to control S/G level, THEN--      Critical Task:  Manually control "C" S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level. Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the "C" S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.      RO/ BOP (Step 2) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint  BEING APPROACHED      CRS (Step 2 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is approached, THEN-. GO TO Step 4.      RO (Step 4) CHECK Reactor Power  LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%      CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      CRS (Step 6) GO TO Appropriate Step From Table Below:    FRV Failure To Control - OBSERVE NOTE 58 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page  27 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Main Steam Line "C" Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 58) CHECK S/G Level  AT OR TRENDING TO PROGRAM NOTE: The CRS go to AOP-025 based on the Note prior to Step 58. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE      CRS (Step 1) GO TO Appropriate Section For Failed Instrument: NOTE: The CRS will select Section D of AOP-025. S/G STEAM PRESSURE, (PT-495) - SECTION D      AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION D, S/G FEED FLOW, STEAM FLOW OR STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE      BOP (Step 1) CHECK affected FRV in MAN: Immediate Action NOTE: FCV-498 will likely be in MANUAL by this Step. FCV-498 (FRV "C")      BOP (Step 2) RESTORE affected S/G level to program Immediate Action      Critical Task:  Manually control "C" S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level. Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the "C" S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page  28 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Main Steam Line "C" Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP/CRS (Step 3) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint - BEING APPROACHED NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.      CRS (Step 3 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is approached, THEN-    GO TO Step 5      CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel of Procedure Entry Using PA System NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      BOP (Step 6) CHECK Failure - FEED FLOW INSTRUMENT FAILURE      BOP (Step 6 RNO) IF failure was a steam flow instrument, THEN- NOTE: The BOP/CRS could go to Step 12 incorrectly believing that it is the Steam Flow instrument that has failed. CRS IF failure was a steam pressure instrument, THEN GO TO Step 17.      BOP (Step 17) PLACE S/G Steam Flow Selector Switch affected by Failed Pressure Instrument to Alternate Channel Below:    S/G "C" STEAM FLOW - FR-498    FAILED CHANNEL (PT-495) AFFECTED CHANNEL (FI-494) SELECTED POSITION (CH 495)      BOP (Step 18) RESTORE affected Controller to Automatic:    CHECK S/G level - WITHIN +/-1% OF PROGRAMMED LEVEL    PLACE affected controller in AUTO Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page  29 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Main Steam Line "C" Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 19) REMOVE affected Transmitter from Servicing Using OWP-025:    CHANNEL (PT-495) OWP (SGP-12) NOTE: The CRS will address OWP-025. OWP-025, STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE (SGP) SGP-11, MAIN STEAM LINE "C" PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-495      BOP FR-498 (STM) - SELECTED TO 495      BOP DELETE INPUT PT-495 FROM CALO PROCESSING. (MSP0441A)      BOP BISTABLE SWITCH B/S 495 RACK #17 NOTE:  The will enter the Simulator Booth (Simulating the Hagan Room). Booth Instructor coordinate with BOP to insert Trip Signals: OPEN Protection Racks Door: IRF BST101 f:D_OPEN  IRF BST014 f:TRIP CLOSE Protection Racks Door: IRF BST101 f:D_CLOSED  BISTABLE LIGHT LOOP 3 PH-P3 HI PC-495 will ILLUMINATE. NOTE: The CRS will return to Section D of AOP-025. AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION D, S/G FEED FLOW, STEAM FLOW OR STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE      CRS (Step 20) REVIEW TS LCOs for applicability: NOTE: The CRS will address Technical Specifications.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page  30 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Main Steam Line "C" Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    TS LCO 3.3.1    TS LCO 3.3.2    TS LCO 3.3.3    TS LCO 3.3.4      CRS (Step 21) GO TO Procedure Main Body, Step 2      TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.2, ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM (ESFAS) INSTRUMENTATION      CRS LCO 3.3.2 The ESFAS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.      CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.2-1.      CRS ACTIONS        CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that Function 1.e (Steam Line High Differential Pressure Between Steam Header and Steam Lines) is affected, and ACTION D.1 or D.2 and D.3 are required. D. One channel inoperable NOTE For Function 4.c, a channel may be taken out of the trip condition for 6 hours for maintenance.
D.1 Place channel in trip. OR D.2.1 Be in MODE 3.
AND  D.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 6 hours    12 hour    18 hours Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page  31 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Main Steam Line "C" Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.6, CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION      CRS The Containment Ventilation Isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE.      CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.6-1.      CRS ACTIONS        CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that Function 4 (Safety Injection), is affected. Refer to LCO 3.3.2, "ESFAS Instrumentation," Function 1, for all initiation functions and requirements.      TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1, RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE AND FLOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING (DNB) LIMITS      CRS LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for pressurizer pressure, RCS average temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be within the limits specified below:  Pressurizer Pressure 2205 psig      CRS APPLICABILITY: Mode 1      CRS ACTIONS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page  32 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Main Steam Line "C" Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: If RCS pressure lowered to less than 2205 psig, the CRS will determine that ACTION A.1 is required. A. One or more RCS DNB parameters not within limits. A.1 Restore RCS DNB parameter(s) to within limit. 2 hours    NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief, and THEN re-commence the up-power. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page  33 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Power Range NI-44 Upper Detector fails HIGH      Next, Power Range, NI-44, Upper Detector will fail HIGH. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-011, "Nuclear Instrumentation (NI)."  The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation." Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF NIS07G f:70  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-005-C3, PR CHANNEL DEV  Power Range N44 is indicating Off-Scale HIGH  Delta-Flux Power Range N44 is Off-Scale HIGH  RTGB Annunciator APP-005- (30 seconds delayed)  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    NOTE: It is likely that the BOP will go to HOLD on the Turbine. APP-005-C3, PR CHANNEL DEV      RO (Step 1) MONITOR the following parameters:    Reactor power    Control rod position      RO (Step 2) IF a Control Rod is misaligned, THEN-. NOTE: There is NO misaligned Control Rod.      RO (Step 3) IF indications of a radial flux tilt are present, THEN PERFORM a Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio per FMP-007, Quadrant Power Tilt.      RO/ CRS (Step 4) IF a Power Range detector has failed, THEN REMOVE failed Power Range Detector from service per OWP-011, Nuclear Instrumentation (NI).      CRS (Step 5) REFER TO TS:    3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) .
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page  34 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Power Range NI-44 Upper Detector fails HIGH      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Table 3.3.1-1, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation. NOTE: The CRS will address OWP-011. NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/I&C to address the PR instrument failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/I&C. OWP-011, NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION (NI) NI-4, N-44, POWER RANGE      BOP REMOVE NI-44 from ERFIS SCAN: NIN0044A      BOP DROPPED ROD MODE Switch (BYPASS)      BOP NI-44 OUT OF SERVICE TRIP SWITCH (TRIP)      BOP ROD STOP BYPASS Switch (BYPASS N44)      BOP COMPARATOR CHANNEL DEFEAT Switch (PR44)        BOP DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR  Drawer:    UPPER SECTION Switch (PR44)    LOWER SECTION Switch (PR44)    NOTE: The CRS will address the Technical Specifications. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) INSTRUMENTATION      CRS LCO 3.3.1, The RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page  35 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Power Range NI-44 Upper Detector fails HIGH      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.      CRS ACTIONS    NOTE: Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page  36 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Power Range NI-44 Upper Detector fails HIGH      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that Functions 2 (Power Range Neutron Flux, a. High, b. Low), 17.c (RPS Interlocks - P8) and 17.d (RPS Interlocks - P10) are affected, and: ACTION D.1.1 and D.1.2 or D.2.1 and D.2.2 or D.3 are required;  ACTION E.1 or E.2 is required; ACTION S.1 or S.2 is required; ACTION T.1 or T.2 is required. D. One Power Range Neutron Flux-High channel inoperable. D.1.1 Place channel in trip. AND D.1.2 Reduce THERMAL RTP. OR D.2.1 Place channel in trip.
AND  NOTE: Only required to be performed when the Power Range Neutron Flux input to QPTR is inoperable. D.2.2 Perform SR 3.2.4.2. OR D.3 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours  12 hours    6 hours Once per 12 hours 12 hours  E. One channel inoperable. E.1 Place channel in trip. OR E.2 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours  12 hours    S. One channel inoperable. S.1 Verify interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions. OR S.2 Be in MODE
: 3. 1 hour    7 hours    T. One channel inoperable. T.1 Verify interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions. OR T.2 Be in MODE 2. 1 hour    7 hours    NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #6.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page  37 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Low Turbine Oil Pressure/Failure of Auto Turbine Trip      Shortly afterwards, an oil leak will develop on the Main Turbine. The operator will respond in accordance with various APP-008, SW, CW & TURB GEN AUX, alarms, and ultimately enter AOP-007, "Turbine Trip Below P-8."  When the Main Turbine Trips one Turbine Stop Valve and one Turbine Governor Valve will remain OPEN, and the operator will need to manually TRIP the Turbine. Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF TUR14 r:01:00  f:100 IMF TUR05B f:100 IMF TUR05C f:AS-IS NOTE: The malfunction takes 1 minute to fully develop  Indications Available:    Turbine Bearing Oil pressure is lowering  RTGB Annunciator APP-008-A4, TURB BRG OIL LO PRESS  RTGB Annunciator APP-008-B4, LO BRG OIL PRESS TURB TRIP  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    AOP-007, TURBINE TRIP BELOW P-8      BOP (Step 1) CHECK turbine stop valves - CLOSED    BOTH turbine stop valves - CLOSED    OR    ALL governor valves - CLOSED      BOP (Step 1 RNO) PERFORM the following:    Manually TRIP the turbine by simultaneously depressing the THINK and TURBINE TRIP pushbuttons.      BOP (Step 2) CHECK MSR PURGE and SHUTOFF VALVES - CLOSED      BOP (Step 3) CHECK Steam Dump Control - IN PRESSURE MODE Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6 Page  38 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Low Turbine Oil Pressure/Failure of Auto Turbine Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 3 RNO) PLACE steam dumps in pressure control mode:    ENSURE STEAM HEADER PRESS Controller PC-464B is in AUTO. ENSURE PC-464B pot setting is 7.28. IF PC-464B has a demand output greater than 0, THEN PERFORM the following:    PLACE PC-464B in MAN. SET PC-464B demand output to 0. PLACE PC-464B in AUTO. SELECT STEAM DUMP MODE Switch to STEAM PRESS. Slowly ADJUST PC-464B pot setting to 7.17.      BOP (Step 4) CHECK Steam Dump Operation - STEAM DUMP OPEN      RO (Step 5) ENERGIZE All Available PZR Heaters      RO (Step 6) CHECK Control Rods - INSERTING IN AUTO      RO (Step 6 RNO) Manually INSERT control rods to achieve Tavg between 547&deg;F and 551&deg;F AND reactor power between 5 and 10%. NOTE: The RO may take the control rods to AUTO. If the plant trips due to the Turbine Trip transient, or when power is between 5-10%, move to Events #7-9.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 39 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Subsequently, the Control Power fuse for Power Range channel N41 will blow causing an automatic reactor trip signal to be generated, however, the reactor will fail to TRIP both automatically and manually (ATWS). The operator will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and attempt to manually trip the reactor. When this fails, the operator will enter FRP-S.1, "Response to Nuclear Power Generation- ATWS."  While in FRP-S.1, Boric Acid to Charging Pump Suction Valve MOV-350 will fail CLOSED. The operator will direct a local trip of the reactor, drive rods in manually, and align the suction of the Charging Pumps to the RWST. Upon completion of FRP-S.1, a "B" Steam Line will rupture inside Containment (over 10 minutes), and the operator will re-enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."  Ultimately, the operator will transition to EOP-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation," to isolate the flow into and out of the "B" Steam Generator and then terminate Safety Injection. However, an Orange and/or Red Path will exist on the RCS Critical Safety Function, and the operator will transition to FRP-P.1, "Response to Imminent Pressurized Thermal Shock Condition." The scenario will terminate at Step 12 of FRP-P.1, when the operator stops SI Pumps. Booth Operator Instructions:  IMF NIS12A f:CONTROL    Indications Available:    Rx Trip First Out LIT, without Rx Trip  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION      RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action    Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers  OPEN    Rod position indicators  FULLY INSERTED    Rod Bottom Lights  ILLUMINATED      RO (Step 1 RNO) Manually TRIP Reactor Immediate Action  IF reactor power is GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 5% OR Intermediate Range SUR is positive, THEN GO TO FRP-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation 0 ATWS, Step 1. NOTE: The CRS will transition to FRP-S.1. FRP-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION-ATWS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 40 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action    Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers  OPEN    Rod position indicators  FULLY INSERTED    Rod Bottom Lights  ILLUMINATED    Neutron flux - LOWERING      RO (Step 1 RNO) PERFORM the following: Immediate Action    Manually TRIP Reactor. IF Reactor will NOT trip, THEN INSERT Control Rods.      Critical Task:  Insert Negative Reactivity into the Core by Inserting Control Rods Manually Prior to Locally Tripping the Reactor (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical or returns to a critical condition. Performance of the critical task would make the reactor subcritical and provide sufficient shutdown margin to prevent (or at least minimize the power excursion associated with) any subsequent return to criticality. Failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance which fails to prevent incorrect reactivity control. In the scenario postulated by the plant conditions, failure to insert negative reactivity by inserting control rods can result in the needless continuation of an extreme or a severe challenge to the subcriticality CSF. Although the challenge was not initiated by the operator (was not initiated by operator error), continuation of the challenge is a result of the operator's failure to insert negative reactivity.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 41 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    DISPATCH operator to locally open the following breakers: NOTE: The CRS will dispatch both the Inside and Outside AO. Booth Instructor:
Acknowledge as each AO, and report after 2 minutes use: IRF EPSV480B3_104 f:RACK_OUT IRF EPSV480B2B_097 f:RACK_OUT and report that the Rx has been locally tripped. Reactor Trip breakers    Reactor Trip Bypass breakers    BOTH MG Set Generator Output breakers    BOTH MG Set Motor Input breakers      BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action    Both Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED    CLOSE MSR Purge and Shutoff valves      BOP (Step 3) CHECK AFW Pumps Running:    CHECK Motor Driven AFW Pumps - BOTH RUNNING    CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels - TWO S/Gs LESS THAN 16%      BOP/CRS (Step 3b RNO) IF S/G Narrow Range level lowers to less than 16% on two S/Gs THEN PERFORM Step3.c. CONTINUE WITH Step 4.      BOP/ RO (Step 4) INITIATE Emergency Boration:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 42 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    START two Charging Pumps at maximum speed    ALIGN Boration Flow Path:    OPEN MOV-350, BA TO CHARGING PMP SUCT NOTE: MOV-350 will not OPEN.      BOP/ RO (Step 4.b.1 RNO) ALIGN suction from RWST:    OPEN LCV-115B, EMERG MU TO CHG SUCT. IF LCV-115B can NOT be opened THEN-    CLOSE LCV-115C, VCT OUTLET Valve.      BOP/ RO (Step 4.b.2) START Boric Acid Pump ALIGNED for BLEND      BOP/ RO (Step 4.b.3) CHECK for Boric Acid flow on FI-110 NOTE: There should be no indicated flow.      BOP/ RO (Step 4.c) ALIGN Charging flow path:    OPEN CVC-310B, LOOP 2 COLD LEG CHG Valve    ADJUST the following as necessary to maintain proper Seal Injection and MAXIMUM Charging flow:    Charging Pump Speed Controller(s)    HIC-121, CHARGING FLOW Controller    Seal Water Flow Control Valves    MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 gpm and 20 gpm per RCP UNLESS Seal Injection isolated    MAINTAIN Charging flow on FI-122A - GREATER THAN BORIC ACID FLOW Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 43 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK PZR pressure - LESS THAN 2335 PSIG      BOP/ RO (Step 5) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation Valves - CLOSED      BOP/ RO (Step 6) CHECK NO SI Signal Exists      RO (Step 7) CHECK IF the Following Trips Have Occurred:    Reactor - TRIPPED    Turbine - TRIPPED      RO (Step 8) CHECK IF Reactor is Subcritical:    Power Range channels - LESS THAN 5%    Intermediate Range channels - NEGATIVE STARTUP RATE    OBSERVE CAUTION prior to Step 18 and GO TO Step 18      RO (Step 18) CHECK ARPI - LESS THAN TWO RODS STUCK OUT      RO (Step 19) STOP RCS Boration:    CHECK MOV-350, BA TO CHARGING PMP SUCT - CLOSED    CHECK Boric Acid Pump Control Switch aligned for blend - IN AUTO    CHECK Emergency Boration - PERFORMED USING MOV-350 FLOWPATH      CRS (Step 19.c RNO) GO TO Step 19.e Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 44 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      RO (Step 19.e) CHECK BOTH of the following conditions - EXIST:    Emergency Boration performed using RWST flowpath    AND    Charging Pump suction aligned to the VCT is desired    CHECK VCT Level - GREATER THAN 20 INCHES    OPEN LCV-115C, VCT OUTLET    CLOSE the RWST supply valve previously opened:    LCV-115B, EMERG TO CHG SUCT    REDUCE Charging Pump speed as desired      RO/ CRS (Step 20) PERFORM the following:    RESET SPDS    RETURN TO Procedure AND Step in Effect      BOOTH INSTRUCTOR:  When the CRS is directing the RO to check the Reactor subcritical, IMF MSS01B r:10:00 f:9.95E6    NOTE: The CRS will transition to EOP-E-0. EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION      RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action    Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers  OPEN    Rod position indicators  FULLY INSERTED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 45 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Rod Bottom Lights  ILLUMINATED    Neutron Flux  LOWERING      BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action    Both Turbine Stop Valves  CLOSED    All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power To AC EMERGENCY BUSSES: Immediate Action    CHECK Bus E1 OR E2  AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED    CHECK Bus E1 AND E2  BOTH ENERGIZED      RO (Step 4) CHECK SI Status:  Immediate Action  RO CHECK if SI is actuated:    SI annunciators  ANY ILLUMINATED    OR    SI equipment  AUTO STARTED      RO CHECK BOTH trains of SI actuated:    SI Pumps  TWO RUNNING    RHR Pumps  BOTH RUNNING      RO/ BOP Foldout Page:    RCP TRIP CRITERIA    FAULTED S/G AFW ISOLATION CRITERIA NOTE:  The condition will be MET.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 46 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    PERFORM Supplement D, De-energizing AFW Valves For AFFECTED S/G. NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use: IRF EPSMCC9_254  f: RACKED_OUT IRF EPSMCC10_266 f: RACKED_OUT As AO, report after 3 minutes that the Supplement D is complete. AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA    DC BUS, INSTRUMENT BUS, OR MCC5 FAILURE CRITERIA    SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING CRITERIA      CRS (Step 5) PERFORM Attachment 1, Auto Action Verification, While CONTINUING WITH This Procedure Examiner NOTE:  The CRS may assign the BOP to perform this action. If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1. Other Examiners follow EOP-E-0 Actions, Step 6, on Page 52. EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ATTACHMENT 1, AUTO ACTION VERIFICATION      BOP (Step 1) CHECK ECCS Pumps Running:    SI Pumps  TWO RUNNING    RHR Pumps  BOTH RUNNING      BOP (Step 2) CHECK ECCS Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment      BOP (Step 3) CHECK CCW Pumps  AT LEAST ONE RUNNING      BOP (Step 4) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 47 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A  ACTUATED    CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A Valves  CLOSED    CHECK Excess Letdown  ISOLATED    CVC387, EXCESS LTDN STOP VALVE  CLOSED    HIC137, EXCESS LTDN FLOW CONTROLLER  AT 0% DEMAND      BOP (Step 5) CHECK Feedwater Isolation:    CHECK Main Feed Pumps  BOTH TRIPPED    CHECK Main Feedwater isolated:    Feedwater Reg Valves  CLOSED    Feedwater Reg Bypass Valves  CLOSED    Feedwater Header Section Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 6) CHECK If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated:    CHECK Main Steam Line Isolation  REQUIRED    CHECK Containment pressure  GREATER THAN 10 PSIG    CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 7) CHECK Proper Service Water System Operation:    CHECK SW Pumps  ALL RUNNING    CHECK SW Booster Pumps - BOTH RUNNING    CHECK Both SW Header Low Pressure Alarms  EXTINGUISHED    APP008F7,SOUTH SW HDR LO PRESS    APP008F8,NORTH SW HDR LO PRESS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 48 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 8) CHECK BOTH EDGs  RUNNING      BOP (Step 9) CHECK ECCS Flow:    CHECK RCS pressure  LESS THAN 1650 PSIG [1725 PSIG] NOTE: Adverse Containment Numbers will be required. CHECK SI Pumps - FLOW INDICATED    CHECK RCS pressure - LESS THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG] NOTE: Adverse Containment Numbers will be required.      BOP (Step 9.c RNO) GO TO Step 10.      BOP (Step 10) CHECK CV Recirculation Fans  ALL RUNNING      BOP (Step 11) CHECK IVSW System Actuated:    PCV1922A, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE  OPEN    PCV1922B, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE  OPEN      BOP (Step 12) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation:    CV Ventilation Isolation Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 13) CHECK Control Room Ventilation Aligned For Pressurization Mode:    HVA1A OR HVA1B,CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING FAN  RUNNING    HVE19A OR HVE19B,CONTROL ROOM AIR CLEANING FAN  RUNNING    HVE16, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN  STOPPED    Control Room HVAC Outside Air Damper A OR B  OPEN Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 49 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CRD1ASA, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER  CLOSED    CRD1BSB, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER  CLOSED      BOP (Step 14) CHECK DS Bus  ENERGIZED      BOP (Step 15) CHECK Battery Chargers ENERGIZED:    APP036D1, BATT CHARGER A/A1 TROUBLE Alarm  EXTINGUISHED    APP036D2, BATT CHARGER B/B1 TROUBLE Alarm  EXTINGUISHED      BOP (Step 16) STOP R11/12 Sample Pump      BOP (Step 17) Locally RESET AND LOAD Instrument Air Compressor(s) As Necessary (38 KW each): NOTE: The BOP may contact the Inside AO. Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge and report that the "B" IA Compressor is running, and the "A" IA Compressor is NOT running. Compressor A (MCC5 CMPT 7M)    Compressor B (MCC6 CMPT 3G)      BOP (Step 18) PERFORM Crew Update To Include The Following:    Attachment completion    Manual actions taken    Failed equipment status    SW status per Step 7.c      EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 50 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE. RO (Step 6) CHECK AFW Pumps Running:    CHECK Motor Driven AFW Pumps  BOTH RUNNING    CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels - TWO S/Gs LESS THAN 16%      BOP (Step 6b RNO) IF S/G Narrow Range level lowers to LESS THAN 16% on Two S/Gs, THEN PERFORM Step 6.c. CRS CONTINUE WITH Step 7      RO (Step 7) CHECK AFW Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment:    AFW Header Discharge Valves  FULL OPEN    AFW Header Section Valves  FULL OPEN    Steam Driven AFW Pump Discharge Valves  FULL OPEN IF PUMP RUNNING      RO (Step 8) CHECK Total AFW Flow:    RESET SI    CONTROL AFW flow to maintain Intact S/G Narrow Range level between 9%[18%] AND 50% NOTE: Adverse Containment Numbers will be required. CHECK total AFW flow  GREATER THAN 300 GPM      RO (Step 9) CHECK CV Spray NOT Required:    CHECK Containment Pressure  HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 51 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 9 RNO) PERFORM the following:    CHECK CV Spray actuated. IF CV Spray is NOT actuated, THEN-. ENSURE BOTH CV Spray Pumps are running. ENSURE CV Spray Pump Discharge Valves are OPEN:    SI880A    SI880B    SI880C    SI880D    ENSURE CV Spray Additive Tank Discharge Valves are OPEN:    SI845A    SI845B    ADJUST Spray Additive Tank flow using SI845C,SAT THROTTLING VALVE to approximately 12 gpm. ENSURE Containment Isolation Phase B Valves are closed. STOP ALL RCPs. CRS  OBSERVE CAUTION prior to Step 10 AND GO TO Step 10. Examiner NOTE: it is expected that an Orange/Red Path will occur on RCS Integrity. When this occurs the CRS will transition to FRP-P.1. When this occurs move forward to actions on Page 56. RO (Step 10) CHECK RCP Seal Cooling:    CCW flow to RCP(s) Thermal Barriers  NORMAL    APP001C1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW ALARM  EXTINGUISHED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 52 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    APP001D1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR LO FLOW alarm  EXTINGUISHED      RO (Step 10 RNO) IF CCW to ANY RCP Motor OR ALL Seal Cooling to ANY RCP has been lost, THEN-    IF ALL Charging Pumps are STOPPED, THEN-      RO (Step 11) CHECK RCS Temperatures:    With ANY RCP running,-.. OR    With NO RCPs running, RCS Cold Leg temperatures  STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547&deg;F      RO (Step 11 RNO) IF temperature is LESS THAN 547&deg;F AND lowering, THEN PERFORM the following:    STOP dumping steam. IF RCS cooldown continues, THEN REDUCE total AFW flow to minimum for decay heat removal. MAINTAIN total AFW flow GREATER THAN 300 gpm UNTIL S/G Narrow Range level is GREATER THAN 9%[18%] in at least one S/G. NOTE: Adverse Containment Numbers will be required. IF RCS cooldown continues, THEN CLOSE MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves.      RO (Step 12) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Spray Valves:    CHECK PZR PORVs  CLOSED    CHECK Normal PZR Spray Valves  CLOSED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 53 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK Aux PZR Spray Valve  CLOSED      RO (Step 13) CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped: NOTE:  It is likely that the RCPs are already OFF. CHECK RCPs  ANY RUNNING      CRS (Step 13.c RNO) GO TO Step 14.      RO (Step 14) CHECK If S/G Secondary Pressure Boundaries Are Intact:    NONE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER    NONE COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED      CRS (Step 14 RNO) PERFORM the following:    RESET SPDS AND INITIATE monitoring of Critical Safety Functions Status Trees. GO TO EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, Step 1.      FRP-P.1, RESPONSE TO IMMINENT PRESSURIZED THERMAL SHOCK      BOP (Step 1) CHECK CST Level  GREATER THAN 13%      RO (Step 2) CHECK RCS Pressure  GREATER THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG] NOTE: Adverse Containment Numbers will be required.      RO (Step 3) CHECK RCS Cold Leg Temperatures  STABLE OR RISING      BOP (Step 3 RNO) TRY to stop RCS cooldown:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 54 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP  ENSURE S/G Steam Line PORVs are CLOSED. ENSURE Condenser Steam Dumps are CLOSED. IF RHR is in service, THEN-.. CONTROL feed flow to Intact S/G(s) to stop RCS cooldown:    MAINTAIN total feed flow GREATER THAN 300 gpm (0.2x106 pph) UNTIL S/G Narrow Range level is GREATER THAN 9% [18%] in at least one Intact S/G. MINIMIZE cooldown from Faulted S/G(s):    RESET SI. IF SI will NOT reset, THEN-.. ENSURE Main Steamline Isolation AND Bypass Valves for each Faulted S/G are CLOSED. CLOSE STEAM SHUTOFF valve(s) from Faulted S/G(s) to Steam Driven AFW Pump. V18B    IF ALL S/Gs are Faulted, THEN-. NOTE: Only the "B" S/G is faulted. IF a Faulted S/G is necessary for RCS Temperature Control, THEN-. CLOSE Feed REG AND Bypass, FW HDR Section, AND AFW Discharge Valves to Faulted S/G(s). S/G B:    FCV488    FCV489    V26B    V214B    V216B Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 55 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    IF ANY valve can NOT be closed, THEN--      Critical Task:  Isolate Feedwater Flow Into and Steam Flow From the Faulted S/G Before a Transition Out of FRP-P.1 Occurs (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Also, depending upon the plant conditions, it could constitute a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Failure to isolate a faulted SG can result in challenges to the Integrity, Subcriticality and Containment CSFs; and result in a mechanical failure due to Pressurized Thermal Shock.      RO (Step 4) CHECK PZR PORV Block Valves:    Power to PZR PORV Block Valves  AVAILABLE    PZR PORV Block Valves  AT LEAST ONE OPEN      RO (Step 5.a) CHECK If PZR PORVs Should Be Closed:    CHECK LTOPP  IN SERVICE      CRS (Step 5.a RNO) GO TO Step 5.d.      RO (Step 5.d) CHECK PZR pressure  LESS THAN 2335 PSIG      RO (Step 5.e) PZR PORVs  CLOSED      RO (Step 6) CHECK SI Pumps  ANY RUNNING Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 56 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 7) CHECK If SI Can Be Terminated:    RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs  GREATER THAN 68&deg;F [87&deg;F] NOTE: Adverse Containment Numbers will be required. RVLIS indication  GREATER THAN REQUIRED VALUE FROM TABLE NOTE: With all RCPs off, 65% is required in RVLIS Full Range.      RO (Step 8) RESET SI      RO (Step 9) RESET Containment Isolation Phase A      RO (Step 10) RESET Containment Spray Signal:    PLACE CONTAINMENT SPRAY Key Switch to OVRD/RESET and RETURN to NORMAL NOTE: If CV pressure is > 10 psig, CV Spray and Phase B Containment Isolation will NOT be able to be reset. RESET Containment Isolation Phase B      RO (Step 11) ESTABLISH Instrument Air To CV:    CHECK APP002F7, INSTR AIR HDR LO PRESS alarm  EXTINGUISHED    RESET IA PCV1716, INSTRUMENT AIR ISOLATION TO CV    CHECK IA PCV1716  OPEN      RO (Step 12) STOP ECCS Pumps:    RHR Pumps    SI Pumps Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 7, 8 & 9 Page 57 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
ATWS/MOV-350 fails to OPEN/"B" SG SLB Inside CV      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:  Stop the High Head SI Pumps Before a Transition Out of FRP-P.1 Occurs (EOP-Based)  Safety Significance:  Failure to stop the high head SI Pumps results in challenges to the Integrity CSF; and could unnecessarily result in a mechanical failure due to Pressurized Thermal Shock. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.
NRC SCENARIO N16-1-4 TURNOVER SHEET  1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life: BOL b) Reactor Power: 25%  c) Turbine Load: 129 MWe  d) Boron Concentration: 1462 ppm e) Rod Height: 147 CB 'D' f) RCS Pressure: 2235 psig g) PZR Level: 28.5%  h) Xenon: Equilibrium  2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. # Description None    3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) The "A" SI Pump is OOS. The "B" SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. 4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a) None 5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a) None 6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a) PI-1616, SW North Header Pressure, is OOS (I&C Investigating). b) RTGB Annunciator APP-007-C3, "FW PMP A LO FLOW TRIP," has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). 7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a) Unrestricted (NOT-PROTECTED) 8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a) Raise power to 100% at 1%/minute. 9. TURNOVER INFORMATION  a) The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. b) Chemistry reports that Heater Drains tank suspended solids is < 25 ppb. 10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a) The Reactor Engineer (RE) is available in the Control Room b) The RE recommends a 6300 gallon dilution, made in several 200-300 gallon batch additions using Section 8.2.7, RCS Quick Dilution Checklist, of OP-301 c) The RE recommends that Control Bank D be at approximately 200 steps upon achieving 100% 11. RISK  a) YELLOW (Planned Power Increase)   
 
PROGRAM: H B Robinson Operations Training  MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam    Scenario N16-1-5   
 
==REFERENCES:==
: 1. GP-005, "Power Operation" (Rev 128) 2. AOP-006, "Turbine Eccentricity/Vibration" (Rev 21) 3. APP-005, "NIS & Reactor Control" (Rev 39) 4. OWP-011, "Nuclear Instrumentation (NI)" (Rev 24) 5. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation" (Amendment 176) 6. AOP-003, "Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control" (Rev 20) 7. APP-001, "Miscellaneous NSSS" (Rev 60) 8. AOP-014, "Component Cooling Water Malfunction" (Rev 37) 9. Technical Specification LCO 3.6.1, "Containment" (Amendment 176) 10. Technical Specification LCO 3.6.3, "Containment Isolation Valves" (Amendment 176) 11. OMM-001, "RNP Conduct of Operations" (Rev 67) 12. EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection"  (Rev 6) 13. EOP-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation" (Rev 3) 14. EOP-ECA-2.1, "Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators" (Rev 1)  Validation Time: 136 minutes Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5  Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 5 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners:  Operators: (SRO)    (RO)    (BOP)  Initial Conditions: The plant is at 3-5% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "B" Condensate Pump is OOS. LI-1417A, Hotwell Level Indication is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-006-F7, "PWST HI/LO LVL," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 30%.              Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*  Event Description  1 NA R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Roll Turbine 2 1 C-BOP C-SRO High Turbine Eccentricity 3  2 I-BOP I(TS)-SRO Loss of Compensation Voltage to Intermediate Range N-35  4 3  I-RO I-SRO VCT Level transmitter LT-112 fails HIGH 5 4 C-RO C(TS)-SRO "B" RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE  6 5 M-RO M-BOP M-SRO Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE 7 6 C-RO Failure of Automatic Rx Trip  * (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,    (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5  H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #5  The plant is at 3-5% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "B" Condensate Pump is OOS. LI-1417A, Hotwell Level Indication is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-006-F7, "PWST HI/LO LVL," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 30%.                                Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 5-8% and startup the Turbine using GP-005, "Power Operation."
When the Turbine is rolling, a HIGH Eccentricity condition will develop on the Main Turbine. The operator will respond using AOP-006, "Turbine Eccentricity/Vibration," and place the Turbine startup on HOLD. Shortly afterwards, the compensating voltage on Intermediate Range Channel N-35 will fail. The operator will remove the instrument from service using OWP-011, "Nuclear Instrumentation (NI)."  The failed channel will require that the Source Range instruments be manually re-energized in the subsequent post-trip conditions. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," and determine to continue with the power increase.
Following this, VCT Level Transmitter LT-112 will fail HIGH causing LCV-115A to divert all letdown flow to the CVCS HUTs and result in an automatic makeup to the VCT. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-003, "Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control."  After this, the power increase will continue. Next, a Thermal barrier leak will develop on the "B" RCP and Flow Control Valve FCV-626 will fail to CLOSE. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-C1, "RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW," and AOP-014, "Component Cooling Water Malfunction."  The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.6.1, "Containment," and Technical Specification LCO 3.6.3, "Containment Isolation Valves."  Subsequently, a Steam Rupture will occur downstream of the MSIVs and the MSIVs will fail to CLOSE automatically and manually. Simultaneously, the Reactor will fail to TRIP automatically. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and manually trip the reactor.      Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation," and then when it is realized that all Steam Generators are faulted, transition to EOP-ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators," and lower AFW flow to each Steam Generator to 60 gpm.
