IR 05000413/2016007: Difference between revisions

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| number = ML16344A074
| number = ML16344A074
| issue date = 12/09/2016
| issue date = 12/09/2016
| title = Catawba Nuclear Station - NRC Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000413/2016007 and 05000414/2016007
| title = NRC Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000413/2016007 and 05000414/2016007
| author name = Davis B J
| author name = Davis B
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB7
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB7
| addressee name = Simril T
| addressee name = Simril T
Line 18: Line 18:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:
{{#Wiki_filter:December 09, 2016
[[Issue date::December 09, 2016]]


Mr. Tom Simril Site Vice President Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Catawba Nuclear Station 4800 Concord Road York, S.C. 29745-9635
==SUBJECT:==
 
CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000413/2016007 AND 05000414/2016007
SUBJECT: CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000413/2016007 AND 05000414/2016007


==Dear Mr. Simril:==
==Dear Mr. Simril:==
On November 10, 2016, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a Problem Identification and Resolution inspection at your Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.
On November 10, 2016, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a Problem Identification and Resolution inspection at your Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.


The NRC inspection team reviewed the station's corrective action program and the station's implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for corrective action programs. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staff's performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
The NRC inspection team reviewed the stations corrective action program and the stations implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for corrective action programs. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
 
The team also evaluated the stations processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the stations audits and self-assessments.
 
Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.


The team also evaluated the station's processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the station's audits and self-assessments. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staff's performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.
Finally the team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment, and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews the team found no evidence of challenges to your organizations safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.


Finally the team reviewed the station's programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment, and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the team's observations and the results of these interviews the team found no evidence of challenges to your organization's safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.
The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.


The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, "Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding."
Sincerely,
/RA/  


Sincerely,/RA/ Bradley J. Davis, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-413, 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35, NPF-52  
Bradley J. Davis, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects  
 
Docket Nos.: 50-413, 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35, NPF-52  


===Enclosure:===
===Enclosure:===
IR 05000413/2016007 and 05000414/2016007  
IR 05000413/2016007 and 05000414/2016007 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information
 
REGION II==
Docket No.:
 
50-413, 50-414
 
License No.:
 
NPF-35, NPF-52
 
Report No:
 
05000413/2016007, 05000414/2016007
 
Licensee:
 
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
 
Facility:
 
Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2
 
Location:
 
York, SC 29745


===w/Attachment:===
Dates:  
Supplemental Information cc Distribution via ListServ
 
October 24 - 28, 2016 November 7 - 10, 2016
 
Inspectors:
J. Worosilo, Senior Project Engineer, Team Leader
 
M. Toth, Project Engineer N. Pitoniak, Senior Fuel Facility Project Inspector N. Coovert, Senior Construction Inspector
 
C. Scott, Resident Inspector
 
Approved by:
 
Bradley J. Davis, Branch Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects


=SUMMARY OF FINDINGS=
=SUMMARY OF FINDINGS=
IR 05000413/2016007, 05000414/2016007; 10/24/2016 - 11/10/2016 Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Biennial Inspection of the Problem Identification and Resolution Program.
IR 05000413/2016007, 05000414/2016007; 10/24/2016 - 11/10/2016 Catawba Nuclear Station,  
 
Units 1 and 2; Biennial Inspection of the Problem Identification and Resolution Program.


The inspection was conducted by one senior project engineer, one senior fuel facility project inspector, one senior construction inspector, one project engineer, and one resident inspector.
The inspection was conducted by one senior project engineer, one senior fuel facility project inspector, one senior construction inspector, one project engineer, and one resident inspector.


No findings were identified. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision (Rev.) 6.
No findings were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process,
Revision (Rev.) 6.
 
Identification and Resolution of Problems


Identification and Resolution of Problems  The inspectors concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized and corrected. The licensee effectively identified problems and entered them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. Generally, prioritization and evaluation of issues were adequate, cause evaluations were adequate, and corrective actions specified for problems were acceptable. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were generally effective and implemented in a timely manner.
The inspectors concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized and corrected. The licensee effectively identified problems and entered them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. Generally, prioritization and evaluation of issues were adequate, cause evaluations were adequate, and corrective actions specified for problems were acceptable. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were generally effective and implemented in a timely manner.


The inspectors determined that overall audits and self-assessments were adequate in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and appropriate corrective actions were developed to address the issues identified. The licensee appropriately evaluated industry operating experience for relevance to the facility and entered applicable items in the CAP. The licensee appropriately incorporated industry and internal operating experience in its cause evaluations.
The inspectors determined that overall audits and self-assessments were adequate in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and appropriate corrective actions were developed to address the issues identified. The licensee appropriately evaluated industry operating experience for relevance to the facility and entered applicable items in the CAP. The licensee appropriately incorporated industry and internal operating experience in its cause evaluations.
Line 62: Line 109:


{{a|4OA2}}
{{a|4OA2}}
==4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution==
==4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution==
===1. Corrective Action Program Effectiveness===
====a. Inspection Scope====
The team reviewed the licensees corrective action program (CAP) procedures which described the administrative process for initiating and resolving problems primarily through the use of nuclear condition reports (NCRs). To verify that problems were being properly identified, appropriately characterized, and entered into the CAP, the team reviewed a sample of NCRs that had been issued between October 2014 and September 2016, including a detailed review of selected NCRs associated with the following risk-significant systems and components: component cooling water, nuclear service water, and safe shutdown facility. Where possible, the team independently verified that the corrective actions were implemented as intended. The team also reviewed selected common causes and generic concerns associated with root cause evaluations (RCEs) to determine if they had been appropriately addressed. To help ensure that samples were reviewed across all cornerstones of safety identified in the reactor oversight process (ROP), the team selected a representative number of NCRs that were identified and assigned to the major plant departments, including quality assurance, health physics, chemistry, emergency preparedness and security. These NCRs were reviewed to assess each departments threshold for identifying and documenting plant problems, thoroughness of evaluations, and adequacy of corrective actions. The team reviewed selected NCRs, verified corrective actions were implemented, and attended meetings where NCRs were evaluated for significance to determine whether the licensee was identifying, accurately characterizing, and entering problems into the CAP at an appropriate threshold.
Plant walkdowns of equipment within the selected systems listed above and other plant areas were conducted by inspectors to assess the material condition and to identify deficiencies that had not been previously entered into the CAP. The team reviewed NCRs, maintenance history, completed work orders (WOs) for the systems, and reviewed associated system health reports. These reviews were performed to verify that problems were being properly identified, appropriately characterized, and entered into the CAP. Items reviewed generally covered a two-year period of time; however, a five-year review was performed for selected systems to identify trends and age related issues.
Control room walkdowns were also performed to assess the main control room (MCR)deficiency list and to ascertain if deficiencies were being tracked to resolution. A sample of operator workarounds and operator burden screenings were reviewed and the team verified compensatory measures for deficient equipment were being implemented in the field.


