IR 05000324/1987041

Insp Repts 50-324/87-41 & 50-325/87-40 on 871116-18.No Violation or Deviation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Licensee Annual Emergency Preparedness Exercise

ML20236X999
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	11/27/1987
From:	Decker T, Gooden A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20236X986	List: IR 05000324/1987041 ML20236X984
References
50-324-87-41, 50-325-87-40, NUDOCS 8712110017
Download: ML20236X999 (17)

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ggp Rfou UNITED STATES 3[s o

/dUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION ll k,I $2

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101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W.

't ATL ANT A, GEORGI A 30323

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DEC 0 21987

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Report No.:

50-325/87-40 and 50-324/87-41 Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company P. O. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602 Docket Nos.:

50-325 and 50-324 License Nos. DPR-71 and DPR-62 Facility Name:

Brunswick Inspection Conducted:

November 16-18, 1987 Inspector:

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Dat6 Signed A. Gooden Accompanying Personnel:

E. D. Testa 27[g7 Approved by:

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T. R. Decker, Section Chief Dat'e Signed Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards SUMARY Scope:

This routine, announced inspection involved the observation and evaluation of the licensee's annual emergency preparedness exercise.

Results:

No violations or deviations were identified.

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1.

Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• C. R. Dietz, General Manager, Brunswick Plant

• R. C. Baldwin, Senior Specialist, Corporate Emergency Preparedness

• G. P. Barnes, Project Specialist, Training

• E. M. Bean, Director - News Program, Corporate Communications

• T. L. Brown, Project Specialist, Brunswick Nuclear Safety i

• J. W. Davis, Project Specialist, Environmental and Radiation Control

• W. J. Dorman, Supervisor, Quality Assurance

• P. G. Dorosko, Administrative Supervisor, Administrative Support

• T. C. Dunn, Writer, Corporate Communications

• E. R. Eckstein, Manager, Technical Support

• H. R. Goodwin, Project' Specialist, Corporate Emergency Preparedness

• A. S. Hegler, Superintendent, Operations

• J. Henderson, Radiation Control Supervisor, Environmental and Radiation Control

• M. L. Highsmith, Technical Aide, Brunswick Emergency Preparedness

• B. L. Houston, Specialist, Brunswick Emergency Preparedness

• R. A. Indelicato, Project Specialist, Corporate Emergency Preparedness

• J. L. Kiser, Project Specialist, Environmental and Radiation Control

• B. W. Morgan, Senior Specialist, Health Physics

• S. W. Morgan, Senior Specialist, Training

• J. Moyer, Manager, Training

• K. Neuschaefer, Senior Specialist, Corporate Nuclear Licensing

• D. E. Novotny, Senior Specialist, Regulatory Compliance

• G. J. Oliver, Manager, Site Planning and Control

• M. Pastva, Technician-NRC, Regulatory Compliance

• R. F. Queener, Principal Specialist, Environmental and Radiation Control

• L. R. Ratliffe, Senior Specialist, Health Physics

• C. E. Robertson, Supervisor, Environmental and Radiation Control

• B. Saburn, Specialist, Brunswick Training Unit

• J. A. Smith, Director, Administrative Support

• S. L. Smith, Senior Specialist, Maintenance

• A. F. Spencer, Project Specialist, Operations

• L. F. Tripp, Supervisor, Environmental and Radiation Control

• W. L. Triplett, Manager, Administration and Logistics

• L. V. Wagoner, Director, IPBS/LRP, Site Planning and Control

• M. S. Williams, Specialist, Operations

• T. H. Wyllie, Manager, Engineering and Support Other licensee employees contacted included construction craftsmen, engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, security office members and office personnel.

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NRC Resident Inspector

• L. W. Garner

• Attended exit interview.

2.

Exit Interview The inspection scope and findings were summarized on November 18, 1987, with those persons' indicated in Paragraph I above.

The inspector described the areas. inspected and discussed in detail the inspection findings.

No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.

The

licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the material provided to or reviewed by the inspector during this inspection.

3.

Licensee Action on Previous Enforcement Matters This subject was not addressed in the inspection.

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4.

ExerciseScenario(82301)

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The scenario for the emergency exercise was reviewed to determine that provisions had been made to test the integrated capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within the licensee's Emergency i

Plans and organization as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F l

of 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,

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Section II.N.

