IR 05000269/2002001: Difference between revisions

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As discussed in our previous annual assessment letter dated May 31, 2001, this inspection and assessment cycle consisted of three quarters (i.e. the second, third, and fourth calendar quarters of Calendar Year 2001) instead of the usual four quarters. This change was implemented in order to align the inspection and assessment cycle with the calendar year beginning on January 1, 2002.
As discussed in our previous annual assessment letter dated May 31, 2001, this inspection and assessment cycle consisted of three quarters (i.e. the second, third, and fourth calendar quarters of Calendar Year 2001) instead of the usual four quarters. This change was implemented in order to align the inspection and assessment cycle with the calendar year beginning on January 1, 2002.


Overall, Oconee operated in a manner that preserved public health and safety and met all cornerstone objectives with moderate degradation in safety performance. For Unit 1, plant performance during the assessment cycle was within the Degraded Cornerstone Column of the NRCs Action Matrix. For Units 2 and 3, plant performance during the assessment cycle was within the Regulatory Response Column of the NRCs Action Matrix. This was based on two inspection findings of low to moderate safety significance (White) in the mitigating systems cornerstone, with one of the findings only applicable to Unit 1.
Overall, Oconee operated in a manner that preserved public health and safety and met all cornerstone objectives with moderate degradation in safety performance. For Unit 1, plant performance during the assessment cycle was within the Degraded Cornerstone Column of the NRCs Action Matrix. For Units 2 and 3, plant performance during the assessment cycle was within the Regulatory Response Column of the NRCs Action Matrix. This was based on two inspection findings of low to moderate safety significance (W hite) in the mitigating systems cornerstone, with one of the findings only applicable to Unit 1.


The first White finding involved a design calculation performance deficiency associated with reduced capability to provide reactor coolant makeup using the spent fuel pool (SFP) as a suction source for a high pressure injection pump following certain tornadoes. While this performance deficiency involved all three units, the White safety significance only applied to Unit 1 based on that unit having older style reactor coolant pump (RCP) seals versus Units 2 and 3 having high temperature RCP seals. The second White finding was for an inadequate procedure which increased the likelihood that station auxiliary service water (ASW) flow to the steam generators could not be established within 40 minutes following certain tornado events.
The first W hite finding involved a design calculation performance deficiency associated with reduced capability to provide reactor coolant makeup using the spent fuel pool (SFP) as a suction source for a high pressure injection pump following certain tornadoes. W hile this performance deficiency involved all three units, the W hite safety significance only applied to Unit 1 based on that unit having older style reactor coolant pump (RCP) seals versus Units 2 and 3 having high temperature RCP seals. The second W hite finding was for an inadequate procedure which increased the likelihood that station auxiliary service water (ASW ) flow to the steam generators could not be established within 40 minutes following certain tornado events.


DEC   2 In October 2001, the NRC conducted a supplemental inspection of the aforementioned White findings per Inspection Procedure 95002. The inspection determined that your overall root cause evaluations and extent of condition review of both findings were adequate. While your planned corrective actions appeared to address problems identified with your tornado mitigation strategy, your corrective actions were not sufficiently developed at the time of the inspection to close the White finding associated with the SFP. The White finding associated with ASW was closed because your corrective actions addressed the specific issues associated with that finding.
DEC 2


Because the White finding associated with the SFP remains open, we plan to perform a followup inspection to the 95002 supplemental inspection to verify that your corrective actions have addressed the finding. In addition, the inspection will assess the adequacy of your corrective actions to address the contributing cause for both White findings and the contributing cause for other problems with your tornado mitigation strategy.
In October 2001, the NRC conducted a supplemental inspection of the aforementioned W hite findings per Inspection Procedure 95002. The inspection determined that your overall root cause evaluations and extent of condition review of both findings were adequate. W hile your planned corrective actions appeared to address problems identified with your tornado mitigation strategy, your corrective actions were not sufficiently developed at the time of the inspection to close the W hite finding associated with the SFP. The W hite finding associated with ASW was closed because your corrective actions addressed the specific issues associated with that finding.
 
