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| | issue date = 06/28/1991 | | | issue date = 06/28/1991 |
| | title = Forwards Rev 9 to Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 1 FSAR (Updated), Vol I & Rev 2 to Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 1 Fire Hazards Analysis. Annual Safety Evaluation Summary Rept Also Encl | | | title = Forwards Rev 9 to Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 1 FSAR (Updated), Vol I & Rev 2 to Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 1 Fire Hazards Analysis. Annual Safety Evaluation Summary Rept Also Encl |
| | author name = WILCZEK S W | | | author name = Wilczek S |
| | author affiliation = NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP. | | | author affiliation = NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP. |
| | addressee name = | | | addressee name = |
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| =Text= | | =Text= |
| {{#Wiki_filter:REGULATORY XNFORMATXON DXSTRIBUTXON SYSTEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9107020464 DOC.DATE: | | {{#Wiki_filter:}} |
| 91/06/28NOTARIZED:
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| YESDOCKETFACXL:50-220 NineMilePointNuclearStation,Unit1,NiagaraPowe05000220AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION WXLCZEK,S.W.
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| NiagaraMohawkPowerCorp.RECXP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATXON DocumentControlBranch(Document ControlDesk),.g~R
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| | |
| ==SUBJECT:==
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| ForwardsRev9to"NineMilePointNuclearStationUnit1'FSAR(Updated),"
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| Vol'I&Rev2to"NineMilePointNuclearStationUnit1FireHazardsAnalysis."
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| Annualsafetyevaluation summaryreptalsoencl.DISTRIBUTION CODE:AO53DCOPIESRECEIVED:
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| LTRI'ENCLQSIZE:ik5+'V~+TITLE:ORSubmittal:
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| UpdatedFSAR(50.71)andAAAendments
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| /NOTES:ARECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD1-1LABRINKMAN,D XNTERNAL:
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| ACRSNRR/DST8E2RGN1EXTERNAL:
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| IHSNSICCOPIESLTTRENCL10112210111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD1-1PD0~9'BREGPILE01NRCPDRSAICLXNER,RCOPIESLTTRENCL101111''11*'11DRDNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECIPIENTS:
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| PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE!CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK,ROOMP1-37(EXT.20079)TOELIMINATE YOURNAMEFROMDISTRIBUTION LISISFORDOCUMENTS YOUDON'TNEED!TOTALNUMBEROFCOPXESREQUIRED:
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| LTTR13ENCL10DD 1"00)~CNll
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| 'trNIASAIRA0~og@HKNIAGARAMOHAWKPOWERCORPORATION/301 PLAINFIELD ROAD,SYRACUSE, NEWYORK13212/TELEPHONE (315)428-715tStanleyW.Wilczek,Jr.VicePresident NudearSupportJune28,1991NMP1L0589U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Attn:DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555Re:NineMilePointUnit1DocketNo.50-220DPR-63Gentlemen:
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| Pursuanttotherequirements of10C.F.R.550.71(e) and10C.F.R.550.59(b),
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| NiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation herebysubmitsRevision9totheNineMilePointNuclearStationUnit1FinalSafetyAnalysisReport(Updated) andtheannualSafetyEvaluation SummaryReport.One(1)signedoriginalandten(10)copiesoftheFSAR(Updated)
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| Revision9areenclosed.
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| CopiesarealsobeingsentdirectlytotheRegionalAdministrator, RegionI,andtheSeniorResidentInspector atNineMilePoint.TheFSAR(Updated) revisioncontainschangesmadesincethesubmittal ofRevision8inJune1990.Thecertification requiredby10C.F.R.550.71(e)(2) isattachedtothisletter.Thetextandtablechangesassociated withFSAR(Updated)
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| Revision9,withtheexception ofrun-overpagesorthosepageswhichareintentionally blank,areannotated
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| 'byvertical barsplacedinthepagemargins.NotethatchangebarsindicateonlythosechangesmadeinFSAR(Updated)
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| Revision9(i.e.,changebarsmarkingchangesmadeinpreviousrevisions havenotbeenretained).
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| Allrevisedpagesandfiguresaremarkedwiththecurrentrevisionnumberanddate.TheenclosedannualSafetyEvaluation SummaryReportcontainsbriefdescriptions ofchangestothefacilitydesign,FSAR(Updated),
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| procedures, tests,andexperiments.
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| NoneoftheSafetyEvaluations involvedanunreviewed safetyquestionasdefinedin10C.F.R.550.59(a)(2).
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| Alsosubmitted withthisletter,consistent withtheguidanceofGenericLetter86-10,isRevision2oftheNineMilePointNuclearStationUnit1FireHazardsAnalysis(FHA).Copiesare9107020464,910628 PDRi':tADOCK,',0~<000220 K~~"~"''-'PDR
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| Page2alsobeingsentdirectlytotheRegionalAdministrator, RegionI,andtheSeniorResidentInspector atNineMilePoint.Revision2oftheFHAconsistsofarepublication ofthedocumentinitsentirety.
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| Changesassociated withFHARevision2aredescribed intheSafetyEvaluation SummaryReportunderSafetyEvaluation 90-052,Revision1.Thesechangeshavebeenmadeinaccordance with10C.F.R.550.59anddonotresultinadecreaseintheeffectiveness oftheFireProtection Program.Ifyouhaveanyquestions concerning thisFSARrevisionortheFHArevision, pleasecontactMr.JohnJ.Laffreyat(315)428-7334.Verytrulyyours,NIAGARAMOAKPOERCORPORATION S.W.Wilczek,Jr.VicePresident NuclearSupportDV/mlsEnclosure 001438GGxc:RegionalAdministrator, RegionIMr.R.A.Capra,ProjectDirector, NRRMr.D.S.Brinkman, SeniorProjectManager,NRRMr.W.L.Schmidt,SeniorResidentInspector Mr.D.R.Haverkamp, Chief,ReactorProjectsSectionNo.1BRecordsManagement h
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| UNITEDSTATESOFAMERICANUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION IntheMatterofNiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation (NineMilePointUnit1)DocketNo.50-220CERTIFICATI NS.W.WilczekJr.,beingdulysworn,statesthatheisVicePresident ofNiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation; thatheisauthorized onthepartofsaidCorporation tosignandfilewiththeNuclearRegulatory Commission thedocuments attachedhereto;andthatallsuchdocuments aretrueandcorrecttothebestofhisknowledge, information, andbelief.S..Wilczek,Jr.VicePresident NuclearSupportSubscribed andsworntobeforeme,aNotaryPubliciriandfortheStateofNewYorkandCountyofthis@dayof1991.otarPubliinandforCounty,NewYorkMyCommission Expires:BEVERLYW.RIPKANotaryPublicStateolNewYorkQual,tnOswegoCLNo.46li87MyCommisston Exp.r8 t,~'l0,ll,yly NINEMILEPOINTNUCLEARSTATIONUNIT1NIAGARAMOHAWKPOWERCORPORATION UPDATEDFSARRECEIPTACKNOWLEDGEMENT Iacknowledge receiptof:Revision9Mycopyhasbeenupdated,andsuperseded pageshavebeenremovedanddiscarded.
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| SetReassinmentand/orSetHolderChaneofAddress(ifnecessary)
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| Pleasereassignthismanualto,and/orchangemyaddressasfollows:Pleasefurnishallrequested information andreturnto:JoanneGilletteNiagaraMohawkPowerCorporation 301Plainfield RoadSyracuse, NY13212NameofsetholderCompanySignature SetNo.Date
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| )
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| NINEMILEPOINTUNIT1FSAR(UPDATED)
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| INSERTION INSTRUCTIONS Thefollowing instructions arefortheinsertion ofthecurrentrevisionintotheNineMilePointUnit1FSAR(Updated) andtheListofEffective Pages.Thesepagesincludethoseidentified ontheERRATASHEET,whichwasinsertedintheListofEffective PagesVolumedistributed withtheRevision8update.Removepages,tables,and/orfigureslistedintheREMOVEcolumnandreplacethemwiththepages,tables,and/orfigureslistedintheINSERTcolumn.Dashes(-)ineithercolumnindicatenoactionrequired.
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| Verticalbarshavebeenplacedinthemarginsofpagesandtablestobeinsertedtoindicaterevisionlocations.
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| iRevision9FII-1June1991 0
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| 'NINEMILEPOINTUNIT1FSAR(UPDATED)
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| INSERTION INSTRUCTIONS TABLEOFCONTENTSREMOVEINSERTxxvxvi1xviiaxyiibxxvxxvixxvliXXXxxxvRevision9FII-2June1991
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| NINEMILEPOINTUNIT1FSAR(UPDATED)
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| INSERTION INSTRUCTIONS LISTOFFIGURESREMOVEgiv1INSERTxlixlviRevision9FII-3June1991
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| NINEMILEPOINTUNIT1FSAR(UPDATED)
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| INSERTION INSTRUCTIONS LISTOFTABLESREMOVEINSERTRevision9FII-4June1991
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| NINEMILEPOINTUNIT1FSAR(UPDATED)
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| INSERTION INSTRUCTIONS LISTOFEFFECTIVE PAGESREMOVE8-1thruEP8-29-1PE10-1J811-113114-1'5-1thruEP15-3+P16-1thtttEP16-317-1thruEP17-2INSERTEP-iEP1-1EP2-1EP3-1EP4-1EP5-1EP6-1EP7-1EP8-1thruEP8-2EP9-1EP10-1EP11-1EP12-1EP13-1EP14-1EP15-1thruEP15-3EP16-1thruEP16-3EP17-1thruEP17-2Revision9FII-5June1991
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| NINEMILEPOINTUNIT1FSAR(UPDATED)
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| INSERTION INSTRUCTIONS VOLUMEIREMOVE21-1WI-19-22II-231Zf434-4816~129478a-15-11-13QI-14XI-15g-16VfI-17189-20,40-50I-61-61a-63II-4I-8I-62I-71I-804X-29(TABLEII-8)(TABLEV-1)(FIGUREV-1)(FIGUREVI-18)(TABLEVI-3a)(TABLEVI-3a)(FIGUREVII-2)(FIGUREVII-4)(FIGUREVII-5)(FIGUREVII-13)(FIGUREVII-17)(FIGUREVIII-2)thruVIII-102INSERTI-2I-3II-21III-1III-5III-19III-22III-23III-43III-44III-48IV-31V-3V-11V-14V-29VI-16VI-19aVI-25VI-40VI-41VI-47VI-48aVII-1VII-5.VII-11VII-13VII-13aVII-14VXI-15VII-16VII-17VII-18VII-19VII-20VII-40VII-50VII-61VII-61aVII-63VIII-4VIII-8VIII-62VIII-71VIII-80IX-4IX-29(TABLEII-8)(TABLEV-1)(FIGUREV-1)(FIGUREVI-4a)(FIGUREVI-18)(TABLEVI-3a)(TABLEVI-3a)(FIGUREVII-2)(FIGUREVII-4)(FIGUREVIX-4a)(FIGUREVII-5)(FXGUREVII-13)(FIGUREVII-17)(FIGUREVIII-2)thruVIII-109Revision9FII-6June1991
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| 'IT NINEMILEPOINTUNIT1FSAR(UPDATED)
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| INSERTION INSTRUCTIONS VOLUMEI(Continued)
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| (FIGUREX-1)(FIGUREX-3)12I-18(TABLEXII-5)REMOVE30VX2(TABLEIX-I)-33.(TABLEIX-1)INSERT,IX-30IX-31IX-32IX-33IX-33aIX-33bX-2X-9X-15X-21X-22X-24X-25X-26X-34X-42X-59X-60X-61X-61aX-63X-64X-65X-66XI-12.XII-18(TABLEIX-1)(TABLEIX-1)(TABLEIX-1)(TABLEIX-1)(FIGUREX-1)(FIGUREX-3)(TABLEXII-5)Revision9FII-7June1991 0
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| NINEMILEPOINTUNIT1FSAR(UPDATED)
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| INSERTION INSTRUCTIONS VOLUMEIIREMOVE~&I3.I-5022-7I-8II-9II-10II-11.II-12II-13I-14I-15I-16-18II-19II-206-46-4852-54-61-64-81-81a~82~~82bW23~136(FIGUREXIII-1)(FIGUREXIII-2)(TABLEXV-2)(TABLEXV-4)(TABLEXV-9)(TABLEXV-9a)(TABLEXV-15)(FIGUREXV-55)(TABLEXV-17)(TABLEXV-18)(TABLEXV-19)(TABLEXV-20)(TABLEXV-21)INSERTXIII-1XIII-2XIII-3XIII-4XIII-5XIII-5aXIII-6XIII-7XIII-8XIII-9XIII-10XIII-11XIII-12XIII-13XIII-14..
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| XIII-15XIII-16XIII-17XIII-18XIII-19XIII-20XV-6XV-46ZV-48XV-52.XV-54XV-61XV-64XV-81XV-81aXV-81bXV-82XV-82bXV-96XV-125ZV-126XV-134XV-136(FIGUREXIII-1)(FIGUREXIII-2)(TABLEXV-2)(TABLEXV-4)(TABLEXV-9)(TABLEXV-9a)(TABLEXV-15)(FIGUREXV-55)(TABLEZV-17)(TABLEXV-18)(TABLEXV-19)(TABLEXV-20)(TABLEXV-21)~137a~137b37c-37d-137e(TABLEXV-21a)ZV-137aXV-137bXV-137cXV-137dXV-137d1XV-137e(TABLEXV-21a)Revision9FII-8June1991 0
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| NINEMILEPOINTUNIT1FSAR(UPDATED)
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| INSERTION INSTRUCTIONS VOLUMEII(Continued)
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| REMOVEhX(f37f~64~j-'126Mg-127M-128-129-130-133-142j-169lÃf187(TABLEXV-21b)(TABLEXV-21c)(FIGUREXV-56b)(FIGUREXV-56c)(TABLEXVI-2)(TABLEXVI-13),(TABLEXVI-20)(TABLEXVI-21)(TABLEXVI-22)(TABLEXVI-23)(TABLEXVI-26)(FIGUREXVI-46)(FIGUREXVI-47)(FIGUREXVI-54)(FIGUREXVI-56)(TABLEXVI-31)INSERTXV-137fXV-137gXV-137jXV-137kXV-160XV-164XVI-7XVI-10XVI-23XVI-65XVI-126XVI-127XVI-128XVI-129XVI-130XVI-133XVI-142XVI-169XVI-170XVI-177XVI-179XVI-186XVI-187XVI-238(TABLEXV-21b)(TABLEXV-21c)(FIGUREXV-56b)(FIGUREXV-56c)(TABLEXVI-2)(TABLEXVI-13)(TABLEXVI-20)(TABLEXVI-21)(TABLEXVI-22)(TABLEXVI-23)(TABLEXVI-26)(FIGUREXVI-46)(FIGUREXVI-47)(FIGUREXVI-54)(FIGUREXVI-56)(TABLEXVI-31)RevisionFII-9June1991 Enclosure toNMP1L0586 NINEMILEPOINT-UNIT1SAFETYEVALUATION SUMMARYREPORT1991I.9'107020464 DocketNo.50-220LicenseNo.DPR-63
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage1of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:81-065Rev.1Mod.Nl-80-040 N/'APostAccidentSamplingPostAccidentSamplingSystemDescription ofChange:Thismodification installed anewpostaccidentreactorcoolantsamplingsystem.Thesamplelinewastappedandnewpipingwasroutedtothesamplingstation.Anadditional samplesourcewasprovidedbytappingintothecontrolroddrivehydraulic line.Two,new,one-third horsepower pumpshavebeenprovidedtoensurethatasamplecouldbeobtainedwhenthereactorisatlowpressure.
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| Thepipingstation,aconfiguration ofpipingdesignedtoreducethetemperature andpressureofthesample,wasinstalled onthereactorbuildingwallcolumnK-8,abovefloorelevation 281'.Asamplestationwasinstalled ontheoppositesideofthewallabovefloorelevation 277'ntheturbinebuilding.
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| Thesamplestationwasconnected tothepipingstationviathirteen1j'8-inch pipesthroughreactorbuildingpenetration R-33.ReactorBuildingClosedLoopCooling(RBCLC')isusedtoprovidecoolingforthepumpsandthepipingstation.An80-gallondemineralized watertank,pressurized to100psibynitrogen, wasinstalled adjacenttothesamplestationtoprovideameansforflushingthesystem.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Themodification wasinstalled tomeetthepostaccidentreactorcoolantsamplingrequirements outlinedinSectionII.B.3ofNUREG0737.Installation ofthissystemwasinaccordance withtheguidelines setforthinSectionII.1.8aoftheNRCclarification letterdatedOctober30,1979.
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| 0 SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage2of65SafetyEvaluation No.:81-065Rev.1SafetyEvaluation Summary:(Continued)
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| Thesystemservesapostaccidentmonitoring functiononly,whichisnotreliedontomitigateorpreventanyanalyzedtransients oraccidents, anddoesnotadversely impactthefunctionofcomponents/systems relieduponforsafeoperation orshutdownoftheplant.RBCLCsystemintegrity hasbeenmaintained.
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| Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage3of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:85-046Mods.N1-85-34, Nl-85-35x-65FireProtection Sprinkler SystemandFireDamperUpgrading andInstallation Description ofChange:Thesemodifications established thereworkandinstallations necessary toupgradethesprinkler systemsandfiredampersatNineMilePointUnit1.Theworkassociated withthefiredampersinvolvedtheinstallation andtestingofvariousnewdampersnecessary formaintaining theintegrity offireratedbarriers.
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| Thisworkalsoinvolvedreworkofexistingfiredamperassemblies tocomplywithmanufacturers'etails andSMACNAstandards.
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| Thedampersarelocatedintheturbine,screenhouse, offgas,administration, reactorandradwastesolidification andstoragebuildings.
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| Thesemodifications wereinitiated asaresultoftheGageandBabcockFireProtection Audit,NRCAppendixRInspection, andanumberofANIInsurance Inspections.
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| Toaddressthe.concernsidentified inthesereports,thesemodifications consisted ofthedesign/redesign oftheexistingsprinkler pipingnetworkandtheinstallation ofnewsystemswithtie-instotheexistingfireprotection waterdistriburtion system.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Failureofapipingsystemduringanearthquake thatcouldcausefailureofsafety-related equipment wasevaluated.
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| Therefore, sprinkler systemslocatedoverornearsafety-related equipment weredesignedtoensurethatduringaseismiceventtheintegrity ofthesafety-related equipment ismaintained.
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| Designcriteriaaddressed thepossibility offallingcomponents anddelugerelease,andincorporated thepreventative measurestoprecludesuchoccurrences.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage4of65SafetyEvaluation No.:85-046SafetyEvaluation Summary:(Continued)
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| Themodifiedsprinkler systemscomplywithNFPA13-83.Allnewsystemswerehydrostatically testedatnotlessthan200psipressurefortwohours.Systemsthathavebeenmodifiedorrepairedtoanappreciable extentweretestedfortwohoursateither50psiabovenormalstaticpressureor200psi.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage5of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System87-008Rev.2Mod.Nl-86-081 N/AReactorContainment PurgeandFillTitleofChange:RemovalofHaysOxygen.and Cambridge DewPointAnalyzers Description ofChange:TheHaysCorporation oxygenanalyzer, Model635-1I,wasremovedbecauseitlackedtheadjustment controlnecessary toaccurately coverthedesiredrange.Documentation tosupportproperoperation andcalibration wasalsoinadequate ormissing.TheCambridge DewPointAnalyzerwasremovedbecauseithadexcessive driftproblems.
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| Thismodelwasobsoleteand,consequently, couldnotberepaired.
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| SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theprobability ofoccurrence ortheconsequences bfanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment important tosafetypreviously evaluated inthesafetyanalysisreportisnotincreased becausethecontainment oxygenconcentration isadequately monitored bytheredundant H2-02primarycontainment monitoring system.Maintaining theoxygenconcentration withinTechnical Specification 3.1.1limitseliminates thepossibility ofhydrogencombustion following aloss-of-coolant accidentconcurrent withafailureofthecorespraysystem.TheCambridge DewPointAnalyzerisnon-safety relatedandisnotassociated withanyaccidentanalysis.
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| Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage6of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:87-013N/AIX-4BennettsBridge115kVBennettsBridgeHydroStationEnergyManagement System(EMS)Description ofChange:Thisevaluation addressed theinstallation ofanenergymanagement system(EMS),consisting ofaremoteterminalunit(RTU),intheBennettsBridgeControlRoom.WiththeEMSinoperation andcontrolofBennettsBridgeandLighthouse HillStations, manualoperations performed bytheBennettsBridgeoperatorduringanemergency willnowberemotelycontrolled fromtheEMSCentralRegionalControlCenterlocatedatHenryClayBoulevard.
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| Uponreceiving analarmforthecompletelossof115Voff-sitepowertoNineMilePointUnit1,theoperatoratHenryClayBoulevard willnowmanuallyswitchoneoftwogenerators atBennettsBridgetothelinesupplying theLighthouse HillStation,whichinturnsuppliesemergency backuppowertotheHighPressureCoolantInjection (HPCI)system.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Allexistingcontrolfunctions intheBennettsBridgeControlRoomremainintactformaintenance oremergency operation.
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| Alocal/remote controldevicelocatedontheRTUintheBennettsBridgeControlRoomallowsoperation fromeithertheRegionalControlCenterorBennettsBridge,butnotbothsimultaneously.
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| TheHPCISystemensuresadequatecorecoolingforsmalllinebreakswhichexceedthecapability ofthecontrolroddrivepumpsandwhicharenotlargeenoughtoallowrapiddepressurization forcorespraytobeeffective.
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| SincetheHPCIbackuppowersupplywasnotassuredduringsystemblackoutduetorequiredoperatoractionatBennettsBridge,creditwasnottakenforitsuseintheAppendixKECCSAnalysis.
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| Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage7of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:87-016Rev.1Mod.Nl-86-43N/AControlRoomDCRDRPhaseIIDescription ofChange:Thismodification consisted ofvariouscosmeticandfunctional fixestoresolveHumanEngineering Observations (HEOs)scheduled for1988.Cosmeticfixesareoperational aidsandenhancements suchaschanginglabels,addingsetpointdata,changingscales,pencolors,chartpaper,pointers, completing mimicsorrevisingtheHumanFactorsDesignManual.Thefunctional fixesconsistofreplacing recorders onBpanelandtheH,O,recorders.
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| SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thecosmeticandfunctional fixesfortheDetailed'ontrol RoomDesignReview(DCRDR)PhaseIImodifications donotaffecttheoperation ofanyplantsafetysystem.Thismodification providesoperatoraids,enhancements, andconsistency incontrolroomdisplaysandprovidesmoreaccurateandreliablerecording devices.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage8of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:87-017GeneralElectricReportRDE18-0687UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:N/AControlRodDriveUseofBWR/6PartsinNineMile1HCUsDescription ofChange:/aseplacement partsfortheHCUdesignpresently installed.
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| Inordertodetermine whichoftheBWR/6partswereappropriate forreplacement parts,GeneralElectric, theHCUmanufacturer, wasconsulted.
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| Replacement partsforNineMilePointUnit1hydraulic controlunits(HCUs)areincreasingly difficult toprocureduetotheirage.Toovercomethisdeficiency, NiagaraMohawkevaluated theuseofseveralHCUsavailable fromacancelled BWR/6plant.TheintentwastousetheseBWR6HCUsrThepurposeofthisevaluation wastoreviewthose.partsacceptable fordirectreplacement andthosewithslightmodification, asidentified inTables3-4and3-5ofGEreportRDE118-0687.
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| SafetyEvaluation Summary:Partsacceptable fordirectreplacement andthoseacceptable withslightmodification arelistedonGEreport,RDE118-0687, "Evaluation oftheInterchangeability BetweentheBWR/6andNineMilePointPlants1and2Hydraulic ControlUnits."Useofpartsacceptable fordirectreplacement andthoseacceptable withslightmodification assparesintheplantareacceptable providedthattheguidelines fromGeneralElectricarecompliedwith.NMPCmechanical engineering reviewedeachoftheproposedminormodifications tothedesignated sparesandfoundthemacceptable.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage9of6SSafetyEvaluation No.:87-017SafetyEvaluation Summary:(Continued)
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| Thischangeinvolvedtheadaptionofpartsforuseasspares.Functionally, thesystemwillremainunchanged andwillnotbedegraded.
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| UseoftheBWRf'6replacement partsdoesnotchangethefacilityorprocedures asdescribed intheFSAR.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage10of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:88-002Mod.N1-87-35III-9(FIII-4)Nj'A'pgradeofTurbineBuilding-Administration BuildingAccessControlPoint(Elevation 261')Description ofChange:Thepurposeofthismodification wastoupgradetheturbinebuilding/administrative buildingaccesscontrolpointinordertoprovidemorethoroughradiation monitoring andfasterprocessing ofpersonnel.
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| TheneedtoupgradetheaccesscontrolpointwasrevealedduringINPOinspections andinternalQAaudits.Thescopeofthemodification wasasfollows:1)Demolition oftheexistingdeconroom.2)Permanent removalofonewasherfromthelaundryroomanddecontamination ofthetrenchbehindthewashers.3)Construction ofanewdeconroominthenortheast corneroftheaccesscontrolareawhich,willconsistofstandardsolidconcreteblockfrom4-footleveltoceiling.4)Installation oftwoFriskallIIAmonitors.
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| 5)Construction ofanewwallbetweenthetopoftheexistinglaundryroomwallandthe277'loorslab.6)Theremoval,revisionoradditionofrequiredplantservices.
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| SafetyEvaluation Summary:ArevisiontoFSARFigureIII-4,StationFloorPlanElevation 261'-0"wasincorporated intotheJune1988FSARUpdate.Theupgradeoftheaccesscontrolpointincluding installation oftheFriskallmonitorshadnoeffectontheoperation ofanysafety-related equipment.
