IR 05000352/1985019: Difference between revisions

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.. : c U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION ' Report No. 85-19
-
- Docket N License N NPF-27
.. :
~ Licensee: Philadelphia Electric Company 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19101 Facility Name: Limerick Generating Station Inspection At: Limerick, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted: April 1-5 and 15-19,1985 Inspectors: 8  us Nud P. H. Bissett, Je12 tor Engineer f f  6 /S Bf date A ~f a b E. T. Shaub, Reactor Engineer S* /,C 0[
c U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I.
date 00 00k AT Alba, Reactor Engineer X-IT-9C date Approved by: [. [cI s m ,   M/6/fC'
 
Dr. P. ~K. Eapen( 'Criief , 'date'
' Report No. 85-19
Quality Assurance Section, EPB, DRS Inspection Summary: Inspection on April 1-5 and 15-19, 1985 (Inspection Report No. 50-352/85-19)
- Docket No.
. Areas Inspected: Primary emphasis of this inspection by Region-based inspectors was the verification of implementation of licensee programs related to the' opera-tion, maintenance, testing, and surveillance of the high-low pressure interface valves and'related hardware to prevent or detect overpressurization in ECCS systems. .The failure of these valves has been identified as a precursor to overpressurization and subsequent LOCA which bypasses containment. Operational experience has shown.that maintenance errors are a primary contributor to the
 
  -
50-352 License No.
failure of these valve In addition the inspectors reviewed licensee actions on previous inspection find-ingst implementation of the QA program including QA/QC administration, audits, i procurement, receipt storage and handling, surveillance, maintenance, measuring
 
.and test equipment, records and document control.
NPF-27
~ Licensee:
Philadelphia Electric Company 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19101 Facility Name:
Limerick Generating Station Inspection At:
Limerick, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted: April 1-5 and 15-19,1985 Inspectors:
 
Nud f
6 /S Bf us P. H. Bissett, Je12 tor Engineer f date A ~f b
S* /,C 0[
a E. T. Shaub, Reactor Engineer date 00 00k X-IT-9C AT Alba, Reactor Engineer date Approved by:
[. [cI s m,
M/6/fC'
Dr. P. ~K. Eapen( 'Criief,
'date'
Quality Assurance Section, EPB, DRS Inspection Summary:
Inspection on April 1-5 and 15-19, 1985 (Inspection Report No. 50-352/85-19)
. Areas Inspected: Primary emphasis of this inspection by Region-based inspectors was the verification of implementation of licensee programs related to the' opera-tion, maintenance, testing, and surveillance of the high-low pressure interface valves and'related hardware to prevent or detect overpressurization in ECCS systems..The failure of these valves has been identified as a precursor to overpressurization and subsequent LOCA which bypasses containment. Operational experience has shown.that maintenance errors are a primary contributor to the
-
failure of these valves.
 
In addition the inspectors reviewed licensee actions on previous inspection find-ingst implementation of the QA program including QA/QC administration, audits, i
procurement, receipt storage and handling, surveillance, maintenance, measuring
.and test equipment, records and document control.


'
'
The inspection involved 186 hours of inspection including 156 hours onsite and 30 hours in offic ~Results: No violations were identified.
The inspection involved 186 hours of inspection including 156 hours onsite and 30 hours in office.
 
~Results: No violations were identified.


l 8505240488 85052 I PDR ADOCM 05000 2  _
l 8505240488 85052 I
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PDR ADOCM 05000
 
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. - * ==
.
DETAILS Persons Contacted D. Clohecy, Quality Assurance Engineer, Engineering & Research Dept. (E&RD)
-o.
 
*
 
==
DETAILS 1.
 
Persons Contacted D. Clohecy, Quality Assurance Engineer, Engineering & Research Dept. (E&RD)
J. Cotton, Maintennace Engineer Electric Production (EP)
J. Cotton, Maintennace Engineer Electric Production (EP)
C. Endriss, . Regulatory Engineer (EP) ~
C. Endriss,. Regulatory Engineer (EP) ~
K. Folta, Operation QC Site Supervisor (Gilbert)
K. Folta, Operation QC Site Supervisor (Gilbert)
G. G11 body, QA Engineer (E&RD)
G. G11 body, QA Engineer (E&RD)
-R. Hennessy, Site QC Supervisor (EP)
-R. Hennessy, Site QC Supervisor (EP)
L. Hopkins, Performance Engineer (EP)
L. Hopkins, Performance Engineer (EP)
F._Kremm, Maintenance Engineering (General Physics)
F._Kremm, Maintenance Engineering (General Physics)
G. Leitch, Station St.perintendent W. Lewis, Test Engineer (EP)
G. Leitch, Station St.perintendent W. Lewis, Test Engineer (EP)
'A. MacAnish, Site QA Supervisor (EP)
'A. MacAnish, Site QA Supervisor (EP)
J. McElwain, QA Auditor (EP)
J. McElwain, QA Auditor (EP)
K. Mandl, Corporate QA Supervisor (EP)
K. Mandl, Corporate QA Supervisor (EP)
Line 56: Line 90:
_ W. Rekito, Regulatory Coordinator (Betchel)
_ W. Rekito, Regulatory Coordinator (Betchel)
R. Smith, QA Auditor (EP)
R. Smith, QA Auditor (EP)
.NRC J. Wiggins, Senior Resident Inspector
.NRC J. Wiggins, Senior Resident Inspector
- The personnel listed above attended either the exit interview of April 4, 1985 or the final exit interview April 19, 198 The inspector also interviewad other licensee personnel including operators, staff engineers, technicians and clerical personnel during the inspectio . Scope The primary objective of this inspection was to verify that the licensee has implemented an' adequate surveillance, maintenance, and test program in accordance with requirements and commitment To verify this, the NRC staff inspection focused on the implementation of surveillance, maintenance and test programs related to high risk systems, particularly the check and isolation valve configurations in the ECCS syste These configurations are designed to prevent the PRA-identified Event V type occurrence which leads to overpressurization of the low pressure side of these systems and subsequently a LOC The vulnerability of the valve configurations at the high low interface has been identified in AE00 Report AE00/E414 and in IE Notice 84-74, both of which indicate problems with the availability of these valves, particularly the air operated check valves. A high contributor to the unavailability   I was shown to be inadequate maintenance and surveillance, including personnel error, of these valve _
- The personnel listed above attended either the exit interview of April 4, 1985 or the final exit interview April 19, 1985.
_ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ ._
 
- -
The inspector also interviewad other licensee personnel including operators, staff engineers, technicians and clerical personnel during the inspection.
,
 
. x
2.
 
Scope The primary objective of this inspection was to verify that the licensee has implemented an' adequate surveillance, maintenance, and test program in accordance with requirements and commitments.
 
To verify this, the NRC staff inspection focused on the implementation of surveillance, maintenance and test programs related to high risk systems, particularly the check and isolation valve configurations in the ECCS system.
 
These configurations are designed to prevent the PRA-identified Event V type occurrence which leads to overpressurization of the low pressure side of these systems and subsequently a LOCA.
 
The vulnerability of the valve configurations at the high low interface has been identified in AE00 Report AE00/E414 and in IE Notice 84-74, both of which indicate problems with the availability of these valves, particularly I
the air operated check valves. A high contributor to the unavailability was shown to be inadequate maintenance and surveillance, including personnel error, of these valves.
 
_
_ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
 
-
,
-
_.
 
._
.
x
 
There are several low pressure safety systems connected to the reactor pressure vessel primary coolant system. These systems are rated at full reactor pressure downstream of the containment isolation valves with the remaining upstream system piping rated below full reactor pressure.


There are several low pressure safety systems connected to the reactor pressure vessel primary coolant system. These systems are rated at full reactor pressure downstream of the containment isolation valves with the remaining upstream system piping rated below full reactor pressure. In order to protect these systems from reactor system pressure (1000 psig),
In order to protect these systems from reactor system pressure (1000 psig),
two or more isolation valves are utilized in series to form the interface between -the high pressure reactor coolant system and the low pressure
two or more isolation valves are utilized in series to form the interface between -the high pressure reactor coolant system and the low pressure
. portions'of the system Surveillance, maintenance and testing activities for these isolation valves, associated :omponents and instrumentation were reviewed to determine if the licensee has implemented adequate mechanisms to ensure high reliability and leak tight integrity for these valves. The Core Spray and Residual Heat Removal Systems were reviewed. A summary of the system configurations, design features to prevent and identify overpressurization and administrative controls are listed in Table . References / Requirements
. portions'of the systems.
--
 
Limerick Generating Station (LGS) Technical Specifications
Surveillance, maintenance and testing activities for these isolation valves, associated :omponents and instrumentation were reviewed to determine if the licensee has implemented adequate mechanisms to ensure high reliability and leak tight integrity for these valves.
--
 
Safety Evaluation Report Supplement III Section 3. LGS Operations Quality Assurance Program
The Core Spray and Residual Heat Removal Systems were reviewed. A summary of the system configurations, design features to prevent and identify overpressurization and administrative controls are listed in Table 1.
--
 
3.
 
References / Requirements Limerick Generating Station (LGS) Technical Specifications
--
Safety Evaluation Report Supplement III Section 3.9.6
--
LGS Operations Quality Assurance Program
--
ANSI 18.7-1976, Administrative Controls for Nuclear Power Plants
ANSI 18.7-1976, Administrative Controls for Nuclear Power Plants
--
--
IE Information Notice 84-74, " Isolation of Reactor Coolant Systems from Low-Pressure Systems Outside Containment", September 1984
IE Information Notice 84-74, " Isolation of Reactor Coolant Systems
--
--
LGS Inservice Testing Program, for pumps and valves, Revision 5 System Description 4.1 Core Spray System Core Spray (CS) consists of two independent loops (A&B) that provide protection to the core for large breaks in the reactor coolant system or small breaks beyond the capacity of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI), Reactor Containment Isolation Cooling (RCIC), and control rod drive water pumps, after ADS actuation. The high pressure / low pressure interface for CS is as follows (refer to Figure 1):
from Low-Pressure Systems Outside Containment", September 1984 LGS Inservice Testing Program, for pumps and valves, Revision 5
  = Loop "B" - a locked npen gate valve (maintenance valve), an air testable check valve (inboard isolation), an air assisted check valve (outboard isolation), and 2 motor operated gate valves (injection valves). The HPCI injection line utilizes the CS "B" injection path between the outboard isolation and the injection valves. Therefore the CS "B" injection valve also provides a high/ low pressure interface between HPCI and the low pressure CS syste . .- _ . ._
--
      -- - - _ .
4.
      - -
 
System Description 4.1 Core Spray System Core Spray (CS) consists of two independent loops (A&B) that provide protection to the core for large breaks in the reactor coolant system or small breaks beyond the capacity of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI), Reactor Containment Isolation Cooling (RCIC), and control rod drive water pumps, after ADS actuation. The high pressure / low pressure interface for CS is as follows (refer to Figure 1):
Loop "B" - a locked npen gate valve (maintenance valve), an air
=
testable check valve (inboard isolation), an air assisted check valve (outboard isolation), and 2 motor operated gate valves (injection valves). The HPCI injection line utilizes the CS "B" injection path between the outboard isolation and the injection valves. Therefore the CS "B" injection valve also provides a high/ low pressure interface between HPCI and the low pressure CS system.
 
