ML23305A042

Updated Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report

ML23305A042
Person / Time
Site:	Braidwood
Issue date:	11/01/2023
From:	Constellation Energy Generation
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML23305A039	List: BW230048, Outage 23 and Unit 2 Refueling Outage 23 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Reports to Reflect TSTF-577 Reporting Requirements ML23305A041 ML23305A042
References
BW230048
Download: ML23305A042 (1)

Text

Enclosure 2 Enclosure 2 Braidwood Station, Unit 2 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report E2 - 1 of 56

Enclosure 2 Braidwood Station, Unit 2 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report Introduction In Reference 1, Constellation Energy Generation (CEG) submitted a request for an amendment to Renewed Facility Operating License No. NPF-77 for the Braidwood Station (Braidwood), Unit 2 to adopt Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF)-577, "Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections" and Reference 2, Supplement to Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-577, "Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections". Reference 1 and 2 were approved by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in Reference 3. As noted in Reference 2, "CEG will submit SG Tube Inspection Reports meeting the revised TS 5.6.9 requirements within 60 days after implementation of the license amendment at Braidwood." Based on NRC approval (Reference 3) TSTF-577 was implemented at Braidwood Station on September 13, 2023.

Braidwood Unit 2 Technical Specification (TS) 5.6.9, "Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report," states "A report shall be submitted within 180 days after the initial entry into MODE 4 following completion of an inspection performed in accordance with the Specification 5.5.9, 'Steam Generator (SG) Program'." This enclosure provides the 180-day report with the revised Braidwood Unit 2 TS 5.6.9 reporting requirements in accordance with References 3. Each Braidwood Unit 2 TS 5.6.9 reporting requirement is listed below along with the associated information based on the inspection performed during the Braidwood Unit 2 Cycle 23 April 2023 refueling outage (A2R23), which was the last inspection of the Braidwood Unit 2 steam generators (SGs) The 180-Day report will follow the template provided in Appendix G to the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) Steam Generator Management Program: Steam Generator Integrity Assessment Guidelines, Revision 5 (Reference 4). which provides additional information beyond the Braidwood Unit 2 TS 5.6.9 reporting requirements.

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Enclosure 2

1. Design and operating parameters The SGs at Braidwood Unit 2 are original Westinghouse Model 05 SGs, which have thermally treated Alloy 600 tubing. The SGs had operated one fuel cycle since the previous inspection in A2R22. Inspections of the SGs were last performed during A2R23. These inspections included eddy current testing of the SG tubing as well as primary and secondary side visual inspections. Table 1 provides the Braidwood Unit 2 SG design and operating parameter information.

Table 1: Braidwood Unit 2 - Steam Generator Design and Operating Parameters I SG Model / Tube Material / I-Westinghouse Model 05 / Allo_y_6_0_0_T_T_/_4__________~

I

• Number of SGs per Unit

-I I Number of tubes per SG / 4,570 I 0.75 in./ 0.043 in I

• Nominal Tube Diameter/ tube thickness

-SupporiPlate Style / Material Quafrefoil (Broached) TSPs and U-bend AVBs /

---

~

stainless

- ,__ steel ------

Last Inspection Date Spring 2023 during A2R23

! EFPM Since Last Inspection 17.4 EFPM (1.45 EFPY) (from A2R22ToA2R23) r-fotal Cumulative SG EFPY 31.3 EFPY (as of A2R23)

Mode 4 lnitialEntry 5/11/2023 from A2R23-0bserved Primary-to-Secondary No Observed Leakage Leak Rate

---

~--

Nominal Thot at Full Power 611 °F Operation Loose Parts Strainer The Model 05 design has a preheater section with multiple baffles through which the main feedwater

• travels. Foreign objects entering the SGs tend to collect on the lowest elevation baffle plate. In addition, each main feedwater pump has small diameter holes in an inlet strainer to prevent the introduction of

• -- - - - - - - - + -forei ~ ~n_t"llaterial into trie pipir:i_gj~_adingJ9Jhe SGs.

Degradation Mechanism A sub-population of 14 potentially high residual Sub-Population  : stress tubes has been identified from eddy current U-bend offset signals and are currently

designated as a sub population potentially more II susceptible to ODSCC in the A2R23 degradation

. assessment.

SG program guideline deviations None

• • ----------1I since last Inspection -------.,-~---~-------- -

SG Schematic .. ~ee Figure 1 _ _ I

---

~

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Enclosure 2 Figure 1: Tube Support Arrangement for Braidwood Unit 2 Model D5 SGs AnU-vlbn,iion

-....;;::::;..1r,;;__-\ ---~-bars 11H 11C 10H 10C 09H 09C 0611 nae 07H 07C 06C 05H 05C 04C i=eedwater Inlet 03H 03C 02C 01H 01C TSH TSC TEH TEC Nozzle Notes: Anti-Vibration Bars (AVB) are denoted as AV in the figure

1. 1. C - Cold Leg Tube Support Plate (quatrefoil) / Baffle (drilled hole)

1. 1. H - Hot Leg Tube Support Plate (quatrefoil) / Baffle (drilled hole)

TSH/TSC -Hot/Cold Tubesheet (designates top of tubesheet)

TEH/TEC - Hot/Cold Tube End E2 - 4 of 56

Enclosure 2

2. The scope of the inspections performed on each SG (TS 5.6.9.a) and if applicable, a discussion of the reason for scope expansion The A2R23 outage was comprised of a 100% bobbin and 100% array probe full length examination of all in service tubes in all four SGs. These inspections may use a combination probe that contains a bobbin coil and array coils.

• Due to a low bend radius of tubes in Rows 1 and 2, these tubes were only inspected from tube end to the 11 th hot leg and cold leg tube support ( 11 H or 11 C).

Rotating pancake coil (RPC) probes (Plus-Point) were used for special interest testing and resolution of bobbin and array indications when necessary. These included:

• 100% Row 1 and Row 2 U-bend region from TSP 11 H to 11 C.

• 100% Dents/Dings >5.0 volts located in the Hot leg, Cold leg and U-bend.

There was no scope expansion required or performed during the A2R23 eddy current inspections.

In addition to the eddy current inspections, visual inspections were also performed on both the primary and secondary sides. Primary side visual inspections included the channel head bowl cladding, divider plate, divider plate welds and previously installed tube plugs.

Secondary side visual inspections were performed at the preheater baffle plate in the SG 2A and SG 2C for detection of foreign objects. No top of tubesheet visual inspection or sludge lancing were performed in A2R23.

3. The nondestructive examination techniques utilized for tubes with increased degradation susceptibility (TS 5.6.9.b).

Prior to A2R22, a re-screening of high-stress tubes (increased degradation susceptibility to ODSCC) was performed using the EPRI Delta Offset method. As a result, the list of high stress tubes remaining in-service has been superseded by these results which contain 14 tubes remaining in-service identified as the next most susceptible to sec initiation. One tube from the 15 identified during the re-screening was plugged during A2R22.

No instances of this degradation mechanism were detected during A2R23. During A2R23, all tube-to-TSP intersections received a bobbin and array exam, so tubes with potentially higher residual stresses no longer need to be treated differently for OA purposes since all tube-to-TSP intersections received the same baseline examinations.

4. For each degradation mechanism found: The nondestructive examination technique utilized (TS 5.6.9.c.1)

All SG eddy current examination techniques used for detection (see Table 2 below) and sizing degradation (see Table 3 below) were qualified in accordance with Appendix H or I of the EPRI PWR SG Examination Guidelines Revision 8. Each examination technique was evaluated to be applicable to the tubing and the degradation mechanisms found in the Braidwood Station Unit 2 SGs during A2R23.

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Enclosure 2 Table 2: Non Destructive Examination (NOE) Detection Techniques Utilized Detection Detection Technique ETSS( 1) Degradation Location Probe Type Mechanism Existing Degradation Mechanisms Bobbin 96041.1 (Rev 7) (App. I) Wear AVB Supports Array 17908.1/.4 (Rev 1) (App. I)

Bobbin 96042.1 (Rev. 4) (App. I) Wear FDB/ Baffle Pates Array 17908.1/.4 (Rev 1) (App. I) (Drilled Hole)

Bobbin 96043.4 (Rev 1) Wear Quatrefoil TSPs Array 11956.3/.4 (Rev 3) (App. I) (broach)

Bobbin 27091.2 (Rev 2) Wear due to Foreign Top of Tubesheet and Array 17901.1/.3 through 17906.1/.3 Objects Sludge Pile Tube (Rev 0) Support Plates Array 20400.1 (Rev 5) and Freespan Array 20402.1 (Rev 5)

Array 20403.1 (Rev 5)

Bobbin 128413 (Rev. 5) (broach/freespan) Axial ODSCC Tube Support Plates, 128411 (Rev. 4) (drilled) FOB/Baffle Plates,

+Point 128424 (Rev. 4) (drilled) Freespan, High Row 128425 (Rev. 4) (broach and Ubend (Rows 10 and Array freespan) higher) 20402.1 (Rev 5)

Bobbin 10013.1 (Rev. 1) (Dents)- Axial ODSCC Dents/Dings <Sv 24013.1 (Rev. 2) (Dings)- Axial

+Point 22401.1 (Rev. 4) Dents/Dings)- Dents/Dings >Sv Axial Baffle Plate Dents 2-21410.1 (Rev. 6) (Dents/Dings)~ Sv Dings below Baffle Circ.