===1. Corrective Action Program Effectiveness===
Detailed reviews of selected NCRs were performed by the inspectors to assess the adequacy of root cause and apparent cause evaluations for identified problems. The team reviewed these evaluations against the descriptions of the problems described in the NCRs and the guidance in licensee procedures AD-PI-ALL-0101, Root Cause Evaluation, and AD-PI-ALL-0102, Apparent Cause Evaluation. The team assessed if the licensee had adequately determined the cause(s) of identified problems, and addressed operability, reportability, common cause, generic concerns, extent-of-condition, and extent-of-cause. The review also assessed if the licensee had appropriately identified and prioritized corrective actions to prevent recurrence as applicable.
 
The team reviewed selected industry operating experience (OE) items, including NRC generic communications and Part 21 reports, to verify that they had been appropriately evaluated for applicability or used in licensee activities and that issues identified through these reviews had been entered into the CAP.


====a. Inspection Scope====
The team reviewed site trend reports to determine if the licensee effectively trended identified issues and initiated appropriate corrective actions when adverse trends were identified.
The team reviewed the licensee's corrective action program (CAP) procedures which described the administrative process for initiating and resolving problems primarily through the use of nuclear condition reports (NCRs). To verify that problems were being properly identified, appropriately characterized, and entered into the CAP, the team reviewed a sample of NCRs that had been issued between October 2014 and September 2016, including a detailed review of selected NCRs associated with the following risk-significant systems and components:  component cooling water, nuclear service water, and safe shutdown facility. Where possible, the team independently verified that the corrective actions were implemented as intended. The team also reviewed selected common causes and generic concerns associated with root cause evaluations (RCEs) to determine if they had been appropriately addressed. To help ensure that samples were reviewed across all cornerstones of safety identified in the reactor oversight process (ROP), the team selected a representative number of NCRs that were identified and assigned to the major plant departments, including quality assurance, health physics, chemistry, emergency preparedness and security. These NCRs were reviewed to assess each department's threshold for identifying and documenting plant problems, thoroughness of evaluations, and adequacy of corrective actions. The team reviewed selected NCRs, verified corrective actions were implemented, and attended meetings where NCRs were evaluated for significance to determine whether the licensee was identifying, accurately characterizing, and entering problems into the CAP at an appropriate threshold. Plant walkdowns of equipment within the selected systems listed above and other plant areas were conducted by inspectors to assess the material condition and to identify deficiencies that had not been previously entered into the CAP. The team reviewed NCRs, maintenance history, completed work orders (WOs) for the systems, and reviewed associated system health reports. These reviews were performed to verify that problems were being properly identified, appropriately characterized, and entered into the CAP. Items reviewed generally covered a two-year period of time; however, a five-year review was performed for selected systems to identify trends and age related issues. Control room walkdowns were also performed to assess the main control room (MCR) deficiency list and to ascertain if deficiencies were being tracked to resolution. A sample of operator workarounds and operator burden screenings were reviewed and the team verified compensatory measures for deficient equipment were being implemented in the field.


Detailed reviews of selected NCRs were performed by the inspectors to assess the adequacy of root cause and apparent cause evaluations for identified problems. The team reviewed these evaluations against the descriptions of the problems described in the NCRs and the guidance in licensee procedures AD-PI-ALL-0101, "Root Cause Evaluation," and AD-PI-ALL-0102, "Apparent Cause Evaluation."  The team assessed if the licensee had adequately determined the cause(s) of identified problems, and addressed operability, reportability, common cause, generic concerns, extent-of-condition, and extent-of-cause. The review also assessed if the licensee had appropriately identified and prioritized corrective actions to prevent recurrence as applicable. The team reviewed selected industry operating experience (OE) items, including NRC generic communications and Part 21 reports, to verify that they had been appropriately evaluated for applicability or used in licensee activities and that issues identified through these reviews had been entered into the CAP. The team reviewed site trend reports to determine if the licensee effectively trended identified issues and initiated appropriate corrective actions when adverse trends were identified. The inspectors reviewed licensee audits and self-assessments, including those which focused on problem identification and resolution programs and processes, to verify that findings were entered into the CAP and to verify that these audits and assessments were consistent with the NRC's assessment of the licensee's CAP. The inspectors attended various plant meetings to observe management oversight functions of the corrective action process.
The inspectors reviewed licensee audits and self-assessments, including those which focused on problem identification and resolution programs and processes, to verify that findings were entered into the CAP and to verify that these audits and assessments were consistent with the NRCs assessment of the licensees CAP. The inspectors attended various plant meetings to observe management oversight functions of the corrective action process.


Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.
Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.


b. Assessment  Problem Identification  The team determined that the licensee was generally effective in identifying problems and entering them into the CAP and there was a low threshold for entering issues into the CAP. This conclusion was based on a review of the requirements for initiating NCRs as described in licensee procedure AD-PI-ALL-0100, "Corrective Action Program," including management's expectation that employees were encouraged to initiate NCRs for any reason, and the lack of deficiencies identified by the team during plant walkdowns not already entered into the CAP. Trending was generally effective in monitoring equipment performance. Site management was actively involved in the CAP and focused appropriate attention on significant plant issues. Based on reviews and walkdowns of accessible portions of the selected systems, the team determined that system deficiencies were being identified and placed in the CAP.
b.


