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* The licensee's Emergency Plan (E-Plan) will be updated to include new organizational charts and position-specific responsibilities and assignments. The Emergency Plan implementing Procedures (EPIPs) will be updated to reflect the new TSC organization and AMT responsibilitici, associated with the SAMG, No additional personnel were added to the ERO to implement SAMG. | * The licensee's Emergency Plan (E-Plan) will be updated to include new organizational charts and position-specific responsibilities and assignments. The Emergency Plan implementing Procedures (EPIPs) will be updated to reflect the new TSC organization and AMT responsibilitici, associated with the SAMG, No additional personnel were added to the ERO to implement SAMG. | ||
* DAEC intends to implement EOP changes using a.10 CFR 50.59 screening evaluation. | * DAEC intends to implement EOP changes using a.10 CFR 50.59 screening evaluation. | ||
Appendix D to the EP/ SAG document will be used as a source document to describe the changes frorn EPG, Revision 4. With regard to the SAG-related changes, the licensee intends to perform a screening evaluation to verify that all associated activities are outside the plant's licensing and design basis. This approach appears consistent with the guidance provided in the staffs January 28,1998, letter to NEl concerning SAM implementation issues, but this would need to be confirmed after the licensee has completed this evaluation. | Appendix D to the EP/ SAG document will be used as a source document to describe the changes frorn EPG, Revision 4. With regard to the SAG-related changes, the licensee intends to perform a screening evaluation to verify that all associated activities are outside the plant's licensing and design basis. This approach appears consistent with the guidance provided in the staffs {{letter dated|date=January 28, 1998|text=January 28,1998, letter}} to NEl concerning SAM implementation issues, but this would need to be confirmed after the licensee has completed this evaluation. | ||
Severe Accident Trainina e Plans for initial and refresher training of the ERO were outlined. However, development and implementation of this training are not scheduled to occur untillater this year, and many aspects of the licensee's refresher training program are undefined at this time. | Severe Accident Trainina e Plans for initial and refresher training of the ERO were outlined. However, development and implementation of this training are not scheduled to occur untillater this year, and many aspects of the licensee's refresher training program are undefined at this time. | ||
DAEC intends to establish plant-specific learning objectives based on BWROG-developed recommended learning objectives. The scope of the training provided to each ERO member will be based on the job-specific grouping of objectives associated with the particular job classification. DAEC intends to develop plant-specific lesson plans based on the generic lesson plans developed through the cooperative BWROG Region 3 effort. A decision regarding which training methods will be used (computer based, classroom, and/or self-study) has not yet been made. | DAEC intends to establish plant-specific learning objectives based on BWROG-developed recommended learning objectives. The scope of the training provided to each ERO member will be based on the job-specific grouping of objectives associated with the particular job classification. DAEC intends to develop plant-specific lesson plans based on the generic lesson plans developed through the cooperative BWROG Region 3 effort. A decision regarding which training methods will be used (computer based, classroom, and/or self-study) has not yet been made. | ||
Revision as of 17:13, 19 March 2021
| ML20237B978 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Duane Arnold  |
| Issue date: | 04/15/1998 |
| From: | Palla R NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | Holahan G NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| References | |
| FACA, NUDOCS 9808200132 | |
| Download: ML20237B978 (276) | |
Text
_________ __-_-____ _ - _ _ ____-___
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0" -'k UNITED STATES l',j p
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't NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHING f ON, D.C. 20555 0001 b ,,, g April 15, 1998 MEMORANDUM TO: Gary M. Holahan, Director Division of Systems Safety and Analysis Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation THRU: Carl H. Berlinger, Chief h.f, Containment Systems and Severe Accident Branch Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: Robert L. Palla, Sr. Reactor Engineer MI Containment Systems and Severe Accident Branch Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation i
SUBJECT:
SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT DEMONSTRATION VISIT AT DUANE ARNOLD, FEBRUARY 5-6,1998 ,
On February 5 and 6,1998, NRC staff attended a severe accident management (SAM) implementation " demonstration" at IES Utilities, Duane Amold Energy Center (DAEC) in Cedar I
Rapids, Iowa. Attendees from NRC headquarters were Robert Palla, Containment Systems and Severe Accident Branch, George Thomas, Reactor Systems Branch, James O'Brien, Emergency Preparedness and Radiation Protection Branch, David Desaulniers, Human Factors Assessment Branch, and Sudhamay Basu, Office of Research. James Foster, Robert Jickling, and Thomas P!oski from Region 111 also attended. The demonstration was also attended by representatives from the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), approximately 20 representatives from U.S. nuclear plant sites, and seven representatives from foreign nuclear sites and regulatory .
l authorities. A list of attendees is provided as Attachment 1. An agenda is included as Attachment 2.
The purpose of the demonstration was to provide the NRC and visiting utility representatives information on DAEC's implementation of severe accident management pursuant to the formal industry position contained in NEl 91-04, Revision 1. Implementation activities at DAEC are in progress and scheduled to be completed by December 1998. The staff's objectives for the visit were to gain insights into the licensee's implementation process, including development and implementation of plant-specific severe accident guidelines (SAG) and technical support guidelines (TSG), application of the BWROG methodology for relocating accident management (A/M) strategies to the Technical Support Center (TSC), use of SAG and TSG during drills, and plans for providing and evaluating severe accident training. This information will be used to guide efforts to finalize a Temporary instruction (TI) for evaluating licensee severe accident management programs. The DAEC demonstration was the third industry-hosted demonstration, and the first demonstration at a BWR facility. O\ g\
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In closing comments, Fred Emerson, NEl, reminded participants of the importance of keeping the priority of SAM implementation in line with the priorities of more important plant activities.
He indicated that in keeping with a performance viewpoint of the demonstration, the answer to the following questions would be yes:
- Has decision making and communications tseen enhanced?
Have tools for advising on severe accident mitigation been enhanced and are they
~
adequate?
- Do the implementors, evaluators, and decision makers understand their responsibilities as indicated by drill results?
- Did the drill provide a useful self-assessment of response capabilities?
He stressed that utilities need to keep resources for SAM implementation and training in perspective with other activities, but given the commitment to complete implementation as an industry initiative, the industry has a responsibility to do this well, and in a way that carries out the mandate that industry set for itself.
Distribution w/ Attachments:
SCSB R/F Central Files
] MModes, RI KBarr, Ril JCreed, Rill BMurray, RIV Distribution w/o Attachments:
TMartin TCollins RGallo DDesaulniers CMiller JO'Brien RBarrett RHasselberg DMatthews PWen DOCUMENT NAME: DUANE.TRP h Y To rece6ve a copy of this document, indicate in the boa: 'C' = Copy without attachment / enclosure *E* = Copy upth attachment / enclosure "N" = No copy OFFICE SCSB:DSSA:NRR l BC:SCSB:DSSh BC:PERB:DRPM l b lBQ,:MOLB A l l NAME RPalla:bw gl.f CBerlinger ( *@Q CMiller f s, , 3WeitBM DATE JP3/98 ') / LJ /98 Ad t/ / h /98 ' # ' * / /#//98/' / /98 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
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The first day of the demonstration consisted of licensee presentations concerning site-specific l SAM development and implementation efforts. Topics addressed included: the DAEC A/M l project plan; EOP revisions; SAG and TSG development processes and resulting products; l evaluation of the impact of severe accident management on the Emergency Response Organization (ERO); changes to the TSC organization, Emergency Plan (E-Plan), and Emergency Plan implementing Procedures (EPIPs); applicability of 10 CFR 50.59 and requirements for NRC notification; and dispositioning of IPE insights. Plans for ERO training were outlined, but not discussed in detail. Documentation of various evaluations and reviews l performed by the licensee as part of the SAM implementation process, and the resulting l
technical guidance documents were made available for examination during the meeting.
Presentation materials are provided as Attachment 3.
The licensee also provided the results of a BWR SAM implementation Survey regarding the approach for addressing various implementation decisions / issues at each BWR utility (included within Attachment 3). The survey, which represents nine of the 25 BWR sitos, suggetts that i
there is considerable variation in implementation approaches among the BWR utilities in some areas. The staff intends to look more closely at the survey results to better understand the l patterns and trends observed.
The principal activity on the second day was a three-hour tabletop drill demonstrating the use of the SAG and TSG by TSC staff. The drill scenario was initiated by a crack in the recirculation system piping, which resulted in ' leakage greater than 50 gpm and declaration of an Alert.
Feedwater and condensate pumps failed during transfer of power sources, but reactor water l
level was maintained using RCIC. Shortly after the TSC was activated, the crack expanded to a large LOCA, resulting in rapid depressurization and RPV level below top of active fuel (TAF).
- Due to a calibration error associated with the low pressure permissive interlock, ECCS inject valves failed closed, thereby precluding injection from low pressure coolant injection (LPCI),
! core spray (CS), and alternate RPV injection sources that inject through the LPCI valves. SAG was entered after determining that RPV level cannot be restored / maintained with available injection (limited to one CRD pump). Prior te RPV breach, actions were taken to use drywell sprays, inject to the containment from external sources, and secure injection from external sources before pressure suppression capability is lost. Following RPV breach, actions to flood i containment ure resumed. The containment pressurized due to the injection of water from extemal sources and the presence of hydrogen, eventually requiring the containment to be vented to prevent containment overpressure. The drill was terminated at that time. Additional information regarding the scenario is provided as Attachment 4. I The drill focussed on demonstrating the use of the SAG and TSG, and involved simulation of activities in the control room and TSC. Staffing of the TSC was limited to the Emergency Coordinator position, and the positions on the accident management team (described later).
The Operations Support Center (OSC) ani the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), and communications with these facilities were r ot simulated. The control room portion of the drill was conducted in the plant's simulator facility. The TSC portion of the drill was conducted in the actual TSC. Players were pre-staged in both facilities and activation of the TSC was not 1 simulated. Communications between the control room and TSC were via a phone link, and were not accessible to drill observers.
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A player debrief / critique was conducted immediately following the conclusion of the tabletop drill at which time drill participants provided thoughts about the drill. An exit meeting was then held during which the licensee, NRC, NEl, and other participants provided their respective l observations. A critique by the drill evaluators was held at a later time and was not observed during the staff's visit. The results of the critique were documented by the licensee in an internal memorandum, and subsequently provided to the NRC (Attachment 5).
Major staff observations were discussed at the exit meeting and are summarized below. The observations are based largely on information presented during the presentations, without the opportunity for staff follow-up, and should not be construed as conclusions:
Overall e The licensee has put forth a significant effort to interact with other BWR utilities to develop a consistent approach to SAM implementation at BWRs. This cooperative effort has led to development of SAM products that, acccrding to DAEC, are being implemented by most BWR utilities, such as flowcharted SAGS and severe accident lesson plans. The process for implementing SAM at DAEC appears to be well defined and effectively managed. The process includes consideration of several associated issues, including: (1) relocation of the entire body of SAG from the CR to the TSC, (2) relocation of combustible gas control from the EOPs to a separate SAG, and (3) the development of additional guidance (beyond that provided in the generic BWR products) for containment venting, use of drywell sprays, and reactor shutdown assessment. Technical evaluations were performed to justify the approaches taken in these areas and are documented. Differences from the generic guidance were alsd noted and are documented.
e The presentations were informative and addressed most of the topics discussed in previous A/M demonstrations. Based on the information provided in the presentations and contained in the supporting evaluations performed by the licensee, the DAEC approach and draft plant-specific guidance appears to be technically sound, and responsive to each of the A/M implementing elements in the formalindustry position on severe accident management (contained in Chapter 5 of NEi 91-04, Revision 1). Additional review of the materials and records in ear of these areas would be needed to confirm these observations once the licensee has completed their implementation efforts.