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  * Loop "A" - a locked open gate valve (maintenance valve), an air testable check valve (inboard isolation), a motor operated gate valve (outboard isolation) and a motor operated gate valve-(injection valve).
 
Loop "A" - a locked open gate valve (maintenance valve), an air
*
_
testable check valve (inboard isolation), a motor operated gate valve (outboard isolation) and a motor operated gate valve-(injection valve).
 
In both cases, the piping and valves are nominally rated at 900 psi up to and including the outboard isolation valve ~, from that point to the injection valves, the piping is nominally rated at 600 psi with the'_ injection valves rated at 900 psi.


In both cases, the piping and valves are nominally rated at 900 psi up to and including the outboard isolation valve ~, from that point to the injection valves, the piping is nominally rated at 600 psi with the'_ injection valves rated at 900 ps To provide overpressurization protection for the low pressure piping
To provide overpressurization protection for the low pressure piping
  --the system design includes relief valves, pressure indication and associated control room alarm .2. Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
--the system design includes relief valves, pressure indication and associated control room alarms.
The RHR system can be divided into various operating modes which function independently,'but utilize the same major equipment. LPCI subsystem is the primary mode and normal valve lineup configuration of RHR. LPCI provides protection for large breaks in the reactor coolant syste Other modes of RHR operation-include shutdown cooling, head spray, drywell and suppression pool spray, and suppression pool coolin The high pressure / low pressure interface for the-RHR system is as follows:
 
-
4.2. Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
  * Loops _C&D (Figure 2)
The RHR system can be divided into various operating modes which function independently,'but utilize the same major equipment.
  --
 
LPCI'- a locked open gate (maintenance valve), an air test-able check valve (inboard isolation) and a motor operated gate valve (outboard isolation);
LPCI subsystem is the primary mode and normal valve lineup configuration of RHR.
  * Loops A&B- (Figure 3)
 
  --
LPCI provides protection for large breaks in the reactor coolant system.
LPCI - a locked open gate (maintenance valve), an air testable check valve-(inboard isolation) and a motor operated gate valve (outboard isolation);
 
  --
Other modes of RHR operation-include shutdown cooling, head spray, drywell and suppression pool spray, and suppression pool cooling.
Shutdown Cooling Return - a locked open gate (maintenance valve), an air testable check valve (inboard isolation) and a motor operated gate valve (outboard isolation);
 
  --
The high pressure / low pressure interface for the-RHR system is as follows:
Shutdown Cooling Supply - a locked open gate (maintenance valve), a motor operated gate valve (inboard isolation) and a motor operated globe valve (outboard isolation);
Loops _C&D (Figure 2)
L
-
  --
*
Head Spray a check valve, a motor operated gate valve
LPCI'- a locked open gate (maintenance valve), an air test-
*
--
  (inboard isolation) and a motor operated globe valve (out-y   board isolation).
able check valve (inboard isolation) and a motor operated gate valve (outboard isolation);
Loops A&B- (Figure 3)
*
LPCI - a locked open gate (maintenance valve), an air testable
--
check valve-(inboard isolation) and a motor operated gate valve (outboard isolation);
Shutdown Cooling Return - a locked open gate (maintenance
--
valve), an air testable check valve (inboard isolation) and a motor operated gate valve (outboard isolation);
Shutdown Cooling Supply - a locked open gate (maintenance
--
valve), a motor operated gate valve (inboard isolation) and a motor operated globe valve (outboard isolation);
Head Spray a check valve, a motor operated gate valve L
--
(inboard isolation) and a motor operated globe valve (out-
*
y board isolation).


_
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  ' Primary Containment L.G.S. Simplified Core Spray System Isolation and Injection Valve Configuration
Y Spear
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' Primary Containment L.G.S. Simplified Core Spray System Isolation and Injection Valve Configuration
,
f Reference: LGS Drawing M-52 Revision 30, Core Spray System Figure 1 i
f Reference: LGS Drawing M-52 Revision 30, Core Spray System Figure 1 i


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Alam and indication in Control Room Primary Containment
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17031
      .
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RHR. %p L.G.S. Simplified RHR (Dedicated LPCI Loops C8D)
RHR. %p L.G.S. Simplified RHR (Dedicated LPCI Loops C8D)
System Isolation / Injection Valve Configuration teference: LGS Drawing M-51 Sheets 1 and 2. Revision 33 RHR System Figure 2
System Isolation / Injection Valve Configuration teference: LGS Drawing M-51 Sheets 1 and 2. Revision 33 RHR System Figure 2


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L.G.S.SimplifiedRHR(LPCI,ShutdownCoolingandHeadSpray)
L.G.S.SimplifiedRHR(LPCI,ShutdownCoolingandHeadSpray)
System Isolation / Injection Valves Reference: LGS Drawing M-51 Sheets 1 and 2 Revision 33 RHR System     Figure 3
System Isolation / Injection Valves Reference: LGS Drawing M-51 Sheets 1 and 2 Revision 33 RHR System Figure 3


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To provide overpressurization protection for the RHR low pressure piping the system design includes relief valves, pressure indication and an associated control room alar . 4.3 System Hardware and Implementation 4. Corrective & Preventive Maintenance The maintenance history for the valves was reviewed and discussed with licensee representatives. The inspector verified that the maintenance was performed in accordance with the administrative controls and included:
To provide overpressurization protection for the RHR low pressure piping the system design includes relief valves, pressure indication and an associated control room alarm.
  --
 
. 4.3 System Hardware and Implementation 4.3.1 Corrective & Preventive Maintenance The maintenance history for the valves was reviewed and discussed with licensee representatives.
 
The inspector verified that the maintenance was performed in accordance with the administrative controls and included:
use of'preapproved maintenance procedures
use of'preapproved maintenance procedures
  --
--
adequate equipment control during maintenance
adequate equipment control during maintenance
  --
--
post maintenance testing was performed as applicable
post maintenance testing was performed as applicable
  --
--
QC involvement commensurate with the maintenance performe Maintenance procedures for the air testable check valves, air assisted check valves, motor operated gate valves, relief valves and the asso-ciated motor operators as applicable were reviewed. The following procedures were reviewed:
QC involvement commensurate with the maintenance performed.
  --
 
PMQ-500-055, Preventive Maintenance Procedure for Atwood and Morrill Testable Check Valves Examination and Repair
--
  --
Maintenance procedures for the air testable check valves, air assisted check valves, motor operated gate valves, relief valves and the asso-ciated motor operators as applicable were reviewed.
PMQ-500-005, Preventive Maintenance Procedure for Anchor-Darling and Velan Bolted Bonnet and Pressure Seal Gate Valves Repair
 
  --
The following procedures were reviewed:
PMQ-500-014, Preventive Maintenance Procedure for lapping of Anchor-Darling and Rockwell-Edwards Globe Valve PMQ-052-008, Preventive Maintenance for Q-Anchor Darling air operated pres sure seal swing check valves HV-052102/208 Examine and La PMQ-500-031, Preventive Maintenance Procedure for Removal of Q-listed Limitorque Operators, Type SMB-000 through SMB-4, 4T and SB-2 and SB- PMQ-500-018, Preventive Maintenance Procedure for the lubrication of Q-listed Limitorque Actuator PMQ-500-017 Preventive Maintenance Procedure for overhaul of Q-listed Limitorque Operators Type SMB-1 through SMB-4 and 4T and SB-2 and S8- I i
PMQ-500-055, Preventive Maintenance Procedure for Atwood and
      !
--
Morrill Testable Check Valves Examination and Repair PMQ-500-005, Preventive Maintenance Procedure for Anchor-Darling
--
and Velan Bolted Bonnet and Pressure Seal Gate Valves Repair PMQ-500-014, Preventive Maintenance Procedure for lapping of
--
Anchor-Darling and Rockwell-Edwards Globe Valves.
 
PMQ-052-008, Preventive Maintenance for Q-Anchor Darling air
--
operated pres sure seal swing check valves HV-052102/208 Examine and Lap.
 
PMQ-500-031, Preventive Maintenance Procedure for Removal of
--
Q-listed Limitorque Operators, Type SMB-000 through SMB-4, 4T and SB-2 and SB-3.
 
PMQ-500-018, Preventive Maintenance Procedure for the lubrication
--
of Q-listed Limitorque Actuators.


.s
PMQ-500-017 Preventive Maintenance Procedure for overhaul of
% ..
--
Q-listed Limitorque Operators Type SMB-1 through SMB-4 and 4T and SB-2 and S8-3.


i
i
  --
-.
PMQ-500-087, Preventive Maintenance Procedure for Electrical Checkout and Adjustment of.Q-listed Limitorque operators.
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
- -
-
-
 
.s
%
..
 
i PMQ-500-087, Preventive Maintenance Procedure for Electrical
--
Checkout and Adjustment of.Q-listed Limitorque operators.


