ML20071E215

Analysis of Low Trajectory Turbine Missile Hazard

ML20071E215
Person / Time
Site:	Perry
Issue date:	10/08/1976
From:	Tate J, Webb S, Weise K GILBERT/COMMONWEALTH, INC. (FORMERLY GILBERT ASSOCIAT
To:
Shared Package
ML20069C402	List: ML20071E215
References
FOIA-83-1 1848, NUDOCS 8303100092
Download: ML20071E215 (81)

Text

{{#Wiki_filter:-. SP. 3 9 2-e ' October-8, 1976 GAI REPORT NO.1848 / F

• AN ANALYSIS OF LOW TRAJECTORY TURBINE MISSILE HAZARD to the

?"RRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNITS 1 & 2 CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLU!!INATING CO. CLEVELAND, OHIO 4 Kenneth E. Weise Stephen W. Webb 4 Jacquelyn Tate 's Gilbert Associates, Inc. 525 Lancaster Avenue Reading, Pennsylvania ' ~- 8303100092 830210 PDR FDIA DLS j HIATT83-1 PDR / ,g, c

3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title M l

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1 2.0 GENERAL DESCRIPTION 3

2.1 DESCRIPTION

OF THE PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 3 2.2 LOW TRAJECTORY MISSILE TARGET ZONE 7 2.3 POSTULATED METHODS FOR COMPROMISING UNIT SAFETY 8 2.4 TURBINE MISSILE CHARACTERISTICS 9 j 3.0 EVALUATION OF IyRBINE MISSILE DAMAGE PROBABILITY 10

3.1 INTRODUCTION

10 3.2 ANNUAL MISSILE EJECTION PROBABILITY - P1 11 3.3 'LTM STRIKE PR03 ABILITIES - P2 12 3.3.1 Method 12 3.3.2 LM Strike Probabilities 13 3.4 DAMAGE PREDICTION - P3 14 3.4.1 Method 14 3.4.2 Intermediate Barrier Interaction 15 3.4.3 Final Barriers 21 3.4.4 Missile Impact Parameters 22 3.4.5 Multiple Impacts 25 3.4.6 . Statistics 27 3.4.7 Damage Probability 29 3.5 TARGEI DAMAGE PROBABILITIES - P 32 ) 4

3.6 CONCLUSION

33 REFERENCES 34 APPENDIX A RESIDUAL PERFORATION VELOCITY APPENDIX B G.: bet /Ccer.sav

n LIST OF TABLES 2-1 SAFETY CLASSIFICATION AND LOCATION OF STRUCTURES 2-2 PROTECTIVE BARRIEPJi FOR LTM STRIKE TARGETS 0-3

SUMMARY

OF DAMAGE MECHANISMS FOR COMPROMISING UNIT SAFETY 2-4 49 INCH LAST STAGE BUCKET - LP TURBINE - MISSILE CHARACTERISTICS 3-1 LTM STRIKE PROBABILITIES 3-2 LOWER AND UPPER IMPACT AREAS 3-3 P3 DAMAGE PROBABILITIES FOR SINGLE IMPACT DESTRUCTIVE OVERSPEED 3-4 P3 DAMAGE PROBABILITIES FOR DOUBLE IMPACT DESTRUCTIVE OVERSPEED 3-5 P DAMAGE PROBABILITIES FOR TRIPLE IMPACT 3 3-6 TURBINE MISSILE HAZARD TO LTM TARGETS P4 ANNUAL PROBABILITY OF DAMAGE i J Gute?.Mam*weteu )

~ LIST OF FIGUP.ES 2-1 GENERAL PLANT LAYOUT 2-2 PLANT LAYOUT ABOVE ELEVATIONS 568'-6", 574'-10", 577'-6" & 580'-6" 2-3 PLANT LAYOUT ABOVE ELEVATIONS 593'-6", 599'-0", 600'-6", 602'-6" & 605'-6" 2-4 PLANT LAYOUT ABOVE FLEVATIONS 620'-6", 623'-6" & 624'-6" 2-5 PLANT LAYOUT ABOVE ELEVATIONS 638'-6", 642'-0" & 647'-6" 2-6 PLANT LAYOUT SECTION A-A 2-7 PLANT LAYOUT SECTION B-B 2-8 MISSILE DIMENSIONING 3-1 MISSILE GENERATION ORIGINS ~ 3-2 RESIDUAL PERFORATION VELOCITIES FOR WEEL GROUP I THROUGH 6" STEEL BARRIER ? 3-3 L:.SIDUAL PERFORATION VELOCITIES FOR WEEL GROUP II TAROUGH 6" STEEL BARRIER 3-4 RESIDUAL PERFORATION VELOCITIES FOR WEEL GROUP III TNROUGH 6" STEEL BARRIER 3-5 RESIDUAL PERFORATION VELOCITIES FOR WEEL GROUP I THROUGH 3' - CONCRETE BARRIER 3-6 RESIDUAL PERFORATION VELOCITIES FOR WEEL GROUP II THROUGH 3' CONCRETE BARRIER 3-7 RESIDUAL PERFORATION VELOCITIES FCR WEEL GROUP III Tl!ROUGli 3' CONCRETE BARRIER 3-8 PROBABILITY HISTOGRAM FOR WEEL GROUP III DESTRUCTIVE OVERSPEED MISSILES EXITING TURBINE BUILDING - 3' CONCRETE BARRIER 3-9 PROBABILITY HISTOGRAM FOR WEEL GROUP III DESTRUCTIVE OVERSPEED MISSILES EXITING TURBINE BUILDING - 6" STEEL AND 3' CONCRETE BARRIER t e Gilt *t /CO*.508tett'th

e 1.0

• INTRODUCTION This document is submitted in support of the application of the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI) to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for a construction permit for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant near Perry, Ohio.

This report has been prepared using the guidelines set down by the NRC in Regulatory Guide 1.115. " Protection Against Low Trajectory Turbine Missiles", for the purpose of demonstrating the adequacy of the plant design with respect to turbine m'issile accidents. This anclysis is based on two wheel burst conditions: a. turbine failure at 120 percent of rated speef (design overspeed) and, b. failure at 180 percent of rated speed (destructive overspeed). The turbine discs ace designed for 120 percent overspeed condition, therefore, this failure would be caused by a flaw in the disc. The turbine discs are not designed for 180 percent of rated speed, therefore, this cor.dition is postulated to result in ductile failure of the disc. The missiles produced by these failures may perforate I the turbine casing with sufficient residual energy to cauce damage to the remainder of the plant. This analysis conservatively assesses the probability of a low-trajectory missile (LTM) damaging a safety-related structure or system s*hich could potentially result in hnacceptable consequences. GMat10cmaretse n-

~ 1 ' The probability of a missile being generated, subs 2quently striking any safety related structure,or system and causing unacceptable consequences is demonstrated to be'less than 1.5 E-8 per year per turbine as summarized in Table 3-6. Unacceptable consequences are defined in this case as damage which could prevent placing and/or maintaining-the, reactor in a safe shutdown condition. In determining these probabilities *,~ the locations of vital equipment behind shield walls, building walls, and at elevations below the affected zones have been considered. These probabilities are well below those limits which would require design changes or modifications to the plant. 5 i O 8 D t G:wn tkwne= man

l ) 2.0 'CENERAL DE".CRIPTION i This section includes physical characteristics of both the Perry Nucicar Power Plant and the postulated turbine missile. Sections 2.1 nnd 2.2 detail general plant design and vital strike targets in 3 , the plant. Mechanisms of plant failure are described in 2.3. Turbine missile characteristics as supplied by General Electric Company are contained in 2.4. Table 2-2 furnishes information concerning the protection afforded to safety related plant structures i and systems.

2.1 DESCRIPTION

OF THE PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT The Perry Nuclear Power Plant is a two-unit boiling water reactor complex with the main turbines in a tangential arrangement. Plant j buildings for each unit, including the major systems and equipment ) located in each, are described briefly as follows: a. Reactor Building Complex The Reactor Building Complex consiste of the' Interior Structure (including Drywell and. Suppression Pool), Containment Vessel, and Shield Building. These structures house and protect the reactor and some safety class equipment. The structures are supported by a commen foundatien-mat at elevation 574'-0" and are structurally separate frcm each other above t'ae mat. The relatio'nship of the structures is shown in Figures 2-1 thru 2-7. In the event of a loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA) these structures function together to contain the released materials and energy. G4en /Wom.nu

The Shield Building functions to:

1.. Form a biological shield for radiation from the reactor.