Problem Prioritization and Evaluation  Based on the review of NCRs sampled by the inspection team during the onsite period, the team concluded that problems were generally prioritized and evaluated in accordance with the licensee's CAP procedures as described in AD-PI-ALL-0100, "Corrective Action Program."  Each NCR was assigned a severity level at the centralized screening team (CST) meeting, and this determination was reviewed at the CAP review meeting. Adequate consideration was given to system or component operability and associated plant risk. The team determined that station personnel had conducted root cause and apparent cause analyses in compliance with the licensee's CAP procedures and the assigned cause determinations were appropriate, considering the significance of the issues being evaluated. A variety of formal causal-analysis techniques were used depending upon the type and complexity of the issue consistent with licensee procedures AD-PI-ALL-0101, "Root Cause Evaluation," AD-PI-ALL-0102, "Apparent Cause Evaluation," and AD-PI-ALL-0103, "Quick Cause Evaluation."
Assessment


Corrective Actions  Based on a review of corrective action documents, interviews with licensee staff, and verification of completed corrective actions, the team determined that generally, corrective actions were timely, commensurate with the safety significance of the issues, and effective, in that conditions adverse to quality were corrected. For significant conditions adverse to quality, the corrective actions directly addressed the cause and effectively prevented recurrence in that a review of performance indicators, NCRs, and effectiveness reviews demonstrated that the significant conditions adverse to quality had not recurred. Effectiveness reviews for corrective actions to prevent recurrence (CAPRs) were sufficient to ensure corrective actions were properly implemented and effective.
Problem Identification


2. Use of Operating Experience
The team determined that the licensee was generally effective in identifying problems and entering them into the CAP and there was a low threshold for entering issues into the CAP. This conclusion was based on a review of the requirements for initiating NCRs as described in licensee procedure AD-PI-ALL-0100, Corrective Action Program, including managements expectation that employees were encouraged to initiate NCRs for any reason, and the lack of deficiencies identified by the team during plant walkdowns not already entered into the CAP. Trending was generally effective in monitoring equipment performance. Site management was actively involved in the CAP and focused appropriate attention on significant plant issues. Based on reviews and walkdowns of accessible portions of the selected systems, the team determined that system deficiencies were being identified and placed in the CAP.


Problem Prioritization and Evaluation
Based on the review of NCRs sampled by the inspection team during the onsite period, the team concluded that problems were generally prioritized and evaluated in accordance with the licensees CAP procedures as described in AD-PI-ALL-0100, Corrective Action Program. Each NCR was assigned a severity level at the centralized screening team (CST) meeting, and this determination was reviewed at the CAP review meeting. Adequate consideration was given to system or component operability and associated plant risk.
The team determined that station personnel had conducted root cause and apparent cause analyses in compliance with the licensees CAP procedures and the assigned cause determinations were appropriate, considering the significance of the issues being evaluated. A variety of formal causal-analysis techniques were used depending upon the type and complexity of the issue consistent with licensee procedures AD-PI-ALL-0101, Root Cause Evaluation, AD-PI-ALL-0102, Apparent Cause Evaluation, and AD-PI-ALL-0103, Quick Cause Evaluation.
Corrective Actions
Based on a review of corrective action documents, interviews with licensee staff, and verification of completed corrective actions, the team determined that generally, corrective actions were timely, commensurate with the safety significance of the issues, and effective, in that conditions adverse to quality were corrected. For significant conditions adverse to quality, the corrective actions directly addressed the cause and effectively prevented recurrence in that a review of performance indicators, NCRs, and effectiveness reviews demonstrated that the significant conditions adverse to quality had not recurred. Effectiveness reviews for corrective actions to prevent recurrence (CAPRs) were sufficient to ensure corrective actions were properly implemented and effective.
===2. Use of Operating Experience===
====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The team examined the licensee's use of industry OE to assess the effectiveness of how external and internal operating experience information was used to prevent similar or recurring problems at the plant. In addition, the team selected operating experience documents (e.g., NRC generic communications, 10 CFR Part 21 reports, licensee event reports, vendor notifications, and plant internal operating experience items, etc.), which had been issued since October 2014 to verify whether the licensee had appropriately evaluated each notification for applicability to the Catawba Nuclear Station, and whether issues identified through these reviews were entered into the CAP.
The team examined the licensees use of industry OE to assess the effectiveness of how external and internal operating experience information was used to prevent similar or recurring problems at the plant. In addition, the team selected operating experience documents (e.g., NRC generic communications, 10 CFR Part 21 reports, licensee event reports, vendor notifications, and plant internal operating experience items, etc.), which had been issued since October 2014 to verify whether the licensee had appropriately evaluated each notification for applicability to the Catawba Nuclear Station, and whether issues identified through these reviews were entered into the CAP.
 
b.
 
Assessment


b. Assessment  Based on a review of documentation related to OE issues, the team determined that the licensee was generally effective in screening operating experience for applicability to the plant. Industry OE was screened by the corporate OE coordinator and relevant information was then forwarded to the site's OE coordinator. Operating experience issues requiring action were entered into the CAP for tracking and closure. In addition, operating experience was included in root cause evaluations and apparent cause evaluations in accordance with licensee procedures AD-PI-ALL-0101, "Root Cause Evaluation," and AD-PI-ALL-0102, "Apparent Cause Evaluation."  3. Self-Assessments and Audits
Based on a review of documentation related to OE issues, the team determined that the licensee was generally effective in screening operating experience for applicability to the plant. Industry OE was screened by the corporate OE coordinator and relevant information was then forwarded to the sites OE coordinator. Operating experience issues requiring action were entered into the CAP for tracking and closure. In addition, operating experience was included in root cause evaluations and apparent cause evaluations in accordance with licensee procedures AD-PI-ALL-0101, Root Cause Evaluation, and AD-PI-ALL-0102, Apparent Cause Evaluation.