!
!
  --
.PMQ-051-007, Preventive Maintenance Procedure for Crosby Type
  .PMQ-051-007, Preventive Maintenance Procedure for Crosby Type J0-Special Relief Valves, PSV-051-1F055A/8 Examination and Repair (Lapping)
--
  --
J0-Special Relief Valves, PSV-051-1F055A/8 Examination and Repair (Lapping)
PMQ-500-051, Preventive Maintenance Procedures for Q-Listed Lonergan Type LCT Relief Valves Examination and Lappin The inspector verified these procedures provided adequate precautions, detailed works instructions and addressed post maintenance testing prior.to return to servic .In addition the licensee is developing preventive maintenance procedures for each system that will provide a system walkdown and examination during each refueling outage which will include visual hardware inspec-tions to detect abnormal aging, degradation, or other conditions that should be corrected to assure equipment availability. The inspector reviewed PMQ-051-007 " Preventive Maintenance Procedure for Visual Examination and Fastener Torque Check for (Core Spray) System Valves and Components". The inspector noted that the procedure included requirements for: 1) examination for evidence of corrosion, rust, and dirt, 2) packing or body to bonnet leakage; 3) torque check of all fasteners; and the operator condition for all valves and other system component . Isolation Valve and Relief Valve Testing In accordance with ASME Section XI, Technical Specifications and the licensee's Inservice Testing Program, preservice tests have been com-pleted on the containment isolation valves and relief valves in the Core Spray and RHR Systems. In addition to the Type C local leak rate tests (LLRT) the technical specifications require a high pressure test of the high-low pressure interface valve The inspectors reviewed the documentation for the LLRTs and high pres-sure tests performed and discussed the test methodology with the licen-see's representatives. The tests were completed in accordance with the procedure, test deficiencies were documented, accurate leak rate calculations were performed, the test acceptance criteria was met, and final valve lineups were independently verified. Tests reviewed for CS and RHR isolation valves included:
PMQ-500-051, Preventive Maintenance Procedures for Q-Listed
  --
--
ST-1-LLRT-161, Core Spray Pump Discharge, Valves HV-52-1F005 April 4, 1984
Lonergan Type LCT Relief Valves Examination and Lapping.
  --
 
ST-1-LLRT-161, Core Spray Discharge, Valves HV-52-1F006A and HV-521F039A March 31, 1984 ~
The inspector verified these procedures provided adequate precautions, detailed works instructions and addressed post maintenance testing prior.to return to service.
Qc t >     s
 
  ;
.In addition the licensee is developing preventive maintenance procedures for each system that will provide a system walkdown and examination during each refueling outage which will include visual hardware inspec-tions to detect abnormal aging, degradation, or other conditions that should be corrected to assure equipment availability. The inspector reviewed PMQ-051-007 " Preventive Maintenance Procedure for Visual Examination and Fastener Torque Check for (Core Spray) System Valves and Components". The inspector noted that the procedure included requirements for:
Y -.
1) examination for evidence of corrosion, rust, and dirt, 2) packing or body to bonnet leakage; 3) torque check of all fasteners; and the operator condition for all valves and other system components.
  '
 
4  -
4.3.2 Isolation Valve and Relief Valve Testing In accordance with ASME Section XI, Technical Specifications and the licensee's Inservice Testing Program, preservice tests have been com-pleted on the containment isolation valves and relief valves in the Core Spray and RHR Systems. In addition to the Type C local leak rate tests (LLRT) the technical specifications require a high pressure test of the high-low pressure interface valves.
o -
 
    -
The inspectors reviewed the documentation for the LLRTs and high pres-sure tests performed and discussed the test methodology with the licen-see's representatives. The tests were completed in accordance with the procedure, test deficiencies were documented, accurate leak rate calculations were performed, the test acceptance criteria was met, and final valve lineups were independently verified. Tests reviewed for CS and RHR isolation valves included:
        , .
ST-1-LLRT-161, Core Spray Pump Discharge, Valves HV-52-1F005
--
April 4, 1984 ST-1-LLRT-161, Core Spray Discharge, Valves HV-52-1F006A and
--
HV-521F039A March 31, 1984
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..ST-1-LLRT-161, Core Spray Discharge, Valve HV-52-1F005, April 4
    :..ST-1-LLRT-161, Core Spray Discharge, Valve HV-52-1F005, April 4
-
    -
.
        '
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    .1984:
.
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:
    >$T-1-052-492-1 Core Sprey Loop "B" Pressure Isolation Valve Leakage
.1984:
        .
'
>$T-1-052-492-1 Core Sprey Loop "B" Pressure Isolation Valve Leakage E
--~
.
Rate' Test, for valve-HV-52-108, March 26, 1985
Rate' Test, for valve-HV-52-108, March 26, 1985
          .
.
  '
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    . ,
.
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    ' ST;1-LLRT-451-1, "A" RHR LPCI, Valves HV-51-IF041, HV-51-142A,
'
    ,HV-51-1F017A,,May 5, 1984 f
W
    ,
' ST;1-LLRT-451-1, "A" RHR LPCI, Valves HV-51-IF041, HV-51-142A,
    -1 .ST-1-LLRT-461-1, "B" RHR LPCI,-Valves HV-51-1F041B, HV-51-1F01428,
--
  ~~
f
,.
,HV-51-1F017A,,May 5, 1984
HV-1-1F017B May 2, 1984 and partial test December 16, 1984 o   ;.
,
    -
~~
    '
.ST-1-LLRT-461-1, "B" RHR LPCI,-Valves HV-51-1F041B, HV-51-1F01428,
ST-1-LLRT-471-1, "C" RHR LCI, Valves HV-51-1F041C, HV-51-1F142C, t
-1 HV-1-1F017B May 2, 1984 and partial test December 16, 1984
J     HV-51-1F017C, May 4, 1984-v    --
,.
    ' ST-1-LLRT-471-1 "D" RHR LPCI, Valves HV-51-IF0410, HV-51-1F1420, HV-51-1F0170, May~4,'1984 and partial test December 19. 198 " '
o
    --
-
    'ST-1-LLRT-181-1, RPV Head Spray, Valves HV-51-1F022, HV-51-IF023,
ST-1-LLRT-471-1, "C" RHR LCI, Valves HV-51-1F041C, HV-51-1F142C,
  ,
;.
PSV-51-122,-June .7,1984 and December 13, 1984
t
    ' - =
'
ST-1-LLRT-131-1, RHR Shutdown Cooling Return, Valves HV-51-1F050A, HV-51-1F151A, HV-51-1F015A May 3, 1984 and partial test December 15, 1984
J HV-51-1F017C, May 4, 1984-
    --
' ST-1-LLRT-471-1 "D" RHR LPCI, Valves HV-51-IF0410, HV-51-1F1420,
ST-1-LLRT-141-1, RHR Shutdown Cooling Return, Va'lves HV-51-1F0508, HV-51-1F0151B, HV-51-1F0158, May 3, 1984
--
    --
v HV-51-1F0170, May~4,'1984 and partial test December 19. 1984.
ST-ILLRT-121-1, RHR Shutdown Cooling Supply, Valves'HV-51-1F008, HV-51-1F009, PSV-51-_155, March 30,.1984
 
; ,
'ST-1-LLRT-181-1, RPV Head Spray, Valves HV-51-1F022, HV-51-IF023,
The inspector verified that the LLRT test results were tabulated and
--
      ~
"
the results added to the " running balance" to ensure the maximum'per-missible containment leak rate was not exceede Documentation for completed relief valve tests was reviewed and discussed'
'
    - with licensee' representatives. The inspector verified that' the Core Spray and RHR system relief valves had been satisfactorily tested prior to plant operatio . ' Surveillance / Calibration of Associated Instrumentation
PSV-51-122,-June.7,1984 and December 13, 1984
    'The CS and'RHR system design includes instrumentation to provide indi-cation, alarm, and low pressure or differential pressure permissive interlocks to prevent the CS and RHR injection valves from opening until reaching a preset pressure, for system overpressurization protec--
,
ST-1-LLRT-131-1, RHR Shutdown Cooling Return, Valves HV-51-1F050A,
' - =
HV-51-1F151A, HV-51-1F015A May 3, 1984 and partial test December 15, 1984 ST-1-LLRT-141-1, RHR Shutdown Cooling Return, Va'lves HV-51-1F0508,
--
HV-51-1F0151B, HV-51-1F0158, May 3, 1984 ST-ILLRT-121-1, RHR Shutdown Cooling Supply, Valves'HV-51-1F008,
--
HV-51-1F009, PSV-51-_155, March 30,.1984
;
,
The inspector verified that the LLRT test results were tabulated and the results added to the " running balance" to ensure the maximum'per-
~
missible containment leak rate was not exceeded.
 
Documentation for completed relief valve tests was reviewed and discussed'
- with licensee' representatives. The inspector verified that' the Core Spray and RHR system relief valves had been satisfactorily tested prior to plant operation.
 
4.3.3
' Surveillance / Calibration of Associated Instrumentation
 
'The CS and'RHR system design includes instrumentation to provide indi-cation, alarm, and low pressure or differential pressure permissive interlocks to prevent the CS and RHR injection valves from opening until reaching a preset pressure, for system overpressurization protec--
tion. Technical Specifications require calibration and functional
tion. Technical Specifications require calibration and functional
    . tests of these instruments on a refueling and monthly basis respectivel .
. tests of these instruments on a refueling and monthly basis respectively.
  )
 
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The inspectors reviewed surveillance procedures and walked through several surveillances/ calibrations with licensee personnel to verify that these instrument loops were calibrated and tested as required by Technical Specifications. Examples of procedures reviewed included:
The inspectors reviewed surveillance procedures and walked through several surveillances/ calibrations with licensee personnel to verify that these instrument loops were calibrated and tested as required by Technical Specifications. Examples of procedures reviewed included:
--
ST-2-52-402-1, Operational Leakage High/ Low Pressure Interface
ST-2-52-402-1, Operational Leakage High/ Low Pressure Interface
- Valve Leakage Monitor (Core Spray Loop A) Calibration / Functional Test (PT-52-IN054A, P15-52-IN654S) PS-52-1N658A), December 7, 1984
--
--
- Valve Leakage Monitor (Core Spray Loop A) Calibration / Functional Test (PT-52-IN054A, P15-52-IN654S) PS-52-1N658A), December 7, 1984 ST-2-52-602-1, Operational Leakage High/ Low Pressure Interface -
ST-2-52-602-1, Operational Leakage High/ Low Pressure Interface -
--
Valve Leakage Monitor (Core Spray Loop A) Functional Test
Valve Leakage Monitor (Core Spray Loop A) Functional Test ST-1-052-101-1, Loop "A" Core Spray LSF/SAA Test (verifies low
--
--
ST-1-052-101-1, Loop "A" Core Spray LSF/SAA Test (verifies low pressure permissive for injection valves).
pressure permissive for injection valves).
 