While terminating Safety Injection in EOP-ECA-2.1, the "A" MSIV will close and the "A" S/G pressure is expected to rise higher than that of the "B" and "C" S/G's. Since the crew will be in the process of terminating SI in EOP-ECA-2.1, the crew will continue to complete the SI termination steps before transitioning back to EOP-E-2.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5  The scenario will terminate at Step 4.c of EOP-E-2, after the operator has closed the AFW Discharge valves to the "B" and "C" Steam Generators. Depending on the timing of the actions taken by the crew when the "A" MSIV is closed, the "A" S/G pressure may not rise significantly higher than that of the "B" and "C" S/Gs, and the crew will remain in EOP-ECA-2.1 past the SI termination steps (i.e. Step 19). If this situation occurs, the scenario will terminate at Step 20 of EOP-ECA-2.1.      Critical Tasks:  Manually trip the reactor from the control room before entry into FRP-S.1  Safety Significance:  Failure to manually trip the reactor causes a challenge to the subcriticality CSF beyond that irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, it constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates the inability of the operator to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. The ERG Background Document for E-0 states that one function of E-0 is to verify that all required automatic protective actions occur before transitioning the crew to the appropriate ORG. The verification is important because the subsequent ORGs are based on the assumption that protective systems will protect all CSFs while the ORG is implemented. Not tripping the reactor when it is possible to do so (as in the postulated conditions) forces an immediate extreme challenge to the subcriticality CSF. Additionally, the incorrect performance of failing to trip the reactor necessitates the operator taking compensating action that seriously complicates the event mitigation strategy. This mis-operation constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. Control the AFW flow rate to not less than 60 gpm per SG in order to minimize the RCS cooldown rate before an EXTREME (Red Path) challenge develops to the RCS Integrity CSF  Safety Significance:  Failure to control the AFW flow rate to the SGs leads to an unnecessary and avoidable extreme challenge to the integrity CSF. Also, failure to perform the critical task increases the challenges to the subcriticality CSF beyond which is irreparably introduced by the postulated plant conditions. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes a demonstrated inability by the operator to take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety. It also fails to prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5  SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS              Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  Sim. Setup Reset to Temp IC 612  T = 0 Malfunctions:  "B" Condensate Pump OOS:  IRF EPSV4160B4_069 f: RACK_OUT ("B" Condensate Pump Breaker Racked Out)  PLACE RED CAP on the RTGB Control Switch for the "B" Condensate Pump PLACE GREEN CAP on the RTGB Control Switch for the "A" Condensate Pump  LI-1417A Hotwell Level Indication OOS  IOR aoCFWDOD035B f:2 Place WHITE DOT on LI-1417A  RTGB Annunciator APP-006-F7 failed ON  IMF ANNXN06f07 f:ALARM_ON Place WHITE DOT on APP-006-F7 Insert the following:  $006_FCV_626_TRIP IOR diCVCAAI103 d:9 f:OPEN (FCV-626 fails to auto CLOSE)  $006_FCV_626_TRIP IOR doCVCAAO103O d:10 f:ON (FCV-626 fails to auto CLOSE)  $006_FCV_626_TRIP IOR doCVCAAO103S d:10 f:ON (FCV-626 fails to auto CLOSE)  $006_FCV_626_TRIP IRF EPSMCC6_221 d:11 f:RACK_OUT (FCV-626 fails to auto CLOSE)  IMF MSS03A f:FAIL_TO_CLOSE ("A" MSIV fails to CLOSE)  IMF MSS03B f:FAIL_TO_CLOSE ("B" MSIV fails to CLOSE)  IMF MSS03C f:FAIL_TO_CLOSE ("C" MSIV fails to CLOSE)  IOR diMSSDDI049 f:OPEN ("A" MSIV fails to CLOSE)  IOR diMSSDDI050 f:OPEN ("B" MSIV fails to CLOSE)  IOR diMSSDDI051 f:OPEN ("C" MSIV fails to CLOSE)  IMF RPS01A f:FAILURE_TO_OPEN, AUTO  IMF RPS01B f:FAILURE_TO_OPEN, AUTO  Place the Simulator in RUN and ACKNOWLEDGE all alarms. Perform Attachment 2 (Simulator Setup For Exams) of TAP-411.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5    Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  Crew Briefing  1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements  2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew. 3. Provide the crew with the following:  Copy of OP-105 marked up for power increase  Attachment 8, Turbine Recommended Start-Up and Loading Times, of GP-005  Attachment 10, Condenser Backpressure Limit Curve, of GP-005  Copy of Technical Specifications/Basis  4. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms. T-0 Begin Familiarization Period  At direction of examiner Execute Lesson Plan for Simulator Scenario N16-1-5. At direction of examiner  Event 1 Roll Turbine Turbine RPM reaches 150 RPM  Event 2  $006_ECC-RPM ICO TURXMTET_HP r:15 F:3.3  High Turbine Eccentricity  NOTE: This Malfunction will occur when the Turbine speed reaches 150 RPM At direction of examiner  Event 3  IMF NIS06A f:4.4E-7  Loss of Compensation Voltage to Intermediate Range N-35  At direction of examiner Event 4 ICO CVCXMTLT_112 r:01:00 f:100  VCT Level transmitter LT-112 fails HIGH  At direction of examiner  Event 5  IMF RCS12B r: 01:00 f:40  "B" RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5    Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION At direction of examiner Event 6 IMF MSS09 f:855700  Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE    Post-Rx Trip Signal Event 7 IMF RPS01A f:FAILURE_TO_OPEN, AUTO IMF RPS01B f:FAILURE_TO_OPEN, AUTO    Failure of Automatic Rx Trip  NOTE: These malfunctions are inserted at T=0      Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page  9 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Roll Turbine      Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 5-8% and startup the Turbine using GP-005, "Power Operation." Booth Operator Instructions:    NA  Indications Available:  NA    Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    GP-005, POWER OPERATION SECTION 6.3, ROLLING THE TURBINE    Examiner NOTE: Procedure Steps are NOT numbered in a continuous manner because some Steps in GP-005 have been previously signed off/completed. RO (Step 8) WHEN Reactor Power approaches 5% THEN perform the following:    Make a plant announcement that MODE 1 has been entered    Record time MODE 1 entered    Change ERFIS Mode Indication to display MODE 1      RO (Step 9) Adjust Control Rods to maintain Reactor Power between 5% and 8% while continuing with this procedure      RO/ BOP (Step 10) Ensure the ERFIS Calorimetric (CALO) program is properly configured for the current plant operation:    Current Excess Letdown operation    Current AFW Pump operation    Current Steam Generator Blowdown (SGBD) operation.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page  10 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Roll Turbine      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 11) Ensure cooling water is being supplied to the following components per OP-903, Placing Secondary Coolers in Service: NOTE: The BOP will contact the AO and direct that the Secondary coolers placed in service. Booth Instructor  acknowledge as AO, and report after 3 minutes that all secondary coolers have been placed in service. Generator Hydrogen Coolers. H2 Seal Oil Coolers. Turbine Lube Oil Coolers. Exciter Air Coolers.      BOP (Step 12) Equalize hydrogen and air side seal oil temperatures per OP-505, Hydrogen Seal Oil System, Section titled "Equalizing Hydrogen Side and Air Side Seal Oil Temperatures Prior to Rolling Turbine".      BOP (Step 13) IF the Generator Temperature Recorder is shutdown, THEN-..      BOP (Step 14) Ensure the following recorders and associated instruments monitoring the Turbine Generator are energized and functional to the point necessary to support Turbine operation:    Turbine Generator Supervisory Recorder. Turbine MSR Temperature Recorder (MSR-TEMP-REC). Turbine Supervisory Alarm Mimic Display. Generator Temperature Recorder.      BOP (step 15) Record the As Found turbine eccentricity (ECC) as indicated on the Turbine Supervisory Instrument Recorder.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page  11 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Roll Turbine      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      BOP (Step 16) IF turbine rotor eccentricity (ECC) is greater than or equal to three mils (0.003 inches) as indicated on the Turbine Supervisory Instrument Recorder OR is in alarm on the RTGB Mimic Display, THEN--      BOP (Step 17) Using Curve 7.8 or Attachment 8, Turbine Recommended Start-Up And Loading Times, determine the Time Required to Accelerate to Sync Speed based on point TC-MTL-IMP-CHMBR indicated temperature and record.      BOP (Step 18) Depress the Valve Position Limit  (lower) pushbutton until the Valve Position Limit indicator registers 0% Valve Limit Position.      BOP (Step 19) IF this is a turbine startup following replacement OR repair of any turbine shaft components or bearings, THEN-..      BOP (Step 20) IF AT ANY TIME during turbine startup it is required to stop turbine rolling activities, THEN perform Attachment 6, Securing Turbine During Startup. NOTE: This Attachment provides steps for securing the Turbine Startup.      BOP (Step 21) Monitor EH oil pressure during latching using ERFIS      BOP (Step 22) Latch the Turbine using one of the following methods:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page  12 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Roll Turbine      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Depress and hold the Turbine pushbutton until local indication PI-63ASO (Auto Stop Oil Press) is greater than 80 psig NOTE: The BOP will contact the AO at the Turbine Standard, and direct that pressure on PI-63ASO be reported. Booth Instructor  acknowledge as AO, and report > 80 psig.      BOP (Step 23) WHEN PI-63ASO (Auto Stop Oil Press) is greater than 80 psig, THEN perform the following:    Ensure SL and SR Turbine Stop Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel    Ensure 1RL, 2RL, 1RR, 2RR, Reheat Stop Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel    Ensure 1IL, 2IL, 1IR, 2IR, Intercept  Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel    Ensure GLU, GLL GRU, GRL Governor Valves indicate CLOSED on the EH Turbine Control Panel    Check green Latch Light is ILLUMINATED    Ensure Unit Trip Light is EXTINGUISHED      BOP (Step 24) Record the following data from the EH Pump (Governor Fluid Pump) local flow indications NOTE: The BOP will contact the AO, and direct that the EH Pump local flow indications be reported. Booth Instructor  acknowledge as AO, and report: FI-4428A - 5 gpm FI-4427A - 3 gpm FI-4428B - 5 gpm FI-4427B - 3 gpm Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page  13 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Roll Turbine      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      BOP (Step 25) IF either EH Pump Discharge Flow reads greater than 6 gpm OR IF either EH Pump Drain Flow indicated greater that 4 gpm, THEN- NOTE: No EH Pump Discharge Flow is greater than 6 gpm and no EH Pump Drain Flow is greater than 4 gpm.      BOP (Step 26) IF the Turbine has rolled off the Turning Gear AND it is desired to place the Turbine back on the Turning Gear, THEN- NOTE: The Turbine has NOT rolled off the Turning Gear.      BOP (Step 27) PERFORM the Turbine Valve/Trip Test    Trip the Turbine by simultaneously depressing the Think and Turbine Trip pushbuttons    CHECK the following Valves:    SL and SR, Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED    1RL, 2RL, 1RR, 2RR, Reheat Stop Valves - CLOSED    1IL, 2IL, 1IR, 2IR, Intercept Valves - CLOSED    Monitor EH pressure during latching using ERFIS    Latch the Turbine using one of the following methods:    Depress and hold the Turbine Latch pushbutton until local indication PI-63ASO (Auto Stop Oil Press) is greater than 80 psig NOTE: The BOP will contact the AO at the Turbine Standard, and direct that pressure on PI-63ASO be reported. Booth Instructor  acknowledge as AO, and report > 80 psig. WHEN PI-63ASO (Auto Stop Oil Press) is greater than 80 psig THEN perform the following:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page  14 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Roll Turbine      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Ensure SL and SR, Turbine Stop Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel    Ensure 1RL, 2RL, 1RR, 2RR, Reheat Stop Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel    Ensure 1IL, 2IL, 1IR, 2IR, Intercept  Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel    Ensure GLU, GLL GRU, GRL Governor Valves indicate CLOSED on the EH Turbine Control Panel    Check green Latch Light is ILLUMINATED    Ensure Unit Trip Light is EXTINGUISHED    Direct an Operator to trip the Turbine locally at the Turbine Front Standard by positioning the Turbine Trip Lever to the TRIP Position NOTE: The BOP will contact the AO at the Turbine Standard, and direct that the Turbine be tripped. Booth Instructor  acknowledge as AO, and use: IRF TUR004 f:TRIPPED and report that the Turbine has been tripped. Check the following:    SL and SR, Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED    1RL, 2RL, 1RR, 2RR, Reheat Stop Valves - CLOSED    1IL, 2IL, 1IR, 2IR, Intercept Valves - CLOSED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page  15 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Roll Turbine      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Direct the Operator at the Turbine Front Standard to reset the Turbine locally by placing the Turbine Trip Lever to RESET and holding (lever will be released in Section 6.3 Step 27.j) NOTE: The BOP will contact the AO at the Turbine Standard, and direct that the Turbine be latched. Booth Instructor  acknowledge as AO, and use: IRF TUR004 f:RESET_HOLD And report that the Turbine has been reset. Check the following:    Ensure SL and SR, Turbine Stop Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel    Ensure 1RL, 2RL, 1RR, 2RR, Reheat Stop Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel    Ensure 1IL, 2IL, 1IR, 2IR, Intercept  Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel    Ensure GLU, GLL GRU, GRL Governor Valves indicate CLOSED on the EH Turbine Control Panel    Check green Latch Light is ILLUMINATED    Ensure Unit Trip Light is EXTINGUISHED    (Operator at the Front Standard) WHEN PI-63ASO (Auto Stop Oil Press) indicates greater than 80 psig, THEN position the Turbine Trip Lever to NORMAL. NOTE: The BOP will contact the AO at the Turbine Standard, and direct that the Turbine Trip Lever to Normal when PI-63ASO is greater than 80 psig. Booth Instructor  acknowledge as AO, and use: IRF TUR004 f:NORMAL And report the Turbine Trip Lever has been returned to Normal.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page  16 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Roll Turbine      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (raise) pushbutton until the Valve Position Limit indicator stops rising.      BOP (Step 31) Depress the Oper Auto pushbutton      BOP (Step 32) At the E-H Cabinet, check the AVP cards are in AUTOMATIC. NOTE: The CRS will contact an AO and direct this action. Floor Instructor respond as the AO and after taking direction and receiving Key #17 and Attachment 9, wait 30 seconds (Out of sight of CRS), initial Attachment 9, and return to CRS.      BOP (Step 33) Set a speed of 490 rpm to 510 rpm in the Setter display using the REF and/or REF        BOP (Step 34) Set the Acceleration Rate thumbwheel to 50 rpm/minute      BOP (Step 35) Record steam inlet pressure as indicated on PI-1304 (HP Turb Throttle Press)      BOP (Step 36) Record Condenser back pressure as indicated on PI-1310 (LP Turb A Cond Press Indicator) and PI-1311 (LP Turb B Cond Press Indicator)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page  17 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Roll Turbine      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 37) WHEN steam inlet pressure is at least 600 psig as indicated on PI-1304 (HP Turb Throttle Press) [Step 35] AND Condenser back pressure is less than or equal to 3.8 inches Hg Abs on PI-1310 (LP Turb 'A' Cond Press Indicator) and PI-1311 (LP Turb 'B' Cond Press Indicator) [Step 36]
THEN depress the Go pushbutton to raise speed.      BOP (Step 38) Perform the following as turbine speed raises;    Ensure turning gear disengages    IF governor valve leakage is causing turbine speed to raise above the speed into the Setter, THEN-    IF Turbine speed stabilizes in  resonant speed range, THEN-    IF Turbine speed exceeds 1395 rpm AND is NOT under positive control of the Operator, THEN-      When the Turbine Eccentricity Alarms move to Event #2.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page  18 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
High Turbine Eccentricity      When the Turbine is rolling, a HIGH Eccentricity condition will develop on the Main Turbine. The operator will respond using AOP-006, "Turbine Eccentricity/Vibration," and place the Turbine startup on HOLD. Booth Operator Instructions:    $006_ECC_RPM ICO          TURXMTET_HP r:15 f:3.3  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-008-B4, TURBINE SUPERVISORY INSTRUMENT  Red ECC status light on Turbine Status Light Panel is LIT  Turbine Supervisory Instrumentation Recorder indicates Turbine Eccentricity at 3.3 mils (If/When selected)  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    APP-008-A8, TURBINE SUPERVISORY INSTRUMENT      BOP (Step 1) IF caused by High Rotor Eccentricity, THEN REFER TO AOP-006      AOP-006, TURBINE ECCENTRICITY/VIBRATION      BOP (Step 1) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System      BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Speed  LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 600 RPM      BOP (Step 3) CHECK Turbine Eccentricity On TURBINE SUPERVISORY INSTRUMENT RECORDER  LESS THAN 3 MILS      BOP (Step 3 RNO) PERFORM the following:    DEPRESS turbine HOLD pushbutton. CONTACT Engineering to evaluate conditions and to provide recommended actions.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page  19 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
High Turbine Eccentricity      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    MAINTAIN turbine speed less than 600 rpm until Engineering provides recommended actions. NOTE: The BOP will suspend the Turbine Startup. NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC to address the abnormal Turbine condition. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page  20 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Compensation Voltage to Intermediate Range N-35      Shortly afterwards, the compensating voltage on Intermediate Range Channel N-35 will fail. The operator will remove the instrument from service using OWP-011, "Nuclear Instrumentation (NI)."  The failed channel will require that the Source Range instruments be manually re-energized in the subsequent post-trip conditions. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, "Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation," and determine to continue with the power increase. Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF NIS06A  f:4.4E-7  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-005-B2, N-35 LOSS OF COMP VOLT  N35 indication changed slightly on NR-45  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    APP-005-B2, N-35 LOSS OF COMP VOLT      RO (Step 1) MONITOR Intermediate Range amps.      RO (Step 2) IF NI-35 has failed, THEN REMOVE NI-35 from service per OWP-011, Nuclear Instrumentation (NI). NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/I&C to address the failed IR Channel. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/I&C and after 2 minutes call as WCCS/I&C and direct that the channel be removed from service.      RO (Step 3) IF a Reactor shutdown occurs, THEN manually ACTIVATE Source Range NIS. NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.      CRS (Step 4) REFER TO TS Table 3.3.1-1, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation.      OWP-011, NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION (NI) NI-7, NI-35 INTERMEDIATE RANGE Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page  21 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Compensation Voltage to Intermediate Range N-35      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      BOP REMOVE NI-35 from ERFIS SCAN: NIN0035A      BOP START UP RATE CHANNEL SELECT Switch - N36      BOP LEVEL TRIP Switch - Bypass      TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS) INSTRUMENTATION      CRS LCO 3.3.1: The RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.        CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.      CRS NOTE: Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.      CRS ACTIONS        CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION F.1or F.2 must be entered. F. THERMAL POWER > P-6 and < P-10, one Intermediate Range Neutron Flux channel inoperable. F.1 Reduce THERMAL POWER to < P-6. OR F.2 Increase THERMAL POWER to > P-10. 2 hours 2 hours 
 
NOTE: The CRS will likely perform an Alignment Brief. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page  22 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
VCT Level transmitter LT-112 fails HIGH      Following this, VCT Level Transmitter LT-112 will fail HIGH causing LCV-115A to divert all letdown flow to the CVCS HUTs and result in an automatic makeup to the VCT. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-003, "Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control."  After this, the power increase will continue. Booth Operator Instructions:    ICO CVCXMTLT_112        r:01:00 f:100  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-003-E3, VCT HI/LO LVL  LT-112 indicates HIGH on ERFIS  LCV-115 Amber status light is LIT (indicating full divert to CVC HUT)  Auto Makeup occurs  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL      RO (Step 1) Check for Failure of A Level Transmitter as follows: NOTE: An Auto Makeup is likely to occur due to Letdown being diverted to the radwaste system. Obtain a VCT level for LT-115 using ERFIS    PT ID CHL0115A    Obtain a VCT level for LT-112 using ERFIS    PT ID CHL0112A    Check VCT level indicator - OSCILLATING LEVEL DEVIATION OBSERVED      CRS (Step 1.c RNO) GO to Step 1.e      RO  CHECK VCT level deviation between LT-112 and LT-115 - GREATER THAN 8 INCHES (13%)      CRS (Step 2) CHECK LT-115 - FAILED NOTE: LT-115 is NOT failed.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page  23 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