2. Provide weather and exterior missile protection for the Containment Vessel. t 3. Provide a relatively leak tight structure so that the annulus. exhaust gas treatment system can be used to minimize the escape of radioactive particles to the environment, by maintaining the annulus air space at a slight negative pressure. The SFleid Building is a reinforced concrete structure consisting of a flat foundation mat, a cylindrical wall, and a shallow dome. General configuration of the Shield Building and its. relation to other structures of the Reactor Building Complex is shown in Figure 2-6. The Shield Building cylindrical wall extends from the top of the f oundation mat to elevation 748.75 f t and is 136 f t 0.D. with a vall thickness of 3 ft. The shallow done has a radius of 120 ft with a wall thickness of 2.5 ft. The ring girder at the top of the cylindrical wall provides the only support for the dome. The C'ontainment Vessel is a pressure retaining structure composed of a steel cylinder and ellipsoidal dome secured to a steel lined reinforced concrete foundation mat. The cat is the common foundation for the three m.1jor structures of the Reactor Building Complex. Geert/Come=tm

.M' The Containment. Vessel is dAsigned to contain radioactive material which might be released from the nuclear steam supply system following a loss of coolant accident. The' steel Containment Vessel ensures a high' degree of leak' tightness 'i during normal operating and accident conditions.' ~, I Basic dimensions of the Containment Vessel are: 1. cylinder inside diameter 120 ft. 2. cylinder height 152.17 ft. 6 3. ellipsoidal dome ratio 2:1 l 4. cylinder thickness 1.5 in. 5. ellipsoidal dome thickness 1.25 in. b. Turbine Building a The Turbine Building (including the Turbine Power Complex and Heater Bay) houses the power conversion system,-including the turbine generator unit, main coedenser, condensate pumps, air ejectors, turbine gland' seal condenscrs, condensate ' i demineralizers, the f eedwater heating system, reactor feedpumps, and the circulating water system. c. Control Complex The Control Complex provides integrated control of the reactor, turbine generator, and auxiliary support systems, including reactor safety systems. This structure is common to both onits. L 9 4 9e t Gueq /Commonegovi a

m e d. Auxiliary Building The Auxiliary Building houses the safety reltrol systems consistihg of sumps, heat exchangers, and piping ahich are used during and after. plant shutdown or following a loss-of-coolant accident. These systems include the Residual Heat Removal (RHR), Low Eressure Coolant Injection (LPCI), High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS), and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) systems. Iuel Handling Intermediate Building e. The Fuel Handling Intermediate Building houses the fuel storage and handling facilities and some radwaste equipment. This building is common to both units. f. Radwaste Building The Radwaste Building houses various liquid and colid radwasto processing sjstems. This building is common to both units. g. Offgas Building The Offgas Building houses equipment used to treat gaseous e-. radioactive effluents drawn from the main condenser by the air ejector. h. Diesel Generator Building The Diesel Generator Building houses the independent and redundant diesel generators that function as standby power sources in the event of loss of off-site power. This building is common to both units. A su= mary of the. safety classifications of the plant' structures is given in Table 2-1. Relative locations of these structures is as shown in Figures 2-1 thru 2-7. G.:be tICommoneesti.h

7, TABLE 2-1 SAFETY CLASSIFICATION AND LOCATION OF STRUCTURES Above Elev. Below Elev. Structure Safety Class 647.5 ft. 647.5 ft. 1. Reactor Building Complex Drywell' 2 X Containment Vessel 2 X ~ Shield Building 2 X 2. Auxiliary Building 2 X 3. Steam Tunnel between Auxiliary Building and Turbine Building NSC* I 4. Fuel Handling Intermediate Building 2 X 5. Radwaste Building-3 X 6. Turbine Building NSC* X 7. Control complex 3 X 8. Diesel Generator Building 3 X 9. Off-gas Building 3 X 10. Emergency Services Water Pump House 3 X 11. Circulating '& Service Water Pump House NSC* X 12. Intake Structures & Cooling t'ater Tunnels 3 X 13. Discharge Tunnel Entrance Structure and Downshaft NSC* X ~

14. Discharge Tunnel and Diffuser Nozzle 3

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a 2.1 LOW TRAJECTORY MISSILE TARGET ZONE The orientation of.the Perry Unit 1 and 2 turbines establishes poten.tial target areas on both units. These areas are depicted in Figures 2-1 thru 2-7 where missile ejection zones are defined by planes rotated 25 away from the wheel plane of the end stages of the low prescare tutbines. The lower extremity of the LTM damage zone is defined as the turbine operating floor (elev. 647.5 ft). Safety related targets located either partially or completely within this zone include: a. Control Room b. Cable Spreading Room c. HVAC Equipment Room d. Ir.termediate Euilding c. Auxiliary Building f. Electrical Penetration Areas g. Unit 1 and 2 Reactor Building Complexes Protective missile shielding barriers in the form of buildings, walls, and moisture separator (M/S) radiation shield are provided for all LTM targets. Table 2-2 summarizes the shielding barriers considered in this analysis. Allowable impact moments appearing in Table 2-2 are discussed in Section 3.4.3. They appear here for future reference. l I

• e G.! bet /Cowemwau

3 ? TABLs 2-2 PROTECIIVE BARRIERS FOR LTM STRIKE TARGETS Allowable Impact Homentum on Final Barriers Target Barriers (Kip - see) Control Room 2 ft. Control Bldg'. Wall 24 Elev. 654.5 ft. 3 f t. Turbine Bldg. Wall to 679.5 ft. 6 in. M/S Radiarion Shield C6ble Spreading Room 2 ft. Control Bldg. Wall 8.2 Elev. 647.5 ft. 3 ft. Turbine Bldg. Wall to 654.5 ft. 6 in. M/S Radiation Shield HVAC Equipment Room 2 ft. Centrol Bldg. Wall 24 Elev. 679.5 ft. 3 ft. Turbine Bldg. Wall to 707.2 ft. 6 in. M/S Radiation Shield Intermediate Bldg. 4.5 ft. Interrediate Bldg. Wall 56 Elev. 647.5 ft. 3 ft. Turbine Bldg. Wall to 707.5 ft. 6 in. M/S Radiation Shield Electrical Penetration 4.5 ft. Intermediate Bldg. Wall 56 Area 3 ft. Turbine Bldg. Wall Elev. 647.5 ft. 6 in. M/S Radiation Shield to 654 ft. Auxiliary Bldg. 3 ft. Auxiliary Bldg. Wall 17 Elev. 647.5 ft. 3 ft. Turbine Bldg. Wall to 652 ft. 6 in. M/S Radiation Shield Containment Vessel #1 3 ft. Reactor Shield Bldg. Wall 119 Below Elev. 706 ft. 3 ft. Turbine Bldg. Wall 6 in. M/S Radiation Shield Containment Vessel #1 3 ft. Reactor Shield Bldg. Wall 119 i Above Elev. 706 ft. 3 ft. Turbine Bldg. Wall ~ Sheet 1 of 2

TABLE 2-2 (Cont'd) Allowable Impact Momentum on Final Barriers Target Barriers (Kip - see) Containment Vessel #2 3 ft. Reactor Shield Bldg. Wall 119 E3ev. 647.5 ft. 2 ft. Intermediate Bldg. Roof tr 735 ft. 4.5 ft. Intermediate Bldg. Wall 3 ft. Turbine Bldg. Wall 6 in. M/S Radiation Shield Containnent Vessel #2 3 ft. Reae. tor Shield Bldg. Wall 119 Above Elev. 735 ft. 3 ft. Turbine Bldg._ Wall 6 in. M/S Radiation Shield Notes: 1. All building walls and roofs are 3000 psi concrete. 2. M/S radiation shield is 6 inch ASTM A-36 steel plate. M/S radiation shield is 144 ft. long and extends from Elev. 647.5 ft. to 663.25 ft. The radiation shield is hung from the Turbine Bldg. steel superstructure and is fastened together to act as one continuous plate. 3. The additional shielding effects of the moisture separator vessels have not been included in this analysis. 4. The Radwaste Building and Service Building have not been included as . barriers due to their marginal shielding capabilities. i l 4 l l ~ em l

2.3 POSTUI.ATED METHODS FOR COMPROMISING UNIT SAFETY Determination of annual probabilities for events wh'ich could lead to unacceptable consequences due to turbine missila accidents is based upon a conservative set of plant damage assumptions. Damage probabilities for non-redundant targets, e.g. Control Room, are based on the frequency with which such areas are penetrated or caused to lose structural integrity. No credit is taken for the potential of penetrating a target without causing a loss of safety function. Structures required to maintain structural and leak tight integrity, e.g. Containment Vessel, are similarly evaluated. In the case of redundant shutdown components or systems, a concurrent single active failure in the redundant safety train is not considered, i.e., missiles generated from a turbine wheel burst must cause damage to both systems in order to lose shutdown capability. Table 2-3 provides a summary of dcmage mechanis=s used in.this analysis by which unacceptable consequences are postulated. a e 4 6mg Geert/ Common.nu n.

