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                                                                                                            .
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      .'                                                                                                              l
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                                                                                                                      1
'
                            U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
1
                                OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS
U.
        NRC Inspection Report:     50-445/87-14           Permits:                       CPPR-126
S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
                                    50-446/87-11                                           CPPR-127
OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS
        Dockets:   50-445                                                   Category:                       A2
NRC Inspection Report:
                    50-446
50-445/87-14
                                                Construction Permit
Permits:
                                                Expiration Dates:
CPPR-126
                                                Unit 1: August 1, 1988
50-446/87-11
                                                Unit 2: Extension request
CPPR-127
                                                                          submitted
Dockets:
50-445
Category:
A2
50-446
Construction Permit
Expiration Dates:
Unit 1:
August 1, 1988
Unit 2:
Extension request
submitted
!
!
        Applicant:   TU Electric
Applicant:
                      Skyway Tower
TU Electric
                      400 North Olive Street
Skyway Tower
                      Lock Box 81
400 North Olive Street
                      Dallas, Texas 75201
Lock Box 81
        Facility Name:     Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES)
Dallas, Texas
                            Units 1 and 2
75201
        Inspection At:     Comanche Peak Site, Glen Rose, Texas
Facility Name:
        Inspection Conducted:     July 8 through August 4, 1987
Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES)
        Inspector:             . /     d*                                                           d[8'7
Units 1 and 2
l                     H'. $. Phillips,' Senior Resident Reactor                                   Date
Inspection At:
                            Inspector, Construction
Comanche Peak Site, Glen Rose, Texas
Inspection Conducted:
July 8 through August 4, 1987
Inspector:
. /
d*
d[8'7
l
H'.
$. Phillips,' Senior Resident Reactor
Date
Inspector, Construction
Reviewed by:
R F u)aamIcA
F- 2 t.- F7
'
'
        Reviewed by:      R F u)aamIcA                                                            F- 2 t.- F7
R.
                          R. F. Warnick, Assistant Director                                         Date
F. Warnick, Assistant Director
                            for Inspection Programs
Date
                          Comanche Peak Project Division
for Inspection Programs
                          Office of Special Projects
Comanche Peak Project Division
              8709020328 870826
Office of Special Projects
              PDR   ADOCK 05000445
8709020328 870826
              O                 PDR
PDR
                                                        _ _ _ _ - _ _         _-____ _ - _ _ _ _ -
ADOCK 05000445
O
PDR
_ _ _ _ - _ _
_-____ _ - _ _ _ _ -


                                                            . _ _ - _ _ -
. _ _ - _ _ -
.
.
                                    2
2
  Inspection Summary
Inspection Summary
  Inspection Conducted:   July 8 through August 4, 1987 (Report
Inspection Conducted:
  Nos.   50-445/87-14; 50-446/87-11)
July 8 through August 4,
  Areas Inspected:   Routine, unannounced safety inspection including
1987 (Report
  (1) followup on previous inspection findings; (2) followup on
Nos.
  applicant identified construction deficiencies; (3) general plant
50-445/87-14; 50-446/87-11)
  inspections; (4) storage / handling of safety-related components;
Areas Inspected:
  (5) penetrations; (6) piping and supports; and (7) electrical work
Routine, unannounced safety inspection including
  activities.
(1) followup on previous inspection findings; (2) followup on
  Results: Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations
applicant identified construction deficiencies; (3) general plant
  were identified. A meeting was held on July 22, 1987, to resolve
inspections; (4) storage / handling of safety-related components;
  the NRC's concern with the TUE response to NRC Inspection Report
(5) penetrations; (6) piping and supports; and (7) electrical work
  50-445/84-32; 50-446/84-11 (paragraph 2).
activities.
Results:
Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations
were identified.
A meeting was held on July 22, 1987, to resolve
the NRC's concern with the TUE response to NRC Inspection Report
50-445/84-32; 50-446/84-11 (paragraph 2).


                                                                                  -           - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
-
  .
- - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _
        ,
.'
          .'
.
                                                          3
,
                                                          DETAILS
3
              1.       Persons Contacted
DETAILS
                        *R. P. Baker, Regulatory Compliance Manager, TU Electric
1.
                                (TUE)
Persons Contacted
                        *J.       L. Barker, Engineering Assurance Manager, TUE
*R.
                        *M.       Blevins,   Technical Support Manager, TUE
P. Baker, Regulatory Compliance Manager, TU Electric
                        *W. G. Counsil, Executive VP, Nuclear Engineering &
(TUE)
                                Operations, TUE
*J.
                        *R. D. Delano, Licensing Engineer, TUE
L. Barker, Engineering Assurance Manager, TUE
                        *D. E. Deviney, Operations Quality Assurance (QA) Manager,
*M.
                                TUE
Blevins, Technical Support Manager, TUE
*W.
G.
Counsil, Executive VP, Nuclear Engineering &
Operations, TUE
*R.
D. Delano, Licensing Engineer, TUE
*D.
E. Deviney, Operations Quality Assurance (QA) Manager,
TUE
'
'
                        *T.       L. Heatherly, Regulatory Compliance Engineer, TUE
*T.
                        *J.       Hicks, Licensing, TUE
L. Heatherly, Regulatory Compliance Engineer, TUE
                        *J.       J. Kelley, Plant Operations Manager, TUE
*J.
                        *0.       Lowe, Engineering Director, TUE
Hicks, Licensing, TUE
                          *L.     D. Nace, VP, Engineering and Construction, TUE
*J.
                        *D.       Noss, QA, TUE
J. Kelley, Plant Operations Manager, TUE
                        *D.       M. Reynerson, Director of Construction, TUE
*0.
,                        *A.       B. Scott, VP, Nuclear Operations, TUE
Lowe, Engineering Director, TUE
                          *C.     E. Scott, Startup Manager, TUE
*L.
                          *J.     C. Smith, Plant Operations Staff, TUE
D. Nace, VP, Engineering and Construction, TUE
                          *P.     B. Stevens, Electrical Engineering Manager, TUE
*D.
                          *J.     F. Streeter, Director of QA, TUE
Noss, QA, TUE
                          *T.     G. Tyler, Projects Director, TUE
*D.
                        The NRC inspector also interviewed other applicant employees
M. Reynerson, Director of Construction, TUE
                        during this inspection period.
*A.
                        * Denotes personnel present at the August 4, 1987 exit
B. Scott, VP, Nuclear Operations, TUE
                                interview.
,
                                                                                                                          l
*C.
              2.     Management Meetings (30702)
E.
                        a.           On July 22, 1987, R. F. Warnick, H. S. Phillips, and C.
Scott, Startup Manager, TUE
                                    Hale of the NRC met with TUE staff members J. F.
*J.
                                    Streeter, R. Spangler, and D. Noss to discuss the TUE
C.
                                    response to NRC Inspection Report 50-445/84-32;
Smith, Plant Operations Staff, TUE
                                    50-446/84-11. The NRC requested clarification and
*P.
                                    additional information. That is, the response reflected a
B. Stevens, Electrical Engineering Manager, TUE
                                    more positive view of the TUE QA and audit program when
*J.
                                    compared to the Comanche Peak Response Team results
F.
                                    reports for Issue-Specific Action Plans (ISAPs) VII.a.4
Streeter, Director of QA, TUE
                                    and VII.a.5. Also the response did not factor in the
*T.
                                    generic findings and corrective action discussed in the
G. Tyler, Projects Director, TUE
                                    ISAPs.
The NRC inspector also interviewed other applicant employees
                      b.           Three representatives from the Texas Department of Labor
during this inspection period.
                                    and Standards were onsite the week of July 13-17, 1987.
* Denotes personnel present at the August 4, 1987 exit
    . .
interview.
            .
l
                  _ _ _ _ _ _ _
2.
Management Meetings (30702)
a.
On July 22, 1987, R. F. Warnick, H. S. Phillips, and C.
Hale of the NRC met with TUE staff members J. F.
Streeter, R. Spangler, and D. Noss to discuss the TUE
response to NRC Inspection Report 50-445/84-32;
50-446/84-11.
The NRC requested clarification and
additional information. That is, the response reflected a
more positive view of the TUE QA and audit program when
compared to the Comanche Peak Response Team results
reports for Issue-Specific Action Plans (ISAPs) VII.a.4
and VII.a.5.
Also the response did not factor in the
generic findings and corrective action discussed in the
ISAPs.
b.
Three representatives from the Texas Department of Labor
and Standards were onsite the week of July 13-17, 1987.
. .
.
_ _ _ _ _ _ _