VCT Level transmitter LT-112 fails HIGH      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      CRS (Step 2 RNO) GO to Step 4      RO (Step 4) CHECK LT-112 - FAILED      RO (Step 5) Stabilize the RCS Makeup System as follows:    Check LT-112 - FAILED HIGH    Place LCV-115A, VCT/HLDP TK DIV, Control Switch to VCT    Obtain Hagan Racks Key number 10    Place VCT Level Transmitter Selector Switch located in Hagan Rack #19, IN LT-115 POSITION NOTE: The BOP will go to the Hagan Room. Booth Instructor use IRF CVC067 f:LT-115. Place the LCV-115A Control Switch to AUTO    Contact I&C to repair failed channel NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/I&C to address the failed channel. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/I&C.      CRS (Step 6) Make PA Announcement for Procedure Entry NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      CRS (Step 7)  Implement the EALs NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.      RO (Step 8) Check VCT Level - LESS THAN 12.5 INCHES (21%) Examiner NOTE:  All required actions have been completed for this failure. Move to the next event as desired.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page  24 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
VCT Level transmitter LT-112 fails HIGH      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 8 RNO) IF VCT level lowers to less than 12.5 inches (21%) THEN perform Steps 9 and 10. CRS  Go to Step 11.      RO (Step 11) Check VCT Level - LESS THAN 20 INCHES (33%)      CRS (Step 11 RNO) Go to Step 21      RO (Step 21) Check VCT Level - LESS THAN 51.5 INCHES (86%)      RO (Step 22) Verify Charging and Letdown Flows are Normal for Plant Conditions      RO (Step 23) Check APP-003-D5, BA FLOW DEV - ILLUMINATED      CRS (Step 23 RNO) Go to Step 28.      RO (Step 28) Check APP-003-E5, MAKEUP WATER DEV - ILLUMINATED      CRS (Step 28 RNO) Go to Step 34      RO (Step 34) Check Boration - REQUIRED      CRS (Step 34 RNO) GO to Step 37      RO (Step 37) Check Dilution - REQUIRED      CRS (Step 37 RNO) Go to Step 40.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page  25 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
VCT Level transmitter LT-112 fails HIGH      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      CRS (Step 40) Check Technical Specifications, Section 3.4.17, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS), For Applicable LCO      CRS (Step 41) Return to Procedure and Step in Effect      At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page  26 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
"B" RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE      Next, a Thermal barrier leak will develop on the "B" RCP and Flow Control Valve FCV-626 will fail to CLOSE. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-C1, "RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW," and AOP-014, "Component Cooling Water Malfunction."  The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.6.1, "Containment," and Technical Specification LCO 3.6.3, "Containment Isolation Valves." Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF RCS12B          r: 01:00 f:40  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-001-C1, RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW  RTGB Annunciator APP-001-B2,  Seal Injection flow on "B" RCP rising  -123A indicating 0"  CCW Surge Tank Level rising  RTGB Annunciator APP-036-D8, PROCESS MONITOR HI RAD  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    APP-001-C1, RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW      RO (Step 1) IF CCW AND Seal Injection are lost to any RCP, THEN-      RO (Step 2) IF result of CCW Pump start only, THEN-      CRS (Step 3) IF a failure of an RCP Thermal Barrier has occurred, THEN REFER to AOP-014. NOTE: The CRS will transition to AOP-014.      RO (Step 4) IF a RCP Number 1 Seal failure has occurred, THEN-    NOTE: The BOP may address AOP-005 as time permits. AOP-014, COMPONENT COOLING WATER MALFUNCTION Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page  27 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
"B" RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Step 1) IMPLEMENT The EALs NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.      CRS (Step 2) NOTIFY Plant Personnel of Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      CRS (Step 3) GO TO Appropriate Section for Indicated Malfunction:    Rising CCW inventory OR R-17 Alarming - Go to Section B NOTE:  The CRS will address Section B of AOP-014. AOP-014, COMPONENT COOLING WATER MALFUNCTION SECTION B, RISING CCW INVENTORY OR R-17 ALARMING      RO (Step 1) CHECK FCV-626, THERM BAR FLOW CONT - AUTO CLOSED      RO (Step 1 RNO) PERFORM the following:    IF APP-001-C1, RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW, is ILLUMINATED, THEN PERFORM ONE of the following:    ENSURE FV-626 is CLOSED AND GO TO Step 2. (RTGB) NOTE: FCV-626 will fail to CLOSE. OR    IF FCV-626 will NOT close, THEN CLOSE CC-735, THERM BAR OUT ISO, AND GO TO Step 2. NOTE: The operator will close CC-735.      RO (Step 2) CHECK RCP Seal Leakoff - ANY GREATER THAN 5 GPM      CRS (Step 2 RNO) GO TO Step 4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page  28 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
"B" RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      RO (Step 4) CHECK the following indications of an RCP Thermal Barrier Failure - BOTH EXIST    RCP Thermal Barrier Cooling - ISOLATED DUE TO HIGH FLOW NOTE: Thermal Barrier is isolated by CC-735. AND    R-17, COMPONENT COOLING WATER RADIOACTIVE LIQUID - RISING TREND OR ALARM NOTE: R-17 is in alarm.      RO (Step 5) CHECK Seal Injection Flow to the Affected RCP(s) - LOST      CRS (Step 5 RNO) GO TO Step 7.      CRS (Step 7)  DISPATCH Operator to Containment to Perform Attachment 6, RCP Thermal Barrier Isolation NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC to address the performance of Attachment 6. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.      RO (Step 8) CHECK RCP Status as follows:    CHECK RCP B OR C - RUNNING    CHECK RCP B - RUNNING    CHECK RCP C - RUNNING      CRS (Step 9)  WHEN Attachment 6 is completed, THEN GO TO Step 23 NOTE:  This Attachment will require a Containment Entry, and will not be completed within the remainder of the Scenario.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page  29 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
"B" RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Examiner NOTE:  Because of the dynamic nature of this event, and the response, the CRS may NOT check the Tech Specs. If not, evaluate the Technical Specification after the Scenario is complete. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.13, RCS OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE      CRS LCO 3.4.13 RCS operational LEAKAGE shall be limited to: 1 gpm unidentified LEAKAGE      CRS APPLICABILITY:MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4      CRS ACTIONS        CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION A.1 must be entered until FCV-626 is isolated (CC-735 Closed). A. RCS operational LEAKAGE not within limits for reasons other than pressure boundary LEAKAGE or primary to secondary LEAKAGE A.1 Reduce LEAKAGE to within limits 4 hours          TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.3, CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES      CRS LCO 3.6.3  Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE      CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 AND 4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page  30 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
"B" RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      CRS ACTIONS        NOTES    1. Penetration flow path(s) may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls. 2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path. 3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by containment isolation valves. 4. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1, "Containment", when isolation valve leakage results in exceeding the overall containment leakage rate acceptance criteria. NOTE: When FCV-626 is unisolated and failed OPEN, Technical Specification LCO 3.6.1 is NOT met. 5. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.8, "Isolation Valve seal Water (IVSW) System" when required IVSW supply to a penetration flowpath is isolated.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page  31 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
"B" RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION A.1, and A.2 must be entered. A. One or more penetration flow paths with one containment isolation valve inoperable. A.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured. AND  A.2 NOTE: Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by use of administrative means. Verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated. 4 hours       
 
Once per 31 days for isolation devices outside containment AND Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days for isolation devices inside containment. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.1, CONTAINMENT      CRS LCO 3.6.1: Containment shall be OPERABLE.        CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.      CRS ACTIONS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page  32 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
"B" RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION A.1 must be entered until FCV-626 is isolated (CC-735 closed and deactivated). A. Containment inoperable. A.1 Restore containment to OPERABLE status. 1 hour        At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #6-7.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 33 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Subsequently, a Steam Rupture will occur downstream of the MSIVs and the MSIVs will fail to CLOSE automatically and manually. Simultaneously, the Reactor will fail to TRIP automatically. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection," and manually trip the reactor. Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-2, "Faulted Steam Generator Isolation," and then when it is realized that all Steam Generators are faulted, transition to EOP-ECA-2.1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant," and lower AFW flow to each Steam Generator to 60 gpm. While terminating Safety Injection in EOP-ECA-2.1, the "A" MSIV will close and the "A" S/G pressure will rise higher than that of the "B" and "C" S/G's. Since the crew will be in the process of terminating SI in EOP-ECA-2.1, the crew will continue to complete the SI termination steps before transitioning back to EOP-E-2. The scenario will terminate at Step 4.c of EOP-E-2, after the operator has closed the AFW Discharge valves to the "B" and "C" Steam Generators. Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF MSS09  f:855700    Indications Available:    Steam noise heard in the Control Room  Lowering pressure in all Steam Generators  Rising level in all Steam Generators  Rising steam flowing all Steam Generators  RCS pressure is lowering  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION      RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action    Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers  OPEN NOTE: The operator will need to trip the Reactor Manually. Rod position indicators  FULLY INSERTED    Rod Bottom Lights  ILLUMINATED    Neutron Flux  LOWERING Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 34 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:  Manually trip the reactor from the control room before entry into FRP-S.1  Safety Significance:  Failure to manually trip the reactor causes a challenge to the subcriticality CSF beyond that irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, it constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates the inability of the operator to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. The ERG Background Document for E-0 states that one function of E-0 is to verify that all required automatic protective actions occur before transitioning the crew to the appropriate ORG. The verification is important because the subsequent ORGs are based on the assumption that protective systems will protect all CSFs while the ORG is implemented. Not tripping the reactor when it is possible to do so (as in the postulated conditions) forces an immediate extreme challenge to the subcriticality CSF. Additionally, the incorrect performance of failing to trip the reactor necessitates the operator taking compensating action that seriously complicates the event mitigation strategy. This mis-operation constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.      BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action    Both Turbine Stop Valves  CLOSED    All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power To AC EMERGENCY BUSSES: Immediate Action    CHECK Bus E1 OR E2  AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED    CHECK Bus E1 AND E2  BOTH ENERGIZED      RO/ BOP (Step 4) CHECK SI Status:  Immediate Action  CHECK if SI is actuated:    SI annunciators  ANY ILLUMINATED    OR Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 35 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    SI equipment  AUTO STARTED        CHECK BOTH trains of SI actuated:    SI Pumps  TWO RUNNING    RHR Pumps  BOTH RUNNING    Examiner NOTE:  The crew may transition to EOP-ES-0.1. If so, wait here until they return to EOP-E-0 on the Foldout Page, and proceed. RO/ BOP Foldout Page:    RCP TRIP CRITERIA    FAULTED S/G AFW ISOLATION CRITERIA    AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA    DC BUS, INSTRUMENT BUS, OR MCC5 FAILURE CRITERIA    SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING CRITERIA      CRS (Step 5) PERFORM Attachment 1, Auto Action Verification, While CONTINUING WITH This Procedure        Examiner NOTE:  The CRS will likely assign the BOP to perform this action. If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1. CRS/RO follow E-0 Actions, Step 6, on Page 37. EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ATTACHMENT 1, AUTO ACTION VERIFICATION      BOP (Step 1) CHECK ECCS Pumps Running:    SI Pumps  TWO RUNNING Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 36 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    RHR Pumps  BOTH RUNNING      BOP (Step 2) CHECK ECCS Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment      BOP (Step 3) CHECK CCW Pumps  AT LEAST ONE RUNNING NOTE: The "A" CCW Pump is running.      BOP (Step 4) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A:    CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A  ACTUATED    CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A Valves  CLOSED      BOP  CHECK Excess Letdown  ISOLATED    CVC387, EXCESS LTDN STOP VALVE  CLOSED    HIC137, EXCESS LTDN FLOW CONTROLLER  AT 0% DEMAND      BOP (Step 5) CHECK Feedwater Isolation:    CHECK Main Feed Pumps  BOTH TRIPPED    CHECK Main Feedwater isolated:    Feedwater Reg Valves  CLOSED    Feedwater Reg Bypass Valves  CLOSED    Feedwater Header Section Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 6) CHECK If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated:    CHECK Main Steam Line Isolation  REQUIRED    High steam flow with: NOTE: The High Steam Flow criteria will be met. S/G pressure  LESS THAN 614 PSIG Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 37 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  OR    Tavg  LESS THAN 543&deg;F      BOP (Step 6.b) CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves  CLOSED NOTE: The valves have failed OPEN and cannot be CLOSED from the RTGB.      BOP (Step 6.b RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as necessary.      BOP (Step 7) CHECK Proper Service Water System Operation:    CHECK SW Pumps  ALL RUNNING    CHECK SW Booster Pumps  BOTH RUNNING    CHECK Both SW Header Low Pressure Alarms  EXTINGUISHED    APP008F7,SOUTH SW HDR LO PRESS    APP008F8,NORTH SW HDR LO PRESS      BOP (Step 8) CHECK BOTH EDGs  RUNNING      BOP (Step 9) CHECK ECCS Flow:    CHECK RCS pressure  LESS THAN 1650 PSIG [1725 PSIG]    CHECK SI Pumps - FLOW INDICATED NOTE:  Based on event timing the SI Pumps may or may not be indicating flow. CHECK RCS pressure - LESS THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG]      BOP (Step 9.c RNO) GO TO Step 10.      BOP (Step 10) CHECK CV Recirculation Fans  ALL RUNNING Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 38 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 11) CHECK IVSW System Actuated:    PCV1922A, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE  OPEN    PCV1922B, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE  OPEN      BOP (Step 12) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation:    CV Ventilation Isolation Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 13) CHECK Control Room Ventilation Aligned For Pressurization Mode:    HVA1A OR HVA1B,CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING FAN  RUNNING    HVE19A OR HVE19B,CONTROL ROOM AIR CLEANING FAN  RUNNING    HVE16, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN  STOPPED    Control Room HVAC Outside Air Damper A OR B  OPEN    CRD1ASA, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER  CLOSED    CRD1BSB, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER  CLOSED      BOP (Step 14) CHECK DS Bus  ENERGIZED      BOP (Step 15) CHECK Battery Chargers ENERGIZED:    APP036D1, BATT CHARGER A/A1 TROUBLE Alarm  EXTINGUISHED    APP036D2, BATT CHARGER B/B1 TROUBLE Alarm  EXTINGUISHED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 39 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 16) STOP R11/12 Sample Pump      BOP (Step 17) Locally RESET AND LOAD Instrument Air Compressor(s) As Necessary (38 KW each): NOTE: This step is NOT necessary.      BOP (Step 18) PERFORM Crew Update To Include The Following:    Attachment completion    Manual actions taken    Failed equipment status    SW status per Step 7.c    If applicable, PERFORM Supplement M, Component Alignment For Loss Of SW To Turbine Building, as time permits    Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE. EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION    NOTE: Due to a previous malfunction on IR N-35, the RO will need to manually re-energize the Source Ranges when < P-6. RO (Step 6) CHECK AFW Pumps Running: NOTE: Based on timing of events, and response actions to these events, the operator may not perform the RNO.      CHECK Motor Driven AFW Pumps - BOTH RUNNING    CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels - TWO S/Gs LESS THAN 16%      RO (Step 6b RNO) IF S/G Narrow Range level lowers to LESS THAN 16% on Two S/Gs, THEN PERFORM Step 6.c. CONTINUE WITH Step 7. NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 40 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      RO (Step 7) CHECK AFW Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment:    AFW Header Discharge Valves  FULL OPEN    AFW Header Section Valves  FULL OPEN    Steam Driven AFW Pump Discharge Valves  FULL OPEN IF PUMP RUNNING NOTE: it is likely that the SDAFW Pump is running.      RO (Step 8) CHECK Total AFW Flow:    RESET SI    CONTROL AFW flow to maintain Intact S/G Narrow Range level between 9%[18%] AND 50%    CHECK total AFW flow  GREATER THAN 300 GPM      RO (Step 9) CHECK CV Spray NOT Required:    CHECK Containment Pressure  HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG    CHECK CV Spray - NOT ACTUATED      RO (Step 10) CHECK RCP Seal Cooling:    CCW flow to RCP(s) Thermal Barriers  NORMAL    APP001C1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW ALARM  EXTINGUISHED    APP001D1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR LO FLOW alarm  EXTINGUISHED NOTE: APP-001-D1 is LIT because CC-735 is CLOSED. OR    Seal Injection flow  ADEQUATE Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 41 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Seal Injection flow  GREATER THAN 6 GPM PER RCP      RO (Step 11) CHECK RCS Temperatures:    With ANY RCP running, RCS average temperature  STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547&deg;F      RO (Step 11 RNO) IF temperature is LESS THAN 547&deg;F AND lowering, THEN PERFORM the following: NOTE:  Due to the unisolable Steam Rupture the RCS temperature is lowering. STOP dumping steam. IF RCS cooldown continues, THEN REDUCE total AFW flow to minimum for decay heat removal. MAINTAIN total AFW flow GREATER THAN 300 gpm UNTIL S/G Narrow Range level is GREATER THAN 9%[18%] in at least one S/G. IF RCS cooldown continues, THEN CLOSE MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves. NOTE: The valves have failed OPEN and cannot be CLOSED from the RTGB.      RO (Step 12) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Spray Valves:    CHECK PZR PORVs  CLOSED    CHECK Normal PZR Spray Valves  CLOSED    CHECK Aux PZR Spray Valve  CLOSED      RO (Step 13) CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped:    CHECK RCPs  ANY RUNNING Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 42 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK SI Pumps  AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW    CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs  LESS THAN 13&deg;F[32&deg;F]      CRS (Step 13.c RNO) GO TO Step 14.      RO (Step 14) CHECK If S/G Secondary Pressure Boundaries Are Intact: NOTE: All Steam Generator pressures are lowering uncontrollably. NONE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER    NONE COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED      CRS (Step 14 RNO) PERFORM the following:    RESET SPDS AND INITIATE monitoring of Critical Safety Functions Status Trees. GO TO EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, Step 1. NOTE: The CRS will transition to EOP-E-2. EOP-E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION      BOP (Step 1) CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass valves For Faulted S/G(s) CLOSED:    S/G A:    V13A    MS353A    S/G B:    V13B    MS353B    S/G C:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 43 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    V13C    MS353C      BOP (Step 1 RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as necessary. NOTE: The valves have failed OPEN and cannot be CLOSED from the RTGB.      