.,._r. TABLE 2-3

SUMMARY

OF DAMAGE MECHANISMS FOR CO$ PROMISING UNIT SAFETY Events Leading to Potentia,11y Direct Strike Target Damage Mechanism Unacceptable Consequences Control Room Perforation, spallation Unit 1 and/or 2 Control Rooms or loss of structural' become non-operational. r l integrity. Cable Spreading Room . Perforation, spallation, Unit 1 and/or 2 Control Rooms or loss of structural become non-operational. integrity. HVAC Equipment Room Perforation or loss of Possible collapse of HVAC I structural integrity. equipment wall or ceilings onto Control Room below. Unit 1 or Unit 2 Control Rooms 'become non-operational. { Intermediate Bldg. Perforation or loss of, Possible collapse of upper structural integrity. sections of Intermediate Bldg. onto Class 1-E cables and ESW piping. Electrical Penetrations Perforation or loss of Damage to Div. I and Div. 2 structural integrity of electrical cables. exterior Intermediate Bldg. vall. Auxiliary Bldg. Perforation,or loss of Possible collapse of uppermost structural integrity. sections of Auxiliary B1dg. onto Class 1E electrical cables. Containment Vessels Perforation Missiles perforating Reactor Shield Bldg. are assumed to perforate Containment Vessel. Loss of structural Collapse of, Reactor Shield integrity. Bldg. onto Containment Vessel and safety train electrical and piping penetrations. 2 i Spallation (not -Containment Vessel is considered) considered only_as a spall barrier. Concrete debris in annulus can damage only i Div. I safety train. Div. 2 penetrations are at the other-side of the Reactor Shield Bldg. I i 1 1 \\ ) .l

u. t 2.4' TURBINE MISSILE CHARACTERISTICS The two turbine generator units for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant Units are manufactured by the General Electric Co. The steam 1800 rpm units with turbines are tanden compound, six flow reheat, 43 inch last stage buckets. Each turbine-generator unit has three low pressure turbines. There is a total of 42 low pressure turbine wheels. The General Electric Co. provides data on turbine missiles originating in the low pressure units for use JLn evaluating plant (I damage hazards. Reportedly, this data is based on an extensive experimez*.al disc-bursting study performed by the turbine manufacturer. Because of similarities with regard to physical and geometric characteristics, this data ir supplied in the form.of three representative wheel groups. Individual wheel groups are further broken down into fragment groups ( ). A summary of this d,ata ~ including weight, physical size, velocity, and energy ranges appears in Table 2-4 and Figure 2-8. The total energies of the missile frag =ents have been ca)culated by * 'Gonyea's method ( } in uhich missile ej ection energy is defined as the di.*ference between the kinetic energy of the wheel fragment at the instant of bursting and energy lost in penetrating stationary parts of~the low pressure section. The energy values appearing in Table 2-4 are effective translational energies which include an additional component corresponding to the rotational energy of the missile fragment. Geirt/Co-nonween

9 4 TABLE 2-4 43 !NCE LAST STAGE BUCKET - LP TURBINE - MISSILE CHARACTERISTICS ~ Wheel Group I (stages 1-3) Fragment group a b c d Number of fragments in group 2 1 3 10 Sector angle, degrees 120 60 Fragment weight,'lbs. 2000 1000 300 100 Radius,*in. R, bore 20 20 1 R, bub 27 27 2 R ' **"" * * 'O 00 3 Thickness, in. T, hub 9 9 g T, vane 3 3 2 Approx. rectangular diraensions,. in. 19x19x3 11x11x3 Design overspeed failure (120%) Minimum velocity, fps 0 0 0 0 Minimum energy, E+6 ft-lbs 0 0 0 0 Maximum velocity, fps 320 440 660 800 Maximum energy, E+6 ft-lbs 3 3 2 1 Destructive overspeed fsilut- (180%) Minimum velocity, fps 0 0 0 0 Minimum energy, E+6 ft-lbs 0 0 0 O Maximum velocity. fps 510 720 1000 1100 Maximum energy, E+6 ft-lbs 8 8 5 2 i NOTES: 1. Data is representative of stage 2. 2 Sixteen missiles in four size classes are postulated to occur per burst. l i bh -

~. TABLE-2-4 (Cent'd)~ Wheel Group II (stages 4-6) Fragment group e b c d Number of fragments in group 2 1 3 10 Sector angle, degrees 120 60 Fragment yeight, 1bs. - 4000 2000 600 '15'O ~ Radius, in..:R, bore 18 18 g R, hub 27 27 2 R vane root 47 47 3 Thickness, in. T, hub 12 12 3 T, vane 5 2 Apprcx. rectangular dimensions, in. 20x20x5 10x10x5 Design overspeed failure (120%) Minimum velocity, fps 0 0 0' O Minimum energy, C+6 ft-lbs 0 0 0 0 Maximum velocity, fps 340 440 660 660 Maximum energy, E+6 ft-lbs 7 6 4 1 Destructive overspeed failure (180%) Minimum velocity, fps 0 0 0 0 Minimum energy, E+6'ft-lbs 0 0 0 0 Maximum velocity, fps 520 720 930 930 4 Maxinum i rgy, E+6 ft-lbs 17 16 8 2 NOTES: 1. Data is representative of stage 5. i 2. Sixteen missiles in four size classes are postulated to occur per burst. Sheet,2 of 3 p

~ ' Q TABLE '2-4 (Cont'd) ' Wheel Group III '(stage 7) Fragment group a b .c .d 1 Number of fragments in group 2 1 3 10-I Sector angle. degrees-120 60 Fragment weight, lbs. 8200 4100 1400 200 ~ Radius, in. R, bore 17 17 g R, hub 28 28 2 R, vane r t 45 45 . -i 3 Thickness, in. T, hub 27 27 y T, vane 12 12 2 Approx. rectangular dimensions, in. 20x20x12 8x8x12 Design overspeed failure (120%) l Minimum velocity, fps 280 0 0 0 I Minimum energy, E+6 f t-lbs 10 0 0 0 Maximum velocity, fpc 420 530 610 800 Maximum energy, E+6 f t-lbs 22 18 8 2 i Destructive overspeed failure (180%) Minimum velocity, fps 450 0 0 0 Minimum energy, E+6 ft-lbs 26 0 'O O Maximum velo;ity, fps 650 770 860 980 Maximum energy, E+6 f t-lbs 53 38 16 3 NOTES: 1. Data is representative of stage 7. 2. Sixteen missiles in four size classes are postulated to cecur per burst.