Because the W hite finding associated with the SFP remains open, we plan to perform a followup inspection to the 95002 supplemental inspection to verify that your corrective actions have addressed the finding. In addition, the inspection will assess the adequacy of your corrective actions to address the contributing cause for both W hite findings and the contributing cause for other problems with your tornado mitigation strategy.


As you are aware, the following issues are still under review as part of the Significance Determination Process and supplemental inspections may also be warranted if these issues are determined to be of greater than very low safety significance (Green):
As you are aware, the following issues are still under review as part of the Significance Determination Process and supplemental inspections may also be warranted if these issues are determined to be of greater than very low safety significance (Green):
* Unresolved Item (URI) 50-269/00-05-11 (Unit 1 mid-loop operations while relying on a temporary cover on the inner emergency personnel hatch to meet the requirements for containment closure)
 
* URI 50-269,270,287/00-08-01 (potential high temperatures in the low pressure injection and high pressure injection pump rooms following loss of coolant accident scenarios)
Unresolved Item (URI) 50-269/00-05-11 (Unit 1 mid-loop operations while relying on a temporary cover on the inner emergency personnel hatch to meet the requirements for containment closure)
* URI 50-269,270,287/00-08-02 (potential flooding problem from non-safety related lines in the auxiliary building)
 
* URI 50-269,270,287/00-08-04 (uncontrolled design changes to penetration room blowout panels)
URI 50-269,270,287/00-08-01 (potential high temperatures in the low pressure injection and high pressure injection pump rooms following loss of coolant accident scenarios)
 
URI 50-269,270,287/00-08-02 (potential flooding problem from non-safety related lines in the auxiliary building)
 
URI 50-269,270,287/00-08-04 (uncontrolled design changes to penetration room blowout panels)
 
The enclosed inspection plan details the inspections scheduled through March 31, 2003. In addition to baseline inspection activities, the plan includes safety issue inspections conducted in accordance with Temporary Instruction 2515/145, Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles (NRC Bulletin 2001-01) and routine inspections of activities associated with your Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation. The inspection plan is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite.
The enclosed inspection plan details the inspections scheduled through March 31, 2003. In addition to baseline inspection activities, the plan includes safety issue inspections conducted in accordance with Temporary Instruction 2515/145, Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles (NRC Bulletin 2001-01) and routine inspections of activities associated with your Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation. The inspection plan is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite.


Routine resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature. The last six months of the inspection plan are tentative and may be revised at the mid-cycle review meeting.
Routine resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature. The last six months of the inspection plan are tentative and may be revised at the mid-cycle review meeting.


With respect to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, immediately following the attacks, the NRC issued safeguards advisories recommending that nuclear power plant licensees go to the highest level of security, and all promptly did so. With continued uncertainty about the possibility of additional terrorist activities, the Nation's nuclear power plants, including Oconee, remain at a high level of security. On February 25, 2002, the NRC
W ith respect to the terrorist attacks on the W orld Trade Center and the Pentagon, immediately following the attacks, the NRC issued safeguards advisories recommending that nuclear power plant licensees go to the highest level of security, and all promptly did so. W ith continued uncertainty about the possibility of additional terrorist activities, the Nation's nuclear power plants, including Oconee, remain at a high level of security. On February 25, 2002, the NRC DEC 3 issued an Order to all nuclear power plant licensees, requiring them to take certain additional interim compensatory measures to address the generalized high-level threat environment.


DEC    3 issued an Order to all nuclear power plant licensees, requiring them to take certain additional interim compensatory measures to address the generalized high-level threat environment.
These additional compensatory requirements will provide the NRC with reasonable assurance that public health and safety and the common defense and security continue to be adequately protected in the current generalized high-level threat environment. These requirements will remain in effect pending notification from the Commission that a significant change in the threat environment occurs, or until the Commission determines that other changes are needed following a more comprehensive re-evaluation of current safeguards and security programs. To date, we have monitored Duke Energy Corporations actions in response to the terrorist attacks through a series of audits. W ith the issuance of the Order, in addition to the inspections described in the enclosed plan, we will evaluate Oconees compliance with these interim requirements.