===3. Self-Assessments and Audits===
====a. Inspection Scope====
====a. Inspection Scope====
The team reviewed audit reports and self-assessment reports, including those which focused on problem identification and resolution, to assess the thoroughness and self-criticism of the licensee's audits and self-assessments, and to verify that problems identified through those activities were appropriately prioritized and entered into the CAP for resolution in accordance with licensee procedure AD-PI-ALL-0300, "Self-Assessment and Benchmark Programs."    b. Assessment The team determined that the scopes of assessments and audits were adequate. Self-assessments were generally detailed and critical, as evidenced by findings consistent with the inspector's independent review. The team verified that NCRs were created to document areas for improvement and findings resulting from the self-assessments, and verified that actions had been completed consistent with those recommendations.
The team reviewed audit reports and self-assessment reports, including those which focused on problem identification and resolution, to assess the thoroughness and self-criticism of the licensee's audits and self-assessments, and to verify that problems identified through those activities were appropriately prioritized and entered into the CAP for resolution in accordance with licensee procedure AD-PI-ALL-0300, Self-Assessment and Benchmark Programs.
 
b.
 
Assessment  
 
The team determined that the scopes of assessments and audits were adequate. Self-assessments were generally detailed and critical, as evidenced by findings consistent with the inspectors independent review. The team verified that NCRs were created to document areas for improvement and findings resulting from the self-assessments, and verified that actions had been completed consistent with those recommendations.


Generally, the licensee performed evaluations that were technically accurate.
Generally, the licensee performed evaluations that were technically accurate.


===4. Safety-Conscious Work Environment===
===4. Safety-Conscious Work Environment===
====a. Inspection Scope====
During the course of the inspection, the team assessed the stations safety-conscious work environment (SCWE) through review of the stations employee concerns program (ECP) and interviews with various departmental personnel. The team reviewed a sample of ECP issues to verify that concerns were being properly reviewed and identified deficiencies were being resolved and entered into the CAP when appropriate.


====a. Inspection Scope====
b.
During the course of the inspection, the team assessed the station's safety-conscious work environment (SCWE) through review of the stations employee concerns program (ECP) and interviews with various departmental personnel. The team reviewed a sample of ECP issues to verify that concerns were being properly reviewed and identified deficiencies were being resolved and entered into the CAP when appropriate.
 
Assessment


b. Assessment  Based on the interviews conducted and the NCRs reviewed, the team determined that licensee management emphasized the need for all employees to identify and report problems using the appropriate methods established within the administrative programs, including the CAP and ECP. These methods were readily accessible to all employees.
Based on the interviews conducted and the NCRs reviewed, the team determined that licensee management emphasized the need for all employees to identify and report problems using the appropriate methods established within the administrative programs, including the CAP and ECP. These methods were readily accessible to all employees.


Based upon interviews conducted with a sample of plant employees from various departments, the team determined that employees felt free to raise issues, and that management encouraged employees to place issues into the CAP for resolution. The team did not identify any reluctance on the part of the licensee staff to report safety concerns.
Based upon interviews conducted with a sample of plant employees from various departments, the team determined that employees felt free to raise issues, and that management encouraged employees to place issues into the CAP for resolution. The team did not identify any reluctance on the part of the licensee staff to report safety concerns.


{{a|4OA6}}
{{a|4OA6}}
==4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit==
==4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit==
On November 10, 2016, the inspectors presented the inspection results to you and other members of the site staff. The inspectors confirmed that all proprietary information examined during the inspection had been returned to the licensee.
On November 10, 2016, the inspectors presented the inspection results to you and other members of the site staff. The inspectors confirmed that all proprietary information examined during the inspection had been returned to the licensee.


ATTACHMENT:
ATTACHMENT:  


=SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION=
=SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION=


==KEY POINTS OF CONTACT==
==KEY POINTS OF CONTACT==
===Licensee personnel===
===Licensee personnel===
:  
:  
Line 117: Line 197:
: [[contact::M. Brigman]], Primary System Engineering Manager  
: [[contact::M. Brigman]], Primary System Engineering Manager  
: [[contact::T. Byrne]], Fleet Regulatory Affairs  
: [[contact::T. Byrne]], Fleet Regulatory Affairs  
: [[contact::M. Carroll]], Safety Analysis
: [[contact::M. Carroll]], Safety Analysis  
: [[contact::B. Cauthen]], System Engineer  
: [[contact::B. Cauthen]], System Engineer  
: [[contact::C. Curry]], Plant Manager  
: [[contact::C. Curry]], Plant Manager  
Line 137: Line 217:
: [[contact::T. Robinson]], Electrical EDG System Engineer  
: [[contact::T. Robinson]], Electrical EDG System Engineer  
: [[contact::P. Simpson]], Design Manager  
: [[contact::P. Simpson]], Design Manager  
: [[contact::W. Snyder]], Senior Nuclear Engineer
: [[contact::W. Snyder]], Senior Nuclear Engineer  
: [[contact::M. Swim]], Diesel System Engineer  
: [[contact::M. Swim]], Diesel System Engineer  
: [[contact::L. Vukelja]], Performance Improvement  
: [[contact::L. Vukelja]], Performance Improvement  
Line 145: Line 225:


===NRC personnel===
===NRC personnel===
:
:  
: [[contact::J. Austin]], Senior Resident Inspector  
: [[contact::J. Austin]], Senior Resident Inspector  


==LIST OF REPORT ITEMS==
==LIST OF REPORT ITEMS==
===Opened and Closed===
===Opened and Closed===
None