Plates 2-Sv Potential Degradation Mechanisms

-~- -- ---

Array 20501.1 (Rev4)-Axial Array 20500.1 (Rev 4) - Circ. PWSCC, Axial/Circ. Expansion Region to

+POINT 11524 (Rev 0) - Circ. (App. I) TTS-1401" Array 20501.1 (Rev 4) -Axial PWSCC, Axial/Gire. Expansion Region to Array 20500.1 (Rev 4) - Circ. (BLG/OXP) TTS-1401"

+POINT 96511.2 (Rev 16) - Axial/Ci re. PWSCC, Axial/Circ. Row 1/Row 2 U-Bend Array 23513.1 (Rev 3) -Axial/Circ. Low Row U-bend Array OD Top of Tubesheet 20402.1 (Rev 5) - Axial ODSCC/PWSCC Expansion Transition, 20400.1 (Rev 5) - Circ Axial/Ci re. Abnormalities ID: (U nderexpansions and 20501.1 (Rev 4) -Axial BLG/OXP) within the 20500.1 (Rev 4) - Circ. Tubesheet and Pre-heater Baffle Plate Expansion Transitions (TSP 02C/03C)

Bobbin 28413 (Rev 5) -Axial (App I)

+POINT 28424 (Rev 4) -Axial (App. I)

+POINT 21410.1 (Rev6)-Circ. ODSCC. Axial/Circ Sludge Pile Array 20402.1 (Rev 5) - Axial Array 20403.1 (Rev 5) -Axial Array 20400.1 (rev. 5) -Circ Array 10413.2 (Rev. 0)- Axial ODSCC, Axial Low Row U-bends, E2 - 6 of 56

Enclosure 2 Rows 3-5 Bobbin 96005.2 (Rev. 9) Pitting, Volumetric Top of tubesheet, Array 24998.1 (Rev. 1) Indications Freespan Note: (1) ETSS - Examination Technique Specification Sheet Table 3 : NDE Sizing Techniques Utilized EPRI Detection ETSS Degradation Technique Location Applicability Probe Rev. Mechanism ETSS Volumetric

+PoinfM 21998.1 4 Foreign Object Wear Locations Wear Wear at AVBs(1l Bobbin 96004.3 14 Structure Wear at TSPs( 1 l (Quatrefoil and Drilled Hole

+Point' 96910.1 12 Structure Baffle)

Note (1) TSP - Tube Support Plate AVB -Anti-Vibration Bar

5. For each degradation mechanism found: The location, orientation (if linear),

measured size (if available), and voltage response for each indication. For tube wear at support structures less than 20 percent through-wall, only the total number of indications needs to be reported (TS 5.6.9.c.2)

Anti-Vibration Bar (AVB) Wear Tube degradation was found during bobbin coil examination in the U-Bend region due to fretting of the AVB on the outer surface of the tube. A total of 1131 indications were reported. After 1 operating cycle, two (2) tubes, one in SG 2A and one in SG 2C had indications of AVB wear meeting or exceeding the 40% TW plugging limit and were removed from service by mechanical tube plugging. The largest AVB wear indication found during A2R23 was measured at 40% through-wall (TW). The Table 4 below provides a summary of AVB wear degradation. Refer to Attachment A for detailed locations and sizing for all AVB wear indications.

Table 4: A2R23 AVB Wear Summary SG 2A SG 2B SG 2C SG 2D Total

1. of Ind. # of Ind. # of Ind. # of Ind. # of Ind.

Total Indications 462 133 320 216 1131

<= 20% TW 256 84 195 149 684 Mechanical Wear at Tube Support Plates (TSPs) - Tube degradation attributed to wear in the quatrefoil (broached) TSPs and in the pre-heater TSPs, which are drilled support baffle plates, was identified. A total of 10 indications in 9 support plate structures were identified as wear during A2R23. Within this population, 7 pre-existing TSP wear indications were identified in the 2A, 2B, and 2D SGs and 3 newly identified TSP wears were found in 2 tubes in 2D SG. The depth of the TSP wear ranged from 7% TW to 34% TW. Table 5 below provides a summary of the tubes that contain indications of pre-heater or quatrefoil TSP wear as identified during A2R23.

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Enclosure?

Table 5: A2R23 Tube Support (Quatrefoil and Baffle Plate) Wear Summary Plus Wear A2R23 Total SG Row Col Location Point Type 3/4TW Length

• ~---~

Volta~

~--

2A 22 98 10C Volumetric 34 0.15 0.34 Drilled 2A 46 48 05C 7 0.21 0.15 Hole Drilled 28 47 39 03C 7 0.22 0.20 Hole I

Drilled 28 47 41 03C 9 0.34 0.23 Hole Drilled 28 49 49 05C 8 0.21 0.22 Hole Single 2D 17 66 08H 22 0.37 0.52 Land Quatrefoil 2D 23 109 11C 12 0.52 0.22 Land 1 Quatrefoil 2D 23 109 11 C 17 0.66 0.36 Land 1 Single 2D 44 26 10H 9 0.51 0.17 Land Single 2D 49 53 07C 15 0.35 0.30

~--*-**

I Land Note:

1. Wear at two lands at this quatrefoil TSP Foreign Object (FO) Wear - A total of 26 indications of FO wear were identified during A2R23. All twenty-six (26) of the indications were historical with no new foreign object wear detected during A2R23. The indications ranged from 10% TWto 38% TW The historical FO wear shows no significant change in eddy current signal response. No new Possible Loose Parts (PLP)s were reported during A2R23. The table below lists the data record for the eddy current signals corresponding to foreign object wear indications detected during A2R23.

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Enclosure 2 Table 6: Braidwood A2R23 Foreign Object Wear Indication Summary and Sizing Results Axial Gire New/ FO Depth +PT Length Extent Legacy Present SG Row Col Locn lnch1 3/4TW Volts (inches) (degrees) 2A 2 2 08H -1.01 14 0.13 0.13 58 Legacy No 2A 8 9 05H -0.36 19 0.17 0.11 62 Legacy No 2A 8 94 07H -0.77 36 0.36 0.1 60 Legacy No 2A 15 47 07H -0.55 20 0.19 0.19 34 Legacy No 2A 24 22 05H -0.74 18 0.13 0.11 63 Legacy No 2A 30 53 01H 0.39 11 0.07 0.05 45 Legacy No I 2A 31 52 01H 0.38 29 0.3 0.11 49 Legacy No 2A 32 53 01H 0.41 17 0.12 0.13 48 Legacy No 2A 42 22 02C 0.73 14 0.11 0.1 46 Legacy No 2B 2 80 07H -0.75 16 0.16 0.21 48 Legacy No 2B 17 59 10H -0.81 27 0.28 0.24 51 Legacy No 2B 20 64 05H -0.68 14 0.13 0.12 49 i Legacy No 2B 21 108 07H -0.69 27 0.26 0.19 52 Legacy No 2B 40 50 03H -0.59 18 0.13 0.19 51 Legacy No

-*- -~- ---- ~ -- --- ~ - -

2B 49 51 TSC 0.65 20 0.15 0.39 52 Legacy No 2B 49 52 TSC 1.06 34 0.42 0.22 63 Legacy No 2B 49 52 TSC 0.43 21 0.2 0.29 52 Legacy No 2B 49 53 TSC 0.49 10 0.08 0.22 57 Legacy No 2C 7 67 07H -0 64 38 0.41 0.21 49 Legacy No 2C 14 43 07H -0.84 29 0.3 0.25 45 Legacy No 2C 17 49 05H -0.57 23 0.18 0.21 58 Legacy No 2C 22 42 07H -0.66 12 0.12 0.16 45 Legacy No 2D 22 73 05H -0.76 31 0.36 0.21 71 Legacy No 2D 24 86 05H -0.75 23 0.19 0.29 66 Legacy No 2D 31 48 01H 0.37 20 0.19 0.24 62 Legacy No 2D 36 61 TSH 0.03 14 0.11 0.11 37 Legacy No Axial ODSCC in Freespan During A2R23, one instance of an axial ODSCC at a Freespan ding in the U-bend was detected from both bobbin and array probe and confirmed with a +POINT probe inspection with details of location and bounding size of the indication presented in Table 7. The indication was sized using Appendix I +POINT technique. The flaw was detected coincident to a low-level ding which was found to not interfere with the flaw signal for sizing purposes.

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Enclosure 2 Table 7: Axial ODSCC at Freespan Ding in SG 2C

--~~--

Max Total

+POINT SG Row Col Deg Ind Locn lnch1 Depth Length Volts (3/4TW) (inches)

C 49 59 0.47 46 SAi AV3 +33.26 64 0.18 Volumetric Indication in Freespan A volumetric indication (49% TW) in the Freespan above the OSH TSP in tube R41-C82 in the 2A SG was detected during A2R23. The flaw was detected from both bobbin and array probes and confirmed with a +PT probe inspection (0.53V) with a total length of O 26 inches.

6. For each degradation mechanism found: A description of the condition monitoring assessment and results, including the margin to the tube integrity performance criteria and comparison with the margin predicted to exist at the inspection by the previous forward-looking tube integrity assessment (TS 5.6.9.c.3). Discuss any degradation that was not bounded by the prior operational assessment in terms of projected maximum flaw dimensions, minimum burst strength, and/or accident induced leak rate. Provide details of any in situ pressure test.

A condition monitoring assessment was performed for each in-service degradation mechanism found during the A2R23 SG inspection. The condition monitoring assessment was performed in accordance with TS 5.5.9.a and NEI 97-06 Rev. 3 using the EPRI Steam Generator Integrity Assessment Guidelines, Revision 5. For each identified degradation mechanism, the as-found condition was compared to the appropriate performance criteria for tube structural integrity, accident induced leakage, and operational leakage as defined in TS 5.5.9.b. For each degradation mechanism a tube structural limit was determined to ensure that SG tube integrity would be maintained over the full range of normal operating conditions, all anticipated transients in the design specifications, and design basis accidents. This includes retaining a safety factor of 3.0 against burst under normal steady state full power operation primary to secondary pressure differential and a safety factor of 1.4 against burst under the limiting design basis accident pressure differential. The structural limits for wear related degradation were performed in accordance with the EPRI Steam Generator Integrity Assessment Guidelines and the EPRI Steam Generator Degradation Specific Management Flaw Handbook, Revision 2 (Flaw Handbook).

The as-found condition of each tubing degradation mechanism found during the A2R23 outage was shown to meet the appropriate limiting structural integrity performance parameter with a probability of 0.95 at 50% confidence, including consideration of relevant uncertainties thus satisfying the condition monitoring requirements. The NOE measured flaw depths are compared to the structural integrity condition monitoring (CM) limits, which account for tube material strength, burst relation, and NOE measurement uncertainties with a 0.95 probability at 50% confidence. Therefore, the NOE measured flaw sizes are directly compared to the CM limit. No indications met the requirements for proof or leakage testing; therefore, no In Situ Pressure tests were performed during A2R23. In addition, no tube pulls were performed during A2R23.