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| Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage11of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:88-006Mod.N1-86-057 N/ARodWorthMinimizer RodWorthMinimizer Inoperability Indication Description ofChange:Technical Specification Section3.1.1.b(3)(b')
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| requirestherodworthminimizer (RWM)tobeoperableinordertomovecontrolrodswheninthestartuporrunmodebelow20percentratedthermalpower.Afterthewithdrawal ofatleast12controlrods,theTechnical Specification allowsthesubstitution ofasecondoperatororengineerinplaceoftheRWM.Ononeoccasion, withlessthan12controlrodswithdrawn andreactorpowerlessthan20%,controlrodsweremovedwhiletherodworthminimizer wasinoperable.
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| Investigations intotheeventconcluded thattheRWMhadfailedduetoanindexingerrorinthesoftware.
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| Duetotheunusualnatureofthefailure,normalinoperability indications andalarmswerenotgenerated totheoperator.
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| ThepurposeofthischangewastoprovideRWMhardwarechangesthatwillinitiateinoperability alarmsfortheoperatorshouldasimilarproblemoccurinthefuture.SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheRWMisacomputerized programthatsupplements procedural controlsinenforcing analyzedcontrolrodwithdrawal sequences.
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| Itisconsidered non-safety related;therefore, 10CFR50AppendixBdoesnotapply.Theconnecting ofthreeadditional contacts(computer parity,computerstallandcomputertrouble)tothespareindicator providesvitalinformation totheoperatorandcouldpossiblypreventfutureTechnical Specifications violations.
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| ThehardwarechangesdonotaffectanyotherplantsystemsbesidestheRWMandcontrolroomEconsole.FSARanalysesconcerning arodwithdrawerrororcontrolroddropareunaffected.
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| Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage12of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:88-020SiteEmergency Plan,Section5.2.2.gUFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:N/ASiteEmergency PlanEmergency PlanStaffingRequirement fortheShiftTechnical AdvisorDescription ofChange:Thischangeresolvesaninconsistency inon-shiftstaffingrequirements fortheShiftTechnical Advisor(STA).TheSiteEmergency Planiscurrently interpreted torequiretheSTApositiontobestaffedatUnit1atalltimes.TheplantTechnical Specifications requiretheSTApositiontobestaffedwhentheunitisoperating orinhotshutdown.
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| ThereisnoSTAstaffingrequirement iftheunitisincoldshutdownorrefueling.
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| Thechangeauthorizes amendment oftheSiteEmergency PlantoclarifythatstaffingoftheSTApositionforUnit1isnotrequiredwhenitisincoldshutdownorrefueling.
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| SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheNRC,inaletterdatedJuly2,1980,statedtheSTAwasnotrequiredforcoldshutdownorrefueling.
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| TheNRC,inalaterletter(July31,1980),identified thattheon-shiftSTAisrequiredonlyforpoweroperation, startup,orhotshutdown.
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| NUREG0654,Rev.1,II.B.5references theJuly31,1980letter,butinTableB-l,minimumstaffingrequirements failtospecifyplantoperating conditions relatedtostaffingrequirements.
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| Duringcoldshutdownorrefueling, reactorcoolanttemperature islowandthereactorisnotpressurized.
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| Thereactorcoolanttemperature isequaltoorlessthan212'Finrefueling orcoldshutdown.
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| Undertheseconditions, possiblewaterleveltransients orthefuelroddropaccidents arethemostsignificant events.Theseeventsarenotofthecomplexity ofthoseeventsthatmightoccurduringpoweroperation.
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| Specialon-shiftengineering expertise isnotrequired, whichiswhytheNRCdidnotrequireSTAsfortherefueling andcoldshutdownmodes.
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| | |
| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage13of65SafetyEvaluation No.:88-020SafetyEvaluation Summary:(Continued)
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| TheSiteEmergency Planhasbeenrevisedconsistent withtheTechnical Specifications tospecifythattheSTApositionisrequiredonlywhenthereactorisinthepoweroperation, startup,orhotshutdownmodes.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage14of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:89-13Rev.'364Mod.N1-89-131, andN1-OP-14VII-15,VII-16,VII-17,VII-19'V160'V164System:TitleofChange:Containment SpraySystemContainment SprayPostDBALOCAAppendixJWaterSealDescription ofChange:SafetyEvaluation 89-13,Revision3,providedadditional analysisofthewatersealmethodtobeemployedatNMP1.Theanalyzedmethodusedthefollowing systemconfiguration toprovidethewatersealwhilesprayingcontainment:
| |
| a.Intertievalves80-45and80-40normallyopen(manualvalves)b.Intertievalves80-41and80-44normallyclosed(remoteairoperatedvalves)c.Injection valves80-15,80-16,80-35,80-36normallyopen(remoteairoperated).
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| SafetyEvaluation 89-13,Revision4,evaluated whethertheabovedescribed valveline-ups(inNl-OP-14) toimplement thewatersealwillimpactthevariousmodesofcontainment spraysystemoperation, specifically, drywellandsuppression poolspraying, toruscooling,toruslevelcontrol,post-LOCA containment floodup,andsupplying rawwatertothecontainment sprayspargersandcreateanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theanalyzedconfiguration providestherequiredwaterseal.Operating Procedure N1-OP-14providesadequateprocedural guidancetoterminate sprayandinitiatetoruscooling,toruslevelcontrol,orcontainment floodingasdictatedbyEOPs.Thewatersealduringspraymodesdoesnotcreatethepossibility foranaccidentofadifferent typethananypreviously evaluated intheFSAR.1
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage15of65SafetyEvaluation No.:89-13Rev.364SafetyEvaluation Summary:(Continued)
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| Establishment ofthewatersealdoesnotreducethemarginofsafetywithrespecttosprayingcontainment.
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| Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thattheContainment SprayPostDBALOCAAppendixJWaterSealdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage16of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:89-024Rev.2Mod.N1-89-208 VI-40,VI-41(FVI-18)Instrument Air113ReactorBuildingTrackBayInnerDoorSealAirSupplyDescription ofChange:Therearetwodoorsonthereactorbuildingtrackbay,eitherofwhichservestoprovidesecondary containment atrequiredperiods.Thepurposeofthismodification wastoupgradethereliability oftheairsupplyandaircontrolequipment andsealhousingtotheinnertrackbaydoorinflatable seal.1nadequate airsealsupportalongtheperimeter ofthedoorframewasidentified.
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| Anewsealhousingandfastening methodwasdesignedandinstalled toeliminate potential problems.
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| SafetyEvaluation Summary:Whentheinnerdoorisused,thesealispressurized toprovideleaktightness.
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| Airtopressurize thesealwassuppliedfromoneoftwosources(i.e.,houseserviceairoradedicated compressor asabackupsource).Anewsourceofsafety-related airwassuppliedtothesealfrominstrument airbranchpiping.Theprobability ofadoorsealsystemfailurewasreducedasaresultofthismodification byupgrading thedoorsealairsupply,aircontrolequipment andsealhousingtosafety-related criteria.
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| Thismodification increased theassurance thatunderpostulated adverseplantconditions, thedoorsealsystemwouldcontinuetobeoperableandcontribute tomaintaining secondary containment.
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| Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage17of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:89-029Mod.No.N1-89-209 X21gX9(FX-3)HeadSpraySystem(34)PartialRemovaloftheHeadSprayPipingDescription ofChange:Thepurposeofthischangewastoeliminate useofthereactorheadspraycoolingsystem.Thiswasaccomplished bypermanently removingthespoolpiecelocatedinthesystemdischarge linetothereactorvesselhead.Theremaining systempiping(including theportionthatcontainsthecontainment isolation valves)wasblindflangedandsupported inamannerconsistent withtheoriginaldesignbasis.Theisolation valvescontinuetobemaintained asdescribed intheTechnical Specifications.
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| Minorchangestotwoplantoperation procedures, OP-4,"Shutdown CoolingandHeadSpraySystem,"andOP-5,"ControlRodDriveSystems,"
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| werealsoimplemented.
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| SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theheadspraysystemwasnotrequiredtooperateunderanyshutdown,
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| : cooldown, accident, ortransient conditions.
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| Thesystemwasoriginally installed tobeusedduringnormalplantshutdownonly.However,atNMP1thissystemwasnotregularly used.ThisflowpathwasalsonotrequiredtosatisfyAppendixRcoldshutdowninventory makeuprequirements sincesufficient makeupcapability (viatheCRDhydraulic system)isprovidedbyotherredundant flowloops.Thedeletionofthespoolpieceandtheinsertion oftheblindflangesprovidedaddedassurance ofreactorpressurevesselisolation.
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| Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| | |
| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage18of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:89-034Rev.1ProblemReport530III-1,III-5,III-23@III43/VI25~VII40'VI23'vz-65, xvz-126,XVI-127(TXVI-20),xvz-128(Txvz-21)gxvz-129(Txvz-22),XVI-130(TXVI23)Ixvz-133(Txvz-26),xvz-142,XVI186(TXVI31)~XVI187System:Generic-SteelandConcreteStructures TitleofChange:Construction CodesforModifications andAdditions toNMP1SteelandConcreteStructures
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| ~~Description ofChange:Thissafetyevaluation wasforaproposedchangeinmodification/change procedure thatpermitted theuseofcurrentconstruction codesformodifications andadditions, toNMP1steelandconcretestructures inlieuoftheoriginalconstruction codes.Specifically thischangepermitted:
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| (a)useofcurrentconstruction codesforallstand-alone modifications/changes, and(b)useofcurrentconstruction codesforreanalysis ofexistingstructures, whenrequired, foramodification/change oraredefinition ofdesignloads,etc.Thecurrentconstruction codeswereconsidered tobeupgradesrelativetotheoriginalconstruction codes.Thatis,therequirements ofthecurrentconstruction codeswereconsidered tobeasgoodas,orbetter(butnotnecessarily moreconservative) than,therequirements oftheoriginalconstruction codes.Onthisbasis,itwasconcluded thatstand-alone modifications/changes toNMP1steelandconcretestructures maybedesignedandanalyzedinaccordance withtherequirements ofthecurrentconstruction codes.Indoingso,itwasconsidered important thatthemodification/change meetalltherequirements ofthecurrentconstruction code-notsomerequirements ofthecurrentcodeandotherrequirements oftheoriginalconstruction code.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage19of65SafetyEvaluation No.:89-034Rev.1SafetyEvaluation Summary:Itwasconcluded thattheoveralldesignmarginsprovidedbythecurrentindustrycodesforsteelandconcretestructures wereadequateforNMP1and,infact,arethesameasthoseprovidedinnewplants.Ampletechnical justification existstousethecurrentindustrycodestoanalyzeandmodify/change existingNMP1steelandconcretestructures.
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| Foranystand-alone modifications/changes inthestructural components ofNMP1,itwasacceptable todesignandanalyzethemodification/change inaccordance withthecurrentconstruction code,aslongasallrequirements (e.g.,materialdesign,inspection, etc.)ofthecurrentconstruction codeweremet.Itwasnotacceptable tomixrequirements (e..g.,thedesignrequirements fromthecurrentcodewiththeinspection requirements fromtheoriginalcode)unlessthedifferences werereconciled.
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| Forreanalysis ofexistingstructures, itwasacceptable toreanalyze theexistingstructure tothecurrentconstruction code,providedthatallconstruction detailsoftheexistingstructure mettherequirements ofthecurrentcode.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded, thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage20of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:89-037N//AN/AInstrument AirSystemEvaluation ofAcceptability ofNon-Safety RelatedLoadsontheSafetyRelatedInstrument AirSystemDescription ofChange:Thepurposeofthissafetyevaluation wastoevaluatetheacceptability ofbothsafety-related andnon-safety relatedairloadsbeingsuppliedoffthesafety-related instrument airsystem(IAS).Nophysicalchangesweremadetothefacilityasaresultofthisevaluation.
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| SafetyEvaluation Summary:Subsequent totheissuanceoftheoperating license,systemloadswereincreased suchthattwoIAScompressors (485scfmeach)hadeachbeenreducedto66%capacity.
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| A729scfmcompressor wasalsoaddedtothesystem.Thereduction intheabilityofeither485scfmcompressor toindependently andfullysupporttheloadsonIASisacceptable duetothelargestoragecapacityofthesystem(assuming loadsareintermittent).
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| Operatoractioncanbetakentoeitherisolatenon-vital loadsfromtheIASsystemortorestoretooperability aninoperable'ompressor ordieselgenerator duringaDBAeventwhichassumesasingleactivefailure.TheIASsystemwasdedicated inplaceasasafety-relatedsystem;however,atthetimeofdedicating thesystem,theeffectofnon-safety relatedloadsonsystemperformance wasnotevaluated.
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| Basedupontheoriginallicensing basis,itisconcluded thatthesenon-safety relatedloadswouldnotfailinamannerthatwouldcausealossoftheirpressureretention functionoftheairintheIASsystemduringaDBA.Thisreasoning issupported bythepositionthataseismiceventisnotpostulated duringaDBA.Withoutaseismiceventduringpostulate afailureoftheairnon-safety relatedairloadonconcluded thatthepresenceofsafety-related airsystemdoesperformance ofIAS.aDBA,itisunreasonable topressureretention functionofaIAS.Therefore, itcanbenon-safety relatedloadsonanotdegradethereliability and
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage21of65SafetyEvaluation No.:89-037SafetyEvaluation Summary:(Continued)
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| Basedupontheabove,theexistence ofnon-safety relatedloadsonthesafety-related IASdoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionandisincompliance withNRCstandards.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage22of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-001N/AN/ARadwasteBuildingTemporary HEPAVentilation fortheRadwasteBldg.225'levation Clean-upProjectDescription ofChange:Radwastebuildingelevation 225'ascleanedbyvacuuming upradwasteprocessfiltersludgeandpumpingthesludgebackthroughthenormalradwastesystemsforprocessing.
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| Duringtheentireoperation, itwasnecessary tousetemporary HEPAfilterunitstodirectcleanairflowtotheareastobeoccupiedbypersonnel anddirectcontaminated airawayfromtheseareasandthepointsofegresstoelevation 225'.SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheadditionofthetwoHEPAfilterunitscausedsomeminorimbalances totheflowsshownonFigureIII-15oftheFSAR.Itwasqualitatively demonstrated anddocumented thattheintendedflowpathsoftheHVACsystemweremet,i.e.,flowfromlowestcontaminated areatomorecontaminated tohighestcontaminated bytheuseof"smoketubetesting"onthe236',248'nd261'levations oftheradwastebuildingimmediately afterthetemporary HEPAventilation unitswerestarted.Airwasremovedfromthemostcontaminated areas,andprocessed throughHEPAfiltersdesignedtofilterradioactively contaminated airwhichresultedinradioactively "clean"airatthefilterdischarge.
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| Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthistemporary changedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| | |
| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage23of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-008N/AN/'AFuelCoreOperating LimitsReport-Revision1Description ofChange:Channelbowwasidentified asacontributing factorinthefuelfailures(4-fuelpins)experienced attheOskarshamn reactorinDecember1987.ThischangeraisestheMCPRlimitinthecoreoperating limitsreport(COLR)tocompensate forthepotential impactofchannelbowing,andappliesamultiplier totheMAPLHGRlimitsintheCOLRtocompensate forthepotential impactofrecirculation linepipewhipduringaDBALOCA.SafetyEvaluation Summary:ChannelbowandGeneralElectric's proposedlongtermfixhasbeenreviewedandacceptedbytheNRC(NoticeNo.89-69).Untilthelongtermfix(updating theprocesscomputerdatabanktoincorporate channelbowintheRfactors)isincorporated, theraisingoftheMCPRoperating limitwillprovideassurance thattheSLCPRwillnotbeviolated.
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| ThecurrentMAPLHGRlimitsintheCOLR(Revision 0)assumetwospargerseachfedbyonecorespraypumpandonetoppingpump.Theotherpumpstringsareassumedlostthroughasinglefailure,e.g.,lossofadieselgenerator.
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| (Anexception isthecorespraylinebreakeventwhichcreditsonlytheremaining spargerfedbyaonepumpstring).ThechangeisbasedonananalysisoftheDBArecirculation linebreak(including resulting loss,bypipewhip,ofacoresprayandemergency condenser line)andcreditsoperation ofasinglespargerfedbyaonepumpstring.ThechangeinMCPRfrom1.41to1.445andtheapplication ofa.85MAPLHGRmultiplier isincompliance withNRCstandards.
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| Thesechangesdonotresultinanyphysicalmodifications toanyECCSsystems.ThechangesensurethattheSLCPRlimitand
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage24of65SafetyEvaluation No.:90-008SafetyEvaluation Summary:(Continued) acceptance criteriaof10CFR50.46 arenotviolated.
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| Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage25of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:90-013Rev.4leod.N1-90-030 X-25,XV-61(TXV-4),XV-64ReactorBuildingClosedLoopCoolingWaterSystem(RBCLC)TitleofChange:Installation ofTravelStopinTCV70-137 ValveActuatorDescription ofChange:Thischangeinstallsamechanical travelstopinthepistonactuatoroftheTCV70-137 valvetopreventthevalvefromclosingcompletely totheRBCLCheatexchangers underanyfailsituation.
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| SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheexistingRBCLCwatertemperature controlloopisonlyondiesel102;therefore, theLOOPwillcauseE/P70-137,TC70-23B, etc.,tofailTCV70-137 closedbecause,perprocedure N1-ICP-C-70, theLOOPwillcausealowsignalforE/P70-137causingthepositioner toclosevalveTCV70-137 toheatexchangers.
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| Licensing commitments takecreditfortheTCV70-137 intheRBCLCsystemfailinginopenpositionintheeventoflossofinstrument airtotheTCVpermitting fullflowtotheRBCLCheatexchangers.
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| Theactualvalve,whentested,remainedinthe"as-is"position.
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| Depending onthevalvepositionatthetimeoffailure,thevalvecouldpotentially drifttothefullbypasspositionduetoflowinducedforces.Thissingleactivefailuremayresultininadequate flowthroughtheRBCLCheatexchangers, thuspreventing coolingofvariousessential heatloads.Inordertoprecludepotential closingofTCV70-137 totheRBCLCheatexchangers duetoLOOPand/orlossofinstrument air,amechanical travelstopisinstalled inthepistonactuator.
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| SincecreditcannotbetakenforoperatoractionduringaDBAevent,thetravelstopislimitedtoprovideadequatecoolingcapacitytoassureremovalofemergency essential heatloadof8.34x10Btu/hr.Althoughonlythecontrolroomairconditioning chillerandtheCADsystems,whichareatotalloadof0.76x10'tu/hr, areultimately essential, Engineering hasdesignedthemechanical travelstoptoallowadequateflowstocoolalltheessential loads.
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| 0'Aa SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage26of65SafetyEvaluation No.:90-013Rev.4SafetyEvaluation Summary:(Continued)
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| Engineering designedthemechanical travelstoptoassurecoolingoftheseloadstoeithermitigatetheconsequences ofanaccidentortoassuredecayheatremoval(e.g.,spentfuelpool).Duringnormaloperation whensomeessential andmostofthenon-essential heatloadsarefunctioning, TCV70-137 willremainabovethemechanical travelstop.Potential overcooling ofpipingandequipment wouldoccurduringaccidentornormalplantoperation inwinterwhenlakewatermaycoolto32'Fresulting incoolerRBCLCwater.ThiscoolerRBCLCwaterinwinterwillnotcauseanydamagetotherecirculating pumpsealsbecausetheytripduringaDBAevent.However,duringnormalplantoperation, coolerRBCLCwatermaybeaconcernfortherecirculating pumpseals.Therefore, thetravelstopforTCV70-137 isselectedinamannerthat,duringaDBAevent,itwilllimittemperature to95'F(FSARlimit)with81'Flakewatertemperature insummerandapproximately 60'Fduringnormaloperation inwinterwhenlakewatertemperature is32'F.Thiswillprecludeanydamagetotherecirculating pumpseals.Basedontheaboveanalysis, itisconcluded thatdisablement oftheRBCLCsystemduetosingleactivefailure,asdiscussed above,isprecluded byinstallation ofamechanical travelstopinthepistonactuatorofTCV70-137.
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| Thispreventsitfromclosingcompletely onlossofinstrument airorlossofpowertothetemperature controlinstruments.
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| Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage27of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-014Rev.02Mod.Ni-90-005 IX-29,IX-30MGSetsMGSetSpeedControlDescription ofChange:Thepurposeofthischangewastoeliminate thespeedcontrolproblemsassociated withMotorGenerator (MG)Sets161,162,167,171,and172identified duringtheN1-ST-R2(simulated LOCA/LOOP) test.Thischangeentailedthede-energization ofacemergency lightingforashorttimeperiodonlossofoffsitepower(LOOP)andreturnofthebatterychargeronauto(closureofthedcbreaker).
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| SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theanalysisshowsthattheemergency dclightingprovidesadequatelightingforplantoperators andemergency maintenance personnel toperformnecessary operations andrepairs,including thesafeaccessandegressroutesthereto.Thisisincompliance withtherequirements ofAppendixR,SafeShutdownAnalysis, FireProtection andLifeSafetyCode.Thetest,usingtheUnit1simulator, indicated thattheillumination inthecontrolroomisadequatefortheoperators toperformtheirfunctions duringthenon-Appendix Revents.TheNMP1emergency lightingalsosatisfies theguidancecontained inNUREG-0800.
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| Theanalysisalsoshowsthatautomatic closureofthebatterychargerbreakerisincompliance withtheFSAR,andthedesignimplications, asdescribed earlier,donotconstitute anydesigndeficiency.
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| Basedontheevaluation.
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| performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage28of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:90-015Rev.1Technical Specification BasesSections3.1.8and4.1.8UFSARAffectedPages:VZZ-61,VZZ-61a,VIZ-63(FVII-17)System:HPCI/Feedwater, Systems29,49,50TitleofChange:HPCIFlowReduction Description ofChange:Thehighpressurecoolantinjection (HPCI)systemisanoperating modeofthecondensate/feedwater system.TheHPCIsystemprovidesanalternate methodofemergency corecoolingforcertainsmallbreakLOCAswhichdonotresultinrapidreactorvesseldepressurization.
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| ThechangerevisestheminimumrequiredflowfortheHPCIsystemfrom3800gpm(designflowrate)to3420gpminordertotakeintoaccounta10%flowdegradation ofthepumpswithoperation.
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| SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thissafetyevaluation assessestheacceptability ofa10percentreduction intheHPCIflowrate(from3800gpmto3420gpm)usedinHPCIperformance analyses.
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| Whentheflowrequirements forHPCIwereoriginally specified intheTechnical Specification BasesandFSAR,themaximumoutputfromonefeedwater train(condensate pump,feedwater boosterpumpandfeedwater pump)of3800gpmwasspecified.
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| Thisflowcapability didnottakeintoaccountanydegradation ofthepumpswithoperation.
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| Hence,thecurrentHPCIflowrate(3800gpm)isthesystemcapability ratherthanamakeuprequirement.
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| Areduction inassumedHPCIflowrateaffectsthecalculated HPCIperformance capability toprovidecorecoveragebyitselfforlinebreaksupto0.063ft(ratherthan0.07ft)whileitsoriginalintendedfunction, todepressurize thevesselto365psig,remainsunaffected.
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| IntheeventofasmallbreakLOCAandlossofoffsitepower,theADSsystem,emergency condenser andcorespraywouldstillbeavailable tomaintainpeakcladtemperatures below10CFR50.46 limitswhiledepressurizing thevessel.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage29of65SafetyEvaluation No.:90-015Rev.1SafetyEvaluation Summary:(Continued)
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| HPCIisstillcapableofdepressurizing thevesselto365psigsothatcoresprayisinitiated.
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| Anavailable HPCIflowof3420gpmpermitspumpperformance trendinginaccordance withSectionXIoftheASMECodewhileensuringthesystemremainsoperable.
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| AchangetoTechnical Specification BasesSections3.1.8and4.1.8hasbeenapprovedbytheNRC(12/31/90) toreduceHPCIflowto90%ofthefeedwater pumpsystemdesigncapability toallowmarginfortrendingofpumpperformance.
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| Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage30Of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:90-017Rev.1N/'AVII11'II13(FVII4)gVII13a(FVII-4a),VII-14(FVII-5),VII-15,VII-16,VII-18System:Containment SprayandContainment SprayRawWaterTitleofChange:Containment SpraySystemAcceptance CriteriaDescription ofChange:TheFSAR(Updated) wasrevisedtoupdatetheperformance parameters andsystemacceptance criteriaforthecontainment sprayandcontainment sprayrawwater(CSRW)pumps,andtodeletethe"typical" performance curvesforthesepumpsfromtheFSAR(Updated).
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| Thesechangesreflecttheresultsofinservice testsperformed onthepumpsaspartoftheISTprogram.Operability requirements forthecontainment sprayrawwaterpumpswereaddedwithrespecttopressuremaintained ontherawwatersideofthecontainment sprayheatexchangers, andflowasafunctionoflakewatertemperature.
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| SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thepresentcontainment
| |
| : analysis, asdescribed intheFSAR(Updated),
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| isnotaffectedforthefollowing reasons:1)Thecontainment sprayflowrequirement of3000gpmisunchanged.
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| Basedonfieldvalidated pumpcurvesandaconservative hydraulic model,thepumpdeveloped headrequirement at3000gpmhasbeendetermined tobe242.5ft(105psid).The375ftcurrently specified issimplytheratedheadofthepumpat3000,gpm.
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| 2)TheCSRWheatremovalrequirement of60xlOBtu/hrisunchanged.
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| Thisrequirement ismetwhenthemaximumallowable lakewatertemperature attheestablished CSRWflowisnotexceeded.
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| Arangeofflowsandtheircorresponding temperatures hasbeendetermined.
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| | |
| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage31of65SafetyEvaluation No.:90-017Rev.1SafetyEvaluation Summary:(Continued)
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| Therequirement for10psipositivepressureontheCSRWoutletoftheheatexchangers relativetotheshellsideisunchanged.
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| Thisrequirement ensuresthatanyleakageisintothecontainment spraysystem.Basedonfieldvalidated curves,therequiredoutletpressurehasbeendetermined tobe141psig.The160psigrequirement currently intheFSAR(Updated) wasapump-based requirement whichenvelopes the10psidrequirement fortheheatexchanger.