                                                                                            ____ __- _ __ _ _ ___ - - - __ _ _-_ _ _______-
____ __- _ __ _ _ ___ - - - __ _ _-_ _ _______-
                                                  4
4
                                                                                  4
4
                                                            The purpose of their visit was to inspect applicant
The purpose of their visit was to inspect applicant
                                                            compliance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code
compliance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code
                                                            as required by Texas law. A representative from the NRC
as required by Texas law.
                                                            onsite staff attended their entrance and exit meetings.
A representative from the NRC
                                                            In addition, P. F. McKee, R. F. Warnick, and H. S.
onsite staff attended their entrance and exit meetings.
                                                            Phillips (J. G. Keppler and C. I. Grimes were in
In addition,
                                                            attendance part of the time) met with Steven M. Matthews,
P.
                                                            Director and Chief Inspector, Boiler Division; George
F. McKee, R.
                                                            Bynog, Assistant Director, Boiler Division; and Ricky
F. Warnick, and H.
                                                            Bryan, Lead Inspector for Comanche Peak, Boiler Division
S.
                                                            on July 14, 1987, to discuss their responsibilities and
Phillips (J.
                                                            authority, under Texas law, and items of mutual interest
G. Keppler and C.
                                                            relating to the applicant's compliance with the ASME
I. Grimes were in
                                                            Code.
attendance part of the time) met with Steven M. Matthews,
                                                    3. Followup On Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)
Director and Chief Inspector, Boiler Division; George
                                                      a.   (Closed) Open Item (445/8214-01): Region IV (RIV)
Bynog, Assistant Director, Boiler Division; and Ricky
                                                            planned to do additional inspection of vendor shop
Bryan, Lead Inspector for Comanche Peak, Boiler Division
                                                            performed welding (including NPSI) during a subsequent                         ,
on July 14, 1987, to discuss their responsibilities and
                                                            inspection.
authority, under Texas law, and items of mutual interest
                                                            This item was opened during a RIV followup inspection in
relating to the applicant's compliance with the ASME
                                                            response to a visit by an alleger at RIV. The original
Code.
3.
Followup On Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)
a.
(Closed) Open Item (445/8214-01):
Region IV (RIV)
planned to do additional inspection of vendor shop
performed welding (including NPSI) during a subsequent
,
inspection.
This item was opened during a RIV followup inspection in
response to a visit by an alleger at RIV.
The original
l
l
concerns dealt with American Welding Society (AWS)
'
'
                                                            concerns dealt with American Welding Society (AWS)
Structural Welding Code, D.1.1, welds that were not in
                                                            Structural Welding Code, D.1.1, welds that were not in
;
;                                                           accordance with this code. The RIV inspector inspected
accordance with this code.
                                                            five girder welds and a box structure on main
The RIV inspector inspected
                                                            steam /feedwater pipe whip restraints, addressing the
five girder welds and a box structure on main
                                                            alleger's concerns in NRC Inspection Report 50-445/82-14.
steam /feedwater pipe whip restraints, addressing the
                                                            Although the concerns were addressed, the NRC inspector
alleger's concerns in NRC Inspection Report 50-445/82-14.
                                                            chose to perform additional inspection of similar vendor
Although the concerns were addressed, the NRC inspector
l                                                           welds including Nuclear Power Services, Inc. (NPSI)
chose to perform additional inspection of similar vendor
l                                                           during a future inspection and left the item open.
l
                                                                                                                                            ]
welds including Nuclear Power Services, Inc. (NPSI)
                                                            The currently assigned NRC inspector found that
l
                                                            additional inspections were performed and documented in                         i
during a future inspection and left the item open.
                                                            50-445/82-22; 50-445/84-29, 50-446/84-10; 50-445/83-24,                         !
]
                                                            50-446/83-15; 50-445/82-25, 50-446/82-13; 50-445/80-22,                         l
The currently assigned NRC inspector found that
                                                            50-446/80-22; and the special NRC Technical Review Team
additional inspections were performed and documented in
                                                            inspection documented in NUREG 0797 Supplement 10                               1
i
                                                            (AQW-22, AW-39, AW-57, AQW-75, and AQW-76).
50-445/82-22; 50-445/84-29, 50-446/84-10; 50-445/83-24,
                                                                                                                                            l
!
                                                      b.   (Closed) Violation (445/8507-V-06; 446/8505-V-04):
l
                                                            Failure to document on a Deficiency and Disposition
50-446/83-15; 50-445/82-25, 50-446/82-13; 50-445/80-22,
                                                            Report (DDR) a 24-48 pound deviation on cement scale MTE
50-446/80-22; and the special NRC Technical Review Team
                                                            779 frcm required accuracy.
inspection documented in NUREG 0797 Supplement 10
                                                            The NRC inspector reviewed the corrective action file and
1
                                                            found that the violation was caused by a lack of
(AQW-22, AW-39, AW-57, AQW-75, and AQW-76).
                                                            procedures. Nonconformance reports (NCR)-C-85-101882,
l
                                                            Revision 1, and NCR-C-85-201617, Revision 1, were issued
b.
                                                                                                                                            i
(Closed) Violation (445/8507-V-06; 446/8505-V-04):
                                                                                                                                            i
Failure to document on a Deficiency and Disposition
  _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _
Report (DDR) a 24-48 pound deviation on cement scale MTE
779 frcm required accuracy.
The NRC inspector reviewed the corrective action file and
found that the violation was caused by a lack of
procedures.
Nonconformance reports (NCR)-C-85-101882,
Revision 1, and NCR-C-85-201617, Revision 1, were issued
i
i
_ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _


                                                                            I
I
. :
:
                              5
.
      to require an evaluation of two concrete placements while
5
      the scales were in this condition and it was found that
to require an evaluation of two concrete placements while
      specified design strengths were attained. This resolves
the scales were in this condition and it was found that
      this issue.
specified design strengths were attained.
    c. (Closed) violation (445/8507-V-02): Failure to use Class
This resolves
      "E" concrete as specified.
this issue.
      The NRC inspector reviewed a TUE file on this item.
c.
      The original response (TXX-4727) from TUE was inadequate;
(Closed) violation (445/8507-V-02): Failure to use Class
      however, the supplemental response (TXX-6211) provided
"E" concrete as specified.
      the necessary information and action. As a result of the
The NRC inspector reviewed a TUE file on this item.
      NRC inquiry, two deficiency reports were issued to ensure
The original response (TXX-4727) from TUE was inadequate;
      appropriate drawing changes, document the design change,
however, the supplemental response (TXX-6211) provided
      and identify causes. The applicant also found that this
the necessary information and action.
      grout substitution for Class E cencrete occurred in seven
As a result of the
      Unit 1 and eight Unit 2 installations not previously
NRC inquiry, two deficiency reports were issued to ensure
      identified in response TXX-4727.
appropriate drawing changes, document the design change,
      The NRC inspector found that the use of commercial
and identify causes.
      non-shrink grout with an average compressive strength of             I
The applicant also found that this
      8450 psi is an acceptable substitute even though it's use           j
grout substitution for Class E cencrete occurred in seven
      was unauthorized at the time. This strength exceeds the               l
Unit 1 and eight Unit 2 installations not previously
      Class "E" concrete minimum strength of 4000 psi. The
identified in response TXX-4727.
      inspector observed a typical baseplate (TBX-RCPCG-01)
The NRC inspector found that the use of commercial
      that was grouted.                                                     )
non-shrink grout with an average compressive strength of
      The applicant's file showed that a project directive
8450 psi is an acceptable substitute even though it's use
      (CPPA-56,467) was issued to emphasize the precedence of
j
      design documents over vendor documents. Stone & Webster
was unauthorized at the time.
      Procedure PP-053, TUE Procedure ECE-DC-5 (used by
This strength exceeds the
      Ebasco), and Impell Procedure IMP-FP-19 have either been
Class
      revised or emphasized to assure that conflicts between
"E" concrete minimum strength of 4000 psi.
      vendor drawings and design drawings are resolved and that
The
      design takes precedence.
inspector observed a typical baseplate (TBX-RCPCG-01)
    d. (Closed) Unresolved Item (446/8511-U-03): The issuance
that was grouted.
      of drawing packages from satellites to the field and the
)
      logging of the status of design change authorizations
The applicant's file showed that a project directive
      (DCAs) and component modification cards (CMCs) into the
(CPPA-56,467) was issued to emphasize the precedence of
      computer were not in controlled procedure DCP-3 but were
design documents over vendor documents.
      covered in uncontrolled guidelines.
Stone & Webster
      The NRC inspector reviewed a TUE package which showed
Procedure PP-053, TUE Procedure ECE-DC-5 (used by
      that the uncontrolled guidelines were incorporated into
Ebasco), and Impell Procedure IMP-FP-19 have either been
      controlled procedures. Paragraph 3.1.2.3 of DCP-3,
revised or emphasized to assure that conflicts between
      Revision 19, dated March 31, 1986, described the issuance
vendor drawings and design drawings are resolved and that
      of drawings to the field. Paragraph 2.1.5 of ECE-DC-7,
design takes precedence.
      Revision 19, dated October 31, 1986, described the
d.
      tracking of DCAs and CMCs. This resolves this issue.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (446/8511-U-03):
                                                            _ _ _ _ - _ _ _
The issuance
of drawing packages from satellites to the field and the
logging of the status of design change authorizations
(DCAs) and component modification cards (CMCs) into the
computer were not in controlled procedure DCP-3 but were
covered in uncontrolled guidelines.
The NRC inspector reviewed a TUE package which showed
that the uncontrolled guidelines were incorporated into
controlled procedures.
Paragraph 3.1.2.3 of DCP-3,
Revision 19, dated March 31, 1986, described the issuance
of drawings to the field.
Paragraph 2.1.5 of ECE-DC-7,
Revision 19, dated October 31, 1986, described the
tracking of DCAs and CMCs.
This resolves this issue.
_ _ _ _ - _ _ _