The sections below provide a summary of the condition monitoring assessment for each degradation mechanism found during A2R23.

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Enclosure 2 AVB Wear- The two largest AVB wear indications found during the A2R23 inspection were 40% TW in SG 2A (R41-C37) and 40% TW in SG 2C (R42-C90) as measured by the EPRI Appendix H qualified technique 96004.3. This is below the AVB wear CM limit of 64.3% TW.

Pre-Heater Baffle/TSP Wear- Both quatrefoil TSP wear (flat or tapered) and drilled hole baffle wear were sized by +POINT probe using ETSS 96910.1. Volumetric point indications within the TSP (one location) were sized using ETSS 21998.1. During prior inspections, drilled hole baffle plate wear was sized using bobbin technique ETSS 96004.3. Since the sizing method was changed to +POINT for A2R23, sizing was performed using both ETSS 96004.3 and ETSS 96910.1 to assess growth while baselining sizing to the +POINT technique ETSS 96910.1 for future inspections.

None of the TSP/drilled hole baffle plate wear indications exceeded the CM limits. The largest TSP wear indication at a quatrefoil tube support plate with single land contact wear was measured at 22% TW at SG 20 tube R17-C66 location 08H. This bounding quatrefoil wear is below the CM limit for quatrefoil TSP wear of 52.7% TW. In addition, the largest drilled hole baffle plate wear indication was measured at 9% TW at SG 2B tube R47C41 location 03C.

The bounding baffle plate wear (9% TW) is less than the CM limit for drilled hole baffle plate wear of 52.8% TW. Therefore, condition monitoring for structural and leakage integrity has been satisfied for both quatrefoil TSP wear and baffle plate wear.

Foreign Object Wear - No new foreign object wear indications were detected during A2R23. All foreign object wear was depth sized using the +Point Examination Technique Specification Sheet (ETSS) 21998.1 technique. The deepest foreign object wear indication found during the A2R23 inspection was 38% TW with axial extent of 0.21 inch and circ extent of 49 degrees (Tube R7-C67 in SG 2C) FO wear flaw measuring 0.5 inches in axial length and up to 135 degrees in circumferential extent. thus bounds the length of the FO wear flaw dataset, is 54% TW.

Since the largest flaw size is much smaller than this, CM is met for structural integrity for all tubes with foreign object wear.

A summary of the CM results from A2R23 as compared to the predictions from the most recent prior inspection (A2R22) is provided in Table 8.

Axial ODSCC in Freespan - For tube R49-C59 in the 2C SG, history review of the bobbin signal reveals that the flaw precursor has been present for many cycles, first detectable in 2006. The last +PT exam at this tube location was performed during A2R19 (2017). The signal has exhibited minor continual changes since 2006. Depth profiling of the flaw was performed based on the voltage-to-amplitude sizing correlation from ETSS 128432. The average depth of the flaw is 57.6% TW and effective length is 0.146 inches. A tube burst calculation is performed for a flaw of this size and the resulting burst pressure was 4883 psi, including burst relation, material property and NOE (depth and length) uncertainties.

NOE depth sizing uncertainties are from ETSS 128432 and to account for NOE length uncertainty 0.09 inches was added to the structural equivalent length (SEL) of the flaw.

Since the calculated pressure exceeds the 3LiPNO performance criteria pressure of 4140 psi, the tube meets CM for structural integrity. The calculated ligament tearing pressure is 5439 psi, which is larger than the 1.4PSLB performance criteria pressure of 3584 psi.

Therefore, the tube meets CM for leakage integrity.

The indication screens out of in situ pressure testing based on the maximum +PT voltage of 0.47V being less than the 0.5V voltage screening threshold. It screens out for leak testing based on the +PT voltage being less than the VTHR-L for axial ODSCC at a Freespan ding which is 1.26V.

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Enclosure 2 Volumetric Indication in Freespan - For tube R41-C82 in the 2A SG, history review of the bobbin signal confirms that the flaw was present during A2R22 (2021) and had exhibited minor growth over the last cycle. The flaw was not present in the A2R 19 (2017) bobbin data. Due to the unique axial and circumferential response of the signal, further investigation was performed on the indication following the issuance of the preliminary OA to confirm the morphology of the flaw. After extensive review, the flaw was determined to be volumetric in nature and exhibit the shape of a tapered football from the +PT graphic. A major factor in the determination of the flaw being volumetric is the circumferential channel response from the array probe exam. Axial SCC indications would not have generated a circumferential channel response.

The indication was sized using a calibration curve built from Appendix H technique 27903.2 for depth sizing of tapered football shaped volumetric indications in the Freespan. The maximum depth associated with a peak-to-peak voltage of 0.53V is 49% TW. The CM limit associated with a volumetric indication sized using ETSS 27903 2 is 64% TW for a flaw length of 0.5 inch. Since the CM limit significantly bounds the detected flaw size, depth profiling of the volumetric flaw is not performed.

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Enclosure 2 Table 8: Comparison of Prior OA Projections to As-Found Results A2R22 OA Projection (NOE Parameter A2R23 As-Found Result Depth) I Maximum Depth for Anti-51.4%TW 40%TW Vibration Bar (AVB) Wear Maximum Depth for Tube 43.9% TW Quatrefoil 22% TW Quatrefoil Support Wear 17.6% TW Baffle Plate 9% TW Baffle Plate No actual change in depth Growth of Repeat Foreign expected since foreign objects No change in measured depth Object Wear Indications are no longer present Maximum Depth for New Limiting flaw won't challenge No new FO wear Foreign Object Wear structural or leakage integrity Maximum Depth for Axial See Note 1 64%

ODSCC Maximum Volumetric (Freespan)

- 49%

Note For a more direct comparison, a mixed arithmetic/ Monte Carlo OA calculation is retroactively performed for A2R22 below. This method is based on a worst-case degraded tube evaluation where the BOC flaw size is selected as the 95th percentile from the nondetected flaw population based on the technique POD function. Per the A2R22 CMOA, the 95th percentile max depth from the nondetected flaw population is approximately 63% TW. Growth is applied using Monte Carlo techniques and utilizes the EPRI default growth rate function from Reference 4 which has a 95th percentile max depth growth of approximately 16.5% TW/EFPY. NOE measurements uncertainties are not included since the flaw is assumed to be undetected. A one-cycle OA simulation of 145 EPFY is performed using Single Flaw Model to simulate the operating interval from A2R22 to A2R23. The calculated burst pressure is 4287 psi and ligament tearing pressure is 4340 psi. Both meet the SG performance criteria, and both are conservative in comparison to the A2R23 detected flaw Because volumetric wear indications will leak and burst at essentially the same pressure, accident-induced leakage integrity is also demonstrated. Operational leakage integrity was demonstrated by the absence of any detectable primary-to-secondary leakage during the operating interval prior to A2R23. Because tube integrity was demonstrated analytically, in-situ pressure testing was not required nor performed during A2R23. There were no tube pulls planned or performed during A2R23.

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Enclosure 2

7. For each degradation mechanism found: The number of tubes plugged during the inspection outage (TS 5.6.9.c.4). Also, provide the tube location and reason for plugging.

Table 9 provides the numbers of tubes plugged for each degradation mechanism detected and for tubes plugged preventatively. Table 10 provides the tube location and reason for plugging.

Table 9: A2R23 Tube Plugging by Degradation Mechanism Degradation Mechanism 2ASG 2BSG 2CSG 2D SG Total Anti-Vibration Bar (AVB) Wear 1 0 1 0 2 Quatrefoil TSP Wear 0 0 0 0 0 Foreign Object Wear 0 0 0 0 0 ODSCC 0 0 1 0 1 i Volumetric lndication 1 1 0 0 0 1 Total Plugged during A2R23 2 0 2 0 4 Notes: Volumetric indication above 08H at SG 2A tube R41 C82 is treated separately from foreign object wear indications since it is believed the indication may be the result of a manufacturing defect such as a lap in the tube.

Table 10: Braidwood A2R23 New Plugging by Location, Degradation Mechanism and Reason SG Ii Row Col Degradation Mechanism Plugging Reason I

A 41 37 AVB Wear Tech Spec;:: 40%

Volumetric Indication in A 41 82 Freespan above 08H (tapered Tech Spec;:: 40%

football shape)

C 42 90 AVB Wear Tech Spec;:: 40%

C Axial ODSCC at Freespan Ding SCC Plug on 49 59 Detection

8. The repair methods utilized, and the number of tubes repaired by each repair method (section 5.6.7.c.5).

No tubes were repaired during A2R23.

9. An analysis summary of the tube integrity conditions predicted to exist at the next scheduled inspection (the forward-looking tube integrity assessment) relative to the applicable performance criteria, including the analysis methodology, inputs, and results (TS 5.6.9.d). The effective full power months of operation permitted for the current operational assessment.

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Enclosure 2 Anti-Vibration Bar (AVB) Wear Operational Assessment (OA)

The OA for AVB wear will use the worst-case degraded tube simplified analysis procedure for plugging on NOE sizing where the NOE uncertainties are combined using a mixed arithmetic/simplified statistical strategy. This method combines the largest flaw left in service as measured by NOE techniques and growth allowance is applied to determine the predicted flaw depth at the end of the next inspection interval. The predicted NDE flaw depth is compared to the condition monitoring limit that includes uncertainties for NDE measurement, material property, and burst relation that are combined through Monte Carlo simulations. The largest AVB wear left in service during A2R23 was measured at 39% TW (ETSS 96004.3) The OA methodology must address flaws that may be undetected by the inspection technique however the 95 th percentile undetected flaw is only 23% TW. Since this is less than the largest AVB wear flaw returned to service (39% TW), the OA for the undetected flaw population is bounded by that of the worst-case degraded tube of the existing flaw population. A separate OA for undetected flaws is not necessary. Therefore, the OA projects that AVB wear degradation will not violate the SG tube integrity performance criteria for a two-cycle or three-cycle interval until the next SG inspection.