Kev Aspects of SAM Implementation at DAEC e The hensee intends to assign the responsibilities for SAG implementation /use and severe accident decision making to the TSC. The transfer of these responsibilities from the CR (the default location in the generic guidelines) to the TSC was evaluated and justified using the BWROG Placement Criteria. (This same approach is being taken by all BWR utilities included in the BWR SAM Implementation Survey.) DAEC's evaluation was briefly described. A copy of this evaluation was provided to NRC staff for information.
N
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e DAEC has defined a five-member Accident Management Team (AMT) within the TSC with overall responsibility for SAG use. The AMT will consist of the TSC Operations Supervisor, who will head the team and serve as the SAM " decision maker," and four technical staff who will serve as " evaluators", i.e., the TSC Operations Liaison, the Reactor Engineer, the Safety Analysis Engineer, and the SPDS Operator. The Control Room Coordinator position currently assigned to the CR, will be relocated to the TSC and renamed the TSC Operations Supervisor. (The licensee indicated that this change would be made despite SAM implementation.) The TSC Operations Supervisor position at DAEC will be staffed by a licensed Senior Reactor Operator. NRC staff expressed support for the concept of staffing the decision maker position with a licensed senior reactor operator, since this would increase the credibility of AMT with the CR operators and reduce the potential for command and control problems. The licensee expects that all staff members that fill these positions in the ERO will be SAMG qualified.
As part of the TSG, DAEC developec position-specific guidance for each evaluator position on the AMT to help support the respective assessment and advisory activities. This guidance is in the form of notebooks, and includes trending / forecasting charts, system dependency matrices, guidance on detecting RPV breach, and guide lines for core /
reactivity assessment, containment venting, and containment spray operations. Although developed as part of SAM implementation, the licensee expects these tools to also be used in events that do not proceed to core damage.
The licensee has performed an evaluation of the conditions under which combustible gas control actions would be required, and concluded that operator actions would not be required until several hours or days into the event, at which time the TSC would be available. On this basis they intend to relocate the instructions related to combustible gas control from the EOPs to the SAG, as SAG-3. However, the CR operators would still be expected to use SAG-3 (the DAEC combustible gas control guideline) without TSC support if the need arises, and would continue to be trained on this as part of accredited training.
The staff noted that relocation of these actions appears reasonable given the systematic evaluation performed, which included consideration of both severe accident and licensing basis sequences. The staff expressed interest in reviewing DAEC's assessment more closely given its generic implications, but indicated that the need for a review would be alleviated by DAEC's commitment to retain CR responsibility for implementing SAG-3 and to continue to train the operators on this guideline.
- DAEC intends to use an emergency preparedness-type critique process for self-assessment of SAM drill performance. NRC staffindicated that this would be an appropriate means of assuring that strengths, weaknesses, and corrective measures are identified and addressed.
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Development and implementation of Plant-Specific SAMG
- The licensee indicated that they did not implement several SAG strategies within the plant-specific SAGS because they had some concern that these strategies may constitute an unreviewed safety question under 10 CFR 50.59. These strategies include operation of containment sprays below the low pressure isolation interlock, override of off gas high i
radiation interlock, and increased flexibility for containment venting. The licensee indicated I
that rationale justifying these changes is being provided in the BWR Owners Group (BWROG) responses to NRC questions regarding the EP/ SAG (the BWROG response to questions sent by the NRC in April 1997). DAEC intends to further evaluate these strategies for implementation following the NRC staffs response to the information provided by the B'NROG.
- DAEC conducted a systematic examination of insights from the IPE and IPEEE to determine whether inclusion of additionalinsights (e.g., unique system alignments or success paths) in the plant-specific SAG is warranted. The licensee did not identify any i additional strategy implementing procedures or equipment pre-staging, although several areas were identified for further evaluation.
- The licensee's Emergency Plan (E-Plan) will be updated to include new organizational charts and position-specific responsibilities and assignments. The Emergency Plan implementing Procedures (EPIPs) will be updated to reflect the new TSC organization and AMT responsibilitici, associated with the SAMG, No additional personnel were added to the ERO to implement SAMG.
- DAEC intends to implement EOP changes using a.10 CFR 50.59 screening evaluation.
Appendix D to the EP/ SAG document will be used as a source document to describe the changes frorn EPG, Revision 4. With regard to the SAG-related changes, the licensee intends to perform a screening evaluation to verify that all associated activities are outside the plant's licensing and design basis. This approach appears consistent with the guidance provided in the staffs January 28,1998, letter to NEl concerning SAM implementation issues, but this would need to be confirmed after the licensee has completed this evaluation.
Severe Accident Trainina e Plans for initial and refresher training of the ERO were outlined. However, development and implementation of this training are not scheduled to occur untillater this year, and many aspects of the licensee's refresher training program are undefined at this time.
DAEC intends to establish plant-specific learning objectives based on BWROG-developed recommended learning objectives. The scope of the training provided to each ERO member will be based on the job-specific grouping of objectives associated with the particular job classification. DAEC intends to develop plant-specific lesson plans based on the generic lesson plans developed through the cooperative BWROG Region 3 effort. A decision regarding which training methods will be used (computer based, classroom, and/or self-study) has not yet been made.
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- The licensee plans to provide SAM refresher training to allimplementors once during each two-year Operator Training Cycle (approximately one-half of the operation staff each year).
Each of the three AMTs (decision-maker and evaluator positions) will receive SAM refresher training once every three years; this refresher training willinclude participation in j a SAM tabletop drill every other cycle. Thus, a SAM tabletop drill will be performed every two years at the DAEC facility, and each AMT will participate in one SAM tabletop drill once every six years. In addition, each AMT will participate in one EP training drill each year as part of required ERO training. During the six-year EP training cycle, one of the EP training drills will be an integrated SAM drill with all facilities manned. In the DAEC implementation, the AMT is expected to use the TSG tools during every EP training drill (even in events that do not proceed to core damage), and to be critiqued on this. Thus, training on a least a ,
portion of the SAMG is provided to each AMT on an annual basis. i i
- DAEC intends to evaluate training effectiveness and the need for future training program f changes based on feedback from course comment cards, drill observations, management oversight of training, and peer observations. It is unclear if the planned drill frequency and feedback mechanisms will provide an acceptable level of feedback regarding training effectiveness. NRC staff pointed out that a Systematic Approach to Training, if properly applied should yield the answers to the form and frequency of training.
AIM Drill Performance and Self-Assessment Progm o Overall, the tabletop drill was usefulin showing the use of SAG by the licensee's AMT.
The transition from EOPs to SAGS appeared to be clear and unambiguous. Execution of the SAGS and the development of recommendations regarding strategy implementation appeared timely, and did not result in undue delays in accident response. The players were able to use the TSGs effectively to support SAG implementation and these tools seemed helpful in assessing plant status and developing recommendations on strategy implementation. Based on the tabletop drill observations, no problems with workload were noted, however, all duties and emergency response activities were not simulated in the tabletop drill.
- The dey,Je of participation and staffing of the various emergency response facilities in the DAEC drill, appears adequate for purposes of training and demonstrating the use of the SAG and TSG, but insufficient for purposes of fully demonstrating: (1) the transition from EOPs to SAG, (2) the ability of TSC engineers to implement SAM and other E-Plan responsibilities concurrently, and (3) communications between ERO facilities (i.e., the Operations Support Center and the Emergency Offsite Facility), since these aspects of response were not fully represented in the tabletop drill. DAEC staff indicated that they were considering conducting an integrated drill with full ERO staffing to more fully assess the integration of SAMG and AMT responsibilities into the ERO structure. NRC staff indicated support for such a drill.
- The drill package included a drill scenario time line and description of expected actions at
- various times lnis information was useful to observers in tracking the progress /
l performance of the TSC during the drill. The package also included an evaluation form for use by the drill evaluators in assessing each of the drill objectives, and a comment form for t . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ .
p.
7 b use by the players in providing written feedback on the drill. The degree to which TSC performance met the outlined expectations was not discussed during the players d although it was addressed in the subsequent evaluator's critique.
- NRC staff offered a number of observations concerning drill organization and performance.
These are summarized below. It should be recognized that the drill participants had received some prior training on the severe accident guidance, but had not yet completed the training that will eventually be required for their respective positions.
Limitations in drill scope led to several artificialities. Specifically, other than the AMT and Emergency Coordinator, no other positions in the TSC were staffed. These other personnel would be expected to place additional demands on the AMT (such as requests for assessments of core damage, plant parameters, and impacts of containment flooding / venting), and could influence decisions regarding strategy implementation, e.g., the decision to proceed with containment flooding ? sm external sources that resulted in containment venting. Also, the status boards were not used during the drill, whereas in an actual event these boards would serve as a key source of information to the AMT and other TSC staff.
- Some difficultly and uncertainty was noted in the AMT's determination of whether reactor vessel breach had occurred and in tracking certain plant parameters, particularly containment water level. Problems in these areas were also noted in the players debrief cnd in the subsequent evaluator critique, and possible enhancements ha've been identified by the licensee for further evaluation.
- Information exchange and integration among the varicus members of the AMT were less than expected. The TSC Operations Supervisor seemed to be the conduit for essentially all information, with information exchange Letween other members being more limited. The TSC Operations Liaison used the SAG flowcharts but did not disseminate related information to the other players, in part because the flowcharts were not clearly visible to the AMT. The safety analysis engineer and reactor engineer similarly used the TSG (e.g., notebook; and trending charts) to support SAG implementation, but rel 'sd information/ evaluations were not widely disseminated to the AMT.
- The players debrief was attended by all drill participants, thereby providing an opportunity for CR and TSC staff to share their perspectives. A limited number of weaknesses were identified during the debrief, such as complications in diagnosing RPV breach and a misunderstanding of containment water level, but their implications on event progression were not discussed. Broader performance issues were also not addressed, including: (1) the degree to which the specific drill objectives were achieved and (2) whether the AMT adequately assessed the negative effects / consequences associated with the strategies as part of the decision-making process. In particular, the AMT did not appear to evaluate the consequences of 1
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flooding containment using external water sources following RPV breach (i.e.,
accelerating the time of containment venting)in reaching the decision to proceed with this strategy, and this was not discussed during the debrief. The staff considers the priority on containment flooding following RPV breach to be a potential deficiency in the -
generic guidance, which at a minimum, warrants careful consideration prior to
)
implementation. Finally, no follow up actions were identified as part of the players i debrief other than an action to develop a standard form for use in TSC briefings.
)
l e An evaluator's critique was performed by DAEC following the exit meeting. The evaluators j included DAEC staff and contractors responsible for SAM product development and implementation. Although not observed by the NRC staff, the results of the critique were documented by the licensee in an intemal memorandum, a copy of which was provided to l the NRC. The evaluator's critique included evaluation of: the drill scenario and its execution; the adequacy of the TSC layout and operations; AMT performance regarding transitioning to the SAG, communications and information flow, tracking of plant status, j and evaluating and recommending A/M strategies; and the technical adequacy of the SAG j and TSG. The critique resulted in identification of several areas for improvement, and )
specifc i follow-up actions (Action Requests) on seven items. The evaluators critique '
appears comprehensive, and the follow-up actions are reasonable and track closely with NRC staff drill observations. In contrast to the players debrief, the evaluators' critique was
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more thorough and resulted in specific follow-up actions. A utility self-assessment
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performed with the same rigor as the DAEC evaluators' critique appears to be an )
appropriate means of assuring that strengths, weaknesses and corrective measures are l l identified and addressed. The players debrief alone did not provide this same level of assurance.