ST-2-051-400-1, High/ Low Pressure Interface - Valve Leakage Monitor
--
(LPCI Loop A, Head Spray and A Shutdown Cooling) Calibration /
Functional Test (PT-51-IN053A, PISH-51-1N653A PSL-51-1N654A),
,
November 10, 1984.
 
ST-2-051-600-1, Operational Leakage High/ Low Pressure Interface
--
- Valve Leakage Monitor (LPCI Loop A, Head Spray and A Shutdown Cooling) Functional Test (PISH-51-1N653A, PSL-51-1N654A), March 24, 1985.
 
ST-2-051-410-1 ECCS-LPCI Division I Header DP Calibration
--
Functional Test (PDT-51-1N060A, PDISH-51-1N660A, PDSL-51-1N661A),
September 25, 1984.
 
ST-1-051-101-1 DIV I RHR (LPCI) LSF/SAA (verifies low pressure
--
permissive).
 
The inspector's review included verifying logic sequences, as appli-cable, and independent verification of switches and valves after system restoration.


To reduce the plant risk associated with intersystem LOCA that could occur during leak testing, valve exercising surveillance or calibration at power, the licensee will perform thesa tests during refueling outages.
These actions were taken as a result of the licensee review of opera-tional experience and agreement with the NRC that the consequences of maintenance / surveillance personnel errors could be reduced if these tests were performed during non power periods.
In addition, the licen-see and architect / engineer reviewed IE Notice 84-74 in detail and noted that the plant design and the existing operational and administrative controls should prevent inadvertant overpressurization of the low pressure system due to personnel erro '
_
. _.. _ _ _
--
--
ST-2-051-400-1, High/ Low Pressure Interface - Valve Leakage Monitor (LPCI Loop A, Head Spray and A Shutdown Cooling) Calibration /
.
Functional Test (PT-51-IN053A, PISH-51-1N653A PSL-51-1N654A), ,
.
November 10, 198 ST-2-051-600-1, Operational Leakage High/ Low Pressure Interface
 
- Valve Leakage Monitor (LPCI Loop A, Head Spray and A Shutdown Cooling) Functional Test (PISH-51-1N653A, PSL-51-1N654A), March 24, 198 ST-2-051-410-1 ECCS-LPCI Division I Header DP Calibration Functional Test (PDT-51-1N060A, PDISH-51-1N660A, PDSL-51-1N661A),
Technical Specifications require the high/ low pressure valve leakage pressure monitors (IN053A-D) to be operable.
September 25, 198 ST-1-051-101-1 DIV I RHR (LPCI) LSF/SAA (verifies low pressure permissive).
 
Due to a pump running interlock in the RHR alarm circuit, the licensee was monitoring and recording RHR pump discharge line pressure once per shift. To elimi-nate the need for monitoring and recording this pressure once a shift the licensee installed a Temporary Circuit Alteration (TCA). The TCA jumpered out the pump running interlock and now provides the alarm function continuously. The inspectors reviewed TCA-186, the associated safety evaluation and then verified installation of the jumpers.
 
4.3.4 As-Built Verification The inspectors verified the as-built valve configuration and the associated instrumentation and controls for CS Loop B and RHR Loop D depicted on the current Core Spray System P&ID (M-52) Revision 30 and RHR System P&ID (M-51) Sheet 1, Revision 33.
 
The verification included nameplate data for valves and operators, penetrations, instrument taps or elements, from the outboard isolation valve to the pump suction.


The inspector's review included verifying logic sequences, as appli-cable, and independent verification of switches and valves after system restoratio To reduce the plant risk associated with intersystem LOCA that could occur during leak testing, valve exercising surveillance or calibration at power, the licensee will perform thesa tests during refueling outage These actions were taken as a result of the licensee review of opera-tional experience and agreement with the NRC that the consequences of maintenance / surveillance personnel errors could be reduced if these tests were performed during non power periods. In addition, the licen-see and architect / engineer reviewed IE Notice 84-74 in detail and noted that the plant design and the existing operational and administrative controls should prevent inadvertant overpressurization of the low pressure system due to personnel erro '
No discrepancies were noted.
_ . _ . . _ _ _    --
. .


Technical Specifications require the high/ low pressure valve leakage pressure monitors (IN053A-D) to be operable. Due to a pump running interlock in the RHR alarm circuit, the licensee was monitoring and recording RHR pump discharge line pressure once per shift. To elimi-nate the need for monitoring and recording this pressure once a shift the licensee installed a Temporary Circuit Alteration (TCA). The TCA jumpered out the pump running interlock and now provides the alarm function continuously. The inspectors reviewed TCA-186, the associated safety evaluation and then verified installation of the jumper . As-Built Verification The inspectors verified the as-built valve configuration and the associated instrumentation and controls for CS Loop B and RHR Loop D depicted on the current Core Spray System P&ID (M-52) Revision 30 and RHR System P&ID (M-51) Sheet 1, Revision 33. The verification included nameplate data for valves and operators, penetrations, instrument taps or elements, from the outboard isolation valve to the pump suctio No discrepancies were note . Review of Events During interviews with control room operators the inspectors were made aware of an actual high pressure alarm in core spray loop A on April 5, 1985. Licensee action in regard to the alarm condition was in accord-ance with the alarm response procedure. The pressure was vented through a flow test valve to the suppression pool and then pressure was monitored to evaluate it against the T.S. leakage limits. An increase of 40 psig over 5 hours was recorded after which the pressure stabilized. This information was given to the test engineers and a leak rate calculation was completed (2 cc/ min net in leakage). No further high pressure alarms in core spray loop A have been noted to date. The licensee's evaluation of the incident concluded that the check valves had not seated properly and when the pressure was vented, the check valves seated properl . Findings 5.1 In the Review of Events, paragraph 4.3.5, the inspectors noted that no information or guidance was provided on the alarm response procedure to allow the control room operator to calculate or evaluate the leak rat Due to the possible unavailability of test engineers on all shifts, further guidance should be provided to the control room operators for evaluation / calculation of the leak rate. The licensee acknowledged the inspector's findings and indicated they would evaluate this issue and provide guidance for leak rate evaluation or calculation to the control room operator ,
4.3.5 Review of Events During interviews with control room operators the inspectors were made aware of an actual high pressure alarm in core spray loop A on April 5, 1985.
 
Licensee action in regard to the alarm condition was in accord-ance with the alarm response procedure. The pressure was vented through a flow test valve to the suppression pool and then pressure was monitored to evaluate it against the T.S. leakage limits. An increase of 40 psig over 5 hours was recorded after which the pressure stabilized. This information was given to the test engineers and a leak rate calculation was completed (2 cc/ min net in leakage). No further high pressure alarms in core spray loop A have been noted to date. The licensee's evaluation of the incident concluded that the check valves had not seated properly and when the pressure was vented, the check valves seated properly.
 
5.
 
Findings 5.1 In the Review of Events, paragraph 4.3.5, the inspectors noted that no information or guidance was provided on the alarm response procedure to allow the control room operator to calculate or evaluate the leak rate.
 
Due to the possible unavailability of test engineers on all shifts, further guidance should be provided to the control room operators for evaluation / calculation of the leak rate. The licensee acknowledged the inspector's findings and indicated they would evaluate this issue and provide guidance for leak rate evaluation or calculation to the control room operators.
 
,
'
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-2 5.2 During the in office review of the system configuration the inspectors
 
noted that the pressure instruments for RHR loops A&B (PT IN053A and
-
PT IN053B) were located upstream of RHR valves used for the LPCI and
-
shutdown cooling modes (HV-51-1F047A/B HV-51-1F003A/B and
=
HV-C-51-1F048A/B).
 
During pump maintenance in these loops, these
'
;
valves would be closed to isolate the pump, also isolating the pressure transmitter. Both the pump and transmitter have associated T.S.
 
requiring operability or entering into a Limiting Condition for Operation
 
(LCO). However, the LC0 for the pressure monitor (alarm function) is
;
more restrictive than for the pump. The pump LCO allows 30 days for
-!
repair before plant shutdown is required, whereas, the pressure trans-f mitter allows only 7 days before 12 hour readings are required and (
then plant shutdown at 30 days if not repaired. The senior resident
;
inspector discussed this situation with the licensee. The licensee S
acknowledged the inspector's findings.
 
_
-
5.3 Technical Specification 3.4.3.2 Action Statement C states "With any
_
.
reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve leakage greater than
,
the above limit (1 gpm), isolate the high pressure portion of the i
affected system from the low pressure portion within 4 hours by use of at least one other closed manual, deactivated automatic, or check
:
valves (which have been verified not to exceed the allowable leakage a
limit at the last refueling outage or after the last time the valve was disturbed, whichever is more recent) or be in at least hot shutdown
'
within the next 12 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 24
 
hours.
 
t
-
_
--
The RHR system cannot satisfy the above action statement.
 
RHR loops a
C&D (dedicated LPCI loops) have only the pump discharge check valve nominally rated at 300 psi.
 
RHR loop A&B (shutdown cooling return
_.
 
LPCI and head spray) have either a motor operated butterfly valve or
-
2 motor operated gate valves all nominally rated at 300 psi; RHR loops
:
A&B (shutdown cooling supply) have a motor operated gate valve nominally rated at 150 psi as the next valve in the low pressure portion of the
--
system. Core spray loops A&B have injection valves, nominally rated g
at 900 psi and thus can provide the required isolation of the low pressre portion of the system.
 
6.
 
Additional Areas Reviewed 6.1 General Overview
 
4 Inspections 84-21 and 84-31 were conducted by Region I inspectors w
between April 30 and July 6, 1984, to ascertain the readiness of various
:
Limerick Generating Station programs for future operation of the plant.