None 
==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED==


==LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED==
Procedures:
: AD-BO-ALL-0005, Asset Risk Based Scoring Approach, Rev. 1
: AD-BO-ALL-0202, Nuclear Project Review and Approval, Rev. 0
: AD-EG-ALL-1104, Obsolescence Program, Rev. 3
: AD-EG-ALL-1130, Activation of Engineering Changes, Rev. 2
: AD-EG-ALL-1202, Preventative Maintenance and Surveillance Testing Administration, Rev. 4
: AD-EG-ALL-1207, Plant Health Process, Rev. 3
: AD-EG-ALL-1208, Life Cycle Management, Rev. 3
: AD-EG-ALL-1209, System, Component, and Program Health Reports and Notebooks, Rev. 5
: AD-EG-ALL-1211, System Performance Monitoring and Trending, Rev. 3
: AD-EG-ALL-1311, Failure Investigation Process, Rev. 0
: AD-NO-ALL-0202, Employee Concerns Program, Rev. 0
: AD-NS-ALL-1001, Conduct of Refueling, Rev. 3
: AD-OP-ALL-0105, Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments, Rev. 3
: AD-OP-ALL-0202, Aggregate Operator Impact Assessment, Rev. 1
: AD-OP-ALL-1000, Conduct of Operations, Rev. 6
: AD-PI-ALL-0100, Corrective Action Program, Rev. 6
: AD-PI-ALL-0101, Root Cause Evaluation, Rev. 2
: AD-PI-ALL-0102, Apparent Cause Evaluation, Rev. 2
: AD-PI-ALL-0103, Quick Cause Evaluation, Rev. 2
: AD-PI-ALL-0201, Corrective Action Program (CAP) Trending, Rev. 0
: AD-PI-ALL-0104, Prompt Investigation Response Team, Rev. 2
: AD-PI-ALL-0105, Effectiveness Reviews, Rev. 0
: AD-PI-ALL-0300, Self-Assessment and Benchmark Programs, Rev. 0
: AD-PI-ALL-0400, Operating Experience Program, Rev. 0
: AD-PI-ALL-1000, Performance Improvement Committee (PIOC) Charter and Conduct, Rev. 1
: AD-WC-ALL-0210, Work Request Initiation, Screening, Prioritization, and Classification, Rev. 1 Directive 3.13 Regulatory Affairs/Licensing Professional Training and Qualification Plan, Rev. 7 IP/0/A/3680/007, Calibration Procedure For The D/G Power Driven Potentiometer and Static Voltage Regulator, Rev. 012 IP/0/B/3710/022, 250/125 VDC SSF Auxiliary Power System (ETM) Batteries Periodic Inspection, Rev. 050 MP/0/A/7150/027G, Repair and Troubleshooting of Fuel Handling Equipment, Reactor Head, and ISFSI Equipment, Rev. 5
: NSD 512, Maintenance of RO/SRO NRC Licenses, Rev. 7
: NSD 203, Operability/Functionality, Rev. 26
: NSD 208, Problem Investigation Program, Rev. 38
: NSC 310, Requirements for the Maintenance Rule, Rev. 12 
: OP/1/B/6100/010C, Annunciator Response for Panel 1AD-2, A/9, Rev. 067 Operations Management Procedure 2-29, LCO Tracking OTMP 4.1, Operations Training Management Procedure 4.1, JPM Exam Preparation and Administration, Rev. 10
: OTMP 8.1, Operations Training Management Procedure 8.1
: Performance Improvement Job Aid, CST Screening Recommendations, Rev. 1
: PT/1/A/4400/003E, Component Cooling Miniflow Verification, Rev. 9
: PY-NO-ALL-0200, Safety Conscious Work Environment (SCWE), Rev. 0 SOMP 01-13, Operations Work List, Routine Task List, and OPS Guides, Rev. 0
: WPM 701, Work Process Manual, Work Order Close-Out, Rev. 11
: NCRs / ARs / PIPs: C-05-04252, C-14-11476, C-14-11404, C-15-0297, C-15-0334, C-15-0028, C-15-0029, C-15-0220,
: 01438872,
: 01449082,
: 01496597,
: 01508311,
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===Work Orders===
(WO):
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: 20090781,
: 20090782,
: 20105665,
: 20105666,
: 20114286,
: 20114286,
: 20114808 
: Audits and Self-Assessments:
: 01998431-05, 2016 CNS MNT Rule A(3) Self-Assessment
: 01898228, Engineering Assessment, C-ENG-SA-13-03, SSF Deep Dive, 08/05/2013
: 01981662, Readiness Assessment for
: IP 71152 Biennial PI&R Inspection, 04/11/2016
: 01985522, Catawba's Implementation of
: AD-EG-ALL-1208, Life Cycle Management Planning, 02/24/2016
: 01998431, MNT Rule A(3) Self- Assessment, 06/01/2016
: 2016-CNS-OPS-01, Nuclear Oversight Audit, Catawba Operational Focus Area, 8/25/16
: AD-PI-ALL-0300, Attachment 9, Self-Assessment and Benchmark Programs, Focused
: Benchmark Report; Training and Qualification for Security Systems I&C Technicians, 7/27/15
: AD-PI-ALL-0300, Attachment 9, Self-Assessment and Benchmark Programs, Focused
: Benchmark Report; Security Processes and Procedures, 8/21/14
: QHSA
: AR 02003477
===Drawings===
: CN-1522-11.85-06, Heating - Ventilating - Air Conditioning Safe Shutdown Facility, Rev. 8
: CN-1579-4.3, Misc. Structure Ventilation System Standby Shutdown Facility, Rev. 4
: CNM 1399.05-0011, Logic Cabinet Four Loop Plants, Sht 1-14, & -18 of 20, Rev. DL 
: Calculation
: CNC-1211.00-00-0121, Evaluation of SSF Ventilation for Hydrogen Concentration Control, Rev. 0
: CNC-1211.00-00-0032, Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) HVAC Requirements, Rev. 4
: CNC-1381.06-00-0035, 250/125 VDC SSF Aux Power System (ETM) Battery and Battery Charger Sizing Calculation, Rev. 7
: CNC-1381.06-00-0053, Voltage Analysis for 250/125 VDC SSF Power System during Station Blackout, Rev. 01
: Licensee Event Reports: 413/2016-001-01
: Other Documents: 2014-CNS-EP-01
: AD-PI-ALL-0300, Attachment 8, Quick Hitter Benchmark report #1991435-04, done 3/3/16 -