Viability of the Demonstration Proeggs i
e The A/M demonstration visit met the established objectives of providing insights into the SAM implementation process at a BWR, and areas where changes to the draft Tl will be needed to accommodate the differences in implementation approaches between PWRs and BWRs. However, the demonstration format does not allow sufficient time and flexibility to thoroughly evaluate the licensee's implementation. Additional demonstrations at a CE and/or B&W plant are still needed in order to form a consolidated view on the industry implementation process, necessary changes to the TI, and the need for any adjustments to the planned inspection process. ,
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9 In closing comments, Fred Emerson, NEl, reminded participants of the importance of keeping the priority of SAM implementation in line with the priorities of more important plant activities.
He indicated that in keeping with a performance viewpoint of the demonstration, the answer to the following questions would be yes:
- Has decision making and communications been enhanced?
- Have tools for advising on severe accident mitigation been enhanced and are they adequate?
e Do the implementors, evaluators, and decision makers understand their responsibilities as indicated by drill results?
- Did the drill provide a useful self-assessment of response capabilities?
He stressed that utilities need to keep resources for SAM implementation and training in perspective with other activities, but given the commitment to complete implementation as an industry initiative, the industry has a responsibility to do this well, and in a way that carries out the mandate that industry set for itself.
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Title:
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Title:
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, 4-I c % 2 3, 6 l l Address: bjf, Ogoh2 _._.]
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Title:
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Name: ~Tottu V M s*tcdA .-
Title:
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Title:
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Title:
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.___ _ __________________ - __ A
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]
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m i % nntni c l T IES UTILITIES DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT PILOT DEMONSTRATION THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 5,1998 TOPIC FACILITATORY TIME
- 1. Welcome and Introductions SAM Team 7:30 AM IES Management Comments Station Management NRC Opening Comments Bob Palla 1 NEI Opening Comments Fred Emerson
- 2. BWROG Products Roy Harter 8:00 AM
- 3. DAEC Project Plan Review Brian Wohlers 8:15 AM
-. ., .w _ _ _ _ _ . . , , . - - .
Mi $2.k E [f -k hfi (E'b [ . . hk _k . + .,
%9M '
- 5. EOP Revisions Roy Harter, Chet Sullivan 8:45 AM
- a. EOP Calculations Chet Sullivan
- b. EOP Overview Roy Harter
- c. EOP Differences Roy Harter liEk .
- 7. IPE Review & Considerations Ed Burns, Brad Hopkins 9:30 AM
- 8. SAG Development Process Ken Ross, Roy Haner 10:00 AM
. a. Region III Effort Roy Harter
- b. SAG Overview Ken Ross
- c. SAG Differences Ken Ross
- d. SAG Use & Transition Ken Ross/Roy Harter
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.%W11dD'AM
, s m 5..8
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- 10. Impact of SAM on ERO Roy Harter/ Brian Wohlers 12:15 PM
- a. ERO Evaluation Process Brian Wohlers
- b. TSC Organizational Changes Roy Harter Page1 Rev 2
9 i IES UTILITIES , DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT PILOT DEMONSTRATION TOPIC FACII,ITATOR TIME 1
- c. TSG Assessment Roy Harter
- 11. TSG Development Process Jeff Gabor, Ed Burns, Chet Sullivan 12:45 PM
- a. TSG Background Chc Sullivan
- b. TSG Reference Manual Ed Burns
- c. TSG Tools & Use JefiGabor
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$? N k$ $ $ $b bYbbh b
- 13. Training Overview Jim Kalamaja 2:00 PM
- a. Operator Training .
- b. ERO Training
- 14. Emergency Planning Issues Brian Wohlers/Roy Harter 2:30 PM
- a. Notifications Roy Harter
- b. E-Plan and EPIP Changes Brian Wohlers Y,hS- 3h A(
h l '
.* h ..
- 16. 10 CFR 50.59 Applicability Roy Harter/ John Karrick 3:00 PM
- 17. Assessment K. Morgan, B. Wohlers, J. Van Sickel 3:30 PM
- a. QA Oversight Kevin Morgan
- b. Peer Reviews John Van Sickel
- c. Benchmarking Results Roy Harter
- d. Drill Conduct & Assessment SAM Team Pagel Rev 2
t.
, IES UTILITIES DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT PILOT DEMONSTRATION
~ '
, FRIDAY, FEBRU ARY 6,1998 -
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Location: Duane Arnold Energy Center Security in-Processing Plant Access 7:00 AM Drill Brief TSC 7:30 AM SAM Drill TSC 8:00 AM Drill Debrief & Critique Paul Sullivan, Jeff Gabor, Jim Kalamaja 11:00 AM
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Plant Support Center, Rooms A & B,11:45 AM -12:45 PM E MMM@ fee @We. CLOSING ACITVITIEs: ~ruWin,FAW M*Q} 1 Location: Training Center l l l TOPIC FACILITATORY TIME i SAM Project Remaining Work Roy Harter/ Brian Wohlers 1:00 PM Question & Answer Period: SAM Team 1:15 PM
- Training
. EP
- EOP/ SAG /TSG
. . IPE e Program BREAK 2:45 PM Closing Remarks: 3:00 PM e Guest Comments Guests
- NEl Comments Fred Emerson
- NRC Comments StaffRepresentatives I
. DAEC Closing SAM Team & Station Management i Comments l ADJOURN 3:30 PM Page3 Rev 2 j
n i o t t a r nt s e n d i o c h c m t r r e AeD o g wan s e a e r to l dM d e l i Man t vi nP l eP VC a S t yE Ce n rA GaD E m Ae g Dan a M
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n a o E 1 n e yc 9 a d l r d e I d i c l u e i E i u c a f t t f f i t N ( o a n G e r s nd e C t e e n d R n v e i d d i a i e N e s u d g c n e f t s n h m o s Gi r e t e g E P u i r o _ g n E Ed s e t a p i d E t n n n P Gn x e e a t a I
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y t t s i e n e g l r c n i o e n o g b c v e l n a f e u q t a i n b o g e n o n n s k o a r o i n o l p p i t t s r i l y n n u s d c w e e d n n n Rf o v d o a e e r i c n i t g l p" c e i a s n r e o n a d r a o o e r v i m n d r e u e t c a e o e v b g ht i s e r e i t a g u c o f s o to r l d a i d t a wm n i t f n a n e o v i i n o r a y m i t a h m a i t a e t m n n p n i i r m g dr o f o e r i t oia t ms o n o mc e er i s s r fr o o l i c o o s o r u nc k t p e l ot t a r f o d u a c oil r i h t n e p t n e a b d u l r c pa n e q Ce v o P i S e o p oig e s r m t s T e o l t yl o og o s e i n o M a g y aR o a c o t i n n embet ar ca t e i t A l i mlogis e f u o l a s t y S r a r a t n mC t r n l e ad mer o a oh e Cmk C i Cd S T pP p S r Tt e i L E P r o + c + O++ + A n u D
s ,s BWROG AMG Overview Document BWROG ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES Overview Document EPG SAG Training TSG Material w PSTG L
-optiones Placement ,_ g,,,n,W Default Default
-OptionaH v v w w v 3 3
{I( EOPs PSAMGs } PSAMGs TSG yl
) l(ITrainin9 Program (CR) (ERQ/TSC) (ERQCR) (ERO)
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a t
. BWROG AMG Overview Document BWROG EPG, Revision 4 RPV CONTROL GUIDELINE RPV Water Level RPV Pressure Reactor Power (RC/L) (RC/P) (RC/Q) a a a a a a I
C3 Steam Cooling l C2 Altemate vel Control ' '" pr s n l l i C4 RPV Flooding i j w w w C5'i / Level / Power Control l i l l w w w C6 Primary Containment Flooding a I i PRIMARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL GUIDELINE Suppression Pool Drywell l Containment Pnmary Containment Suppression Pool
~
Hydrogen and Oxygen Temperature Temperature Temperature Pressure Water Level Concentration (SP/T) (DW/T) l (CN/T) (PC/P) (SP/L) (PC/H) 1 I SECONDARY CONTAINMENT CONTROL GUIDELINE RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE CONTROL GUIDELINE Area Area Area Offsite Temperature Radiation Level Water Level Radioactivity Release (SC/T) (SC/R) (SC/L) [ (RR) Figure 2-1 l 2-4 I L_____ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ - _ _ _ - - - - - - - - ' - '
a . e BWROG AMG Overview Document , 5:82 i l . g .__.......______..... .. .... g Jgjg ..__. _______._...__ ... .... jjjg
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1 o 0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 16000 Suction Flow (gpm) Figure 9: RHR Vortex Limit
KLR 97-111 Attachment 2 Page 15 EOP Calculation Changes 16 14 '
- New
~ 12- )
Old a' a /
/
I 1* /
/
g6 f
/
h V) 4 2 0 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000 Suction Flow (gpm) l Figure 10: Core Spray Vortex Limit {
\
i j
l KLR-97-111 Attachment 2
- Page 16 EOP Calculation Changes 9
8 e 7 E
}
3' lii lii 5 3 ) 8 E 4 E 3 h v> 2 1 0 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 Suction Flow (gpm) Figure 11: HPCI Vortex Limit
KLR-97-111 Attachment 2 Page 17 EOP Calculation Changes I l 7 e 6 2 {5 ' a 5 lii lii 4 3 n.
.6 e
- =
h2 1 0 : 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 j Suction Flow (gpm) l l 1 Figure 12: RCIC Vortex Limit i
4 KLR-97-111 Attaciunent 2 Page 18 EOP Calculation Changes 300 250 C t
~~~**CL""~""""~~~ m ' ~
gl 2M ---=== ,=.
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a 150 8 c. C
.2
- New,15 psig
@ 100 g Old, t6 psig
---==== New,0 psig 50 ==----- Old,0 psig 0
0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000 12000 14000 RHR Pump Flow (gpm) Figure 13: RHR NPSH Limit
KLR-97-111 Attachment 2 Page 19 EOP Calculation Changes 300 250 e L I ( e ' 200 - wwgg.,,, .
}
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. ,~
a
- 150
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$ 100 Old,15 psig -
S y ------. New,0 psig 50 ------. Old, 0 psig _ l . t 0- ' O 500 1000 1500 20'O 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 LPCS Pump Flow (gpm) Figure 14: Core Spray NPSH Limit l
KLR-97-111 Attachment 2 Page 20 EOP Calculation Changes 300 250 15 peig b -%
'O #8
_b 200- -% % 150 c.
.6 h100 -
v) 50 0 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 HPCI Pump Flow Figure 15: HPCINPSHLimit
e O l KLR-97-111 Attachment 2 Page 21 k:. EOP Calculation Changes l l l l 3M
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j DAEC SAM EOP CHANGES
/. A k? ??C NEI SAM Pilot Demonstration February 5,1998 UTILMES
N A M U H f S ) S S E E E N I 7 i D I U C L E D P S O G O I U E'R ' G E T R O I R P , N W P ( I N O I
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O T r L A C N I N C H E I A FT I A C r C E T) E G C M ED PE ' CT I S N E P SC TR NU FI P C( EE RT EN FE O AO LS P PN SI TE L F I M DU L : ND AI GC TO E ) S LU PG SD P V N / O G I P E T A L E D U C L ( A P C P O Y S E CIN ( O E
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EOP CHANGES: GENERAL l Structure
. Replaced PCF with SAG-1
- Replaced PCH with SAG-3 e Separated ALC and ED EOPs remains in effect until emergency no longer exists e Integrated depressurization steps into RPV/F Format Divided complex instructions into primary steps and details.