The largest flaw size projected at A2R25 (2 cycles) and A2R26 (3 cycles) is determined as follows:

Table 11: Braidwood Unit 2 - Steam Generator 2 & 3 Cycle AVB OA Projections QA for AVB Wear 2-cycle OA 3-cycle OA Maximum BOC NOE Depth, %TW 39.03/4TW 39 03/4TW 99th Percentile Growth per EFPY 4.14%TW/EFPY 4.14%TW/EFPY EFPY per Cycle 1.46 EFPY 1.46 EFPY Number of Cycles 2 3 Predicted NOE Depth 51.4%TW 57.6%TW Condition Monitoring Limit( 1J 63.6%TW 63.6%TW Notes: The CM limit includes NOE measurement, material property, and burst relation uncertainties at 0.95 probability and 50% confidence level.

Mechanical Wear at Quatrefoil Tube Supports OA The OA for Quatrefoil TSP wear will use the worst-case degraded tube simplified analysis procedure for plugging on NOE sizing where the NOE uncertainties are combined using a mixed arithmetic/simplified statistical strategy. This method combines the largest flaw left in service as measured by NOE techniques and growth allowance is applied to determine the predicted flaw depth at the end of the next inspection interval. The predicted NOE flaw depth is compared to the condition monitoring limit that includes uncertainties for NOE measurement, material property, and burst relation that are combined through Monte Carlo simulations. For OA purposes, all quatrefoil TSP wear flaws are conservatively assumed to be flat wear and conservatively assumes a flat wear profile of the maximum flaw depth applied over the entire 1.125 inch TSP thickness.

During the A2R23 inspection there was a total of 10 indications considered to be tube wear at TSP/baffle plates. The indications are comprised of five instances of tube wear at quatrefoil TSPs (maximum depth of 22% TW), four instances of tube wear at drilled hole baffle plates (maximum depth of 9% TW), and one instance of a volumetric indication within the TSP and without land E2 - 15 of 56

Enclosure 2 contact that historically been sized using ETSS 21998.1. The indication has been slow growing from A2R17 (26%TW) to A2R19 (28% TW) to A2R22 (31% TW) and finally to A2R23 (34% TW). It exhibited growth of around 2% TW/EFPY over the last inspection interval, so while it is being treated with the other classical TSP wear in terms of OA, it is considered extremely conservative based on the historical data for the flaw. Two new TSP wear indications were detected at the same tube-to-TSP intersection in SG 2D tube R23C 109 at two separate lands of 11 C, one measured at 12% TW and the other at 17% TW.

Seven indications with point-to-point sizing data are too few to develop a 95th percentile plant specific growth rate and essentially no growth has been exhibited by the existing population of TSP/baffle plate wear flaws at A2R23. As such, bounding growth rates applied in the A2R22 CMOA will continue to be used for the A2R23 OA These include 5.2% TW/EFPY for quatrefoil TSP wear, 4.2% TW/EFPY for drilled hole baffle plate wear, and 4.4% TW/EFPY for the volumetric indication within a TSP without land contact. A 2-cycle and a 3-cycle OA prediction was performed to provide flexibility in outage planning. The largest 3-cycle flaw size projected at A2R25 (2-cycles) and A2R26 (3-cycles) is determined as follows:

Table 12: Braidwood Unit 2 - Steam Generator 2 & 3 Cycle TSP OA Projections OA for Quatrefoil TSP Wear 2-cycle OA 3-cycle OA 95 th Percentile from POD Curve, %TW (BOC depth) 22%TW 22%TW 95th Percentile Growth per EFPY 5.2% TW/EFPY 5.2%TW/EFPY EFPY per Cycle 3.0 EFPY 4.5 EFPY Predicted NOE Depth 37.6%TW 45.4%TW Condition Monitoring Limit 52%TW 52%TW Mechanical Wear at Drilled Hole Baffle Plate Supports OA The OA for drilled hole baffle plate wear will use the worst-case degraded tube simplified analysis procedure for plugging on NOE sizing where the NOE uncertainties are combined using a mixed arithmetic/simplified statistical strategy. This method combines the largest flaw left in service as measured by NOE techniques and growth allowance is applied to determine the predicted flaw depth at the end of the next inspection interval. The predicted NOE flaw depth is compared to the condition monitoring limit that includes uncertainties for NOE measurement, material property, and burst relation that are combined through Monte Carlo simulations.

Similar to the quatrefoil TSP OA methodology described above, the OA for drilled hole baffle supports will conservatively assume flat wear instead of tapered wear.

The maximum measured wear indication at a drilled TSP that was left in service was 4% TW by bobbin and sized at 9% TW by +POINT. The three indications of drilled baffle plate wear exhibited essentially zero growth from A2R 19. The length of the largest indication left in service is assumed to be 0.75 inch, which is the bounding length that was assumed. The uniform thinning model (degradation assumed 360-degrees circumferentially around the tube and axially flat) is applied for tube wear at drilled support plate intersections.

The 95th percentile undetected flaw size from the POD function is 5% TW. Since this is less than the largest baffle plate wear flaw returned to service (9% TW) the OA for the undetected flaw population is bounded by that of the worst-case degraded tube of the existing flaw population.

E2 - 16 of 56

Enclosure 2 A 2-cycle and a 3-cycle OA prediction was performed to provide flexibility in outage planning. The largest 2-cycle flaw size projected at A2R25 (2 cycles) and A2R26 (3-cycles) is determined as follows:

Table 13: Braidwood Unit 2 - Steam Generator 2 & 3 Cycle Drilled Hole Baffle OA Projections OA for Drilled Hole Baffle Wear 2-cycle OA 3-cycle OA Maximum BOC NOE Depth,% TW 9%TW 9%TW 95th Percentile Growth per EFPY 4.2% TW/EFPY 4.2%TW/EFPY EFPY per Cycle 1.46 EFPY 1.46 EFPY Number of Cycles 2 3 Predicted NOE Depth 21.6%TW 27 9%TW Condition Monitoring Limit 52.4%TW 52.4%TW Mechanical Wear due to Foreign Obiects OA There were no tubes containing newly reported FO wear during A2R23 that had to be preventively plugged The only FO wear indications remaining inservice have been in service for multiple cycles and with no evidence of a FO. These indications have not changed or grown since their initial detection. Therefore, continued operation until the next planned SG inspection during A2R25 or A2R26 is acceptable since there is no wear mechanism for continued growth All the existing FO wear indication wear depths are less than the condition monitoring limit and therefore meets the OA performance criteria for existing volumetric wear with the upper tube bundle.

For new FO wear associated with migration of objects that caused the existing wear found in A2R23, an OA is performed based upon a volumetric work rate that caused a known existing or new wear FO wear in the upper bundle In addition to no growth being anticipated for foreign object wear flaws, a reasonable amount of margin exists between the maximum measured foreign object wear indication of 38% TW with a 0.25-inch foreign object wear flaw measured with ETSS 21998.1 and a limit of 63.5% TW. The length of the largest object known to be remaining in the SGs is 1.25-inch. The structural limit for a 1.25 inch wear scar is 66% TW This object resides in the preheater baffle plate region where only one current FO wear indication exists, which was measured at 14%

TW.

One instance of a volumetric indication was detected from both array and bobbin probes during the full-length exams in the Freespan above 08H. The indication in tube R41-C82 in the 2A SG is potentially the result of a foreign object, but also could be a manufacturing defect in the tube such as a lap that became more prominent over time. Either way, from an OA perspective it is treated similar to foreign object wear where the degradation is not projected over the next inspection interval with no wear initiating mechanism known to be present. Further, the tube was plugged during A2R23.

No new tube wear was detected from foreign objects in high flow regions or otherwise typical foreign object locations during A2R23. Therefore, the structural and leakage integrity performance criteria limits are not expected to be challenged over the next inspection interval (two or three cycles until the next SG ECT examination) due to existing foreign object wear.

E2 - 17 of 56

Enclosure 2 Based upon the above evaluations, it is concluded that OA performance criteria is satisfied with margin for all existing wear degradation mechanisms for inspection intervals of both 2-cycles and 3-cycles. These results are summarized in Table 14.

Table 14: Braidwood-2 Deterministic Operational Assessment Summary for Existing Wear Degradation Mechanisms 2-Cycle 3-Cycle Condition 2-Cycle 3-Cycle Degradation Projection, Projection, Monitoring Margin to Margin to Mechanism 3/4TW %TW Limit, 3/4TW Limit, %TW Limit, %TW AVB Wear 51.4 57.6 63.6 12.2 6.0 Quatrefoil TSP Single 37.6 45.4 52 14.4 6.6 Land Wear Quatrefoil TSP 47.2 53.8 63.5 16.3 9.7 Volumetric Wear Drilled Hole Baffle 21.6 27.9 52.4 30.8 24.4 Wear No growth expected for Foreign Object Wear( 1 l < 66 < 66 66 existing indications I

Notes 1) Structural Limit for a 1.25 inch wear scar.

E2 - 18 of 56

Enclosure 2 Stress Corrosion Cracking OA The Final Operational Assessment for SCC mechanisms provides reasonable assurance that SG tube integrity will be maintained until the next planned SG inspection. These OA evaluations are performed for existing SCC mechanisms (whether detected during A2R23 or not) via probabilistic calculations using the Westinghouse Full Bundle Model software. The maximum achievable OA duration of 2 cycles, due to SCC detection during A2R23, will be performed for each existing mechanism. As assessment is also conducted of the limiting potential mechanisms based on OE of other Alloy 600TT SG units.

The OA performed for existing SCC mechanisms includes Axial ODSCC at Freespan (ding or no ding present), which was detected during A2R23. Also, Axial ODSCC at tube-to-TSP intersections, which was not detected during A2R23, was included in the OA.

Table 15 provides a summary of the OA results for the SCC mechanism evaluated using fully probabilistic methods with their margin to the performance criterion.

Table 15: Braidwood-2 Fully Probabilistic Operational Assessment Summary for SCC Degradation Mechanisms lh'gnufatii,n ()\ l'OB POL Bur~t  :,,, l B Bur,t \LB l.~*ak

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Enclosure 2

10. The number and percentage of tubes plugged to date, and the effective plugging percentage in each SG (TS 5.6.9.e).

Table 16 shows the number of tubes plugged before and after the A2R23 outage and the percentage of tubes currently plugged (total and effective). No sleeves have been installed in Braidwood Unit 2.