The scenario was reviewed in advance of the scheduled exercise date and was discussed with licensee representatives prior to the exercise. While no major problems were identified during the review, several items requiring clarification and additional details were noted.

A revised scenario package, addressing the scenario review comments, was provided at the final Evaluator meeting held prior to the exercise.

During the exercise, several minor inconsistencies were noted; however, these inconsistencies did not detract from the overall performance of the licensee's emergency organization.

Scenario problems were discussed by licensee representatives during the controller / observer meeting on November 17, 1987.

The scenario developed for this exercise was adequate to fully exercise the licensee's onsite and offsite emergency organizations.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5.

Fire Drill Scenario (82301)

. The scenario for the fire drill was reviewed to assure that provisions were made to test specific functions in the licensee's Fire Protection Program and Emergency Plan pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), Paragraph IV.F of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria in Section II.N of i

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The drill scenario was adequate to exercise the licensee's on-shift fire brigade and the offsite local fire department.

l The licensee made a significant commitment to training and personnel as evidenced by the large numbers of controllers, evaluators, and specialists j

participating in the drills.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6.

Assignment of Respor.Woility (82301)

This area was observed to determine whether primary responsibilities for emergency response by the licensee have been specifically established, and that adequate staff was available to respond to an emergency as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(1),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV. A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.A.

The inspector observed that specific emergency assignments had been made for the licensee's emergency response organization and that there were adequate staff available to respond to the simulated emergency.

The inspector observed the activation, staffing, and operation of the emergency organization in the Control Room, the Technical Support Center

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(TSC), the Operations Support Center (0SC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF).

At each of the emergency facilities, tha assignment of responsibility and staff appeared to be consistent with the licensee's Emergency Plan.

As a result of the scenario, long term or continuous staffing of the emergency response organization was not required.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7.

Onsite Emergency Organization (82301)

The licensee's onsite emergency organization was observed to assure that i

the following requirements were implemented pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), Paragraph IV.A of Appendix E to 10 CFR 50, and specific criteria defined in Section II.B of NUREG-0654:

(a) responsibilities for emergency response were unambiguously defined; i

(b) adequate staffing was provided to assure initial facility accident resporse in key functional areas at all times; and (c) the onsite and offsite support organizational interactions were specified.

The inspector observed that the initial onsite emergency organization was adequately defined and that staff was. available to fill key functional positions within the emergency organization.

The Shift Operating Supervisor assumed the duties of Site Emergency Coordinator promptly upon initiation of the simulated emergency and directed the response until relieved by the Plant General Manager.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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8.

Emergency Response Support and Resources (82301)

This area was observed to determine whether arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources had been made and that other organizations capable of augmenting the planned response were identified as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(3), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.A, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.C.

Licensee contact with offsite organizations was conducted in accordance with the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures, and was consistent with the scope and objectives of the exercise. Assistance resources.from State / local agencies were limited to offsite fire support (discussed in Paragraph 17).

No violations or deviations were identified.

9.

Emergency Classification System (82301)

This area was observed to verify that a standard emergency classification and action level scheme was in use by the licensee as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.C, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.D.

An emergency action level scheme was used to promptly identify and-classify the emergency and escalate to more severe emergency classes as the simulated emergency progressed.

Licensee actions in this area were considered adequate.

No violations or deviations were identified.

10.

Notification Methods and Procedures (82301)

This area was observed to determine that procedures had been established by the licensee for notification of State and local response organizations, licensee emergency personnel, and that the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations had been established; and the means to provide early notification to the populace within the plume exposure pathway had been established as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.E.

An inspector observed that notification methods a:d procedures had been l

established and were available for use in providing information concerning the simulated emergency conditions to Federal, State and local response organizations and to alert the licensee's augmented emergency response organization.

The initial notification of the offsite response

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organizations from the Control Room was conducted in a very prompt and effective manner.

However, there.were no followup messages provided to the State / counties for more than 1 1/2 hours after the initial l

notification was made.

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their controller / observer critique following the exercise.

Based on the

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above observation, this item is considered an exercise weakness that will be reviewed during a subsequent exercise.

Inspector Followup Item (50-325/87-40-01, 50-324/87-41-01):

Exercise Weakness - Failure of Control Room personnel to provide timely followup messages to the offsite authorities.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

11.