      -2 5.2 During the in office review of the system configuration the inspectors 3 noted that the pressure instruments for RHR loops A&B (PT IN053A and -
-
PT IN053B) were located upstream of RHR valves used for the LPCI and -
Specific areas reviewed during these two inspections included QA/QC
shutdown cooling modes (HV-51-1F047A/B HV-51-1F003A/B and  =
-
HV-C-51-1F048A/B). During pump maintenance in these loops, these
administration, QA audits, document control, records, surveillance /
        '
-
      ;
calibration, receipt, storage and handling, procurement, measuring
valves would be closed to isolate the pump, also isolating the pressure transmitter. Both the pump and transmitter have associated requiring operability or entering into a Limiting Condition for Operation 2 (LCO). However, the LC0 for the pressure monitor (alarm function) is ;
-
more restrictive than for the pump. The pump LCO allows 30 days for -!
and test equipment and maintenance.
repair before plant shutdown is required, whereas, the pressure trans- f mitter allows only 7 days before 12 hour readings are required and (;
then plant shutdown at 30 days if not repaired. The senior resident inspector discussed this situation with the licensee. The licensee S acknowledged the inspector's finding _
      -
.
5.3 Technical Specification 3.4.3.2 Action Statement C states "With any _
reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve leakage greater than ,
the above limit (1 gpm), isolate the high pressure portion of the  i affected system from the low pressure portion within 4 hours by use of at least one other closed manual, deactivated automatic, or check :
valves (which have been verified not to exceed the allowable leakage a limit at the last refueling outage or after the last time the valve was disturbed, whichever is more recent) or be in at least hot shutdown '
within the next 12 hours and in cold shutdown within the following 24 3 t
hour _
      --
The RHR system cannot satisfy the above action statement. RHR loops a C&D (dedicated LPCI loops) have only the pump discharge check valve nominally rated at 300 psi. RHR loop A&B (shutdown cooling return LPCI and head spray) have either a motor operated butterfly valve or -
2 motor operated gate valves all nominally rated at 300 psi; RHR loops :
A&B (shutdown cooling supply) have a motor operated gate valve nominally rated at 150 psi as the next valve in the low pressure portion of the --
system. Core spray loops A&B have injection valves, nominally rated g at 900 psi and thus can provide the required isolation of the low pressre portion of the syste . Additional Areas Reviewed 6.1 General Overview    2


Inspections 84-21 and 84-31 were conducted by Region I inspectors w between April 30 and July 6, 1984, to ascertain the readiness of various :
During these two inspections, j
Limerick Generating Station programs for future operation of the plan Specific areas reviewed during these two inspections included QA/QC -
the inspectors were in most instances, able to review only those
administration, QA audits, document control, records, surveillance / -
-
calibration, receipt, storage and handling, procurement, measuring  -
programmatic aspects applicable to each area since little or no system T
and test equipment and maintenance. During these two inspections, j the inspectors were in most instances, able to review only those -
activity had occurred to date.
programmatic aspects applicable to each area since little or no system T activity had occurred to dat m-b
 
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This inspection (85-19) reviewed implementation of the programs in conjunction with the high/ low pressure system interface review. This review consequently provided an indication of how effectively various areas of the licensee's operational program were being implemented, specifically in the areas of maintenance, surveillance / calibration, measuring and. test equipment, records and document contro Other program areas, in which the implementation aspect was reviewed, included procurement, receipt, storage and handling, QA/QC administra-tion and QA audits. For review of these areas, the inspectors randomly sampled completed activities to verify adherence to administrative
This inspection (85-19) reviewed implementation of the programs in conjunction with the high/ low pressure system interface review. This review consequently provided an indication of how effectively various areas of the licensee's operational program were being implemented, specifically in the areas of maintenance, surveillance / calibration, measuring and. test equipment, records and document control.
. procedures and related governing documents. Specifics in each of the areas included the following:
 
Other program areas, in which the implementation aspect was reviewed, included procurement, receipt, storage and handling, QA/QC administra-tion and QA audits.
 
For review of these areas, the inspectors randomly sampled completed activities to verify adherence to administrative
. procedures and related governing documents. Specifics in each of the areas included the following:
6.2 Audits Audits AL 84-18SP, 84-78 MEM, and 84-85 MI covering Procurement / Storage, Preventive Maintenance,-and Calibration and Control of Measuring and Test Equipment were reviewed by the inspectors to verify that:
6.2 Audits Audits AL 84-18SP, 84-78 MEM, and 84-85 MI covering Procurement / Storage, Preventive Maintenance,-and Calibration and Control of Measuring and Test Equipment were reviewed by the inspectors to verify that:
--
-a written checklist had been developed that covered the scope of
  -a written checklist had been developed that covered the scope of the audit
--
--
the audit identified deficiencies were documented and reviewed
identified deficiencies were documented and reviewed
--
--
follow-up was accomplished / planned and corrective action was
follow-up was accomplished / planned and corrective action was adequate and timel .3 QA/QC Administration The inspectors discussed with the QC. Site Supervisors, the extent of
--
.QC involvement with onsite operating activities. With the Quality Control Section having just arrived on site in May 1984, they have steadily expanded their scope of activities to include maintenance, operations, procurement,-material receipt, procedure reviews, training,
adequate and timely.
-startup/ hot functional testing and~ corrective action. The inspectors reviewed and verified the conduct of the following activities:
 
--
6.3 QA/QC Administration The inspectors discussed with the QC. Site Supervisors, the extent of
Quality Control Inspection Reports   '
.QC involvement with onsite operating activities. With the Quality Control Section having just arrived on site in May 1984, they have steadily expanded their scope of activities to include maintenance, operations, procurement,-material receipt, procedure reviews, training,
--
-startup/ hot functional testing and~ corrective action. The inspectors reviewed and verified the conduct of the following activities:
Quality Control Inspection Reports
--
'
Monitoring Reports
Monitoring Reports
--
--
Nonconformance report list
Nonconformance report list
--
--
Procurement reviews
--
--
Procurement reviews Maintenance work request review in reference to " hold points"
Maintenance work request review in reference to " hold points"
--
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The: inspectors reviewed the on-site receipt of six safety-related items to verify the following:
receipt inspections were conducted in accordance with administra-
'-- :
tive controls
'
disposition of an' item was:in accordance with administrative
--
controls storage of: items,. including packaging, preservative, covering.
 
--
and environmental conditions-were in accordance with' manufacturer's recommendations nonconforming items were clearly marked and segregated-from other
--
safety-related items.
 
.
' documentation of nonconforming items were transmitted to respon-
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Receipt, Storage' Handling
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The: inspectors reviewed the on-site receipt of six safety-related 2  items to verify the following:
  '-- :  receipt inspections were conducted in accordance with administra-tive controls disposition of an' item was:in accordance with administrative
    '
  --
controls
  --
storage of: items,. including packaging, preservative, coverin and environmental conditions-were in accordance with' manufacturer's recommendations
  --
nonconforming items were clearly marked and segregated-from other safety-related item .
  - - '
    ' documentation of nonconforming items were transmitted to respon-
,,
,,
sible' organization for determination of final dispositio <
A tour of ths licensee warehouse was conducted to verify the-following:
A tour of ths licensee warehouse was conducted to verify the- following:
<
,
  --
controlled access to the storage area was maintained
controlled access to the storage area was maintained
, ,
--
  --
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cleanliness and good housekeeping practices were enforced
cleanliness and good housekeeping practices were enforced
  --. ' fire. protection.was commensurate with the type of storage area
--
    ;and materials involved
' fire. protection.was commensurate with the type of storage area
:
--.
  ---
;and materials involved
:
food and associated items were not permitted
food and associated items were not permitted
  --
---
    . hazardous material w~as segregated items in storage were' traceable back to procurement documents
. hazardous material w~as segregated
  '
--
  --
items in storage were' traceable back to procurement documents
<^-
'
. and receipt inspection checklist Items selected included a valve seat ring, relief valve, pressure indicator gauges, markers and general' purpose-' relay .4. Procurement
--
~1 The. inspectors reviewed seven safety related procurement package These purchase-orders were reviewed to verify the following:
< ^ -
  '
.
* ' --  procurement documents were prepared in accordance with adminis-
and receipt inspection checklists.
 
Items selected included a valve seat ring, relief valve, pressure indicator gauges, markers and general' purpose-' relays.
 
6.4. Procurement
~1 The. inspectors reviewed seven safety related procurement packages.
 
These purchase-orders were reviewed to verify the following:
'
*
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_
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procurement documents were prepared in accordance with adminis-trative controls m[
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procurement-documents contained requirements for the vendor /-
procurement-documents contained requirements for the vendor /-
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l supplier to provide appropriate documentation'and the documenta-p tion was available on site
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ade,uate controls were established and maintained for transfer of material from Unit.2 to Unit 1 6.6 Findings No violations were identifie . Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item (352/84-31-06) Develop a procedure to establish controls for maintaining and controlling onsite records storage vault prior to turno'ver from Bechtel to PECO. The licensee's onsite record storage vault is used as an interim storage area for quality records prior to final processing and shipment to a permanent offsite storage facilit The licensee has written procedure SSDI-6 " Procedure for Utilizing PECO Storage Vault-by the Limerick Generating Station Document Administration Center" which details how this storage area is to be maintained. The inspector reviewed the procedure and toured the storage vault. The inspector also reviewed Surveillance Report No. G0108 " LGS Quality Records Vault" performed on December 12, 1984. During the inspector's tour of the vault,
ade,uate controls were established and maintained for transfer
-corrective action was verified to have been taken in regard to those findings noted in Surveillance Report No. G010 Based on the above review, this item is close (Closed)-Inspector Follow-up Item.(352/84-31-08) Review Appendix 1 of A-46 to ensure that all QA records and those groups respo,sible for maintaining-and transmitting them to NRMS is complete. The licensee initiated a memor-andum to all supervisors in.structing them to perforn a review of Appendix
--
~1 to ensure that it included all QA records generated within their work group. Following completion of responsible supervisor's review, Appendix l'was revised accordingly. The inspector subsequently reviewed Appendix 1 and had no further question Based on the above review, this item is close (0 pen) Inspector Follow-up Item (352/84-21-03) Develop and implement a trend analysis method that addresses all existing corrective action system Beginning in April,~1985, the licensee began implementing the Quality Assurance Tracking and Trending system. This system provides the ability to detect trends, track items and access the effectivness of the actions
of material from Unit.2 to Unit 1 6.6 Findings No violations were identified.
- taken to correct trends previously identified as being adverse to qualit Input is provided from a wide range of reports, audits, etc. generated by-the licensee's internal organizations and also outside groups (i.e., INPO,
 
  ~
7.
 