: 4/5/16
: AD-OP-ALL-0202, Attachment 3, Aggregate Operator Impact Assessment ANSI/IEEE Std 450-1975, IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and
: Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations
: ANSI/IEEE Std 450-1980, IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations
: CNS-114.00-EQB-0001, Design Basis Specification for the EQB System, Rev. 16
: CNS-120.01-EQC-0001, Design Basis Specification for the EQC System, Rev. 19
: CNS-1301.00-00-0002, Diesel Electric Generator Units Vendor Manual, Rev. 4
: CNS-1560.SS-00.0001, Design Basis Specification for the Standby Shutdown Facility, Rev. 37
: CNM-1301.00-0237.005, Diesel Generator Instruction Manual Vol. 5, Rev. 011
: CNM-1301.02-0011.001, SSF D/G Battery Charger Installation and Operating Instructions, Rev.
: D8
: CNM 1301.02-0058.002, SSF Diesel Generator Instruction Manual Volume II
: CNM-1301.02-0078.001, SSF D/G Batteries, Rev. D6
: CNM-1356.09-0004 001, 125
: VDC 900 Amp SSF Charger Instruction Book, Rev. D5
: Catawba KC System Heat Exchanger Data Sheet Catawba Nuclear Station Selected Licensee Commitments, Rev. 9
: Catawba Nuclear Station Technical Specifications, dated 06/29/2016 Catawba Nuclear Station UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT, Rev. 18 CNS Performance Trending Report - 1st Trimester 2016 Duke Fleet Protection Services Annual Benchmark Schedule - 2016
: EC-110969
: EC-114871
: EC-400855
: EC-401513
: EC-404080
: EC-404711
: EC-8663 Engineering 2nd Trimester 2016 Performance Trend Report E-Plan LOA #20
: EP/1/A/5000/G-1 Generic Enclosures Revision 10
eSOMS Unit 1 Operations Log 3/3-3/4/2016
eSOMS Unit 2 Operations Log, 2/2/2016
: G-ENG-SA-14-07, 2014 CNS Maintenance Rule (a)(3) Assessment LCO Tracking Record T-1-16-00315 Maintenance 2nd Trimester 2016 Performance Trend Report
: Maintenance Rule Function Scoping Document -
: EQC.1 Diesel Generator Control
: Maintenance Rule Function Scoping Document -
: EQD.1 SSF Diesel Control Maintenance Rule Function Scoping Document -
: ETM.1 250/125 VDC SSF Auxiliary Maintenance Rule Function Scoping Document -
: ETM.2 250/125 VDC SSF Auxiliary Nuclear Service Water Lesson Plan Course Code - CNOC87-N, 9/27/13
: NUREG-0954, Safety Evaluation Report, Supplement No. 4, December 1984 Operations 2nd Trimester 2016 Performance Trend Report Operator Challenge Evaluation Form for U1 Turbine Turning Gear, 2/10/16 Operator Challenge Evaluation Form for U1 Generator Hydrogen Leak, 1/6/16 Operator Challenge Aggregate Assessment Review Team Meeting minutes, 10/5/15
: OPS Guide 15-06, Draining Systems that Cross the Protected Area Bounding, 4/6/15 OPS Guide 16-04, Revision 4, Interim Actions for Stagnant Loop Warming, 8/4/16 Plant Health Committee Meeting Minutes, 01/06/2015 Plant Health Committee Meeting Minutes, 04/21/2015
: Plant Health Committee Meeting Minutes, 03/22/2016
: PT/1/A/4700/012 Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) Control Panel Functional Verification Revision No.007 Security 2nd Trimester 2016 Performance Trend Report System Health Report - Component Cooling Water System 4th Quarter 2014 System Health Report - Component Cooling Water System 1st Quarter 2015
: System Health Report - Component Cooling Water System 2nd Quarter 2015 System Health Report - Component Cooling Water System 3rd Quarter 2015 System Health Report - Component Cooling Water System 4th Quarter 2015 System Health Report - Component Cooling Water System 1st Quarter 2016 System Health Report - Component Cooling Water System 2nd Quarter 2016 System Health Report - Emergency Diesel Generator 4th Quarter 2014 System Health Report - Emergency Diesel Generator 1st Quarter 2015
: System Health Report - Emergency Diesel Generator 2nd Quarter 2015 System Health Report - Emergency Diesel Generator 3rd Quarter 2015 System Health Report - Emergency Diesel Generator 4th Quarter 2015 System Health Report - Emergency Diesel Generator 1st Quarter 2016 System Health Report - Emergency Diesel Generator 2nd Quarter 2016 System Health Report - Nuclear Service Water System 4th Quarter 2014 System Health Report - Nuclear Service Water System 1st Quarter 2015 System Health Report - Nuclear Service Water System 2nd Quarter 2015 System Health Report - Nuclear Service Water System 3rd Quarter 2015 System Health Report - Nuclear Service Water System 4th Quarter 2015 System Health Report - Nuclear Service Water System 1st Quarter 2016 System Health Report - Nuclear Service Water System 2nd Quarter 2016 System Health Report - Standby Shutdown Facility 4th Quarter 2014 
: System Health Report - Standby Shutdown Facility 1st Quarter 2015 System Health Report - Standby Shutdown Facility 2nd Quarter 2015 System Health Report - Standby Shutdown Facility 3rd Quarter 2015 System Health Report - Standby Shutdown Facility 4th Quarter 2015 System Health Report - Standby Shutdown Facility 1st Quarter 2016 System Health Report - Standby Shutdown Facility 2nd Quarter 2016 PICASSO #25452353
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 16:20, 9 January 2025