Emergency Communications (82301)

This area was observed to assure that provisions existed for prompt communications among the principal response organization and emergency personnel as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(6),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.F.

i Communications among the licensee's emergency response facilities and

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emergency organization and between the licensee's emergency response organization and offsite authorities were good. However, the licensee did identify a need for providing additional training to the Brunswick County i

Communicators.

This licensee finding was identified as a result of the Brunswick County Communicator's failure to understand the Selective j

Signaling System Verification Code used during an exercise message

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transmission.

This finding did not detract from the flow of exercise communication or impede the attainment of an exercise objective.

No violations or deviations were identified.

12.

Public Education and Information (82301)

i This area was observed to determine that information concerning the simulated emergency was made available for dissemination to the public as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(7), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.D, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.G.

Many aspects of the public education and information program were not l

tested during this exercise.

Partial participation and simulation of activities was noted by the observer at the Plant Media Center. Although a licensee observer noted that the news releases did not indicate the status of radiation releases at the plant, news releases were generally accurate and not too technical.

Efforts were made to provide news releases in a timely manner.

However, the one exception was failure to make a news release for more than two hours.

It was noted by the observer l

that Press Release No. I was issued at 9:15 a.m.; a subsequent press l

l release was not until 11:40 a.m.

This finding and possible actions to l

l prevent recurrence was discussed by the licensee during their controller / observer critique following the exercise.

Based on the i

aforementioned observation, the licensee was informed that this finding is

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l considered an exercise weakness that will be reviewed during a subsequent

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exercise.

Inspector Followup Item (50-325/87-40-02, 50-324/87-41-02):

Exercise Weakness - Failure to provide news release in a timely manner.

. The inspector also noted that no provisions were made for security or health physics coverage at the Plant Media Center.

This finding was also identified and discussed by the licensee during their controller / observer critique.

The licensee acknowledged this finding and was informed that this is considered an inspector followup item.

Inspector Followup Item (50-325/87-40-03, 50-324/87-41-03):

Provide security and health physics at the Plant Media Center during exercises and/or events.

No violations or deviations were identified.

13. Emergency Facilities and Equipment (82301)

This area was observed to determine that adequate emergency facilities and equipment to support an emergency response were provided and maintained as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(8), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.E, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.H.

The inspector observed the activation, staffing and operation of the following emergency response facilities:

a.

Control Room - Although the Control Room personnel acted promptly to initiate emergency respor.se to the simulated emergency, the inspector and licensee observer noted that the controllers for the Control Room failed to conduct player briefings -or provide initial conditions prior. to commencing the exerci'.,e.

It was approximately 14 minutes into the exercise before information was provided.

The licensee discussed this finding during the controller / observer meeting held after the exercise.

The licensee was informed that this matter is considered an Inspector Followup Item.

Inspector Followup Item (50-325/87-40-04, 50-324/87-41-04):

Conduct player briefings, or provide initial conditions prior to the start of the exercise.

The Shift Operating Supervisor and other Control Room personnel appeared to be cognizant of their roles, responsibilities, and authorities.

These personnel demonstrated an understanding of the emergency classification system and demonstrated the ability to use specific procedures to determine and classify the event.

Control Room personnel demonstrated effective use of the PA system for keeping plant personnel informed of plant status or event classification.

Communications from the Control Room to other facilities and response organizations appeared adequste throughout

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L the exercise with.one minor exception.

Control Room personnel failed to properly inform TSC personnel that fuses which had been directed to be pulled in the main steam.line isolation logic could not be identified in the field by the description provided by the TSC. As a result, the. Control Room personnel, without notifying the TSC, developed and implemented a plan to remove other. fuses in the protective logics which would provide the desired results (see Paragraph b below).

b.

Technical Support Center - The TSC was activated and staffed promptly upon notification by the Site Emergency Coordinator of the simulated emergency conditions leading to an Alert emergency classification.

The TSC staff appeared to be knowledgeable concerning their emergency responsibilities and TSC operations proceeded smoothly.

The TSC appeared to have adequate equipment for the support of the assigned staff.

It was noted that on several occasions, the technical support provided by the TSC was slow in forthcoming and in one instance, was erroneous.