Table 16: Braidwood-2 Tube Plugging Through A2R23 SG 2A SG 2B SG 2C SG 2D Total No. Tubes Plugged prior to A2R23 119 81 81 55 336 No. Tubes Plugged during A2R23 2 0 2 0 4 Total No. Tubes Plugged through B2R23 121 81 83 55 340 Percent (Actual and Effective) Tubes 2.65% 1.77% 1.82% 1.20% 1.86%

Pluqqed Allowable Percent Tubes Plugged 10% 10% 10% 10% 10%

11. The results of any SG secondary-side inspection (TS 5.6.9.f). The number, type, and location (if available) of loose parts that could damage tubes removed or left in service in each SG.

Foreign object search and retrieval (FOSAR) inspections were conducted from the secondary side at the preheater baffle plate in SGs 2A and 2C. This included visual examination of tube bundle periphery tubes from the hot leg and cold leg annulus and center no tube lane. As listed in Table 17, a total of two foreign objects were removed from the preheater baffle plate region. The foreign objects remaining are wire bristles, fibrous materials, machine turnings, machine remnants which are located at the top of the tubesheet on the CL side, these foreign objects were considered to be not capable of causing significant tube wear. There were no objects identified that had the potential to pose an imminent threat to tube integrity.

Any foreign objects not able to be retrieved were characterized and an analysis performed to demonstrate acceptability of continued operation without exceeding the performance criteria. No top of tubesheet in-bundle visual inspection was performed During A2R23. The tube integrity assessment of the foreign objects remaining in the SGs also supports the conclusion as no adverse effects on tube integrity are projected within two cycles of operation.

E2 - 20 of 56

Enclosure 2 Table 17: Foreign Object Summary SG / FO Retrieval Foreign Object New/ [ Dimensions, Location Row-Col Comment ID Status Description Legacy ! inch 2A/001 Active Wire Bristle TSP 02C R22-C73 New 0.25 X 0.01 Fixed Machine 2A/002 Retrieved TSP 02C R22-C95 New 0.625 X 0.2 X 0.0625 ---

Remnant i 2A/003 Active Wire Bristle TSP 02C R27-C65 New 0.25 X 0.005 Fixed 2A/004 Active Machine Turning TSP 02C R27-C36 New 0.25 X 0.05 X 0.01 Loose 2A/005 Active Wire Bristle TSP 02C R30-C25 New 0.625 X 0.01 Fixed 2A/006 Active Wire Bristle TSP 02C R31-C20 New 0.3125 X 0.01 Loose 2A/007 Active Wire Bristle TSP 02C R33-C30 New 0.125 X 0.02 Fixed 2C/001 Active Machine Turning TSP 02C R22-C100 New 0.5 X 0.125 X 0.0625 Loose 2C/002 Active Wire Bristle TSP 02C R30-C64 Legacy 0.25 X 0.01 Fixed 2C/003 Active Wire Bristle TSP 02C R33-C99 Legacy 0.3125 X 0.02 Fixed 2C/004 Active Machine Turning TSP 02C R48-C64 New 0.1 X 0.05 X 0.05 Loose Rectangular 2C/005 Active TSP 02C R44-C44 New 0.3 X 0.1 X 0.02 Fixed Metallic Object 2C/006 Active Wire Bristle TSP 02C R26-C10 New 0.25 X 0.0625 Fixed 2C/007 Active Wire Bristle TSP 02C R22-C20 New 0.15 X 0.0625 Fixed 2C/009 Active Fibrous Material TSP 02C R10-C56 New 0.3125 X 0.01 X 0.3125 Loose 2C/010 Active Wire Bristle TSP 02C R9-C59 Legacy 0.125 X 0.0625 Fixed 2C/011 Active Wire Bristle TSP 02C R12-C59 New 0.0625 X 0.01 ---

Scale and deposits in the vicinity of the object which may be keeping the 2C/012 Active Wire Bristle TSP 02C R1-C60 Legacy 1.25 X 0.0625 object at the location and preventing its migration despite not being fixed 2C/013 Active Wire Bristle TSP 02C R2-C61 New 06 X 0.0625 Loose

~~

2C/014 Active Wire Bristle TSP 02C R13-C62 New 0.6 X 0.0625 Fixed 2C/015 Retrieved Wire Bristle TSP 02C R2-C59 Legacy 0.5 X 0.05 ---

E2 - 21 of 56

Enclosure Waterbox/ Pre-Heater Inspections A visual inspection of the 2A and 2C SG waterbox and cap plate regions was performed during A2R23. All four fit-up backing blocks under TSP 03C were intact in both SGs inspected. The vertical rib plates impingement plate and cap plates were inspected in both SGs and found to be in acceptable condition with no notable indications of degradation erosion or other inspection anomalies.

A visual inspection of the 2A and 2C SG preheater regions where the feedwater enters the SG were performed during A2R23. All four (4) fit-up blocks under TSP 03C were found intact in the 2A and 2C SGs inspected. The waterbox vertical rib plates and target plate in both SGs inspected were found to be in acceptable condition with no indication of degradation, erosion or other anomalies.

Steam Drum Inspections During A2R23, steam drum inspections were performed in all four SGs. The only degradation noted in this report was Flow Accelerated Corrosion (FAC) degradation of the carbon steel material of the SGs primary moisture separator (PMS) riser barrels, swirl vane blades, spacer tabs, downcomer barrels and tangential nozzles. This degradation includes the general material loss (i.e., thinning) of the primary moisture separator components that has been monitored for the past 19-plus years, with through-wall holes discovered during the A2R22 and A2R23 refueling outages. Repairs were made in A2R23 to address the as-found conditions. However, no evidence of loose part generation over prior operating cycles was found.

A prioritized list was developed by Constellation and Westinghouse post inspection of the steam drum using degradation trends based A2R23 and previous outages to determine the likelihood of through-wall holes or other conditions that required immediate repairs. The PMS components and corresponding degradation locations were ranked in in terms of severity to indicate the priority of repairs needed to be completed in order to satisfy acceptability for one, two or three cycles of operation. Various swirl vane blade and/or riser barrel components were repaired, and spacer tabs were removed in eleven (11) PMS in SG 2A, twelve (12) PMS in SG 2B. thirteen (13) PMS in SG 2C and eight (8) PMS in SG 2D which completed the prioritized list of repairs for up to three operating cycles.

It was concluded that operation of all four SGs for the next three operating cycles poses a low risk of impacting SG structural integrity, thermal performance, and nuclear safety.

12. The scope, method, and results of secondary-side cleaning performed in each SG Due to Sludge lancing activities being performed in A2R22, no sludge lancing was performed in A2R23. Historical weight of deposits removed from each SG by sludge lancing is provided in Table 18. Secondary side deposits that may affect tube integrity have been managed by periodic sludge lancing, one "soft" chemical cleaning (ASCA) in 2017 and improving deposit removal efficiency through the use of a polyacrylic acid dispersant (PAA).

These actions, combined with a lower feedwater iron concentration achieved through the combination of high pH and amines, have maintained the iron deposit inventory low and broach blockage at a low level such that SG water levels and steam pressure have been relatively steady for the past 2 years.

E2 - 22 of 56

Enclosure 2 Table 18: A2R23 and Prior Outage Sludge Lance Deposit Removal Results SG 2A SG 28 SG 2C SG 2D Outage rotal (lbs)

(lbs) (lbs) (lbs) (lbs)

A2R17 24.25 8.5 41 24.75 99 A2R18 Sludge Lancing Not Performed A2R19 69 106 84.5 76 335.5 (ASCA)

A2R20 Sludge Lancing Not Performed A2R21 Sludge Lancing Not Performed A2R22 23 46 28.5 21.5 119 A2R23 Sludge Lancing Not Performed

13. The results of primary side component visual inspections performed in each SG Visual Inspection of Installed Tube Plugs and Tube-to-Tubesheet Welds All previously installed tube plugs were visually inspected for signs of degradation and leakage.

The tube-to-tubesheet welds were visually inspected during eddy current. No degradation or anomalies were found.

SG Channel Head Bowl Visual Inspections Each SG hot and cold leg primary channel head was visually examined in accordance with the recommendations of Westinghouse NSAL 12-01 and NRC IN 2013-20 for evidence of breaches in the cladding or cracking in the divider to channel head weld and for evidence of wastage of the carbon steel channel head. No evidence of cladding breaches, wastage or corrosion in the channel head was identified. Also, no cracking in the divider to channel head weld was identified.

14. Braidwood Unit 2 has the following plant specific reporting requirements:

For Unit 2, the operational primary to secondary leakage rate observed (greater than three gallons per day) in each steam generator (if it is not practical to assign the leakage to an individual steam generator, the entire primary to secondary leakage should be conservatively assumed to be from one steam generator) during the cycle preceding the inspection which is the subject of the report (TS 5.6.9.g); and There was no confirmed operational primary to secondary leakage rate exceeding 3 gallons per day in the operating period since the last SG inspection.

For Unit 2, the calculated accident induced leakage rate from the portion of the tubes below 14.01 inches from the top of the tubesheet for the most limiting accident in the most limiting SG. In addition, if the calculated accident induced leakage rate from the most limiting accident is less than 3.11 times the maximum operational primary to secondary leakage rate, the report should describe how it was determined (TS 5.6.9.h); and Based on the Braidwood Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) the accident leakage limit for the most limiting accident scenario leading to offsite dose consequences is the steam line break E2 - 23 of 56

Enclosure 2 (SLB) accident. For this accident, the limiting accident induced leak rate in the affected SG is 0.5 gpm. If no SCC is detected above the tubesheet and in the portion of the tube 14.01 inches from the top of the tubesheet and no wear induced leakage exists, then the entire accident induced allowable leakage (0.5 gpm) divided by 3.11 can be allocated to the tubesheet expansion region below 14.01 inches from the top of the tubesheet. Effectively, this means that 0.16 gpm leakage (0.5 gpm/3.11) is allowed during operation from the faulted SG within the portion of the tubes below 14.01 inches from the top of the tubesheet. Therefore, no administrative limit on operational leakage is necessary since the more limiting 150 gpd (0.104 gpm) TS operational leakage limit assures that the 0.5 gpm accident leakage limit is not exceeded.