Grouped primary steps and contingency actions. Deleted dotted connecting lines for graphs. Cautions Modified tables in Caution #1. Deleted old CLotion #3 (HPCI/RCIC rpm limits) Added new Caution #3 (NPSH limits) Added NPSH and vortex limits for HPCI/RCIC. Changed old Caution #5 to operating detail. Added new Caution #5 (effect of containment sprays on NPSH) Curves Modified Heat Capacity Temperature Limit Replace Tailpipe Level Limit with fixed value of 13.8 ft. Revised Boron Injection Initiation Temperature
EOP CHANGES: EOP-1 l i i Sten Channes CRS after RC-3 Converted diamond to CRS. Deleted " reactor appears to be going critical" from RC/P. Moved exits to RPV/F from RC/L and RC/P paths to top of procedure. RC/L CRS Moved RPV/F exit to top of procedure. Reworded " terminate injection" action. RC/L Deleted exit to IPOI 4. RC/L-1 Combined contingency actions with primary step. Table 1 Added authorization to defeat HPCI/RCIC high area temperature isolations. RC/P Deleted exit to IPOI 4. RC/P CRS Combined symbols into single CRS. Changed ED condition to "is or has been required." _ Moved RPV/F exit to top of procedure. Deleted Tailpipe Level Limit condition. RC/P-2 Modified " SRV cycling" instruction. RC/P-3 Combined contingency action with pdmary step. Modified "SRV cycling" instruction. RC/P-5 Moved in-line with RC/P-4. RC/P-6 Combined contingency actions with primary step. Reworded to clarify objective. DAECSAMPilot Demo
EOP CHANGES: EOP-1 (cont'd) Sten Chances Table l A Added references to new Caution #3. Table 7 Changed direction to " maintain suction on CS ' to " preferred suction from the CST" for HPCI/RCIC. Added references to new Caution #3. DAECS4MPilot Demo
EOP CHANGES: ALC Sten Channes General Separated from ED. CRS' Changed EOP-1 return to #1. Reworded " terminate injection" action. ALC-1 Changed " lockout ADS" from CRS to simple step. ALC 7 Modified structure to clarify intent ofinstructions, improve transition from EOP-1. ALC-8 Changed action level for ED or Steam Cooling from-TAF to -30 in. ALC-12,13 Added SAG entry requirement. Changed action level from TAF to -30 in. Steam Cooling Added direction to stabilize pressure. Modified ED requirements:
. Injection source restored, level cannot be restored and maintained above -30 in.
~
. RPV cannot be stabilized and rising.
- SRVs being used to stabilize pressure and nitrogen supply lost.
Table 1A Added details on system operation. Table 1C Added list ofInjection subsystems. DAECSAMPilot Demo
EOP CHANGES: ATWS Sten Chances
/L-2 Moved authorization to defeat MSIV interlocks to top of procedure.
/L CRS Added direction to lower level to address instabilities. t w ei U Reworded " terminate injection" action.
/L-1,/L-2 Added direction to lower level to address instabilities.
/L-4 Expanded level control band, eliminated alternate band.
/L-8 Combined contingency actions with primary step.
/L-14 Eliminated requirement to restore level above TAF.
Combined contingency actions with primary step.
/L-15 Added SAG entry requirement.
Table 1 A Added authorization to defeat HPCI/RCIC high area temperature j isolations.
~
Table 1 A, IB Added references to new Caution #3. .
/P-2 l Modified "SRV cycling" instruction.
CRS Before /P-2 Combined symbols into single CRS. Changed ED condition to "is or has been required." Deleted Tailpipe Level Limit condition. I
~
/P-4 Combined contingency action with primary step. Modified "SRV cycling" instruction.
DAEC SAM Pilot Derr.o
4 EOP CHANGES: ATWS (cont'd) Sten Chages
/P-7 Combined contingency actions with primary step. Reworded to clarify objective.
Table 7 Changed direction to " maintain suction on CST" to " preferred suction from the CST" for HPCI/RCIC.
/Q-2 Changed conditional runback to simple step. /Q-6 CRS Added instability requirement for boron injection.
s DAECSAMPilot Demo
EOP CHANGES: EOP-2 Sten Chances PC/H Replaced PCH with SAG-3. T/L Deleted CRS transfer to PCF. T/L-3 Switched position of high/ low branches. T/L High Deleted TPLL branch; replaced TPLL with fixed limit of 13.8 ft added to vacuum breaker branch. Deleted 95 ft. branch. Tff-l Added reference to new Caution #3. D W/f-5 Added reference to new Caution #5. Changed restriction on use of RHR pumps to include all spray sources. Added reference to new Table 9. DW/T-6 Changed " maintained" to " restored and maintained." PC/P-4, 6 Added references to new Caution #5. PC/P-6 Changed restriction on use of RHR pumps to include all spray sources. Added reference to new Table 9. PC/P Deleted final spray step. Table 9 Added list of spray sources. Included reference to new Caution
#3.
DAECSAMPilot Demo
7--~--~-------~-------~---- . EOP CHANGES: RPV/F Steo Channes Generd Incorporated depressurization steps. Require at least 3 SRVs open. RPV/F-9 Listed systems in separate table. RPV/F.10 Combined conditions to match RPV/F-18. RPV/F-11,19 Added SAG entry requirement. l DAECSAMPilot Demo
l . EOP CHANGES: ED Sten Chances General Separated from ALC. Remains in effect until emergency no longer exists. Deleted direction to stop depressurization at 200 psig. CRS before ED-1 Added exit to RPV/F. Added direction to open inboard MSL drain. ED-1 Added Defeat 11. ED-12 Added progression to cold shutdown. (< * ' - " ~ . ~ ~ g,, n V* l l l . DAECSAMPilot Demo L___ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ . - - - - - - _ _ _
EOP CHANGES: EOP-3, EOP-4 Sten Channes SC-3 Changed list of exceptions to the general entry " systems
, required to be operated by other EOP steps."
RR-1 Changed list of exceptions to the general entry " systems required to be operated by other EOP steps." RR-2 Changed diamond to hold point. RR-4 Changed action level to "before... General Emergency." DAECSAMPilot Demo
MAJOR EOP DIFFERENCES Primary Containment Control
. Hydrogen control designated as an SAG Containment sprays terminated at 2.0 psig rather than "before.. O psig" High torus water level values limited by maximum indicated level (16 ft)
. Tail Pipe Level Limit implemented as a fixed value Primary Containment Pressure Limit implemented as bounding pressure and level values ED required if drywell temperature cannot be restored and maintained below 281*F.
Alternate Level Control
. ALC logic simplified; emergency depressurization required "before -30 in."
ATWS Offgas and main steam line drain high radiation interlocks not defeated < -w. / 4 Recirculation pumps always run back before trip
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i DAEC SAM Pilot Demonstration SAG Overview kw non , t ! I ! l February 5,1998 1 i i i ! l I l I l 5 UnUTIEs KL Services, Inc. z - - - - - - -
I . . SAG Purpose and Goals E Purpose
. Assist operating and technical support staff in diagnosing and responding to a severe accident E Goals
. Terminate core damage progression
. Maintain containment integrity ~
. Minimize radioactivity release DAEC SAM Pilot Demonstration SAGS-1
( , 1 1 l-4 b SAG Organization .
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[6g [ ! EOPs 4 SAGS ! l Level r [ SAG-1
> Primary Containment l
, Flooding o
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$ Pressure -
m Q. E l Power -
,_ SAG-2
(. m RPV, Containment, f Radioactivity Release Control J Primary , Containment y Control SAG-3
> Hydrogen Control Secondary Containment '
Control l Radioactivity , Release ' Control \ DAEC SAM Pilot Demonstration SAGS-2
l SAG Entry E EOP-1: RPV water level cannot be restored and maintained above -30 in. (MSCRWL) l E RPV/F: Flooding conditions c .inot be established E ATWS: RPV water level cannot be , restored and maintained above -30 in. (MSCRWL) i DAEC SAM Pilot Demonstration SAGS-3
Transition From EOPs E When TSC is operational i E Exit EOPs E Transfer decision making responsibility l l DAEC SAM Pilot Demonstration SAGS-4
BWROG SAG Development t p
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J Ip'i (*'t#!';p! , lcy (- ' i Literature l , f ,i ; I' g(t iI / 3r o J( < vI[i,' / Insights f t}. e^
- Y g' I\ .J 1r Y EPG issues Strategies ATWS/ Stability L
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1P EPGs/ SAGS A [ ) DAEC PSTGs Region ill SAGS 6 1r 1r DAEC EOPs DAEC SAGS DAEC SAM Pilot Demonstration SAGS-5
i Integrated Flooding Strategy E RPV/ Containment injection l l I E Containment Venting
)
E RPV Venting l i E Containment Spray ! l l l l l l DAEC SAM Pilot Demonstration SAGS-6
Injection Strategies E Restore RPV water level > TAF l i l E Prevent breach
. Submerge debris in-vessel
. Maintain RPV injection > MDRIR E Mitigate breach
. Maintain PSP
= Submerge debris l
l l DAEC SAM Pilot Demonstration SAGS-7 f 1 -
~ ~ ~~ ~ '-- ---
~
~
Flooding Strategy Decision Loop l l Has core debris breached the RPV? 00 Can RPV water level be restored and maintained above +15 in. (TAF)? 1 p0 Can RPV water level be restored and maintained f above -144 in. (BAF)? - i I l j ho v Can RPV injection be restored and maintained I ' above the Minimum Debris Retention injection Rate (Graph 12)? 3
)
no \ - Inside Pressure Suppression Pressure I (Graph 5)? I no Outside Pressure Suppression Pressure (Graph 5)? DAEC SAM Pilot Demonstration SAGS-8
SAG Characteristics l E Integrated flooding strategy E Top-level, functional guidance i E Detailed knowledge of phenomena not required E Different from EOPs E Addresses priorities and judgments E Intended to be supported by TSGs DAEC SAM Pilot Demonstration SAGS-9
.. \
SAG-1 Format i E Entry questions require repetitive evaluation , i E Paths define flooding strategies l E Numbered priorities define hierarchy E Shaded headings define functions E Bulleted subheadings suggest thought I process DAEC SAM Pilot Demonstration sags-1O 1 l
l l SAG-1 Format V-u._ ..Mvl.courmusutssemu_e er P=anmss. B. nieseen terue emer eewW betw 118 4 3 Meue emner en evees test 3 Ressore #IPV seesten esm De hisesum Desse Resenten aquemen Rene Eerspa IJA 4 Inges see sie psemosy ' isem messes eewees 3 GIcehees: o use eseisp 1 gg Gseep 3 syneese (Deens Al M - E
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- As esseseepy Is hoe benesie
- To eseelassue asenewe nome P57 IGresh 5; lose ' L_--- . Leeuw sesseh
- As seaweety SAG 4 er SA48 5 Gleihees; eF. .asne eso, one e gang is 3.
1ME8e..euse sie gene 6 SEP Jos I. e 8. assem amar acues e a er samen se t M fie Sense oefWid as N THEAeons se agumL SEP 30sJ. [, s. gM g - afK e wier e De gg,emthe RPV h D EM N_O "' '
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e Opses speye easL.g RPV sweseem as to messes e Ost as ese esewom eeween e
- HPV esenewo e sees een 40 se ebene teme reesse.
AeID e Vee een eser mese se Psessue ! Pseenwe lessen SL
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a when:
- As answee my 5404 er SA43 g
* &aELA RPV essaan as se seeses a-e Cuores esseye aug;J RPV ogsamen as to genes e Olt en ese enems sessees t
- RPW passwo e lose than to se escue some pesswe.