For example, Control Room personnel were directed by the TSC to remove fuses from the Main Steam Line isolation logic panel applicable to the. MSIV valve position and the jumpers to reset the scram breakers.

The descriptive information provided by the TSC was inadequate due to inconsistency in the identifying or labeling l

information found on fuse cabinets and the General Electric Prints I

that were used.

This item was identified by NRC and licensee evaluators.

This matter was discussed by the licensee.during the licensee controller / observer critique.

The licensee was informed that this finding is considered an inspector followup item.

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Inspector Followup Item (50-325/87-40-05, 50-324/87-41-05):

Provide timely and accurate technical support for conducting accident i

mitigation and assessment.

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A licensee observe? in the TSC noted that the PA system in the dose projection area of the TSC was inaudible during the exercise.

The licensee was informed that this licensee identified item will be tracked as an inspector followup item for review during a subsequent j

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Inspector Followup Item (50-325/87-40-06, 50-324/87-41-06):

Ensure

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the operability of the PA system in the dose projection area of the

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TSC.

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Ha!Itability surveys were conducted throughout the exercise.

The Plant Manager demonstrated excellent command and control as the Site Emergency Coordinator (SEC) as evidenced by the following:

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effective and timely status briefings to TSC staff; conducted effective status and planning caucuses with TSC staff; and demonstrated an effective and expeditious turnover and relief as SEC from the Shift Operating Supervisor.

The TSC status boards were i

strategically located and effectively maintained to chronicle changes I

throughout the exercise.

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Operations Support Center - The OSC was staffed promptly following activation of the Emergency Plan by the Site Emergency Coordinator.

The inspector noted slight delays in assembling teams for deployment.

These delays did not impede the'0SC in performing the assigned functions or missions.

It was noted that the teams were properly briefed regarding health physics concerns.and plant status.

Health Physics personnel provided routine habitability surveys in the OSC and surrounding areas throughout the exercise.

In-plant health physics coverage appeared to be adequate with respect to Damage Control Teams.

The OSC Leader was knowledgeable of his duties and responsibilities, and displayed significant command and control.

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Emergency Operations Facility - The EOF was promptly activated and staffed in a manner consistent with the exercise scenario.

The faci 11ty staff appeared to be knowledgeable regarding their emergency duties, authorities, and responsibilities, and the required operation appeared to be adequate.

The facility was provided with adequate equipment for support and maintenance of the assigned staff.

Security was promptly established and effectively maintained.

The exercise players demonstrated good drillmanship throughout the exercise.

No violations or deviations were identified.

14. Accident Assessment (82301)

This area was observed to determine whether adequate methods, systems and equipment for assessing and monitoring actual or potential offsite consequences of a radiological emergency condition were in use as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.B, and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.I.

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The accident assessment program included an engineering assessment of plant status and an assessment of radiological hazards to both onsite and offsite personnel resulting from the accident.

During the exercise, the

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engineering accident assessment team functioned effectively in analyzing l

the plant status so as to make recommendations to the Site Emergency

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Coordinator concerning mitigating actions to reduce damage to plant J

I equipment, to prevent release of radioactive materials and to terminate the emergency condition.

i Radiological assessment activities were spread over several groups.

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accident assessment group in the TSC was effectively estimating the radiological impact in the plant based on in-plant monitoring and onsite measurements.

Radiological effluent data was received in the TSC.

The results were compared with the data obtained in the EOF from the offsite monitoring groups.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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15. Protective Responses (82301)

This area was observed to determine that guidelines for protective actions during the emergency, consistent with federal guidance, are developed and

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in place, and protective actions for emergency workers, including evacuation of nonessential personnel, were implemented promptly as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10), and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.J.

The inspector verified that the licensee had emergency procedures for formulating protective action recommendations for offsite populations within the 10-mile EPZ.

The licensee's protective action recommendations were consistent with the EPA and other criteria and notifications were

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made to the appropriate State and local authorities within the 15-minute criteria.

The inspector observed that protective actions were ins +ituted for onsite emergency workers which included periodic radiation surveys in the facility, evacuation of nonessential personnel, and accountability of emergency response personnel.

A licensee observer in the E0F noted that personnel from the Plant Training Unit staff were not included in the onsite accountability performed by security personnel.

This matter was discussed by the licensee during the licensee's controller / observer meeting held after the exercise.