BOP (Step 2) CHECK If ANY S/G Secondary Pressure Boundary Is Intact    CHECK pressures in ALL S/Gs  ANY STABLE OR RISING NOTE: All Steam Generator pressures are lowering uncontrollably.      BOP (Step 2 RNO) IF ALL S/G pressures are lowering in an uncontrolled manner, THEN PERFORM the following:    RESET SPDS. GO TO EOPECA2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization Of All Steam Generators, Step 1. NOTE: The CRS will transition to EOP-ECA-2.1. EOP-ECA-2.1, UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS      RO/ BOP Foldout Page:    SI REINITIATION CRITERIA    EOP-E-2 TRANSITION CRITERIA    IF ANY S/G pressure rises at ANYTIME, EXCEPT while performing SI Termination in Steps 10 THROUGH 19, THEN GO TO EOPE2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, Step 1. NOTE: This criteria is expected to be applicable while in EOP-ECA-2.1. EOP-E-3 TRANSITION CRITERIA Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 44 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCHOVER CRITERIA    AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA      BOP (Step 1) CHECK Secondary Pressure Boundary: NOTE: The valves have failed OPEN and cannot be CLOSED from the RTGB. CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves - CLOSED      BOP/ CRS (Step 1.a RNO) Manually OR locally CLOSE valve(s) as necessary, ONE S/G loop at a time:    S/G A NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO. This action will NOT be taken until Step 11 of EOP-ECA-2.1, AFTER Phase "A" Containment Isolation is RESET. V1-3A    MS-353A    S/G B    V1-3B    MS-353B    S/G C    V1-3C    MS-353C  BOP  CHECK Feedwater Isolation:    FW Reg valves - CLOSED    FW Reg Bypass valves - CLOSED    FW Header Section valves - CLOSED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 45 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP  CHECK Steam Driven AFW Pump Steam Shutoff Valves - CLOSED: NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use codes listed BELOW. V1-8A, SDAFW PUMP STEAM ISOLATION (MCC-5, CMPT-16F) IRF EPSMCC5_189 f:RACK_OUT    V1-8B, SDAFW PUMP STEAM ISOLATION (MCC-6, CMPT-16M) IRF EPSMCC6_226 f:RACK_OUT    V1-8C, SDAFW PUMP STEAM ISOLATION (MCC-6, CMPT-18M) IRF EPSMCC6_227 f:RACK_OUT  BOP  CHECK S/G Steam Line PORVs - CLOSED  BOP  CHECK Faulted S/G(s) Blowdown AND Blowdown Sample Valves - CLOSED    CHECK valve status using ERFIS/SPDS. BOP  Locally ENSURE the following valves CLOSED: (pipe jungle above/right of associated V1-8 valves): NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the area has too much steam, and that entry cannot be made. BYPASS DRN & WARM-UP LINE TO AFW PUMP    MS-20    MS-29    MS-38    STEAM LINE BEFORE SEAT DRAIN ROOT ISOL    MS-19    MS-28    MS-37    STEAM LINE AFTER SEAT DRAIN ROOT ISOL Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 46 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    MS-21    MS-30    MS-39      BOP/ CRS (Step 2) CHECK for adequate Shutdown Margin: NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/Chemistry to address the samples. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/Chemistry. SAMPLE RCS for boron    SAMPLE PZR for boron    CHECK Shutdown Margin - ADEQUATED FOR COLD SHUTDOWN (When results available)      RO/ BOP (Step 3) CONTROL Feed Flow to MINIMIZE RCS Cooldown:    CHECK cooldown rate in RCS Cold Legs - LESS THAN 100&deg;F in the last 60 minutes      BOP (Step 3.a RNO) LOWER feed flow to 60 gpm to each S/G. NOTE: The crew may take various actions to reduce FW flow to 60 gpm to each S/G, including stopping AFW Pump(s), adjusting Pump discharge valves and/or directing that the AO locally adjust flow (If so, Booth Instructor use codes listed BELOW).      BOP (Step 3.b) CHECK S/G Narrow Range level in ALL S/Gs - LESS THAN 50%    CHECK RCS Hot Leg temperatures - STABLE OR LOWERING Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 47 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK ANY S/G Narrow Range Level - LESS THAN 9% [18%]  BOP/ CRS  OPEN MDAFW HEADER DISCHARGE Valve breakers: NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use codes listed BELOW. V2-16A, MCC-9, CMPT-2ML IRF EPSMCC9_255 f:RACK_OUT    V2-16C, MCC-9, CMPT-3J IRF EPSMCC9_256 f:RACK_OUT    V2-16A, MCC-10, CMPT-4C IRF EPSMCC10_264 f:RACK_OUT    V2-16B,MCC-10, CMPT-4F IRF EPSMCC10_266 f:RACK_OUT  BOP/ CRS  THROTTLE AFFECTED S/G MDAFW HDR DISCH valve to establish a MINIMUM of 60 gpm  to the AFFECTED S/G NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. S/G A - V2-16A IRF CFW009 r: 35 f:2.2    S/G B - V2-16B IRF CFW010 r: 33 f:2    S/G C - V2-16C IRF CFW011 r: 31 f:2    Examiner NOTE: When AFW flow is throttled to 60 gpm to each S/G a Red Path will exist on the HEAT SINK CSFST. The operator will address FRP-H.1 and immediately return to EOP-ECA-2.1.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 48 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:  Control the AFW flow rate to not less than 60 gpm per SG in order to minimize the RCS cooldown rate before an EXTREME (Red Path) challenge develops to the RCS Integrity CSF  Safety Significance:  Failure to control the AFW flow rate to the SGs leads to an unnecessary and avoidable extreme challenge to the integrity CSF. Also, failure to perform the critical task increases the challenges to the subcriticality CSF beyond which is irreparably introduced by the postulated plant conditions. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes a demonstrated inability by the operator to take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety. It also fails to prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.      RO (Step 4) CHECK if RCPs Should be Stopped:    CHECK RCPs - ANY RUNNING    CHECK SI Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE Of DELIVERING FLOW    CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs - LESS THAN 13&deg;F [32&deg;F]      CRS (Step 4.c RNO) OBSERVE CAUTION prior to Step 5 AND GO TO Step 5      RO (Step 5) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Block Valves:    CHECK power to PORV Block Valves - AVAILABLE    CHECK PORVs - CLOSED    CHECK PORV Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN      BOP (Step 6) Check Secondary Radiation:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 49 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    REQUEST periodic activity samples of ALL S/Gs NOTE:  The CRS may call RP/Chemistry to address the samples. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as RP/Chemistry. CHECK unisolated secondary radiation monitors - HAVE REMAINED NORMAL    R-15, CONDENSER AIR EJECTOR GAS    R-19s S/G Blowdown Radiation    R-31s, STEAMLINE RADIATION MONITORS  CRS  CHECK secondary sample results - NORMAL (When results available)      RO (Step 7) CHECK If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped:    CHECK RHR pumps - ANY RUNNING WITH SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST    CHECK RCS pressure:    Pressure - GREATER THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG]    Pressure - STABLE OR RISING    RESET SI    STOP RHR pumps    CHECK RCS pressure remains - GREATER THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG]      RO (Step 8) CHECK IF CV Spray Should Be Stopped:    CHECK CV Spray Pumps - ANY RUNNING      CRS (Step 8.a RNO) GO TO Step 9.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 50 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      RO (Step 9) CHECK RWST Level - GREATER THAN 27%      RO (Step 10) RESET SI      RO (Step 11) RESET Containment Isolation:    PHASE A NOTE: The CRS has previously dispatched an AO to locally CLOSE an MSIV. Booth Instructor: AFTER Phase "A" Containment Isolation is RESET in Step 11, use: DMF MSS03A DOR diMSSDDI049 To locally CLOSE the "A" MSIV. 30 seconds later report that the "A" MSIV has been CLOSED. NOTE: The "A' S/G will rise in comparison to the "B" and "C" S/G's and the criteria for item #2 on the Foldout Page will be met. However, the transition back to EOP-E-2 cannot take place until the SI Termination Step is complete (Step 19). PHASE B Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 51 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 12) RESET IVSW System: NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use: IRF SIS026 f:RESET IRF SIS027 f:RESET and report after 1 minute that the IVSW System has been reset. IVSW RESET PCV-1922A (In Relay Cabinet ARP-1)    IVSW RESET PCV-1922B (In Relay Cabinet ARP-2)      RO (Step 13) ESTABLISH Instrument Air To CV:    CHECK APP-002-F7, INSTR AIR HDR O PRESS alarm - EXTINGUISHED    RESET IA PCV-1716, INSTRUMENT AIR ISOLATION TO CV    CHECK IA PCV-1716 - OPEN      RO (Step 14) CHECK if SI Accumulators Should Be Isolated:    CHECK at least two RCS Hot Leg temperatures -LESS THAN 430&deg;F    CHECK power to Accumulator Discharge Valves - ENERGIZED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 52 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 14.b RNO) RESTORE power to Accumulator Discharge Valves by closing the following: NOTE: The CRS/RO will dispatch an AO to CLOSE the Accumulator Isolation Valve motor breakers. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use: IRF EPSMCC5_204 f:RACK_IN IRF EPSMCC5_205 f:RACK_IN IRF EPSMCC6_232 f:RACK_IN report after 2 minutes that the breakers are CLOSED. MCC-5 CMPT 9F (SI-865C)    MCC-5 CMPT 14F (SI-865A)    MCC-6 CMPT 10J (SI-865B)    CLOSE ALL Accumulator Discharge Valves      BOP (Step 15) CHECK Power Supply to Charging Pumps -  OFFSITE POWER AVAILABLE      RO (Step 16) ESTABLISH Charging Flow:    CHECK Charging Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING    ESTABLISH desired charging flow:    START additional Charging Pump(s) as necessary    ADJUST the following as necessary to maintain proper Seal Injection AND desired Charging flow:    Charging Pump Speed Controller(s)    HIC-121, CHARGING FLOW Controller Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 53 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Seal Water Flow Control Valves    MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 gpm AND 20 gpm per RCP UNLESS Seal Injection isolated      RO (Step 17) CHECK If ECCS Flow Should Be Terminated:    CHECK SI pumps - ANY RUNNING    CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs - GREATER THAN 18&deg;F [37&deg;F]    Pressure - GREATER THAN 1650 PSIG      CRS (Step 17.c RNO) OBSERVE CAUTION prior to STEP 3 AND RETURN TO Step 3. NOTE: Based on the EOP-ECA-2.1 Foldout Page criteria being met, the CRS may transition back to EOP-E-2, and isolate the "B" and "C" S/G's. If not, continue. Pressure  STABLE OR RISING    PZR level  GREATER THAN 14% [31%]        (Step 18) STOP ECCS Pumps:    STOP SI pumps    CHECK RHR Pumps  ANY RUNNING WITH SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST    STOP RHR Pumps        (Step 19) CHECK ECCS Flow Not Required:    CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs  GREATER THAN 18&deg;F [37&deg;F]
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 54 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK PZR level  GREATER THAN 14% [31%]          EOP-E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION      BOP (Step 1) CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass valves For Faulted S/G(s) CLOSED:    S/G A: NOTE: The "A" MSIV and Bypass Valves are CLOSED. V13A    MS353A    S/G B: NOTE: The "B" MSIV is failed OPEN. V13B    MS353B    S/G C: NOTE: The "C" MSIV is failed OPEN. V13C    MS353C      BOP (Step 1 RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as necessary. NOTE: The valves have failed OPEN and cannot be CLOSED from the RTGB. The CRS may dispatch an AO to locally CLOSE one of the two failed OPEN MSIVs. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO. BOP (Step 2) CHECK If ANY S/G Secondary Pressure Boundary Is Intact    CHECK pressures in ALL S/Gs  ANY STABLE OR RISING NOTE: The "A" S/G pressure is stable for plant conditions.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 55 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 3) IDENTIFY Faulted S/G(s):    CHECK pressures in ALL S/Gs      ANY S/G PRESSURE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER NOTE: The "B" and "C" S/Gs are still faulted. OR    ANY S/G COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED      BOP (Step 4) ISOLATE Faulted S/G(s):    CHECK Main Feedwater Reg Valve, Reg Bypass Valve AND Header Section Valve to Faulted S/G(s) shut:    S/G B valves  CLOSED    FCV488    FCV489    V26B    S/G C valves  CLOSED    FCV498    FCV499    V26C    RESET SI    CLOSE AFW Discharge Valve(s) to Faulted S/G(s):    S/G B valves  CLOSED    V214B    V216B NOTE: The BOP will contact the AO and direct that V2-16B be locally CLOSED. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use IRF CFW010 f:0. S/G C valves  CLOSED    V214C Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6 & 7 Page 56 of 57          Event
 
== Description:==
Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    V216C NOTE: The BOP will contact the AO and direct that V2-16C be locally CLOSED. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use IRF CFW011 f:0. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.
NRC SCENARIO N16-1-5 TURNOVER SHEET  1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life: EOL b) Reactor Power: 4.5% c) Turbine Load: 0 MWe  d) Boron Concentration: 511 ppm e) Rod Height: 148 CB 'D' f) RCS Pressure: 2235 psig g) PZR Level: 26.4%  h) Xenon: Equilibrium  2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. # Description None    3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) The "B" Condensate Pump is OOS. 4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a) None 5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a) "A" Condensate Pump 6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a) LI-1417A, Hotwell Level Indication is OOS (I&C Investigating). b) RTGB Annunciator APP-006-F7, "PWST HI/LO LVL," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). 7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a) Unrestricted (NOT-PROTECTED) 8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a) Raise power to 30% IAW GP-005 starting with Section 6.3 9. TURNOVER INFORMATION  a) The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. 10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a) The Reactor Engineer (RE) is available in the Control Room b) The RE recommends a 7,485 gallon dilution, made in several 200-300 gallon batch additions c) The RE recommends that Control Bank D be at approximately 160 steps upon achieving 30% 11. RISK  a) YELLOW (Planned power increase)   
 
PROGRAM: H B Robinson Operations Training  MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam    Scenario N16-1-6   
 
==REFERENCES:==
: 1. Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating" (Amendment 203) 2. AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction" (Rev 33) 3. OP-105, "Maneuvering the Plant When Greater Than 25% Power" (Rev 62) 4. OP-301, "Chemical And Volume Control System" (Rev 112) 5. APP-008 "SW, CW, & TURB GEN AUX" (Rev 67) 6. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, "Service Water System (SWS)" (Amendment 176) 7. Technical Specification LCO 3.6.6, "Containment Spray and Cooling Systems" (Amendment 176) 8. AOP-018, "Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions" (Rev 31) 9. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6, "Component Cooling Water (CCW) System" (Amendment 176) 10. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.17, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)" (Amendment 223) 11. EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection"  (Rev 6) 12. EOP-ECA-0.0, "Loss of All AC Power" (Rev 4) 13. EOP-ES-1.1, SI Termination" (Rev 2) 14. EOP-ES-0.1, "Reactor Trip Response" (Rev 7)  Validation Time: 100 minutes Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6  Facility: HB Robinson Scenario No.: 6 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners:  Operators: (SRO)    (RO)    (BOP)  Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "A" EDG is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 ACTION B.1, B.2, B.3.2.1 and B.3.2.2, and B.4. R-15, Condenser Air Ejector Gas Radiation Monitor is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-002-F8, "STA AIR HDR LO PRESS," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The "B" MFWP has experienced high noise/vibration over the last two hours (Maintenance is investigating).              Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*  Event Description  1 1 C-BOP C-SRO Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN 2 NA R-RO N-BOP N-SRO Lower Power 3  2 C-BOP C(TS)-SRO "C" Service Water Pump Trips  4 3 C-RO C(TS)-SRO DS Bus De-energizes/"C" CCW Pump Trips on Start 5 4 C-RO C-SRO "A" RCP Seal Failure 6 5 M-RO M-BOP M-SRO Loss of Offsite Power 7 5 C-BOP "B" EDG Fails to Start  8 6 NA DSDG Trips  9 7 C-BOP "D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start  * (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,    (I)nstrument,    (C)omponent,    (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6  H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #6  The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The following equipment is Out-Of-Service:  The "A" EDG is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 ACTION B.1, B.2, B.3.2.1 and B.3.2.2, and B.4. R-15, Condenser Air Ejector Gas Radiation Monitor is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-002-F8, "STA AIR HDR LO PRESS," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The "B" MFWP has experienced high noise/vibration over the last two hours (Maintenance is investigating).                                Shortly after taking the watch, HCV-1459, Heater Bypass Valve will fail OPEN. The crew will implement AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction," and close the valve. After the overpower transient is stabilized, the WCCS will call the control room and direct that reactor power be lowered to 50% for the purpose of removing the "B" Main Feedwater Pump from service. The operator will lower power in accordance with AOP-038, "Rapid Downpower."
After the power reduction is in progress, the "C" Service Water Pump will trip on overload. This will cause the running Service Water Booster Pump to trip as well. The operator will respond in accordance with various APP-008 annunciators and start a standby Service Water Pump; and then respond in accordance with APP-002-A through D8, "HVH WTR OUTLET LO FLOW," and re-start a Service Water Booster Pump. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, "Service Water System (SWS)," and Technical Specification LCO 3.6.6, "Containment Spray and Cooling Systems."    Following this, Breaker 52/32A will Trip de-energizing the DS Bus, and stopping the only running Charging Pump and CCW Pump. The operator may address AOP-018, "Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions," or various APP's to restore Charging and Seal Injection flow; and then APP-001-F5, CCW PMP LO PRESS, and ensure that the standby CCW Pump started. 10 seconds after the Standby CCW Pumps start, the "C" CCW Pump will trip, and only the "B" CCW will be left running. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6, "Component Cooling Water (CCW) System," and Technical Specification LCO 3.4.17, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)."    Next, a #1 Seal Failure will occur on the "A" RCP. The crew will implement AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions," trip the reactor, stop the pump, and three minutes after the pump is stopped, CLOSE the Seal Leakoff Valve. The crew will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."  Simultaneously, a Loss of Offsite Power will occur on the reactor trip, and the "B" Emergency Diesel Generator will fail to automatically start. Additionally, the DS DG will trip.      Upon entry into EOP-E-0, the operator will determine that both ESF buses are de-energized and transition to EOP-ECA-0.0, "Loss of All AC Power." The operator will subsequently start the "B" EDG by depressing the SI Actuate Pushbutton, restore power to Bus E-2, and transition back to EOP-E-0. When Bus E-2 is re-energized, the "D" Service Water Pump will fail to sequence automatically and will need to be manually started. Upon transition back to EOP-E-0, the crew will complete the immediate actions of EOP-E-0, and continue with AOP-018.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6  The scenario will terminate when the crew has terminated Safety Injection and re-established Charging/Seal Injection in Step 6 of ES-1.1. Critical Tasks:  Energize at Least One AC Emergency Bus Before Defeating the Auto Loading of the Safeguards Equipment in EOP-ECA-0.0  Safety Significance:  Failure to energize an ac emergency bus constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency power capacity. Failure to perform the critical task also results in needless degradation of any barrier to fission product release, specifically of the RCS barrier at the point of the RCP seals. Additionally, failure to perform the critical task results in the unnecessary continuation of a situation in which RCS inventory is being lost uncontrollably and cannot be replaced. This situation is equivalent to mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity at a time when a small-break LOCA is in progress. In this case, at least one ac emergency bus can be energized from the control room. Failure to perform the critical task means that RCS inventory lost through the RCP seals cannot be replaced. It also means that the RCP seals remain without cooling and gradually deteriorate. As the seals deteriorate the rate of RCS inventory loss increases. Manually Start SW Pump for EDG Cooling within 40 Minutes of starting the "B" EDG  Safety Significance:  Failure to manually start the SW pump under the postulated plant conditions means that the EDG is running without SW cooling. Running the EDG without SW cooling leads to a high-temperature condition that can result in EDG failure due to damage caused by engine overheating. Under the postulated plant conditions, the running EDG is the only operable EDG. The calculated maximum time an EDG may operate without cooling to preclude adverse effects is 40 minutes. Since during the first 40 minutes of EDG operation in this scenario there are two procedural cues to check, and if needed, start a SW Pump, it is believed that failure to perform the critical task constitutes mis-operation or incorrect performance in which the crew does not prevent "degraded- emergency power capacity."