                                                                                                          ,
,
                                      .
.
,                                   .
,
  ,
.
                                                                      6
,
                                          e.   (Closed) Open Item (445/8601-0-01; 446/8601-0-01):
6
                                                Ultrasonic testing procedures were not onsite.
e.
                                                The NRC inspector reviewed copies of the CB&I procedures
(Closed) Open Item (445/8601-0-01; 446/8601-0-01):
                                                UTP-18B and UTP-25B that are now in the records vault.
Ultrasonic testing procedures were not onsite.
                                                TUE reviewed CB&I records that were removed and returned   i
The NRC inspector reviewed copies of the CB&I procedures
                                                to site and found that they have essential records. This
UTP-18B and UTP-25B that are now in the records vault.
                                                resolves this issue.                                     I
TUE reviewed CB&I records that were removed and returned
                                          No violations or deviations were identified.
i
                                        4. Followup On Applicant Identified Construction Deficiencies
to site and found that they have essential records.
                                          (92700)
This
                                          The NRC inspector reviewed construction deficiency reports     j
resolves this issue.
                                          CP-87-13 through CP-87-54 which had been identified as         l
I
                                          potentially reportable construction deficiencies in accordance j
No violations or deviations were identified.
                                          with 10 CFR Part 50.55(e). Each report was reviewed to assure   '
4.
                                          that the deficiency was fully identified, described,
Followup On Applicant Identified Construction Deficiencies
                                          evaluated, and that the NRC was notified in accordance with
(92700)
                                          TUE Procedure NEO-CS-1, Revision 1 and 10 CFR 50.55(e).
The NRC inspector reviewed construction deficiency reports
                                          The following potentially reportable items were inspected in
j
                                          the field to observe the deficient conditions and any
CP-87-13 through CP-87-54 which had been identified as
                                          corrective actions in process.
l
                                          Location       Number             Deficient Condition
potentially reportable construction deficiencies in accordance
                                                                                                          1
j
                                          RCB 1&2,       CP-86-61           Polar Crane not installed   i
with 10 CFR Part 50.55(e).
                                          el 905'                             properly                   I
Each report was reviewed to assure
                                          RCB 1&2         CP-85-26           Steam generator lateral
'
                                          el 905'                             support restraint bolts
that the deficiency was fully identified, described,
                                                                              shortened
evaluated, and that the NRC was notified in accordance with
                                                                                                          l
TUE Procedure NEO-CS-1, Revision 1 and 10 CFR 50.55(e).
                                          AB 2           CP-86-76           Gould battery racks
The following potentially reportable items were inspected in
                                          el 792'                             improperly spaced
the field to observe the deficient conditions and any
                                          EC 1           CP-85-07           Butt splice CPI-ECPRC-13
corrective actions in process.
                                          el 830'                             improperly made
Location
                                          EC 1&2         CP-86-54           Seismic supports for CR
Number
                                          el 840'                             ceiling improperly
Deficient Condition
                                                                              installed
1
                                          AB 1&2         CP-86-11           CCW pump impellers cracked
RCB 1&2,
                                          el 810'
CP-86-61
                                          AB 1&2         CP-87-18           CCW heat exchangers have
Polar Crane not installed
                                          el 790'                             deficient seismic
i
                                                                              qualifications
el 905'
  _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
properly
I
RCB 1&2
CP-85-26
Steam generator lateral
el 905'
support restraint bolts
shortened
l
AB 2
CP-86-76
Gould battery racks
el 792'
improperly spaced
EC 1
CP-85-07
Butt splice CPI-ECPRC-13
el 830'
improperly made
EC 1&2
CP-86-54
Seismic supports for CR
el 840'
ceiling improperly
installed
AB 1&2
CP-86-11
CCW pump impellers cracked
el 810'
AB 1&2
CP-87-18
CCW heat exchangers have
el 790'
deficient seismic
qualifications
_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _


                                                                                          ___-_-__
___-_-__
  .,
.'
    .'                                                                                            i
i
                                                            7
.,
                              Location       Number               Deficient Condition
7
                              SGB 1           CP-87-15             Air accumulators improperly
Location
                              el 790'                             stored
Number
                              SGB 1           CP-87-20           6.9kV transformer porcelain
Deficient Condition
                              el 810'                             bus cracked
SGB 1
                              DGB 2           CP-84-02             DG piston skirt had linear
CP-87-15
                              el 810'                             indication
Air accumulators improperly
                              SGB 2           CP-86-10             Bunker-Ramo penetration
el 790'
                              el 852'                             assemblies removed
stored
                              No violations or deviations were identified.
SGB 1
                            5. General Plant Inspections
CP-87-20
                              At various times during the inspection period, the NRC
6.9kV transformer porcelain
                              inspector conducted general inspections of the Unit 1 and 2
el 810'
                              reactor containment (RCB), safeguards (SGB), auxiliary (AB),
bus cracked
                              electrical control (ECB), and diesel generator (DGB)
DGB 2
                              buildings. All accessible rooms in these buildings were
CP-84-02
                              inspected to observe current work activities with respect to
DG piston skirt had linear
                              major safety-related equipment, electrical cable / trays,
el 810'
                              mechanical components, piping, welding, coatings, Hilti bolts,
indication
                              and removal of debris from the seismic gap between the
SGB 2
                              buildings. The housekeeping, storage and handling conditions
CP-86-10
                              inside these buildings and various outside storage areas were
Bunker-Ramo penetration
l                              also inspected (paragraph 6). Four backshift and two weekend        )
el 852'
                              inspections were performed during this inspection period.
assemblies removed
                              Work activities that were selected for more detailed                  l
No violations or deviations were identified.
                              inspections are described in paragraphe 7, 8 and 9.                  l
5.
\
General Plant Inspections
                                                                                                      l
At various times during the inspection period, the NRC
inspector conducted general inspections of the Unit 1 and 2
reactor containment (RCB), safeguards (SGB), auxiliary (AB),
electrical control (ECB), and diesel generator (DGB)
buildings.
All accessible rooms in these buildings were
inspected to observe current work activities with respect to
major safety-related equipment, electrical cable / trays,
mechanical components, piping, welding, coatings, Hilti bolts,
and removal of debris from the seismic gap between the
buildings.
The housekeeping, storage and handling conditions
inside these buildings and various outside storage areas were
l
l
also inspected (paragraph 6). Four backshift and two weekend
)
inspections were performed during this inspection period.
Work activities that were selected for more detailed
l
inspections are described in paragraphe 7, 8 and 9.
l
l
\\
l
No violations or deviations were identified.
'
i
i
                              No violations or deviations were identified.                           '
6.
Identification and Storage of Site Materials, Parts, and
'
'
                            6. Identification and Storage of Site Materials, Parts, and
Components (50073, 50090, 50095, 51053, 51063, 53053)
                              Components (50073, 50090, 50095, 51053, 51063, 53053)
a.
                              a.   Identification
Identification
                                    The NRC inspector verified that equipment, components,
The NRC inspector verified that equipment, components,
                                    parts, and materials used in civil, electrical, and
parts, and materials used in civil, electrical, and
mechanical activities were positively identified during
l
l
'
'
                                    mechanical activities were positively identified during
receiving, storage, and installation.-
                                    receiving, storage, and installation.-
l
l                             b.   Warehouses /Laydown Yards
b.
Warehouses /Laydown Yards
l
l
                                    The NRC inspector observed all materials, parts, and
The NRC inspector observed all materials, parts, and
                                    components stored in all warehouses (A, B, C, D, and
components stored in all warehouses (A, B,
                                    Electrical) and all laydown yards to determine if storage
C, D,
        _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ .
and
Electrical) and all laydown yards to determine if storage
_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ .


  . .'
.'
                                  8
.
            met the equivalent measures of Regulatory Guide 1.38 and
8
            American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
met the equivalent measures of Regulatory Guide 1.38 and
            N45.2.2-1972. These measures were implemented to prevent
American National Standards Institute (ANSI)
            damage, deterioration, or contamination.
N45.2.2-1972.
            Equipment such as instrumentation, tubing, Conax
These measures were implemented to prevent
            electrical penetrations, cable, Barton/Rosemount pressure     i
damage, deterioration, or contamination.
                                                                          '
Equipment such as instrumentation, tubing, Conax
            transmitters, ASCO Solenoids, pressure indicator
electrical penetrations, cable, Barton/Rosemount pressure
            switches, thermowells/ thermocouple, Magnetrol level
i
            indicators, Namco switches, bulk hardware, and shelf life     '
'
                                                                            ,
transmitters, ASCO Solenoids, pressure indicator
            material were stored to Level A and B requirements in
switches, thermowells/ thermocouple, Magnetrol level
            Warehouse "B". The humidity was being recorded on a
indicators, Namco switches, bulk hardware, and shelf life
            circular chart which measured temperature / humidity and
,
            which was calibrated February 23, 1987 and due for
'
            calibration again August 24, 1987. Materials such as           i'
material were stored to Level A and B requirements in
            "0" ring seals, spacers, piston kits, gaskets, and
Warehouse
            diaphragms for valves were monitored by date of
"B".
            expiration of shelf life. Other equipment such as pumps,
The humidity was being recorded on a
            valves, thermal insulation, abrasives, adhesives,
circular chart which measured temperature / humidity and
            grouting, and chemical materials were stored to Level "C"
which was calibrated February 23, 1987 and due for
            requirements in Warehouses A, C, and D. Bulk electrical
calibration again August 24, 1987.
            hardware was stored in the Electrical Warehouse.
Materials such as
i
"0"
ring seals, spacers, piston kits, gaskets, and
'
diaphragms for valves were monitored by date of
expiration of shelf life. Other equipment such as pumps,
valves, thermal insulation, abrasives, adhesives,
grouting, and chemical materials were stored to Level "C"
requirements in Warehouses A,
C,
and D.
Bulk electrical
hardware was stored in the Electrical Warehouse.
l
l
l
l          The NRC inspector inspected nine outside storage areas.
The NRC inspector inspected nine outside storage areas.
l
l
Electrical cable, trays, and miscellaneous hardware were
'
'
            Electrical cable, trays, and miscellaneous hardware were
stored in the cable reel yard and an adjacent yard for
            stored in the cable reel yard and an adjacent yard for
l
l           hardware. Piping supports, reinforcing / structural steel,
hardware.
            fuel racks, and other miscellaneous material were stored
Piping supports, reinforcing / structural steel,
            to Level "D" storage requirements; i.e., up on wood
fuel racks, and other miscellaneous material were stored
            dunnage and covered where necessary.
to Level "D"
l     c.   In Place Storage
storage requirements;
            The NRC inspector observed all accessible equipment in
i.e.,
i           Unit 1 and 2 to determine that equipment moved into
up on wood
            buildings and temporarily or permanently stored in place
dunnage and covered where necessary.
            continues to be appropriately stored and is afforded
l
            special protection where necessary to protect it from
c.
            ongoing construction activities.
In Place Storage
      d.   Quality Control
The NRC inspector observed all accessible equipment in
            The NRC jnspector found that quality controls (QC) for
i
            receiving and storage were implemented.   In Warehouse "B"
Unit 1 and 2 to determine that equipment moved into
            a QC inspector was stationed to perform receipt
buildings and temporarily or permanently stored in place
            inspections and there was evidence that a number of items
continues to be appropriately stored and is afforded
            had been inspected, rejected, tagged, and segregated to
special protection where necessary to protect it from
            preclude inadvertent use.
ongoing construction activities.
      No violations or deviations were identified.
d.
I                                                                         !
Quality Control
                                                                          l
The NRC jnspector found that quality controls (QC) for
                                                                  _-_ - -
receiving and storage were implemented.
In Warehouse
"B"
a QC inspector was stationed to perform receipt
inspections and there was evidence that a number of items
had been inspected, rejected, tagged, and segregated to
preclude inadvertent use.
No violations or deviations were identified.
I
!
l
_-_ -
-


          .,
!
                                    !                                                                                              ,
.,
                                                                                                  9
,
                                                                  7. RCB Penetrations and Fire Barriers (53053)
9
                                                                      The NRC inspector observed in process or completed work
7.
                                                                      relative to Unit 1 and 2 electrical and mechanical
RCB Penetrations and Fire Barriers (53053)
                                                                      penetrations. All mechanical penetrations have been
The NRC inspector observed in process or completed work
                                                                      installed.
relative to Unit 1 and 2 electrical and mechanical
penetrations.
All mechanical penetrations have been
installed.
'
'
                                                                      In SGB 1, el 832', room 88, the NRC inspector observed the
In SGB 1, el 832', room 88, the NRC inspector observed the
                                                                      physical appearance of the following previously installed
physical appearance of the following previously installed
                                                                      mechanical penetrations as:
mechanical penetrations as:
                                                                      MI-09, 10, 11 & 12         Steam generator blowdown
MI-09, 10, 11 & 12
                                                                                                piping
Steam generator blowdown
                                                                      MIII-20                   Demineralized H 2O to RCB
piping
                                                                      MV-3 & 4                   CCW from letdown heat exchanger
MIII-20
                                                                                                (Hx) and reactor containment
Demineralized H O to RCB
                                                                                                drain tank Ex
2
                                                                      MV-5                       Service air to RCB
MV-3 & 4
                                                                      MV-6                       CCW drain tank pump discharge line
CCW from letdown heat exchanger
                                                                      The NRC inspector observed the quality of fire barrier seals
(Hx) and reactor containment
                                                                      installed in SGB 1, el 832', Room 89. One volume control tank
drain tank Ex
                                                                      (TBX-LSATVC-01) and the associated piping which penetrates two
MV-5
                                                                      walls is located in this room. Completed fire barriers           ,
Service air to RCB
                                                                      6026183101 2003 6 89, 6026183100 2002 6 89, and 60260831 2001   !
MV-6
                                                                      6 89 were installed around the piping.                           !
CCW drain tank pump discharge line
                                                                                                                                      !
The NRC inspector observed the quality of fire barrier seals
                                                                      The NRC inspector observed AB 1 and 2 penetrations MV-14 and     )
installed in SGB 1, el 832', Room 89.
                                                                      MIII-18, RCB pressure relief and hydrogen purge supply exhaust   I
One volume control tank
                                                                      system located on the 832' el.
(TBX-LSATVC-01) and the associated piping which penetrates two
                                                                                                                                      1
walls is located in this room.
                                                                      Electrical penetrations in SGB 1 and 2 were observed to be in   i
Completed fire barriers
                                                                      various stages of construction; however, no in process work
,
                                                                      was observed.
6026183101 2003 6 89, 6026183100 2002 6 89, and 60260831 2001
                                                                      The installation of Bisco seal material Release No.
!
                                                                      SG-2-790-RM64-5001 was observed while work was in progress for
6 89 were installed around the piping.
                                                                      Machine 9876-1 System 95.
!
                                                                      No violations or deviations were identified.
!
                                                                  8. Piping and Piping Supports (50090, 55053)
The NRC inspector observed AB 1 and 2 penetrations MV-14 and
                                                                      The NRC inspector previously identified planned work
)
                                                                      modifications in SGB 1, room 88, that resulted from DCA 24676,
MIII-18, RCB pressure relief and hydrogen purge supply exhaust
I                                                                     Revision 0. During this inspection period the inspector
I
                                                                      observed that the modifications were in progress to relocate
system located on the 832' el.
                                                                      valves IMS-149, 151, 153, and 155. Unit 2 valves were to be
1
  _ _ _ _   . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Electrical penetrations in SGB 1 and 2 were observed to be in
i
various stages of construction; however, no in process work
was observed.
The installation of Bisco seal material Release No.
SG-2-790-RM64-5001 was observed while work was in progress for
Machine 9876-1 System 95.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8.
Piping and Piping Supports (50090, 55053)
The NRC inspector previously identified planned work
modifications in SGB 1, room 88, that resulted from DCA 24676,
I
Revision 0.
During this inspection period the inspector
observed that the modifications were in progress to relocate
valves IMS-149, 151, 153, and 155.
Unit 2 valves were to be
_ _ _ _
. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _


.'
.
.
  -
-
    .'                                                                                      ,
,
                                                                                            1
1
                                  10                                                         l
10
      transferred to Unit 1 and be renumbered. The reason for the
transferred to Unit 1 and be renumbered.
      change was the existing steam generator blowdown valves did
The reason for the
      not meet operability requirements. The applicant considered
change was the existing steam generator blowdown valves did
      this to be a significant deficiency (CP-86-035). The piping
not meet operability requirements.
      was described on drawings BRP MS-1-SB-003 through 006. The
The applicant considered
      NRC inspector found that the valve being removed from the
this to be a significant deficiency (CP-86-035).
      piping going into penetration MI-12 was partially resting on
The piping
      another pipe. This was pointed out to the applicant who
was described on drawings BRP MS-1-SB-003 through 006.
      immediately corrected the problem.
The
      The NRC inspector observed welding activities that were in
NRC inspector found that the valve being removed from the
      progress in the Brown & Root Fabrication Shop. The
piping going into penetration MI-12 was partially resting on
      documentation for support CC1 066 077 S33K, Revision 0,
another pipe.
      appeared to conflict with the safety class stamped on the name
This was pointed out to the applicant who
      plate.   The paperwork indicated it was American Society of
immediately corrected the problem.
      Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Class 3 while snubber 15090 was
The NRC inspector observed welding activities that were in
      marked ASME Class 2. The inspector found that there was no
progress in the Brown & Root Fabrication Shop.
      conflict because Section III of the ASME Code allows the
The
      downgrading of components to a lower class. The material for
documentation for support CC1 066 077 S33K, Revision 0,
      transition kit 16524-1720 was traceable using receiving
appeared to conflict with the safety class stamped on the name
      inspection report 20536 and material report 418991. The work
plate.
      was being accomplished to drawing Revision CP-2.
The paperwork indicated it was American Society of
      The NRC inspector observed work in progress in RCB 2 at the
Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Class 3 while snubber 15090 was
      885' el.   Feedwater (FW) support FW2-018-444-C72K was being
marked ASME Class 2.
      checked for concrete attachment (embeds) separation
The inspector found that there was no
      violations. Discussions with the responsible personnel
conflict because Section III of the ASME Code allows the
      revealed that multiple separation violations had been
downgrading of components to a lower class.
      identified when compared to the new specification (SS-30)
The material for
      criteria. More violations were expected in Unit 2 than Unit 1
transition kit 16524-1720 was traceable using receiving
      because 15,000 embeds were built into Unit 2 versus 3,000 in
inspection report 20536 and material report 418991.
      Unit 1. The NRC inspector found that corrective action report
The work
      (CAR) 86 plus 50.55(e) reports CP 86-04 and 86-59 had
was being accomplished to drawing Revision CP-2.
      identified these deficiencies to the NRC.
The NRC inspector observed work in progress in RCB 2 at the
      The NRC inspector observed work in progress in RCB 1 at
885' el.
      el 905'.   Containment spray piping support CT-2-044-015-C92R
Feedwater (FW) support FW2-018-444-C72K was being
      was being reworked, that is, washers were inserted and the
checked for concrete attachment (embeds) separation
      angle of the snubber was checked. The construction foreman
violations.
      had signed off the completed work.
Discussions with the responsible personnel
      The NRC inspector observed a CCW pipe support in room 205 of
revealed that multiple separation violations had been
      the AB 1. The installation of support CC-1-043-010-A43K had
identified when compared to the new specification (SS-30)
      been completed but had not been painted.
criteria.
      The NRC inspector observed that several restraints / supports in
More violations were expected in Unit 2 than Unit 1
      the hallway of the AB 2 (elevation 810') had paint removed to
because 15,000 embeds were built into Unit 2 versus 3,000 in
      determine the number vibroetched onto this component. They
Unit 1.
      were located near valve LCV-0112E at centerline GA 8'-0" 0/S
The NRC inspector found that corrective action report
      N.6-A.   TUE answered an inquiry as to whether this was an
(CAR) 86 plus 50.55(e) reports CP 86-04 and 86-59 had
      identification (10 CFR Appendix B, Criterion VIII) deficiency
identified these deficiencies to the NRC.
      that violated the ASME Section III, Division 1, Code. At a
The NRC inspector observed work in progress in RCB 1 at
                                                                    _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ -
el 905'.
Containment spray piping support CT-2-044-015-C92R
was being reworked, that is, washers were inserted and the
angle of the snubber was checked.
The construction foreman
had signed off the completed work.
The NRC inspector observed a CCW pipe support in room 205 of
the AB 1.
The installation of support CC-1-043-010-A43K had
been completed but had not been painted.
The NRC inspector observed that several restraints / supports in
the hallway of the AB 2 (elevation 810') had paint removed to
determine the number vibroetched onto this component. They
were located near valve LCV-0112E at centerline GA 8'-0" 0/S
N.6-A.
TUE answered an inquiry as to whether this was an
identification (10 CFR Appendix B,
Criterion VIII) deficiency
that violated the ASME Section III, Division 1, Code.
At a
_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ -


                                                                            .-_
.-_
A     .
A
                                                                                  l
.
    .
.
  .,
.,
                                        11
11
            meeting the TUE representative stated that there was no code
meeting the TUE representative stated that there was no code
            violation and presented an ASME procedure which controls such
violation and presented an ASME procedure which controls such
            activities and allows the observed practice.
activities and allows the observed practice.
            No violations or deviations were identified.
No violations or deviations were identified.
        9. Electrical Work Activities (51053, 51063)
9.
            The NRC inspector preselected electrical work activities to           i
Electrical Work Activities (51053, 51063)
            observe.   (The storage and handling of electrical materials is     j
The NRC inspector preselected electrical work activities to
            described in paragraph 6 and includes all that is presently
i
            stored on site.)
observe.
            The NRC inspector observed a cable tray walkdown in progress         ,
(The storage and handling of electrical materials is
            in Unit 2 cable spread room. The walkdown was a quality               j
j
                                                                                  '
described in paragraph 6 and includes all that is presently
            control training exercise. In ECB 1 cable spread room, the
stored on site.)
            NRC inspector observed in-process work activities at different
The NRC inspector observed a cable tray walkdown in progress
            times during the inspection period. The activities included a
,
            TUE audit that was in process, conduit walkdowns, and an
in Unit 2 cable spread room.
            electrical modification which resulted from DCA 31278R1 (which
The walkdown was a quality
            was nonsafety related).
j
            In AB 1, a power distribution panel CPX-EPDPNB-26 and
control training exercise.
            electronic control panel XAT-10B were inspected.     A bolt was
In ECB 1 cable spread room, the
            found to be missing from a bolt hole in the base support that
'
            secures these cabinets to the floor. These cabinets were
NRC inspector observed in-process work activities at different
            later identified as nonsafety related.
times during the inspection period.
            The NRC inspector observed in SGB 1, room 83, the replacement
The activities included a
            of 6.9 kv transformer porcelain buses that had been
TUE audit that was in process, conduit walkdowns, and an
            overtorqued and cracked.
electrical modification which resulted from DCA 31278R1 (which
            The NRC inspector observed various work activities in and
was nonsafety related).
            around cable trays. Two adverse conditions were referred to
In AB 1, a power distribution panel CPX-EPDPNB-26 and
            the applicant. First, workers expressed a concern about the
electronic control panel XAT-10B were inspected.
            installation of fire protection / detector conduit because
A bolt was
            procedure ECP-19A only allowed workers to go one size larger
found to be missing from a bolt hole in the base support that
            on conduit elbows.     It was stated that this sharp bend radii
secures these cabinets to the floor.
            will cause problems later when wirdng is run. This
These cabinets were
            nonsafety-related activity was referred to the applicant for
later identified as nonsafety related.
            resolution. Secondly, the NRC inspector observed cable tray
The NRC inspector observed in SGB 1, room 83, the replacement
            T13GSN83 in AB 1, room 88, which had cable spilling over the
of 6.9 kv transformer porcelain buses that had been
            tray.   The applicant determined that cable SP1197679 was a
overtorqued and cracked.
            spare which was coiled in the tray and the coil went over the
The NRC inspector observed various work activities in and
            edge of the tray.
around cable trays.
            No violations or deviations were identified.
Two adverse conditions were referred to
                                                                      ___ _     -
the applicant.
First, workers expressed a concern about the
installation of fire protection / detector conduit because
procedure ECP-19A only allowed workers to go one size larger
on conduit elbows.
It was stated that this sharp bend radii
will cause problems later when wirdng is run.
This
nonsafety-related activity was referred to the applicant for
resolution. Secondly, the NRC inspector observed cable tray
T13GSN83 in AB 1, room 88, which had cable spilling over the
tray.
The applicant determined that cable SP1197679 was a
spare which was coiled in the tray and the coil went over the
edge of the tray.
No violations or deviations were identified.
___ _
-