NRC Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000413/2016007 and 05000414/2016007
ML16344A074
Person / Time
Site: Catawba  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 12/09/2016
From: Bradley Davis
Reactor Projects Branch 7
To: Simril T
Duke Energy Carolinas
References
IR 2016007
Download: ML16344A074 (17)
v • d • e


Text

December 09, 2016

SUBJECT:

CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - NRC PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION AND RESOLUTION INSPECTION REPORT 05000413/2016007 AND 05000414/2016007

Dear Mr. Simril:

On November 10, 2016, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed a Problem Identification and Resolution inspection at your Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 and discussed the results of this inspection with you and other members of your staff. The results of this inspection are documented in the enclosed report.

The NRC inspection team reviewed the stations corrective action program and the stations implementation of the program to evaluate its effectiveness in identifying, prioritizing, evaluating, and correcting problems, and to confirm that the station was complying with NRC regulations and licensee standards for corrective action programs. Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

The team also evaluated the stations processes for use of industry and NRC operating experience information and the effectiveness of the stations audits and self-assessments.

Based on the samples reviewed, the team determined that your staffs performance in each of these areas adequately supported nuclear safety.

Finally the team reviewed the stations programs to establish and maintain a safety-conscious work environment, and interviewed station personnel to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs. Based on the teams observations and the results of these interviews the team found no evidence of challenges to your organizations safety-conscious work environment. Your employees appeared willing to raise nuclear safety concerns through at least one of the several means available.

The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance. This letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be made available for public inspection and copying at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html and at the NRC Public Document Room in accordance with 10 CFR 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding.

Sincerely,

/RA/

Bradley J. Davis, Acting Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos.: 50-413, 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35, NPF-52

Enclosure:

IR 05000413/2016007 and 05000414/2016007 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket No.:

50-413, 50-414

License No.:

NPF-35, NPF-52

Report No:

05000413/2016007, 05000414/2016007

Licensee:

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC

Facility:

Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2

Location:

York, SC 29745

Dates:

October 24 - 28, 2016 November 7 - 10, 2016

Inspectors:

J. Worosilo, Senior Project Engineer, Team Leader

M. Toth, Project Engineer N. Pitoniak, Senior Fuel Facility Project Inspector N. Coovert, Senior Construction Inspector

C. Scott, Resident Inspector

Approved by:

Bradley J. Davis, Branch Chief Reactor Projects Branch 7 Division of Reactor Projects

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000413/2016007, 05000414/2016007; 10/24/2016 - 11/10/2016 Catawba Nuclear Station,

Units 1 and 2; Biennial Inspection of the Problem Identification and Resolution Program.

The inspection was conducted by one senior project engineer, one senior fuel facility project inspector, one senior construction inspector, one project engineer, and one resident inspector.

No findings were identified. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process,

Revision (Rev.) 6.

Identification and Resolution of Problems

The inspectors concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, prioritized and corrected. The licensee effectively identified problems and entered them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. Generally, prioritization and evaluation of issues were adequate, cause evaluations were adequate, and corrective actions specified for problems were acceptable. Overall, corrective actions developed and implemented for issues were generally effective and implemented in a timely manner.

The inspectors determined that overall audits and self-assessments were adequate in identifying deficiencies and areas for improvement in the CAP, and appropriate corrective actions were developed to address the issues identified. The licensee appropriately evaluated industry operating experience for relevance to the facility and entered applicable items in the CAP. The licensee appropriately incorporated industry and internal operating experience in its cause evaluations.

Based on discussions and interviews conducted with plant employees from various departments, the team determined that personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and use the CAP to resolve those concerns.

The NRC inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance.

REPORT DETAILS

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

1. Corrective Action Program Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed the licensees corrective action program (CAP) procedures which described the administrative process for initiating and resolving problems primarily through the use of nuclear condition reports (NCRs). To verify that problems were being properly identified, appropriately characterized, and entered into the CAP, the team reviewed a sample of NCRs that had been issued between October 2014 and September 2016, including a detailed review of selected NCRs associated with the following risk-significant systems and components: component cooling water, nuclear service water, and safe shutdown facility. Where possible, the team independently verified that the corrective actions were implemented as intended. The team also reviewed selected common causes and generic concerns associated with root cause evaluations (RCEs) to determine if they had been appropriately addressed. To help ensure that samples were reviewed across all cornerstones of safety identified in the reactor oversight process (ROP), the team selected a representative number of NCRs that were identified and assigned to the major plant departments, including quality assurance, health physics, chemistry, emergency preparedness and security. These NCRs were reviewed to assess each departments threshold for identifying and documenting plant problems, thoroughness of evaluations, and adequacy of corrective actions. The team reviewed selected NCRs, verified corrective actions were implemented, and attended meetings where NCRs were evaluated for significance to determine whether the licensee was identifying, accurately characterizing, and entering problems into the CAP at an appropriate threshold.

Plant walkdowns of equipment within the selected systems listed above and other plant areas were conducted by inspectors to assess the material condition and to identify deficiencies that had not been previously entered into the CAP. The team reviewed NCRs, maintenance history, completed work orders (WOs) for the systems, and reviewed associated system health reports. These reviews were performed to verify that problems were being properly identified, appropriately characterized, and entered into the CAP. Items reviewed generally covered a two-year period of time; however, a five-year review was performed for selected systems to identify trends and age related issues.

Control room walkdowns were also performed to assess the main control room (MCR)deficiency list and to ascertain if deficiencies were being tracked to resolution. A sample of operator workarounds and operator burden screenings were reviewed and the team verified compensatory measures for deficient equipment were being implemented in the field.

Detailed reviews of selected NCRs were performed by the inspectors to assess the adequacy of root cause and apparent cause evaluations for identified problems. The team reviewed these evaluations against the descriptions of the problems described in the NCRs and the guidance in licensee procedures AD-PI-ALL-0101, Root Cause Evaluation, and AD-PI-ALL-0102, Apparent Cause Evaluation. The team assessed if the licensee had adequately determined the cause(s) of identified problems, and addressed operability, reportability, common cause, generic concerns, extent-of-condition, and extent-of-cause. The review also assessed if the licensee had appropriately identified and prioritized corrective actions to prevent recurrence as applicable.

The team reviewed selected industry operating experience (OE) items, including NRC generic communications and Part 21 reports, to verify that they had been appropriately evaluated for applicability or used in licensee activities and that issues identified through these reviews had been entered into the CAP.

The team reviewed site trend reports to determine if the licensee effectively trended identified issues and initiated appropriate corrective actions when adverse trends were identified.

The inspectors reviewed licensee audits and self-assessments, including those which focused on problem identification and resolution programs and processes, to verify that findings were entered into the CAP and to verify that these audits and assessments were consistent with the NRCs assessment of the licensees CAP. The inspectors attended various plant meetings to observe management oversight functions of the corrective action process.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b.