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| TheseFSAR(Updated) changesdidnotinvolveanyphysicalchangestotheplant.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage32of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-019Temporary Procedure Nl-89-10XII-18(TXII-5)RadwasteRemovalofExtraneous Equipment UsingtheTetheredRemoteOperating Device(TROD)DuringtheRadwasteBuildingCleanupOperation Description ofChange:TheusebftheTRODwasaddressed inSafetyEvaluation 190-084.InorderfortheTRODtoadequately performthecleanupoperation, itwasnecessary toremovecertainpiecesofequipment suchastheconveyersystem,drumcappingandfillingequipment andtheassociated controlsystems.Equipment wasremovedrobotically becauseofthecontamination levelsonthem.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Sincenobuildingstructural memberswereallowedtoberemovedormodifiedbythisanalysis, theremovalofthisabandoned equipment hadnoeffectontheradwastebuildingintegrity.
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| TheEquipment Qualification Reviewshowsnoconcernwiththeremovalofthisabandoned equipment.
| |
| Thisequipment wasnotrequiredforthesafeshutdownofthereactor,nordiditprovideanysafetyfunction.
| |
| Theremovalofthisequipment didnotimpactanyofthepreviously identified circuitsinvolvedinthesafeshutdownoftheplant,anyemergency lightintheplantnorthefiredetection systeminthearea.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage33of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:90-026Mod.Nl-90-107 VI-16MainSteamLineContainment Penetrations Z-2AandX-2BTitleofChange:MainSteamPenetrations BellowsRepairDescription ofChange:Themainsteamlinecontainment penetrations weredetermined tobeleakingduringtheperformance ofaLocalLeakRateTest(LLRT).Subsequently, leakswerediscovered intheconvolutions oftwoofthefourbellowsexpansion joints.Therepairconsisted ofinstalling "clam-shell" bellowshalvesovertheexistingbellows.Aportionoralloftheconvoluted sectionoftheexistingbellowswasremoved.Landingringswereattachedtothepipenipplesoftheexistingexpansion joints.Thetwoleakingbellowswererepairedpriortoplantstartup,andtheothertwonon-leaking bellowswererepairedafterplantstartup.\SafetyEvaluation Summary:Accidents analyzedintheFSARwillbeunaffected sincetheclam-shellbellowswillperformthedesignfunctionoftheoriginalbellows.Theadditionoftheclam-shell bellowswillnotchangetheprobability orconsequences ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment.
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| Theadditionoftheclam-shell bellowshelpsreducetheconsequences ofanaccidentbyreducingcontainment leakage.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage34of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:90-028Chemistry Procedure N1-CSP-7X, Rev.0UFSARAffectedPages:System:VIII-71StackAuxiliary EffluentSamplingTitleofChange:StackEffluentSamplingUsingAuxiliary SamplingEquipment Description ofChange:Thestackgasmonitoring systemsforUnit1aretheRadioactive GaseousEffluentMonitoring System(RAGEMS)andtheOffgasEffluentStackMonitoring System(OGESMS).
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| OGESMSisthenormaloperation systemandRAGEMSistheaccidentmonitoring system.Thischangeaddressed theregularplantstackgasmonitoring systemstoallowsamplingusingauxiliary samplingequipment andprocedures described inN1-CSP-7X toallowtheplanttocontinueoperating inaccordance withtheTechnical Specifications.
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| Theauxiliary samplingequipment arrangement specified inNl-CSP-7Xconsistsoftygontubingconnected tothenormalsamplesupplyandreturnlines,afilterholderforiodineandparticulate cartridges, aflowmeter,pump,pressure.
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| gaugeandfoursamplevalves.Thisequipment canbeinstalled andfunctioning withintheeighthoursrequiredbyTechnical Specification Section3.6.14.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thetemporary alteration toRAGEMSorOGESMStoobtainstackeffluentsamplesusingauxiliary equipment allowscontinued operation oftheplantwithcontinued effluentreleaseviathemainstackinaccordance withTechnical Specification 3.6.14.Theexistingfunctions ofRAGEMSandOGESMSarenotaltered.Useoftheauxiliary samplingarrangement doesnotaffectthequantityofreleasedeffluents anddoesnotresultinalossofcontrolofradioactive releases.
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| Analysisoftheauxiliary samplingsystemhasdemonstrated thatthesystemwillproviderepresentative samples.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage35of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:90-035N/'AXV81~XV81bXV82(TXV-9),XV-96,XV-125(TXV-15)gXV126(FXV55)gXV-134(TXV-18),XV-136(TXV-21),XV-137b,XV137dgXV-137d1System:TitleofChange:FuelCoreOperating LimitsReport-Revision02Description ofChange:Thissafetyevaluation waswrittentoevaluatethefollowing:
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| a.removaloftheaddertotheMCPRlimitinthecoreoperating limitsreport(COLR)whichcompensated forthepotential impactofchannelbowing,b.c~removalofthemultiplier ontheMAPLHGRlimitsfortheP8DNB277fuelintheCOLRwhichcompensated forthepotential impactofrecirculation linepipewhipduringaDBALOCA,andremovaloftheMAPLHGRlimitsforfueltype8DNB277.SafetyEvaluation Summary:a~b.GeneralElectrichaddetermined thepotential impactofchannelbowofMCPRtobeupto0.035forD.Latticeplants(NineMilePointUnit1).ToaccountforthistheMCPRlimitswereraisedfrom1.41to1.445inCOLRRevision1.Theprocesscomputerdatabankhasbeenupdatedtoincorporate channelbowintotheRfactorsandthe.035penaltywasredundant andwasremoved.AfuelMAPLHGRevaluation wasperformed fortheNineMilePoint1NuclearPowerStationusingtheSAFERmethodology described inNEDC-30996-A.
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| Theanalysisutilizedallmodelsandprocedures fortheReload10a11fuelbundlesdesigns.TheReload9fuelbundledesignwasalsoaddressed.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage36of65SafetyEvaluation No.:90-035SafetyEvaluation Summary:(Continued)
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| Fromthis,aMAPLHGRmultiplier of.85wasimplemented inCOLRRevision1toensurecompliance withregulatory fuelpeakcladdingtemperature andcladdingoxidation limitsfortheP8DRB299andBD321Bfuel.Inaddition, thisevaluation determined thattheP8DNB277fuel'slimitswereconservative andrequirednomultiplier.
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| c.TheMAPLHGRlimitsforfueltypeSDNB277havebeenremovedfromtheCOLRasthisfueltypeisnotintheCycle10core.BasedupontheaboveanalysisthechangeinMCPRfrom1.445to1.41,theremovalofthe.85MAPLHGRmultiplier fromthePSDNB277fuel,andtheremovaloffueltypeSDNB277fromtheCOLRdonotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionandareincompliance withNRCstandards.
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| Thesechangesdonotresultinanyphysicalmodifications toanyECCSsystems.TheMCPRchangeandtheremovalofthe.85MAPLHGRmultiplier fromtheP8DNB277fuelwereimplemented throughamodificaton totheprocesscomputerdatabank.ThechangesensurethattheSLCPRlimitandacceptance criteriaof10CFR50.46 arenotviolated.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage37of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:90-037Mod.Nl-89-174 Rev.1Temp.Mod.5299UFSARAffectedPages:SystemN/ALowPressureReactorFeedwater System(SystemI51)TitleofChange:Temporary GaggingofReliefValves51-04A,05A,06A,and51-77,78,79Description ofChange:Thisevaluation provides:
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| Thetechnical justification whichdemonstrates thatthereliefvalvesmaybetemporarily gaggedduringplantoperation withoutconstituting anunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| 2.Thenecessary precautions tobetakentoensurethereliefvalvegagsareremovedduringvarioussystemisolation conditions.
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| Modification N1-89-174, Rev.0,decreased thelowpressurereactorfeedwater systemdesignpressurefrom600to500psig.Setpoints forsafetyreliefvalvesinthesystemoriginally setat600psigwerechangedto500psig.Asaresultofrecentfeedwater systemtesting,boththecondensate andfeedwater boosterpumpcurveshavebeenfieldcorrected, andithasbeenconcluded thatthemaximumsystemoperating pressures willexceed500psig.Therefore, Modification Nl-89-174 hasbeenrevisedtoincreasethedesignpressurefrom500psigto530psig.Accordingly, thesubjectreliefvalvesmustalsoberesetto530psig.Asitwasimpractical toremove,reset,andreinstall thereliefvalvesinthetimeallotted, thesubjectreliefvalvesweregagged.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thereliefvalvesaresmall(3/4"x1")andlowcapacity(27gpm)designedprimarily forthermalrelief.Thevalvesareinstalled forprevention ofexcessive pressures inthesystemwhentheportionofthesystembecomesisolatedandthatportionmaybesubjected tounexpected sourcesofheatasstatedintheFSAR.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage38of65SafetyEvaluation No.:90-037SafetyEvaluation Summary:(Continued)
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| Thereliefvalvesarenotinstalled topreventexcessive dynamicheadinthesystem.Furthermore, duetothesmallsizeandlowcapacityofthereliefvalves,thevalveswillprovideinsignificant dynamicpressurerelief.Therefore, thevalvesweretemporarily gaggedduringnormalplantoperation andaresubjecttothefollowing provisions:
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| 1.Theportionsofthesystemprotected bythereliefvalvesdidnotbecomeisolatedbytheclosingofvalves(Note:Unexpected automatic isolation ofthevalvesisnotofconcernbecausethevalvesrequiredtoisolatethefeedwater heatersandpumpsareallmanuallyoperatedvalves).2.Cautionstatements wereincorporated intotheapplicable plantoperating procedures whichgaveinstruction toremovethereliefvalvetestrods(i.e.,removegags)priortoclosingtherequiredvalvesnecessary toisolateatrainoffeedwater heatersorafeedwater pump.Furthermore, anytimepiping/equipment protected bythereliefvalvesisisolated, thepiping/equipment ventordrainvalvesareopened.Additional cautionistakentoensurethefeedwater pumpcasingwarm-upsupplyvalvesareclosedpriortoclosingthepumpsuctionisolation valves.Temporarily gaggingthesubjectreliefvalvesdoesnotrepresent anunreviewed safetyquestion, nordoesitadversely affectoperation orpreventsafeshutdownoftheplant.Thedesigncodeforthelowpressurefeedwater systemdoesnotrequirereliefvalvesforthisapplication; therefore, gaggingthevalvesdoesnotviolatedesigncoderequirements.
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| Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage39of65SafetyEvaluation No.:90-038Rev.1Implementation DocumentNo.:N/AUFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:III-19TurbineBuildingVentilation Operation withTurbineBuildingVentsand/orDoorsOpenDescription ofChange:Thisanalysisaddresses theimpactsofoperating theNMP1plantwiththeturbinebuildingroofvents,exteriordoorsorothernormallyclosedfixturesinanopenposition.
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| Thisanalysiswasperformed topermitadditional buildingcoolingduringwarmweatherconditions.
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| SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheturbinebuildingHVACsystemhasnosafety-related function.
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| Failureormalfunction ofthesystemwillnotcompromise anysafety-related systemorcomponent, orpreventsafereactorshutdown.
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| Theturbinebuildingisnotclassified asacontainment structure; however,itsventilation systemisdesignedtoexhaustmoreairthanismechanically
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| : supplied, therebymaintaining anegativepressuretoinhibittheexfiltration ofcontaminants.
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| Onlythemainstackandemergency condenser ventareconsidered asnormalreleasepointsforNMP1.Sincebuildingfixtureswillonlybeopenedintermittently asdesiredtoprovideadditional buildingcooling,theopenventsordoorsarenotconsidered tobeadditional releasepoints.Evaluations havebeenperformed toensurethatopenturbineroofventsand/ordoorsdonotprovideapotential forunmonitored effluentreleasesduringnormaloperation, andtoensurethattheestimated annualdosesfromgaseouseffluents willremainbelowdosecriteriaspecified in10CFR20andintheTechnical Specifications.
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| Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage40of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:90-039Calculation S13.4-70-F007 Z-22,Z-24,Z-25ReactorBuildingClosedLoopCoolingTitleofChange:ReviseFSARChapterZ,SectionDDescription ofChange:Thereactorbuildingclosedloopcooling(RBCLC)heatexchangers havebeenrepairedtocorrectproblemsassociated withflowinducedtubevibration attheinletandoutletnozzles.However,flowinducedvibration remainsaprobleminthevicinityoftheturnaround openingofthebaffle.Itwasnecessary tolimittheshellside flowtoeachRBCLCheatexchanger toapproximately 3000gpm.(Tubeside flowisnotaconcernforflowinducedtubevibration.)
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| Shellside flowwasadministratively controlled byrevisingoperating procedures.
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| Limitingtheshellside flowtoapproximately 3000gpmperheatexchanger didnotaffecttheRBCLCsystem'scapacityandflexibility tocoolvariouscombinations ofequipment regardless ofthestation's poweroutput.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Forthevariousmodesofoperation, calculations/performance curveshavebeendeveloped todetermine theactualRBCLCsystemcapability withvariousarrangements ofheatexchangers, pumps,andvaryingshellside andtubesideflows.Theresultsshowedthatforthemostdemanding loadcases,i.e.,10-hourshutdownandnormalshutdown, anycombination ofonepumpandtwoheatexchangers providedadequatecooling,i.e.,RBCLCeffluenttemperature of90+5'Fandsufficient flowtorequiredon-lineusers.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage41of65SafetyEvaluation No.:90-039'afety Evaluation Summary:(Continued)
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| LimitingRBCLCheatexchanger shellside flowtobelowapproximately 3000gpmwillassureelimination ofharmfulflowinducedtubevibration.
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| Withthisdone,thestructural integrity oftheRBCLCheatexchangers isassured.TheRBCLCsystem'scapacityforcoolingandoperating flexibility willbeunaffected bytheseadministrative controls.
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| Calculations ontheRBCLCsystem(including hydraulic benchmarking) andtheshutdowncoolingsystemshowthattheyhavesufficient capacitytohandlethemostlimitingoperational mode,i.e.,10-hourshutdown.
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| Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage42of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-040Rev.1Mod.N1-90-900 V-29,VIII4~XV6(TXV2),XV46'V48'V52@XV54Emergency Condenser (39)Emergency Condenser AutoInit.TimeDelaySetpointDescription ofChange:Thismodification changedthesettingoftheeightemergency coolingsystem(ECS)automatic initiation timers(11K61,11K61A,11K62,11K62A,12K61,12K61A,12K62,12K62A)from10secondsto12+1seconds.SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheFSARstatesthatduringaturbinetripwithpartialbypass"...thevesselpressureexceedsthetrippointfortheECSactuation foronlyapproximately 6.6seconds.Thus,fromthisanalysis, atimedelayof10secondsissetfortheemergency coolingsystemtopreventitsactuation inthisinstance."
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| TheFSARalsostatesthatthesetpointof15secondsisalimitthatshallnotbeexceededforMSIVclosureanalysis.
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| Therefore, thetimersetpointisboundedonthelowendbyturbinetripwithpartialbypassanalysis(approximately 7seconds)andthehighendbyMSIVclosureanalysis(approximately 15seconds).
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| Thesetpointof12+1secondsiswithinthelimitsdescribed inTechnical Specification Section3.1.3and4.1.3Bases,andthereisnoimpacttoanypresentsafetyanalysis.
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| Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage43of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-043Rev.'N/AN/AContainment SpraySystemJustified Operability oftheContainment SpraySystematReducedPowerLevelsandElevatedLakeTemperatures Description ofChange:Thissafetyevaluation justifies theoperability ofthecontainment spraysystemswiththereactoroperating atreducedpowerwhentherawwaterlaketemperatures areabovethefullpowerallowable temperature.
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| Intheeventofanaccidentwhenthereactorisatreducedpower,theheatgeneration rate,aswellasthedecayheat,arelowerthanthoseforthedesignbasisaccidentdescribed intheFSAR,thusrequiring alesserdutyfromthecontainment sprayheatexchangers.
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| Sincetherequiredheatremovalrateislower,smallerdifferential temperatures arerequiredacrosstheheatexchangers allowingforhigherlakewatertemperatures.
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| SafetyEvaluation Summary:Operating theplantatlowpowerlevelswithcorrespondingly higherallowable laketemperature doesnotincreasetheprobability ofanaccidentormalfunction ofequipment becausetheconsequences ofanaccidentarelesssevereatlowerpowerlevels.Also,thecontainment spraysystemisapostaccidentsystem,sotheprobability ofoccurrence ofanaccidentisnotchanged.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage44of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:90-044PowerAscension TestN1-PAT-8-3 UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:N/AHPCI/Feedwa terTemporarily DisableHPCIInjection onHighFlowDescription ofChange:Thissafetyevaluation examinestheconsequences oftemporarily disabling HighPressureCoolantInjection (HPCI)autoinitiation onfeedwater flowsgreaterthan1.9x10ibm/hroneithermotordrivenfeedwater pump(duringN1-PAT-8-3 only).HPCIinitiation onhighflowisforpumpprotection fromrunout(maximumdischarge andlowesthead).Beyondthispointcavitation andvibration canoccur,damagingthepump.Limitingpumpflowto3800gpmpreventsthepumpfromrunoutanddamage.Thus,HPCIinitiation athighflowisnotnecessarily indicative ofareactorproblemrequiring HPCI,ratheritisasafetymechanism toensurepumpintegrity.
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| SafetyEvaluation Summary:Temporarily disabling HPCIautoinitiation onhighmotordrivenpumpflow(greaterthan1.9x10ibm/hr)doesnotdegradethedesignoftheHPCIsystemasdescribed intheFSARandTechnical Specifications.
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| Throughout thedurationofPowerAscension TestN1-PAT-8-3, motorcurrentandNPSHaremonitored toensurepumpprotection.
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| ThefunctionanddesignoftheHPCIsystemremainedunchanged.
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| Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthistemporary changedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage45of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-045NMPCSpecification N-126I-3Nj'AUseofThreadedConnections andCompression FittingsDescription ofChange:Thischangeconsisted ofrevisingpipingspecifications topermitlimiteduseofthreadedconnections andcompression fittingsonNMP1pipingsystems.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thecodeofrecordfororiginalconstruction ofNMP1pipingsystemsisASAB31.1-1955.
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| Subsequent construction forrepair,replacement, ormodifications toexistingsystemsisperformed toASMESectionXIper10CFR50.55a.
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| ASMESectionXI,paragraph IWA-7120,allowscompliance toeithertheoriginalcode(ASAB31.1)ortheASMECode,providedreconciliation totheoriginalcodeismade.ASAB31.1NuclearInterpretation N-3requiressealweldsatallthreadedconnections onnuclearpiping,while.ASME requiressealweldsonlyatClass1pipingthreadedconnections.
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| Thus,originalconstruction requiredsealweldsatthreadedconnections whileplantrepairsormodifications maynotrequiresealwelds,depending onwhetherornottheyareonASMEClass1equivalent systemsandprovidedtheASMECodeisreconciled totheASAB31.1Code.Thereconciliation determined thatthreadedconnections musthavesealweldsexceptincertainisolatedapplications:
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| 1)2)3)4)TheSystemisnotanASMEClass1equivalent system,Pressureboundaryintegrity requirements aremet,(asdefinedinB31.1),Component qualification andASMEclassification isdocumented inacalculation, Theappropriate PipeSpecification RecordSet(PSRS)isrevisedtodocumenteachspecificapplication ofthreadedconnections withoutsealwelds.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage46of65SafetyEvaluation No.:90-045SafetyEvaluation Summary:(Continued)
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| Nosealweldrequirement existsforcompression fittingssocompression fittingsmaybeusedasspecified inASAB31.1-1955.
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| ASME-1980 hasbeenreconciled toB31.1-1955 andcanbeusedforcompression fittingsifnecessary.
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| Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage47of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:90-046Rev.2Information Notice89-76,GenericLetter89-13UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:N/AN/AZebraMusselBiocideTreatment ProgramDescription ofChange:TheNRCrequiresthatlicensees implement andmaintainanongoingprogramofsurveillance andcontroltechniques tosignificantly reducetheincidence offlowblockageduetobiofouling ofsafety-related servicewatersystemsandothersystemstakingfeedfromtheGreatLakes.Thereareseveralbiocidesonthemarketforuseincontrolling Zebramussels.However,thereisonechemical, Clamtrol-CT-1(hereafter referredtoasClamtrol) suppliedbyBetzLaboratories, Inc.,whichhasbeenapprovedbytheNewYorkStateDepartment ofEnvironmental Conservation (DEC)foruseincontrolling thesemollusks.
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| Thissafetyanalysisisdesignedtocovertheuseof.Clamtrol inthescreenhouse forebaytocontrolthegrowthofthemusselsinthesystemstakingfeedorcoolingwaterfromLakeOntariowater.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Clamtrolhasbeenusedsuccessfully atseveralnuclearpowerplants(Peachbottom, Fermi,Perry,Comanche.
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| Peak,etc.)forcontrolling mollusktypeanimals.Nonegativereportshavebeennotedattributed totheuseofthischemical.
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| Theadditionofachemicalbiocidetothelakewaterintakestructure tocontrolanderadicate zebramusselsinthesystemstakingfeedfromthissource,i.e.,circulating water,servicewater,emergency dieselgenerator coolingwater,containment sprayrawwaterandfirewater,willnotaffecttheanalysisofpostulated accidents previously evaluated forthesesystems,becausethesystemswillnotbetakenoutofnormaloperating configuration.
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| Ratherbyprocedure, variouspumpswillbestartedandvalveswithinthesystemopenedtoassurethateachportionofthesystemstobetreatedisactuallytreatedwiththechemicalbiocide.Also,engineering evaluation oftheuseofthischemicalhasshownthatthechemicalshouldhavenoeffectonthematerials ofconstruction ofthetreatedsystems.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage48of65SafetyEvaluation No.:90-046Rev.2SafetyEvaluation Summary:(Continued)
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| Floodinganalysisisnotaffectedbyaruptureofthehopperormoatduringaseismicevent.Thischemicaladditiondoesnotaffecttheoperability oftheaffectedsystemsorcreatethepossibility foranaccidentormalfunction ofadifferent typethanthosepreviously evaluated intheFSAR.Thesystemswillnotbetakenoutoftheirconfiguration norwillequipment beaddedortakenoutofthesystem.ThechemicaladditionwillnotaffectthebasisofanyTechnical Specification becausethistypeoftemporary chemicaladditionisnotthecurrentbasisofanyTechnical Specification.
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| Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthischangedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage49of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-047Temporary Mod.5309ZI-12Condensate SystemOxygenInjection Description ofChange:Thepurposeofthissafetyevaluation wastoaddressthetemporary modification toinjectoxygenintothesuctionsideofthecondensate pumpsandthechangetotheFSARforthedesiredfeedwater oxygenconcentration.
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| TheFSARhadstatedthattheoxygenconcentration inthecondensate discharge headerwasexpectedtobe7ppb.TomeettheBWRWaterChemistry guidelines, NMP1StationGeneralOrderN89-07,andtheNMP1FuelsWarranty, therecommended rangeforfeedwater oxygenconcentration shouldbe20-50partsperbillion(ppb).FSARpageXI-12hasbeenrevisedtoreflecttherecommended rangeof20-50ppb.Thetemporary modification toinjectoxygenintothe.suctionsideofthecondensate pumpsinordertoincreasethelevelofoxygeninthecondensate andfeedwater wasnotperformed.
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| SafetyEvaluation Summary:Becausetheoxygenconcentration ofthecondensate/feedwater systemreturnedtothe20-50ppbrangeaspowerwasincreased, thetemporary modification wasnotperformed.
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| However,theadditionofoxygenintothecondensate andfeedwater systemswouldnotaffectanyoftheanalyzedaccidents inthesafetyanalysisreport.Theoxygeninjection wasintendedtoenhancewaterchemistry topreventgeneralerosioncorrosion inthepiping.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthechangetotheFSARdoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage50of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:90-048RestartTestProcedure N1-PAT-2-2 Rev.2UFSARAffectedPages:System:N/ATurbineBypassPortionofMainSteamTitleofChange:PowerAscension TestException IN1-PAT-2-2-1 Shortfall ofTurbineBypassValveCapacityDescription ofChange:Restarttestprocedure N1-PAT-2-2 hasmeasuredaturbinesteambypassvalvecapacityof2.51mlb/hrversusthe2.901mlb/hrvaluestatedinFSARChapterXI.Mechanical DesignEngineering, inconsultation withGE,Electrical, Licensing andFuelsorganizations, hasreviewedandevaluated thesubjectException No.N1-PAT-2-2-1 whichreported2.51mlb/hrversusthe2.901mlb/hrvaluestatedintheFSAR.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thissafetyevaluation confirmsGE'sconcurrence thatUnit1testingandoperation cancontinueinspiteofthecapacitydifference.
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| Thebypassvalve'scapacityshortfall isacceptable basedonthesafetyevaluation considerations.
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| Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thattheslightreduction incapacityobserveddoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.'
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage51of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-049N/ASectionXIIIReorganization NineMilePointNuclearDivisionReorganization Description ofChange:SectionXIIIoftheFSAR(Updated) describes theorganization responsible foroperation ofNineMilePointUnit1.TheNuclearDivisiondepartments havebeenreorganized, positions redefined andtitlechangesmade.Titleshavebeenchangedtobemorejobspecific.
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| Departments andpositions wereredefined andreorganized toenhancetheflowofcommunication andproductivity oftheNuclearDivisionwhileeasingtheworkload.Thereorganization oftheNuclearDivisionmaybestbedescribed astheadjustment oflayersofmanagement andspansofcontrol.(Spanofcontrolreferstothenumberofpeoplethatreporttoamanager;layersdefinethedistanceinthechainofcommandfromtheseniorofficertofrontlineworkers.)
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| SafetyEvaluation Summary:Thissafetyevaluation addresses theNineMilePointNuclearDivisionReorganization.
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| Theneworganization dictatesfunctional lines,eliminating redundant functions andreducingsituations whereworkdonebyonegroupmustbepassedontoanotherunitthatreportstoadifferent partoftheorganization.