Licensee representatives took exception to this finding and indicatad that a review of security activities involving accountability would be conoucted to determine the validity of this finding. The licensee was informed that this matter is considered an exercise weakness.

Inspector Followup Item (50-325/87-40-07, 50-324/87-41-07):

Exercise Weakness - Failure to include Brunswick Training Unit personnel in the onsite accountability check.

No violations or deviations were identified.

16. Radiological Exposure Control (82301)

This area was observed to determine that means for controlling radiological exposures in an emergency were established and implemented for emergency workers, and that procedures include exposure guidelines consistent with EPA recommendation as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(11), and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.K.

An inspector noted that radiological exposures were controlled throughout the exercise by itsuing emergency workers supplemental dosimeters and by periodic surveys in the emergency response facilities.

Exposure guidelines were in place for various categories of emergency actions and adequate protective clothing and respiratory protection were available for use as required.

Health Physics and radiation area access appeared to be adequate throughout the exercise.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

17.

Fire Drill (82301)

The inspector observed the emergency fire drill held concurrent with the annual exercise. The inspector noted that security for the fire drill was prompt, and effectively established.

The offsite fire support agency (Southport Fire Department) response time was not evaluated during this drill.

The scenario for the' fire drill included simulations and pre-staged activities.

The NRC inspector and the licensee observer noted that the offsite fire engine pumping equipment failed to maintain an adequate water pressure for extinguishing the simulated fire.

However, fire fighting capability was not hampered by this failure as a result of fire fighting personnel disconnecting from the fire engine pumping system and connecting the hose directly to the plant fire hydrant nearby.

In addition, a backup fire engine was requested and responded in a very timely manner.

The Shift Fire Commander demonstrated familiarity and knowledge of his role and responsibility at the scene of the simulated fire. The response time by the Shift Fire Comander and Fire Brigade members were in accordance with the approved Fire Protection Procedures.

The inspector noted good hose placement, command and control, and communications between the Shift Fire Commander, Fire Brigade members, and the Control Room.

It appeared as though the objectives for the fire drill were met.

No violations or deviations were identified.

18.

Recovery and Reentry Planning (82301)

This area was observed to determine that general plans are made for recovery and reentry as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(13), 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.H and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.M.

The licensee briefly discussed recovery and reentry planning, but the exercise was being terminated at this point.

No violations or deviations were identified.

19. ExerciseCritique(82301)

The licensee's critique of the emergency exercise was observed to assure that deficiencies identified as a result of the exercise and weaknesses noted in the licensee's emergency response organization were formally presented to licensee management for corrective actions as required by 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14),10 CFR 50, Appendix E, Paragraph IV.F and specific criteria in NUREG-0654,Section II.N.

A formal critique for exercise participants was held on November 18, 1987.

Persornel in attendance included licensee management, exercise controllers

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and observers, and NRC representatives. Strong points and weaknesses were discussed.

Items requiring followup actions were identified.

Review of the licensee's action on these matters will be reviewed during subsequent inspections.

Observation of the licensee controller / observer critique, held on November 17, 1987, was included as part of the exercise

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evaluation.

The licensee's critique was detailed and effective.

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critique included identification and discussion of strengths, weaknesses, f

deficiencies, required improvements, and the required corrective actions.

In addition, the inspector noted that the licensee discussed items

identified during the 1986 exercise as requiring followup actions, to determine if action demonstrated during the 1987 exercise were acceptable as corrective actions.

The licensee's significant findings, which included similar findings as observed by the NRC evaluation team, were

"q presented at the formal critique.

No violations or deviations were identified, i

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Inspector Followup (92701)

a.

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item (IFI) 50-325, 324/85-20-02:

Exercise Weakness - Update onsite contamination control measures, access control procedures, and decon capabilities to comply with Section K-6 and K-7 of NUREG-0654.

A review of licensee Plant Emergency Procedures (PEPS) indicated that PEPS 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 were revised to comply with Section K-6 and K-7 of NUREG-0654.

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b.

(Closed) IFI 50-325/86-34-02, 50-324/86-35-02:

Exercise Weakness -

Procedures did not accurately reflect all parties on the ARD telephone used for notification.

The inspector verified that procedure PCP-2.6.21, " Emergency Communicator," Revision 12, includes all parties on the ARD Telephone. The inspector observed during the exercise that only those parties listed in PEP-2.6.21 were contacted by the ARD telephone.