For Unit 2, the results of monitoring for tube axial displacement (slippage). If slippage is discovered, the implications of the discovery and corrective action shall be provided (TS 5.6.9.i).

The bobbin data collected from all SGs were screened by automated data analysis for large amplitude tubesheet indications of greater than 50 volts with a phase angle between 25° and 50° suggestive of tube severance with tube slippage. No indications of tube slippage were detected during the A2R23 inspection. Additionally, the 100% full-length array probe inspections did not identify any signals indicative of tube severance (i.e., tube slippage) within the tubesheet References

1. CEG letter to NRC, RS-22-086, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-577, "Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections", dated August 10, 2022 (ML22222A068)

2. CEG letter to NRG, RS-23-050, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-577, "Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections" (ML23143A136)

3. NRC letter to CEG, BRAIDWOOD STATION, UNIT NOS. 1 AND 2 - ISSUANCE OF AMENDMENTS 233 AND 233 RE: ADOPTION OF TSTF-577, "REVISED FREQUENCIES FOR STEAM GENERATOR TUBE INSPECTIONS," REVISION 1 (EPID L-2022-LLA-0115)",

dated July 26, 2023 (ML23188A129)

4. Steam Generator Management Program: Steam Generator Integrity Assessment Guidelines, Revision 5, EPRI, Palo Alto, CA, December 2021 (3002020909)

E2 - 24 of 56

Enclosure 2 ATTACHMENT A Anti-Vibration Bar (AVB) Wear Indications (SG 2A)

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., ")

..!. .. .::... al,\/1 '...: _'.;::1 1.99 20 41 71 12 E2 - 30 of 56

Enclosure 2 SGID Raw Col Volts locr lnchl I 16 39 13 39 39 - . 6 20 2.31 A\/}, 0.19 67 0.98 10 A\/1 0.08 1.8~ 24 .AVZ 0.14

':8 D.6, .AVl 0.05 AV2 0.14 39 r--\ 10 16 7r:-. 17 18 16

/6 1 18 .A.V4 -0.11

_,::_ J,*-; 78 2.34 0.16

'8 1.91 .A\/3 0.19

<4 1.D4 l,' A\/1 -0.21 J:

1.4-:'.

Jl 14 g- U lj 1:::

.:.:__J

.L.J l':J 0.8'.::: }\Vl -011 4.b9 -0.27 AV3 -0.24 1.0) .AV4 -0 19 l .AVl *006 40 ..'

A A .J1J 22

.

._ 40 *1 ::.

JIJ A 40 29 25 3.13 AV3 0.47 4U ..::..1 C_, 16 A 40 21]

A 40 34 E2 - 31 of 56

Enclosure 2 Row Col Volts loo~ !nch1 A. 40 31 '*' 16 40 2S 40 l .lb 18 '** l3 40 J 6 Jl li.\/2 -0.06 31 2.34 .AV3 -0.2l A -'-r\.i J.1 1.19 20 .AV4 40 .B 1} A.V3 -0.14 40 34 14.c' lS AV2 -0.2

"',,"1 A 40  : Db lf ~-',,; ,*

A 40 -- Jl

_A 40 2t A. 4(}  :.* 72 E A * .\ j A 40 ,_,,6b lC '*** *... *,

40 1.l.4 1S A\/2 0.16 40 12 A\/3 0.08 11 ' .:-\\/1 0.08

-13 .AV2 -0.1;,

1.1 U ' .AV3 0.08 A 40 A 40 2(

A 40 12 JC 40 u.13 40 116 -0 11 lS AVi 1 .. 19 /J.\/2 -0.1

• 4() O.bi 13 -0 L 68 1.62 23 A\/2 0.16 0 b? 13 A\/3 D.84 u .AVl 0.08 A 40 L A \',/1 40 '

I 40 lb 40 l.24 n V: A\/2 -0.19 1

• A 40 ~ :JS 1.

J,_ 40 .

, -

E2 - 32 of 56

Enclosure 2 SGID Row Col Vo!ts Per locr lnchl 40 33 40 on 40 . - .J.:l 18 13 40 27

.A\/1 0.19 AV3 (I 2

.A\/1 -021 A S3 *1 L<-~L C *1 29 AV2 40  :'.3 151 11 .AV3 -0.16 A 40 40 Li 40 .l.'.J4 32 A. 40 2:

40 l}

A gg 0.9j lo .A\/3 -0.13 41 24 3.L' ]

.JL

)

A\/2 -0.22

.l} 2.'.:,9 .JU 30 .

-+ l J4 15  : .AV2 O. H A 41 16 **** ...*'

A 41 4C 41 3  ! l ~ ...

µ,_ 41 3 ;~_; ' . .-

j 41 J l 41 39 1. .AV4 -0.lc 41 O.b:: .A\::2, 0.16

,,.,;,,_ 1.b4 jl,\/3 *0.16

-+ .1 2_17 .A\/2 *0.1S1

• 1 *_1 41 ~-. .J 2S AV3 *0.16 41 A 41 A 41 A. 41 3C A 41 14 41 b9 D.81 41 A 41 14 A 41 21 E2 - 33 of 56

Enclosure 2 SGID Row Coi Volts Per lorn lnchl 41 75 l. 2 24 0 41 A\/2 -0 06 A l.72 A\/3 A 41 /\\/3 21.

l 1 7 41 79 41 79 A i\\/1 A /\\/2 28 82 21 -0 . 10 J.} 84 18 -0.1~1

~--------

.A .1}  : 2.45 l 7 A -11 S 1.42 41 ;e\\/2 87 30

-11 20 42 (,1,,,S l b >8 l.lb '.8 42 28

_ _l_s_',4------.,:-,---;:.,-,i---_-0 131

=+H 28 18 -0.Jel I 42 30 19 .A\/l -0.lo I A 42 Ci.S'S .AV2

______ -L_*.1- ~ - - * - - ~ _ .. _ _ _ _ _ _ _.A_,\_,/....1_.: ,.*

.:.,, -L2 ~J.t:7 i\\/J 42 n _t\',JL 0.0:, I A 42 1S -._-,,*1

.~, *,; ~'

20 -0.14 J,\/2

,,, \ ,)

_,-,,,1.*.;;

42 /- i.

89 ~

-' 19 0.16 42 055 125 43 ,A\/1 71 31 o.n

-4 43 71 23 -0.16 E2 - 34 of 56

Enclosure 2 5GID Row Co, Volts  ::, 2f locn lnchl A

-43 7-C l::> iWl -o_u-_

-0_08

-43 1

A 72_ .AV3 A 43

--~:

93 .AV3 -o_u, A 43 l.-'- ~-~ A\/4 0_21 A 44 2-:  : I AVl 0_02 41 55 fJ.S9 10 ~- -o _ (j::!

1()1 1 D.52 1D 0.7~ E ,.\\/-4 13 J.~ -.+G ~).65 1C ~1,/l 2.:.~

.. _.,;"")

A --l 4C D.B3 12 -~;*,;;,_

A 45  !:. s .A\/2 -006 A 45 t.,.

-- ~ CJ .AV3 -o_o::

A 45 2.'; AVl O_O':

A 45 2 :l A 1n ¥L 0_16 A 45 ."IC 1*1

-j- _;, n .~\l3, D A_ 45 _J .AV2 -014

.:l ::

48 07 "i /1, -~, ~- l3 A 45 49 l.UB 16 .!_ i~, DJ

-+ :-_; ':i l 0.93 E, ,

\'

l*-

45 :i2 0.31 12 -~-\:*2  ;,}8 4:::: ~J4 0.2::;1 L*, 4-\\.' :~-

1::_1 ,*, 1 A ..,.,:; .)~- __

-~\;d. l,..)" .lC' 45 C

.::::3 A\/3 _,.-,

u.L..

A. 45 S*:J lj A\/2 013 A 45 C.. _: ,2.:) .AV3 -O_E:

A 45 t-,_  :::,1- L) _i!.;\/3, -O.E 1 A 45 _;_ ~J ,;..\\/l 0.08 A ,.:15 lt: ,..\ \/3 *l} 1 l

µ, -4S lO 2.Dl 1 C

.:.__[ ,,_\ V~'. -(J_l -:

.i

:: 70 l.2:3 1'

.L...;. ,.._.;,-,;_..;, 16

/0 1.17 l .-  :,, \/ 4 7' l.lt) 18 J,\/1 , *; lJ

-, ' 0.95 k )_ 1:

I -

A 45 t::' _'3 AVJ. 0.14 A 45 r, A\/3 -0 l'.-:1 A 45 .~--- ~l AV4 -o_or A 45 f:,-C. C 15 AV2 -0_1,;

A 45 E~ - -2 :l .AVJ -0_2.::,

A I 45 I C;,

I - '::*..:'. -l I A\/1 I -0.0S E2 - 35 of 56

Enclosure 2 SGID Row Col \/o!ts Per Lon, inchl 46 13 46 33 l.ll l A 46 17 A. 46 l 2 lb 113 lS _A.\/1 0.11

.A\r*"t V L -0.22 Cl 0.71 13 .AVl 0.11 4:::,* D.95 k * .AV2 -0.14 46 13':, iW2 -0.19 4S 19 4b ,_, r 1 1 .,L 4b 17 46 l.U3 18 Cl.,

34 C l 7.:... 4.l.1

,j 7 2 26 A\/2 0.14 29 2.1 A\/j 0.08

-l / 171 .AV2 4:' 30 15,'. i .AV3 -0.16 33 O.S 13 i AVl *006 A 47 . '. .::.C< 1/

~-------------

A J. 7 2.8 lS E2 - 36 of 56

Enclosure 2 ATTACHMENT A Anti-Vibration Bar (AVB) Wear Indications (SG 2B)

SGID Row Coi Volts locri

[3 Ll 110

.l '

~L 109 16 OJl.