          .
.
        -
-
  . , .
. , .
                                          12
12
            10. Exit Interview (30703)
10.
                An exit interview was conducted on August 4, 1987, with the
Exit Interview (30703)
                applicant's representatives identified in paragraph 1 of this
An exit interview was conducted on August 4, 1987, with the
                report. During this exit interview, the scope and findings of
applicant's representatives identified in paragraph 1 of this
                the inspection were summarized.
report.
During this exit interview, the scope and findings of
the inspection were summarized.
l
l
l
l
Line 552: Line 809:
l
l
1
1
                                                                        -- _A
--
_A


.,.                             <l
<l
                                                    DISTRIBUTION:
.,.
                                                  4 Docket 1 Files:z(50-445/446)([NRCiPDRik
DISTRIBUTION:
                                                                    .
4 Docket 1 Files:z(50-445/446)([NRCiPDRik
                                                    Local PDR
Local PDR
                                                    CPPD Reading (HQ)
.
                                                    Site Reading
CPPD Reading (HQ)
                                                    *CPRT Group
Site Reading
                                                    * SRI-OPS
*CPRT Group
                                                    * SRI-CONST
* SRI-OPS
                                                    * MIS System
* SRI-CONST
                                                    *RSTS Operator
* MIS System
                                                    RPB
*RSTS Operator
                                                    RIV File
RPB
                                                    *DWeiss, RM/ALF
RIV File
                                                    JKeppler/JAxelrad
*DWeiss, RM/ALF
                                                    CIGrimes
JKeppler/JAxelrad
                                                    PFMcKee
CIGrimes
                                                    HSchierling
PFMcKee
                                                    JLyons
HSchierling
                                                    LChandler, OGC
JLyons
                                                    CPPD-LA, OSP
LChandler, OGC
                                                    *w/766
CPPD-LA, OSP
  _ _ - _ - _ - - - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ - _ -                       -   ._- _-         - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ - _ _ _
*w/766
_ _ - _ - _ - - - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ - _ -
-
._- _-
-
_ _ _ _ _ - _
_ - _ - _ _ _
}}
}}

Latest revision as of 07:28, 2 December 2024

Insp Repts 50-445/87-14 & 50-446/87-11 on 870708-0804.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected: Followup on Previous Insp Findings & Applicant Identified Const Deficiencies,General Plant Insps & Penetrations
ML20237G606
Person / Time
Site: Comanche Peak  Luminant icon.png
Issue date: 08/26/1987
From: Phillips H, Warnick R
NRC OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS
To:
Shared Package
ML20237G582 List:
References
50-445-87-14, 50-446-87-11, NUDOCS 8709020328
Download: ML20237G606 (13)


See also: IR 05000445/1987014

Text

_ .

.

_-__-

.'

l

.

'

1

U.

S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROJECTS

NRC Inspection Report:

50-445/87-14

Permits:

CPPR-126

50-446/87-11

CPPR-127

Dockets:

50-445

Category:

A2

50-446

Construction Permit

Expiration Dates:

Unit 1:

August 1, 1988

Unit 2:

Extension request

submitted

!

Applicant:

TU Electric

Skyway Tower

400 North Olive Street

Lock Box 81

Dallas, Texas

75201

Facility Name:

Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES)

Units 1 and 2

Inspection At:

Comanche Peak Site, Glen Rose, Texas

Inspection Conducted:

July 8 through August 4, 1987

Inspector:

. /

d*

d[8'7

l

H'.

$. Phillips,' Senior Resident Reactor

Date

Inspector, Construction

Reviewed by:

R F u)aamIcA

F- 2 t.- F7

'

R.

F. Warnick, Assistant Director

Date

for Inspection Programs

Comanche Peak Project Division

Office of Special Projects

8709020328 870826

PDR

ADOCK 05000445

O

PDR

_ _ _ _ - _ _

_-____ _ - _ _ _ _ -

. _ _ - _ _ -

.

2

Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted:

July 8 through August 4,

1987 (Report

Nos.

50-445/87-14; 50-446/87-11)

Areas Inspected:

Routine, unannounced safety inspection including

(1) followup on previous inspection findings; (2) followup on

applicant identified construction deficiencies; (3) general plant

inspections; (4) storage / handling of safety-related components;

(5) penetrations; (6) piping and supports; and (7) electrical work

activities.

Results:

Within the areas inspected, no violations or deviations

were identified.

A meeting was held on July 22, 1987, to resolve

the NRC's concern with the TUE response to NRC Inspection Report

50-445/84-32; 50-446/84-11 (paragraph 2).

-

- - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.'

.

,

3

DETAILS

1.

Persons Contacted

  • R.

P. Baker, Regulatory Compliance Manager, TU Electric

(TUE)

  • J.

L. Barker, Engineering Assurance Manager, TUE

  • M.

Blevins, Technical Support Manager, TUE

  • W.

G.

Counsil, Executive VP, Nuclear Engineering &

Operations, TUE

  • R.

D. Delano, Licensing Engineer, TUE

  • D.

E. Deviney, Operations Quality Assurance (QA) Manager,

TUE

'

  • T.

L. Heatherly, Regulatory Compliance Engineer, TUE

  • J.

Hicks, Licensing, TUE

  • J.

J. Kelley, Plant Operations Manager, TUE

  • 0.

Lowe, Engineering Director, TUE

  • L.

D. Nace, VP, Engineering and Construction, TUE

  • D.

Noss, QA, TUE

  • D.

M. Reynerson, Director of Construction, TUE

  • A.

B. Scott, VP, Nuclear Operations, TUE

,

  • C.

E.

Scott, Startup Manager, TUE

  • J.

C.

Smith, Plant Operations Staff, TUE

  • P.

B. Stevens, Electrical Engineering Manager, TUE

  • J.

F.

Streeter, Director of QA, TUE

  • T.

G. Tyler, Projects Director, TUE

The NRC inspector also interviewed other applicant employees

during this inspection period.

  • Denotes personnel present at the August 4, 1987 exit

interview.

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2.

Management Meetings (30702)

a.

On July 22, 1987, R. F. Warnick, H. S. Phillips, and C.

Hale of the NRC met with TUE staff members J. F.

Streeter, R. Spangler, and D. Noss to discuss the TUE

response to NRC Inspection Report 50-445/84-32;

50-446/84-11.

The NRC requested clarification and

additional information. That is, the response reflected a

more positive view of the TUE QA and audit program when

compared to the Comanche Peak Response Team results

reports for Issue-Specific Action Plans (ISAPs) VII.a.4

and VII.a.5.

Also the response did not factor in the

generic findings and corrective action discussed in the

ISAPs.

b.

Three representatives from the Texas Department of Labor

and Standards were onsite the week of July 13-17, 1987.

. .

.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _

____ __- _ __ _ _ ___ - - - __ _ _-_ _ _______-

4

4

The purpose of their visit was to inspect applicant

compliance with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code

as required by Texas law.

A representative from the NRC

onsite staff attended their entrance and exit meetings.

In addition,

P.