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(Closed) IFI 50-325/86-34-03, 50-324/86-35-03:

ERM needs to ensure

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that followup messages correctly reflect the emergency classification in effect.

The county emergency management coordinators did not participate since this was a small scale drill.

However, the inspector reviewed the followup messages and noted that the emergency classifications were accurately reflected on followup message forms.

d.

(Closed) IFI 50-325/86-34-04, 50-324/86-35-04:

Exercise Weakness -

The SEC downgraded the emergency classification without considering

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revision of the PAR and without coordinating the decision with appropriate personnel.

The inspector noted that decisions regarding event classification and/or event classification downgrade was discussed between %e Site Emergency Coordinator in the TSC and the Emergency Response Manager in the EOF.

e.

(Closed) IFI 50-325/86-34-05, 50-324/86-35-05:

OSC operations were conducted without consideration of the effects of the drywell f

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venting.

The inspector 'noted that the OSC leader maintained an awareness of changing plant conditions and the possible affects on the OSC operations in the event of evacuation and the hazards associated with personnel protection.

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(Closed) IFI 50-325/86-34-06, 50-324/86-35-06:

Plant status parameters posted in the EOF were not always current.

The inspector noted that plant status parameters were maintained current.

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Information was posted in a timely manner.

g.

(Closed) IFI 50-325/86-34-07, 50-324/86-35-07: Licensee critique did not have player input.

The licensee revised the CP&L Corporate Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (CEPIP-18), " Emergency Response Exercises," to include as a requirement to obtain player input as part of the evaluation of a drill or exercise.

During the

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mini-critique following the exercise, it was noted that player comments were included in the licensee's critique.

Attachment:

Exercise Scope and Objectives and Narrative Summary

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CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY PLAN FOR BRUNSWICK STEAM ELECTRIC PLANT D4ERGENCY EXERCISE November 17, 1987 I '. MISSION AND PURPOSE OF EXERCISE To activate and evaluate major portions of emergency response -

capabilities and other elements of the CP&L Brunswick Steam Electric Plant' Plan, associated implementing procedures, and the CP&L Corporate Emergency Plans in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory-Commission (NRC)

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Regulation 10 CFR 50.47(b).

II.

SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES A.

Scope A simulated accident at the Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP)

which could escalate to a general emergency and will involve planned response and recovery actions to include; emergency classification; notification of off-site organizations and plant personnel; actions to correct the emergency conditions; and initiation of accident assessment and protective actions as necessary to cope with the accident.

The exercise will simulate an emergency that.results in off-site radiological releases which l

require responses by state and local governcent personnel.

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B.

Objectives 1.

Demonstrate the ability of on-site personnel to effectively utilize the emergency action level scheme.

2.

Demonstrate the ability of-on-site personnel to classify the emergency based on existing plant conditions.

3.

Demonstrate the adequacy of the control room staff in the ability to perform control and accident mitigation activities along with accident assessment.

Demonstrate the adequacy of procedures for alerting, notifying, and mobilizing emergency response * personnel (some individuals will be pre-staged within the local area).

5.

Demonstrate that communications capabilities exist to accomplish notification of off-site agencies.

6.

Demonstrate the ability to notify off-site authorities within 15 minutes of the emergency classification.

7.

Demonstrate the adequacy of the information provided in the

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initial notification, as well as follow-up notifications to the State and Counties (state and local government organizations will not participate).

-1-(87-2HRG/pej)

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i II.

SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES (Cont'd)

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8.

Demonstrate the ability of on-site personnel to form" late protective action recommendations based on pre-established criteria.

9.

Demonstrate ability of personnel to activate the TSC; OSC, EOF, and Plant Media Center as described in the emergency plan and procedures.

10.

Demonstrate transfer of responsibility between emergency response facilities as described in the plan and procedures.

Demonstrate the ability to communicate between emergency response facilities.

12.

Demonstrate the adequacy of the Operations Support Center in providing manpower support and coordination.

Demonstrate the adequacy of the Technical Support Center in providing accident assessment and mitigation, dose assessment, and communication / notification activities.

Demonstrate the adequacy of the EOF in coordinating off-site utility activities.

15.

Demonstrate recordkeeping requirements as described in the plan and procedures.

16.