Assessment

Problem Identification

The team determined that the licensee was generally effective in identifying problems and entering them into the CAP and there was a low threshold for entering issues into the CAP. This conclusion was based on a review of the requirements for initiating NCRs as described in licensee procedure AD-PI-ALL-0100, Corrective Action Program, including managements expectation that employees were encouraged to initiate NCRs for any reason, and the lack of deficiencies identified by the team during plant walkdowns not already entered into the CAP. Trending was generally effective in monitoring equipment performance. Site management was actively involved in the CAP and focused appropriate attention on significant plant issues. Based on reviews and walkdowns of accessible portions of the selected systems, the team determined that system deficiencies were being identified and placed in the CAP.

Problem Prioritization and Evaluation

Based on the review of NCRs sampled by the inspection team during the onsite period, the team concluded that problems were generally prioritized and evaluated in accordance with the licensees CAP procedures as described in AD-PI-ALL-0100, Corrective Action Program. Each NCR was assigned a severity level at the centralized screening team (CST) meeting, and this determination was reviewed at the CAP review meeting. Adequate consideration was given to system or component operability and associated plant risk.

The team determined that station personnel had conducted root cause and apparent cause analyses in compliance with the licensees CAP procedures and the assigned cause determinations were appropriate, considering the significance of the issues being evaluated. A variety of formal causal-analysis techniques were used depending upon the type and complexity of the issue consistent with licensee procedures AD-PI-ALL-0101, Root Cause Evaluation, AD-PI-ALL-0102, Apparent Cause Evaluation, and AD-PI-ALL-0103, Quick Cause Evaluation.

Corrective Actions

Based on a review of corrective action documents, interviews with licensee staff, and verification of completed corrective actions, the team determined that generally, corrective actions were timely, commensurate with the safety significance of the issues, and effective, in that conditions adverse to quality were corrected. For significant conditions adverse to quality, the corrective actions directly addressed the cause and effectively prevented recurrence in that a review of performance indicators, NCRs, and effectiveness reviews demonstrated that the significant conditions adverse to quality had not recurred. Effectiveness reviews for corrective actions to prevent recurrence (CAPRs) were sufficient to ensure corrective actions were properly implemented and effective.

2. Use of Operating Experience

a. Inspection Scope

The team examined the licensees use of industry OE to assess the effectiveness of how external and internal operating experience information was used to prevent similar or recurring problems at the plant. In addition, the team selected operating experience documents (e.g., NRC generic communications, 10 CFR Part 21 reports, licensee event reports, vendor notifications, and plant internal operating experience items, etc.), which had been issued since October 2014 to verify whether the licensee had appropriately evaluated each notification for applicability to the Catawba Nuclear Station, and whether issues identified through these reviews were entered into the CAP.

b.

Assessment

Based on a review of documentation related to OE issues, the team determined that the licensee was generally effective in screening operating experience for applicability to the plant. Industry OE was screened by the corporate OE coordinator and relevant information was then forwarded to the sites OE coordinator. Operating experience issues requiring action were entered into the CAP for tracking and closure. In addition, operating experience was included in root cause evaluations and apparent cause evaluations in accordance with licensee procedures AD-PI-ALL-0101, Root Cause Evaluation, and AD-PI-ALL-0102, Apparent Cause Evaluation.

3. Self-Assessments and Audits

a. Inspection Scope

The team reviewed audit reports and self-assessment reports, including those which focused on problem identification and resolution, to assess the thoroughness and self-criticism of the licensee's audits and self-assessments, and to verify that problems identified through those activities were appropriately prioritized and entered into the CAP for resolution in accordance with licensee procedure AD-PI-ALL-0300, Self-Assessment and Benchmark Programs.

b.

Assessment

The team determined that the scopes of assessments and audits were adequate. Self-assessments were generally detailed and critical, as evidenced by findings consistent with the inspectors independent review. The team verified that NCRs were created to document areas for improvement and findings resulting from the self-assessments, and verified that actions had been completed consistent with those recommendations.

Generally, the licensee performed evaluations that were technically accurate.

4. Safety-Conscious Work Environment

a. Inspection Scope

During the course of the inspection, the team assessed the stations safety-conscious work environment (SCWE) through review of the stations employee concerns program (ECP) and interviews with various departmental personnel. The team reviewed a sample of ECP issues to verify that concerns were being properly reviewed and identified deficiencies were being resolved and entered into the CAP when appropriate.

b.

Assessment

Based on the interviews conducted and the NCRs reviewed, the team determined that licensee management emphasized the need for all employees to identify and report problems using the appropriate methods established within the administrative programs, including the CAP and ECP. These methods were readily accessible to all employees.

Based upon interviews conducted with a sample of plant employees from various departments, the team determined that employees felt free to raise issues, and that management encouraged employees to place issues into the CAP for resolution. The team did not identify any reluctance on the part of the licensee staff to report safety concerns.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On November 10, 2016, the inspectors presented the inspection results to you and other members of the site staff. The inspectors confirmed that all proprietary information examined during the inspection had been returned to the licensee.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

S. Andrews, Regulatory Affairs Senior Engineer
C. Bigham, Organizational Effectiveness Director
M. Brigman, Primary System Engineering Manager
T. Byrne, Fleet Regulatory Affairs
M. Carroll, Safety Analysis
B. Cauthen, System Engineer
C. Curry, Plant Manager
C. Fletcher, Regulatory Affairs Manager
B. Foster, Operations Manager
L. Fredrich, Fleet Equipment Reliability CFAM
T. Garrison, Operations Procedures Supervisor
K. Hear, Battery System Engineer
R. Herring, System Engineer
T. Hinkle, System Engineer
L. Keller, General Manager Nuclear Engineering
K. Lyall, Engineering
J. Marcum, Electrical System Engineer
A. Michalski, Operator Workaround Coordinator
S. Milton, Shift Manager
S. Myers, Engineering Design Director
T. Poetzsch, System Engineering Director
D. Powell, Performance Improvement Manager
T. Robinson, Electrical EDG System Engineer
P. Simpson, Design Manager
W. Snyder, Senior Nuclear Engineer
M. Swim, Diesel System Engineer
L. Vukelja, Performance Improvement
B. Woolweber, I&C Design Engineering
D. Yang, Regulatory Affairs - Engineer
M. Young, Equipment Reliability Lead

NRC personnel

J. Austin, Senior Resident Inspector

LIST OF REPORT ITEMS

Opened and Closed

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

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