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| Also,theneworganization establishes distinctlinesofauthority andresponsibility foreachUnit.Theorganizational changeswillnotaffectthesafeoperation ofsystemsorsafeshutdownoftheplant.Basedontheevaluation, thereorganization doesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestionandisincompliance withNRCstandards.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage52of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:90-050CoreOperating LimitReport,Rev.3UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:SectionsVIIandXVFuelCoreOperating LimitsReport-Revision3Description ofChange:Thischangeaddresses removingthemultiplier ontheMAPLHGRlimitsintheCOLRRevision02andincorporating newMAPLHGRlimitsbasedonahighercoresprayflow.Inaddition, theMAPLHGRmultipliers forfour-loop operation havebeenspecified inmoredetailratherthantheboundingnumberpreviously used.SafetyEvaluation Summary:AfuelMAPLHGRevaluation wasperformed fortheNineMilePoint1NuclearPowerStationusingtheSAFERmethodology.,
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| Peakcladdingtemperature (PCT)andcladdingoxidation werecalculated forseveraldifferent fuelaverageplanar'exposure points.Fromthesecalculations, MAPLHGRlimitswerecalculated toensurecompliance withregulatory fuelPCTandcladdingoxidation limitsfortheP8DRB299andBD321Bfuel.Thesecalculations alsodetermined thattheP8DNB277fuel'slimits(calculated usingpre-SAFER methodology) wereconservative andrequirednomultiplier.
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| BasedupontheaboveanalysisthenewMAPLHGRlimitsareincompliance withNRCstandards.
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| Thesechangesdonotresultinanyphysicalmodifications toanysystems.TheMAPLHGRlimitsareimplemented throughamodification totheprocesscomputerdatabank.Thechangeensuresthattheacceptance criteriaof10CFR50.46 arenotviolated.
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| Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage53of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-051Temporary Mod.5317N/ACondensate Condensate Pump11/12PowerSuppliesDescription ofChange:Duringrecentsurveillance testinginvolving thecondensate system,condensate pump11failedtoprovideflowafterattempting toplaceitbackintoservice.Underthistemporary modification, thepowersupplyforcondensate pump12waschangedfrompowerboard 101topowerboard 11,thusenablingcondensate pump12toreplacecondensate pump11asthebackupHPCIpump.condensate pump11wastemporarily suppliedfrompowerboard 101topermitoperation ofcondensate pump11afterrepairswerecompleted.
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| Thiswasaccomplished byinterchanging the4160-volt feedercablessupplying condensate pump11andcondensate pump12.Condensate pump11circuitbreakerinPB11,withitsassociated controlsandinstrumentation, wasusedforcondensate pump12andviceversa.Affecteddrawings, panellabelingandannunciation werealsotemporarily changedasaresultofthismodification toprovideconsistent references andnomenclature.
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| SafetyEvaluation Summary:Technical Specification 3.1.8definestheHPCIsystemLimitingCondition forOperation.
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| Redundant components arerequiredtobeoperableatalltimes.Withthistemporary modification, condensate pump12satisfied theHPCIdesignrequirements intermsofbothcontrollogicandpowersupplyintegrity forbackup(redundant) pumpoperation.
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| Capability ofcondensate pump12tooperateas'aHPCIpump,asdescribed intheTechnical Specification bases,wasdemonstrated bysurveillance testinginaccordance withTechnical Specification 4.1.8.b.Also,condensate pump12motor,currently classified non-safety related,wasdedicated asa"9"component forthistemporary modification.
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| Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatusingcondensate pump12asabackupHPCIpumponatemporary basiswasinconformance withHPCIdesignbasisandlicensing requirements anddoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| I'1 SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage54of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-053Temporary Mod.5318N/ACondensate Suction(49)BlankFlangeCondensate PumpI11StrainerDescription ofChange:Duringsurveillance testinginvolving thecondensate system,condensate pumpI11failedtoprovideflowafterattempting toplaceitbackintoservice.Troubleshooting suggested thatthecondensate pumpIliisolation valvemaynothaveopened.Thepurposeofthistemporary modification wastoblankflangecondensate pump511strainer(EPN49-53)downstream ofsuctionisolation valve(EPN49-11)toinvestigate theoperability ofthecondensate pumpsuctionvalve.Thisrequiredtheremovalofthebellows(EPN49-08)andinopingcondensate pump111.Installation oftheflangeatthedownstream sideofthestrainerbodymaintained thepressureboundaryofthecondensate systemwhenthesuctionvalvewasopened.SafetyEvaluation Summary:Technical Specification 3.1.8definestheHPCIsystemLimitingCondition forOperation.
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| Redundant components arerequiredtobeoperableatalltimes.Condensate pumpI12HPCIdesignrequirements wastemporarily reconfigured toperformasanHPCIpumpwhilecondensate pump111wasoutofservice,withthepressureboundarymaintained bytheblankflange.(Thisconfiguration wasevaluated underaseparatesafetyevaluation.)
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| Theblankflangedesignwasinaccordance withANSI/ASME B31.1-1986.Theboltingandtheinstallation wereinaccordance withANSI/ASME B31.1-1986 andEngineering Specification SDS-006.Theanalysisdemonstrated thatthisTemporary Modification didnoteffecttheabilityoftheCondensate SystemtosupportHPCIoperation asrequiredbyTechnical Specifications andassociated bases.Furthermore, itmetapplicable designbasesandqualityrequirements.
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| Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthistemporary changedoesnotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage55of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:90-057Rev.1Unit1FireHazardsAnalysisN/AFireBarriersFHAFireBarrierUpgradesDescription ofChange:Thischangeupgradedvariousplantbarrierstofireratedasanenhancement totheFireProtection Program.ThesubjectbarriersconsistoftheUnit1stack(261'o289'),mainsteamtunnel240'loorslab(G-H,10-12),andreactorbuildingbarriersinthefirebreakzonesatelevations 237',261',281',and298'.Eachoftheseareaddressed below.Stack:Upgrading thestack(261'o289')to3-hourfireratedestablished aleveloffireprotection controloverfuturemodifications toensurethestack'sfireratingisnotdegraded.
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| MainSteamTunnel:Upgrading thesteamtunnelG-H,10-12,240'loorslabto3-hourfireratedestablished aleveloffireprotection controloverfuturemodifications toensuretheslab'sfireratingisnotdegraded.
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| FireBreakZones:Onelevation 237'fthereactorbuilding, theinstrument roomnorthwallatPc,8-9,hasbeenupgradedtoathree-hour rating.Thisbarrierisnotedashavinganon-rated feature(ventilation ductwithoutafiredamper).2.Onelevation 281'fthereactorbuilding, thenorthwallofinstrument roomatMb,6-7,hasbeenupgradedtoaone-hourbarrier.3.Thereactorbuilding298'loorslabbetweenMb-N,6-7,overlapping the281'irebreakzonehasbeenupgradedtoaone-hourbarrier.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage56of65SafetyEvaluation No.:90-057Rev.1SafetyEvaluation Summary:Upgrading thebarriersisanenhancement totheFireProtection Programandprovidesamoreconservative barrierdesign.Showingthesebarriersasfireratedonplantdrawingsensuresthatcontrolsexisttopreventbarrierderatingbyfuturemodifications.
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| Theseproposedchangesdonotalteranysafetyfunctiondescribed intheFSARanddonotadversely affectfireprotection orsafeshutdownoftheplant.NochangestotheTechnical Specifications arecreatedandnoadverseeffectsonthesafeoperation ofNineMilePointUnit1arecreated.Basedontheaboveanalysis, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage57of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:90-063Calculations 125VDC-BATTERY-CASEBg125VDCBATT11CASEBg125VDC-BATT12-CASE-B UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:IX29IIX30'X31gIX32(TIX1)~IX33(TIX1)Ix-33a(TIX-1),IZ-33b(TIZ-1)125VDCSystemFSARChapterIZChangesDescription ofChange:TheMGSetsarepresently onlyidentified bytheirfunctioninthetextofFSARChapterIX.Thischangeaddedtheequipment piecenumberbywhicheachMGSetisindividually
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| : referred, andrevisedthelistofmajor125VdcsystemloadsandtheircurrentdrawsinTableIZ-1.TableIZ-1wasrevisedsothatitagreeswiththecurrentplantdesignandassociated calculations.
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| SafetyEvaluation Summary:TheadditionoftheMGSetnumberstotheFSARtextdoesnotchangethedesign,analyses, orevaluations oftheMGSets.Baseduponthechangestothenumberofthemajorloadsandtheircurrentdraw,aslistedinFSARTableIZ-1,thebatteries remainadequatefortheFSARCase"a"andFSARCase"b"events.Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage58of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:D90-084Mod.Nl-89-251 N/ARadwasteTetheredRemoteOperating Device(TROD)Description ofChange:UseofTetheredRemoteOperating Device(TROD)duringtheRadwasteBuilding-El225'lean-up projectto:uprightthedrumsofsludge,transport emptydrumstoasafeareaforfinaldecontamination, manipulate hydrolazing equipment fordeconning ofequipment, floorsandwalls,holdhosesforvacuuming ofdrumsandfloors,holdhosesfortheadditionofsluicingwatertodrums,anddisassembly andremovalofinstalled equipment whichhinderedtheclean-upeffortSafetyEvaluation Summary:Thesafetyevaluation considered theeffectsofusingtheexistingmonorailsystemtomoveandoperatetheTROD.Structural calculation no.S2.3-WD225-MISC01 demonstrates thattheexistingmonorailsystemhassufficient capacitytosupporttheTRODbasedonvariousoperating limitations asidentified instructural calculations.
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| TheTRODoperation willbecontrolled withintheselimitations basedonanapprovedTRODoperating procedure.
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| Thestructural calculation considers dead,liftedandliftingimpactloads.Furthermore, thestructural analysisdemonstrates thatiftheTRODshouldfallfromthemonorailsupportsystem,therewillbenoadverseimpactontheradwastebuildingmatoranysafety-related system.TheuseoftheTRODintheclean-upeffortontheRadwasteBuildingEl.225'ndEl.236'-6"(duringtestingphase)doesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage59of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:TitleofChange:91-003Rev.1N/'ASectionXIIIReorganization NineMilePointRadiation Protection Reorganization Description ofChange:SectionXIIIoftheFSAR(Updated) describes theorganization responsible foroperation ofNineMilePointUnit1.Inordertoreflecttheproposedorganizational structure oftheRadiation Protection organization, positions havebeenredefined andtitlechangesmade.Positions wereredefined andreorganized toenhancetheeffectiveness oftheRadiation Protection organization.
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| SafetyEvaluation Summary:Theseorganizational changeswillprovidetheRadiation Protection organization withresources tobebothefficient andeffective whilemeetingNRCguidance(NUREG0800).Theseorganizational changeswillnotaffectthesafeoperation ofsystemsorsafeshutdownoftheplant.Thesechangesareincompliance withNRCStandards.
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| Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| t SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage60of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:91-021N/AVIII-80throughVIII-109VariousPlantandSystemMonitoring Instrumentation TitleofChange:UpdateofNineMilePointUnit1FinalSafetyAnalysisReportRegarding Instrumentation ofRegulatory Guide1.97Description ofChange:ThischangerevisedSectionVIII.C.5oftheFSARtodocumentinformation andcommitments regarding implementation ofRegulatory Guide(RG)1.97atUnit1thathavebeenpreviously submitted totheNRC,orwerepresented duringNRCinspections andaudits.Relativetothematerialthatiscurrently intheFSAR,theproposedreplacement materialimplemented thefollowing:
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| a0Addedrelevantlicensing background information.
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| b.Addeddefinitions of"Type"and"Category" asthesetermsrelatespecifically toRG1.97variables andassociated instrumentation.
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| c~Addedasummaryofthedetermination thattherearenoRG1.97TypeAvariables forUnit1.(Thematerialpreviously intheFSARidentified severalparameters asTypeAvariables, butnobasisfortheirselection ordetermination wasprovided.)
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| d.Addedasummaryofthebasisfor,andthedetermination of,thelistof"EOPKeyParameters."
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| e.Added,inmatrixformat,thespecification ofTypeandCategoryforUnit1ofallBWRvariables listedinRG1.97withtheplant-specific basisforeachofthedifferences fromthegeneralrecommendations ofRG1.97Table1,"BWRVariables,"
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| explained/justified.
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| Addedasummarydescription oftheimportant RG1.97instrument designandimplementation criteriathatwereestablished aspartoftheUnit11990restartactivities.
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| (Relatestotheevaluations andactivities performed toresolveRG1.97implementation issuesidentified bytheNRC.)
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage61of65SafetyEvaluation No.:91-021Description ofChange:(Continued) g.Deletedthelistingsoftheplant-specific RG1.97instruments andassociated designfeatures(i.e.,removesinformation currently includedintheFSARregarding plant-specificRG1.97instrumentation).
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| Inaddition, thedetermination oftheEOPkeyparameters resultedintwoadditional parameters beingidentified beyondthoseoriginally classified as"TypeA."Thesetwoparameters are"NeutronFlux(APRMs)"and"DrywellWaterLevel."SafetyEvaluation Summary:ThechangetoFSARSectionVIII.C.5clearlydocumented theapproachfollowedatNineMilePointUnit1forimplementation ofRG1.97.Theprincipal featuresofthisapproachare:Designation ofagroupofvariables as"EOPKeyParameters."
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| Variables sodesignated aredetermined byanalysisoftheNMP1Emergency Operating Procedures.
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| Instrumentation formonitoring theEOPkeyparameters isspecified asCategory1.Throughtheapplication oftheCategory1designation, components ofsomemonitoring instruments are,newlydesignated assafetyrelated.Implementation ofRG1.97atNMP1waspursuedonabasiswhichincludedtheperformance ofplant-unique reviewsandevaluations ofspecificdesigncriteriaforselectedinstrumentation asdocumented invariousletterstotheNRCandinassociated NRCinspection/evaluation reports.Implementation ofthischangedidnotaddto,delete,orphysically modifyanyexistingplantstructures, systems,orcomponents.
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| Basedontheevaluation performed, itisconcluded thatthesechangesdonotinvolveanunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage62of65SafetyEvaluation No.:Zmplementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:91-02510CFR50.54 xzzz-5aQualityAssurance TopicalReportTitleofChange:Revision6totheQualityAssurance TopicalReport(NMPC-QATR-1)
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| Description ofChange:Revision6totheTopicalReportwasageneralupdateandclarification oftheaccountability ofqualityattaining functions including changesrequested byNuclearDivisionorganizations sincetheissuanceofRevision5.Therevisionincludedthefollowing:
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| 1)TheTopicalReporthasbeenrevisedtoreflectthecurrentorganizations andresponsibilities.
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| 2)Experience qualification ofQualityAssurance managersandsupervisors hasbeenrevisedtobeconsistent withtherequirements ofANS3.1.3)IAppendixBDeterminations havebeenaddedasoneoftheprocesses toidentifysafety-related itemstobeincludedinthescopeoftheQualityAssurance Programandtheextenttowhichitscontrolsareapplied.4)Thepreparation, review,andapprovalofmaterialandserviceprocurement specifications hasbeenaddedtothescopeofNuclearEngineering's responsibilities.
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| Theoverallcontrolofdesigndocuments hasbeenchangedfromthedesignofficetoNuclearEngineering toreflectthechangesintheorganization.
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| 5)Thescopeofprocurement documentcontentshasbeenincreased toincludematerialdescription andQualityAssurance programmatic requirements ofASMENQA-1basicrequirements whereapplicable.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage63of65SafetyEvaluation No.:91-025Description ofChange:(Continued) 6)Thestatement "Alternately, itemsorservicesmaybeprocuredfromsuppliers andacceptedbasedonappropriate inspection orverification activities" hasbeenaddedtotheQATR-1sectiononcontrolofpurchased
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| : material, equipment andservices.
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| 7)Aninterpretation hasbeenaddedtoAppendixB"Interpretations andExceptions ofAppendixADocuments" forparagraph 3.2ofReg.Guide1.281983Ed.Rev.3.8)9)NMPCrequiresthatqualified suppliers involvedinactiveprocurements beauditedeverythreeyears.However,atolerance ofonequarterofayearcanbeapplied.Thisallowsforscheduling flexibility whichmayberequiredduetoperformance considerations toresolveanyopenitemsfromvendorauditswithouttheremovalofthesupplierfromtheQualified Contractors List.TheTopicalReporthasbeenrevisedtoallowfortheorganization orpersonaccountable forthequalityattaining functiontoperformtherequiredreviewand/orverification.
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| 10)Themeansbywhichthemanagement ofNMPCatthepresidential orchiefexecutive officerlevelassessestheQualityProgramhasbeenchangedtoreflectthecurrentassessment reporting methods'(Internal SALPType,Assessment Reportsissuedsemi-annually) andtheexecutive levelmeetingsattendedbytheVicePresident QualityAssurance.
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| (NuclearOversight Committee, CEOandCo-Tenants)
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| TheelementsoftheQATRwhichapplytoradioactive wastehandlingactivities wererevisedtochangetheannualauditsoftheradioactive wastehandlingprogramtoQualityAssurance auditsoftheradioactive wastehandlingprogram.12)Thelistingofdepartmental procedures hasbeenrevisedtoNuclearDivisionDirectives andNuclearDivisionInterfacing Procedures toreflectthecurrentrestructure oftheNuclearDivisionProcedure System.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportPage64of65SafetyEvaluation No.:91-025SafetyEvaluation Summary:(Continued)
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| Increases tothescopeoftheQualityProgramasoutlinedintheevaluation donotreduceanypreviouscommitments orreducetheeffectiveness oftheQualityAssurance Program.Thechangeswillnothaveanyeffectonthesafeoperation ofanysystemorsafeshutdownoftheplant.Thischangedoesnotconstitute anunresolved safetyquestionandisincompliance withNRCstandards.
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReportage65of65UFSARTEXT,TABLEANDFIGURECHANGES(BASEDONPREVIOUSLY REPORTEDSAFETYEVALUATIONS)
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| Anumberoftext,tableandfigurechangesweremadetotheUFSARtoincludeadditional changesthatarebasedonpreviously reportedsafetyevaluations.
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| Thesechangesareidentified below.SafetyEvaluation No.:81-39Previously Reported:
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| 07/19/82Mod.No.Nl-81-22UFSARTableV-1(pageV-3)andTableXVI-2(pageZVI-7)havebeenupdatedtoreflectthereactorpressurevesselclosurestudmaterialasASMESA-540asopposedtoSA-193.Thesechangesareconsistent withSafetyEvaluation 81-39,whichwaspreviously reported.
| |
| ~~~~~SafetyEvaluation No.:82-27Mod.No.N1-82-58reviously Reported:
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| 06/27/85and06/24/88UFSARpageX-63Section3.2.1hasbeenrevisedtoindicatethat"six"(notfive)separatewaterspraysystemsareprovidedfortheprotection ofthemaintransformers, stationservicetransformer, tworeservetransformers andthehydrogenstoragerack.Modification 82-58addedanadditional transformer andwaterspraysystem.SafetyEvaluation No.:84-03Previously Reported:
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| 06/27/85Mod.No.Nl-82-13UFSARpageZ-42hasbeenrevisedtoprovideareference toFSARpageZ-40,FigureX-7.Thischangeisadministrative innature,toclarifythepurposeofUFSARFigureZ-7.SafetyEvaluation No.:89-13Rev.1Previously Reported:
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| 06/27/90Mod.No.N1-89-131 UFSARpagesVII-15,VII-16,VII-17,VII-19,ZV-160andXV-164havebeenupdatedtoreflectchangesmadetotheContainment SpraySystem.oraPostDBALOCAAppendixJWaterSeal.
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| NINEMILEPOINT-UNIT1SAFETYEVALUATION SUMMARYREPORT1991NINEMILEPOINTNUCLEARSTATIONUNIT1FIREHAZARDSANALYSISREVISION2
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| SafetyEvaluation SummaryReport-FHAPage1of54SafetyEvaluation No.:Implementation DocumentNo.:UFSARAffectedPages:System:90-052Rev.1FireHazardsAnalysisRev.2N/AFireProtection Systems99-101TitleofChange:FireHazardsAnalysis1990UpdateDescription ofChangeandSafetyEvaluation Summaryfollow.
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| Page2of54TABLEOFCONTENTS1.02.0Correction ofErrorsandOmissions NotTechnical inNature1.1Background andScope1.2Analysis1.3Conclusion Correction ofErrorsandOmissions Technical inNature2.1Background andScope2.2Analysis2.3Conclusion 3.04.0BatteryRoomDoors3.1Background andScope3.2Analysis3.3Conclusion OffgasBuilding, SafetyRelatedEquipment
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| | |
| ===4.1Background===
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| andScope4.2Analysis4.3Conclusion
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| | |
| ==5.0 Organization==
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| andPersonnel
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| ===5.1Background===
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| andScope5.2Analysis5.3Conclusion 6.07.0DieselFirePumpRoomDescription
| |
| | |
| ===6.1Background===
| |
| andScope62Analysis6.3Conclusion FireAreaDesignations
| |
| | |
| ===7.1Background===
| |
| andScope7.2Analysis7.3Conclusion 8.0FireDetectto'n Systems8.1Background andScope8.2Analysis8.3Conclusion
| |
| | |
| ==9.0 AdditionofFixedSuppression==
| |
| List9.1Background andScope9.2Analysis9.3Conclusion 10.0AdditionofNFPACodeDeviation
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| | |
| ===9.1Background===
| |
| andScope9.2Analysis9.3'onclusion
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| Page3of54TABLEOFCONTENTS(Continued) 11.0AdditionofCharcoalFilterFireProtection andFireLoadingInformation 11.1Background andScope11.2Analysis11.3Conclusion 12.0FHAOverlayChanges12.1Background andScope12.2Analysis12'Conclusion 13.0FireRatedHallsandSlabs13.1Background andScope13.2Analysis13.3Conclusion 14.0Transformer OilSpillPrevention 14.1Background andScope14.2Analysis14.3Conclusion 15.0Technical Specifications 15.1Background andScope15.2Analysis15.3Conclusion 16.0Previously AcceptedFPDCNs17.0References
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| page4of541.0TITLE:CORRECTION OFERRORSANDOMISSIONS NOTTECHNICAL INNATURE.1.1BACKGROUND ANDSCOPE:InDec.1987the"NineMileUnit1FireProtection Program"wasrevisedandissuedtotheNRC,June1,1988,asthe"FireHazardsAnalysis" Revision1.ThisupdatedFireHazardsAnalysiswasageneralrewriteoftheprograminitsentirety.
| |
| DuetothelargescopeoftheRevisionIupdate,manyerrorsandomissions existedwhicharebeingcorrected inthe1990annualupdate.1.2ANALYSIS:
| |
| Errorsandomissions beingaddressed inthisdetermination arenottechnical innatureandareconsistent withtheoriginaldocument's intentsandbases.Correcting theerrorsandomissions willprovideforaclearerdescription oftheFireProtection Program.AsummaryofthesechangesareprovidedasTable1.0.TheonlyitemaffectedbythesechangesistheFHAitself.Theseproposedchangestonotaffect:FSARsectionX',"FireProtection System,"ALARAdesign,Equipment Qualification, 10CFR50AppendixR,ControlRoomHabitability, FuelAnalysisReview,ISI/ISTdesigncriteria, HumanFactorsdesigncriteria, HeavyLoaddesigncriteria, NMPlTechnical Specifications, Environmental Protection Plan,oranyaccidentdiscussed inFSARchapterXV-"Safety Analysis."
| |
| | |
| ==1.3CONCLUSION==
| |
| :
| |
| Errorsandomissions beingcorrected withthisdetermination arenottechnical innature.Correcting theseerrorsandomissions willprovideforamorereadableclearFireHazardsAnalysiswithoutaffecting thedocument's intents.orbases.Theseproposedchangesdonotalteranysafetyfunctiondescribed intheFSARanddonotadversely affectfireprotection orsafeshutdownoftheplant.NochangestotheTechnical Specification arecreatedandnoadverseeffectsonthesafeoperation ofNineMilePointUnit1arecreated.Basedontheaboveanalysis, thesechangesdonotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| Page5of54ERRORSANDOMISSIONS TABLEFHATNChange...