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item (352/84-31-06) Develop a procedure to establish controls for maintaining and controlling onsite records storage vault prior to turno'ver from Bechtel to PECO.
 
The licensee's onsite record storage vault is used as an interim storage area for quality records prior to final processing and shipment to a permanent offsite storage facility.
 
-The licensee has written procedure SSDI-6 " Procedure for Utilizing PECO Storage Vault-by the Limerick Generating Station Document Administration Center" which details how this storage area is to be maintained. The inspector reviewed the procedure and toured the storage vault. The inspector also reviewed Surveillance Report No. G0108 " LGS Quality Records Vault" performed on December 12, 1984. During the inspector's tour of the vault,
-corrective action was verified to have been taken in regard to those findings noted in Surveillance Report No. G0108.
 
Based on the above review, this item is closed.
 
(Closed)-Inspector Follow-up Item.(352/84-31-08) Review Appendix 1 of A-46 to ensure that all QA records and those groups respo,sible for maintaining-and transmitting them to NRMS is complete. The licensee initiated a memor-andum to all supervisors in.structing them to perforn a review of Appendix
~1 to ensure that it included all QA records generated within their work group.
 
Following completion of responsible supervisor's review, Appendix l'was revised accordingly. The inspector subsequently reviewed Appendix 1 and had no further questions.
 
Based on the above review, this item is closed.
 
(0 pen) Inspector Follow-up Item (352/84-21-03) Develop and implement a trend analysis method that addresses all existing corrective action systems.
 
Beginning in April,~1985, the licensee began implementing the Quality Assurance Tracking and Trending system. This system provides the ability to detect trends, track items and access the effectivness of the actions
- taken to correct trends previously identified as being adverse to quality.
 
Input is provided from a wide range of reports, audits, etc. generated by-the licensee's internal organizations and also outside groups (i.e., INPO,
~
NRC,etc.). The inspectors' reviewed the program description and found it to include all' existing corrective action systems, however an administra-tive procedure for delineating the responsibility, reviews, control, etc.
NRC,etc.). The inspectors' reviewed the program description and found it to include all' existing corrective action systems, however an administra-tive procedure for delineating the responsibility, reviews, control, etc.


has yet to be developed. This item remains open pending issuance of the-applicable administrative procedure and subsequent NRC review.
has yet to be developed. This item remains open pending issuance of the


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19 Management Meetings =
.
 
8.
 
Management Meetings =
Licensee management was informed of;the scope and purpose of the_ inspection-at an entrance. interview conducted on April.1, 1985. An interim exit was
Licensee management was informed of;the scope and purpose of the_ inspection-at an entrance. interview conducted on April.1, 1985. An interim exit was
. conducted on April- 4,1985 and the final exit on April 19, 1985,.(see paragraph Il for ~ attendees) at which time the findings of the inspection were presente At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the
. conducted on April-4,1985 and the final exit on April 19, 1985,.(see paragraph Il for ~ attendees) at which time the findings of the inspection were presented.
 
At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the licensee.


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Latest revision as of 14:46, 12 December 2024

Insp Rept 50-352/85-19 on 850401-05 & 15-19.No Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Programs Re Operation,Maint, Testing & Surveillance of high-low Pressure Interface Valves & Related Hardware to Prevent ECCS Overpressurization
ML20128B330
Person / Time
Site: Limerick Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 05/16/1985
From: Alba A, Bissett P, Eapen P, Shaub E
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20128B328 List:
References
50-352-85-19, NUDOCS 8505240488
Download: ML20128B330 (20)
v • d • e


Text

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-

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.. :

c U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION I.

' Report No. 85-19

- Docket No.

50-352 License No.

NPF-27

~ Licensee:

Philadelphia Electric Company 2301 Market Street Philadelphia, PA 19101 Facility Name:

Limerick Generating Station Inspection At:

Limerick, Pennsylvania Inspection Conducted: April 1-5 and 15-19,1985 Inspectors:

Nud f

6 /S Bf us P. H. Bissett, Je12 tor Engineer f date A ~f b

S* /,C 0[

a E. T. Shaub, Reactor Engineer date 00 00k X-IT-9C AT Alba, Reactor Engineer date Approved by:

[. [cI s m,

M/6/fC'

Dr. P. ~K. Eapen( 'Criief,

'date'

Quality Assurance Section, EPB, DRS Inspection Summary:

Inspection on April 1-5 and 15-19, 1985 (Inspection Report No. 50-352/85-19)

. Areas Inspected: Primary emphasis of this inspection by Region-based inspectors was the verification of implementation of licensee programs related to the' opera-tion, maintenance, testing, and surveillance of the high-low pressure interface valves and'related hardware to prevent or detect overpressurization in ECCS systems..The failure of these valves has been identified as a precursor to overpressurization and subsequent LOCA which bypasses containment. Operational experience has shown.that maintenance errors are a primary contributor to the

-

failure of these valves.

In addition the inspectors reviewed licensee actions on previous inspection find-ingst implementation of the QA program including QA/QC administration, audits, i

procurement, receipt storage and handling, surveillance, maintenance, measuring

.and test equipment, records and document control.

'

The inspection involved 186 hours0.00215 days <br />0.0517 hours <br />3.075397e-4 weeks <br />7.0773e-5 months <br /> of inspection including 156 hours0.00181 days <br />0.0433 hours <br />2.579365e-4 weeks <br />5.9358e-5 months <br /> onsite and 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> in office.

~Results: No violations were identified.

l 8505240488 85052 I

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DETAILS 1.

Persons Contacted D. Clohecy, Quality Assurance Engineer, Engineering & Research Dept. (E&RD)

J. Cotton, Maintennace Engineer Electric Production (EP)

C. Endriss,. Regulatory Engineer (EP) ~

K. Folta, Operation QC Site Supervisor (Gilbert)

G. G11 body, QA Engineer (E&RD)

-R. Hennessy, Site QC Supervisor (EP)

L. Hopkins, Performance Engineer (EP)

F._Kremm, Maintenance Engineering (General Physics)

G. Leitch, Station St.perintendent W. Lewis, Test Engineer (EP)

'A. MacAnish, Site QA Supervisor (EP)

J. McElwain, QA Auditor (EP)

K. Mandl, Corporate QA Supervisor (EP)

K. Meck, QA Engineer (EP)

_ W. Rekito, Regulatory Coordinator (Betchel)

R. Smith, QA Auditor (EP)

.NRC J. Wiggins, Senior Resident Inspector

- The personnel listed above attended either the exit interview of April 4, 1985 or the final exit interview April 19, 1985.

The inspector also interviewad other licensee personnel including operators, staff engineers, technicians and clerical personnel during the inspection.

2.

Scope The primary objective of this inspection was to verify that the licensee has implemented an' adequate surveillance, maintenance, and test program in accordance with requirements and commitments.

To verify this, the NRC staff inspection focused on the implementation of surveillance, maintenance and test programs related to high risk systems, particularly the check and isolation valve configurations in the ECCS system.

These configurations are designed to prevent the PRA-identified Event V type occurrence which leads to overpressurization of the low pressure side of these systems and subsequently a LOCA.

The vulnerability of the valve configurations at the high low interface has been identified in AE00 Report AE00/E414 and in IE Notice 84-74, both of which indicate problems with the availability of these valves, particularly I

the air operated check valves. A high contributor to the unavailability was shown to be inadequate maintenance and surveillance, including personnel error, of these valves.

_

_ _ _. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _

-

,

-

_.

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.

x

There are several low pressure safety systems connected to the reactor pressure vessel primary coolant system. These systems are rated at full reactor pressure downstream of the containment isolation valves with the remaining upstream system piping rated below full reactor pressure.

In order to protect these systems from reactor system pressure (1000 psig),

two or more isolation valves are utilized in series to form the interface between -the high pressure reactor coolant system and the low pressure

. portions'of the systems.

Surveillance, maintenance and testing activities for these isolation valves, associated :omponents and instrumentation were reviewed to determine if the licensee has implemented adequate mechanisms to ensure high reliability and leak tight integrity for these valves.

The Core Spray and Residual Heat Removal Systems were reviewed. A summary of the system configurations, design features to prevent and identify overpressurization and administrative controls are listed in Table 1.

3.

References / Requirements Limerick Generating Station (LGS) Technical Specifications

--

Safety Evaluation Report Supplement III Section 3.9.6

--

LGS Operations Quality Assurance Program

--

ANSI 18.7-1976, Administrative Controls for Nuclear Power Plants

--

IE Information Notice 84-74, " Isolation of Reactor Coolant Systems

--

from Low-Pressure Systems Outside Containment", September 1984 LGS Inservice Testing Program, for pumps and valves, Revision 5

--

4.

System Description 4.1 Core Spray System Core Spray (CS) consists of two independent loops (A&B) that provide protection to the core for large breaks in the reactor coolant system or small breaks beyond the capacity of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI), Reactor Containment Isolation Cooling (RCIC), and control rod drive water pumps, after ADS actuation. The high pressure / low pressure interface for CS is as follows (refer to Figure 1):

Loop "B" - a locked npen gate valve (maintenance valve), an air

=

testable check valve (inboard isolation), an air assisted check valve (outboard isolation), and 2 motor operated gate valves (injection valves). The HPCI injection line utilizes the CS "B" injection path between the outboard isolation and the injection valves. Therefore the CS "B" injection valve also provides a high/ low pressure interface between HPCI and the low pressure CS system.

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Loop "A" - a locked open gate valve (maintenance valve), an air

_

testable check valve (inboard isolation), a motor operated gate valve (outboard isolation) and a motor operated gate valve-(injection valve).

In both cases, the piping and valves are nominally rated at 900 psi up to and including the outboard isolation valve ~, from that point to the injection valves, the piping is nominally rated at 600 psi with the'_ injection valves rated at 900 psi.

To provide overpressurization protection for the low pressure piping

--the system design includes relief valves, pressure indication and associated control room alarms.

4.2. Residual Heat Removal (RHR)

The RHR system can be divided into various operating modes which function independently,'but utilize the same major equipment.

LPCI subsystem is the primary mode and normal valve lineup configuration of RHR.