AeID e Veu een stay esas ese Psesswa h Pseemse w> a m. ~ e.e s oieen evees . - .ee - i . Ps, DAEC SAM Pilot Demonstration SAGS-11
i SAG-1 Usage Rules E Exit EOPs E Start from EOP endpoints E Continue control, mitigative, and restoration actions
.g,,irl,.;!.QA-)
E Determine applicable flooding step E Prioritize injection ( E Watch for limits i E Evaluate need for venting ' M Evaluate need for sprays E Change steps as conditions change
- DAEC SAM Pilot Demonstration SAGS-12 l
SAG-1: PATH #1 OVERVIEW Condition RPV breached by core debris. Injection Priorities 1. Drywell spray at 4600 gpm.
- 2. RPV injection from external sources.
- 3. PC injection from external sources.
- 4. RPV injection from torus.
PC Level / Pressure Limits 95 ft: Stop all external injection not needed for MDRIR. 53 psig: 1. Vent containment.
- 2. Stop all externalinjection not needed for MDRIR.
PC Venting As necessary to facilitate flooding. Approaching /above 53 psig. As required by SAG-2 or SAG-3. RPV Venting Not performed. : Sprays When: Operate drywell sprays to cool debris. As required by SAG-2 or SAG-3. l
)
Drywelllimits: Inside Drywell Spray Initiation Limit. ' Torus limits: Drywell spray can be maintained above 4600 gpm. DAEC SAM Pilot Demonstration SAGS-13 l l
r SAG-1: PATH #2 OVERVIEW l t Condition RPV water level can be maintained above TAF. injection Priorities 1. Restore / maintain level between TAF and +211 in. PC Level / Pressure Limits 95 ft: 1. Stop external PC injection.
- 2. Stop external RPV injection.
53 psig: 1. Stop external PC injection.
- 2. Vent the containment.
- 3. Stop external RPV injection.
PC Venting As necessary to facilitate flooding. Approaching /above 53 psig. As required by SAG-2 or SAG-3. RPV Venting As necessary to restore / maintain RPV water level above TAF. Sprays When: As required by SAG-2 or SAG-3. Drywelllimits: Inside Drywell Spray Initiation Limit, and ,
- RPV water level can be maintained above TAF, and Torus water level below vacuum breakers.
Torus limits: RPV water level can be maintained above TAF. l
)
DAEC SAM Pilot Demonstration SAGS-14
SAG-1: PATH #3 OVERVIEW Condition RPV water level can be maintained above BAF. Injection Priorities 1. Core Spray. I
- 2. Restore / maintain RPV water level above BAF.
- 3. Maximize total external injection.
I i PC LevrJtPressure Limits l l 95 ft: 1. Stop external PC injection.
- 2. Stop external RPV injection.
53 psig: 1. Stop external PC injection.
- 2. Vent the containment.
- 3. Stop external RPV injection.
RPV pressurized: Stop external PC injection. PC Venting As necessary to facilitate flooding. Approaching /above 53 psig. As required by SAG-2 or SAG-3. RPV Venting Containment water level above RPV water level. Sprays When: As required by SAG-2 or SAG-3. Drywell limits: Inside Drywell Spray initiation Limit,and RPV water level can be maintained above BAF, and Torus water level below vacuum breakers. Torus limits: RPV water level can be maintained above BAF. DAEC SAM Pilot Demonstration SAGS-15
SAG-1: PATH #4 OVERVIEW Condition RPV injection can be maintained above MDRIR. Injection Priorities 1. Core Spray.
- 2. Restore / maintain RPV injection above MDRIR.
- 3. Maximize total external injection.
PC Level / Pressure Limits 95 ft: 1. Stop external PC injection.
- 2. Stop external RPV injection.
53 psig: 1. Stop external PC injection.
- 2. Vent the containment.
- 3. Stop external RPV injection.
RPV pressurized: Stop external PC injection. PC Venting As necessary to facilitate flooding. Approaching /above 53 psig. As required by SAG-2 or SAG-3. RPV Venting Containment water level reaches 53 ft. Sprays When: As required by SAG-2 or SAG-3. ! I Drywelllimits: Inside Drywell Spray Initiation Limit, and ! RPV injection can be maintained above MDRIR, and Torus water level below vacuum breakers. I Torus limits: RPV injection can be maintained above MDRlR. I DAEC SAM Pilot Demonstration SAGS-16
SAG-1: PATH #5 OVERVIEW Condition Corc debris may melt through RPV,inside PSP. Injection Priorities 1. Maintain torus level below 13.8 ft.
- 2. Have water on drywell floor.
- 3. Restore RPV injection above MDRIR.
- 4. Inject into PC from outside sources.
PC Level / Pressure Limits 13.8 ft: 1. Stop external PC injection.
- 2. Stop external RPV injection.
PSP: Vent the containment. RPV pressurized: Stop external PC injection. l PC Venting As necessary to increase injection. As necessary to facilitate flooding Control pressure below PSP. As required by SAG-2 or SAG-3. RPV Venting Not performed. Sprays When: As required by SAG-2 or SAG-3, even if injection will be reduced. Drywell limits: Inside Drywell Spray initiation Limit, and Torus water level below vacuum breakers. Torus limits: None. DAEC SAM Pilot Demonstration SAGS-17
SAG-1: PATH #6 OVERVIEW Condition Core debris may melt through RPV, outside PSP. Injection Priorities 1. Have water on drywell floor.
- 2. Maximize total RFV injection.
l 3. Maximize PC injection from outside sources.
)
PC Level / Pressure Limits
)
95 ft: Stop external PC injection. 53 psig: 1. Vent the containment.
- 2. Stop external PC injection. i RPV pressurized: Stop external PC injection.
PC Venting As necessary to increase injection. As necessary to facilitate flooding Approaching /above 53 psig. As required by SAG-2 or SAG-3. RPV Venting Containment water level reaches 53 ft. Sprays When: As required by SAG-2 or SAG-3. I Drywelllimits: Drywell Spray Initiation Limit, and Torus water level below vacuum breakers, and Either:
- RPV injection will not be reduced, or RPV pressurized, or Pressure suppression can be restored.
Torus limits: RPV injection will not be reduced, or
, RPV pressurized, or Pressure suppression can be restored.
DAEC SAM Pilot Demonstration SAGS-18
SAG-1: PATH #7 OVERVIEW Condition RPV breached by core debris, containment flooded. injection Priorities 1. Core Spray.
- 2. Maintain water level between TAF and vent.
PC Level / Pressure Limits 95 ft: Stop external RPV and PC injection. 53 psig: 1. Vent containment.
- 2. Stop external RPV and PC injection.
1 PC Venting As necessary to maintain level. '
- Approaching /above 53 psig. l As required by SAG-2 or SAG-3.
RPV Venting Not performed. , i Sprays Spray function not available. l 1 DAEC SAM Pilot Demonstration SAGS-19
SAG-2: Other Control Functions E Objectives
. Maintain RPV depressurized.
. Shut down reactor.
Protect equipment in primary and secondary containments.
. Maintain primary and secondary containment integrity.
- Limit radioactivity release.
E Entered concurrently with SAG-1 l l , l 3 l 5 Extension of EOP actions E Post-depressurization steps l DAEC SAM Pilot Demonstration SAGS-20 l
SAG-2 Functions E RPV
. Power
. Pressure l
E Primary Containment
. Torus Temperature
. Drywell Temperature
. Pressure
. Radiation
. Hydrogen / Oxygen E Secondary Containment
. . Temperature
. Radiation
. Water Level E Radioactivity Release
. Offsite release rate DAEC SAM Pilot Demonstration SAGS-21
)
SAG-3: Hydrogen i 4 E Entered from EOPs or SAGS i E Controls hydrogen and oxygen l I concentrations in drywell and torus ( E Actions
. Vent and purge
. Containment sprays
. Emergency depressurization (EOPs) l l
l l l I l l i DAEC SAM Pilot Demonstration SAGS-22 l
- - - - _ _ - - - - - - - - - - _ - - - I
MAJOR SAG DIFFERENCES
. Implemented in the TSC . Reinerting addressed through normal and alarm procedures . Containment sprays terminated when " pressure drops below 2.0 psig" rather than "before... pressure drops to O psig." . High torus water level values limited by maximum indicated level (16 ft) . Primary Containment Pressure Limit implemented as bounding pressure and level values
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l i l s P t n O e E f s m e o - e e g n o i n s n a n a i t a l o t e p n d s e Mt e i R n m u g d e l e G n i a c i p m a c r s t e iA l r e vy i t l a o o r u o p m d g e a r p o nT a g p n t nl i n)T p u Mi n u E e p s f: o e t n S l s e r ul miMoG e iAt c s dAt s s c n e r e m e a t p d eS s e l p mlu (m c i f i c u i t a ud s s nRI e m r n o - i n t S I s e mT s a C - h I - c . . . . e - T - 1 L
Accident Management Team Too s
. Technical Support Guidelines . Reference Manual l
Guideline Focus
. CPAG . Inputs
. PSAG . Trends / Status
. SSAG = Systems
. EAAG . Actions (Timit:g, Paths)
TSG Tools
. Reactor Engineer Guidance
. SPDS Operator Guidance
. Safety Analysis Engineer Guidance
. Operations Liason Guidance
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I r ' I EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION GRO) TRAINING Decmon Maker , The ernergency response organnanon function responsible for assessing and selecung the scendens nung to be amplemenced. l l 1 C 3 1 2 i I [ . _ . . - _ _ _ -. ___ --.
e EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION (ERO) TRAINING Evaluator-The emergency response organizauon funcuon responsible for evaluaung plant symptoms in order to determine the damage condsoons and recommending any potenual sentegies thar may be used to mingate the event I C-- 2 I EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION (ERO) TRAINING Implementor- . Plant personnel responsible for performing those steps necessary to accomphsh the objecuves of the accident mangauon strategies (e.g. hands-on control of valves, breakers, conaallers). I C ' l EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION (ERO) TRAINING Decision Maker-Operanons Supervisor posinon in the TSC 1 l ' ' i 3
1 . . 4 EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION (ERO) TRAINING Evaluators-Accideot Management team member
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. Evaluanon mechamsms such as wnnen exam quesuons or table top scenanos will be developed to access the performance of the Accide '
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- briplementors: once dunng the two year Opermor Trumag Cycle
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l EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION (ERO) TRAINING EVALUATION. Trumns effecoveness will be evaluated by obiasmag ongomg foodback and evaluaung the (numng progranu for fu changes using tools such as:
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- SAM Pilot Demonstration l
l L__________.-_-______________
Quality Assurance e SAM will be assessed with the same format as EPIPS
- Personnel qualifications and training
- Drill performance
- Assess that SAMGs will not result in a decrease in the effectiveness of the plants emergency response Quality Assurance e Key areas assessed during SAM Pilot
- Communications
- Transition fonn EOP s to SAGS
- Transfer of command and control
- Use of technica! support
- Review ofindicators / strategies i
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1-L Quality Assurance 1 e Evaluator / Controllers assessed for:
- Training prior to the drill l - During the drill avoid leading the SAM Team
- Critique post drill
- Action Request initiated as appropriate
- Controllers debrief following the drill
- Follow - up
- Improvements / lessons learned trained on before the next drill J
Quality Assurance 4 l e Assessment reports will become part of the QA quarterly report - record retention l e Other areas:
- 10CFR50 Appendix B criteria
- NR 1.33 procedures used to mitigate the consequences of an accident
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eTABLE OF CONTENTS t 1.0 Scope and Objectives 1.1 Scope 1.2 Objectives Summary 1.3 IES Utilities Objectives 2.0 Drill Information 2.1 Drill Participants 2.2 Drill Organization 2.3 IES Emergency Response Facilities 2.4 Offsite Emergency Response Facilities N/A This drill 2.5 Drill Conduct and Critique 2.6 Precautions and Limitations 2.7 Participant instructions 2.8 References / Abbreviations / Definitions 3.0 Controller / Evaluator information 3.1 GeneralInstructions 3.2 Controller / Evaluator instructions 3.3 Controller / Evaluator Assignments 4.0 Schedule of Events 5.C Scenario 5.1 Narrative Summary 5.2 initial Conditions 5.3 Scenario Timeline 5.4 Termination Criteria i 5.5 Simulator Instructions
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6.0 Participant Comment Sheet 7.0 Plant Scenario Data j l l i l l 1998 SAM Pilot sm-Toc ooc i Rev.1/29/98
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a
. FOREWORD The Duane Amold Energy Center (DAEC) Emergency Plan describes IES' capability to respon effectively to a radiological emergency at DAEC, and provides a detailed description of IES' interaction with Federal, State, and local govemment agencies and private organizations. The Emergency Plan provi continuous emergency preparedness including the conduct of an annual Exercise and preparatory dril Accident management consists of those actions taken during the course of an accident by the Emergency Response Organization (ERO): specifically plant operations, technical support and plant management staff, in order to:
. Prevent the accident from progressing to core damage
. Terminate core damage progression once it begins e Maintain the capability of the containment as long as possible e Minimize on-site and off-site releases and their effects The latter three actions constitute a subset of accident management referred to as severe accident management, or more specifically, severe accident mitigation. The goal of severe accident management is to enhance the capabilities of the ERO, and provide guidance where Emergency Operating Procedure are no longer effective to mitigate severe accidents, and prevent or minimize any off-site releases. The objective is to establish core cooling and ensure that any current or immediate threats to the fission p barriers are being managed. To accomplish this the ERO should make use of existing plant capabilities including standard and non-standard uses of plant systems and equipment.