These additional compensatory requirements will provide the NRC with reasonable assurance that public health and safety and the common defense and security continue to be adequately protected in the current generalized high-level threat environment. These requirements will remain in effect pending notification from the Commission that a significant change in the threat environment occurs, or until the Commission determines that other changes are needed following a more comprehensive re-evaluation of current safeguards and security programs. To date, we have monitored Duke Energy Corporations actions in response to the terrorist attacks through a series of audits. With the issuance of the Order, in addition to the inspections described in the enclosed plan, we will evaluate Oconees compliance with these interim requirements.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC W eb site at http://www.nrc.gov/r eading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
 
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).


If circumstances arise which cause us to change our inspection plan, we will contact you to discuss the change as soon as possible. Please contact Robert Haag at (404) 562-4550 with any questions you may have regarding this letter or the inspection plan.
If circumstances arise which cause us to change our inspection plan, we will contact you to discuss the change as soon as possible. Please contact Robert Haag at (404) 562-4550 with any questions you may have regarding this letter or the inspection plan.
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Sincerely,
Sincerely,
/RA Bruce Mallett for/
/RA Bruce Mallett for/
Luis A. Reyes Regional Administrator Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, 50-287, 72-04 License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55, SNM-2503 Enclosure: Oconee Inspection/Activity Plan cc w/encl:
 
Luis A. Reyes Regional Administrator
 
Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, 50-287, 72-04 License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55, SNM-2503
 
Enclosure: Oconee Inspection/Activity Plan
 
cc w/encl:
Compliance Manager (ONS)
Compliance Manager (ONS)
Duke Energy Corporation Electronic Mail Distribution Lisa Vaughn Legal Department (PB05E)
Duke Energy Corporation Electronic Mail Distribution
Duke Energy Corporation 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 cc: Continued see page 4
 
Lisa Vaughn Legal Department (PB05E)
Duke Energy Corporation 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242
 
cc: Continued see page 4 DEC 4 cc: Continued Anne Cottingham W inston and Strawn Electronic Mail Distribution
 
Mel Fry, Director Division of Radiation Protection N. C. Department of Environmental Health & Natural Resources Electronic Mail Distribution
 
Henry J. Porter, Assistant Director Div. of W aste Mgmt.
 
S. C. Department of Health and Environmental Control Electronic Mail Distribution
 
R. Mike Gandy Division of Radioactive W aste Mgmt.
 
S. C. Department of Health and Environmental Control Electronic Mail Distribution
 
County Supervisor of Oconee County 415 S. Pine Street W alhalla, SC 29691-2145


DEC  4 cc: Continued Anne Cottingham Winston and Strawn Electronic Mail Distribution Mel Fry, Director Division of Radiation Protection N. C. Department of Environmental Health & Natural Resources Electronic Mail Distribution Henry J. Porter, Assistant Director Div. of Waste Mgmt.
Lyle Graber, LIS NUS Corporation Electronic Mail Distribution


S. C. Department of Health and Environmental Control Electronic Mail Distribution R. Mike Gandy Division of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.
Manager Nuclear Regulatory Licensing Duke Energy Corporation 526 S. Church Street Charlotte, NC 28201-0006


S. C. Department of Health and Environmental Control Electronic Mail Distribution County Supervisor of Oconee County 415 S. Pine Street Walhalla, SC 29691-2145 Lyle Graber, LIS NUS Corporation Electronic Mail Distribution Manager Nuclear Regulatory Licensing Duke Energy Corporation 526 S. Church Street Charlotte, NC 28201-0006 Peggy Force Assistant Attorney General N. C. Department of Justice Electronic Mail Distribution
Peggy Force Assistant Attorney General N. C. Department of Justice Electronic Mail Distribution DEC 5 Distribution w/encl :
L. Olshan, NRR RIDSNRRDIPMLIPB PUBLIC