LPCI provides protection for large breaks in the reactor coolant system.

Other modes of RHR operation-include shutdown cooling, head spray, drywell and suppression pool spray, and suppression pool cooling.

The high pressure / low pressure interface for the-RHR system is as follows:

Loops _C&D (Figure 2)

-

LPCI'- a locked open gate (maintenance valve), an air test-

--

able check valve (inboard isolation) and a motor operated gate valve (outboard isolation);

Loops A&B- (Figure 3)

LPCI - a locked open gate (maintenance valve), an air testable

--

check valve-(inboard isolation) and a motor operated gate valve (outboard isolation);

Shutdown Cooling Return - a locked open gate (maintenance

--

valve), an air testable check valve (inboard isolation) and a motor operated gate valve (outboard isolation);

Shutdown Cooling Supply - a locked open gate (maintenance

--

valve), a motor operated gate valve (inboard isolation) and a motor operated globe valve (outboard isolation);

Head Spray a check valve, a motor operated gate valve L

--

(inboard isolation) and a motor operated globe valve (out-

y board isolation).

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f Reference: LGS Drawing M-52 Revision 30, Core Spray System Figure 1 i

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RHR. %p L.G.S. Simplified RHR (Dedicated LPCI Loops C8D)

System Isolation / Injection Valve Configuration teference: LGS Drawing M-51 Sheets 1 and 2. Revision 33 RHR System Figure 2

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To provide overpressurization protection for the RHR low pressure piping the system design includes relief valves, pressure indication and an associated control room alarm.

. 4.3 System Hardware and Implementation 4.3.1 Corrective & Preventive Maintenance The maintenance history for the valves was reviewed and discussed with licensee representatives.

The inspector verified that the maintenance was performed in accordance with the administrative controls and included:

use of'preapproved maintenance procedures

--

adequate equipment control during maintenance

--

post maintenance testing was performed as applicable

--

QC involvement commensurate with the maintenance performed.

--

Maintenance procedures for the air testable check valves, air assisted check valves, motor operated gate valves, relief valves and the asso-ciated motor operators as applicable were reviewed.

The following procedures were reviewed:

PMQ-500-055, Preventive Maintenance Procedure for Atwood and

--

Morrill Testable Check Valves Examination and Repair PMQ-500-005, Preventive Maintenance Procedure for Anchor-Darling

--

and Velan Bolted Bonnet and Pressure Seal Gate Valves Repair PMQ-500-014, Preventive Maintenance Procedure for lapping of

--

Anchor-Darling and Rockwell-Edwards Globe Valves.

PMQ-052-008, Preventive Maintenance for Q-Anchor Darling air

--

operated pres sure seal swing check valves HV-052102/208 Examine and Lap.

PMQ-500-031, Preventive Maintenance Procedure for Removal of

--

Q-listed Limitorque Operators, Type SMB-000 through SMB-4, 4T and SB-2 and SB-3.

PMQ-500-018, Preventive Maintenance Procedure for the lubrication

--

of Q-listed Limitorque Actuators.

PMQ-500-017 Preventive Maintenance Procedure for overhaul of

--

Q-listed Limitorque Operators Type SMB-1 through SMB-4 and 4T and SB-2 and S8-3.

i

-.

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

- -

-

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i PMQ-500-087, Preventive Maintenance Procedure for Electrical

--

Checkout and Adjustment of.Q-listed Limitorque operators.

!

.PMQ-051-007, Preventive Maintenance Procedure for Crosby Type

--

J0-Special Relief Valves, PSV-051-1F055A/8 Examination and Repair (Lapping)

PMQ-500-051, Preventive Maintenance Procedures for Q-Listed

--

Lonergan Type LCT Relief Valves Examination and Lapping.

The inspector verified these procedures provided adequate precautions, detailed works instructions and addressed post maintenance testing prior.to return to service.

.In addition the licensee is developing preventive maintenance procedures for each system that will provide a system walkdown and examination during each refueling outage which will include visual hardware inspec-tions to detect abnormal aging, degradation, or other conditions that should be corrected to assure equipment availability. The inspector reviewed PMQ-051-007 " Preventive Maintenance Procedure for Visual Examination and Fastener Torque Check for (Core Spray) System Valves and Components". The inspector noted that the procedure included requirements for:

1) examination for evidence of corrosion, rust, and dirt, 2) packing or body to bonnet leakage; 3) torque check of all fasteners; and the operator condition for all valves and other system components.

4.3.2 Isolation Valve and Relief Valve Testing In accordance with ASME Section XI, Technical Specifications and the licensee's Inservice Testing Program, preservice tests have been com-pleted on the containment isolation valves and relief valves in the Core Spray and RHR Systems. In addition to the Type C local leak rate tests (LLRT) the technical specifications require a high pressure test of the high-low pressure interface valves.

The inspectors reviewed the documentation for the LLRTs and high pres-sure tests performed and discussed the test methodology with the licen-see's representatives. The tests were completed in accordance with the procedure, test deficiencies were documented, accurate leak rate calculations were performed, the test acceptance criteria was met, and final valve lineups were independently verified. Tests reviewed for CS and RHR isolation valves included:

ST-1-LLRT-161, Core Spray Pump Discharge, Valves HV-52-1F005

--

April 4, 1984 ST-1-LLRT-161, Core Spray Discharge, Valves HV-52-1F006A and

--

HV-521F039A March 31, 1984

_._

- - -. --

-

-. -.

. -

. - - - -

. -. - -. -

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..ST-1-LLRT-161, Core Spray Discharge, Valve HV-52-1F005, April 4

-

.

-..

.

.1984:

'

>$T-1-052-492-1 Core Sprey Loop "B" Pressure Isolation Valve Leakage E

--~

.

Rate' Test, for valve-HV-52-108, March 26, 1985

.

'

.

,

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' ST;1-LLRT-451-1, "A" RHR LPCI, Valves HV-51-IF041, HV-51-142A,

--

f

,HV-51-1F017A,,May 5, 1984

,

~~

.ST-1-LLRT-461-1, "B" RHR LPCI,-Valves HV-51-1F041B, HV-51-1F01428,

-1 HV-1-1F017B May 2, 1984 and partial test December 16, 1984

,.

o

-

ST-1-LLRT-471-1, "C" RHR LCI, Valves HV-51-1F041C, HV-51-1F142C,

.

t

'

J HV-51-1F017C, May 4, 1984-

' ST-1-LLRT-471-1 "D" RHR LPCI, Valves HV-51-IF0410, HV-51-1F1420,

--

v HV-51-1F0170, May~4,'1984 and partial test December 19. 1984.

'ST-1-LLRT-181-1, RPV Head Spray, Valves HV-51-1F022, HV-51-IF023,

--

"

'

PSV-51-122,-June.7,1984 and December 13, 1984

,

ST-1-LLRT-131-1, RHR Shutdown Cooling Return, Valves HV-51-1F050A,

' - =

HV-51-1F151A, HV-51-1F015A May 3, 1984 and partial test December 15, 1984 ST-1-LLRT-141-1, RHR Shutdown Cooling Return, Va'lves HV-51-1F0508,

--

HV-51-1F0151B, HV-51-1F0158, May 3, 1984 ST-ILLRT-121-1, RHR Shutdown Cooling Supply, Valves'HV-51-1F008,

--

HV-51-1F009, PSV-51-_155, March 30,.1984

,

The inspector verified that the LLRT test results were tabulated and the results added to the " running balance" to ensure the maximum'per-

~

missible containment leak rate was not exceeded.

Documentation for completed relief valve tests was reviewed and discussed'

- with licensee' representatives. The inspector verified that' the Core Spray and RHR system relief valves had been satisfactorily tested prior to plant operation.

4.3.3

' Surveillance / Calibration of Associated Instrumentation

'The CS and'RHR system design includes instrumentation to provide indi-cation, alarm, and low pressure or differential pressure permissive interlocks to prevent the CS and RHR injection valves from opening until reaching a preset pressure, for system overpressurization protec--

tion. Technical Specifications require calibration and functional

. tests of these instruments on a refueling and monthly basis respectively.

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.

.

-

The inspectors reviewed surveillance procedures and walked through several surveillances/ calibrations with licensee personnel to verify that these instrument loops were calibrated and tested as required by Technical Specifications. Examples of procedures reviewed included:

ST-2-52-402-1, Operational Leakage High/ Low Pressure Interface

--

- Valve Leakage Monitor (Core Spray Loop A) Calibration / Functional Test (PT-52-IN054A, P15-52-IN654S) PS-52-1N658A), December 7, 1984 ST-2-52-602-1, Operational Leakage High/ Low Pressure Interface -

--

Valve Leakage Monitor (Core Spray Loop A) Functional Test ST-1-052-101-1, Loop "A" Core Spray LSF/SAA Test (verifies low

--

pressure permissive for injection valves).

ST-2-051-400-1, High/ Low Pressure Interface - Valve Leakage Monitor

--

(LPCI Loop A, Head Spray and A Shutdown Cooling) Calibration /

Functional Test (PT-51-IN053A, PISH-51-1N653A PSL-51-1N654A),

,

November 10, 1984.

ST-2-051-600-1, Operational Leakage High/ Low Pressure Interface

--

- Valve Leakage Monitor (LPCI Loop A, Head Spray and A Shutdown Cooling) Functional Test (PISH-51-1N653A, PSL-51-1N654A), March 24, 1985.

ST-2-051-410-1 ECCS-LPCI Division I Header DP Calibration

--

Functional Test (PDT-51-1N060A, PDISH-51-1N660A, PDSL-51-1N661A),

September 25, 1984.

ST-1-051-101-1 DIV I RHR (LPCI) LSF/SAA (verifies low pressure

--

permissive).

The inspector's review included verifying logic sequences, as appli-cable, and independent verification of switches and valves after system restoration.

To reduce the plant risk associated with intersystem LOCA that could occur during leak testing, valve exercising surveillance or calibration at power, the licensee will perform thesa tests during refueling outages.

These actions were taken as a result of the licensee review of opera-tional experience and agreement with the NRC that the consequences of maintenance / surveillance personnel errors could be reduced if these tests were performed during non power periods.