The purpose of this Table Top Drillis to perform an initial evaluation prior to implementing severe accident management at the Duane Amold Energy Center. This pilot demonstration is being performed to ensure the Severe Accident Management Guidance (SAMG) can be integrated into the emergency respon l~ capability 'without adversely affecting emergency response, i.e., SAMGs will not result in a decrease in the { i festiveness of the DAEC emergency response. This drill will incorporate a entique process similar to the Emergency Planning (EP) exercise entique process. A technical assessment of any useful preventive and mitigative measures identified will be self evaluated as part of long-term follow-up. The conduct and evaluation of this Drill provides additional tra for emergency response organization personnel and a means to further enhance IES UTILITIES' em response capability.
C This Manual has been developed to provide the basis for the conduct and the control mechanism of the Drill,
- through which the capabilities and effectiveness of the SAMGs for IES UTILITIES INC. can be evaluated.
This manual is to be utilized by the Drill Controllers / Evaluators. Drill " Players" will not have prior knowledge of the nature of the simulated incident or any parts thereof. l l
6 1.0 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES O 1.1 Scope The 1998 Duane Amold Energy Center Severe Accident Management Pilot Demonstration, to be conducted on February 6,19h will provide the emergency response personnel responsible for implementing Severe Accident Manage. ment Guidance (SAMG) the opportunity to evaluate the guidelines and associated l supporting material to be integrated into the emergency response capability. l This drill willinclude partial participation by the Control Room operating crew (Implementors), and selected members of the TSC Emergency Response Organization (Evaluators and Decision Makers). All activities, except the actual use of the SAGS, will be simulated. The drill scenario was developed to represent a combination of extremely unlikely conditions that can lead to core damage. Given the myriad of deteriorated plant conditions under which severe accident management strategies would be required, assumptions conceming equipment availability will be used instead of the detailed steps to realistically depict the malfunctions. of the low frequency sequences that can lead to core damage, the most probable of accident sequences, based on DAEC Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) studies, are used in the development of drill scenarios. 1998 SAM Pilot sAu t ooc 1.1 1 Rev. 214/98 i
1.2 Objxtives Summnry l The Duane Amold Energy Center (DAEC) 1998 Severe Accident Management Pilot Drill objectives are based on guidelines delineated in NEl 91-04, Revision 1, Severe Accident issue Closure Guidelines, BWROG Accident Management Guidelines Overview Document, Rev.1, and BWROG Emergency Procedure and Severe Accident Guidelines (EPGs/ SAGS). This drill will include partial participation by the Control Room operating crew (Implementors), and selected members of the TSC Emergency Response Organization (Evaluators and Decision Makers). The primary focus of the table top drillis on the Evaluators and the Decision Makers. This drill will be used as a supplement to severe accident training and as an evaluation to ensure that this representative sample of the total accident management team has been effectively trained and can implement the SAGS. i i 1997 SAM Pilot seu ooc 1.2-1 Rev. 2/4/98 L_-_---_------_----- - - - - - -
1.3 IES UTILITIES INC. OBJECTIVES The following are specific objectives for the drill with regard to the effectiveness of the SAMG products and AMT training. 1. SAG entry requirement is recognized in a timely manner and on existing plant conditions. 2. The transition from the EOPs to the SAGS is well defined and clearly communicated.
- 3. Command and controlis clearly understood by all participants.
- 4. Individual roles in the drill are clearly understood.
5. Trending and forecasting of the plant control parameters are timely and well communicated. 6. Mitigation strategies are selected using a team approach based on available tools and information. 7. Due consideration is given to both the positive and negative impacts associated with mitigation strategies.
- 8. SAG specified actions are communicated to implementors.
9. The implemented strategies are checked for effectiveness to determine whether additional strategies should be attempted. 10. Entry parameters to applicable guidelines are continuously analyzed.
- 11. Identification of the potential for RPV breach is timely and accurate and the evaluation of the RPV breach signature occurs.
i i 1998 SAM Pilot sw.oooc 13-1 Rev. 2/4/98 I 1
9 9
2.01 L DRILI. INFORM TION.! 2.1 Drill Participants The participants in this Drill will include members from the following organizations:
- a. IES Utilities Inc. Emeraency Response Organization a
Control Room (CR) e implementors Operations Shift Manager John Van Sickel Operations Shift Supervisor Edward Harrison Shift Technical Advisor Kevin Steimer Nuclear Station Operating Engineer Lonnie Gross Assistant Nuclear Station Operating Engineer Joeickes Assistant Nuclear Station Operating Engineer Jeff Stevens
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Technical Support Center (TSC) Emergency Coordinator Gary Van Middlesworth
. Evaluators Operations Liaison Merle Pettengill Safety Analysis Engineer Brad Hopkins SPDS Operator Dick Woodward Reactor Engineer Matt Brandt
. Decision Maker Operations Supervisor Mike Davis I
I 1998 SAM Pilot saa ooc 2.1 - 1 I Rev. 2/4/98
2.2 Drill Organization Yne organization for this Drill will consist of the Lead Drill Controller, Lead Facility Controllers, Controllers / Evaluators, Players, and Observers, as follows:
- a. The Lead Drill Controller will coordinate Drill preparations, including the development of the scenario and controller input messages. He will control all aspects of the conduct of l- the Drill, prepare a consolidated evaluation and critique report at the conclusion of the
(. Drill, and prepare and follow-up on an itemized list of corrective actions . recommended as s ! a result of the evaluation and critique.
- b. Lead Facility Controllers - Each Emergency Response Facility (or activity) will have a Lead Facility Controller. This person is the cognizant individual concoming Drill objectives, extent of play, control, simulation, response and evaluation for that facility / activity. All Controllers in a facility report to the Lead Facility Controller, who in tum reports to the Lead Drill Controller.
- c. Controllers /Evalustors are personnel seiected to deliver Drill messages to designated players at specific times and places during the Drill. They will inject or deliver additional messages as may be required to initiate the appropriate player response and keep the action moving according to the scenario and Drill objectives. The Controllers will be provided with this Drill Manual.
As Controllers / Evaluators, they are responsible to observe the Drill a.1d to judge the effectiveness of selected organizations, personnel, functions, and activities in response to the simulated emergency situation. Selection of Controllers / Evaluators is based on their expertise and qualifications to evaluate an assigned activity or area. They will record their observations using an evaluabon form and provide recommendations on corrective actions to the Lead Drill Controller prior to the scheduled critique. They will take steps, whenever possible, to collect data on the tirne-and-motion aspects of the activity observed for post-Drill use in designating and implementing system improvements.
- d. The Players include DAEC/IES personnel. Players from offsite organizations and agencies that are normal participants will be simulated by phone cell as they would be during an actual emergency situation. The success of the Drillis largely dependent upon player reaction, player kac#.c4 of their Severe Accident Management Guidance (SAMG) and associated suppcrting material and an understanding of the Drill objectives.
Initial conditions will be delineated at the time the Drill begins. Drill conditions will be provided by Controllers as appropnate Players, therefore, are responsible for initiating actions during the Drill in accordance with procedures, responsibilities, and tasks c,uttined for their particular function in the Accident Management Team (AMT). Each Player will generally advise his/her Controller prior to performing required emergency actions during the play of simulated activities to ensure that the Player is credited for their actions,
- e. Observers from lES and other organizations may be authorized, on a limited basis, to participate in the Drill solely for the purpose of observing Drill activity for personal educabon Observers will report initially to the Lead Facility Controller for the facility in which they wish to observe (for authonzed admittance). They will be provided with Drill information. Requests to participate as Observers must be submitted to the Lead Drill Controller no later than one week before the Drill.
1998 SAM Pilot swa poc 2.2 - 1 Rev. 2/4/98
l 2.3 IES Emergen y Response Fccilitiro During this Drill, the following Emergency Response Facilities will be activated to manage, 3 assess, and support the IES response to the simulated emergency situation. ' l a. Control Room (CR): (As Demonstrated by the Control Room Simulator) The Control Room, located in the Control Building, contains instrumentation for monitoring and controlling the plant operatW and safety systems. Emergency response measures will be implemented and coordb ned from the CR under the direction of the Operations Shift Manager (OSM) for all incident' prior to the activation of the Technical Support Center. For purposes of the Drill, all CR personnel will initially be stationed in, and all Emergency Response measures will be controlled from, the DAEC Control Room Simulator. The Simulator is ) in the Training Center, First Floor.
- b. Technical Support Center (TSC)
When emergency conditions escalate to an ALERT status or higher, coordination for emergency response will shift from the Contrni Room to the TSC, located in the building adjacent to the Administration Building. When the EOPs have been exited and SAGS are being implemented, the Operations Supervisor (Decision Maker) directs SAM activities from the TSC. Technical management personnel (Evaluators) will use information on plant status provided in the TSC to support actions being performed in the Control Room
)
I l l l l l I i 1998 SAM Pilot sm,t ooc 2.3 -1 Rev. 2/4/98
2.5 Drill Crnduct and Critiqua
- a. Conduct The conduct of this Drill will demonstrate the anticipated effectiveness of the Severe Accident
' Management program at DAEC. The Drill will simulate an abnormal radiologicalincident a' DAEC which will result in the implementation of the Emergency Operating Procedures and the Emergency Plan. Emerges.cy response actions during the simulated emergency will be unsuccessful and the EOPs will be exited and the SAG will be implemented.
All messages or communications with any other members of the Emergency Response Organization not specifically listed as participants in the Drill Manual, will be simulated by Controllers. Simulated plant conditions for the Drill will initially be provided by the DAEC Simulator until after the transition to the SAGS occur. Any supplemental parameters or simulated plant conditions will, and in the case of Simulator failure or time jumps, be provided by the controllers. Notifications of, and contact with, supervisors, plant management, corporate management, EOF, and offsite agencies will be sir Jlated with Controllers. Only Controllers can modify Drill messages or initiate free play messages.