• +9

) ~ 3. <? ~. 1 I ,,,er,. ',**C.,' . y FRAGMENT GROUP a FRAGMENT GROUP b -+e- ~ ,e T2 60* ~ / a 120' a \\ +s f- / R R R j 2 3 LJ e Tj FRAGMENT GROUPS e AND d X X T2 n .<r .?~ p .,y . n. .s-. I y g r;. ' ' t5 4, - ..1 .g ~

=> 3.0 EVALUATION OF TURBINE MISSILE DAMAGE PROBABILITY. This section details met. ds used to determine the' risk due to low ~ trajectory turbine missiles. --Both deterministic and' random sampling techniques are employed.. For simplicity, only the risk associa'ted with the Unit I turbine is addressed in.this chapter. - Based on symmetry arguments, the Unit 2 low pressure turbines have similar values. 3.1 INTROLUCTION .The P damage probability for causing unacceptable damage to a safety 4 related component or structure is comprised of the product of three contributing probabilities P, P, an P. By definition: g 2 3 P = probability of turbine missile ejection g 2 " Probability that' a missile is ej ected in a spatial P direction so as to impact a target P3 " Prabability of sctually reaching a target and tausing' damage given the initial impact direction Because these probabilities are of ten interrelated, each missile / target / trajectory combination can have its own unique P4 "*1"*' ~ Therefore, many individual P values must be calculated and appro-4 priately combined to yield the overall target risk. A sumsary of the assumptions and methods used in determining P and 4 i each of its constituant probabilities follows. l l l l - cean/ common.nu .w

/ 3.2

• ANNUAL MISSILE EJECTION PROBABILITY - P y For this study, desiga (120 percent) and ' destructive '.180 percent) overspeed turbine missile ejection probabilities of 9E-5 and 4E-5 events per year, respectively, have been used.

These probabilities are based mainly on an analysis performed by Bush.( } Inclusion of the Gallatian turbine failure which occurred after Bush's work, has no appreciable effect on the design speed missile ejection probability. As described in Section 3.1,.each missile / target / trajectory combination must be examined. In determining the P damage 4 probabilities, it is convenient to define the P for each miscile y origin-target combination as the, annual probability of a given missile being generated at a given origin or location. Hypothetical missile generation origins are defined.in Section 3.3. The individual annual ejection probability at each hypothetical missile generation origin is determined for each unit by multiplying the annual failure probabilities by the conditional probability of a given wheel failing at the particular location under consideration. All 42 low pressure turbine wheels are postulated to have equal f ailure probabilities. Therefore, the conditional probability of any particular disc failing is taken as 0.0238. The sum of all individual missile generation origin probabilities must equal the annual ejection probability for i both the design and the destructive overspeed cases. i 3-4 s GabetICommmeso

s f2-3.3 .LTM STRIKE PROBABILITIES - 3.3.1 Method P strike probabilities are calculated using sinple solid angle 2 arguments. Ejection of a missile fragment is assumed to be ' equally probable over the range of permissible solid angle ejection space. The probability of taissile strike is.then determined by integrating the differential solid angle dQ over the limits defined by the - availabla LTM impact area of the target. Therefore, P is 'given by: 2 2"~ff(D)dQ Oc[A da P (1) = 2n{ sin 6u - sin 6 } t where 6, 6g are the upper and lower wheel deflection angles. u For most LTM strikes Equation (1) can be adeqtfately approximated in terns o-f the ground plane angle 0 and elevation angle $ as

1. 0#O P2 " 27 { sin 6 - sin 6g}

1 u u (2) Of {6, 6u}

0. 0 P

]- 2 = 1 where A.$ and 60 are the maximum subtending elevation and range angular intervals respectively. A derivation of Equation 2 appears in Appendix B. i For inner wheel disc bursts, low pressure turbine discs 1 through 6, .the range of 6 is taken as 5 from the plane of the whec1 dise; I for end stage wheel discs 6g=0 and 6 = 25. ( ) u n Geert/ Common erth 162

o 3.3.2 LTM Strike Probabilities i -All LTM strike probabilities have been conservatively evaluated using the minimum distance from the origin of missile generation to the particular target in question. The 0 ground plane angular limits used correspond to the maximum angular range subtending the ~ particular target region under onsideratior., except for the Shield q Buildin; where an effective concrete thickness of 7.5 feet has been used to ' determine the limits. All missiles ejected in the direction of the turbine operating floor (Elev. 647.5 ft) are assumed to be contained within-the concrete turbine pedestal complex and/or condenser areas. The turbine pedestal complex includes the turbine support girders which form a shield in excess of 10 feet of concrete on either side of, and parallel to, the turbine. A missile impacting either of these areas presents no safety hazard. Thus, all LTM zones have as a lower boundary the plane of the turbine operating floor. Table 5-1 presents the results of the P strike probability calculations on 2 Unit 1 and 2 from the assumed missile generation origins corresponding to the Unit 1 turbine. All tabulated values are for a single missile. Nomenclature used in identifying the Unit I missile generation origins appears in Figure 3-1. Gw./Comm.u:ta TLB

m - w e,me, w < .w , ~.. . > ~ : e.- w wwmv szwe+ca TAB 1.E 3-1 LTN STRIKE FROhABILITIES

• ow Pressure Turbine A Imv Pressure Turbine B tav Pressure Turbine C Taract E 1.55*

Inner

• W t.S B
• E LSB*

Innere - W LS B* E t.SB* I'nner e W LSBS Control Room 0 3.1 E-3 1.4 E-2 6.1 E-4 1.1 E-2 1.5 E-2 1.3 E-2 1.5 E-2 1.1 E-2 Cable Spreading Room 0 8.3 E-4 3.9 E-3 1.8 E-4 3.1 E-3 4.4 E-3 3.7 E-3 4.4 E-3 3.2 E-3 IIVAC Equipment Room 0 3.3 E-3 1.5 E-2 6.7 E-4 1.2 E-2 1.7 E-2 1.4 E-2 1.7 E-2 1.2 E-2 Intermediate Bu11 ding 0 4.4 E-2 1.1 E-2 1.7 E-2 1.5 E-2 0 3.4 E-2 0 0 Llectrical Penetrations 0 6.7 E-3 1.7 E-3 2.5 E-3 2.3 E-3 0 2.9 E-3 0 0 Auxiliary Butiding 5.4 E-3 6.4 E-3 2.8 E-3 6.4 E-3 9.6 E-4 0 3.8 E-3 0 0 Containment Vesset #1 Below Eley. 706 ft. 6.9 E-2 2.8 E-2 0 4.8 E-2 0 0 2.7 E-2 0 0 Contcatament Vestal #1 Above Elev. 706 ft. 2.9 E-2 1.1 E-2 0 2.0 E-2 0 0 1.0 E-2 0 0 Containment Vesse1*f2 Below Elev. 733 ft. 0 0 0 5.7 E-3 3.4 E-3 0 1.1 E-2 0 0 Containment vessel #2 Above Elev. 735 ft. 0 0 0 9.8 E-4 3.3 E-4 0 2.2 E-3 0 0

• NOTE: E LSB = East Last Stage Bucket U LSB = West Last Stage Bucket Inner = fcner Stage Bucket

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i.

s s_ s ii y x ii HI h LOW LOW LOW TURBINE PRESSURE PRESSURE PRESSURE TURBlNE TURBINE TURBlNE

• C'

'B' W o f 9

O 3.4 DAMAGE PREDICTION - P3 P is defined in this analysis in terms of the probability of a missile j 3 actually reaching a target given the condition that it is ejected in the direction of the target. The effee.s of intervening barriers.are included in the determination of P. Note, that the target is-3 considered irreconcilably damaged if. the missile should breach the target boundary. 3.4.1 Method The P damage probability is evaluated by a Monte Carlo approach for 3 representative LTM trajectories throughout the plant. Initial missile ej ection velocity and impact area are determined by random sampling techniques. Evaluation of barrier response to a particular missile is made by deterministic perforation and residual velocity models. The process continues to the next barrier where a new impact area is selected. The impact velocity is taken as the 4 . residual velocity calculated from the p'revious barrier interaction. 1 The process is stopped when the missile either (1) fails to perforate an intermediate barrier, or (2) reaches the final barrier. The final. barrier is then tested for penetration and for acceptable structural response. If the final barrier fails either test, the target is considered damaged. This entire procedure continues several thousand times with differing initial velocities and impact areas until a damage probability can be statistically predicted for each fragment. The recainder of this section presents the models and assumptions used in evaluating the P damage probabilities. 3 e & G:bertlCcmmnete 14

g. 3.4.2 Intermediate Barrier Interaction Criteria used in determing barrier adequacy in shielding safety related targets are based upon penetration, perforation, residual energy, and missile impace' parameters. 3.4.2.1 Steel Barriers For calculation of turbine missile perforation-of the steel radiation shield next to the turbine, the Hagg-Sankey method detailed in 1: Reference 5 is employed. Containment of the missile by the steel barrier is a two stage process. ~ Stage 1 involves inelastic impact and momentum transfer to an effective target mass. If perforation does not occur in Stage 1, the calculation proceeds to Stage 2 which includes the plastic strain capacity of the effective target mass. For perforation in Stage 1 or Stage 2, the ' residual energy and velocity are computed and used as input for the next barrier. The effective mass of the target during Stage 1 1s that portion of the steel shield that can respond to the missile during the initial contact and momer.tum transfer. The effective target mass is incorporated in the target resistance necessary for nonperforation in Stage 1 of the process. For nonperforation, the compressive strain energy, Ec,, and shear strain energy, Es, for the steel shield must exceed the' energy that must be dissipated for momentum transfer', AE1, from the missile-target combination. Therefore, for nonperforation in Stage 1, Es+Ec>AE1 (3) tm