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| FH:NATUREHANTableofContents1.2.1.21.1.21.2.21.2.41.2.51.32.1.22.1.52,1.92.2.22.2.3.22.2.42.2.5.12.2.5.22.2.62.2.72.4.4.42.4.1.12.4.1.22.4.1.32.4.1.42.4.1.7TB320BatteryRackevaluation isauspicies categoryandisDuring..document.
| |
| standards forIngeneralspec1f1ctrayspreventfireredundant...fire prevent...systems.
| |
| eg,Halonconsequences oracceptable firefireutil1zesopenspraySafe...removal.vessel...s1nk,drawingsanalysestopreludeBy...metspecialseparation buildingandsim11arareaddressed Pr1mary...condition forleadership completion ofthedr111shallhavethefirebrigadewhenfightingdevelopment ofthecharcoalbutnotbespecialseparat1on and/orShutdownEvaluation Systemandautomatic Inanycase,thelessin1tsuseconf1gurat1ontheextentatanend...powerboardRB340/TB333/TB351/
| |
| TB369BatteryPackevaluat1on areauspicescategoryandareDurtng...document.
| |
| standards usedinSpecifictrayswhereappropriate preventafireredundant...shutdown prevent...boundaries e.g.halonconsequences ofacceptable fireutilizeswaterspraySafe...established.
| |
| vessel,overlaysfordrawingsanalyzestoprecludeIncorporation
| |
| ...equ1pment spatialseparation build1ngs orsimilarisaddressed Conduction toassessleadership complet1on havefirebrigadeoffightingdevelopment ofthecharcoalbutisnotspac1alseparat1on andShutdownAnalys1sSystem(s)
| |
| ,anautomat1c Thelessthegreatestextentattheend...powerboardsclarifyWrongWordgrammarspellinggrammarclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifytypotypotypotypoclar1fyclarifyclarifyclar1fywrongwordtypoclarifywrongwordgrammargrammargrammarclarifyclarifyclarifyclar1fyclarifygrammargrammargrammargrammarwrongwordclar1fyclarifyclar1fygrammarclarifyclar1fyclarifygrammar I'
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| Page6of54FHASECTION2.41.82.4.1.92.4.).iO2.4.2.12.4.2.32''.22.4'.42.4.3.52.4.3.62.4.3.82.4.3.102.4.4.12.4.4.72.4.4.82.4.5.12.5.1.1Table2.5.1.1-1 Table2.5'.1-2Table2.5.1.1-7 2.5.2.3Change...
| |
| FROM:walltothewallequipment duringtosafety-related automatic systemC-39491-C boundedcablingcablebarriersTransient...total Newcables...Testcarbondioxidepreaction cable,propagation alongNewcables...requirement Cableisonlypermitted forcabletraysorconduit.kepttoaminimumthrough...systemMFACPorLFACPheatventscompensate shouldstat1onalarmsSCBApaksBatteryRack/instairway, aswellas)nH)ththe(MFCP)(LFCP)surve)llance RmPanelMGSetIVRoomverticalf1reatanettemporarily howeverNormal...funct1ons screenhouse wallsDailybecheckingTO:walluptothemetalwallequipment orsupporting systemsnecessary forthesafeshutdownoftheplantresultant fromtothissafety-related automatic firesystemC-39591-C boundedbyratedconstruction cabling,cablewallsAllowance...total Sincethe..~383.carbondioxide,pre-actioncablepropagation offirealongSincethe...383.Onlycableispermitted incabletraysorconduits.
| |
| *kepttotheminimumby...monitormain...panelventscompensate firef1ghtingeffortsshouldStationoperations SCBApacksBatteryPack/1nstairways, aswellas,inWhenthedeletesurveillance andactionsRmPanelsMGSetAreaValveRoomverticalshaftturbine-typecentrifugal withanetTemporarily.
| |
| However,Systems...auxiliary Screenhouse walls,asrequiredDailybycheckingNATUREOFCHANGEclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifytypoclarifygrammarclarifyclarifyc'1arifytypogrammarclarifyclarifyclarifygrammarclarifyclarifyc'larifyclarifyclarifytypowrongword/typo typogrammarextraneous clarifytypoclarifytypoclarifygrammarclarifyclarifytypoclarifytypo kt'(i'r page7ofFHASECTION2.5.2.52.5.2.72.5.3.12.5.3.32.5.2.72.5.3.32.5.3.42.5.3.42.5.3'2.5.4.12.5.4.22.5.5.12.5.5.32.5.6.12.6.1.22.6.32.6.52.6.72.6.8.22.6.9Change...
| |
| FROM:use.Even...connection areprovidedtoprovide2.3.7.2hydranthousestheyard,MayandNovemberprovideminorsystemsprotectssafetyor,manual...automatic, hydranthousesidentified sprayback-upback-upor2.5.3.4-2 2.5.3.4hazardSystemsstandpipe concentrate formanualwhichdesignedfortomaintainback-upandataminimumtestedlocationapplication 261protectsafetyrelatedorareexposurehazardstosafetyminimumlevelevaluatetheLocalPanelC-3031LOCATplacements arethisperiodapparatus isisphysically whichalsoThe...area providedforthis,areforalarmat11/2hourisprotected dieselgenerator roomenclosure atoneTO:useprov)de2.5.7.2hydranthosehousesthetwoyardorMayorNovemberminimizesystemssafetyorprotecting (manual...automatic) hydranthosehousesidentified waterspraybackupbackupdelete2.5.3.4-1 hazard,Systems"standpipes concentrate tosupportwhichdesignedtomaintainbackupandtestedlocalapplication 261ft.protectsafetyrelatedareas,exposurehazardsorsafetyminimumtanklevelevacuatetheapplicable LocalPanelsC-3031ManualLOCATIONplacement istheseperiodsapparatus unitsarearephysically thisalsoThe...room provideinthisareaalarmsataminimumof11/2hourareprotected DieselGenerator Roomenclosure (FA18DG102MissileShield)atNATUREOFCHANGEconsistency clarifytypoclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifygrammarclarifyclarifyspellingconsolidated typogrammartypogrammarclarifygrammargrammarspellingclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifytypoclarifyclarifytypotypogramargrammargramnargrammargrammarc1arifyclarifygrammarclarifygrammargrammarclarifyclarify
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| Page8of54FHASECTION2.6.112.6.142.6.153.13.1,13.1.23,2.13.2.43.3.13.3.43.3.53.4.13.4.23.4.33.4.4Change...
| |
| FROM:canstillbeextinguishers areprovided...area.withoutFuelAreastorageareaBuilding...is RadwasteRadwasteAnautomatic thedocontamination zoneincluding anticipate eg.'tairway, however,BuildingishavebeenprovidedremainsentiresystemorencloseHowever,intheareasprovidesthisareextinguishers provides'ystemsprovidesprovidesback-upfoamwaterfoamhosetanksmanualBuild1ng, however,isInaddition, theseareprovidedThereexistunprotected steelpartofcont1nued firealarmsLossoftheseareas1nhab1tab1eRoomdoesnotmaterial, howeverisSystemberequiredTO:isextinguishers.
| |
| evenwiththelossofFuelStorageVaultstoragevaultBuilding...is HasteWasteAutomatic thepermanent decontamination zone'sandanticipated e.g.stairway.
| |
| HoweverBuildingareprovideremaintheentiresystemcouldbeortoencloseIntheareaprovidethisareaextinguishers providesystemsprovideprovidebackupthefoamwaterthefoamhosetankseachincluding aseparatemanualBuilding.
| |
| However,itisThesearealsoprovidedUnprotected steelexistsw1thincontinuous fireareasLossofshutdowncomponents intheseareasuninhabitable Roomsdonotmaterial.
| |
| HoweveritisSystemlsrequiredNATUREOFCHANGEclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifygrammarclarifygrammarclarifygrammargrammargrammarclarifygrammarclarifytypoclarifygrammartypogrammargrammargrammarspellingclarifyclar1fyclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifyclarifygramnarclarify~rongwordtypoclarifywrongwordgrammar,clarifygrammar 4\~.b, Page9of54FHASECTIONChange...
| |
| FROM'O:NATUREOFCHANGE3.4.53.5.13.5.53.6.13.7.13.7.43.7.53.9.13.9.33.9.53.10.13.10.23.10.53.11.53.11.1extinguishers providesBuildingzoned,ad)acentBuilding, however,isequipment Buildings partofeg.Automatic, PreactorSprinkler SystemsprovidewirepumpBailerRoomEastRadwasteBailerRoomAtimed...detectors.
| |
| zoned,itconsidered ispouredHowever,ifzoned,Anautomatic systemprovidesstairtowers providesstairtower enclosure fromtheHowever...plant.
| |
| zoned,thisareabussbussTank1sresealedconf1gurati onprimaryextinguishers provideBuildingroofzonedwhereitprotrudes Building.
| |
| However,itiscablesBuildingwithine.g.Anautomatic preaction sprinkler systemprovidesfirepumpBalerRoomtheEastHasteBalerRoomAtimed...actuation.
| |
| zoneditisconsidered arepouredIfzonedSeparateautomatic systemsprovidestairtowers providestairtowers enclosures andfiredepartment Equipment...plant.
| |
| zonedthisbuildingbusbusTankareeachsealedconfigurations normalstationgrammarclarifygrammarclarifyclarifyclarifytypoclarifytypowrongwordclarifygrammartypowrongwordtypoclarifywrongwordclarifygrammargrammargrammarclarifygrammarclarifygrammargrammartypogrammarclarifyclarifygrammarclarifyspellingspellingclarifywrongwordtypoc1arifyTable3.7.1Table3.6-1Table2.3Table1.2.2BailerFIRESUBAREANonconforming Items10.0Stat1onssite...sufficient apenetrations locations ispenetrat1ons BalerspellingFIREAREAclarifyNonconforming Items12.0typoStationgrammarsite-pumpers.
| |
| clarifyatpenetrations grammarlocations aregrammarpenetrations isprovidedclarify
| |
| | |
| Page10of54FHASECTIONTable3.1.1-2Table3.1.1-6Table3.3-1Table3.3-2Table3.3-1Table3.6-1Change..FROM:Sprinkler Value-Insulation BailerSprinkler "blank"RoomPowerboard
| |
| ...RoomCablePumpCableArea"blank"TO:NATUREOFCHANGESprinklers Va1ve-InsulationBalerSprink1ers"Separation
| |
| ...Evaluation typotypospellingtypoclarifyBelow...102/103CableEnclosure CircWaterPumpCableTunnelBuildingEntranceLevel261clarifyclarifyclarifyclarifyRoomandSteamTunnelclarify
| |
| | |
| Page11of542.0TITLE:CORRECTION OFERRORSANDOMISSIONS TECHNICAL INNATURE2.1BACKGROUND ANDSCOPE:InDecember1987the"NineMileUnit1FireProtection Program"wasrevisedandissuedtotheNRC,June1,1988,asthe"FireHazardsAnalysis,"
| |
| Revision1.DuetothelargescopeoftheRevision1update,errorsandomissions existedwhicharebeingcorrected inthe1990annualupdate.Inaddition, changesarebeingimplemented toremovetherevisiondatesonreferenced documents tofacilitate futureupdatesandtoincludechangesintheprogramthathaveminimalimpacts.Thesechangesaccurately reflectthe"asbuilt"condition oftheprogram.2.2ANALYSIS:
| |
| Thechangesbeingimplemented inthissectionaretechnical innature.ThesechangeswillmakethecontentoftheFireHazardsAnalysisconsistent withotherdesignbasisdocumentandthe"asbuilt"condition oftheprogram.2.
| |
| | |
| ==2.1REFERENCES==
| |
| :
| |
| Revisiondatesornumbersarebeingremovedinthisupdateforthosereferenced documents thataredynamicandsubjecttofuturechanges'hese documents willbereferenced inthefutureonlybythedocumenttitle.Thesechangeswillfacilitate futureupdatestotheFireHazardsAnalysisbyremovingtheneedtocontinually changethereferenced document's revisionnumberordated.Byreferencing onlythedocumenttitlesintheFireHazardsAnalysis, itisimpliedthatthecurrentrevisionortherevisionusedatthetimeofthesystemdesignisapplicable.
| |
| ThischangewillmaketheFireHazardsAnalysisclearer,moreaccurate, anduserfriendly.
| |
| FHASECTIONFROMTO1.2.1.1"Appendix RReview,Safe"Appendix RReview,SafeShutdownEvaluation,"
| |
| ShutdownAnalysis."
| |
| Revision1,Sept.1987.2,1.1.12.32.4.4.72.5.2.33.1.1FPQAP-1NHPC-FPQAP-l, Revision1September 1987NFPA204-68Section16,FireProtection
| |
| : Handbook, 15thEditionASTM-D270-65 ASTH-D/975-74 NFPAFireProtection
| |
| : Handbook, 14thEdition(NMPC-FPQAP-1)
| |
| NMPC-FPQAP-1 NFPA204NFPAFireProtection HandbookASTHStandards ASTHStandards NFPAFireProtection Handbook
| |
| | |
| Page12of542.2.2ShutdownTemperature Insection1.3oftheFireHazardsAnalysisthetemperature referenced forhotandcoldshutdownwas200'.Thisisbeingchangedtothecorrecttemperature of212'2>>B.ThiswillmaketheFHAtextconsistent withNMPITechnical Specifications andAppendixRSafeShutdownAnalysis.
| |
| Thetemperature referenced forhotandcoldshutdownisintheFHAsolelytoprovidedefinftions anddoesnotaffecttheoverallcontentofthedocument.
| |
| 2.2.3FireHazardTablesSection2.4.1.2oftheFHAidentified thatTables3.1.1-1through3.1.1-9indicated thepresenceofsafety-related equipment/cabling.
| |
| Revision0oftheFHAincludedalistingofSafeShutdownequipment inthecorresponding Tables.Thisinformation wasnotincludedinTables3.1.1-1through3.1.1-9fortheRevision1update.Thelistingofsafeshutdownequipment andSafeShutdownequipment impactedbycablesforeachfireareaisavailable inthe"Appendix RSafeShutdownAnalysis."
| |
| ThetextoftheFHAidentifies thepresenceofsafety-related equipment andcablingforparticular buildingareas.Including thisinformation inTables3.1.1-1through3.1.1-9wouldberedundant andisnotnecessary.
| |
| Therefore, reference tosafety-related equipment intheseTablesisbeingdeletedfromsection2.4.1.2.2.2.4FireOetectfon Section2.5.1.4oftheFHAdescribes thatthefiredetection andcontrolsystemsareconnected totheplantemergency powersupply.Confusion hasexistedoverthemechanics ofhowthisisachieved.
| |
| Unit1electrical hasprovidedamoredetaileddescription onhowthefiredetection andcontrolsystemispowered4.
| |
| Thisdescription isbeingusedtoclarifyandreplacetheexistingdescription intheFHA.Thereviseddescription providesmoretechnical detailbutdoesnotchangetheunderlying basisthatthefiredetection andcontrolsystemsareconnected totheplantemergency powersupply2.2.5SupplyValvesSection2.5.3.2oftheFHAisbeingrevfsedtoreadthatwatersupplysystemvalvesaresupervised inthecorrectposftion, ratherthanpositively supervised intheopenposition.
| |
| Amajorityofthesupplyvalvesareintheopenposition.
| |
| Thereare,however,instances whenftisdesfrable tohavesupplyvalvesintheclosedposition.
| |
| Examplesofthiswouldbewhenasystemisdesignedtobemanuallyoperated, TurbineBuildingTrackBay,orisabackuptoanothersystem,Unit2cross-connection.
| |
| ThischangewillcorrecttheFHAtoreflecttheplantdesignandprocedures.
| |
| | |
| Page13of542.2.6Tech.Specs.Tablesoffireprotection equipment locatedintheTechnical Specifications wereduplicated intheFHAtofacilitate eventually removingthefireprotection fromtheTechnical Specifications.
| |
| Thefiredetection systemDA-2092W, sprinkler systemHP-2041,andhosestationFS-114wereincorrectly shownasdetection systemDA-2092E, sprinkler systemWP-2031,andhosestationFS-144intables2.5.1.1-2, sect)on2.5.3.3andtable2.5.3.4-1, respectively.
| |
| Similarly, thecolumndesignations forhosestationsFS-108andFS-405intables2.5.3.4-1 and2.5.3.4-2 wereincorrectly shownasLllandW9.ThecorrectcolumnsareK11andH9.ThesetablesandsectionarebeingrevisedtomatchtheTechn/cal.
| |
| Specif)cat)ons exactly.2.2.7CableSpreading RoomFireprotection fortheCableSpreading Roomisdescribed insection2.6.3oftheFHA.Cablingnecessary toachievehotshutdownindependent ofthecablespreading roomisdescribed astheredundant train.Theshutdownsupervisory controlsystemwhichautomatically initiates theemergency condenser hotshutdownsystemsuponreceiving reactorprocessparameters iscompletely separateandindependent fromtheredundant hotshutdownsystemsintheCableSpreading Room2.Reference toitbeingaredundant trainis,therefore, beingremoved.2.2.8TurbineGenerator Suppression Systems.Foamwaterfireprotection systemsfortheturbinegenerator areasaredescribed insection3.3.5oftheFHA.Thedescriptions forthesesystemsareinconsistent withtheactualdesignandthedescription providedlntheFSAR57.Inparticular, onlythewaterportionoffoursystemsisautomatic andfoam)n)ect)on forallofthesystemsismanuall'y lnltiated fromtheControlRoomand/orFoamRoom.Thedescrlptlon ofthesesystemsls,therefore, beingrevisedtomoreclearlystatetheactualdesign.2.2.9Administration BuildingSuppression SystemsAnareadescription oftheAdministration Buildingisprovidedlnsection3.10.5.Previously aRecordsFileRoomand'RecordsProcessing AreawerelocatedintheAdministration Building.
| |
| Theuseoftheseroomsandthehazardslocatedinthemhassincechanged.Forthisreason,consideration isbeinggiventoconverttheexistingpreactlon sprinkler systemtoawetpipesprinkler system,asthehazardofwaterdamageintheareanolongermeritsapreaction sprinkler system48.
| |
| Thisintentlsbeingreflected inthisFHAupdated.Anyplantmodifications willbeaddressed underaseparatesafetyevaluation.
| |
| | |
| Page14ofS42.2.10ReactorBuildingHoseReelsSection2.6.1.2oftheFHAdescribes fireprotection providedintheprimarycontainment duringrefueling andmajormaintenance.
| |
| Thisdescription, inpart,specifies theuseofone-inchhosereelswhichisbeingchangedtohosereels.Thismoregenericwordingisintendedtofacilitate anyfuturechangesiflargersizehosereelsaredesired(11/2in.21/2in.).2.2.11Combustible LoadingAssumptions usedtoassigncombustible loadingtoplantequipment andareaswastobeprovidedinsection2.1.1oftheFHA.Howeveronlytwotypesofequipment arelisted(motoroperatedvalves,motorsandcable)andacombustible loadingvalueisonlyassignedtothemotor-operated valves,motors.Thevalueassignedtomotor-operated valves,motorsisnotthevalueusedintheactualcombustible loadinganalysistoarriveatthevaluesshowninFHAtables3.1.1-1through3.1.1.9.ThissectionoftheFHAistherefore beingreplacedwiththeassumptions usedtodevelopthecombustible loadinganalysis.
| |
| Thischangeisconsistent withthevaluesshownintheFHAcombustible loadingtables.Thischangewillcorrecttheexist1nginformation aswellasdocumenting theotherassumptions used.2.2.12FireBrigadeThetitle"FireDepartment" asitappears.throughout theFHAisbeingchangedto"FireBrigade."
| |
| Subtledifferences existinthedefinition forthesetitles.Thetitlemostapplicable totheNMPlstructure isFireBrigade.ThischangewillalsomaketheFHAconsistent withtheTechnical Specifications whichusethetitle"FireBrigade."
| |
| 2.2.13Misc.Addit1onal 1nformation isbeingaddedwhichsupportsorenhancespos1tions previously reflected 1ntheFHA.Insection2.4.1.1reference isbeingaddedtotheDamageRepairProcedures whichareusedtomitigatetheeffectsofapostulated fire.Acalculation hasbeenperformed, andisnowreferenced insection2.6.8.2,whichsupportstheacceptability ofunprotected structural steel.ANFPAcodedeviation existsforthedieselandelectricfirepumpcontrollers.
| |
| Achangeinthesetpoints forthepressureswitchesonthesesystemsenhancesNMPCpreviousargumentforthefirepumpsabilitytostaggerstartandis,therefore, beingadded.Thesechangesareconsidered asaddit1onal information whichdoesnotchangebutsupportsconclusions previously reachedintheFHA.
| |
| | |
| Page15of54~~2.2.14ReactorBuildingStairwell Reference totheReactorBuildingsoutheast stair'well isbeingaddedtosection3.2.1oftheFHA.Thisstairwell waspreviously shownontheFHAfirebarrierdrawings.
| |
| Althoughthestairwell doesnotseparatesafety-related equipment, itisappropriate toreference itasitisthemainmeansofegressfromthebuilding.
| |
| 2.2.15FireZoneSuppression/Detection TheSummaryHazardsAnalysistablesincludedintheFHAarebeingrevisedtocorrecterrorsandomissions intheprotection providedforthefirezones.Thesetablesfunctiontoprovideinformation onthehazardsandcombustible loadinginplantareas.Additionally, reference isprovidedforthemainfireprotection features.
| |
| intheareas.ThesefeaturesarebeingrevisedtobettermatchthetextoftheFHAandtheFHAoverlayswherethefireprotection featuresinformation wasderived.2.32.2.16BulkGasStorageSections2.4.2.2and3.11.1oftheFHA,inpart,describethebulkgasstorageofhydrogenandnitrogen.
| |
| Thewordingofsection2.4.2.2indicates thatthehydrogenandnitrogenstoragetanksarecommonwheninfacttwoseparatetanksexist".Insection3.11.1thetanksarrangements aredescribed havingtheirlongaxesperpendicular totheWestandNorthwallsoftheReactorBuilding.
| |
| Thisarrangement isphysically impossible.
| |
| Forthesereasons,theFHAisbeingcorrected toindicatetwotankswiththeiraxesperpendicular totheWestwalloftheReactorBuilding' TheonlyitemaffectedbythesechangesistheFHAitself.Theseproposedchangesdonot'affect:FSARsectionX.K,"FireProtection System,"ALARAdesign,Equipment Qualification, 10CFR50AppendixR,ControlRoomHabitability, FuelAnalysisReview,ISI/ISTdesigncriteria, HumanFactorsdesigncriteria, HeavyLoaddesigncriteria, NMP1Technical Specifications, Environmental Protection Plan,oranyaccidentdiscussed inFSARchapterXV-"Safety Analysis."
| |
| CONCLUSION:
| |
| Changesbeingimplemented inthissectionaffectthetechnical contentoftheFHA.Thesechanges,however,donotaffectthebasesorintentsoftheFHA.Implementing thesechangeswillmakethecontentoftheFHAconsistent withthe"as-built" condition oftheplantorwillclarifythecontentoftheFHAtofacilitate futureupdates.Theseproposedchangesdonotalteranysafetyfunctiondescribed intheFSARanddonotaffectfireprotection orsafeshutdownoftheplant.NochangestotheTechnical Specifications arecreatedandnoadverseeffectsonthesafeoperation ofNineMilePointUnit1arecreated.Basedontheaboveanalysis, thesechangesdonotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
| |
| | |
| Page16of543.0TITLE:BatteryRoomDoors3.1BACKGROUND ANDSCOPE:Hallsseparating theBatteryRoomsfromtheTurbineBuildingaredesignedtoprovideatwo-hourfireresistance rating3.FiredoorsD-112,0-113,0-114,and0-115provideaccesstotheBatteryRooms.NMPChascommitted toprovidefiredoorinstallations inaccordance withNFPA80,StandardforFireDoorsandHindows14.
| |
| NFPA80requiresthatfiredoorsinstalled intwo-hourratedwallsbedesignedtoprovidea11/2hourfireresistive ratings>>.
| |
| Originally three-hour ratedfiredoorswithnon-rated louverswereinstalled intheBatteryRooms.The1977FireProtection SERidentified thatthiscondition wasevaluated andthattheconstruction ofthedoorswouldprovideanacceptable resistance ofa11/2hourratingoncethelouverswerereplacedwithfireratedlouvers15.
| |
| However,11/2hourf1rerateddamperswereprovidedinlieuoffireratedlouvers3.
| |
| Thiscondition wasevaluated andreflected inRevision1oftheFHA.In1988following theGageBabcockAudit,aNonconformance ReportwaswrittenontheBatteryRoomDoors,duetothefactthattheinstallation utilizing firedamperswasatechnical deviation fromNFPA8016,173.2BatteryRoomdoors0-112,0-113,D-114,and0-115werereplacedin1989withthree-hour rateddoorstocorrectthiscondition18 19.Thissafetyevaluation shallbeusedonlytochangethetextoftheFHAtoreflectthenewconfiguration.
| |
| A'NALYSIS:
| |
| Revision1oftheFHA,Section2.6.7,identifies thethree-hour ratedfiredoorsand11/2hourfiredampersusedintheBatteryRoomconfiguration3.
| |
| SincethistimetheBatteryRoomdoorshavebeenreplacedwithnewflushthree-hour rateddoors1920.Correspondingly, thetextoftheFHAisbeingrevisedtoreflectthenewcondition19.
| |
| TheBatteryRoomdoorsdescribed 1nRevision1oftheFHAfunct1oned tomainta1na11/2hourresistive ratingandprovideventilation pathsnecessary toadequately preventanybuildupofhydrogengas~.Thenewthree-hour rateddoorswillsimilarly ma1ntainthef1rebarriersintegrity andwillprovideadequateventilat1on usingthe3/4in.doorundercuts>>
| |
| 21.Thisconf1guration 1sconsidered tobeanupgradeintheprotection originally provided.
| |
| Reflecting thiscondition intheFHAisappropr1ate andinnowaydetractsfromthecurrentconfigurat1on.
| |
| | |
| Page17of54TheonlyitemaffectedbythischangeistheFHAitself.Thisproposedchangedoesnotaffect:FSARsectionX.K,"FireProtection System,"ALARAdesign,Equipment Qualificati'on, 10CFR50AppendixR,ControlRoomHabitability, FuelAnalysisReview,ISI/ISTdesigncriteria, HumanFactorsdesigncriteria, HeavyLoaddesigncriteria, NMPlTechnical Specifications, Environmental Protection Plan,oranyaccidentanalysisdiscussed inFSARchapterXV-"Safety Analysis."
| |
| | |
| ==3.3CONCLUSION==
| |
| :
| |
| BatteryRoomdoors0-112,0-113,0-114,and0-115havebeenreplhced, toresolveconcernswiththe11/2hourdampersusedintheirconfiguration.
| |
| Thereplacement doorsaredesignedtoprovidethree-hour fireresistive protection.
| |
| Thereplacement doorsareanupgradeinthefireprotection providedfortheBatteryRooms.Reflecting thischangeintheFHAisappropriate.
| |
| Thisproposedchangedoesnotalteranysafetyfunctiondescribed intheFSARanddoesnotadversely affectfireprotection orsafeshutdownoftheplant.NochangestotheTechnical Specifications arecreatedandnoadverseeffectsonthesafeoperation ofNineMilePointUnit1arecreated.Basedontheaboveanalysis, thischangedoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
| |
| 0 Page18of544.0TITLE:Off-GasBuilding, SafetyRelatedEquipment 4.14.24'BACKGROUND ANDSCOPE:Section3.8oftheFHAisbeingrevisedtoidentifythepresenceofthesafetyrelatedcablesupplying normalpowertopowerboard 103.Section3.8oftheFHAdescribes indetailthefireprotection featuresandhazardsoftheOffgasBuilding.,
| |
| Previously thissectionoftheFHAidentified thatnosafetyrelatedequipment waslocatedintheOffgasBuilding.
| |
| IntheFireHazardsAnalysisforeachbuilding, adescription ofthesafetyrelatedequipment andcablingisprovided.