DEC    5 Distribution w/encl:
PUBLIC DOCUMENT (circle one): YES NO OFFICE SIGNATURE vm rh NAME VMcCree RHaag DATE 2/28/02 2/28/02 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: C:\\Program Files\\Adobe\\Acrobat 4.0\\PDF Output\\E O C Oconee Assess L 2002.wpd
L. Olshan, NRR RIDSNRRDIPMLIPB PUBLIC PUBLIC DOCUMENT (circle one): YES NO OFFICE SIGNATURE vm rh NAME VMcCree RHaag DATE 2/28/02 2/28/02 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: C:\Program Files\Adobe\Acrobat 4.0\PDF Output\E O C Oconee Assess L 2002.wpd
}}
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Revision as of 18:55, 13 November 2024

Annual Assessment Letter - Oconee Nuclear Station (NRC Inspection Report 50-269/02-01, 50-270/02-01 and 50-287/02-01)
ML23194A045
Person / Time
Site: Oconee  Duke Energy icon.png
Issue date: 03/04/2002
From: Reyes L
Division Reactor Projects II
To: Mccollum W
Duke Energy Corp
References
IR 2002001
Download: ML23194A045 (1)
v • d • e


Text

March 4, 2002

SUBJECT:

ANNUAL ASSESSMENT LETTER - OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION (NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-269/02-01, 50-270/02-01 AND 50-287/02-01)

Dear Mr. McCollum:

On February 4, 2002, the NRC staff completed its end-of-cycle plant performance assessment of the Oconee Nuclear Station. The end-of-cycle review for Oconee involved the participation of all technical divisions in evaluating performance indicators (PIs) and inspection results for the period from April 1 through December 31, 2001. The purpose of this letter is to inform you of our assessment of your safety performance during this period and our plans for future inspections at your facility. This will provide you with the opportunity to prepare for these inspections and to inform us of any planned inspections which may conflict with your plant activities.

As discussed in our previous annual assessment letter dated May 31, 2001, this inspection and assessment cycle consisted of three quarters (i.e. the second, third, and fourth calendar quarters of Calendar Year 2001) instead of the usual four quarters. This change was implemented in order to align the inspection and assessment cycle with the calendar year beginning on January 1, 2002.

Overall, Oconee operated in a manner that preserved public health and safety and met all cornerstone objectives with moderate degradation in safety performance. For Unit 1, plant performance during the assessment cycle was within the Degraded Cornerstone Column of the NRCs Action Matrix. For Units 2 and 3, plant performance during the assessment cycle was within the Regulatory Response Column of the NRCs Action Matrix. This was based on two inspection findings of low to moderate safety significance (W hite) in the mitigating systems cornerstone, with one of the findings only applicable to Unit 1.

The first W hite finding involved a design calculation performance deficiency associated with reduced capability to provide reactor coolant makeup using the spent fuel pool (SFP) as a suction source for a high pressure injection pump following certain tornadoes. W hile this performance deficiency involved all three units, the W hite safety significance only applied to Unit 1 based on that unit having older style reactor coolant pump (RCP) seals versus Units 2 and 3 having high temperature RCP seals. The second W hite finding was for an inadequate procedure which increased the likelihood that station auxiliary service water (ASW ) flow to the steam generators could not be established within 40 minutes following certain tornado events.

DEC 2

In October 2001, the NRC conducted a supplemental inspection of the aforementioned W hite findings per Inspection Procedure 95002. The inspection determined that your overall root cause evaluations and extent of condition review of both findings were adequate. W hile your planned corrective actions appeared to address problems identified with your tornado mitigation strategy, your corrective actions were not sufficiently developed at the time of the inspection to close the W hite finding associated with the SFP. The W hite finding associated with ASW was closed because your corrective actions addressed the specific issues associated with that finding.

Because the W hite finding associated with the SFP remains open, we plan to perform a followup inspection to the 95002 supplemental inspection to verify that your corrective actions have addressed the finding. In addition, the inspection will assess the adequacy of your corrective actions to address the contributing cause for both W hite findings and the contributing cause for other problems with your tornado mitigation strategy.