• hP l

N, fLP

a -q l . If this inequality is not ' satisfied, perforation occurs and the 1 residual velocity is' calculated from energy and-momentum considerations. .If the missile does not. perforate the steel curtain in Stage 1, t the process proceeds to Stage 2.. In Stage 2, energy is dissipated by tension strain in the target. This tension strain energy, E, t depends on the effective volume of' target material strained and must be greater than the residual energy of the missile, AE, af ter. 2 Stage 1 interactions for nonperforation. Therefore, k (4) Eg > AE2 4 for nonperforation, or containment, in Stage 2. Again, if this i equality does not hold, perforation occurs and the residual . velocity is calculated from energy considerations. The effective mass of the target used in Stage 1 and Stage 2 ~ calcult.tions exrands to plastic hinges 1.5 fee.t around the entire perimeter of the missile; this value corresponds to 3T as discussed' in Reference 5, where T is the thickness of the target. For calculation of the Stage 1 compressive strain energy, E, a c relatively low value of strain equal to 0.07 is used. A strain value of 0.035 is used for the average tensile strain in Stage 2; this is the minimum value reported in Refer'ence 5. i All impact geometrics are considered square. This assumption is conservative because it tends to minipize the ef f ective target mass for any given impact area. GJbe4 /Cemmonwee'th r M -- l

The dynamic strength factor used in the Hagg-Sankey formulation is calculated from the following _ fit.of tha data presented in Figure 17 of Reference 5: P 4 hd = 8.89 .674 Ino Uu 1 78,000 psi, u u (5) -[f.=~1.30 cu > 78,000 psi where cd = dynamde strength o'f M/S steel radiation shield, psi. c = ultimate _stre'ngth of M/S steel radiation shield, psi. u An ultimate strength of 69,700 psi is used for 6 inch thick ASTM A-36 plate. This is an average value obtained from vendor Contacts. Figures 3-2 thru 3-4 provide residual perforation velocities after perforation of a 6 inch A-36 steel plate as a function of impact velocity for various turbine missiles. Discontinuities in the curves indicate transition between Stage 1 and 2 phenomena. Minimum missile. impact areas have been used in all cases (See Section 3.4.4). A comparison of the residual velocities as predicted by the Hagg-Sankey method and an extension of the BRL steel perforation formula appears in Appendin A. t G'tertItyr. mon eau .07. -

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9 o 3.4.2.2 - Concrete Barriers l 3.4.2.2.1 Penetration and Perforation Missile penetration into an infinitely thick slab of concrete is f 1 predicted by the empirical Petry relationship. { l 2 D = KA log 10 1+ V (6) p 215,000, l

where, 1

D = the penetration depth, fc l 3 l K = an empirical penetration coefficient, ft /lb Ap = the sectional pressure of the missile, obtained by dividing the missile wei (W) by the appropriate missile frontal area (A),lb/ftght l V = the mis::ile velocity, f t/sec. j For finite concrete thicknesses, the following modification is empicyed 1 ~ -4(T/D-2) D'=D 1+e (7) j

where,

[ ~ D = infinite slab penetration depth, ft. i D' = penetration depth in a finite thickness slab, ft. T = slab thickness, ft. ~ l If 2D is greater than or equal to T in Equation (7), where T is the l concrete thickness in feet, then perforation of the barrier by the l missile is indicated. l ~ l l C->. tlComwetsu . Kli\\. I

Impacts are considered to be head-on, which result's in the minimum available concrete thickness to resist penetration. This ~ i assumption is conservative especially with regard to the curved Shield Building wall surface..A penetration coefficient value, K, 3 -1 of 0.~0042 ft -lb has been assumed for 3000 psi concrete. This constant appear,s to be a reasonable value from available literature.-( ) (0) () 3.4.2.2.2 Perforation Residual Velocities For those barriers that are perforated, the residual veolocity, v ' r is calculated from energy considerations. The residual kinetic energy Er of the missile after perforation is defined as the difference between the missile at impact E, and i that energy required to just perforate the barrier E. p E =Eg-Ep (8) r In Equation (8) no credit is taken for,that portion of thd impact energy that is dissipated in deformation or cracking and splintering of the target barrier; i.e. impact and perforation are considered local even::s. The residual velocity, v, after perforation of a barrier is r determined by substitution of Equation (6) and (7) into Equaticn (8) T/(2n ) vr" Vi - 215,000 10 p,1 (9) where vi = the initial impact velocity corresponding to the impact energy E, (fps). i GetICommm*es!th D

All other variables in Equation (9) have been previously' defined. - Figures (3-5) through (3-7) provide residual velocities after perforation of a three foot thick 3000 psi concrete slab as a function of impect velocities for various turbine missiles. Minimum impact areas have been used in all cases. (See Section 3.4.4) A comparison of the residual velocities predicted by Equation (9) and that of the BRL concrete perforation formula appears in Appendix A. A d 1

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. +....,,-

2./ *3*-. % 0.

A 3.4.3* - Final Barriers The adequacy of final barriers is evaluated by consideration of perforation, penetration, and overall structural integrity after impact. Allowances are made for concrete spalling where this. phenomona-may provide some element of risk to plant safety. 3.4.3.1 Penetration and Perforation Final barriers are checked for perforation and penetration using the nethods o'f Section 3.4.2.1. Additional conservatism is obtained by use of a safety factor of 1.3 with Equation (7) for penetration in ~ final barriers. 3.4.3.2 Spallation For those final barriers where a spalling allowance is made, spalling is assumed.to occur if T<D'+S (10) where T = the final barrier slab thickness, ft. D' = the penentration depth in a finite thickness slab as calculated from Equation (7), ft. S = the spalling' allowance, f t. The spalling allowance thickness is taken as one-half the thickness l of the final barrier. 1 i . au. R3-J

w c-3.4.3.3 Structural Integrity The analytical procedure used to determine the structural integrity of the final barriers is the same approach as found in Teference 8.' ~ The maximum static concentrated load is first calculated for the final' barrier. For a reinforced cancrete slab or wall, yield line theory is used to calculate the maximum concentrated load to cause the ultimate resisting moment of the slab or wall. For a beam the maximum , concentrated load is that load that causes the ultimate resisting moment of the beam with the appropriate end conditions. Using these concentrated loads as the equivalent static loads, the momentum capacities of the final barriers are obtained. A ductility factor of 10.0 for reinforced concrete was used. Allowable impact momenta used for structural integrity evaluation appear in Table 2-2. 3.4.4 Missile Impact Parameters In evaluation of the turbine missile threat to the plant, two parameters are randomly sampled. These parameters are turbine missile impact area and initial ejection velocity. 3.4.4.1 Missile Impact Area Impact area definition for the type A and B fragment wheel sector missiles is treated conservatively by assuming that all missile barrier interactions occur wi,th the missile on edge, i.e., any deflection of the missile onto its flat side is neglected. The dynamic re'straints on the smaller postulated missiles are considerablyiessthantheturbinediscsectormissiles. Therefore, the range of impact areas for type C and D rectangular missiles 1 \\ EM4 /Chwwwesu 22

