IR 07200030/2022401

Company - NRC Independent Spent Fuel Storage Security Inspection Report No. 07200030/2022401

ML22272A506
Person / Time
Site:	Maine Yankee
Issue date:	10/11/2022
From:	Daniel Schroeder Decommissioning, ISFSI, and Reactor Health Physics Branch
To:	Laing D Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co
References
IR 2022401
Download: ML22272A506 (1)

Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

475 ALLENDALE ROAD, SUITE 102 KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406-1415

October 11, 2022

Docket No. 07200030 License No. SFGL-14

Mr. Dan Laing, ISFSI Manager Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company 321 Old Ferry Road Wiscasset, ME 04578-4922

SUBJECT: MAINE YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY - NRC INDEPENDENT SPENT FUEL STORAGE SECURITY INSPECTION REPORT NO. 07200030/2022401

Dear Mr. Laing:

On September 15, 2022, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) security inspection at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company in Wiscasset, Maine. The inspection covered the licensees physical security plan and the October 16, 2002, Interim Compensatory Measures for Dry Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Order and was conducted using NRC Inspection Procedure 81311, Physical Security Requirements for Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations.

The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed with you and other members of your staff, on September 15, 2022.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to security and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no violations were identified.

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading -rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely, Daniel L. Schroeder, Chief Security, Emergency Preparedness and Incident Response Branch Division of Radiological Safety and Security

Enclosure:

Inspection Report No. 07200 030 /2022 401

REGION I==

INSPECTION REPORT

Docket No. 07200030

License No. SFGL-14

Report No. 0720 0030/2022 401

Licensee: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company

Address: 321 Old Ferry Road, Wiscasset, ME 04578

Location Inspected: Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI)

Inspection Dates: September 12 - 15, 20 22

Inspectors: Kenneth Hussar, Senior Physical Security Inspector Michael Ordoyne, Physical Security Inspector Thomas Eck, Physical Security Inspector

Approved by: Daniel L. Schroeder, Chief Security, Emergency Preparedness and Incident Response Branch, Division of Radiological Safety and Security

Enclosure REPORT DETAILS

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated this area by reviewing the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) security plan, implementing procedures, and records; conducting interviews with responsible security personnel and plant employees; and performing walk-downs of the ISFSI.

The inspectors: (1) reviewed the access authorization program for the ISFSI; (2) verified and assessed the licensees testing and maintenance program to assure the functionality and reliability of security equipment; and (3) verified that a rapid, capable response to safeguards contingency events had been appropriately developed and effectively implemented.

The inspectors conducted the following specific inspection activities and evaluated the program to determine if: (a) the access authorization program provided reasonable assurance that individuals granted unescorted access to the ISFSI Protected Area (PA)

were trustworthy and reliable and did not constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and safety; (b) procedures were in place to ensure that vehicles accessing the ISFSI had proper authorization and were properly searched; (c) keys, locks, combinations, and associated hardware used in the ISFSI PA were properly controlled; (d) the intrusion detection system (IDS) had the ability to detect and assess unauthorized penetration of the ISFSI PA and adequate response capability existed; (e) alarms for the ISFSI IDS annunciated at an alarm station which was continually staffed; (f) the ISFSI PA was illuminated to facilitate adequate assessment of PA penetration or unauthorized activity; (g) a program was in place for testing and maintenance of the physical protection systems associated with the ISFSI; (h) the spent fuel storage was within a PA and was protected by two barriers; (i) the vehicle barrier system satisfied the design vehicle bomb attack requirements; (j) communications had been established between onsite security forces and a designated response force or local law enforcement agency (LLEA); (k) a security organization with written procedures had been established; (l) members of the security organization were trained, equipped, qualified, and requalified to perform assigned duties; (m) the committed responders provided for an adequate armed response; (n) written response procedures were established and maintained; (o) training included ISFSI activities; (p) safeguards events were being properly reported; (q) audits of the physical protection system were conducted; (r) signs were posted in accordance with requirements; (s) the licensee established an emergency plan; (t) the response force or LLEA had unimpeded access to the ISFSI PA during contingency events; and (u) staffing, procedures, and resources were adequate to protect against radiological sabotage.

b. Findings

c. Conclusions

No violations were identified.

Exit Meeting Summary

On September 15, 2022, the inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Dan Laing, ISFSI Manager, and other members of the licensees staff. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.

A-1

ATTACHMENT SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel D. Laing, ISFSI Manager J. Lenois, Security Program Manager S. Hemingway, Asst. Director of Operations

LIST OF ITEMS OPEN, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened None

Opened and Closed None

Closed None

INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED

IP 81311, Physical Security Requirements f or Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Procedures SP-2, PA Access Authorization Program, Revision 12 SP-10, Security Force Patrols, Revision 13 SP-11, Testing and Maintenance of Security Equipment, Revision 32 SP-13, Lock and Key Control, Revision 17 SP-16, Application of Safeguards Compensatory Measures, Revision 21 SP-18, Contingencies, Revision 10

Other Documents ISFSI VBS Evaluation Rev 0 - Calc No 044-01 Blast Calculation - NEI Package DTD - Feb 25, 2002 Maine Yankee Physical Security Plan, Revision 4 ISFSI Memo 21-108 & 109, LLEA MOU Self-Assessment MY-SA-21- 002 Quality Assurance Audit No. MY-22-A06-01

Condition Reports MY-CR-20-126 MY-CR-21-013 MY-CR-21-032 MY-CR-21-061 MY-CR-21-088 MY-CR-21-175 MY-CR-21-191 A-2

MY-CR-21-192 MY-CR-22-072

Condition Reports Generated MY-CR-22-225 MY-CR-22-226 MY-CR-22-227 MY-CR-22-228 MY-CR-22-229

LIST OF ACRONYMS USED

ADAMS Agencywide Documents and Access Management System CFR Code of Federal Regulations IDS Intrusion Detection System ISFSI Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation LLEA Local Law Enforcement Agency NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission PA Protected Area PA R S Publicly Available Records