Demonstrate that status boards are maintained and updated.

17.

Demonstrate the ability to provide adequate radiation protection services such as dosimetry and personnel monitoring.

18.

Demor e.trate the capability to perform radiological monitoring activities and assessments.

19.

Demonstrate the ability to support the radiological assessment l

process while maintaining personnel radiation exposure as-low-

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as-reasonably achievable (ALARA).

20.

Demonstrate the assessment of radiological consequences of the accident and of any releases of radioactive material to the environment.

Demonstrate the activation, operation, and reporting of the field monitoring teams within and beyond the site boundary.

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22.

Demonstrate the ability to perform on-site accountability within 30 minutes from the time of the order for accountability.

-2-(87-2HRG/poj)

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e II.

SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES (Cont'd)

23. Demonstrate.the ability to provide safe on-site access to off-site emergency services and/or support personnel (normal security access procedures will be adhered to).

24.

Demonstrate proper procedures for the fire brigade response to the type of fire chosen for the exercise.

25.

Demonstrate the adequacy of the interface between off-site fire support personnel and the plant fire brigade.

26.

Demonstrate the capability 't-o produce public information releases.

III.

SITUATION AND ASSUMPTIONS A.

Exercise Dates

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1.

Submit exercise scope, and objectives to NRC:

Exercise - 75 days (september 3, 1987).

2.

Submit exercise scenario to NRC:

Exercise 45 days (October 2, 1987).

Final Evaluator Meeting:

Exercise - November 16, 1987; 1400 hours0.0162 days <br />0.389 hours <br />0.00231 weeks <br />5.327e-4 months <br /> TSC/ EOF Training Building, Room No. 122,

Exercise:

November 17,1987; 0800 to 1600 hours0.0185 days <br />0.444 hours <br />0.00265 weeks <br />6.088e-4 months <br /> 5.

Evaluator Group Meeting:

November 17,1987; 1600 to 1800 hours0.0208 days <br />0.5 hours <br />0.00298 weeks <br />6.849e-4 months <br />

Lead Eval.uator Meeting:

November 17,1987; 1800 to 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> 7.

Post Exercise Critique Report to Players:

November 18, 1987; 1100 hours0.0127 days <br />0.306 hours <br />0.00182 weeks <br />4.1855e-4 months <br /> 8.

NRC Exit / Critique November 18,1987; 1130 hour0.0131 days <br />0.314 hours <br />0.00187 weeks <br />4.29965e-4 months <br />s-3-(87-2HRG/poj)

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l NARRATIVE SUMMARY I

This exercise is initiated by a seismic event'which damages reactor internals'

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resulting in blockage of coolant flow to a small. percentage of fuel assemblies. This results in fuel element heat up and ultimate fuel cladding failure.

The main steam line radiation monitors will start showing an increase approximately one hour into the event.

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'The diesel generator fuel oil storage tank will also be damaged by the seismic event.

Approximately. one hour and forty-five minutes into the exercise, a fire will be reported at this tank. Off-site assistance will be required for the fire.

The fuel cladding damage will result in main steam line isolation valve closure and reactor scram signals three hours into the exercise. One main steam line will. fail.to isolate and all control rods will not fully insert.

There will be some increase in radioactivity within the turbine building due to the continued steam flow to the condenser.

There will be no off-site radiological. consequences as a result of this event.

Reactor power will be approximately 10%.

The Standby Liquid Control System (SLC) will be initiated to shutdown the reactor.

At three. hours and forty-five minutes.into the event, it will be discovered that the SLC discharge valve has failed.

Activities required for a repair entry will be initiated at this time.

The main steam line that failed to isolate will be closed four hours into the exercise.

The reactor will not be shutdown at this time due to failure of all rods to insert and failure of the SLC Systec. This will result in using SRV's to reject heat from the reactor to the suppression pool and containment heat up.

All control rods will be fully inserted five hours into the exercise.

Simultaneously with the' control. rod insertion, a break will occur in the scram discharge _ volume header. This results in releasing reactor coolant, directly into secondary containment with a release path from the main stack via the

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Standby Gas Treatment Jystem.

The Environmental Monitoring Team will provide off-site radiological assessment of this release.

The exercise will be terminated when the scram discharge volume header is isolated and recovery actions are initiated.

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(87-4HRG/poj)

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