| |
| Thissafetyevaluation willaddresschangingthewordingoftheFHAtoreflecttheroutingofcable101-87.ANALYSIS:
| |
| Cables101-11and101-5frompowerboards102and103routedtopowerboard 101wereincloseproximity tooneanother.Modification N1.80.11involvedrerouting cable101-11ascable101-87toaffordsufficient separation oftheoutputcablessuchthatacommonfailurewouldnotdisablebothpowerboards25 Cable101-87isroutedthroughtheOffgasBuilding26.Thismodification isaddressed insafetyevaluation 80-05.Safetyrelatedequipment andcablingareidentified intheFHA,inpart,toprovidethebasesforfireprotection featuresandfamiliarize engineers withtheplantlocations.
| |
| Cable101-87isrouted-throughtheOffgasBuildingtopreventacommonfailurefromdisabling bothpowerboards 103and102.Thesignif'icance ofthiscableroutinghaspreviously beenevaluated insafetyevaluation 80-0525~27.Additionally, thiscableroutingisreflected intheAppendixRAnalysisforUnit1.Thechannelized cableroutingdesignoftheplantismaintained withthismodification28.
| |
| TheonlyitemaffectedbythischangeistheFHAitself.Thisproposedchangedoesnotaffect:FSARsectionX.K,"FireProtection System,"ALARAdesign,Equipment Qualification, 10CFR50AppendixR,ControlRoomHabitability, FuelAnalysisReview,ISI/ISTdesigncriteria, HumanFactorsdesigncriteria, HeavyLoaddesigncriteria, NMP1Technical Specifications, Environmental Protection Plan,oranyaccidentanalysisdiscussed inFSARchapterXV-"Safety Analysis."
| |
| CONCLUSION:
| |
| TheFHAisused,inpart,toidentifythepresenceofsafetyrelatedequipment orcabling.TheFHAisbeingrevisedthroughthisevaluation toshowthepresenceofthesafetyrelatedcable101-87intheOffgasBuilding.
| |
| | |
| Page19of54Modification N1.80.11initiating thischangewasproperlyevaluated andisconsistent withtheplantdesignguidelines.
| |
| Changing'he FHAtoreflectthesafetyrelatedcableisappropriate andwi.llfacilitate futurefireprotection reviewsfortheOffgasBuilding.
| |
| Thisproposedchangedoesnotalteranysafetyfunctiondescribed intheFSARanddoesnotadversely affectfireprotection orsafeshutdownoftheplant.NochangestotheTechnical Specifications arecreatedandnoadverseeffectsonthesafeoperation ofNineMilePointUnit1arecreated.Basedontheaboveanalysis, thischangedoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
| |
| | |
| Page20of54S,OTITLE:Organization andPersonnel 5.15.2BACKGROUND ANDSCOPE:FireProtection Personnel andorganizational responsibilities aredescribed intheFHA.Conflicts haveexistedbetweenthissectionoftheFHAandotherfireprotection documents (NEL-805, AP.3.5,NDMP-6,FPQAP-1).
| |
| Thepurposeofthisevaluation istoreviewthesafetysignificance associated withrevisingtheFHAtoincludechangesintheprogram,agreaterlevelofdetailandtoprovideconsistency withotherfireprotection documents.
| |
| ANALYSIS:
| |
| Organizational responsibilities andpersonnel implementing thefireprotection programatNMPIhavebeendynamic.Revision2oftheFHAincludesthefollowing changesthathavetakenplaceintheprogramstructure:
| |
| TheExecutive VicePresident NuclearOperations hasoverallmanagement responsibility forfireprotection.
| |
| ThetitleofSupervisor FireProtection isnowSiteFireProgram.Coordinator.
| |
| Responsib)lity forimplementation oftheQualityAssurance ProgramrestswiththeVicePresident QualityAssurance andnottheSupervisor QualityAssurance.
| |
| Thepositionandresponsibilities oftheFireProtection ProgramManagerhavebeencreated.Qualifications fortherolesoftheFireProtection
| |
| : Engineer, FireProtection EngineerQualified, andAppendixREngineerhavebeenadded.ThesechangestotheFireProtection organization wereimplemented toimprovetheprogramandaddresspreviously identified shortcomings>>.
| |
| Organizational responsib11)ties intheFHAhavealsobeenexpandedtoincludeagreaterlevelofdetail.Thesechangesidentifyresponsibilities forpositions previously includedinotherprimarydocuments2g Organizational responsibilities areincludedforthefollowing titles:Technical Superintendent, Supervisor
| |
| : Training, SiteFireProgramCoordinator, Supervisors Operation, UnitSupervisors, VicePres)dent NuclearEngineering andLicensing, FireProtection EngineerQualif1ed, HanagerNuclearConsulting, FireProtection ProgramManager,VicePresident QualityAssurance, HanagerQualityAssurance Nuclear,Supervisor QualityAssurance Operations Surve)llance, Supervisor QualityEngineer)ng Control,HanagerCorporate Qual)tyAssurance, Supervisor QualityAssurance Audits,Supervisor QualityAssurance
| |
| : Services, HanagerQua11tyandRel)ab)l)ty, Supervisor Qua11tyAssurance Engineering, Supervisor Procurement QualityandReliab)11ty, Supervisor Hater1alQualityEng)neer)ng, RiskManagement Department, HanagerSystemPurchasing, ProgramDirectorNuclearHaterialHanagement andHanagerHeterandLaboratory.
| |
| Persons1nthesepositions have,inpart,responsibilit)es forma)orandminoraspectsoftheprogram2g.
| |
| Including thesepositions intheFHAwillhelptoelim1nate anyconfusion overprogramresponsibil)ties andinterfaces.
| |
| TheonlyitemaffectedbythesechangesistheFHAitself.Theseproposedchangestonotaffect:FSARsectionX.K,"FireProtection System,"ALARAdesign,Equipment Qual)ficat)on, 10CFR50AppendixR,
| |
| | |
| Page21of54ControlRoomHabitability, FuelAnalysis'eview, ISI/ISTdesigncri.teria, HumanFactorsdesigncriteria, HeavyLoaddesigncriteria, NHPlTechnical Specifications, Environmental Protection Plan,oranyaccidentdiscussed inFSARchapterXV-"Safety Analysis."
| |
| | |
| ==5.3CONCLUSION==
| |
| :
| |
| Changestothefireprotection personnel andorganization described intheFHAarepartofanoverallefforttoimproveandintegrate thedifferent aspectsofthefireprotection program.Thesechangesaredesignedtoprovideagreaterlevelofconsistency inallfireprotection documents.
| |
| Thisproposedchangedoesnotalteranysafetyfunction,.described intheFSARanddoesnotadversely affectfireprotection orsafeshutdownoftheplant.NochangestotheTechnical Specifications arecreatedandnoadverseeffectsonthesafeoperation ofNineHilePointUnit1arecreated.Basedontheaboveanalysis, thischange'doesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
| |
| | |
| Page22of546.0T1TLE:DieselFirePumpRoomDescription 6.1BACKGROUND ANDSCOPE:Theareadescription fortheDieselFirePumpRoomlocatedontheeastsideofthescreenhouse atelevation 256'-0"isbeingrevisedtomoreaccurately identifythefireprotection featuresprovided.
| |
| Theexistingdescription oftheDieselFirePumpRoomidentifies fireratedwallsandroofassemblies areprovided.
| |
| OnlythesouthandwestwallsexposedtotheScreenhouse needtobeidentified asfirerated.ThenorthandeastwallsoftheDieselFirePumpRoomareexteriorwallswithnosignificant exposurefromtheyardarea.Inaddition, thefloorslaboftheDieselFirePump'Room providesratedprotection fromtheareabelow.Forthesereasons,section3.6.1oftheFHAisbeing--revised specifically totdentifythebarrierswhicharefirerated.6.2Structural steelformingtheroofassemblyoftheDieselFirePumpRoomwaspreviously identified asunprotected.
| |
| Asprinkler systemlocatedaboveandbelowthisassemblyiscreditedforproviding exposureprotection fortheunprotected steel>.Thissteelis,however,nowprovidedwiththree-hour fireresistive protection33.
| |
| TheFHAisbeingrevisedtoreflectth1sconfiguration.
| |
| ANALYSIS:
| |
| WallsoftheDieselFirePumpRoomaredescribed intheFHAasfirerated.Twoofthesewallsareexter1orplantwalls'hat donotseparatesafetyrelatedequipment andarenotexposedtosignificant outsidefirehazards.Consequently thereisnoreasontoestablish afireratingforthesewall&~,norhavetheybeenratedinthepast34.Sectton3.6.1oftheFHAis,therefore, beingrevisedtospecifically calloutonlythesouthandwestwallasfirerated.ThefloorslaboftheDieselF1rePumpRoomispotentially exposedtothead)acentf1reareabelow.Thefloorslabwas,however,notrated.Thiscond)ttonwasreportedtotheNRCunderLER88-0936.Inordertocorrectthisdeficiency, thefloorslaboftheD1eselFirePumpRoomisnowma1ntained asathree-hour firebarrier19.
| |
| TheFHAisbeingrevisedtoreflectthisupgradeintheDieselFirePumpRoomconfigurat1on.
| |
| Upgradesintheplant'sfireprotection featureswereimplemented aroundthe1982-1985 ttmq,frametosatisfytheseparation requtrements ofAppendtxWto 10CFR5023>.UpgradestotheD1eselFirePumpRoomincludedprotecting thestructural steelwithathree-hour ratedconfiguration>>
| |
| 38.ThenewDieselF)rePumpRoomconfigurat1on isevaluated underSafetyEvaluation 83-0838.TheFHAaddressed thesechangesinpart,however,protection ofthestructural steelwasoverlooked.
| |
| Anautomatic sprinkler systemiscreditedwithprotecting thestructural steeltnlieuofftreprooftng3.
| |
| Underthissafetyevaluat1on, theFHAisbeing
| |
| | |
| Page23of54revisedtocreditthethree-hour ratedfireproofinginstalled toprotectthestructural stee133.TheonlyitemaffectedbythischangeistheFHAitself.Thisproposedchangedoesnotaffect:FSARsectionX.K,"FireProtection System,"ALARAdesign,Equipment Qualification, 10CFR50AppendixR,ControlRoomHabitability, FuelAnalysisReview,ISI/ISTdesigncriteria.
| |
| HumanFactorsdesigncriteria, HeavyLoaddesigncriteria, NHP1Technical Specifications, Environmental Protecti,on Plan,oranyaccidentanalysisdiscussed inFSARchapterXV-"Safety Analysis."
| |
| | |
| ==6.3CONCLUSION==
| |
| :
| |
| Tobetterrepresent theas-builtconfiguration oftheDieselFirePumpRoom,theapplicable FHAsectionsarebeingrevisedtobetterdescribetheroom'sfireprotection featuresclarifytheOieselFirePumpRoom'sdescription andincorporate thechangesfrompreviousmodifications.
| |
| Thisevaluation isnecessary toaccurately reflectthecurrentconfiguration intheFHA.Thisproposedchangedoesnotalteranysafetyfunctiondescribed intheFSARanddoesnotadversely affectfireprotection orsafeshutdownoftheplant.NochangestotheTechnical Specifications arecreated,andnoadverseeffectsonthesafeoperation ofNineMilePointUnit1arecreated.Basedontheaboveanalysis, thischangedoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| | |
| Page24of547.0TITLE:FireAreaDesignations.
| |
| 7.17.2BACKGROUND ANDSCOPE:FireBarriersareprov1dedatNMPltosubdivide thestructures intodistinctareas.Thesebarriersseparatebuildingareasandredundant safeshutdownequipment intof1reareasforthepurposeof.mitigating theconsequences resultant fromafireevent.Fireareasarefurtherdividedintofirezoneswhoseboundaries neednotconsistofratedorapprovedbarriers, butarechosenbasedonthephysicalplantdesign,convenience, and/orlayoutoffiredetection andsuppression systems.Fireareasandzoneshavenumericoralphanumeric designators todistinguish themforreference
| |
| : purposes, Thesedesignators arenotconsistent betweenthetwopr1maryfireprotection documents, theFHAandSafeShutdownAnalysisandwiththebuildingareas.Forthisreason,thedesignators usedintheFHAarebeingrevised.Thischangeisconsidered clericalinnatureasitdoesnoteffectthefirebarrierswhichprovideseparation, ofthebuildingareas.ANALYSIS:
| |
| Twoareadesignations, fireareaandfiresub-area, havebeenusedintheFHAforareasseparated bythree-hour barriersoracceptable AppendixRseparation respectively.
| |
| Theterm"firearea"asusedinAppendixR,however,meansanareasufficiently boundedtowithstand thehazardsassociated withtheareaand,asnecessary, toprotectimportant equipment withintheareafromafireoutsidethearea32.Thetermfiresub-areaasitappearsintheFHAis,therefore, amisnomerasthefiresub-areas meettherequirements offireareas.Changingthedesignator offiresub-areatofireareawi11alsobettermatchthealphanumeric designators giventothemintheAppendixRanalysis.
| |
| Forthesereasonsthedefinition ofandreference tofiresub-areas asItappearsintheFHAisbeingchangedtofirearea.FireareashavebeenchosenatNMPItosatisfytherequirement ofAppendixAtoBTP9.5-1andtheSafeShutdownAnalysisforAppendixRto10CFR50.TheFHAdescr1bes thefireprotection featuresprovidedfortheseareas.TheSafeShutdownAnalysisisthedrivingdocumentfordetermining ama]orityofthefireareaboundaries andfunctionally usestheseareaboundaries todemonstrate compliance w1thAppendixRto10CFR50.Fireareadesignators astheyappearintheFHAhavenotbeenconsistent withthedes1gnators usedintheSafeShutdownAnalysisalthoughtheactualphysicalboundaries forseparation remainthesame.Forthisreason,theFireAreadesignators usedintheSafeShutdownAnalys1saresuperceding thoseusedintheFHA.Fireareadesignations havealsobeengiventotheBatteryandBatteryBoardRooms,DieselGenerator 102miss11eshieldandDieselGenerator 103cableway,ReactorbuildingEastandWest,OffgasTunnel,Diesel-Fire PumpRoomandFoamRoom,alongwithconsolidating theOffgasBuildingandAdministration Buildingintolargerfireareas.Again,thephysicalseparation oftheareaswasprev1ously creditedintheFHAandSafeShutdownAnalysis.
| |
| These
| |
| | |
| Page25of54changeswereimplemented tomatchtheSafeShutdownAnalysisthateithercreditedorconsolidated theareaforanalysispurposes.
| |
| Inadditiontothesechanges,thefirezonedesignator fortheMSIVroomisbeingchanged.Thefirezonedesignator giventotheHSIVroom,RlE,reflected thezoneaspartoftheReactorBuilding.
| |
| ThiszonehasalwaysbeenpartoftheTurbineBuildingandisreflected thiswayintheSafeShutdownAnalysis.
| |
| Usingthedesignator RlEisamisnomerthatleadstoconfusion regarding wheretheHSIVroomislocated.Forthisreason,firezoneRlEisbeingrelabeled asT1A.Torepresent thischange,drawings8-40142-C overlay4-2and8-40143-C overlay4-3havebeenrevised.TheseoverlaychangesareincludedinFireProtection Document(FPDCN)FHA-90-3(seeSafetyEvaluation section12.0).Thefollowing changesarebeingmadetotheFHAinordertoreconcile differences inthewaythefireareasarereferenced intheSafeShutdownAnalysis:
| |
| FireHazardsAnalysisSection3.0:From:FAlTo:FA5FA6FA19FA13FA25FA26(FA12,FA27,FA28,FA29,FA29,FA30)FAl,FA2FA5,FA16A,FA168,FA17A,FA178FA6,FA9FA18,FA19FA13,FA14FA5FA15.FA12,FA4FireAreaZoneSummaryTables3.2-1-3.10-1:From:FSA1To:FSA2FSA18FSAFBZFSA1CFASRlEFA6FA22FA19"blank"FA25"blank"FA26FA27FA27(FA28,FA29,FA30)FA1FA2YardFA1orFA2FA3FA16A,FA168,FA17A,FA178T1AFA9FA20FA18FA14FA5FA5FA15FA12,FA4FA12
| |
| | |
| Page26of54SummaryHazardsAnalysisTables3.1.1-1to3.1.1-9:From:FSA1To:FSA1BFSA18FSA,FBZFSAICFA6FA5RlEFA22FA19FA13FA25FA26FA27(FA28,FA29,,FA30>FA27FAlFA2YardFA1orFA2FA3FA9FA16A,FA168,FA17A,FA17BTlAFA20FA18FA14FA5FA15FA12FA12FA4Theseproposedchangesdonotaffect:FSARsectionX.K,"FireProtection System,"ALARAdesign,Equipment Qualification, 10CFR50AppendixR,ControlRoomHab1tability, FuelAnalysisReview,ISI/ISTdesigncriteria, HumanFactorsdesigncriteria, HeavyLoaddesignicriteria, NMPlTechnical Specifications, Environmental Protection Plan,oranyaccidentdiscussed inFSARchapterXV-"Safety Analysis."
| |
| 7,3CONCLUSION:
| |
| Firebarriersandboundaries areusedatNMPltoseparatethestructures intodistinctareas.Inconsistencies haveexistedinthedesignators usedtodescribetheseareas.Forthisreason,changesarebeingimplemented totheFHAtoreconcile differences inNRCdefinitions32, theSafeShutdownAnalysisandplantconf1guration.
| |
| Thesechangesareconsidered clericalinnatureastheydonotaffectthefirebarrierswhichprovideseparation ofthebuildingareas.Theseproposedchangesdonotalteranysafetyfunctiondescribed intheFSARanddonotadversely affectfireprotection orsafeshutdownoftheplant.NochangestotheTechnical Specifications arecreatedandnoadverseeffectson,thesafeoperation ofNinelh1lePointUnit1arecreated.Basedontheaboveanalysis, thesechangesdonotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| | |
| Page27of548.0TITLE:FireDetection Systems.8.18.2BACKGROUND ANDSCOPE:Firedetection systemsareinstalled atNMPltodetectrapidlythosefiresthatdooccur.Therebyextending theconceptofdefense-in-depth tofireprotection insafety-related areas>>.Insection2.5oftheFHA,adescription oftheNMPldetection systemsisprovidedalongwithtableslistingthosedetection systemswhichprovideprotection ofsafety-related equipment.
| |
| Thesetablesaretransposed directlyfromtheNMPlTechnical Specifications andwilleventually replacethem32.FireProtection Engineering hasidentified twoadd>tiondetection zonesthatsatisfythebasesforthesystemslistedintheFHAandare,therefore, tobeincluded40.
| |
| Additionally, modifications havebeenpreviously implemented whichdeviatefromthefiredetection systemdescription intheFHA,andadddetectors tozones0-2151,0-3031PL, D-3054,0-4197,0-420741.
| |
| Thisexcept1on and-newdetection willalsobelisted.Therefore, thepurposeofthissafety.evaluation sectionshallbetoadddetection systemsandanadditional detectortotheFHAtablesandtoaddanexception tothefiredetection systemdesignprovided.
| |
| ANALYSIS:
| |
| Aspartoftheconceptofdefense-in-depth detection systemsareinstalled atNMPltorapidlydetectthosefiresthatdooccur>>.Detection systemshavebeeninstalled basedonthelocationoffirehazardsandtheareasorequipment beingprotected.
| |
| Asubsetofthesedetection systemsarethosesystemsthatprovideprotection forareasthatcontainorpresentafireexposuretosafety-related equipment3 39.A11stingofthesesystemsisprovidedintheNMPITechnical Specifications andtheFHAforthepurposeofidentifying necessary compensatory actionsandsurvelllances requiredfortheiroperation.
| |
| FireProtection Engineer1ng hasidentified twoadditional detection systemsthat,inpart,protectsafety-related, safeshutdownequipment40.
| |
| Detection systemD-2194attheTurbineBuilding277'levat1on
| |
| : protects, inpart,RemoteShutdownPanel12.Likewise, detection system0-2304attheTurbineBuilding291'levation
| |
| : protects, 1npart,D.C.ValveBoard12.RemoteShutdownPanel12andD.C.ValveBoard12areclassified assafeshutdownequipment andconta1ncomponents thataresafetyrelated242.Basedonthis,1thasbeendetermined thatdetection systems0-2194and0-2304merittheextracompensatory actionsandsurveillance requiredtobeperformed onthosesystemsintheFHAtables40.
| |
| Table2.5.1.1-4 1ntheFHAis,therefore, beingrevisedtoincludesystems0-2194andD-2304.Ithasalsobeendetermined thatanappropriate numberofoperabledetectors forthesesystemswouldbe59and28detectors respectively43.
| |
| Thischangeisconsidered anupgrade1ntheprogramthatisconsistent w1ththeoriginalbasesoftheFHA.
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| | |
| Page28of54Firedetection system0-3054providesprotection fortheControlRoomarea.Anadditional
| |
| : detector, 0-3054-27, hasbeeninstalled on'thissystemtoprovidedetection intheControlRoomventilation ductontheTurbineBuildingelevation 300-ft.54.Detection SystemD-3054isincludedintheTechnical Specifications.
| |
| However,theadditional detectorwasnotincluded.
| |
| Thisdiscrepancy waspreviously identified duringanexternalauditoftheTechnical Specifications55 56.Inordertocorrectthisdiscrepancy, thefiredetection tablesintheFHAarebeingrevisedtoincludedetectorD-3054-27.
| |
| 8.3Additionally, theTechnical Specification iscurrently incorrect inthenumberofdetectors specified fordetection zones0-3031PL, 0-4197,andD-4207.TheFHAisbeingrevisedtoshow102,10and8detectors forthesezonesrspectively.
| |
| Section2.5oftheFHAalsoprovidesinformation onallofthefiredetection system'sdesigns.Inparticular, itspecifies thatdetection zonewiringisClassAsupervised, meaningthatthecontrolwiringforthedetectors isloopedindualpathstopreventthelossofasingledetectorfromdisabling thesystem44.
| |
| Detection systemsD-1114andDA-1114have,however,beenchangedtoClassBSupervised meaningthatonlyasinglepathisprovidedforthecontrolwiring~1.
| |
| BychangingtoaClassBSupervised design,failureofonedetectorwilldisablethedetectors thatfollowitontheloop44.Detection systems0-1114andDA-1114arelocatedinthehydrogensealoilunitroom.Sincethesetwosystemsloopthemaingenerator leads,inducedACvoltagewasexperienced withtheClassAdesign.Thisinducedvoltagecausedthesystemstroublealarmlighttoglowcontinually andpotent1ally couldhavecausedtheinadvertent actuation oftheareasuppression systems.Forthisreasonthedetection systemdesignswerechangedtoClass8Supervised andtheproblemwaseliminated40.
| |
| Thischangewasappropriately addressed inSafetyEvaluation 82-03.Thissafetyevaluat1on sectionisbeingpresented onlytoincorporate thisexcept1on tothespecified designintheFHA.TheonlyitemaffectedbythesechangesistheFHAitself.Theseproposedchangestonotaffect:FSARsectionX.K,"FireProtection System,"ALARAdesign,Equipment Qualification, 10CFR50AppendixR,ControlRoomHabitab111ty, FuelAnalys1sReview,ISI/ISTdesigncr1teria, HumanFactorsdesigncriter1a, HeavyLoaddesigncriteria, NHP1Technical Specif1cations, Environmental Protect1on Plan,oranyaccidentdiscussed 1nFSARchapterXV-"Safety Analysis."
| |
| CONCLUSION:
| |
| Detection systemsandadetectorexistatNHPl,0-2194,andD-2304,andD-3054-27, thatmerittheextracompensatory act1onsandsurveillance requiredtobeperformed onthosesystemslistedintheFHAtables.Additionally, systemshavebeenmodified, D-1114andDA-1114,thatdeviatefromthedesignspecif1ed intheFHA.Itis,therefore, appropriate tospecifythesechangesintheFHA.Thesechangesareanupgradeintheprogramorhavebeenpreviously evaluated.
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| | |
| Page29of54Theseproposedchangesdonotalteranysafetyfunctiondescribed intheFSARanddonotadversely affectfireprotection orsafeshutdownoftheplant.NochangestotheTechnical Specifications arecreatedandnoadverseaffectsonthesafeoperation ofNineHilePointUnitlarecreated.Basedontheaboveanalysis, thesechangesdonotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| | |
| Page30of549.0TITLE:AdditionofFixedSuppression List.9.1BACKGROUND ANDSCOPE:TheNineMilePointUnit1(NMP1')FireHazardsAnalysis(FHA)isaLicensing documentintendedtoaddressthefeaturesandadequacyofthefireprotection program.FHAsection2.5discusses theNMPlsuppression systems.Theonlysuppression systemsidentified inthissectionaretheTechnical Specification systemsprotecting safety-related equipment.
| |
| InordertoenhancetheFHA,acompletelistofallthefixedfiresuppression systemsisbeingaddedtotheFHA.ThisFHAenhancement willprovideaneasilyaccessible reference listofallfixedsuppression zonenumbers,suppression systemtypesandlocationdescription ofsystemcoverage.
| |
| 9.2ThepurposeofthisSafetyvaluation sectionistoanalyzetheadditionofacompleteNMP1suppression systemlisttotheFHA.ANALYSIS:
| |
| Thefixedfiresuppression systemsincludewater(wet-pipe, dry-pipe, preaction andwaterspray),foam-water, C02(lowpressureandhighpressure) andHalon1301,Thesesystemsarelocatedtoprotectspecificcombustibles, hazardous equipment andareasofNMP1.Thetypeofsystemusedistheoptimumforthetypeoffireexpected, basedonthehazardpresent,Thenewsuppression systemlisthasbeeninserted1ntheFHAasTable4.0.FHATable4.0wasobtainedfromcontrolled NMPCdrawings(andassociated OCRs)andprocedures.
| |
| References to"seeTable4.0forcomplete11stofplantsuppression systems,"
| |
| havebeenaddedtoFHAsections2.5.3.1-,
| |
| 2.5.3.6,2.'5.4.3, and2.5.5.1.TheFHA"Tableof'ontents/List ofTables"hashadthereference toTable4.0added.TheonlyitemaffectedbythischangeistheFHAitself.Thisproposedchangedoesnotaffect:anyotherFHAsectionsincluding thesection3.0,"Detailed FireHazardsAnalysisbyBuilding,"
| |
| FSARsectionX.K,"FireProtection System,"surveillance andtestingprocedures, AL'ARAdesign,Equipment Qualification, 10CFR50AppendixR,ControlRoomHabitab111ty, FuelAnalysisReview,ISI/ISTdesigncriteria, HumanFactorsdesigncriteria, HeavyLoaddesigncr1teria, NMP1Techn1cal Specifications, Environmental Protection Plan,oranyaccidentanalysisdiscussed inFSARchapterXV-"Safety Analysis."
| |
| Th1sproposedchangeisanenhancement thatsimplyaddsadditional reference informat1on totheFHA.
| |
| | |
| ==9.3CONCLUSION==
| |
| :
| |
| Onefunct1onoftheNMPlFHAistodescribethesuppression systemspresentintheplant.Th1sproposedchangewillhelpdescr1beallthefixedsuppression systemstomaketheFHAamoreinformative document.
| |
| Th1sproposedchangedoesnotalteranysafetyfunctiondescribed intheFSARanddoesnot.adversely affectfireprotection orsafeshutdownoftheplant.No
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| | |
| Page31ofS4changestotheTechnical Specifications arecreatedandnoadverseeffectsonthesafeoperation ofNineHilePointUnitlarecreated.Basedontheaboveanalysis, thischangedoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| | |
| Page32of5410,0TITLE:AdditionofNFPACodeDeviation.