As you are aware, the following issues are still under review as part of the Significance Determination Process and supplemental inspections may also be warranted if these issues are determined to be of greater than very low safety significance (Green):

Unresolved Item (URI) 50-269/00-05-11 (Unit 1 mid-loop operations while relying on a temporary cover on the inner emergency personnel hatch to meet the requirements for containment closure)

URI 50-269,270,287/00-08-01 (potential high temperatures in the low pressure injection and high pressure injection pump rooms following loss of coolant accident scenarios)

URI 50-269,270,287/00-08-02 (potential flooding problem from non-safety related lines in the auxiliary building)

URI 50-269,270,287/00-08-04 (uncontrolled design changes to penetration room blowout panels)

The enclosed inspection plan details the inspections scheduled through March 31, 2003. In addition to baseline inspection activities, the plan includes safety issue inspections conducted in accordance with Temporary Instruction 2515/145, Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles (NRC Bulletin 2001-01) and routine inspections of activities associated with your Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation. The inspection plan is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved in advance of inspector arrival onsite.

Routine resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature. The last six months of the inspection plan are tentative and may be revised at the mid-cycle review meeting.

W ith respect to the terrorist attacks on the W orld Trade Center and the Pentagon, immediately following the attacks, the NRC issued safeguards advisories recommending that nuclear power plant licensees go to the highest level of security, and all promptly did so. W ith continued uncertainty about the possibility of additional terrorist activities, the Nation's nuclear power plants, including Oconee, remain at a high level of security. On February 25, 2002, the NRC DEC 3 issued an Order to all nuclear power plant licensees, requiring them to take certain additional interim compensatory measures to address the generalized high-level threat environment.

These additional compensatory requirements will provide the NRC with reasonable assurance that public health and safety and the common defense and security continue to be adequately protected in the current generalized high-level threat environment. These requirements will remain in effect pending notification from the Commission that a significant change in the threat environment occurs, or until the Commission determines that other changes are needed following a more comprehensive re-evaluation of current safeguards and security programs. To date, we have monitored Duke Energy Corporations actions in response to the terrorist attacks through a series of audits. W ith the issuance of the Order, in addition to the inspections described in the enclosed plan, we will evaluate Oconees compliance with these interim requirements.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRCs Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be made available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC W eb site at http://www.nrc.gov/r eading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

If circumstances arise which cause us to change our inspection plan, we will contact you to discuss the change as soon as possible. Please contact Robert Haag at (404) 562-4550 with any questions you may have regarding this letter or the inspection plan.

Sincerely,

/RA Bruce Mallett for/

Luis A. Reyes Regional Administrator

Docket Nos.: 50-269, 50-270, 50-287, 72-04 License Nos.: DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55, SNM-2503

Enclosure: Oconee Inspection/Activity Plan

cc w/encl:

Compliance Manager (ONS)

Duke Energy Corporation Electronic Mail Distribution

Lisa Vaughn Legal Department (PB05E)

Duke Energy Corporation 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242

cc: Continued see page 4 DEC 4 cc: Continued Anne Cottingham W inston and Strawn Electronic Mail Distribution

Mel Fry, Director Division of Radiation Protection N. C. Department of Environmental Health & Natural Resources Electronic Mail Distribution

Henry J. Porter, Assistant Director Div. of W aste Mgmt.

S. C. Department of Health and Environmental Control Electronic Mail Distribution

R. Mike Gandy Division of Radioactive W aste Mgmt.

S. C. Department of Health and Environmental Control Electronic Mail Distribution

County Supervisor of Oconee County 415 S. Pine Street W alhalla, SC 29691-2145

Lyle Graber, LIS NUS Corporation Electronic Mail Distribution

Manager Nuclear Regulatory Licensing Duke Energy Corporation 526 S. Church Street Charlotte, NC 28201-0006

Peggy Force Assistant Attorney General N. C. Department of Justice Electronic Mail Distribution DEC 5 Distribution w/encl :

L. Olshan, NRR RIDSNRRDIPMLIPB PUBLIC

PUBLIC DOCUMENT (circle one): YES NO OFFICE SIGNATURE vm rh NAME VMcCree RHaag DATE 2/28/02 2/28/02 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: C:\\Program Files\\Adobe\\Acrobat 4.0\\PDF Output\\E O C Oconee Assess L 2002.wpd

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