- includes the likelihood that the missile will not strike the target i on a flat end side. Credit is taken for oblique frontal impact by defining the upper Ibnit of the area range for each fragment by('} 2 Amax = X 1+2T' (11)- ipr where T and X are postulated missile thickness and square _ side dimensions respectively. Reference (9) demonstrates for a 90 disc sector missile that a linear cumulative distribution approximation overestimates the actual impact area distribution. These results can be readily extrapolated to the 60 and 120 sector missiles used in this analysis. This same assumption is used in defining the distribution function for the C and D fragment groups. Table 3-2 provides the lower and upper impact areas limits used for each fragment. 3.4.4.2 Missile Ej ection Velocity Reference 2 presents no information on the missile ejection velocity distribution spectrum. In this analysis a uniform velocity distribution has been assumed for each fragment. The upper and lower bounds of the distribution correspond to the minimum and maximum casing exit velocities appearing in Table 2-4. The assu=ption of a uniformly distributed velocity spectrum reflects the uncertainty in the velocity data from previous turbine failures and in the potential interactions occurring inside the turbine between wheel disc break up and casing perforation. m. G@ert/Commoneta'th R3

r u t0 ~ From a statistical viewpoi'nt, the. actual distribution (if one-could be measured or calculated) is most likely peaked and falls to zero as the end points are approached. The uniformity assumption is unrealistic at the maximum velocity in the sense that the distribation immediately drops to zero. It is conservative in that more higher v'elocity missiles cre sampled and examined.for potential damage. S m 6 o N O .e S 9 3'Wt /Ocmmonets'th

TABLE 3-2 . LOWER AND UPPER ~ IMPACT AREAS Stage Fragm'ent Type Group Bound A ~ B C D 1 I Minimum 216 150 57 33 Maximum 530 306 370 130 II Minimum 316 236 100 50 Maximum 734 423 424 122 III Minimum 731 563 240 64 Maximum 1662 960 525 150 NOTE: 1. All areas in inches. 2. All areas are minimum and maximum projected fragment areas calculated from data in Section 2.0. + f l i 8 6 ,c.- x ...g-

v q. 1 3.4.5 Multiole Impacts i Six fragments are considered in the multistrike analysis. The six missiles are two "A" fragments, one "B" fragment, and three "C" fragments. The ten "D" fragments are small missiles corresponding to secondary missiles from casing perforation, turbine blading, disc i rings, etc. These small missiles most li';tly would have a larger spatial emission-distr.ibution than the disc segments. Furthermore, their kinetic energies and penetrability throughout the plant are uinimal compared to the other fragments. Therefore, all D group missiles are considered to be of minimal threat to the plant and' arc excluded from the multiple strike analysis. 7 3.4.5.1 Multiple Impact configuration-i An upper limit on the number of missile hits can be estimated by I i assuming that any_ individual missile can cause unacceptable damage to the plant, i.e. P is assumed unity. All missiles are assumed to be 3 j generated with equal independent probability in all directions. Theref. ore, using a typical direct strike P f 0.02 the upper estimate { 2 of damage due to multiple hits is estimated using the binominal distribution as j 3 i P(n > 4) = 1 - B(n, 6,.02) = 2.32 E-6 (12) i n=0 q d P(n=3) = B(3, 6,.02) = 1.51 E-4 l 1 The above. values are conditional on an annual turbine failure l 1 -4 -1 Thus, up :o three missile hits on a target- ' 4 probability of 10 yr j ~1 ~ should be considered in achieving a 10 yr goal. i l i j G4rt/Cnmca uu W

o 3.4.5.2 Multiple Impact' Method There is currently no existing methodology for accurately predicting i damage effects caused by multiple missile impact.' However, it is o possible to postulate a conservative criterf on bated on shield barrier adequacy to determine pultiple impact damage probabilities. ~ ~ Missiles are exgmined for ability to perforate interrediate barriers in serial order for each impact configuration set. If a missile is stopped by a barrier the next missile in the configuration is started out at that barrier. No credit is taken for a barrier once it has been perforated. Tnis process continues until the. target is either damaged or the alotted number of missiles in the impact set has.been expanded. Each multiple hit sequence is evaluated by the same Monte Carlo techniques used for single missile hits. Analysis.of intermediate and final barriers are by the methods discussed in Section 3.4.2. G 9 e i i e f a l Chs /Cc%wta*Lh i k@

1 r g_ e 3.4,6 Statistics 3.4.6.1 Sample Mean Af ter processing N histories, the best estimate of tite P3 damage probability is the mean of the individual values Xn (n = 1, N) where ' for the n'th history: X =1 for a damaging missile strike n Xn = 0 for a nondamaging missile strike Thus, the Monte Carlo estimate of the unknown, P3, ir 5 where N 5=f) X (13) n 1 3.4.6,2 Statistical Confidence To place some statistical confidence on the P3 value of Equation (13), the Shapiro-Wilk (11) test is used. j The N histories are grouped into G groups with M histories in each group such that MG = N. The samp1'e me.an of the g'th group is E, g M SP X E Mf k.g (14) g The overall sample neAn for the N histories is then G X= X (15) g I which is identical to Equation (13). The standard deviation of the G group averages about the average is G Sg = Y h (I - 5) 2 (16) g I G.Wt/ Comme = tau 82

The distribution of,the 's is by the Central' Limit Theorem asymptotically normal for large M. ~Thus, even though the Xn's are - notnormallydistributedabcut5,the-$'sareexpectedtobenotaally distributed about 5 provided the number of his' tories M in each group i is large enough. For Monte. Carlo results Burrows and HacMillian(") suggest fixing the 2 ^ number of groups at G = 25. The Shapiro-Wilk test for a sample size of 25 is then evaluated in the following manner.( 1) The X{'s are arranged in ascending ' order and relabeled,yg (i = 1, 25) where y1 and y25 are the smallest and largest values, respectively. The value of the Shapiro-Wilk tese, W, is computed from i 2 [' 5 4 1 2 1 1 )i' ai yi l W= (17) 25 r35 ,2 ) 71 25 .I. 71 1 l J 1 i, are given below("} where the at = -a26-1 r i _i a 1 -0.4450 2 .-0.3069 I 3 -0.2543 4 -0.2148 S -0.1822 6 -0.1539' 7 -0.1283 8 -0.1046 9 -0.0823 10 -Ci. 0610 l 11 -0.0403 l 12 -0.0200 13 0.0000 i G.:te%ICommon.nu V1

f ,. The magnitude of W tests the departure'from normality in the distribution of the X 's.- W will be less than 0.931'only 10 percent g of the times that this test is applied to samples actually drawn from i a normal distribution. Thus, if W is less than 0.931, the validity-of the~ calculated standard deviation s is doubtful. g s W Vill be less than 0.888 only 1 per' cent of the time that this test is applied to samples' actually drawn from a normal distribution., If W is less than 0.888, the reliability of X as an estimate of X is i doubtful. 4 In evaluation of the various P 's the number of Monte Carlo historius 3 i N is chosen _such that W > 0.931 except where noted. 3.4.7 Damare Probabilities P damage probab'111 ties using the methods described in Section 3.4.1 3 to 3.4.6 are presented in this section. Zero P3 damage probabilities appearing in the tables of this section correspond to no damaging i hits for the number of Monte Carlo histories specified. 3.4.7.1 Single Missile Impacts Single impact damage probabilities appear in Table 3-3 for the j i destructive overspeed case. Standard deviations appear in parenthesis. ~ l No D fragment missile has sufficient energy to perforate the M/S steel j radiation shield. Probability histograms 'as a function of exit energy of the missiles in Wheel Group III escaping the Turbine Building are displayed in Figures 3-8 and 3-9. i Ghe tICommwnu 2 .._-._,29-__

L 7 Design speed missiles cannot perforate the M/S shield - three foot Turbine Building wall barrier combination. It' is possible co just perforate the three foot Turbine Building wall if the design. speed missile is ojected such that it clears the M/S radiation shield. However, it is not possible to damage the plant because of its 'small residual velocity. Therefore, all P3 values for the design speed case are zero. 3.4.7.2 Multiple Impacts Double impact P damage probabilities appear in Table 3-4 for the 3 destructive overspeed case. Design speed case double impact probabilities have been determined to be negligible and, therefore, are not included here.