F. McKee, R.

F. Warnick, and H.

S.

Phillips (J.

G. Keppler and C.

I. Grimes were in

attendance part of the time) met with Steven M. Matthews,

Director and Chief Inspector, Boiler Division; George

Bynog, Assistant Director, Boiler Division; and Ricky

Bryan, Lead Inspector for Comanche Peak, Boiler Division

on July 14, 1987, to discuss their responsibilities and

authority, under Texas law, and items of mutual interest

relating to the applicant's compliance with the ASME

Code.

3.

Followup On Previous Inspection Findings (92701, 92702)

a.

(Closed) Open Item (445/8214-01):

Region IV (RIV)

planned to do additional inspection of vendor shop

performed welding (including NPSI) during a subsequent

,

inspection.

This item was opened during a RIV followup inspection in

response to a visit by an alleger at RIV.

The original

l

concerns dealt with American Welding Society (AWS)

'

Structural Welding Code, D.1.1, welds that were not in

accordance with this code.

The RIV inspector inspected

five girder welds and a box structure on main

steam /feedwater pipe whip restraints, addressing the

alleger's concerns in NRC Inspection Report 50-445/82-14.

Although the concerns were addressed, the NRC inspector

chose to perform additional inspection of similar vendor

l

welds including Nuclear Power Services, Inc. (NPSI)

l

during a future inspection and left the item open.

]

The currently assigned NRC inspector found that

additional inspections were performed and documented in

i

50-445/82-22; 50-445/84-29, 50-446/84-10; 50-445/83-24,

!

l

50-446/83-15; 50-445/82-25, 50-446/82-13; 50-445/80-22,

50-446/80-22; and the special NRC Technical Review Team

inspection documented in NUREG 0797 Supplement 10

1

(AQW-22, AW-39, AW-57, AQW-75, and AQW-76).

l

b.

(Closed) Violation (445/8507-V-06; 446/8505-V-04):

Failure to document on a Deficiency and Disposition

Report (DDR) a 24-48 pound deviation on cement scale MTE

779 frcm required accuracy.

The NRC inspector reviewed the corrective action file and

found that the violation was caused by a lack of

procedures.

Nonconformance reports (NCR)-C-85-101882,

Revision 1, and NCR-C-85-201617, Revision 1, were issued

i

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_ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _

I

.

5

to require an evaluation of two concrete placements while

the scales were in this condition and it was found that

specified design strengths were attained.

This resolves

this issue.

c.

(Closed) violation (445/8507-V-02): Failure to use Class

"E" concrete as specified.

The NRC inspector reviewed a TUE file on this item.

The original response (TXX-4727) from TUE was inadequate;

however, the supplemental response (TXX-6211) provided

the necessary information and action.

As a result of the

NRC inquiry, two deficiency reports were issued to ensure

appropriate drawing changes, document the design change,

and identify causes.

The applicant also found that this

grout substitution for Class E cencrete occurred in seven

Unit 1 and eight Unit 2 installations not previously

identified in response TXX-4727.

The NRC inspector found that the use of commercial

non-shrink grout with an average compressive strength of

8450 psi is an acceptable substitute even though it's use

j

was unauthorized at the time.

This strength exceeds the

Class

"E" concrete minimum strength of 4000 psi.

The

inspector observed a typical baseplate (TBX-RCPCG-01)

that was grouted.

)

The applicant's file showed that a project directive

(CPPA-56,467) was issued to emphasize the precedence of

design documents over vendor documents.

Stone & Webster

Procedure PP-053, TUE Procedure ECE-DC-5 (used by

Ebasco), and Impell Procedure IMP-FP-19 have either been

revised or emphasized to assure that conflicts between

vendor drawings and design drawings are resolved and that

design takes precedence.

d.

(Closed) Unresolved Item (446/8511-U-03):

The issuance

of drawing packages from satellites to the field and the

logging of the status of design change authorizations

(DCAs) and component modification cards (CMCs) into the

computer were not in controlled procedure DCP-3 but were

covered in uncontrolled guidelines.

The NRC inspector reviewed a TUE package which showed

that the uncontrolled guidelines were incorporated into

controlled procedures.

Paragraph 3.1.2.3 of DCP-3,

Revision 19, dated March 31, 1986, described the issuance

of drawings to the field.

Paragraph 2.1.5 of ECE-DC-7,

Revision 19, dated October 31, 1986, described the

tracking of DCAs and CMCs.

This resolves this issue.

_ _ _ _ - _ _ _

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,

6

e.

(Closed) Open Item (445/8601-0-01; 446/8601-0-01):

Ultrasonic testing procedures were not onsite.

The NRC inspector reviewed copies of the CB&I procedures

UTP-18B and UTP-25B that are now in the records vault.

TUE reviewed CB&I records that were removed and returned

i

to site and found that they have essential records.

This

resolves this issue.

I

No violations or deviations were identified.

4.

Followup On Applicant Identified Construction Deficiencies

(92700)

The NRC inspector reviewed construction deficiency reports

j

CP-87-13 through CP-87-54 which had been identified as

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potentially reportable construction deficiencies in accordance

j

with 10 CFR Part 50.55(e).

Each report was reviewed to assure

'

that the deficiency was fully identified, described,

evaluated, and that the NRC was notified in accordance with

TUE Procedure NEO-CS-1, Revision 1 and 10 CFR 50.55(e).

The following potentially reportable items were inspected in

the field to observe the deficient conditions and any

corrective actions in process.

Location

Number

Deficient Condition

1

RCB 1&2,

CP-86-61

Polar Crane not installed

i

el 905'

properly

I

RCB 1&2

CP-85-26

Steam generator lateral

el 905'

support restraint bolts

shortened

l

AB 2

CP-86-76

Gould battery racks

el 792'

improperly spaced

EC 1

CP-85-07

Butt splice CPI-ECPRC-13

el 830'

improperly made

EC 1&2

CP-86-54

Seismic supports for CR

el 840'

ceiling improperly

installed

AB 1&2

CP-86-11

CCW pump impellers cracked

el 810'

AB 1&2

CP-87-18

CCW heat exchangers have

el 790'

deficient seismic

qualifications

_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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7

Location

Number

Deficient Condition

SGB 1

CP-87-15

Air accumulators improperly

el 790'

stored

SGB 1

CP-87-20

6.9kV transformer porcelain

el 810'

bus cracked

DGB 2

CP-84-02

DG piston skirt had linear

el 810'

indication

SGB 2

CP-86-10

Bunker-Ramo penetration

el 852'

assemblies removed

No violations or deviations were identified.

5.

General Plant Inspections

At various times during the inspection period, the NRC

inspector conducted general inspections of the Unit 1 and 2

reactor containment (RCB), safeguards (SGB), auxiliary (AB),

electrical control (ECB), and diesel generator (DGB)

buildings.

All accessible rooms in these buildings were

inspected to observe current work activities with respect to

major safety-related equipment, electrical cable / trays,

mechanical components, piping, welding, coatings, Hilti bolts,

and removal of debris from the seismic gap between the

buildings.

The housekeeping, storage and handling conditions

inside these buildings and various outside storage areas were

l

also inspected (paragraph 6). Four backshift and two weekend

)

inspections were performed during this inspection period.

Work activities that were selected for more detailed

l

inspections are described in paragraphe 7, 8 and 9.

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No violations or deviations were identified.

'

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6.

Identification and Storage of Site Materials, Parts, and

'

Components (50073, 50090, 50095, 51053, 51063, 53053)

a.

Identification

The NRC inspector verified that equipment, components,

parts, and materials used in civil, electrical, and

mechanical activities were positively identified during

l

'

receiving, storage, and installation.-

l

b.

Warehouses /Laydown Yards

l

The NRC inspector observed all materials, parts, and

components stored in all warehouses (A, B,

C, D,

and

Electrical) and all laydown yards to determine if storage

_ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ .

.'

.

8

met the equivalent measures of Regulatory Guide 1.38 and

American National Standards Institute (ANSI)

N45.2.2-1972.

These measures were implemented to prevent

damage, deterioration, or contamination.

Equipment such as instrumentation, tubing, Conax

electrical penetrations, cable, Barton/Rosemount pressure

i

'

transmitters, ASCO Solenoids, pressure indicator

switches, thermowells/ thermocouple, Magnetrol level

indicators, Namco switches, bulk hardware, and shelf life

,

'

material were stored to Level A and B requirements in

Warehouse

"B".