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6  SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS              Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  Sim. Setup Reset to Temp IC 613  T = 0 Malfunctions:  EDG "A" OOS:  IRF EPSV480E1_120, d:0 f: RACK_OUT (EDG BKR Racked Out)  IRF EDG01A, d:0 (EDG "A" OOS)  IRF EDG003, d:0 f: Local (EDG "A" OOS)  PLACE RED CAP on the RTGB Control Switch for  EDG "A" & 52/17B  Place GREEN CAPS on the RTGB Control Switches BELOW (See OMM-048, Attachment 9):  HVS-5 RTGB Switch  HVE-17 RTGB Switch  52/27B RTGB Switch  52/28B RTGB Switch  "B" EDG RTGB Switch  V1-8A RTGB Switch  V1-8B RTGB Switch  V1-8C RTGB Switch  V2-14A RTGB Switch  V2-14B RTGB Switch  V2-14C RTGB Switch  Protected Switchyard  Place GREEN DOT on APP-010-D2  R-15 OOS  IRF RMS049 f:PWR_OFF Place WHITE DOT on R-15 Place GREEN DOT on APP-036-D8 Place GREEN DOT on APP-036-E7  RTGB Annunciator APP-002-F8 failed ON  IMF ANNXN02F08 f:ALARM_ON Place WHITE DOT on APP-002-F8  Insert the following:  $006_RTA_TRIP IMF EDG01B ("B" EDG fails to START on Rx Trip)  IMF EDG04E f:TRAIN_B ("D" SW Pump fails to Sequence ON when E-2 re-energized)  Verify that the "A" Charging Pump is RUNNING and the "B" and "C" Charging Pumps are OFF.
Place the Simulator in RUN and ACKNOWLEDGE all alarms. Perform Attachment 2 (Simulator Setup For Exams) of TAP-411.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6    Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  Crew Briefing  1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements  2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew. 3. Provide the crew with the following:  Copy of Technical Specifications/Basis  4. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms. T-0 Begin Familiarization Period  At direction of examiner Execute Lesson Plan for Simulator Scenario N16-1-6. At direction of examiner  Event 1 IMF CFW36  Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN At direction of examiner  Event 2 Lower Power  NOTE: to initiate this event, the WCCS will call and inform the operator that reactor power be lowered to 50% for the purpose of removing the "B" Main Feedwater Pump from service. At direction of examiner Event 3  IMF SWS01C  "C" Service Water Pump Trips At direction of examiner  Event 4 IRF EPSV480DS_063  f:TRIP  IMF CCW01C d:10  DS Bus De-energizes/"C" CCW Pump Trips on Start  At direction of examiner Event 5  IMF RCS13A r:2:00 f:50  "A" RCP Seal Failure Post-Rx Trip Event 6 IMF EPS13  Loss of Offsite Power  NOTE: This event occurs on the Rx Trip Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6    Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION  Post-Rx Trip  Event 7  "B" EDG Fails to Start  NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0  Post-Rx Trip  Event 8 IMF EDG01C d:2 DSDG Trips NOTE: This event occurs on the Rx Trip  Post-Rx Trip  Event 9  "D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start  NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0      Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page  9 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN      Shortly after taking the watch, HCV-1459, Heater Bypass Valve will fail OPEN. The crew will implement AOP-010, "Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction," and close the valve. Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF CFW36  Indications Available:    Rx Power starts to RISE  RTGB Annunciator APP-007-D7, HTR 3A HI/LO LVL  RTGB Annunciator APP-007-D8, HTR 3B HI/LO LVL  HCV-1459 Red and Green status lights are LIT  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    NOTE: The crew may enter and exit TS LCO 3.4.1 (DNB) one or more times during this event. AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION      BOP (Step 1) CHECK FRVs  OPERATING PROPERLY (MANUAL OR AUTO):    FCV478    FCV488    FCV498      RO/ BOP (Step 2) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint  BEING APPROACHED NOTE: A Power Limit Warning is possible during this event which will require a reduction in power.      CRS (Step 2 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is approached, THEN TRIP the reactor and GO TO EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection. NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. GO TO Step 4.      RO (Step 4) CHECK Reactor Power  LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page  10 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO/ BOP (Step 4 RNO) IF reactor power exceeds 100%, THEN REDUCE turbine load as necessary using turbine valve limiter to maintain reactor power less than or equal to 100%.      CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      CRS (Step 6) GO TO Appropriate Step From Table Below:    Other -Step 35      BOP (Step 35) REDUCE Turbine Load Using Attachment 1 to Match Feedwater And Steam Flows WHILE CONTINUING WITH This Procedure. NOTE:  The CRS may assign the BOP to perform this action. BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1. Other Examiners follow AOP-010 Actions, Step 36, on Page 12. AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION ATTACHMENT 1, REDUCING TURBINE LOAD      BOP (Step 1) REDUCE Turbine Load at 1%/MIN to 5%/ MIN to achieve Goal Specified in Procedure Body:    CHECK control rods - IN AUTOMATIC    CHECK turbine mode - AUTOMATIC    DEPRESS IMP IN pushbutton    SET desired load rate    DEPRESS GO or HOLD pushbutton as needed to reduce turbine load    BORATE using OP-301, RCS Boration Quick Checklist, as necessary to maintain AFD within the operating band Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page  11 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      BOP (Step 2) CHECK Goal of Load Reduction -  REACHED    To achieve a target power level    OR    To match steam flow with feed flow    OR    To raise MFP suction pressure      BOP (Step 3) CHECK Current Loading for the following Pumps - LESS THAN MAXIMUM NOTE: The BOP will contact the Outside AO to check associated parameters. Booth Instructor report data from Attachment 10.2 of OST-013 (See Below). MFP - 0.710 KILOAMPS "A" MFP - .60 KAMPs "B" MFP - .59 KAMPs    Condensate Pump - 370 AMPS "A" MCP -  360 AMPs "B" MCP - 350 AMPs    HDP - 90 AMPS "A" HDP -  79 AMPs "B" HDP - 78 AMPs      BOP (Step 4) Stop Load Reduction      BOP (Step 5) NOTIFY CRS/SM that Load Reduction is Complete       
 
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page  12 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION    Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE. CRS (Step 36) DISPATCH an Operator to Observe Valve positions: NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the LCV-1530A and B are operating normally. LCV-1530A, HDT LEVEL CONTROL VALVE    LCV-1530B, HEATER DRAIN PUMPS SUCTION DUMP TO CONDENSER      BOP (Step 37) DETERMINE If a Heater Drain Tank Level Control Valve has Failed:    CHECK HDT level control valve or controller - HAS MALFUNCTIONED      CRS (Step 37.a RNO) IF HDT Level is controlling correctly, THEN OBSERVE NOTE prior to Step 40 and GO TO Step 40.      CRS (Step 40 ) CHECK for Leak - CAUSING FW TRANSIENT NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO to look for leaks, however, the reason for being in the AOP is because the Heater Bypass valve has opened. Visual indication of leak    FW Heater level alarms    FW Heater normal and alternate drain valve positions level dump valve positions    FW Heater #1 & #2 emergency dump valve positions Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page  13 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Gland Steam Condenser abnormal indications/alarms      CRS (Step 40 RNO) OBSERVE NOTE prior to Step 43 and GO TO Step 43.      CRS (Step 43) DETERMINE If a HDP has malfunctioned:    DISPATCH an operator to evaluate HDPs for damage: NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the HDPs are operating normally. LISTEN for unusual noise    OBSERVE pump shaft for breakage    OBSERVE for abnormal running current:    A - 4KV Bus 1 CMPT-5    B - 4KV Bus 4 CMPT-25    CHECK pump damage - INDICATED      CRS (Step 43.b RNO) OBSERVE NOTE prior to Step 46 and GO TO Step 46.      CRS (Step 46) DETERMINE if a Condensate Pump has malfunctioned:    DISPATCH an operator to evaluate Condensate Pumps for damage: NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the Condensate Pumps are operating normally. LISTEN for unusual noise    OBSERVE pump shaft for breakage Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page  14 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    OBSERVE for abnormal running current:    A - 4KV Bus 1 CMPT-6    B - 4KV Bus 4 CMPT-22    CHECK pump damage - INDICATED      CRS (Step 46.b RNO) OBSERVE CAUTION and NOTE prior to Step 49 and GO TO Step 49.      BOP (Step 49) CHECK for HCV-1459 Failure:    CHECK HCV-1459, LP HEATERS BYP - OPEN      CRS/ BOP (Step 50) DISPATCH an Operator to monitor MFP Suction Pressures: NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute the suction pressure for both pumps. Use actual indications from  Simulator P&ID screen CFW3. PI-1433 - "A" FW PUMP SUCTION PRESSURE    PI-1434 - "B" FW PUMP SUCTION PRESSURE      CRS/ BOP (Step 51) CHECK MFP Suction Pressures - LESS THAN 400 PSIG      CRS (Step 51 RNO) GO TO Step 54.      BOP (Step 54) CLOSE HCV-1459 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page  15 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Step 55) CONTACT I&C to Troubleshoot and Correct HCV-1459 Problem NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/I&C to address the Valve failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/I&C.      CRS (Step 56) GO TO Step 58      BOP (Step 58) CHECK S/G Level - AT OR TRENDING TO PROGRAM      RO (Step 59) CHECK Tavg - AT OR TRENDING TO Tref      CRS (Step 60) CONTACT Maintenance to Troubleshoot and Correct the Feedwater Problem NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC/I&C to address the Valve failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/I&C.      CRS (Step 61) IMPLEMENT EALs NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.      RO (Step 62) CHECK Total Reactor Power Change - LESS THAN 15%      RO (Step 63) CHECK APP-005-B5, ROD BANDS A/B/C/D LO LIMIT - EXTINGUISHED      RO (Step 64) MONITOR Axial Flux Difference to Ensure Compliance with TS 3.2.3 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page  16 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 65) NOTIFY Load Dispatcher of Unit's Load Capability NOTE: The BOP will call Load Dispatcher. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Load Dispatcher.      CRS (Step 66) RETURN TO Procedure and Step In Effect    NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 2 Page  17 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Lower Power      After the overpower transient is stabilized, the WCCS will call the control room and direct that reactor power be lowered to 50% for the purpose of removing the "B" Main Feedwater Pump from service. The operator will lower power in accordance with AOP-038, "Rapid Downpower." Booth Operator Instructions:    As WCCS, call Control Room and state the following:        "A step change has occurred on the "B" Main Feedwater Pump vibrations, and station management has directed that reactor power be lowered to 50% using AOP-038 at 1-2%/minute for the purpose of removing the "B" Main Feedwater Pump from service. Indications Available:    NA    Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER      BOP (Step 1) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using The Plant Page System      RO (Step 2) DETERMINE Corrected Boration And Target Rod Height For Target Power Level Using Most Recently Performed OST947, OPERATIONS REACTIVITY PLAN    Target Load Reduction Rate __%/min    Target Power Level ___    Target Rod Height ___ NOTE: The RO will determine approximately 144 Steps (2%/minute). Corrected Boration ___ NOTE: The RO will determine approximately 146 gallons (2%/minute).      RO (Step 3) CHECK Required Power Reduction Rate  LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 5%/MINUTE Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 2 Page  18 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Lower Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Step 4) PERFORM Brief Of Control Room Personnel To Include The Following:    Reason for downpower    Target Power Level    Target Rod Height    Rate of load reduction    Amount of boric acid addition      RO (Step 5) ENERGIZE All Available PZR Heaters    PZR HTR CONTROL GROUP    PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP A    PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP B      RO (Step 6) CHECK Rod Control  IN AUTO      RO (Step 7) INITIATE Boration Using Attachment 1, RCS Boration, While Continuing With This Procedure    Examiner NOTE:  The CRS will assign the RO to perform this action. RO Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1. Other Examiners follow AOP-038 Actions, Step 8, on Page 19. AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER ATTACHMENT 1, RCS BORATION      RO (Step 1) PLACE The RCS MAKEUP MODE Selector Switch In BORATE Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 2 Page  19 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Lower Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 2) IF Frequent Boric Acid Transfer Pump Starts Are Anticipated, THEN PLACE Boric Acid Transfer Pump Switch Aligned To BLEND To ON.      RO (Step 3) SET YIC113, BORIC ACID TOTALIZER to amount determined in Main Body Step 2      RO (Step 4) Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to START      RO (Step 5) IF Boric Acid flow is NOT achieving the desired effect, THEN PLACE FCV113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, in MAN AND manually Adjust controller FCV113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, using the UP and DOWN pushbuttons      RO (Step 6) WHEN the desired amount of Boric Acid has been added to the RCS OR the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Switch is placed in STOP, THEN ENSURE the following:    FCV113A, BA TO BLENDER, closes. FCV113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, closes. IF in AUTO, THEN operating Boric Acid Pump stops. RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF.      AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER    Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/BOP continue HERE. BOP (Step 8) INITIATE Turbine Load Reduction While Continuing With This Procedure    CHECK EH Turbine Control  IN OPER AUTO Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 2 Page  20 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Lower Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    PREPARE For Turbine Load Reduction As Follows:    CHECK IMP IN  ILLUMINATED      BOP (Step 8.b.1 RNO 1) IF Turbine Load reduction is available using IMP IN, THEN PERFORM the following:    DEPRESS IMP IN pushbutton    CHECK IMP IN light illuminated    CHECK IMP OUT light extinguished      BOP (Step 8.b) SET desired load in the SETTER    SELECT the desired Load Rate    DEPRESS the GO pushbutton to initiate Turbine Load reduction      BOP (Step 9) ADJUST Turbine Load To Control Tavg Within 5&deg;F Of Tref Using One Of The Following:    ADJUST Load Rate    OR    DEPRESS GO and HOLD pushbuttons      CRS/ BOP (Step 10) INITIATE Notification of The Following: NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM/WCC/Communicator to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge. Load Dispatcher of load reduction    E&C to control secondary chemistry    RC for elevated radiation levels in CV Pump Bays and Pipe Alley    Oncall Duty Manager to activate the Event Response Team Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 2 Page  21 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Lower Power      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    E&C for impending 15% power change for I131 sampling within 2 to 6 hours    E&C for impending power reduction greater than 20% terminate zinc injection    NRC within 4 hours      BOP (Step 11) CHECK Auxiliary Boilers  AT LEAST ONE OPERATING      BOP (Step 11 RNO) IF Plant Shutdown is required, THEN NOTIFY AO to start at least one Auxiliary Boiler per OP401, AUXILIARY HEATING SYSTEM. NOTE: The BOP will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.      RO (Step 12) CHECK Tavg  WITHIN 5&deg;F OF Tref      RO (Step 13) CHECK Axial Flux Distribution  WITHIN TARGET BAND      BOP (Step 14) CHECK APP006F5, STEAM DUMP ARMED  EXTINGUISHED      RO (Step 15) CHECK Any Of The Following Conditions  MET:    Target load/power has been reached    Load reduction is no longer required    CRS/SM directs termination of load reduction    STOP Rapid Downpower using Attachment 3, Termination Of Rapid Downpower      At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 3 Page  22 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Service Water Pump Trips      After the power reduction is in progress, the "C" Service Water Pump will trip on overload. This will cause the running Service Water Booster Pump to trip as well. The operator will respond in accordance with various APP-008 annunciators and start a standby Service Water Pump; and then respond in accordance with APP-002-A through D8, "HVH WTR OUTLET LO FLOW," and re-start a Service Water Booster Pump. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, "Service Water System (SWS)," and Technical Specification LCO 3.6.6, "Containment Spray and Cooling Systems." Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF SWS01C  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-008-F4, SW PMP A/B/C/D OVLD  RTGB Annunciator APP-008-F7, SOUTH SW HDR LO PRESS  RTGB Annunciator APP-008-F8, NORTH SW HDR LO PRESS  SW North Header Pressure PI-1616 indicating 12 psig  SW South Header Pressure PI-1684 indicating 13 psig  "C" SW Pump Green and Red status lights LIT  "A' SW Booster Pump trips  RTGB Annunciator APP-002-A8 THROUGH D8, HVH-1(2-4) WTR OUTLET LO FLOW  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    NOTE: The crew will likely place the Turbine in HOLD. APP-008-F4, SW PMP A/B/C/D OVLD      BOP (Step 1) IF an operating SW Pump has tripped, THEN PERFORM the following:    START a Standby Pump. DISPATCH operator to check breaker(s) AND Current Limiter Fuses: SW Pump C - 480V Bus E2 (CMP 24A) NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 10 minutes that the "C" SW Pump motor is "Hot to the touch."    THROTTLE CCW Heat Exchanger Return Valves, as necessary, to maintain 40 to 50 psig in the SW Headers. NOTE: This action is NOT needed (Starting the "D" SW Pump will restore system pressure).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 3 Page  23 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Service Water Pump Trips      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Step 2) IF a single-phase open circuit condition is suspected ENTER AOP-026. NOTE: This action will need further investigation. APP-002-A8, HVH-1 WTR OUTLET LO FLOW      BOP (Step 1) IF the operating Service Water Booster Pump has tripped, THEN start Standby Service Water Booster Pump.      BOP (Step 2) IF no Service Water Booster Pump can be started, THEN-.. NOTE: The Standby SW Booster Pump will start.      BOP (Step 3) IF V6-33A (SW Booster Pump 'A' Supply to HVH-1) has closed, THEN-. NOTE: V6-33A has NOT CLOSED.      BOP (Step 4) IF a Service Water rupture outside of the HVH boundaries is indicated, THEN-.. NOTE: There is no SW Piping Rupture.      BOP (Step 5) IF required, THEN dispatch personnel to check local indications: NOTE: The CRS/BOP may dispatch an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the system flows/pressures are normal and that the standby SW Booster Pump is NOT rotating in reverse. FI-1698A (HVH-1 Outlet Flow). PI-1646A (HVH-1 Outlet Pressure). Standby Service Water Booster Pump rotation.      BOP (Step 6) IF standby Service Water Booster Pump check valve is stuck open, THEN-.. NOTE: The standby SW Booster Pump Check Valve is NOT stuck OPEN.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 3 Page  24 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Service Water Pump Trips      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 7) IF a SW leak exists inside the CV, THEN-.. NOTE: There is no SW leak in the CV.      CRS (Step 8) IF at least 800 gpm flow through HVH-1 can NOT be established, THEN declare HVH-1 inoperable and refer to ITS LCO 3.6.6. NOTE: Once the standby SW Booster Pump is started LCO 3.6.6 will be met.      BOP (Step 9) IF required, THEN ensure correct valve alignment in accordance with OP-903, Service Water System. NOTE: This action will not be required.      BOP (Step 10) IF alarm is invalid, THEN -. NOTE: The alarm is valid. NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC to address the "C" SW Pump failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.        NOTE:  The CRS may address Technical Specifications. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.7, SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (SWS)      CRS LCO 3.7.7: Two SWS trains and the Turbine Building loop isolation valves shall be OPERABLE.      CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.      CRS ACTIONS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 3 Page  25 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
"C" Service Water Pump Trips      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION A.1 must be entered. NOTE: The "A" and "B" SW Pumps must declared inoperable within 4 hours because the "A" EDG is inoperable. A. One SWS train inoperable. A.1 NOTES: Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources- Operating," for emergency diesel generator made inoperable by SWS. Restore SWS train to OPERABLE status.