In addition, the licen-see and architect / engineer reviewed IE Notice 84-74 in detail and noted that the plant design and the existing operational and administrative controls should prevent inadvertant overpressurization of the low pressure system due to personnel erro '

_

. _.. _ _ _

--

.

.

Technical Specifications require the high/ low pressure valve leakage pressure monitors (IN053A-D) to be operable.

Due to a pump running interlock in the RHR alarm circuit, the licensee was monitoring and recording RHR pump discharge line pressure once per shift. To elimi-nate the need for monitoring and recording this pressure once a shift the licensee installed a Temporary Circuit Alteration (TCA). The TCA jumpered out the pump running interlock and now provides the alarm function continuously. The inspectors reviewed TCA-186, the associated safety evaluation and then verified installation of the jumpers.

4.3.4 As-Built Verification The inspectors verified the as-built valve configuration and the associated instrumentation and controls for CS Loop B and RHR Loop D depicted on the current Core Spray System P&ID (M-52) Revision 30 and RHR System P&ID (M-51) Sheet 1, Revision 33.

The verification included nameplate data for valves and operators, penetrations, instrument taps or elements, from the outboard isolation valve to the pump suction.

No discrepancies were noted.

4.3.5 Review of Events During interviews with control room operators the inspectors were made aware of an actual high pressure alarm in core spray loop A on April 5, 1985.

Licensee action in regard to the alarm condition was in accord-ance with the alarm response procedure. The pressure was vented through a flow test valve to the suppression pool and then pressure was monitored to evaluate it against the T.S. leakage limits. An increase of 40 psig over 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> was recorded after which the pressure stabilized. This information was given to the test engineers and a leak rate calculation was completed (2 cc/ min net in leakage). No further high pressure alarms in core spray loop A have been noted to date. The licensee's evaluation of the incident concluded that the check valves had not seated properly and when the pressure was vented, the check valves seated properly.

5.

Findings 5.1 In the Review of Events, paragraph 4.3.5, the inspectors noted that no information or guidance was provided on the alarm response procedure to allow the control room operator to calculate or evaluate the leak rate.

Due to the possible unavailability of test engineers on all shifts, further guidance should be provided to the control room operators for evaluation / calculation of the leak rate. The licensee acknowledged the inspector's findings and indicated they would evaluate this issue and provide guidance for leak rate evaluation or calculation to the control room operators.

,

'

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____.-_..__-_m._

- - - - -

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-2 5.2 During the in office review of the system configuration the inspectors

noted that the pressure instruments for RHR loops A&B (PT IN053A and

-

PT IN053B) were located upstream of RHR valves used for the LPCI and

-

shutdown cooling modes (HV-51-1F047A/B HV-51-1F003A/B and

=

HV-C-51-1F048A/B).

During pump maintenance in these loops, these

'

valves would be closed to isolate the pump, also isolating the pressure transmitter. Both the pump and transmitter have associated T.S.

requiring operability or entering into a Limiting Condition for Operation

(LCO). However, the LC0 for the pressure monitor (alarm function) is

more restrictive than for the pump. The pump LCO allows 30 days for

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repair before plant shutdown is required, whereas, the pressure trans-f mitter allows only 7 days before 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> readings are required and (

then plant shutdown at 30 days if not repaired. The senior resident

inspector discussed this situation with the licensee. The licensee S

acknowledged the inspector's findings.

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5.3 Technical Specification 3.4.3.2 Action Statement C states "With any

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reactor coolant system pressure isolation valve leakage greater than

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the above limit (1 gpm), isolate the high pressure portion of the i

affected system from the low pressure portion within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of at least one other closed manual, deactivated automatic, or check

valves (which have been verified not to exceed the allowable leakage a

limit at the last refueling outage or after the last time the valve was disturbed, whichever is more recent) or be in at least hot shutdown

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within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in cold shutdown within the following 24

hours.

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The RHR system cannot satisfy the above action statement.

RHR loops a

C&D (dedicated LPCI loops) have only the pump discharge check valve nominally rated at 300 psi.

RHR loop A&B (shutdown cooling return

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LPCI and head spray) have either a motor operated butterfly valve or

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2 motor operated gate valves all nominally rated at 300 psi; RHR loops

A&B (shutdown cooling supply) have a motor operated gate valve nominally rated at 150 psi as the next valve in the low pressure portion of the

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system. Core spray loops A&B have injection valves, nominally rated g

at 900 psi and thus can provide the required isolation of the low pressre portion of the system.

6.

Additional Areas Reviewed 6.1 General Overview

4 Inspections 84-21 and 84-31 were conducted by Region I inspectors w

between April 30 and July 6, 1984, to ascertain the readiness of various

Limerick Generating Station programs for future operation of the plant.

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Specific areas reviewed during these two inspections included QA/QC

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administration, QA audits, document control, records, surveillance /

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calibration, receipt, storage and handling, procurement, measuring

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and test equipment and maintenance.

During these two inspections, j

the inspectors were in most instances, able to review only those

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programmatic aspects applicable to each area since little or no system T

activity had occurred to date.

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This inspection (85-19) reviewed implementation of the programs in conjunction with the high/ low pressure system interface review. This review consequently provided an indication of how effectively various areas of the licensee's operational program were being implemented, specifically in the areas of maintenance, surveillance / calibration, measuring and. test equipment, records and document control.

Other program areas, in which the implementation aspect was reviewed, included procurement, receipt, storage and handling, QA/QC administra-tion and QA audits.

For review of these areas, the inspectors randomly sampled completed activities to verify adherence to administrative

. procedures and related governing documents. Specifics in each of the areas included the following:

6.2 Audits Audits AL 84-18SP, 84-78 MEM, and 84-85 MI covering Procurement / Storage, Preventive Maintenance,-and Calibration and Control of Measuring and Test Equipment were reviewed by the inspectors to verify that:

-a written checklist had been developed that covered the scope of

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the audit identified deficiencies were documented and reviewed

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follow-up was accomplished / planned and corrective action was

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adequate and timely.

6.3 QA/QC Administration The inspectors discussed with the QC. Site Supervisors, the extent of

.QC involvement with onsite operating activities. With the Quality Control Section having just arrived on site in May 1984, they have steadily expanded their scope of activities to include maintenance, operations, procurement,-material receipt, procedure reviews, training,

-startup/ hot functional testing and~ corrective action. The inspectors reviewed and verified the conduct of the following activities:

Quality Control Inspection Reports

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Monitoring Reports

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Nonconformance report list

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Procurement reviews Maintenance work request review in reference to " hold points"

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~6.4 Receipt, Storage' Handling

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The: inspectors reviewed the on-site receipt of six safety-related items to verify the following:

receipt inspections were conducted in accordance with administra-

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tive controls

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disposition of an' item was:in accordance with administrative

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controls storage of: items,. including packaging, preservative, covering.

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and environmental conditions-were in accordance with' manufacturer's recommendations nonconforming items were clearly marked and segregated-from other

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safety-related items.

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' documentation of nonconforming items were transmitted to respon-

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sible' organization for determination of final disposition.

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A tour of ths licensee warehouse was conducted to verify the-following:

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controlled access to the storage area was maintained

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cleanliness and good housekeeping practices were enforced

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' fire. protection.was commensurate with the type of storage area

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and materials involved

food and associated items were not permitted

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. hazardous material w~as segregated

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items in storage were' traceable back to procurement documents

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and receipt inspection checklists.

Items selected included a valve seat ring, relief valve, pressure indicator gauges, markers and general' purpose-' relays.

6.4. Procurement

~1 The. inspectors reviewed seven safety related procurement packages.

These purchase-orders were reviewed to verify the following:

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procurement documents were prepared in accordance with adminis-trative controls m[

L items were purchased from qualified vendors

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procurement-documents contained requirements for the vendor /-

l supplier to provide appropriate documentation'and the documenta-p tion was available on site

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evaluated suppliers list was maintained

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ade,uate controls were established and maintained for transfer

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of material from Unit.2 to Unit 1 6.6 Findings No violations were identified.

7.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Inspector Follow-up Item (352/84-31-06) Develop a procedure to establish controls for maintaining and controlling onsite records storage vault prior to turno'ver from Bechtel to PECO.

The licensee's onsite record storage vault is used as an interim storage area for quality records prior to final processing and shipment to a permanent offsite storage facility.

-The licensee has written procedure SSDI-6 " Procedure for Utilizing PECO Storage Vault-by the Limerick Generating Station Document Administration Center" which details how this storage area is to be maintained. The inspector reviewed the procedure and toured the storage vault. The inspector also reviewed Surveillance Report No. G0108 " LGS Quality Records Vault" performed on December 12, 1984. During the inspector's tour of the vault,

-corrective action was verified to have been taken in regard to those findings noted in Surveillance Report No. G0108.

Based on the above review, this item is closed.

(Closed)-Inspector Follow-up Item.(352/84-31-08) Review Appendix 1 of A-46 to ensure that all QA records and those groups respo,sible for maintaining-and transmitting them to NRMS is complete. The licensee initiated a memor-andum to all supervisors in.structing them to perforn a review of Appendix

~1 to ensure that it included all QA records generated within their work group.

Following completion of responsible supervisor's review, Appendix l'was revised accordingly. The inspector subsequently reviewed Appendix 1 and had no further questions.

Based on the above review, this item is closed.

(0 pen) Inspector Follow-up Item (352/84-21-03) Develop and implement a trend analysis method that addresses all existing corrective action systems.

Beginning in April,~1985, the licensee began implementing the Quality Assurance Tracking and Trending system. This system provides the ability to detect trends, track items and access the effectivness of the actions

- taken to correct trends previously identified as being adverse to quality.

Input is provided from a wide range of reports, audits, etc. generated by-the licensee's internal organizations and also outside groups (i.e., INPO,

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NRC,etc.). The inspectors' reviewed the program description and found it to include all' existing corrective action systems, however an administra-tive procedure for delineating the responsibility, reviews, control, etc.

has yet to be developed. This item remains open pending issuance of the

-applicable administrative procedure and subsequent NRC review.

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8.

Management Meetings =

Licensee management was informed of;the scope and purpose of the_ inspection-at an entrance. interview conducted on April.1, 1985. An interim exit was

. conducted on April-4,1985 and the final exit on April 19, 1985,.(see paragraph Il for ~ attendees) at which time the findings of the inspection were presented.

At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the licensee.

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