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| 10.1BACKGROUND ANDSCOPE:NationalFireProtection Association (NFPA)standard8013,section2-5.4,requiresthathollowmetalsteeldoor/frame clearances notexceed1/8inchforheadjam,sides,andbetweendoubledoors.Maximumclearance atdoorbottomisnottoexceed3/8inchwhenthereisaraisednoncombustible silland3/4inchwhennosillispresent.Modification Nl-87-032 installed newdoorsatNineMilePointUnit1(NMP1),butnotframes.TheInstallation Planforthemodification calledoutthattheNFPA80door/frame clearance criteriabesatisfied.
| |
| Afterinstallation, measurement ofclearances determined thattheNFPA80clearance criteriacouldnotbesatisfied fordoorsD117-lAandD291.Afterinspection ofthedoorsandthesurrounding conditions, FireProtection Engineering Evaluation (FPEE)-1-90-00752 waspreparedsomodification Nl-87-032 couldbeclosed.TheFPEEdetermined thattherewasadequatejustification toconcludethatthefiredoorswillperformtheirintendedfunctionofaratedfirebarrierevenwithslightlylargerdoor/frame clearances thanthatspecified byNFPA80.AllNFPAcodedeviations forNHPlarelistedinFHATable1.2.2.ThistableliststheNFPAcodedeviations andthejustifications foreachdeviation.
| |
| Basedonthefollowing section10.2"ANALYSIS,"
| |
| itlsconcluded thatundercertaincircumstances, firedoor/frame gapscanexceedthelimitssetbyNFPA80.Todocumentthis,theNFPAcodedeviation andjustification mustbeaddedtoFHATable1.2.2.Thisidentified codedeviation lsnotspecifictodoors0117-1Aor0291andiswrittengenerically.
| |
| Thisgenericdeviation (notspecifictoanyparticular door)willallowsimilarfuturedeviations, withonlythepreparation ofaFPEEinsteadofa10CFR50.59 determination.
| |
| ThepurposeofthisSafetyEvaluation sectionistoanalyzetheproposedchangeofaddingagenericNFPA80codedeviation totheFHA.10.2ANALYSIS:
| |
| Firebarriers(including doors,dampers,penetratlons.
| |
| etc.)arepassiveelementsintheNHP1fireprotection program.Firedoorassemblies aredesignedandinstalled inaccordance withtestedconfigurations toprovideaspecificdegreeoffireresistance (usuallyequaltothatofthebarrier).
| |
| Theoperability offiredoors(alongwithalloftheotherelementsofabarrier),
| |
| ensuresthatafirewillbeconfinedoradequately retardedfromspreading toadjacentfireareas.ThepresenceofoperablefiredoorsatNHP1helpsminimizethepossibility ofasinglefirerapidlyinvolving severalfireareasofthefacilitypriortodetection andextinguishment.
| |
| | |
| Page33of54Theproposedexemption/deviation istoallowdoor/frame gapsofupto1/8inchgapbeyondthatstatedinNFPA80section2-5.4.Thelimitations onthisproposedchangeareasfollows:1)appliestohollowmetalsteeldoorsonly;2)theminimumlatchengagement intothestrikeplatespecified inNFPA80issatisfied; 3)aFireProtection Engineering Evaluation (FPEE)ispreparedinaccordance withNEL-805thatjustifies whytheexcessdoorgapisacceptable.
| |
| PerNEL-805,theFPEEmustbeapprovedbytheFireProtection ProgramManager.Reasonsthatexcessdoor/frame gapsareacceptable mayinclude(butarenotlimitedto):1)thelabeledfiredoormeetsorexceedsthefireratingofthebarrier;2)presenceoffiredetection ononeorbothsidesofthebarrier;3)presenceofsuppression systemsononeorbothsidesofthebarrier;4)absenceofsafety-related equipment ononeorbothsidesofthebarrier;5)lowareafireloadingcomparedtothatofthebarrier;6)doorisnotnormallyusedforegress;7!othermeansofegressexist;8)adequatedoorlatchengagement; 9)theresultsoffiredoortestsperformed forotherutilities.
| |
| Items8and9arediscussed below.Themajor,firedoortestrequirement isthatitstayinplacewithoutopeningduringapotential fire.Firedoors.canwarpwhenexposedtoafire.Thiswarpagecouldcausethelatchbolttoretractfromthestrikeplate,allowingthedoortoswingopen.Therefore, therequiredminimumlatchengagement intothestrikemustbesatisfied.
| |
| Note:TherequiredminimumlatchthrowiseitherstampedonthedoorlabelorobtainedfromNFPA80Table2-88.Therequiredminimumlatchthrowminus1/8inch(themaximumNFPAdoorjambclearance) equalstherequiredminimumlatchengagement.
| |
| Theactualmeasuredlatchthrowminustheactualdoorjambclearance mustmatchorexceedtherequiredminimumlatchengagement.
| |
| References 22,23,and24arefiredoorendurance andhosestreamtests.performed forotherutilities onFenestraandOverlybranddoorswithexcessive doorgaps.Theresultsofthesetestsshowsthatincreased door/frame clearances upto1'/4inchforheadjamand~sides,1/2inchforbottomswithraisedsills,and1inchforbottomwithoutraisedsills,stillpassthestandard3-hrfireandhosestreamtest.Thus,theNFPAdoor/frame clearance criteriaisexceededby1/8inchforheadjams, sides,andbottomswithraisedsills,and1/4inchforbottomswithoutraisedsills.Althoughthesametestresultsmaynotbeobtainedforallbrandsoffiredoorsduetodifferences inconstruction, thistestdataisconsidered generally applicable toal.lqualityfirerateddoors,suchasusedatNMPl.ThisproposedchangeonlyaffectstheFHATable1.2.2anddoesnotaffectanyotherNMPldocuments.
| |
| Theproposedchangewillallowfuturedoorswithdoor/frame gaps,ofnotmorethan1/8inchabovetheNFPAcodelimit,tobeevaluated toensuretheyprovidetherequiredfireresistance tolimitfireandsmokepropagation.
| |
| If
| |
| | |
| Page34of54thedoorgapconfiguration isdetermined tobeadequate, basedonFPEE,nofurtherdocumentation (i.e.,a10CFR50.59 determination) willberequired.
| |
| Thisproposedchangedoesnotaffect:anyotherFHAsectionsincluding thesection3.0"Oetailed FireHazardsAnalysisbyBuilding,"
| |
| FSARsectionX.K,"FireProtection System,"ALARAdesign,Equipment Qualification, 10CFR50AppendixR,ControlRoomHabitability, FuelAnalysisReview,ISI/ISTdesigncriteria, HumanFactorsdesigncriteria, HeavyLoaddesigncriteria, NMP1Technical Specifications, Environmental Protection Plan,oranyaccidentanalysisdiscussed inFSARchapterXV-"Safety Analysis."
| |
| ThisproposedchangewillincreasetheaccuracyofFHATable1.2.2bylistingallexistingNFPAcodedeviations, asistheintentofthetable.
| |
| | |
| ==10.3CONCLUSION==
| |
| :
| |
| Basedontheresultsoffiretestdataandcertainotherdoor/plant criteria(latchengagement, suppression, detection, fireloading,etc.),thereisadequatejustification forexceeding theNFPA80door/frame gapsby1/8inch.ThechangewillrequirethataFireProtection Engineering Evaluation beperformed foranyfuturedoorthatcannotquitemeettheNFPAgapcriteria.
| |
| WiththeFPEEbeingapprovedbytheFireProtection ProgramManager,adequatecontrolsexisttoensurethecodedeviation isnotabused.Thisproposedchangedoesnotalteranysafetyfunctiondescribed intheFSARanddoesnotadversely affectfireprotection orsareshutdownoftheplant.NochangestotheTechnical Specifications arecreatedandnoadverseeffectsonthesafeoperation ofNineMilePointUnit1arecreated.Basedontheaboveanalysis, thischangedoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| | |
| Page35of5411.0TITLE:AdditionofCharcoalFilterFireProtection andFireLoadingInformation.
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| Note:ThisSafetyEvaluation sectiondiscusses anumberofsubjectsassociated withcharcoalfilterfireprotection.
| |
| Inaddition, charcoalfilterfireloadingandothermodification fireloadingchangesareincluded.
| |
| Tomoreclearlydistinguish betweenthesetopics,eachisassignedasubjectnumber.11.1BACKGROUND ANDSCOPE:~Subect1:TheNineMllePointUnit1(NMPl)FireHazardsAnalysis(FHA)describes fireprotection forplantcharcoalfiltersystems.Theonlysystemsdiscussed aretheReactorBuildingandControlRoomEmergency Ventilation charcoalsystems.Inadditiontothesesystems,therearecharcoalfilterfiredetection/suppression systemsontheRadwasteSolidification ItStorageBuilding(RSSB)HVACExhaustSystemandtheoldTSCEmergency Ventilation System.ThenewTSCVentilation Systemutilizesducttypesmokedetection downstream ofthecharcoalfilterwithoutasuppression system.Theadditionofinformation aboutthenewTSCVentilation SystemisincludedinSubject4below.Toproperlyaddressallfiveofthesesystems,additional information hasbeenaddedtotheFHAthatdescribes thesesystems.~Subect2:TheAdministration BuildingPenthouse Ventilation Roomisnotcurrently identified asafirezone.ThisproposedchangeaddsthePenthouse Ventilation Roomtothedesignatea firezonesoftheAdministration Building.
| |
| ~Subect3:Thefireloadinginformation listedforFireZonesRS3AandRS4Aistransposed.
| |
| Thisproposedchangecorrectsthezonefireloadingerrors.~Subect4:Modification 63-60,"Relocation oftheTechnical SupportCenter,"addedtheTSCCharcoalFilterEquipment Room.Thisproposedchangeaddsapplicable information totheFHAaboutthenewTSCandTSCCharcoalFilterEquipment Room.~Subect6:AsaresultofModification N1-69-229, thefireloadinginformation ofFHATable3.1.1-2,"SummaryHazardsAnalysis-Turbine Building,"
| |
| hasbeenmodified.
| |
| Thisproposedchangeupdatestheabovefireloadingtabletoreflectthecurrentfireloadingaftertheperformance ofthemodification.
| |
| ~gubect6:Tuominordiscrepancies existontheFNAfloorplandrawings(B40141-C throughB-40148-C) thatrequirerevisiontomakethesedrawingsmoreaccurate.
| |
| ThepurposeofthisSafetyEvaluation istoanalyzetheproposedchangeoftheabovesixsubjects.
| |
| 11.2ANALYSIS:
| |
| ~Subect1:TheNMP1FNASection2.4.4.4describes fireprotection forplantcharcoalfiltersystems.Theonlysystemsdiscussed aretheReactorBuildingandControlRoomEmergency Ventilation charcoalsystems.Inadditiontothesesystems,therearecharcoalfilterfiredetection/suppression systemsontheRSSB t
| |
| Page36of54HVACExhaustSystemandtheoldTSCEmergency Ventilation System.ThenewTSCVentilation Systemutilizesducttypesmokedetection downstream ofthecharcoalfilterwithoutasuppression system.Theadditionofinformation aboutthenewTSCVentilation SystemisincludedinSubject4below.TheintentoftheFHAistoaddressallpertinent aspectsoftheNMP1FireProtectProgramandtheplantfireprotection features.
| |
| Referencing theadditional charcoalfireprotection systemsisneededtoensuretheFHAadequately addresses theplantsfireprotection features.
| |
| Thischangesimplyaddsacompletedescription ofcharcoalfilterfiresystemspresently installed.
| |
| Thereinstallation hasbeenaddressed inpreviousreviewsandtherefore isnotachangetotheplantoranunreviewed safetyquestion.
| |
| Toproperlyaddressallfiveofthesesystems,additional information hasbeenaddedtotheFHAthatdescribes thesesystem'.TheFHAsection2.4.4.4describes thecharcoalfilterfireprotection fortheControlRoomandReactorBuildingEmergency Ventilation Systems.Asdiscussed above,thereareactuallyfivecharcoalfiltersystemsthatareequippedwithsuppression and/ordetection systems.Therefore, FHAsection2.4.4.4hasbeenrevisedtodescribeeachsystem.FHAsection3.0istheFireHazards/Loading Studythathassectionsdescribing thefiredetection andsuppression systemspresentforeachplantbuilding.
| |
| Review'ofeachbuildingfiredetection andsuppression description foundthatnoneofthecharcoalfilterdetection/suppression systemsaredescribed.
| |
| Therefore, FHAsections3,3.5(forTurbineBuilding),
| |
| section3.9.5(forRSSB)andsection3.10.5(forAdmin.Building) havebeenrevisedtoincludethedescription ofthesefiresystems.NMPlFSARsectionX-K.2.2doesnotaddressthefixedsuppression systemsoftheControlRoomEmergency Ventilation SystemortheRSSBHVACExhaustsystem.FSARsectionX-K.3.2.1 doesnotaddressthefixedsuppression systemsontheRSSBHVACExhaustsystem.ALicensing DocumentChangeNotice(LDCN)hasbeenpreparedtoincludereference tothesecharcoalfiltersuppression systems.FHATables3.1.1-1thru3.1.1-9listthefireloadingandfiresystemspresentforeachfirezoneoftheplant.FireZonesT4A.T6C,RS4A,AB3A,andAB5containthefivecharcoalfiltersystems.Thefireloadingtablesthatlistthesezonesdonotidentifythepresenceofthecharcoalfireprotection systems.Therefore.
| |
| FHATables3.1.1-2(T4A,TGC),3.1.1-8(RS4A),and3.1.1-9(AB3A,ABS)havebeenrevisedtoidentifythepresenceofthecharcoalfilterdetection andsuppression systems.Inaddition, thefireloadingtablesforfirezonesT4AandT6Cdonotlistthecharcoalasapartofthefireloadingofthearea.Therefore, theweightofcombustible charcoalisbeingaddedtoTable3.1.1-2.ThefireloadingtableforFireZoneT4Aalsodidnotincludethe289'ezzanine leveloftheTurbineAuxiliary Extension Building.
| |
| Therefore, thefireloadingandadditional areaisbeingaddedtoTable3.1.1-2.
| |
| | |
| Page37of54~Subect2:TheAdmlnlstratlon gulldlngVentllatlon Penthouse, elevation 290',housestheoldTSCEmergency Ventilation CharcoalFilters(alongw1thotherequipment).
| |
| Thisroomisenclosedandhasgeneralareasmokedetection (D-9249),
| |
| charcoalfilterheatdetection (D-9249FL),
| |
| andacharcoalfilterwaterspraysystem(WO-9249FL).
| |
| Basedonthisroombeingattachedtotheplant,withacertain.fireload1ngandfiresystemspresent,thisroomshouldhaveadesignated firezonenumber.Therefore, theAdministration BuildingVentilation Penthouse hasbeenassignedasFireZoneAB5.Toincorporate thisaddition, Table3.10-1hashadFireZoneAB5addedtotheFireArea/Zone SummaryandtheFireZoneAB5fireloadinginformation hasbeenaddedtoTable3.1.1-9.TheadditiontozonenumberAB5toFHAdrawingB-40145-C overlay3-5isincludedonFPDCNFHA-90-3(seesection12.0).Noadditional firebarrierrequirements arecreatedbythist;hange.~Subect3:Whileperforming researchonSub3ectl,ltwasobservedthattheFHATable3.1.1-8fireloadinginformation forFireZonesRS3AandRS4Aistransposed.
| |
| Thetransposition wasidentified bythetypeofcombustibles presentandthediscrepancy inareasquarefeetofthetwozones.Fieldwalkdownofcombustibles andzoneareaconfirmthatthefireloadinginformation forthesetwozonesaretransposed.
| |
| Reviewofthefireloadingfieldwalkdownsheetsshowsthattheerroroccurredduringtheinit1alf1reloadingfieldwalkdowns.
| |
| FireProtection Engineering hascorrected thiserroronthefireloadingfieldwalkdownsheetsforFireZonesRS3AandRS4A.FHATable3.1.1-8hasbeencorrected toshowtheproperfireloadinginformation forFireZonesRS3AandRS4A.Thispreviously unidentified error,hasnoadverseaffectontheadequacyofthefireprotection featuresinfirezonesRS3AandRS4Aanddoesnotrequirethat'dditional fireprotection featuresbeinstalled ormod1f1ed.~Subect4:SafetyEvaluation 85-01addressed thechangesofModification 83-50,"Relocation oftheTechnical SupportCenter,"Thef1reloadingforFireZoneAB2B(FHATable3.1.1-9)wasproperlyupdatedtoindicatethefireload1ngforthenewTSCduringtheFHArevisionl.However,otherinformation existsthatrequiresincorporation.
| |
| Otherrequ1redFHAchanges1ncludeadditionofthe:1)TSCCharcoalFilterEqu1pment RoomtotheFHA261'loorplandrawingB-40143-C; 2)Locations oftheductsmokedetectors onB-40143-C FHAoverlay1-3andB-40142-C FHAoverlay1-2;3)TSCCharcoalFilterEquipment Roomfireloadinginformation toFHATable3.1.1-9forFireZoneAB3A;4)words"Technical SupportCenter"toFHAdrawingB-40142-C inthegeneralareaofFireZoneAB2B.TheoldTSCareaisnowtheWorkControlOfficeand,thus,thedeletionofthewords"DESTECHSUPPCTR"fromFHAdrawingB-40144-C 1srequired.
| |
| Toincorporate thefloorplandrawingchanges,DesignChangeRequest(DCR)Nl-90-001LS635 hasbeenpreparedalongwiththeassociated FireProtection DocumentChangeNotice(FPOCN)FHA-90-4.
| |
| ThefloorplanoverlaychangeshavebeenincludedinFPDCNFHA-90-3(seeSafetyEvaluation section12.0).
| |
| | |
| Page38of54Aftertherelocation oftheTSC,NMPhastwoTSCcharcoalfilterventilation systems,anewoneandanoldone.ThenewTSCcharcoalfilterventilation systemisnotequippedwithafixedsuppression system.FSARsectionsX-K.2.2andX-K.3.2.1 bothreference theTSCcharcoalfiltersuppression systems.Tomakethesesectionscorrect,theword"old"isbeingaddedtospecifythecorrectsystem.ThischangeisincludedontheLOCNdiscussed inSub)ect1.0.AllotherNMPdocumentchangesasaresultoftheTSCrelocation havebeenimplemented/incorporated.
| |
| ~Subect5:Nodlflcatlon N1-89-229, replacedthe125VDCstationbatteries withlargersizeandweightbatteries.
| |
| Therefore, theFHATable3.1.1-2,"SummaryHazardsAnalysis-Turbine Building,"
| |
| hasbeenrevisedtoshowtheincreaseh weightofcombustible batterycomponents inthe277'attery rooms(FireZones82AandB2B).NootherFHAchangesarerequiredasaresultofModification N1-89-229.
| |
| ~Subect6:FNAfloorplandrawings8-40141-C through8-40148-C allstate,"ACCESSPASSAGEWAY (FUTURE)."
| |
| Withthecompletion ofNineMilePointUnit2,thepassageways arecompleteandpresent.Therefore, FPOCNFHA-90-4includesthedelytionoftheword"FUTURE"fromdrawingsB-40141-C throughB-40148-C.
| |
| Inaddition, FHAfloorplandrawingB-40144-C identifies theAdmin.Building277'ileRoomandViewing5WorkRoom.Thesetworoomsnolongerhavethesespecified functions and,therefore, isincorrect.
| |
| FPOCNFHA-90-4andOCRNl-90-001-LS635 havebeenpreparedtodeletethetitlesofthesetworooms.ThesechangesmaketileFHAfloorplandrawingsbetterrepresent theactualplantconfiguration.
| |
| EndofIndividual SubectAnalsis:Theonlydocumen'ts affectedbythesechangesisFSARsectionX-K,"FireProtection System,"andtheFHAitself.Theseproposedchangesdonotaffect:surveillance andtestingprocedures, ALARAdesign,Equipment Qualification, 10CFRSOAppendixR,ControlRoomHabitability, FuelAnalysisReview,ISI/ISTdesigncriteria, HumanFactorsdesigncriteria, HeavyLoaddesigncriteria, NMP1Technical Specifications, Environmental Protection Plan,oranyaccidentanalysisdiscussed inFSARchapterXV-"Safety Analysis."
| |
| ThyrseproposedchangesmaketheFHAmoreaccurateby;1)addressing allcharcoalfilterfiresuppression systems;2)including allrequiredplantareasasfirezones;3)correcting fireloadingerrors;4)including allaffectsoftheTSCrelocation; 5)including modification relatedfireloadingchanges;6)correcting minordrawingerrors.
| |
| | |
| Page39of54
| |
| | |
| ==11.3CONCLUSION==
| |
| :
| |
| Oneofthefunctions oftheFHAistodescribetheNMPlsuppression/detection systems.Theseproposedchangescorrectpreviouserrorsandomissions andhelpdescribeallthecharcoalfiresystemstomaketheFHAamorecompleteandinformative document.
| |
| AnotherfunctionoftheFHAistolisttheestimated combustible fireloadingforeachfirezone.TheproposedfireloadingchangeshelpmaketheFHAmoreaccuratebyindicating theas-builtfireloadingofthesub)ectfireareasandcorrected drawingerrors.Theseproposedchangesdonotalteranysafetyfunctiondescribed intheFSARanddonotadversely affectfireprotection orsafeshutdownoftheplant.NochangestotheTechnical Specifications arecreatedandnoadverseeffectsonthesafeoperation ofNineMilePointUnit1arecreated,Basedontheaboveanalysis, thesechangesdonotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
| |
| | |
| Page40of54'2.0TITLE:FHAOverlayChanges.12.1BACKGROUND ANDSCOPE:FireHazardsAnalysisdrawings8-40141-C through8-40148-C arefloorplansshowingthelocations offireratedbarriersateachelevation ofNineHilePointUnit(NMP1).Overthedrawingsaretransparent overlaysshowingtheidentification numbersandphysicallocations oftheNHPIfiredetection systems,firesuppression systems,smokeremovalzonesandfirezones.Plantwalkdownanddrawingreviewhaveidentified anumberofoverlayerrors.FireProtection DocumentChangeNotice(FPDCN)FHA-90-3hasbeenpreparedtocorrecttheseerrors.ThepurposeofthisSafetyEvaluation sectionistoanalyzetheproposedchangesofFPDCNFHA-90-3.
| |
| 12.2ANALYSIS:
| |
| Thefirepmtection systems(water,foam,C02,andHalonsuppression andfiredetection) primaryfunctionistoextendtheconceptofdefense-in-depth tofireprotection insafetyrelatedareasbyrapidlydetecting, containing, andext1nguishing anyfireswhichmightoccur.Toensurethefireprotection programismaintained, accuratedrawingsmustexistthatshowtheactualconfiguration ofallfiresystems.Asfiresystemsaremodified, allrelateddrawings, ideally,areupdatedtoshowthechange.TheFHAfloorplanoverlayshavebeenoverlooked intheprocess(inmanycases)and,thus,alargenumberoferrorsexistontheoverlays.
| |
| Otheroverlaydiscrepancies ident1fied aresimplyduetoerrorsduringtheoriginaloverlaypreparation.
| |
| Twod1screpancies areduetochangesinfirezonenumbersasaresultoftheNMPIAppendixRAnalysiswhichwerenotincorporated inthe1987FHAupdate.ThisproposedchangedoesaffectFHAoverlays8-40142-C 2-2,3-2,4-2.8-40143-C 1-3,2-3,4-3,8-40144-C 1-4,2-4,4-4,8-40145-C 1-5,2-5,3-5,8-40146-C 1-6,2-6,8-40148-C 2-8.Aspartofthissamesafetyevaluation (section9.0),Table4.0isbeingaddedtotheFHA.FHATable4.0listsallthef1xedsuppression systemsintheplant.FPDCNFHA-90-3correctsvarioussuppress1on systemnumbersthatwereincorrect ontheFHAoverlays.
| |
| Thesecorrect1ons havebeenincorporated onTable4.0.Aspartofth1ssamesafetyevaluation (sect1on7.0),FireZoneRlE1sbeingchangedtoF1reZoneT1A.FPDCNFHA-90-3alsoincludestherequiredchangeto8-40142FHAOverlay4-2and8-40143-C FHAoverlay4-3tochangeFireZoneRlEtoTlA.
| |
| | |
| Page41of54Aspartofthissamesafetyevaluation (Section11.0,Subject2),theAdmin.BuildingPenthouse isbe1ngmadeFireZoneAB5on'-40154-C overlay3-5.FPDCNFHA-90-3alsoincludestherequiredchangetothisoverlay.Aspartofthissamesafetyevaluation (section11.0,subject4),theductsmokedetection ofthenewTechnical SupportCenterisbeingaddedtoB-40143-C FHAoverlay1-3andB-40142-C FHAoverlay1-2.FPDCNFKA-90-3alsoincludestherequiredchangestotheabovedrawingoverlays.