- b. Critiaue and Evaluation The Dril! will be graded by Controllers / Evaluators who have the qualifications to evaluate the activity in their assigned locations. Evaluation of this Drill will be based on the objectives and requirements contained in this drill manual. Controllers / Evaluators will complete evaluation forms and provide recommendations on corrective actions to the Lead Drill Controller.
An all facility player critique in the TSC will directly follow the conclusion of the Drill. The overall Lead Facility Controller will coordinate and conduct a consolidated post-Drill critique, with input i from the facility controllers. Deficiencies in implementing Severe Accident Management Guidance (SAMG) and associated supporting material, training, facilities and equipment, and/or other areas which retuited in failure to meet an objective will be identified through the critique process. The
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deficiencies will be documented by each of the Lead Facility Controllers and submitted to : Emergency Planning, which will coordinate the resolution of the deficiencies. Any weaknesses which result in partially meeting an objective will also be identified. G l: 1 l 1998 SAM Pilot swaooc 24 -1 Rev. 2/4/98
2.6 Precautions and Limitations a Should, at any time during the course of the conduct of this Drill, an actual emergency
- situation arise, all activities and communications related to the Drill will be suspended. It will be the responsibility of any Controller that becomes aware of an actual emergency to suspend Drill response in the immediate area and to inform the Lead Drill Controller of the i
situation. Upon notification of an actual emergency, the Lead Drill Controller may notify all other Controllers to suspend all Drill activities. The Lead D.-ill Controller will make a determination at that point whether to continue, ternporarily hold, or terminate the Drill. Participants are to interject as much realism into the Drill as is consistent with its safe performance; however, caution must be used to prevent over-reaction. Care must be taken to assure that any non-participating individuals who may observe Drill activities or overhear Drill communications are not misled into believing that an actual emergency exists. Any Controller who is aware of an individual or group of individuals in the immediate vicinity who have become alarmed or confused about the situation, should approach that individual or group and explain the nature of the Drill and its intent. Controllers need to be thoroughly familiar with the objectives and participant instructions as listed in this Drill manual. 1998 SAM Pilot swa. ooc 2.6 - 1 Rev. 2/4/98
2.7 Participant In'tru:tions Drill Controllers serve an active role in the Drill by providing messages or instructions to players. They may also serve to prompt or initiate certain actions to assure continuity of the events described in the Drill scenario. Controllers are also Evaluators and will note all actions, both good and bad. They will be a main source of input to the critique. The Lead Drill Controller ensures that the overall progression of events occurs as designed. l l l 1998 SAM Pilot swa ooc 2.7 1 l Rev. 2/4/98 i l L_______-_______-_-__---_-_--
2.8 References / Abbreviations / Definitions . A/E Architect Engineer ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable AMWG Accident Management Working Group APRM Average Power Range Monitor ARM Area Radiation Monitor (s) ATWS Anticipated Transient Without Scram AMT Accident Management Team BAF Bottom of Active Fuel BOP Balance of Plant BRH Bureau of Radiological Health BWR Boiling Water Reactor BWROG Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group BWROG AMG BWROG Generic Accident Management Guidelines CAM (s) Continuous Air Monitor (s) CAS Central Alarm Station CCI Core Concrete interaction . CD Civli Defense CDE Committed Dose Equivalent
._ CDF Core Damage Frequency CFR Code of Federal Regulations CR Control Room CS Core Spray DBA Design Basis Accident DCH Direct Containment Heating l DDE Deep Dose Equivalent L
DAEC Duane Amold Energy Center DOE Department of Energy DOE-lRAP DOE Interagency Radiological Assistance Plan
' 1998 SAM Pilot sm-a ooe ' 2.8-1 Rev. 2/4/98
DW Drywall EAL(s) Emergency Action Levet(s) EAS Emergency Alerting System EC Emergency Coordinator ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System EOC Emergency Operating Center EOF- Emergency Operations Facility EOP Emergency Operating Procedures EPA Environmental Protection Agency EPC Emergency Planning Coordinator EPGc Emergency Procedure Guidelines (Revision 4 unless otherwise noted) EPl Emergency Public Information EPIP(s) Emergency Plan implementing Procedure (s) EPZ Emergency Planning Zone ERF(s) Emergency Response Facility (s) ERO Emergency Response Organization FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency FRRP Federal RadiologicalResponse Plan HCTL Heat Capacity Temperature Limit HP Health Physicist HPCI High Pressure Coolant injection ) HPME High Pressure Melt Ejection HPN Health Physics Network HVAC Heating, Ventilation, Air Conditioning l- ICF Integrated Containment Flooding ? I lES lES Utilities Inc. IES Tower IES Industries General Offices INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operations IPE Individual Plant Examination 1996 SAM Pilot swa ooc 2.8 - 2 Rev. 2/4/98
l l' IPEEE Individurl Plint Examination for Extema! Events IRM Intermediate Range Monitoring System JPIC Joint Public Information Center KI Potassium lodide LCO Limiting Condition of Operation LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident LPCI Low Pressure Coolant injection LPRM Local Power Range Monitor MDC Minimum Detectable Concentration MDRlR Minimum Debris Retention Injection Rate MPC Maximum Permissible Concentration NAWAS NationalWaming System NEl Nuclear Energy Institute NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSSS Nuclear Steam Supply System OSC Operations Support Center OSM Operations Shift Manager OSS Operations Shift Supervisor PAG (s) Protective Action Guide (s) PASS Post Accident Sampling System PC Prirnary Containment PlO Public information Officer PRM(s) Process Radiation Monitor (s) PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment PSAMG Plant Specific Accident Management Guidelines PSC Plant Support Center RCIC Reactor Core isolation Cooling RCP Reactor Coolant Pump RCS Reactor Coolant System 1998 SAM Pilot swa ooc 2.8 - 3 Rev. 2/4/98 1
RHR Rs:idu:1 Hart Rimoval RMT Radiation Monitoring Team RPV Reactor Pressure Vessel SAG Severe Accident Guidelines SAM Severe Accident Management SAMG Severe Accident Management Guidance SAS Secondary Alarm System SCP Security Control Point SER Safety Evaluation Report SJAE Steam Jet Air Ejector SPDS Safety Parameter Display System SRM Source Range Monitor SRO- Senior Reactor Operator SRV Safety Relief Valve TAF Top of Active Fuel TIC TechnicalInformation Center TSC Technical Support Center TSG Technical Support Guidelines TLD Thermoluminescent Dosimeter TEDE Total Effectrve Dose Equivalent Definitions Administrative Control Procedures (ACP) - Procedures used to establish division and departmental administrative methods of control. Alert (Condition Classification B) - Events are in process or have occurred which involve
. an actual or potential substantial degradation of the level of plant safety.
I: Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) - Failure of the reactor control rods to insert into the core upon demand. Assessment Actions - Actions taken during or after an accident to obtain and process the information that is necessary for making decisions to implement specific emergency measures. 1998 SAM Pilot swa poc 2.8 4 Rev. 2/4/98
Qentral Alarm Station - The site security command center which monitors entry and exit of all protected areas including the site perimeter (Refer to the DAEC Security Plan). Committed Dose Eouivalent (CDE)-The dose equivalent to organs or tissues of reference that will be received from an intake of radioactive material during the 50-year period following the intake. The Thyroid CDE refers to the dose to the thyroid from an intake, Condition Classification - The DAEC classification (i.e., A, B, C and D) of Emergency Action Levels. Contamination (Radioactivity) - Deposits of radioactive material in any place where it may harm persons, spoil experiments or make products or equipment unsuitable or unsafe for some specific use. The presence of unwanted radioactive matter. Control Room Coordinator -Individual reporting to the Control Room during an emergency and assuming responsibility for all operations- related activities. Corrective Actions - Emergency measures taken to mitigate or terminate an emergency condition at or near the source of the problem in order to prevent an uncontrolled release of radioactive material or to reduce the magnitude of a release, e.g., shutting down equipment, fire fighting, repair, and damage control. Also, those meas'ures taken to preclude repetitipn of the emergency condition. Decontamination - The process by which the body or an object is relieved of radioactive substances. Deep Dose Eouivalent (DDE)- Applies to external whole body exposure at h tissue depth of 1 cm. I Dose Assessment - The process of estimating the amount of radiation a person will potentially receive as a result of a radiological release. Dose Rate - Absorbed dose delivered per unit time, as rads per seconds or rads per hour. Dosimeter - A device that measures radiation dose, such as a film badge or ionization chamber. Qdil - A supervised instruction period aimed at testing, developing, and maintaining , skills in a particular operation. Emeroency Action Levels - A system of classification (refer to Table D-2) which uses radiological dose rates; specific contamination levels of airbome, waterborne, or surface-deposited concentrations of radioactive materials; or specific instrument indications (including their rates of change) as thresholds for initiating specific emergency measures, a notification procedure, or a particular protective action. o NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT (Condition Classification A) 1998 SAM Pilot swapoc 2.8 - 5 Rev. 2/4/98
)
o ALERT (Condition Classification B) , o SITE AREA EMERGENCY (Condition Classification C) o GENERAL EMERGENCY (Condition Classification D) Emeraency Coordinator - Individual responsible for overall direction of on-site actions during an emergency at the DAEC. Emeraency Operations Center (County and State)- Emergency facilities directed by the County Emergency Management Director and the State of Iowa State Emergency Management Division. The State EOC is located at the STARC Armory. Emeraency Operations Facility - An off-site facility located on the 14th floor of the lES Tower in Cedar Rapids and operated by lES, for continued evaluation and coordination of emergencies having environmental consequences. The EOF provides a centralized location for representatives of Federal, State, and local agencies. Emeroency Planners - Individual responsible for developing, reviewing, and updating the Emergency Plan; coordinating off-site emergency planning efforts. Emeraency Plan lmolementina Procedures (EPIPs) - Those procedures which implement the DAEC Emergency Plan. Emeroency Plannina Zone - The areas of major exposure pathways for which there is planning for predetermined protective actions. The two predominant exposure pathways are: o Inaestion Emeroency Plannina Zone - Area within a 50-mile radius of the nuclear power facility in which the principa! radiation source is ingestion of contaminated water or foods. o Plume Emeroency Plannina Zone - Area within a 10-mile radius of _ the nuclear power facility in which the principal radiation sources are whole-body extemal exposure to gamma radiation from the plume and deposited materials, and inhalation exposure. Emeroency Response Facility - Any of several on-site and off-site centers which are activated to coordinats emergency actions. Included in this category are the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Operations Support Center, Emergency Operations Facility, Joint Public information Center and State and local Emergency Operations Centers. Emeroency Response Organization (FEQ1 - Those personnel who are responsible for
. retuming the plant to a safe and stable operating condition.
Emeraency Response and Recovery Director (ER&RD) - Individual responsible for overall management of the recovery organization, including staffing, as appropriate, and providing sufficient support for various functions. 1998 SAM Pilot smo poc . 2.8 - 6 Rev. 2/4/98
- Evaluator- A member of the Exercise evaluation group. An evaluator may serve in a dual capacity as both a Controller and Evaluator. Each Evaluator may be assigned to one or more activities or functions for the purpose of evaluating, recording, critiquing, and making recommendations for improvements.