• Each probability for a given combination type appear?ng in Table 3-4 includes random ordering of the constituant missiles.

Thus, the P3 probability for the set A-B includes the two subsets correspondits to (1) an A missile followed by a B missile, and (2) a B missile followed by an A missile. A total of 5,000 Honte Carlo histories is used in determining each subset probability. Triple impact damage probabilities have been evaluated for the Control Room and Containment Vessel at design and destructive overspeed. These probabilities are provided in Table 3-5. The procedural bre.akdown of each co=bination type into subsets is similar to the double impact case.

• For double i= pact configurations, the hazard to the plant from design speed missiles is two orders of magnitude lower than from destructive overspeed missiles.

l l ~' carztcewesu 30-

~ -~ A majority of'the Wheel Grottp I and.II multiple ~ impact damage t probabilities fail the Shapiro-Wilk test of Section' 3.4.6. The poor statistics are the result of calculat'ing the probability of infrequently occurring events with moderate amounts of Monte Carlo histories, i.e., 10;000 to'15,000 histories per impact configuration. These small probability values are point estimates of the expected damage event. 'They have no significant effect on the results of the study. 4 e D e 9 e O a f 9 l crescemmr.no N,- . - ~,.

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~ s [ 4 TA5t.' 3-3 P DAMAGE PROBABILITIES FOR SINGLE INPACT 3 DESTRUCTIVE OVt.RSPFID (Standatd Deviations Appear in Parentheses) 1 TARC8T WilEEL CROUP I WitEEL CROUP II WHELL CROUP III Fragment Fragment Fragment A B C D A B C D A B C D Control Room 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.33 E-1 2.17 E-3 0 0 Elev. 654.5' to 679.5' '(1.9-2) (1.3-3) Cable Spreading Room 0 0 0 0 3.20 E-3 4.64 E-3 0 0 1.59 E-1 8.40 E-3 0 0 Elev. 647.5' to 654.5' (2.2 E-3) (2.7 E-3) (3.3 E-2). (3.4 E-3) IIVAC Esttsipment Room 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.37 E-1 2.17 E-) 0 0 Elev. 654.5' to 702.2' (1.9 E-2) (1.3 E-3) Intermediate Bldg. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.26 E-2 0 0 0 Elev. 647.5" to 707.5' (1.9 E-2) Electrical Penetration Area 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.26 E-2 0' 0 0 (1.3 E-2) Elev. 647.5' to 652' Auxiliary Building 0 0 0 0 I7.20E-4 0 0 0 1.48 E-1 5.60 E-3 0 0 Elev. 647.5 to 652' ~ (8.9 E-4)* (3.2 E-2) (2.8 E-3) Containment Vesset #1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 'O O O O Below Elev. 706' contains.ent vessel #1 0 0 0 0 2.70 E-4 5.33 E-3 3.10 E-4 0 5.52.E-2 't.78 E-3 0 0 i Above Elev. 706' (2.1 E-4) (1.7 L.s3) (.l.1 E-4)* (7.3 E-3) (8.7 E-4) Containment vessel #2 C 0 0 0 0 0 0 ' 0-0 0 0 ,0 Elev. 647.5' to 735' Containment Vessel #2 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 Above Elev. 735'

• Fa!!a Shapiro-Wilk Tett for Standard Deviation

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TABLE 3-5 P DAMAGE PROBABILITIES FOR TRIPLE IMPACT 3 k' KEEL GROUP I 1, TARGET IMPACT ~CONFIGUEATION DESIGN OVERSPEED A-A-B A-A-C A-B-C .B-C-C A-C-C C-C-C ~ Control Room O O O O O O Elev. 654.5' to 679.5' ~ containment Vessel #1 0 -0 0 0 0 0 Below Elev. 706' Containment Vessel #1 0 0' O-0 0 0 Above 706' Containment Vessel #2 0 0 0 0 O O' Elev. 647.5' to 735' i Containment Vessel #2 0 0 0 0 0 0 Above Elev. 735' DESTRUCTIVE OVERSPEED Control Room 1.40 E-3 1.33 E-3 1.04 E-3 0 0 0 Elev. 654.5' to 679.5' Containment Vessel #1 6.67'E-5 0 4.00 E-5 0 0 'O Below Elev. 7' 6' Conta.inment Vessel #1 2.87 E-3 1.37 E-3 2.52 E-3 0 0 0 Above Elev. 706' Containment. Vessel #2 0 0 0. 0 0 0 ' lev. 647.5' to 735' Cor.tainment Ve.ssel #2 6.67 E-5 0 4.00 E-5 0 0, 0 Above Elev. 735' 2-Sheet 1 of 3 E

TABLE 3-5 (Cont'd). i } l WHEEL CROUP II TARGET IMPACT CONFICURATION 1 i i DESIGN OVERSPEED' A-A-B A-A-C A-B-C B-C-C A-C-C C-C-C R Control Roon 0 6.67'E-5 0 0 0 0 Elev'. 654.5' to 679.5' Containment Vessel #1 0 0 0 0 0 0 Below Elev. 706' Containment Vessel #1 0 0 0 0 0 0 Above 706' Containment Vessel #2 0 0 0 0 'O O i Elev. 647.5' to.735' Containment Vessel #2 0 0 0 0 0 0 Above Elev. 735' DESTRUCTIVE OVERSPEED Control Room 9.03 E-2 3.96 E-2 4.59 E-2 1.27 E-2 1.27 E-2 2.0 E-3 Elev. 654.5' to 679.5' Containment Vessel #1 l'.15 E-2 2.67 E-3 5.60 E-3 2.07 E-3 1.'07 E-3' 2.0 E-4 Below Elev. 706' l Containment Vessel #1 5.75 E-2 2.33 E-2 3.89 E-2 2.57 E-2 1.13 E-2 5.40 E-4 Above Elev. 706' Containment Vessel #2 0 0 0 0 0 0 Elev. 647.5' to 735' 4 i Containment Vessel #2 1.15 E-2 2.67 E-3 5.60 E-3 2.07 E-3 1.07 E-3 2.0 E-4 t Above Elev. 735' ) i ' Sheet 2 of 3 .k

l c I TABLE 3-5 (Cont'd)' I WHEEL GROUP III TARGET-IMPACT CONFIGURATION l DESIGN OVEROPEED A-A-B A-A-C A-B-C B-C-C-A-C-C-C-C-C ,l l Control Room 1.69 E-2 1.21 E-2 3.60 E-3 0 1.7 E-3 0- .i Elev'. 654.5' to 679.5' Containment Vessel #1 2.67 E-4 0 1.20 E-4 0 0 0 Below Elev. 706' Containment Vessel #1 6.67 E-4.8.67 E-4 1.60 E-4 0 6.67 E-5 0 Above Elev. 706' I Containment Vessel #2 0 0 0 0 0 0 Elev. 647.5' to 735' Containment Vessel #2 2.67 E-4 0 1.20 E-4 0 0 0 Above Elev. 735' I 4 DESTRUCTIVE OVERSPEED Control Room 6.94 E-1 6.53 E-1 3.99 E-1 6.68 E-2 2.95'E-l' l.66 E-2 e Elev. 654.5' to 679.5' Containocnt Vessel #1 3.38 E-1 2.70 E-1 7.96 E-2 6.70 E-3' 4.50 E-2 2.40 E-3 Beltv Elty. 706' Contai. ment Vessel #1 6.27 E-1 5.93 E-1 2.36 E-1 3.67 E-2 1.61 E-1 1.68 E-2 Above Elev. 706' Containment Vessel #2 0 0 0 0 0 0 Elev. 647.5' to 735' Containment Vessel #2 3.38,E-1 2.70 E-1 7.96 E-2 6.70 E-3 4.50 E-2 2.04 E-3 Above Elev. 735' i i E l 1 I i i Sheet 3 of 3 L