| |
| NMPCreference drawingsshowingthecorrectfiresystemconfigurations arelistedontheFPDCNpages.Allcontrolled fireprotection drawingsreviewedareaccurateand,thus,nootherdrawingchangesarerequired.
| |
| Surveillance andtestingprocedures arenotaffectedbythischangesinceallrequiredfiresystemsareproperlyidentified andtested.Thisproposedchangedoesnotaffect:anyotherFHAsectionsincluding thesection3.0"Detailed FireHazardsAnalysisByBuilding,"
| |
| FSARsectionX.K,"FireProtection System,"ALARAdesign,Equipment Qualification, 10CFR50AppendixR,ControlRoomHabitability, FuelAnalysisReview,ISI/ISTdesigncriteria, HumanFactorsdesigncriteria, HeavyLoaddesigncriteria, NMPlTechnical Specifications, Environmental, Protection Plan,oranyaccidentanalysisdiscussed inFSARchapterXV-"Safety Analysis."
| |
| ThisproposedchangewillincreaseaccuracyoftheFHAfloorplanoverlaysbyshowingtheas-builtcondition oftheNMPlfireprotection systems.
| |
| | |
| ==12.3CONCLUSION==
| |
| :
| |
| TheFHAfloorplanoverlaysareusedtoquicklydetermine firezoneareasandtheareasofNMPlthathavedetection, suppression, andsmokeremovalsystems.Errorsintheseoverlayscouldleadtomis1nformation.
| |
| Thesechangesw111helpensureaccurateinformation isobtainedfromtheoverlays.
| |
| Thisproposedchangedoesnotalteranysafetyfunctiondescribed intheFSARanddoesnotadversely affectfireprotection orsafeshutdownoftheplant.NochangestotheTechnical Spec1flcations arecreated,andnoadverseeffectsonthesafeoperation ofNineMilePointUnit1arecreated.Basedontheaboveanalysis, thischangedoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| | |
| Page42of5413.0TITLE:FireRatedWallsandSlabs.13.1BACKGROUND ANDSCOPE:Firebarriersareutilizedtoseparatestructures atNMP1intodistinctareas.Thesebarriersareidentified ondrawings8-40141-C through8-40148-C.
| |
| Barriersidentified onthesedrawingsareallinclusive ofthosebeingmaintained.
| |
| Thesebarrierswereestablished tosatisfytheseparation requirements ofAppendixAtoBTP9.5-1andAppendixRto10CFR50,aswellas,Insurance Recommendations, LifeSafetyconcerns, andgoodfireprotection engineering designs.Mostrecently, firebarriersandboundaries havebeenincorporated intothesedrawingstoincorporate theresultsoftheSafeShutdownAnalysisrequiredbyAppendixRto10CFR50.Subsequent tothiseffort,numerousdeficiencies wereidentified inthefirebarrierprogramatNMP11645'6.Resultant fromthesedeficiencies, thedesignbasisdocuments forthefirebarrierswerechangedtoreflecttheas-installed condition31.
| |
| FireBarrierdrawings8-40141-C through8-40148-C wererevisedaspartofthefirebarrierupgrades19.
| |
| Theserevisions producedas-builtdrawingsoffireratedbarriers.
| |
| ForthepurposeofthisFHAupdate,thesechangeswillbeevaluated forincorporation intotheFHAbygroupingandaddressing thechangesbyspecificcategories.
| |
| 13.2ANALYSIS:
| |
| Drawing8-40141-C through8-40148-C areissuedaspartoftheFHAtodefinefirebarriersutilizedatNMPl.Inresponse.
| |
| toNRCviolations thesedrawingswererevisedtoreflecttheas-builtcond/tion ofthebarriers.
| |
| Changesmadetodrawings8-40141-C through8-40148-C, inordertoproduceas-builtdrawings, canbecategorized asdrawingerrors,omissions, revisedboundaries, changeinbarrierratingsandclarifications.
| |
| 13.2.1DrawingErrors:Thefollowing drawingerrorshavebeencorrected aspartofthefirebarrierdrawingupdate:DescritlonLocationN185044LS-557
| |
| -532-603-568-603Adding2-hr.ReactorBuildingSouthWal1sDeleting1-hr.floorslabareainexcessoftheMechanical StorageAreaDeletingfloorsandwallsshownintheHydrogenSealOilplatformareaDeleting3-hr.floorslabsoverstair-wellsDeleting3-hr.floorslaboverstair-well,Extending 2-hr.wallintheReactorBuilding351-369RB320TB277TB261TB261TB/RB
| |
| | |
| Page43of54ThesouthwalloftheReactorBuildingalongcolumnlineJbetweenrows4and12hasafireresistive ratingof2hoursaboveelevation 340'.Theratingofthiswallwascorrectly shownonelevation 340'.Thedrawingdetailsforthissamewaliatelevations 351'nd369',however,failedtoshowthewalls'orresponding rating.Tocorrectthisdiscrepancy, thedrawingdetailsnowshowthesouthwalloftheReactorBuildingas2hourrated.Thesouthstairwell oftheReactorBuildingisseparated with2hourfireresistive barriers.
| |
| Inpart,thisisaccomplished byutilizing thewallatcolumnlineLbetweenrows91/2andllatelevation 261'.Previously thecolorcodingidentifying thewallsratingstoppedatcolumnline10approximately fivefeedshortofthewallslength.Thiserrorhasbeenresolvedbyextending thecolorcodingtheentirelengthof-thewall.Floorassemblies arerequiredtoberatedovertheboundaries forthefireareasorhazardsbeingseparated.
| |
| Portionsofthefloorslabsoverthemechanical storageareaandoverseveralTurbineBuildingstairwells unnecessarily overlapintosimilarareasnotrequiring separation.
| |
| Inordertoreducetheamountoffirebarriersbeingmaintained, theunnecessary overlapping portionsofthesefloorassemblies arenolongershownasfirerated.Onelevation 277'ftheTurbineBuildingratedbarriersareshownseparating theHydrogenSealOilplatform.
| |
| However,theonlybarriersrequiredtoseparateHydrogenSealOilhazardarethewallsandflooroftheHydrogenSealOilUnitroom.AsthebarriersoftheHydrogenSealOilUnitroomsufficiently boundthehazardthefireratingsforthebarriersoftheHydrogenSealOilplatformarebeingremoved.Thesechangesarebeingmadetocorrectdrawingerrorsnecessary toreflecttheas-builtplantconfiguration consistent with,theoriginaldesignintentsandbases.13.2.2Omiss,ions:
| |
| /Thefirebarrierdrawingshavealsobeenrevisedtoaddnecessary fireratingsandfeaturespreviously omitted.Thefollowing isalistofthesechanges:H185044LS-557
| |
| -532-603-694DescritionAdditionof2-hr.ceilingontheReactorBuildingsoutheast stairwell Additionof1-hr.floortoHechanical StorageAreaAdding2-hr.wallsanda3-hr.floortotheHydrogensealoilUnitRoomAddingprotected southandeastwallsoftheControlRoomLocation340300291291RBTBTBCT
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| | |
| Page44of54DCR-567N185035LS-244 N185044LS-566
| |
| -542-581N188001LS-145 LocationAdding2-hr.Administration Building277ShaftAdding3-hr.floorandceilingto261Administration BuildingOilStorageRmAdding3-hr.floortotheDieselFire261PumpRmAdding3-hr.wallsandfloorforthe250TurbineBuildingsouthelevatorshaftAddinga3-hr.wallandfloorforthe250HainSteamTunnelAddinga3-hr.wallandfloorforthe250TurbineBuildingNorthStairwells ADADSMTBTBTBIntheseareasitwasdetermined thattheexistingbarrierswerenotsufficient toboundthehazardsorplantareas.Theseareasweresubsequently upgradedbyestablishing fireratingsforexistingbarriersorcrediting protection featuresprovided.
| |
| Theseupgradesareenhancements totheprogramwhichimprovetheabilitytomitigatetheeffectsofanticipated fires.Theadditionofthesechangeswillproperlyidentifythenecessary fireprotection featuresandwillfacilitate maintaining fireprotection commitments fortheseareas.13.2.3RevisedBoundaries:
| |
| Aportionoftheareaboundaries werealsochangedwhichsubsequently hasresultedinchangingthefollowing areabarriers:
| |
| DCRDescritionLocationN185044LS-542
| |
| -554LG-084-145,422556566Addinganddeletingbarrierstobetter300.291AD/TBdefinethebarriersseparating thestairwells andelevatorshaftbetweentheAdministration andTurbineBuildings Addinganddeletingwallsofthe288.261CT.ControlRoomVentShaft250DeletingCableSpreading Roomexterior250CTAddinganddeletingbarrierstobetter250RB/TBdefinethebarriersoftheeastandweststairwells separating theReactorandTurbineBuildings.
| |
| Deletingredundant barriersseparating 250HB/RSSBtheHasteBuildingandtheRSSBDeletingthewallsoftheDieselFire230SHPumpSumpnowprotected byafloorslab
| |
| | |
| Page45of54FirebarriersareutilizedatNMPlinparttoestablish andseparatefireareas.Duringthepenetration upgradeeffort,around1989,minorchangesweremadetomanyofthefirearea.boundries19.
| |
| Fireareaboundries wereredefined tooptimizetheavailable barriersrequiredforseparating plantareasandspecifichazardsorequipment.
| |
| Thefirebarriersnotedabovehavebeenrevisedtoreflectredefined fireareaboundries whichseparatetheNMP1structure.
| |
| 13.2.4Ratings:Thefollowing firebarrierratingshavebeenchangedwherethebarrier's construction wasinconsistent withtheratingorhazardbeingseparated nolongerexist:DCRDescritionLocationN189008LS-471 N185044LG-075 N190001LS-237 N1805044LS-603 Changingthe3-hr.wallsofthe298ReactorBuildingIsolation ValveRoomto1-hr.wallsDeletingthe2-hr.ratingforAdminis-277trationBuildingFileRoomHallsDeletingthe2-hr.ratingforthe277Administration BuildingViewingandWorkRoomwalls.Deletingthe2-hr.walloftheWaste261BuildingTruckLoadingPlatformRBADAOTheReactorBuildingEmergency Condenser Isolation ValveRoomwallsarebeingchangedfroma3-hr.ratingtoa1-hr.ratinginordertoel.iminate theneedtoreplacetheinstalled firedooranddamper.ThewallsoftheIsolation ValveRoomareconstructed toathree-hour ratinganautomatic halonsuppression systemanddetection systemarealsoprovided.
| |
| Thecombustible loadingoftheroomiswellbelow1-hr.Thefiredoorisratedat11/2hoursandadamperisprovidedtocontainthehalononly.Inordertomaintainthethree-hour fireratingfortheroomwalls,thedooranddamperwouldhavehadtobereplaced.
| |
| Basedonthelowcombustible loading,automatic suppression anddetection, itisacceptable toreclassify thewallsasone-hourbarrierseliminating theneedtoreplacethedooranddamper.Two-hourratedfirebarrierswereprovidedfortheAdministration BuildingFileRoomandViewingandHorkRoom.Theoccupancy ofthyrseroomshassincechangedwiththenewoccupancy notrequiring ratedbarriers47 48.Forthisreasonthebarrierratingsarebeingdeleted.
| |
| | |
| Page46of54,Two-hr.ratedfirebarrierswereprovidedfortheWasteBuildingTruckLoadingPlatform.
| |
| Thesebarriersarebeingdeletedastheyarenotnecessary toprovideadequateseparation.
| |
| 13.2.5Clarifications:
| |
| Inadd1tiontobarrierchanges,thefollowing noteshavebeenincorporated intothebarrierdrawings:
| |
| DCRN185035LS-244 N185044LS-542 N188001LS-694 N185044LS-557 DescritionRSSBControlRoomRoofTurbineBuildingStairwells andElevatorAd]acenttotheAdministration BuildingControlRoomWallsabove289'-4"WallsofDieselGenerator Rooms,ReactorBuildingAirlockLocation261RSSB277,261AO/TB250277CT261DG/RBTheseOCRsincorporate notesthatarebeingaddedtothebarrierdrawingstoclarifyareasthedrawingscannotclearlyshow.TheonlyitemaffectedbythesechangesistheFHAitself.Theseproposedchangestonotaffect:FSARsectionX.K,"FireProtection System,"AURAdesign,Equipment Qualification, 10CFR50AppendixR,ControlRoomHabitability, FuelAnalysisReview,ISI/ISTdesigncriteria, HumanFactorsdesigncriteria, HeavyLoaddesi'gncriteria, NHP1Technical Specifications, Environmental Protection Plan,oranyaccidentdiscussed inFSARchapterXV-"Safety Analysis."
| |
| | |
| ==13.3CONCLUSION==
| |
| :
| |
| Drawings8-40141-C through8-40148-C areall1nclusive representat1ons ofthefirebarriersatNHPl.Deficiencies existedinthesedrawingsandinthebarriersselected.
| |
| Thesedeficiencies wereproperlyevaluated forthepurposeofproducing as-builtdrawingsoftheplantstructures.
| |
| Throughthisevaluation thespecificdrawingchangeshavebeencategorized andevaluated for1ncorporation
| |
| '1ntotheFHA.Theseproposedchangesdonotalteranysafetyfunctiondescribed 1ntheFSARanddonotadversely affectfireprotection orsafeshutdownoftheplant.NochangestotheTechn1cal Specification arecreatedandnoadverseeffectsonthesafeoperation ofNineNlePointUnit1arecreated.Basedontheaboveanalysis, thesechangesdonotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
| |
| f Page47of54'4.0TITLE:Transformer OilSpillPrevention 14.114.214.3BACKGROUND ANDSCOPE:Previously NHP1utilizedaspillretention systemfortransformels thathadthepotential foreventualrunoffIntoLakeOntario.InJune1986theUnitedStatesEnvironmental Protect)on Agency(EPA)performed afieldinspection toconfirmtheOilSpillPrevention ControlandCountermeasure PlansforNineMilePoint49.TheEPAreportmaderecommendations whichrequiredphysicalchangestoprovideadditional oilspillprotection topreventcontamination ofLakeOntario49.
| |
| Thesechangeswereevaluated forsafetysignificance andimplemented atNHP).Thissafetyevaluation sectionwillbeusedtochangethedescription oftheoilcollection systemintheFHAtomatchtheexistingconfiguration.
| |
| ANALYSIS:
| |
| FHAsection2.4.1.8providesadescription oftheoilcollection systemusedforapotential transformer oilspill.ChangeshavebeenmadetoimprovethedesignofthissystemtosatisfyFederalandStateenvironmental regulations.
| |
| : Likewise, theFHAisbeingrevisedtoreflectthiscurrentdesign.AsitIsdescribed intheFHA,thetransformer oilspi11containment consistsofa12in.rocklayerinacurbedareasurrounding eachtransformer.
| |
| Drainageofthissystemallowedforanynormaloraccidental oilspillagetoeventually enterLakeOntario.Similarly, thenewdrainagesystemutilizescurbsandbasinstocontainspillsatthesource5~.
| |
| However,asystemofdrainagesewerstransports potential runofffromtheseareastoaretention basinwheretheoilisseparated fromtherunoffpriortoitsrelease50.
| |
| ThisdesignaccountsforrunoffQomrainfall, aswellas,automatic andmanualfiresuppress1on systems50.
| |
| Thisimproveddes1gnhaspreviously beenreviewedforundersafetyevaluation 88-004.Itis,therefore, appropriate torevisetheFHAtoreflectthisnewconfiguration.
| |
| TheonlyitemaffectedbythischangeistheFHAitself.Thisproposedchangedoesnotaffect:FSARsectionX.K,"FireProtection System,"ALARAdesign,Equipment Qual)f)cat)on,
| |
| )OCFR50AppendixR,ControlRoomHabitability, FuelAnalysisReview,ISI/ISTdesigncr1teria, HumanFactorsdesigncriteria, HeavyLoaddesigncriteria, NHPlTechnical Specifications, Environmental Protection Plan,oranyaccidentanalysisdiscussed
| |
| )nFSARchapterXV-"Safety Analysis."
| |
| CONCLUSION:
| |
| Section2.4.1.8oftheFHAprovidesadescript)on ofthetransformer 011collection system,SincethelastrevisionoftheFHA,thissystemhasbeenmodifiedtoimprovetheoilcollect1on capab111ty andpreventthepotential foro11pollution enter1ngLakeOntario.Thismodification hasbeenpreviously reviewedforsafetysignificance.
| |
| Itisappropriate to)ncludethisimprovedconfiguration intheFHAdescription.
| |
| | |
| Page48of54Thisproposedchangedoesnotalteranvsafetyfunctiondescribed intheFSARanddoesnotadversely affectfireprotection or.safeshutdownoftheplant.NochangestotheTechnical Specifications are'reated andnoadverseeffectsonthesafeoperation ofNineHilePointUnit1arecreated.Basedontheaboveanalysis, thischangedoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
| |
| | |
| Page49of5415.0TITLE:Technical Specifications'5.1 BACKGROUND ANDSCOPE:GenericLetter86-10requested thatlicensesincorporate theNRC-approved FireProtection ProgramintheirFinalSafetyAnalysisReports51.
| |
| Uponcompletion ofthisprogram,thelicensees werefurtherencouraged to,inpart,removeunnecessary fireprotection Technical Specifications.
| |
| Later,theNRCprovidedspecificguidanceinGenericLetter88-12fortheremovaloffireprotection fromtechnical specifications.
| |
| Inaccordance withGenericLetter86-10,NMPltranscribed thefireprotection Technical Specification requirements intorevisiononeoftheFHAinpreparation foreventually removingtheTechnical Specifications.
| |
| Aportionoftherequirements forfirebrigadestaffingandthedefinition foraFireHatchPatrolwere,however.nottransposed.
| |
| Inaccordance withtheoriginalintentofhousingTechnical Specification requireme'hts intheFHA,thesechangeswillbeimplemented throughthissafetyevaluation.
| |
| 15.2ANALYSIS:
| |
| NiagaraMohawkiscurrently pursuingremovingfireprotection fromtheTechnical Specifications.
| |
| Inordertoaccomplish this,thefireprotection programrequirements currently intheTechnical Specifications willbehousedintheFHA.Themajorportionofthiswasaccomplished inrevisiononeoftheFHA.ThisrevisionoftheFHAwillincludetwoadditional changestoinsureprogramcompliance.
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| Technical Specifications mandatethataFireBrigadeoffivemembersshallbemaintained onsite.FireBrigadecomposition maybelessthantheminimumrequirements foraperiodnottoexceedtwohoursinordertoaccommodate unexpected absence,providedimmediate actionistakentofilltherequiredpositions.
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| Section2.1.1.2oftheFHAstatesthataChiefNuclearFire-fighter andfourNuclearFire-fighters areassignedtorotatingshifts.Itisnotapparentinthisdescription thatthefirebrigadestaffingisaprogramrequirement norareanyprovisions allottedforanunexpected absence.ThissectionoftheFHAis,therefore, beingrevisedtobettermatchthecurrentTechnical Specifications.
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| TheTechnical Specifications defineactionsforaFireHatch.Inparticular, atleasteachhour,anareawithinoperable fireprotection equipment shallbeinspected forabnormalconditions.
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| AlthoughtheFHAdoesmakereference totheFireHatchPatrol,thertquirements forthepatrolarenotincluded.
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| Forthisreason,section2.1.1.2oftheFHAwillalsoberevisedtoincludetheseprogramrequirements.
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| TheonlyitemaffectedbythischangeistheFHAitself.Thisproposedchangedoesnotaffect:FSARsectionX.K,"FireProtection System,"ALARAdesign,Equipment Qualification, lOCFR50AppendixR,ControlRoomHabitability, FuelAnalysisReview,
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| | |
| Page50of54ISI/ISTdesigncriteria, HumanFactorsdesigncriteria, HeavyLoaddesigncriteria, NMPlTechnical Specifications, Environmental Protection Plan,oranyaccidentanalysisdiscussed inFSARchapterXV-"Safety Analysis."
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| | |
| ==15.3CONCLUSION==
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| :
| |
| Inaccordance withNRCguidance, fireprotection requirements currently housedinheTechnical Specifications arebeingtranscribed intotheFHA.Themajorportionofthiseffortwasaccomplished inrevisiononeoftheFHA.However,twoareaswereoverlooked.
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| Forthisreason,theFHAisbeingrevisedtoexpandandincludeprogramrequirements forFireBrigadestaffingandFireHatchPatrols.Thesechangesareconsistent withcurrentNRCguidanceandwilleventually facilitate removingfireprotection fromtheTechnical Specifications.
| |
| Thisproposedchangedoesnotalteranysafetyfunctiondescribed intheFSARanddoesnotadversely affectfireprotection orsafeshutdownoftheplant.NochangestotheTechnical Specifications arecreatedandnoadverseeffectsonthesafeoperation ofNineMilePoint1arecreated.Basedontheaboveanalysis, thischangedoesnotconstitute anunreviewed safetyquestion.
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| Page51of5416.0TITLE:Previously AcceptedFPOCNs.ForfutureFHAannualupdates,areportwillbeprovidedtosummarize andincorporate alloftheapplicable FPOCNs.Thisreportwillestablish atraceable pathbetweentheupdatedFHA,associated safetyevaluations andFPOCNs.Ootothesizeofthissafetyevaluation, itisimpractical towriteaseparatereport.Forthisreason,theapplicable FPOCNsarebeingincorporated byreference intothissafetyevaluation whichwillactasthereportforrevision2totheFHA.SafetyEvaluations 89-025and90-042includechangesnecessary tobeincorporated inthisrevisionoftheFHA.FPOCNsFHA-90-01 andFHA-90-02 werepreparedforthesechangesandareincludedasanattachment tothisSafetyEvaluation.
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| Thesechangeswerepreviously evaluated andareonlybeingincludedinthisSafetyEvaluation forreference purposes.
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| Page52of54l.2.3.4,5.6.8.9.10.12.13.14.15.16.17.18.19.20.21.22.REFERENCES Technical Specifications NMPl.AppendixRAnalysis.
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| FireHazardsAnalysisR.l.LetterF.J.Constance toJ.Limes2/8/90.LetterM.KammertoJ.Jirousek12/7/87.Procedure Nl-FPM-FPW-M002.
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| .Procedure Nl-FST-FPW-W001.
| |
| Technical Specification NMP1Amend.53.OCRN1-85-044-LS-557.
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| CharcoalFilterDrawings.
| |
| FireProtection Program.BTP9.5-1App.A.NFPA80,StandardforFireDoorsandWindows.NMPCFSAR.FireProtection SER7-26-79.GBAAuditReport1984-1985.
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| NCR1-88-2009.
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| MWRNl-85-044-LA093.
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| 50.59Determination D87-001R.3.
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| DCRN1-85-044LS494.
| |
| Calc.S10-203-HV01.
| |
| .WarnockHerseyInternational, Inc.,"ReportoftheFireEndurance andHoseStreamTestingofa6'0"*7'0" FireRatedDoorAssemblyInstalled WithExcessive Clearances inaConcreteBlockWall,"performed forPaloVerdeGenerating StationonOctober24,1986.23.WarnockHerseyInternational, Inc.,"ReportoftheFireEndurance andHoseStreamTestingofTwoSingle,FireRatedDoorAssemblies WithExcessive Clearances Installed inaConcreteBlockWall,"performed forPaloVerdeGenerating StationonOctober22,1986.24.WarnockHerseyInternational, Inc.,"ReportoftheFireEndurance andHoseStreamTestingofAPairof3'0"*7'0" SteelDoorsanda6'0"*7'0" SteelFrameAssemblyWithExcessive Clearances BetweentheDoorandFrame,"performed forGeorgiaPowerCompanyonMay5,1987.25'.SafetyEvaluation 80-05.
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| Page53of5426.27.28.29.30.31.32.33.34.35.36.37.38.39.40.41.42.43.44,45.46.47.48.49.50.51.52.53.54.55.56.57.58.59.LetterJ.F.LimestoH.L.Schivone3/9/90SM-CS90-0098.
| |
| DrawingC-19907-C Sh.3R.4.Electrical DesignGuide1300.NMPC-FPQAP-1 R.2.NEL-805.ResponsetoNOV,NMPlL0317,Oct.21,1988.GenericLetter86-10.DrawingC-27152-C Sh.1R.2.FireratedbarrierdrawingB-4014-C.
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| OCRN185044LS566.
| |
| LER88-09.AppendixRto10CFR50.'afetyEvaluation 83-08.LetterG.GresocktoFileMarch1,1982.Letter.R.C.BeliertoM.A.DooleySept.21,1989.'afety Evaluation 82-03.Q-List.LetterJ.F.LimestoA.Barnhardt June13,1990.NFPACodes72D&72E.NOV(NRCInspection ReportNc.50-220/88-15)
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| Sept.19,1988.LER83-44.LetterSellertoAndersen1/29/90.MemoGC89-014(12/8/89)
| |
| D.T.Edelmann.
| |
| SafetyEvaluations 88-004.Engineering Reportforwastewater Treatment FacilityforRunofffromOilSpillAreasNineMilePointUnit1Jun18,1989.GenericLetter88-17.FireProtection Engineering Evaluation FPEE-1-90-007, "Excessive Door/Frame Clearance ofFireDoors0117AandD291.OCRN-l-90-001LS635, "FHAFloorPlanDrawingUpdate."DrawingC-34010-C'ev.
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| 3.LetterR.C.BeliertoBobPigeon,SM1-089-0443, 9-7-89.PickardLowe&GarrickAuditNo.0366.LetterNMPlL0450 NiagaraMohawktoNRCNov.3,1989.NMP1FinalSafetyAnalysisReport(updated).
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| DCRN1-90-001LS673.
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| Page54of5460.61,62.63.64.65.66.YendorDraining,
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| : Custodis, CH-520-67-A.
| |
| DrawingC-10321-C.
| |
| FireProtection Handbook16thEdition.LetterNMPCtoNRCDec.22,1983;May11,1984.NRCFireBreakZoneSER,8-6-86.DrawingB-40148-C Calculation M31.1-RX261-CW01
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| 'I00}}
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