109 C!.91 17 B 24 *  :~; 0.74 * .AV4 *. 12 8 ~*...* 0.83 le  : .AV1

}J D.41 75

[; 25 107 C bl B

25 D.42 E*

6 108 24

[: 106 15

,, ' ,*,**1 u 106 ..;_ *'-*;_:i 19 *0 .. 1:.l

,,,1,

?-J; *~* ..l..

E L~- D 9g .A\/2 1__ ~2

---

'----------~-----------

E 157 85 12 *O 06 G 85 17 0.1:.l

-0 14 19

J.97 lUl

~

' f *1 u.u::;

[3 101 ~.1 19 *O l.:!

103 17 -Q}j E _', ".:

_,:\\i:2__

32 J 32 101 *0.16 101 15 0.1:.l

\)

.. '-1 1 .,L ~\/l E 33 2.51 2, .A,\/3,

~1.75 .i..J .A\12 103 22 j *0.22 59 75 H 0.17

• 1,1 E 35 0.68 _P.,\-'3 E2 - 37 of 56

Enclosure 2 5GID Row Col Volts Per locr, 36 81 lC 5 36 9.~ 16 B i *U l :1 96 , 0.7S lS 0.36 B 96 u .A\14 0.06 97 24 A\11 5 0.9:l 17 .A\/2 0.05 15: .A\/3 -0.14 8

8 5 36 _ 55 B 36 ~ .23 5

G 36 18 A\/2 0.14 I.. 3t:, l ..: AV3 -0.2~

36 .A 1/4 (J16 i

38 i AVl 0.11 38 4.42 38 .A\/2 0.2 B 57 .* 5 8

B 37 Q __ J

?S B 37 112 l.S:iJ.

l.t/*-1 23 .A\14 -cu:,

~.23 ,. -

• 1-:

2 19 J*

101 El .AV4 -0.0'::,

1::.

39 E2 - 38 of 56

Enclosure 2 SGID Row Col Volts Per Locn tnch1 l.

B 39 - D 23 ___, ,.;_*...-

1(1 13 40 ,*: *_--6 12 .  :

8 40 21 1.2 1.2 1:3 A\/3 -0.19 G 0.85 ,AV2 *0.13 E, 40 46 22 ,A\/2 0_24 E, . 1.4b

L_._ A\/3 0.08 40 1.0S lS A\13 -0.16 B --i,*,,

8 40 20 G 40 b~, l ..:'..l 17 40 24 '~ l G 40 / ..,..,, .:..__l_ 7 21 s 40 7t 82 16 .A\11 O.OS 0.6 7 l .\ .A\:'2 0.16 2.71 .AV:J -0_2.4

-Vi 0.53 i.L .AV4 0.18 G 7 D.6~ 14 i .A\/2 0.11 G 40 Si *.. *

-,~

) -,

G 40 9 .... 1 1::...

_,..'.*'J 21

--~-:---:-*~-;---~-:~-.---.:.-:-:---~-:-*___~_. __*/_'__ ..... . I n

G 40 l'

_j...:., c*

4C 0. / 3 AV4 -0.EJ

[, 40 '::'3 1.8 _A\/2 -0.22 40 2.LS AV3

,JC.:

~..1 0.92 AV2 *O 14 95 D.91 .A\/3 -0.ll 4-1 16 1.2 7 19 A\/2 0.11 13 41 ~- _\4 El B 41 1-:;5 JS B 41 27 41 "

...:__,:..1 23 41 19 41 .A\/2 *0.03 8 41 Jo B 41 19 5 I 42 I I .. 0:.1 I 20 I .\\' l I '** l -

E2 - 39 of 56

Enclosure 2 SGID Row Coi Voi!s Pe: tocn !nchl

[ 42 B 42 lS ,_, l 'J G 43 3,_ ~ J4 2t

[; 30 * [! 91 l3 AV3 -0.11 32 1.3 El _;.\Vl 32 AV2 0.16 32 l:,  : .AV3 0.08 43 37 1. 23 i A\/1 0.11 f:l 4 33 8 3C 44 11 44 l..ll B 47 lE 47 I .j 7 I :,9 I 1.L:, I 2[J I .A\13 I *O H, E2 - 40 of 56

Enclosure 2 ATTACHMENT A Anti-Vibration Bar (AVB) Wear Indications (SG 2C)

SGID Row Col Volts Per Locn lnchl C -0 32

• 1 1 C J...UJ n

17 .i-1.\/l (J}-:!

9 0.08

( 9 l! *Ct 17

~\/2 ()_i.JS

.11_,

17 L.l 103 A,\/L L2  ;:,,**,/ l 0 13 C {J.6 7 0 27 1.35 *O 19 42 1 *11

...:...L.:... -~1.J

• ,_ 17 ,;,,\/1

-0 1::.

JO 1J lJ CL lOl

.H  :..\ '1/.2 iJ C,3

() 22 J2 J 1 C l 1,\,*t C .-', ,,,,;:...,

C J,J .L22

• 1*1

.).)

'.1

--+ l.31 L.' *Ol*~

J3 D.63 i:.i,\/ l jJ D.1.:-..

72  !:..,\' J 33 /b 1_1.5:J 33 O.b 11 33 E2 - 41 of 56

Enclosure 2

~GID Row Coi Volts locn lnchl C :J_ll

,_ 1.04 0.18 C 34 i D.96 D.16 C 1.67 18 1.07 18 .t..\/2 -C C3 56 1.65 23 .AVl C 34 100 lW3

.LL AV2 C C l.93 25 A\/3

\\/l ].OS C 1.26

.,_ 36 3.lS '... c_ iJ 22 C '*.:

J.08 C J6 2.83 .*\ J.47 19 34 .AV3 -() iJJ

',_ 19 1G AV4 C* 3" C

\._

C l.21 C-.19 C U.96 C 1.35 -- ~'j lb .AV4 34 8 34 26 *C.19

':,o l.b4 0 11 C 36 '-~ *-~

9{J 3.74 3b 1.38 E2 - 42 of 56

Enclosure 2

~GID Row Cc! Volts Per locr !nchl I C

9.'

C 3b 96 1.03 0.11

% 1 ,...;_,

'.:l(l

.AV3 C 99 0.9c, i.4 .AVl OJJS

',_ qg 2.14 24 AV2 -0.D 34 A\/3 -0.24

\_ 21 C 37 IL

.:,/ ~ 23 C 37 C 2..69 2C . \ ,,, C

,:: 37 ,, ,' 2.54 Lo

,,.., l Cl.' O.i'S .AVl 0.03 C 0.16 l.? 3 _i!,,\/3 -01.:1.

S7 D.7E .AV4 0.13 OJ< l2 /',,V2 0.05 C 37 ', .. ,-------<

I,_* 11 C 37 C 37 2l 27 AVl 0.29 7 :_;;

27 L.~*._i .A\/2 O.lt 27 lJS '

.l. -0.19 30 "t r*,1 L.1._: 0.33 JD -0 1~1 59

~.24 4' ~' 11 56 1.9:2 C

C 38 l 34 C

E2 - 43 of 56

Enclosure 2 5GID Row Col Voits Per Locn lnchl C 30 C . 6b -!...~ 7 lo 0.72 .AV-4 0.26 68 1.02 .AVl 0.19 C: 68 1.9 .AV2 -0.11 AV3 0.11 1.51 AV2 -0.19 7J. 19 C .'

.;-._,L 21 C 3S 91 , 1.1'~1 :8 I .AV2 0

~11 3.3.5 i /\\/3 -0.16

.* .. 1.0S .A\/2 -008

.AV3 -0 . 14 C 0.3'.:' AV3 -0.4 l ,-\ -.; _;_

39 40 7*..:

40 L 12 2} *.iL 40 ' . :.:.__, __r:.J

..:.. 22 . ()_1_;-~

1. /-:= 24 *U.J.2 40 0.7 l - ..:1 A\/l -006 81 3 02 0.16

_f!,.,\/3 0.17

_i: ', S3 D.b 7 _3 AVl O.ll 40 -0.28

.:+i,___; 3.

C 4C) '* .-,,:.

C 40 - ,_. 5 40

,_ 40 40 58 1.93 15 A_\/2. 0.3 40 C 40 Ll

• 1c 40 ,;;,._!

C 40 40 D.67 E2 - 44 of 56

Enclosure 2 5GID Row Col Volts Per locn inch1 28 AV2 -0 22 38 92 1_22 C 40 D.75 Li 40  !~4 O.Eb 94 11 .A\/J *0.22 C (} 7 1 \

.L.i.. /!:.,\/]

C l,85 21 .-:1.\,'-4 -C.16 C ..Jl 0.77 A\12 i\ '.

\.,' J..l 41 17 -(t27 41

• ,_ 41 _J,\/3 ~O lt*

41 l.17 C 41 ]'.J '*1-i

...:... ::., ,' 22 .A\/J 0.03 24 _D. 1,/l

-+l A\,,2 41 31 C -.i 31 41 J4 29  :\\/1 0 16

• ,,*--1 41 34 '.., _,

.:Jl ]4 A\/4 41 iO .A'/1 () DS 11 C .:_.+j JS 1.17 41 .A\/l D.l

~,\/1 41 3b /:J,\/J C 41 1,;,*1 41 3.1 33  ;.,_.,-,.,iL 41 l. 73 C l C:2 C 41 41 C 41 D.tit: -* ' ~.\/L

'*1:*

(_ 41 49 .l. .),:'.,': 2:Z.. t?..,\/1

r)

_1,_, Ci. 7 J C*.L 41 A\/2 3.23

\_ D.S2 .\\/ l C 41 71 .P,\il *0.03 41 71 _;...\\il D C I .:\1 I 7l I 2(}1 I 23 I 1\V::S I -0.E E2 - 45 of 56

Enclosure 2 SGID Row Col Volts Per Locr lnchl C 41 81 . :. . -'---,7 *.: ~L 41 l.06 41 83 1 13 A\/1. 0.11 11

~ .. ..i .AVJ [I 41 (J 9 13 AVl 41 1.62 .AV2 41 1.4\:: A\/3 -0.14 C 41 I_ 41 '. !_-_i5 34 41 .:_ J7 24 16

' 1 1 r:.