3.5 , TARGET DAMAGE PROBABILITIES - P 4 Overall P4 demage probabilities are evaluated by considering the probability of missile impact and the condseional probabiliry of damage. based on.a given impact configuration. In evaluating i probabilities mutually excletive sets of evants are considered for single, double, and triple impacts.,The total damage est2 mate is calculated as the sum of the damage probabilities calculated for each of the three impact configuration sets. Higher order t configurations can be neglected as discussed in Section 3.4.5. A 2 total of'41 impact combinations per wheel group are evaluated for each target-missile generation site pairing. Calculated P4 values for all targets within the LTM zone appear in Table 3-6. As noted in Section 3.0, only the risk associated with Unit 1 turbines is presented in this table. Based on symmetry arguments the Unit 2 turbines have similar risk values. When evaluating all targets, triple impact P3 values are assumed to be equal to the Control Room values given in Table 3-5 because of the relatively small effect on the P4 probability. The exception is craluation of the Containment Vessel targets. This procedure is coaservative, yet demonstrates the relative magnitude of the hazerd. ) i w C4 ret (Crv.cnwuq 3R

t TABLE 3-6 TURBINE MISSILE ilAZARD TO LTH TARCETS P ANNUAL PROBABILITY OF DAMAGE 4 SI!!GLE STRIKE DOUBLE STRIKE TRIPLE STRIKE TARCET i IMPACTS IMPACTS IMPACTS TOTAL-Control Room 1.3 E-8 2.0 E-9 7.8 E-11. 1.5 E-8 Elev. 654.5' to 679.55 Cable Spreading Room 5.2 E-9 2.3 E-10 1.'9 E-12 5.4 E-9 Elev. 647 $' to 654.5' 4 IIVAC Equipment Room 1.4 E-8 2.4 E-9 1.0 E-10 1.7 E-8 . Elev. 654.5' to 702.2' Intermediate Building 5.5 E-9 2.2 E-9 5.5 E-10 8.2 E-9 Elev. 647.5 to 707.5' Electrical Penetration Area 7.0 E-10 2.7 E-11 1.4 E-12 7.3 E-10 Elev. 647.5' to 654' Auxiliary Building 5.4 E-9 2.9 E-10 4.8 E-12 5.7 E-9 Elev. 647.5' to 652' Containment Vessel #1 7.0 E-9 4.1 E-9 8.5 E-10 1.2 E-8 Elev. 647.5' to 730' Containment Vessel #2 0 _2.0 E-12 2.1 E-14 2.0 E-12 Elev. 647.5' to 750' m

3.6 CONCLUSION

The turbine missile hazard to an individual safety related target has been conservatively. demonstrated to be less than 1.5 E-8 per year per turbine. This acceptebly low value is within the limits' prescribed in Regulatory Guide 1.115 and, therefore, redesign for additional turbine missile protection is unnecessary. 6 4 I l t e e e e \\ i g

~ 9 ' REFERENCES l. Preliminary Safety Analysis Report, Perry Nuclear Power Plant. Docket Nos.,50-440/441, Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., Cleveland, Ohio. i 2. Gonyea, D. C., " An Anaiysis of the Energy of Hypothetical Wheel Missiles ' Escaping Trom Turbine Casings". DF73LS12, General-Electric Co., Februsry 1973. 3. ' Bush, S. H., Probability of Damage to Nuclear Components Due to Turbine Failure", Nuclear Saf ety, Vol.14, No. 3, May-June 1973. 4. Memo Report, " Hypothetical Turbine Missiles - Detailed Sample Calculations", General Electric Co., 12/1/73. 5. Hagg, A. C. and Saatsy, G. O., '"The Containment of Disc Burst Fragments by Cylindrical Shells", Paper No. 73-WA-PWR-2, ASME Winter Meeting', Detroit, Michigan, November 11-15, 1973. i 6. Linderman, R. B. et al, " Design of Structures for Missile Impact", BC-TOP-2, Revision 2, Bechcel Power Corporation, September 1974. 7.

Amirikan, A., " Design of Protective Structures (A New Concept of Structural Behavior)", NAVDOCKS P-51, Annual Meeting o.' ASCE, October 1950.

8. Williamson, R. A., and Alvy, R. R., " Impact Eff ect of Fragments Striking 1 Structural Elements", Holmes & Narver, Inc., Revised November 1973. 4 i 9. Johnson, B. et al, " Analysis of the Turbine Missile Hazard to the Nuclear 4 . Thermal Power Plant at Pebble Springs, Oregon", Docket Nos. 50-514, Portland I General-Electric Co.,' Portland, Oregon.

• • a M'Com m C,_... _.

o -o - - v u . g .w ,e i REFERENCES (Cont'd) ( 10. Shapiro, S. and Wilk, M. B., "An Analysis of Variance Test for Normality l (Complete Sampics)", Biomet.rika, Vol. 52., P. 591,1965. 1 11. Burrows, G. L., and MacMillian, " Confidence Limits for Monte Carlo Calculations", Nuc. Sci-and Eng., Vol. 22, p. 384, 1965. J i 7 I i 9 e l e S

4 + O O 0 9 6 4 i e 4 e e A?PENDIX A / RESIDUAL PERFORATION VELOCITY S e a k i ( i l 1

S Appendix A Resideal Perforation Velocity The Ballistic Ressarch Laboratores (BRL) formulae for concrete and steel are two commonly used methods for evaluating perforation of barrier 3 A comparison is made between the residusi velocities through barriers as calculated by the methods used in Section.3.4.2 and *. hose predicted by use of the BRL equations. A.1 Residual Velocity in Concrete o The BRL formula for perforation of a 3000 psi reinforced concrete slab of tiickness T is (1) W D.2 f y}1.33 0 T = 7.8 ^~ 2 1000 D L where D = diaceter of missile, in. T = thickness of concrete slab that vill be perforated, in. W = missile weight, lb. V = impact velocity, fps. Using the criterion appearing in Equation (8) of Section 3.4.2, the BRL residual velocity v after perforation of a barrier of thickness T is r TD. 8' lE 1 2 l ^~ } v ~ r" Vi ,7.8 W, where v = residual velocity, fps. r vt = impact velocity, fps. l T = barrier thickness, in, l W = missile veight, lb. D = diameter of missile, in.

e For irregularly shaped missiles of, impact area A, an equivalent cylindrical diameter o'f 1 fk (A-3) ~ D4 is used. The residual velocity of perforation as~ calculated in this study is based on the modified Petry formula,' and is given in Section 3.4.2.2.2 by. T/(2KA ) 1, 2 vr" V - 215000 ,'l0 p-(A-4) i A comparison of Equations A-2 and A-4 is presented in Figures A-1 to A-3 for minimum area Wheel Group III missiles over arbitrary impact ^ velocity ranges. Little difference exists between the predictions of both methods. A.? Residual Velocity in Steel The BRL formula for perforation cf a steel plate of thickness T is ( ) 2 1T.5

0. 5 -KV

= 21 (A-5) 17,400 K D.5 where T = steel vall thickness, in. M = mass of the missile, lb-sec /ft. V = velocity of missile, fps. l I K = empirical constant usually assumed as 1.0. D = diameter of missile, in. 4 S . _., _ _ ~ _

For irregularly shaped m,issiles, Equation (A-3) is used to calculate an effective diameter for use with Equation (A-5). Again, using the. criterion in Section 3.4.2, the residucl velocity after perforation of a barrier based' on the BRL formula in Equation (A-5) is 1/2 -(* + ( ) (A-6) Vr "' V i where 'vi = incident missile velocity, fps. r. residual velocity, fps. v t D = missile diameter, in. T = barrier thickness, in. W = missile weight, Ib. A comparison of the residual velocities predicted by Equation (A-5) and the Hagg-Sankey method as given in Section 3.4.2.1 for minimum area - Wheel Group III missiles appears in Figures A-4 to A-6. Discontinuitien exist in the Ha5g-Sankey results as previously discussed in Section 3.4.2.1. Over the velocity range of concern, the Hagg-Sankey metho'd predicts larger residual velocities than the BRL formulation. Tha Hagg-Sankey method is considered to be more accurate for the lower velocity, larger mass, blunt missiles. At very great velocities be*ter agre.ement exists between both models. (I) Cwaltney, R.C., Missile Generation and Protection in Light-Water-Cooled Power neactor Plants, ORNL-NSIC-22, September 1968.

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2 RESIDUAL PERFORATIO.N VELOCITIES FOR WHEEL GROUP 111, FRAGMENT A THROUGH 3000 PSI CONCRETE

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