The humidity was being recorded on a

circular chart which measured temperature / humidity and

which was calibrated February 23, 1987 and due for

calibration again August 24, 1987.

Materials such as

i

"0"

ring seals, spacers, piston kits, gaskets, and

'

diaphragms for valves were monitored by date of

expiration of shelf life. Other equipment such as pumps,

valves, thermal insulation, abrasives, adhesives,

grouting, and chemical materials were stored to Level "C"

requirements in Warehouses A,

C,

and D.

Bulk electrical

hardware was stored in the Electrical Warehouse.

l

l

The NRC inspector inspected nine outside storage areas.

l

Electrical cable, trays, and miscellaneous hardware were

'

stored in the cable reel yard and an adjacent yard for

l

hardware.

Piping supports, reinforcing / structural steel,

fuel racks, and other miscellaneous material were stored

to Level "D"

storage requirements;

i.e.,

up on wood

dunnage and covered where necessary.

l

c.

In Place Storage

The NRC inspector observed all accessible equipment in

i

Unit 1 and 2 to determine that equipment moved into

buildings and temporarily or permanently stored in place

continues to be appropriately stored and is afforded

special protection where necessary to protect it from

ongoing construction activities.

d.

Quality Control

The NRC jnspector found that quality controls (QC) for

receiving and storage were implemented.

In Warehouse

"B"

a QC inspector was stationed to perform receipt

inspections and there was evidence that a number of items

had been inspected, rejected, tagged, and segregated to

preclude inadvertent use.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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!

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,

9

7.

RCB Penetrations and Fire Barriers (53053)

The NRC inspector observed in process or completed work

relative to Unit 1 and 2 electrical and mechanical

penetrations.

All mechanical penetrations have been

installed.

'

In SGB 1, el 832', room 88, the NRC inspector observed the

physical appearance of the following previously installed

mechanical penetrations as:

MI-09, 10, 11 & 12

Steam generator blowdown

piping

MIII-20

Demineralized H O to RCB

2

MV-3 & 4

CCW from letdown heat exchanger

(Hx) and reactor containment

drain tank Ex

MV-5

Service air to RCB

MV-6

CCW drain tank pump discharge line

The NRC inspector observed the quality of fire barrier seals

installed in SGB 1, el 832', Room 89.

One volume control tank

(TBX-LSATVC-01) and the associated piping which penetrates two

walls is located in this room.

Completed fire barriers

,

6026183101 2003 6 89, 6026183100 2002 6 89, and 60260831 2001

!

6 89 were installed around the piping.

!

!

The NRC inspector observed AB 1 and 2 penetrations MV-14 and

)

MIII-18, RCB pressure relief and hydrogen purge supply exhaust

I

system located on the 832' el.

1

Electrical penetrations in SGB 1 and 2 were observed to be in

i

various stages of construction; however, no in process work

was observed.

The installation of Bisco seal material Release No.

SG-2-790-RM64-5001 was observed while work was in progress for

Machine 9876-1 System 95.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8.

Piping and Piping Supports (50090, 55053)

The NRC inspector previously identified planned work

modifications in SGB 1, room 88, that resulted from DCA 24676,

I

Revision 0.

During this inspection period the inspector

observed that the modifications were in progress to relocate

valves IMS-149, 151, 153, and 155.

Unit 2 valves were to be

_ _ _ _

. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

.'

.

-

,

1

10

transferred to Unit 1 and be renumbered.

The reason for the

change was the existing steam generator blowdown valves did

not meet operability requirements.

The applicant considered

this to be a significant deficiency (CP-86-035).

The piping

was described on drawings BRP MS-1-SB-003 through 006.

The

NRC inspector found that the valve being removed from the

piping going into penetration MI-12 was partially resting on

another pipe.

This was pointed out to the applicant who

immediately corrected the problem.

The NRC inspector observed welding activities that were in

progress in the Brown & Root Fabrication Shop.

The

documentation for support CC1 066 077 S33K, Revision 0,

appeared to conflict with the safety class stamped on the name

plate.

The paperwork indicated it was American Society of

Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Class 3 while snubber 15090 was

marked ASME Class 2.

The inspector found that there was no

conflict because Section III of the ASME Code allows the

downgrading of components to a lower class.

The material for

transition kit 16524-1720 was traceable using receiving

inspection report 20536 and material report 418991.

The work

was being accomplished to drawing Revision CP-2.

The NRC inspector observed work in progress in RCB 2 at the

885' el.

Feedwater (FW) support FW2-018-444-C72K was being

checked for concrete attachment (embeds) separation

violations.

Discussions with the responsible personnel

revealed that multiple separation violations had been

identified when compared to the new specification (SS-30)

criteria.

More violations were expected in Unit 2 than Unit 1

because 15,000 embeds were built into Unit 2 versus 3,000 in

Unit 1.

The NRC inspector found that corrective action report

(CAR) 86 plus 50.55(e) reports CP 86-04 and 86-59 had

identified these deficiencies to the NRC.

The NRC inspector observed work in progress in RCB 1 at

el 905'.

Containment spray piping support CT-2-044-015-C92R

was being reworked, that is, washers were inserted and the

angle of the snubber was checked.

The construction foreman

had signed off the completed work.

The NRC inspector observed a CCW pipe support in room 205 of

the AB 1.

The installation of support CC-1-043-010-A43K had

been completed but had not been painted.

The NRC inspector observed that several restraints / supports in

the hallway of the AB 2 (elevation 810') had paint removed to

determine the number vibroetched onto this component. They

were located near valve LCV-0112E at centerline GA 8'-0" 0/S

N.6-A.

TUE answered an inquiry as to whether this was an

identification (10 CFR Appendix B,

Criterion VIII) deficiency

that violated the ASME Section III, Division 1, Code.

At a

_ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ -

.-_

A

.

.

.,

11

meeting the TUE representative stated that there was no code

violation and presented an ASME procedure which controls such

activities and allows the observed practice.

No violations or deviations were identified.

9.

Electrical Work Activities (51053, 51063)

The NRC inspector preselected electrical work activities to

i

observe.

(The storage and handling of electrical materials is

j

described in paragraph 6 and includes all that is presently

stored on site.)

The NRC inspector observed a cable tray walkdown in progress

,

in Unit 2 cable spread room.

The walkdown was a quality

j

control training exercise.

In ECB 1 cable spread room, the

'

NRC inspector observed in-process work activities at different

times during the inspection period.

The activities included a

TUE audit that was in process, conduit walkdowns, and an

electrical modification which resulted from DCA 31278R1 (which

was nonsafety related).

In AB 1, a power distribution panel CPX-EPDPNB-26 and

electronic control panel XAT-10B were inspected.

A bolt was

found to be missing from a bolt hole in the base support that

secures these cabinets to the floor.

These cabinets were

later identified as nonsafety related.

The NRC inspector observed in SGB 1, room 83, the replacement

of 6.9 kv transformer porcelain buses that had been

overtorqued and cracked.

The NRC inspector observed various work activities in and

around cable trays.

Two adverse conditions were referred to

the applicant.

First, workers expressed a concern about the

installation of fire protection / detector conduit because

procedure ECP-19A only allowed workers to go one size larger

on conduit elbows.

It was stated that this sharp bend radii

will cause problems later when wirdng is run.

This

nonsafety-related activity was referred to the applicant for

resolution. Secondly, the NRC inspector observed cable tray

T13GSN83 in AB 1, room 88, which had cable spilling over the

tray.

The applicant determined that cable SP1197679 was a

spare which was coiled in the tray and the coil went over the

edge of the tray.

No violations or deviations were identified.

___ _

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.

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12

10.

Exit Interview (30703)

An exit interview was conducted on August 4, 1987, with the

applicant's representatives identified in paragraph 1 of this

report.

During this exit interview, the scope and findings of

the inspection were summarized.

l

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1

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1

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_A

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.,.

DISTRIBUTION:

4 Docket 1 Files:z(50-445/446)([NRCiPDRik

Local PDR

.

CPPD Reading (HQ)

Site Reading

  • CPRT Group
  • SRI-OPS
  • SRI-CONST
  • MIS System
  • RSTS Operator

RPB

RIV File

  • DWeiss, RM/ALF

JKeppler/JAxelrad

CIGrimes

PFMcKee

HSchierling

JLyons

LChandler, OGC

CPPD-LA, OSP

  • w/766

_ _ - _ - _ - - - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ - _ -

-

._- _-

-

_ _ _ _ _ - _

_ - _ - _ _ _