C 41

( '-f.l. 9 l ..J9 1'

-_c 1.5 lS! .AVJ 21 1.4-1 l i

3.13 \

.AV3 -0.22

-l2 1.91 AV4 0.lS 0.7'.:: 0.0S 1 SJ -0 14 C 42 I ,__;7 C 42 -** .-'L C 42 42 42 3t

,\Sq J6 4.Cl .~v -* 0.2 36 1 f',

.l..'L*-i I

_/ AVA 0.13

• , *:i 39 l.S7 A,\/2 -011 C -L' 39

• A\/3 1.11 .A\/3 -0.ll

(.

s:_ - .1 lS  : ,._ ./ 1 42 24 ,__. l '.J

( ..i2 33 __,

42 2[

C 42 8.

\_ 2.01 C 42 C 42 82 27

! '1 C 42 82-C 42 8' lb S3 1.2 19 AV3 -0.2i E2 - 46 of 56

Enclosure 2 SGID Row Co! \/cits Per inchl C 42 9! - 2

..,~

.1 ') __ ,_,

qr 38 9C1 5.11 I_, -0.13 C 90 102 AV4 -0.08 C 0.72 AV3 D 1.35 AV4 -003 0.63 .AVl 0.11 C 20 C 43 16 C 43 43 23

,4 2.04 26 AV3 -0.16 0.7 ll .A.\/2 0.16 l .,

• ._j 4.3b AVl 0.19

• • j j 2.D1  ; .A\/4 0 2':,

D 82 .AVl U.16 l L' A\/2 -0 08 43

. )

43 SL :2 J,:;_

l ~-S 43 gr_,  : 73 lC 43 '" "---

C* 1-.i

• _) 84 2.8 .' 29 AV3 -0.24

.A\/4 C ~-*

1' 91 1.11 -0.19 0.93 .A\/4 0.19 C: 28 13 C

18 C 44 C 44 17 44 *-' C, 7 13 C l.d 21 D. 7E:

C 44 9 44 1.2 45 7 38 C 45 ;__ 5.4 18 0.59 E2 - 47 of 56

Enclosure 2 5GID Row Co! Volts Per !m:hl C 45 . 3( ;___:_::7 n C 45 3l 39

.: 23 -0.18

( 36 0.64 .Al/2 0.16

\..  :+5 36 Al/3 -0 11

,0 0.7'0 .Al/1 0.26 C 45 1.66 .Al/1 -0.22

\_ 45  ! Sl - *'

-,>'-t 24 C 45 --** 2 33 ,.) l::,

C 45 i9 C 45 ~I J ~ .1 1 -/ '

• I 22 45 . .µ,\/ l u.2.i S4 .A\/3 0.03 1.63 * .Al/1 0.13 0.13

.\ ~. 1. 3 l_l_ .AV3 *0.11 1.9;:; -008 C 45 C 6.l 24 45 ',_ l 3

\_ 4 -'c 16 .. '

~- y .,_

\_ 45 34 34 2.2t -0.14 4b 24:: _,l,1/3 -0.14 34 1.95 A\/4 -0.19 S5 ' 044 ,A\/3 0.14

.lo .Al/1 C  ::i:\/2 C

C 46 bl C 46 7{J ,. I AV1 0_18 I C 47 47 ld C 4 c,"  :::*.:l 10 C  :,. .Ll9 18 0.%

E2 - 48 of 56

Enclosure 2 SGID Row Col \lo its Per A\/4 u E2 - 49 of 56

Enclosure 2 ATTACHMENT A Anti-Vibration Bar (AVB) Wear Indications (SG 2D)

E2 - 50 of 56

Enclosure 2 5GID Row Col Volts Per locn lnchl

,., 1(:,

u 9 D 142 AVl C 26 6 16  ; A\/4 D 48 l.7l

• 1 f D 2S 48 1

...:... . .L.' 20 -0 16 D 50 17 A*./1 so l.l 7 D 2b 58 *0.19 26 13 ,A\/2 27 ..J.\/l G.27

[J l..l D 18 D 62 13 A\/3 1.42 .k\/l IJ.13 D 1.89 -U.ld Ll8 27 U.19 r,

u 1.75 *O l&

14 l1 l SJ 21 13 D 14 1.17 21J A\i2 14 l l 18 ,.'.,\/J .,n l.:..

12 C, l'.:I D 3.:.. -- . _......*1 F* ~

12 D 22 .2:,\/J,

-, 2.44 0 19 D E 3.2 .:,_)

L 1.17 l:J -(J.16 D J() 13 J.bl

1 13 1.27 A\/3 J l.Cb () C)S l'.J l _,__,

1' D 14 ,., -,*,

L' ,' ::_ 14 D /\\/1

,1

[J .:.Dl 12 *O OJ D 37 _J,\/J

,-, 14

'-' 13 14 1f1

.LU /.1.,=/3 17 E2 - 51 of 56

Enclosure 2 SGID Row co: Volts D 33 3 18 D 3 1:,

D 3 J_ -,

D 33 16 ll .A\/3 0 33 0.75 E, A\/4 J 25

• 14 A\/2 0.3 25 1.27 20 .AV3 003 W  ; A,\/2 0.38 D 12  :'\\/2

[J 13 D 34 8 19 D 34 18 D 3S 7 ... 14 -*, ,, _L_

D 35 7-1.3l 20 I AV2 CUl 1.lS lJ  ?,'I f"l

....... lJL -0.ll 1 _t',,\/4 -0.18 L) 1:.1 i .AVL 2.13 27 i /.l,\/2 *O 24 0 35 **,,*.* I_ l ~

0 20 I_ 13 D

0 JL

_)',_: 3 .:' lg '*. ~J 7- -fl 17 Avi O.b3 A\/3 0.11 j? 11':! .A\/2. -0.E O.bl '*,

J.L AV3 O.ll

[! D. 7: 1.: .AVl Cl l "l')

..L.L.,:, 20 *

.AV3 -OE, lS D 1S D

---

~----------.)-1_

D 37 3_;_ i ..2S 2C..- _ , - - - - ~ .

~ '

1.07 Ll .AV2 *0.21 u 1' L~ r, lS D - li D _ 15 2C E2 - 52 of 56

Enclosure 2 SGID Row Col Volts Per Locn lnc:hl D l-+ l Ci-+ 18 .i',,V3 D 79 AVl C.16 D lC /:.i,\/2 D G 52 ll 0 ()8 0 43 l l.4 l::? G.00 0 13 ,c},\/3 U D3 D ,.:\\/2 22

[ l.L cu

[l 23 D.,\12 O.h D Jl L:1.19 D ~.\/2 D f.: 7 D D G :.,w 0.19 D 0.95

[l 18

2)  :::,\/ l D l.1G 19 D 18 0.()::3 37 ,A\/J D l :, U D8

.:\\c'2_

D -1,C Ci.91 n *;, 7 43  : ,'

10 D l?

D D

D D 19

[1 J:

2U 18 i.\\/3 .,J.16 2C: 19 A,/2. 16 19 CL19 16 16 E2 - 53 of 56

Enclosure 2 5GID Row Cci Volts Per locr lnchl D

D 22

[J 2G

[J 0.94 0.34 0 1.24 AV2 047

[J 4U 48 2.04 /W3 0.03 0 0.5 .AV4 0.12 40 0.5::. ~1  ; A\il 041 D 40 .\ \. 2 D 40 12 D 40 12 D 40 2l

[J 40 1.15 19 D 4t) L:.5 Y7 1.4-:l 22 ' AV3 -01S 29 -0.18 33 l. 7~~ AV2 -0.16 D 33 1.Db lS 027 D -+ l 0.86 16 .A\/2 (tll

[J 41 3  ;~.- .l _)

D 41 1

• D 41  !:"I

'.".*L.. ,_ 1,:-1 r,

u 41 4, 14 ,,,..: ,,..) 1. -

[J 41 3C 0.19

., 1

[: -u 1.31 0 41 D.47 l ~ A\/4 [I 4.3t .AVZ 0 r,

L~ 1.0_; lS AV3 l.7E _A\/J -0 24

[J 41 '** _._,;

[J 41  : b

[J 41 13 D 41 :_ 21 19 D 41 7t E, i_, .l

• D D 41 13

[J 41 l

[J 41 1 -,L

[J 41 12 E2 - 54 of 56

Enclosure 2 SGID Row Co! Volts Per locr, lnchl D 41 1.59 23 0.14 35 0.89 l} 2.,\/l D.l:.

D 42 l.75 \ ", ('1

<-'\ V L *0.19

[J 42 JS  ::_1_3J ii.VJ O.Oo D 42 3S ~J.bJ 13 D 42 1.12 19 P.V4 004 D 1.91 2t:

£\\/1 (),37 D 17 ,:.\\/2 G.B D 42 51 42 J.22 -0.24 D l.SS 23

[J D.~l _..:.,\,:J,

[J 41 c-o G 19

[J 42 lC ..\v3 C 57 o, J:,

.JV

[J l.12 0 19 0 42 2..bS ,:.\*./3

[J 42 ~.ll 18

• r

[J ].:) U.tJ3 43 36  :.9J -u 22 D 43 36 D ~.\' l D l.tiE 3.~,

D 43 4U 0.0.3

.:lJ D

1: ,.\\./1

~.)

D l,,\: l

[) 43 l 7b

_:1.t:E .,.l,\,'2 U 22 D l.~1'l D

.,, -C).18 2C D 16 u 45 1.1 19 D .A.\/3 D l lS E2 - 55 of 56

Enclosure 2 5GID Row Col Volts Per locn lm:hl 16 D A\/4 18 D 32 OA:i

• 1

[l 1::

~t.J 50 *1 **i

,:__;;_J:_ 27 0.17

[l 56 18 O.lo 45 234 A\/1 C 2.8b A\/3 4b .AVL 56 23 37 13 -0.13 D 50 13  :\**/l (1-34 49 ;Ll,\/4 145 .;j.,\/1 . ' ~'.:i D D.J ;_: 55

[J 66 i'T 1 71 I . ,c1 I 12 I _,._ \ : I o o:,

E2 - 56 of 56