72 hours    TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.6, CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS      CRS LCO 3.6.6: Two containment spray trains and two containment cooling trains shall be OPERABLE.      CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.      CRS ACTIONS        CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION D.1 must be entered (Until SWBP is restarted). D. Two containment cooling trains inoperable. D.1 Restore one containment cooling train to OPERABLE status. 72 hours    NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief. NOTE: The crew will likely continue to down power. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 4 Page  26 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
DS Bus De-energizes/"C" CCW Pump Trips on Start      Following this, Breaker 52/32A will Trip de-energizing the DS Bus, and stopping the only running Charging Pump and CCW Pump. The operator may address AOP-018, "Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions," or various APP's to restore Charging and Seal Injection flow; and then APP-001-F5, CCW PMP LO PRESS, and ensure that the standby CCW Pump started. 10 seconds after the Standby CCW Pumps start, the "C" CCW Pump will trip, and only the "B" CCW will be left running. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6, "Component Cooling Water (CCW) System," and Technical Specification LCO 3.4.17, "Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)." Booth Operator Instructions:    IRF EPSV480DS_063 f:TRIP          IMF CCW01C d:10  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-001-B4, RCP SEAL INJ HI/LO FLOW  "A" Charging Pump trips  FR-124 indicates no Seal Injection flow  RTGB Annunciator APP-001-F4, CCW PMP MOTOR OVLD/TRIP  "A" CCW Pump trips  "B" and "C" CCW Pump auto start  "C" CCW Pump trips 10 seconds after start (Green and Red status lights are LIT)  RTGB Annunciator APP-036-H6, DS BUS SUPPLY BKR 52/32A TRIP  RTGB Annunciator APP-036-H8, DS BUS UNDER VOLT  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    NOTE: The RO may start a Charging Pump using the APP, and bypass AOP-018. APP-001-B4, RCP SEAL INJ HI/LO FLOW  RO (Step 1) DETERMINE if alarm is High or Low flow condition.      RO (Step 2) IF Number 1 Seal failure OR Loss of Seal Injection has occurred, THEN-. NOTE: A Number 1 Seal Failure has NOT occurred.      RO (Step 3) IF FR-124 is NOT available, THEN-. NOTE: FR-124 is available.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 4 Page  27 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
DS Bus De-energizes/"C" CCW Pump Trips on Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 4) PERFORM any of the following to establish adequate seal injection flow: Examiner NOTE: The crew may address AOP-018. If so, continue below. If not, proceed to Page 30 to address the CCW Pump failure. ADJUST position of HCV-121, Charging Flow    ADJUST Charging Pump speed    START additional Charging Pumps      RO (Step 5) IF required, THEN DISPATCH an operator to adjust RCP SEAL WATER FLOW CONTROL VALVE CVC-297A, CVC-297B OR CVC-297C IAW OP-301.      RO (Step 6) IF Seal Injection flow can NOT be maintained greater than 6 gpm, THEN REFER to ITS SR 3.4.17.1. NOTE: The CRS may enter AOP-018. AOP-018, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS      CRS (Step 1) MAKE PA announcement for Procedure Entry NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      CRS (Step 2) EVALUATE Plant Conditions AND GO to the Appropriate Section for RCP Malfunction Not Yet Addressed:    Loss of Seal Injection - Section C NOTE: The CRS will transition to Section C of AOP-018. AOP-018, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS SECTION C, LOSS OF SEAL INJECTION Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 4 Page  28 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
DS Bus De-energizes/"C" CCW Pump Trips on Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    NOTE: Power will be automatically restored to the DS Bus in 95 seconds. RO (Step 1) CHECK APP-001-D1, RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR LO FLOW alarm - ILLUMINATED      RO (Step 1 RNO) IF APP-001-D1 ILLUMINATES, THEN GO TO Step 2. NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. CRS  OBSERVE the NOTE prior to Step 11 AND GO TO Step 11.      RO (Step 11) DETERMINE if a Charging Pump Can be Started:    CHECK Charging System Piping - RUPTURED      CRS (Step 11.a RNO) GO TO Step 12      RO (Step 12) CHECK SI - INITIATED      CRS (Step 12 RNO) GO TO Step 14      RO (Step 14) ENSURE at Least ONE Charging Pump - RUNNING NOTE:  The RO will start the "B" and/or the "C" Charging Pump.      RO (Step 15) CHECK Seal Injection to RCPs:    ANY Seal Injection flow - LESS THAN 6 GPM    AND    ANY Thermal Barrier P - LESS THAN 5 inches Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 4 Page  29 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
DS Bus De-energizes/"C" CCW Pump Trips on Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CRS (Step 15 RNO) GO TO Step 47        (Step 47) ESTABLISH Charging Flow on FI-122A, CHARGING LINE FLOW- GREATER THAN 40 GPM      RO (Step 48) CHECK Normal Letdown - IN SERVICE      RO (Step 49) CONTROL charging and Letdown Flow to Maintain Pressurizer Level as follows:    Within +/- 5% Of Reference Level      RO (Step 50) ESTABLISH Normal Seal Injection    CHECK RCP Seal Injection - ALIGNED    CHECK RCP Seal Injection Flow - BETWEEN 8 GPM AND 13 GPM      RO (Step 51) CHECK Seal Injection Flow - ESTABLISH TO ALL RCPs      CRS (Step 52) IMPLEMENT the EALs NOTE:  The CRS may ask SM to address. If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.      CRS (Step 53) REFER to Technical Specification for any applicable LCOs    3.4.13 - RCS Operational Leakage    3.4.17 - CVCS    3.4.9 - PZR Level    3.4.4, 3.4.5, & 3.4.6 - RCS Loops Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 4 Page  30 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
DS Bus De-energizes/"C" CCW Pump Trips on Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 54) CHECK RCP Seal Cooling - ISOLATED      CRS (Step 54 RNO) OBSERVE the NOTE prior to Step 2 AND GO To the Main Body, Step 2 of this procedure.      AOP-018, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS      CRS (Step 2) EVALUATE Plant Conditions AND GO to the Appropriate Section for RCP Malfunction Not Yet Addressed:      CRS (Step 2 RNO) RETURN TO procedure and step in effect. NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC to address the failure of the DS Bus normal supply breaker. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC. NOTE: While both the "B" and the "C" CCW Pump started on low system pressure, the "C" CCW Pump has tripped shortly after start. The CRS will address the APP. APP-001-F4, CCW PMP MOTOR OVLD/TRIP      RO (Step 1) IF alarm is due to intentional operator action, THEN-      RO (Step 2) IF the running CCW Pump has tripped, THEN ENSURE Standby CCW Pump STARTED NOTE: Both the "B" and the "C" CCW Pump started on low system pressure, however, the "C" CCW Pump has tripped shortly after start.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 4 Page  31 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
DS Bus De-energizes/"C" CCW Pump Trips on Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      RO (Step 3) IF Standby CCW Pump can NOT be started, THEN-      RO (Step 4) IF FCV-626, THERM BAR FLOW CONT, closes due to pump start, THEN- NOTE: FCV-626 is OPEN.      (Step 5) IF CCW Pump tripped due to electrical fault, THEN DISPATCH an operator to check breaker and Current Limiter Fuses (E-1/E-2 breakers only) NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the "C" CCW Pump motor has an acrid smell.      CRS (Step 6) IF a single phase open circuit condition is suspected ENTER AOP-026 NOTE: This action will need further investigation. NOTE:  The CRS may call WCC to address the "C" CCW Pump failure. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.6, COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW) SYSTEM      CRS LCO 3.7.6 Two CCW trains powered from emergency power supplies shall be OPERABLE      CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.      CRS ACTIONS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 4 Page  32 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
DS Bus De-energizes/"C" CCW Pump Trips on Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that ACTION A.1 must be entered. NOTE: The "B" CCW Pump must declared inoperable within 4 hours because the "A" EDG is inoperable. A. One required CCW train inoperable. NOTE: Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops - MODE 4, for residual heat removal loops made inoperable by CCW. A.1 Restore required CCW train to OPERABLE status.
72 hours    TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.17, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)      CRS LCO 3.4.17 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal injection shall be OPERABLE, with :  Two charging pumps shall be OPERABLE  Two Makeup Water Pathways from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) shall be OPERABLE      CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4      CRS ACTIONS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 4 Page  33 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
DS Bus De-energizes/"C" CCW Pump Trips on Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME NOTE: The CRS will determine that because all Charging Pumps were OFF, ACTION E.1, E.2 and E.3 were entered; and that these ACTIONS were exited upon restoration of Seal Injection Flow. E. Seal injection to any RCP not within limit. AND At least one charging pump OPERABLE. E.1 Initiate action to restore seal injection to affected RCP(s)  AND  E.2 Be in MODE 3. AND  E.3 Be in MODE 5. Immediately 6 hours    36 hours    NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief. At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 5 Page  34 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
"A" RCP Seal Failure      Next, a #1 Seal Failure will occur on the "A" RCP. The crew will implement AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions," trip the reactor, stop the pump, and three minutes after the pump is stopped, CLOSE the Seal Leakoff Valve. The crew will enter EOP-E-0, "Reactor Trip or Safety Injection."  Simultaneously, a Loss of Offsite Power will occur on the reactor trip, and the "B" Emergency Diesel Generator will fail to automatically start. Additionally, the DS DG will trip. Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF RCS13A r:2:00  Indications Available:    RTGB Annunciator APP-001-B4, RCP SEAL INJ HI/LO FLOW  RTGB Annunciator APP-001-D2, RCP #1 SEAL LEAKOFF HI FLOW  FR-124 indicates that "A" RCP Seal injection flow is rising  FR-124 indicates that "B" and "C" RCP Seal injection flow is lowering  FR-154 indicates that "A" RCP seal leakoff flow is rising  Charging Pump speed is increasing  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    AOP-018, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS      CRS (Step 1) MAKE PA announcement for Procedure Entry NOTE: The CRS will most likely make this announcement.      CRS (Step 2) EVALUATE Plant Conditions AND GO to the Appropriate Section for RCP Malfunction Not Yet Addressed:    Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Failure - Section A NOTE: The CRS will transition to Section A of AOP-018. AOP-018, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS SECTION A, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEAL FAILURE      RO (Step 1) CHECK Any RCP #1 Seal Leakoff Flow - GREATER THAN 5.7 GPM      RO (Step 2) CHECK Either of the following Conditions Exist:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 5 Page  35 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
"A" RCP Seal Failure      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    RCP #1 Seal Leakoff Flow On Unaffected RCP(s) - REDUCED    OR    RCP(s) - REDUCED      RO (Step 3) CHECK Plant Status - MODE 1 OR MODE 2      RO (Step 4) PERFORM the following:    TRIP the reactor    TRIP the affected RCP(s)    GO TO EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, while continuing with this procedure.      RO (Step 5) CHECK Time Elapsed Since Stopping the Affected RCP(s) - GREATER THAN 3 MINUTES. NOTE:  This action will be taken post-reactor trip.      RO (Step 6) CLOSE Seal Leakoff Valve(s) for Affected RCP(s):    RCP - A, VALVE - CVC-303A      RO (Step 7) CHECK SI ACTUATED      CRS (Step 7 RNO) GO TO Step 30 NOTE:  The CRS will likely perform this procedure concurrently with the EOPs. When the Operator Trips the Reactor, move to Events #6-9.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 36 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Upon entry into EOP-E-0, the operator will determine that both ESF buses are de-energized and transition to EOP-ECA-0.0, "Loss of All AC Power." The operator will subsequently start the "B" EDG by depressing the SI Actuate Pushbutton, restore power to Bus E-2, and transition back to EOP-E-0. When Bus E-2 is re-energized, the "D" Service Water Pump will fail to sequence automatically and will need to be manually started. Upon transition back to EOP-E-0, the crew will complete the immediate actions of EOP-E-0, and continue with AOP-018. The scenario will terminate when the crew has terminated Safety Injection and re-established Charging/Seal Injection in Step 6 of ES-1.1. Booth Operator Instructions:    IMF EPS13          IMF EDG01C d:2          (Occurs on Rx Trip)  Indications Available:    Indications of Reactor Trip  Control Room lights dim  Bus E-1 is de-energized  Bus E-2 is de-energized  DS Bus is de-energized  "B" EDG RUNNING  Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION      RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action    Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers  OPEN    Rod position indicators  FULLY INSERTED    Rod Bottom Lights  ILLUMINATED    Neutron Flux  LOWERING      BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action    Both Turbine Stop Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 2.a RNO) Manually TRIP Turbine. Immediate Action NOTE: No power to the Turbine Control status lights.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 37 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    IF Turbine will NOT trip, THEN manually RUNBACK Turbine at maximum rate UNTIL ALL Governor valves are CLOSED. IF Turbine can NOT be runback, THEN manually CLOSE MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves.      BOP (Step 2.b) All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves  CLOSED Immediate Action      BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power To AC EMERGENCY BUSSES: Immediate Action    CHECK Bus E1 OR E2  AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED    CHECK Bus E1 AND E2  BOTH ENERGIZED      CRS (Step 3 RNO) GO TO EOP-ECA-0.0, Loss Of All AC Power, Step 1 Immediate Action    WHEN time permits, THEN TRY to restore power to de-energized AC Emergency Bus. NOTE: The CRS will transition to EOP-ECA-0.0. EOP-ECA-0.0, TOTAL LOSS OF AC POWER      RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action    Reactor Trip AND Bypass breakers - OPEN    Neutron flux - LOWERING      BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action    BOTH Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED    MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves - CLOSED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 38 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      BOP (Step 2 RNO) Manually TRIP Turbine. Immediate Action NOTE: No power to the Turbine Control status lights. If Turbine will NOT trip, THEN CLOSE MSIV AND MSIV Bypass Valves.      CRS/BOP (Step 3) DISPATCH an Operator to Perform Attachment 1, Restoring AC Power From The DSDG Immediate Action NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 5 minutes that the DSDG will NOT start.      RO (Step 4) CHECK if RCS is isolated:    CHECK LTDN LINE STOP Valves - CLOSED    LCV-460A    LCV-460B    CHECK PRZR PORVs - CLOSED    CHECK CVC-387, EXCESS LTDN STOP Valve - CLOSED    CHECK RCS Vent System Valves - CLOSED OR DEENERGIZED    RC-567, HEAD VENT    RC-568, HEAD VENT    RC-569, PZR VENT    RC-570, PZR VENT    RC-571, PRT ISO    RC-572, CV ATMOS      RO (Step 5) CHECK CCW Pump Running for RCP Seal Cooling Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 39 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      RO (Step 5 RNO) IF LESS THAN 15 minutes elapsed since RCP SEAL Cooling lost, THEN START CCW Pump A. NOTE: The DS Bus is de-energized. IF RCP SEAL Cooling can NOT be restored WITHIN 15 minutes, THEN PERFORM the following prior to starting a CCW Pump    OPEN breaker for FCV-626, THERM BAR FLOW CONT Valve (MCC-6 CMPT 8F)    Locally CLOSE FCV-626, THERM BAR FLOW CONT Valve.      BOP (Step 6) CHECK AFW Flow    CHECK AFW flow- GREATER THAN 300 GPM    DISPATCH an Operator to locally perform Attachment 4, Local Control Of S/G Level and Pressure NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use: IRF CFW 012, f:100 IRF CFW 013, f:100 IRF CFW 014, f:100 And report after 5 minutes that the Attachment 4 is complete. CONTROL S/G WR level BETWEEN 60% and 67%      BOP (Step 7) TRY To Restore Power to ANY AC Emergency Bus:    Energize AC Emergency Bus with EDG:    CHECK EDG-A AND EDG-B - RUNNING NOTE: The "A" EDG is OOS. The "B" EDG is NOT running.      BOP (Step 7.a.1 RNO) DEPRESS BOTH SAFETY INJECTION pushbuttons Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 40 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    If NO EDG started, THEN--    IF ANY EDG is running AND its output breaker is open, THEN -- NOTE: The "B" EDG will start and close in on Bus E-2.      BOP (Step 7.a.2) CHECK BOTH AC Emergency Busses  AUTOMATICALLY ENERGIZED NOTE: Bus E-2 is energized. E-1    E-2      BOP (Step 7.a.2 RNO) IF ANY EDG is running AND its output breaker is open, THEN--    If ANY EDG is running AND its output breaker can NOT be closed from the Control Room, THEN-    If an AC Emergency Bus can NOT be energized OR SW Cooling is NOT available to ANY running EDG, THEN-. NOTE: The "D' SW Pump has failed to auto-start; and the BOP will need to start this pump manually.      BOP  CHECK AC Emergency Busses - AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED    E-1    OR    E-2 NOTE: E-2 is energized.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 41 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:  Energize at Least One AC Emergency Bus Before Defeating the Auto Loading of the Safeguards Equipment in EOP-ECA-0.0  Safety Significance:  Failure to energize an ac emergency bus constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency power capacity. Failure to perform the critical task also results in needless degradation of any barrier to fission product release, specifically of the RCS barrier at the point of the RCP seals. Additionally, failure to perform the critical task results in the unnecessary continuation of a situation in which RCS inventory is being lost uncontrollably and cannot be replaced. This situation is equivalent to mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity at a time when a small-break LOCA is in progress. In this case, at least one ac emergency bus can be energized from the control room. Failure to perform the critical task means that RCS inventory lost through the RCP seals cannot be replaced. It also means that the RCP seals remain without cooling and gradually deteriorate. As the seals deteriorate the rate of RCS inventory loss increases.      RO  Establish Seal Injection flow    CHECK adequate DSDG OR EDG capacity to run one Charging Pump (108 KW each) (DSDG preferred)    RESET SI    ESTABLISH Charging flow NOTE: The RO will start the "C" Charging Pump. CHECK Charging Pumps - ANY RUNNING      RO (Step 7.c.3.a RNO) IF RCP Seal Cooling has been lost for LESS THAN 15 minutes, THEN START Charging Pumps as necessary NOTE: It is expected that RCP Seal Cooling will be lost for less than 15 minutes. If ALL Seal Cooling to ANY RCP can NOT be restored within 15 minutes, THEN-      RO (Step 7.c.3.b) DISPATCH an operator to perform the following: NOTE: These valves can be controlled from the RTGB.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 42 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    OPEN CVC-358, RWST TO CHARGING PUMP SUCTION Valve NOTE: The CRS may dispatch an AO. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, use: IRF CVC048 f:100 IRF CVC059 f:0 and report after 3 minutes that the Charging Pump suction is aligned to the RWST. CLOSE LCV-115C, VCT OUTLET Valve      RO (Step 7.c.3.c) ADJUST the following as necessary to maintain proper Seal Injection AND Charging flow:    Charging Pump Speed Controller(s)    HIC-121, CHARGING FLOW Controller    Seal Water Flow Control Valves      RO/ BOP (Step 7.c.3.d) MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 gpm AND 20 gpm per RCP UNLESS Seal Injection isolated CHECK the applicable EDG has loaded required equipment    SW Pumps NOTE: The "D" SW Pump has to be manually started, if not previously started. MDAFW Pump NOTE: The "B" MDAFW Pump is running. CCW Pump (as needed) NOTE: The "C" CCW Pump has previously failed. SW Booster Pump NOTE: The "B" SW Booster Pump has started on the SI.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 43 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:  Manually Start SW Pump for EDG Cooling within 40 Minutes of starting the "B" EDG  Safety Significance:  Failure to manually start the SW pump under the postulated plant conditions means that the EDG is running without SW cooling. Running the EDG without SW cooling leads to a high-temperature condition that can result in EDG failure due to damage caused by engine overheating. Under the postulated plant conditions, the running EDG is the only operable EDG. The calculated maximum time an EDG may operate without cooling to preclude adverse effects is 40 minutes. Since during the first 40 minutes of EDG operation in this scenario there are two procedural cues to check, and if needed, start a SW Pump, it is believed that failure to perform the critical task constitutes mis-operation or incorrect performance in which the crew does not prevent "degraded- emergency power capacity."      RO (Step 7.c.3.e) PERFORM the following:    RESET SPDS AND Initiate MONITORING Critical Safety Function Status Trees. IMPLEMENT FRPs as necessary  CRS  RETURN TO procedure AND step in effect NOTE: The CRS will transition to EOP-E-0. NOTE: The CRS may assign the RO or the BOP to continue with AOP-018 actions, while the crew continues with EOP-E-0. EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION      RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action    Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers  OPEN    Rod position indicators  FULLY INSERTED    Rod Bottom Lights  ILLUMINATED    Neutron Flux  LOWERING Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 44 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action    Both Turbine Stop Valves  CLOSED    All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power To AC EMERGENCY BUSSES: Immediate Action    CHECK Bus E1 OR E2  AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED NOTE: Bus E-2 is energized. CHECK Bus E1 AND E2  BOTH ENERGIZED      CRS (Step 3 RNO) WHEN time permits, THEN TRY to restore power to de-energized AC Emergency Bus.      RO (Step 4) CHECK SI Status:  Immediate Action  CHECK if SI is actuated: NOTE: SI was manually actuated in EOP-ECA-0.0. SI annunciators  ANY ILLUMINATED    OR    SI equipment  AUTO STARTED      RO CHECK BOTH trains of SI actuated:    SI Pumps  TWO RUNNING    RHR Pumps  BOTH RUNNING      RO (Step 4.b) Manually ACTUATE SI by depressing BOTH SI pushbuttons. NOTE: Bus E-1 is de-energized and the "A" Train ECCS Pumps cannot be started.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 45 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO/ BOP Foldout Page:    RCP TRIP CRITERIA    FAULTED S/G AFW ISOLATION CRITERIA    AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA    DC BUS, INSTRUMENT BUS, OR MCC5 FAILURE CRITERIA    SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING CRITERIA      CRS (Step 5) PERFORM Attachment 1, Auto Action Verification, While CONTINUING WITH This Procedure    Examiner NOTE:  The CRS will likely assign the BOP to perform this action. If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1. CRS/RO follow E-0 Actions, Step 6, on Page 51. EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ATTACHMENT 1, AUTO ACTION VERIFICATION      BOP (Step 1) CHECK ECCS Pumps Running:    SI Pumps  TWO RUNNING      BOP (Step 1 RNO) Manually START pump(s) as necessary NOTE: Bus E-1 is de-energized and the "A" Train ECCS Pumps cannot be started.      BOP (Step 2) CHECK ECCS Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment      BOP (Step 2 RNO) Manually ALIGN valve(s) as necessary. NOTE: "A" Train valves cannot be aligned from the RTGB.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 46 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 3) CHECK CCW Pumps  AT LEAST ONE RUNNING NOTE: The only available CCW Pump has previously tripped.      BOP (Step 3 RNO) PERFORM the following:    IF NO CCW Pump is RUNNING AND CV Spray is NOT actuated, THEN START one CCW Pump on Emergency Bus energized by EDG (246 Kw)    IF NO CCW Pump can be started, THEN TRIP ALL RCPs.      BOP (Step 4) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A:    CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A  ACTUATED    CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A Valves  CLOSED      BOP (Step 4.b RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as necessary NOTE:  Some valves will need to be closed manually.      BOP (Step 4.c) CHECK Excess Letdown  ISOLATED    CVC387, EXCESS LTDN STOP VALVE  CLOSED    HIC137, EXCESS LTDN FLOW CONTROLLER  AT 0% DEMAND      BOP (Step 5) CHECK Feedwater Isolation:    CHECK Main Feed Pumps  BOTH TRIPPED    CHECK Main Feedwater isolated:    Feedwater Reg Valves  CLOSED    Feedwater Reg Bypass Valves  CLOSED    Feedwater Header Section Valves  CLOSED NOTE:  V2-6A has no indication no power.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 47 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 5.b RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as necessary      BOP (Step 6) CHECK If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated:    CHECK Main Steam Line Isolation  REQUIRED    High steam flow with:    S/G pressure  LESS THAN 614 PSIG    OR    Tavg  LESS THAN 543&deg;F    CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves - CLOSED NOTE:  The MSIVs are already CLOSED.      BOP (Step 7) CHECK Proper Service Water System Operation:    CHECK SW Pumps  ALL RUNNING NOTE:  The "A" and "B" SW Pumps have no power, the "C" Pump has previously tripped, and the "D" SW Pump has failed to auto start.      BOP (Step 7.a RNO) Manually START pump(s) as necessary NOTE:  If the "D" SW Pump has NOT been manually started, it will be started here.      BOP (Step 7.b) CHECK SW Booster Pumps  BOTH RUNNING NOTE:  The "B" SW Booster Pump has started on the SI, the "A" SW Booster Pump has no power.      BOP (Step 7.b RNO) Manually START pump(s) as necessary    CHECK Both SW Header Low Pressure Alarms  EXTINGUISHED NOTE:  BOTH alarms will be LIT. APP008F7,SOUTH SW HDR LO PRESS    APP008F8,NORTH SW HDR LO PRESS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 48 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments      BOP (Step 7.c RNO) PERFORM the following:    ISOLATE SW to the Turbine Building: NOTE:  BOTH valves are already CLOSED. CLOSE V6-16C, SW Turbine Building Isolation valve. OR    CLOSE V6-16A and V6-16B, SW Turbine Building Supply valves    WHEN this Attachment is complete, THEN PERFORM Supplement M, Component Alignment For Loss Of SW To Turbine Building, as time permits. NOTE: The BOP will contact an AO and direct performance of Supplement M. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.      BOP (Step 8) CHECK BOTH EDGs  RUNNING NOTE: The "B" EDG is running.      BOP (Step 8 RNO) Manually START Emergency Diesel(s) as necessary. NOTE: The "A" EDG is OOS.      BOP (Step 9) CHECK ECCS Flow:    CHECK RCS pressure  LESS THAN 1650 PSIG [1725 PSIG]      BOP (Step 9.a RNO) GO TO Step 10.      BOP (Step 10) CHECK CV Recirculation Fans  ALL RUNNING NOTE: The "3" and "4" HVH Fans are running (With Hi Vibration).      BOP (Step 10 RNO) Manually START fan(s). NOTE: The "1" and "2" HVH Fans are unavailable (No power).      BOP (Step 11) CHECK IVSW System Actuated:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 49 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    PCV1922A, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE  OPEN    PCV1922B, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE  OPEN      BOP (Step 12) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation:    CV Ventilation Isolation Valves  CLOSED NOTE: The "A" Train valves have no power or indication.      BOP (Step 12 RNO) DEPRESS H.V. OFF on R-11 OR R-12 to initiate Containment Ventilation Isolation. IF ANY Containment Ventilation Isolation valve does NOT close, THEN manually OR locally ISOLATE AFFECTED penetration outside Containment while CONTINUING WITH this procedure. NOTE: The BOP will contact an AO and direct local action. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.      BOP (Step 13) CHECK Control Room Ventilation Aligned For Pressurization Mode:    HVA1A OR HVA1B,CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING FAN  RUNNING    HVE19A OR HVE19B,CONTROL ROOM AIR CLEANING FAN  RUNNING    HVE16, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN  STOPPED NOTE: No Indication. The BOP will take the Control Switch to STOP    Control Room HVAC Outside Air Damper A OR B  OPEN    CRD1ASA, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER  CLOSED    CRD1BSB, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER CLOSED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 50 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  BOP (Step 14) CHECK DS Bus  ENERGIZED NOTE: The DS Bus is NOT energized. An attempt has already been made to start the DSDG and re-energize the DS Bus.      BOP (Step 14 RNO) Locally PLACE DSDG in service using EPP-25, Energizing Supplemental Plant Equipment Using the DSDG.      BOP (Step 15) CHECK Battery Chargers ENERGIZED:    APP036D1, BATT CHARGER A/A1 TROUBLE Alarm  EXTINGUISHED NOTE: The "A" Train DC Bus is on the Battery. APP036D2, BATT CHARGER B/B1 TROUBLE Alarm  EXTINGUISHED      BOP (Step 15 RNO) RESTART Battery Chargers within 30 minutes of power loss using OP-601, DC Supply System. (46 KW each) NOTE: The "B" Train DC Bus is on the Battery Chargers.      BOP (Step 16) STOP R11/12 Sample Pump      BOP (Step 17) Locally RESET AND LOAD Instrument Air Compressor(s) As Necessary (38 KW each): NOTE: The BOP will contact the Inside AO about locally resetting and starting the "B" IA Compressor. Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge IRF EPSMCC6_ 218  f: RACK_IN    Compressor A (MCC5 CMPT 7M)    Compressor B (MCC6 CMPT 3G)      BOP (Step 18) PERFORM Crew Update To Include The Following:    Attachment completion Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 51 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Manual actions taken    Failed equipment status    SW status per Step 7.c    If applicable, PERFORM Supplement M, Component Alignment For Loss Of SW To Turbine Building, as time permits    Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE. EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION      RO (Step 6) CHECK AFW Pumps Running:    CHECK Motor Driven AFW Pumps  BOTH RUNNING NOTE: The "B" MDAFW Pump is likely running.      (Step 6.a RNO) Manually START pump(s). NOTE: The "A" MDAFW Pump is unavailable (No power).      RO (Step 6.b) CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels  TWO S/Gs LESS THAN 16%      RO (Step 6.b RNO) IF S/G Narrow Range level lowers to LESS THAN 16% on Two S/Gs, THEN PERFORM Step 6.c NOTE: This is a Continuous Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware. CRS  CONTINUE WITH Step 7.      RO (Step 7) CHECK AFW Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment: NOTE:  These valves are under local control. The crew may elect to restore control of these valves to the RTGB. AFW Header Discharge Valves  FULL OPEN    AFW Header Section Valves  FULL OPEN Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 52 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Steam Driven AFW Pump Discharge Valves  FULL OPEN IF PUMP RUNNING NOTE:  The SDAFW Pump is likely to be NOT running.      RO (Step 8) CHECK Total AFW Flow:    RESET SI    CONTROL AFW flow to maintain Intact S/G Narrow Range level between 9%[18%] AND 50%    CHECK total AFW flow  GREATER THAN 300 GPM NOTE:  It is likely the S/G levels are high, and that AFW flow has been throttled to little or no flow.      RO (Step 8.c RNO) IF S/G Narrow Range level is GREATER THAN 9% [18%] in ANY S/G, THEN CONTROL AFW flow to maintain S/G Narrow Range level. NOTE:  S/G levels are likely high in the band, but under operator control. IF S/G Narrow Range level is LESS THAN 9% [18%] in ALL S/Gs, THEN-      RO (Step 9) CHECK CV Spray NOT Required:    CHECK Containment Pressure  HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG    CHECK CV Spray  NOT ACTUATED      RO (Step 10) CHECK RCP Seal Cooling:    CCW flow to RCP(s) Thermal Barriers  NORMAL    APP001C1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW ALARM  EXTINGUISHED    APP001D1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR LO FLOW alarm  EXTINGUISHED NOTE:  The LO Flow alarm will be LIT. OR Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 53 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    Seal Injection flow  ADEQUATE    Seal Injection flow  GREATER THAN 6 GPM PER RCP NOTE:  It is likely that Seal Injection flow is > 6 to each RCP. OR    Thermal Barrier Ps  GREATER THAN 5 INCHES WATER PER RCP      RO (Step 11) CHECK RCS Temperatures:    With NO RCPs running, RCS Cold Leg temperatures  STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547&deg;F NOTE:  It is likely that Tcolds are >547&deg;F.      RO (Step 11 RNO) IF temperature is LESS THAN 547&deg;F AND lowering, THEN-    IF temperature is GREATER THAN 547&deg;F AND rising THEN- NOTE:  Although Tcolds are >547&deg;F, they are most likely stable. If Tcolds are rising, the CRS will contact the AO to locally dump steam steam using the S/G Steam Line PORVs. If so, Booth Instructor use: IRF MSS097 f:15:00 IRF MSS091 f:DEFEAT IRF MSS094 f:MANUAL IRF MSS098 f:15:00  IRF MSS092 f:DEFEAT IRF MSS095 f:MANUAL IRF MSS099 f:15:00 IRF MSS093 f:DEFEAT IRF MSS096 f:MANUAL IRF AIR027 f:N2_SUPPLY IRF MSS099 r:25 f:1022 IRF MSS098 r:25 f:1022 IRF MSS097 r:25 f:1022 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 54 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments  RO (Step 12) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Spray Valves:    CHECK PZR PORVs  CLOSED    CHECK Normal PZR Spray Valves  CLOSED    CHECK Aux PZR Spray Valve  CLOSED      RO (Step 13) CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped:    CHECK RCPs  ANY RUNNING NOTE:  All RCPs are OFF.      CRS (Step 13.a RNO) GO TO Step 14.      RO (Step 14) CHECK If S/G Secondary Pressure Boundaries Are Intact:    NONE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER    NONE COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED      RO (Step 15) CHECK If S/G Tubes Are Intact:    Secondary Radiation Monitors  HAVE REMAINED NORMAL    R15, CONDENSER AIR EJECTOR GAS NOTE:  R-15 is OOS. R19s, S/G Blowdown Radiation NOTE:  R-19 is de-energized. R31s, STEAMLINE RADIATION MONITORs    S/G levels  NONE RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER      RO (Step 16) CHECK if RCS is Intact:    CV radiation - NORMAL Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 55 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    R-2,CV AREA    R-32A, CV HIGH RANGE    R-32B, CV HIGH RANGE    CV pressure - NORMAL    CV Sump level - NORMAL      RO/ BOP (Step 17) CHECK If ECCS Flow Should Be Terminated:    CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs - GREATER THAN 18&deg;F    CHECK Secondary Heat Sink level    Total AFW flow to S/G(s) - GREATER THAN 300 GPM    OR    S/G Narrow Range level in at least one S/G - GREATER THAN 9% NOTE:  It is likely that all S/G Narrow Range levels are > 9%. CHECK RCS pressure:    Pressure - GREATER THAN 1650 PSIG    Pressure - STABLE OR RISING    CHECK PZR level - GREATER THAN 14%    RESET SPDS AND INITIATE monitoring of Critical Safety Functions Status Trees. GO TO EOP-ES-1.1, SI Termination, Step 1 NOTE: The CRS will transition to EOP-ES-1.1. EOP-ES-1.1, SI TERMINATION      RO/ BOP Foldout Page:    SI REINITIATION CRITERIA    SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 56 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA      RO (Step 1) RESET SI      RO (Step 2) RESET Containment Isolation PHASE A      RO (Step 3) ESTABLISH Instrument Air To CV:    CHECK APP002F7, INSTR AIR HDR LO PRESS alarm  EXTINGUISHED NOTE: If not previously done, the BOP will contact the Inside AO about locally resetting and starting the "B" IA Compressor. Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge IRF EPSMCC6_ 218  f: RACK_IN    RESET IA PCV1716, INSTRUMENT AIR ISOLATION TO CV    CHECK IA PCV1716  OPEN      BOP (Step 4) CHECK DC Busses A AND B  ENERGIZED NOTE: Both DC Busses are energized, although the "A" DC Bus is on the Battery.      RO (Step 5) STOP ECCS Pumps:    STOP SI Pumps    CHECK RHR Pumps  ANY RUNNING WITH SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST    STOP RHR Pumps      RO (Step 6) CHECK Charging Flow Has Been  ESTABLISHED Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2            Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 57 of 58          Event
 
== Description:==
Loss of Offsite Power/"B" EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/"D" Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start      Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments    CHECK Charging Pumps  AT LEAST ONE RUNNING    ESTABLISH desired Charging flow:    START additional Charging Pump(s) as necessary    ADJUST the following as necessary to maintain Charging flow AND Seal Injection:    Charging Pump speed controller    HIC121, CHARGING FLOW Controller    RCP Seal Water Flow Control Valve NOTE:  The RO may contact the AO to adjust Seal Injection flows. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO; and use: IRF CVC030 f: 100 IRF CVC031 f: 100 IRF CVC032 f: 100    MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 gpm AND 20 gpm per RCP UNLESS Seal Injection isolated      At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.
NRC SCENARIO N16-1-6 TURNOVER SHEET  1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life: MOL b) Reactor Power: 100% c) Turbine Load: 770.3 MWe  d) Boron Concentration: 853 ppm e) Rod Height: 218 CB 'D' f) RCS Pressure: 2235 psig g) PZR Level: 53.3%  h) Xenon: Equilibrium  2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. # Description LCO 3.8.1 Condition B1, B.2, B.3.2.2 and B4  3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) The "A" EDG is OOS. 4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a) None 5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a) "B" EDG b) DSDG c) DS Bus d) 4KV Bus 3 e) Bus E-2 f) SDAFW Pump 6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a) R-15, Condenser Air Ejector Gas Radiation Monitor is OOS (I&C Investigating). b) RTGB Annunciator APP-002-F8, "STA AIR HDR LO PRESS," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).                  7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a) PROTECTED 8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a) Maintain Steady-State conditions 9. TURNOVER INFORMATION  a) The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift. b) The "B" MFWP has experienced high noise/vibration over the last two hours (Maintenance is investigating). c) SR 3.8.1.1, Offsite Power Checks were last completed 2 hours ago. 10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a) IAW OST-947 data 11. RISK  a) GREEN}}

Latest revision as of 00:30, 10 January 2025

(10) Robinson 2016-301 Final Simulator Scenarios
ML16125A039
Person / Time
Site: Robinson Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/27/2016
From:
Division of Reactor Safety II
To:
Duke Energy Progress
References
50-261/OL-16-301
Download: ML16125A039 (368)
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