Exclusion Area - Area surrounding the DAEC, in which IES has the authority to L determine and control all activities including exclusion or removal of personnel and property from the area. General Emeraency (Condition Classification D)- Events are in process or have l occurred which involve actual or imminent substantial core degradation or melting with potential for loss of containment integrity. L lES Utilities Sookesperson - Individual coordinating with officials of the various i govemments to provide accurate and timely information to the news media. This individual acts as the official company spokesperson. Letters of Aareement (LOAs)- Letters of understanding from organizations which have agreed to support site or corporate emergency response activities. These letters define the actual assistance which will be provided in the event of an emergency. Local Emeraency Response Plans - Plans for local govemmental response to radiological emergencies at DAEC (i.e., Benton and Linn counties in Iowa). The plans set forth specific responsibilities and procedures for emergency agencies responsible for off-site emergency operations and the protection of the affected population. Notification of Unusual Event (Condition C! ossification A)- Events are in process or have occurred which indicate a potential degradation of the level of safety of the plant. ' Observer - Any individual who is authorized to observe the Drill, but is not authorized to interact with the players.
- Off-Site - Allland and water areas outside the Owner-Controlled Area fence surrounding the DAEC.
On-Site - Allland and water areas within the Owner-Controlled Area fence surrounding the DAEC. 1 On-site Emeroencv Response Organization - An organization, assembled for near- and long-term efforts, which is automatically established during any shift for an immediate response effort, as directed by the Emergency Coordinator. Operational Supoort Center (OSC) - A facility on the first floor of the DAEC administration building which serves as the coordination center for initial dose assessment, monitoring teams, and personnel who support Control Room emergency activities. 1998 SAM Pilot sm-2 ooc 2.8 - 7 Rev. 2/4/98
Participant - An individual who has some part in the Drill, whether as an Evaluator, , Controller, Player or Observer. 1 Players - All individuals (DAEC, IES personnel, and individuals from off-site organizations and agencies) who are assigned to perform functions of the Emergency j Response Organization, as described in the appropriate Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan implementing Procedures.
)
Plant Suooort Center - An office building housing support personnel for normal plant activities. 1 Population-at-Risk - Those persons for whom protective actions are being or would be i taken. Process Radiation Monitors -Instrumentation designed to detect abnormal radiation levels in process and effluent pathways and to activate appropriate alarms and controls. Protected Area - The area within the Site Boundary encompassed by physical barriers and to which access is controlled for security purposes. Protective Actions - Emergency measures taken after an uncontrolled release of radioactive material to prevent or minimize the radiological exposure likely tcroccur to individuals. Protective Action Guides (PAGs) - The projected radiological dose (or dose commitment values) to individuals in the general public that would warrant protective action against a release of radioactive material. Protective actions are warranted if the dose reduction achieved is not offset by risks associated with taking the protective actions. PAGs are guides used as a decision aid in an actual emergency response situation. The PAG does not include the dose that has unavoidably occurred prior to the assessment. (
Reference:
Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear incident: dated October 1991 with second orintina May 1992.
~
Protective Clothina - Wom to protect against surface contamination and put on and taken off inside of the controlled area. Includes lab coats, pants, coveralls, various types of hand covers, shoe covers, and hoods or caps. Radiological Assessment Coordinator (RAC)- Individual responsible for dispatching l personnel sent to monitor the environs, assessing the monitoring results, apprising the , appropriate personnel, and making recommendations to the Radiological & EOF Manager. Radiological Monitorina Teams (RMTs) - Two-person teams responsible for monitoring i radiation levels in the environment and collecting soil, air and water samples for laboratory analysis, i l' 1998 SAM Pilot swa poc 2.8 - 8 Rev. 2/4/98 1
" Radioorotective Drua (Potassium lodide)- A drug administered under the direction of a licensed physician to retard or prevent thyroid ingestion of radioactive isotopes of iodine (thyroid blocking).
Radwaste Supervisor- Individual responsible for managing the radiological control and radioactive waste aspects of the recovery operation, developing plans and procedures, and providing health physics support off-site. Recovery and Re-entry Actions - Actions taken to re-enter the plant and retum it to an operable status. Recoverv Organization - These personnel who perform recovery tasks following the efforts of the Emergency Response Organization in retuming the plant to a safe and stable operating condition. REM (rem)- The unit of dose equivalent in body tissue. It is equal to the absorbed dose (measured in rads) multiplied by the quality factor (which takes into account the effectiveness of different types of radiation) and by other multiplying factors. For beta and gamma radiation the quality factor is 1. Respiratory Protection - Breathing apparatus used to protect against contamination. Respiratory protection can consist of a simple face mask, air charcoal filtered mask, a self-contained breathing apparatus with air tanks, or a mask using a remote air supply and hoses. Secondary Alarm Station (SAS)- A security alarm station located in the Control Room as backup to the Central Alarm Station (refer to the DAEC Security Plan). _ Security Control Point (SCP) - The central security guard station on the first floor of the administration building through which all personnel entering or leaving the site premises must pass (refer to the DAEC Security Plan).
' Severe Accident - Accidents that result in catastrophic fuel rod failure, core degradation and fission provact release into the reactor vessel, containment or the environment.
Severe Accident Manaaement Guidance (SAMG) - Plant-specific guidance developed to assist +ha plant operating and technical staff in implementing strategies for the best use of the existing plant capabilities to d.iagnose, respond to, and recover from a severe accident. Shift Supervisor. Ooerations (OSS) - Senior Licensed Operator assigned shift supervisory duties during normal operation of the unit. This individual is qualified for initiation and administration of the DAEC Emergency Plan, maintaining the plant status, and retuming it to a stable and safe operating condition. Site Area Emeroency (Condition Classification C)- Events are in process or have occurred which involve actual or likely major failures of plant functions needed for protection of the publi<- ! t 1998 SAM Pilot sw2. ooc 2.8 - 9 Rev. 2/4/98 l t l
i
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Support Services Coordinator - Individual providing administrative, logistic cornmunications, and personnel support for the recovery effort. Technical Support Center (TSC)- A facility adjacent to the DAEC administration 3 building and staffed by plant management and technical personnel to provide in-depth technical support of Control Room activities. The Technical Support Center provides the main communications link between the plant (Control Room) and the Emergency Operations Facility. Thermoluminescent Dosimeter (TLD)- A dosimetry badge worn by workers in the nuclear industry 'to measure possible exposure to ionizing radiation. It is characteristic of thermoluminescent material that radiation causes internal changes which make the material, when subsequently heated, give off an amount oflight directly proportional to the radiation dose, which can be measured. Total Effective Dose Ecuivalent (TEDE)- The sum of the deep dose equivalent (for external exposures) and the committed effective dose equivalent (for internal exposures). UCi/cc - Microcurie per cubic centimeter, a unit of radiation activity. 1998 SAM Pilot sm.: ooc 2.8-10 Rev. 2/4/98
3.0- CONTROLLER / EVALUATOR INFORMATION-3.1 GeneralInstructions Each Controller and Evaluator should be familiar with the following:
- a. The basic objectives of the Drill,
- b. The assumptions and precautions being taken.
- c. The Drill scenario, including the initiating events and the expected course of action to be taken.
- d. The various locations that will be involved and the specific times to be observed at those locations.
- e. The evaluation forms provided,
- f. Player instructions.
I I l l l l i 1 1998 SAM Pilot se ooc 3.1 - 1 Rev. 'J4/98
4 3.2 Controller / Evaluator Instructions Each Controller / Evaluator will take detailed notes regarding the progress of the Drill and the response of the Drill participants at their assigned locations. Each Controller / Evaluator should carefully note the time when major activities or milestones occur, and areas where problems are encountered. The evaluation of performance during this tabletop drill should be based 1 on the process used to arrive at SAM recommendations rather than the l actual decision made. It is not necessary to exercise every step in the SAGS. One of the primary missions of the drill is to demonstrate the effectiveness of the team and team communications. The evaluation process should strive to confirm that the drill objectives described on the evaluation form are addressed and that the plant staff involved in the drill were given proper and appropriate training for their role in accident management. The criteria used by Controller / Evaluators to evaluate assigned areas pertaining to the drill are described on the evaluation form. A dual purpose will be served by this method. First, each facility or response area will be evaluated with respect to the applicable objectives, and second, the system will provide a vehicle for implementing lessons learned and improving severe accident response. l 1 l 1998 SAM Pilot sm,mooc 3.2 - 1 Rev. 2/4/98
DUANE ARNOLD ENERGY CENTER SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT PILOT DEMONSTRATION EVALUATION FORM CRITERIA ES COMMENTS /NEEDS IMPROVEMENT
- 1. SAG entry requirement recognized in a timely manner based on existing plant conditions.
COMMENTS: O
- 2. The transition from the EOPs to the SAGS was well defined and clearly communicated.
COMMENTS: O 1 1998 SAM Pilot samooc 3.2 - 2 Rev. 2/4/98
]
CRITERIA YES
- COMMENTS /NEEDS IMPROVEMENT
- 3. Command and control clearly understood by all participants.
I l COMMENTS: l O ! l 4
-i i
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- 4. Individual roles in the drill clearly understood.
COMMENTS: I O ( i
- 5. Trending and forecasting of the plant control parameters was timely and well communicated.
COMMENTS: O t l l l l 1998 SAM Pilot mooc 3.2 - 3 l Rev. 2/4/98
CRITERIA YES COMMENTS /NEEDS , IMPROVEMENT
- 6. Mitigation strategies were selected using a team approach based on available tools and information.
COMMENTS: i O
- 7. Due consideration given to both the positive and negative impacts associated with mitigation strategies.
COMMENTS: g
- 8. SAG specified actions communicated to
. Implementors COMMENTS:
O 1 1 1998 SAM Pilot smDoc 3.2 - 4 Rev. 2/4/98
CRITERIA YES COMMENTS /NEEDS IMPROVEMENT
- 9. The impleme'nted strategies are checked for effectiveness to determine whether additional strategies should be attempted.
COMMENTS: O
- 10. Entry conditions to applicable guidelines were evaluated with regard to changes in plant parameters.
COMMENTS: O
- 11. Parameters associated with RPV breach signature were closely monitored and evaluated.
{ COMMENTS: O l I f l 1 1 1998 SAM Pilot sAu-aoooc 3.2 - S Rev. 2/4/98
CRITERIA YES COMMENTS /NEEDS " IMPROVEMENT
- 12. Consideration was given regarding the selection of the correct SAG branch.
COMMENTS: O l l 1 l 1 I I 1998 SAM Pilot se.coe 3.2 - 6 Rev. 2/4/98
3.3 Controller / Evaluator Assignments Facility l Assignment Name l l Phone Note: Four digit plant extensions are given unless otherwise noted. Lead Onsite Paul Sullivan TBD Controller
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Control Room OSS/ CR Operators Jim Kalamaja 7825 OSS/ CR Operators Duane Haas 7825 m < , TSC EC/AMT Paul Sullivan TBD AMT Ken Ross TBD AMT Ed Burns TBD AMT Jeff Gabor TBD
& s gp l 1998 SAM Pilot sm43 ooc 3.3 - 1 Rev. 2/4/98 L
l
/4.0 SCHEDULE OF EVENTS 1 l -
Fridav. Februarv 6 0700 Security In-Processing DAEC: Access Contro! 0730 Drill Brief TSC 0800 SAM Drill TSC 1100 Drill Debrief & Critique TSC (P. Sullivan, J. Gabor, J. Kalamaja) 1145-1245 Lunch Plant Support Center, Rooi A&B 1300 DAEC Implementation Schedule Training Center 1330 Question & Answer Period SAM Team & Consultants
- Training
- EP
- EOP/SAGTTSG
*IPE
- Program 1445 Break 1500 Closing Remarks l
- Guest Comments Guests i
- NEl Comments Fred Emerson
- NRC Comments Staff Representatives
- DAEC Closing Comments Station Management 1530 Adjoum 1998 SAM Pilot swaooc 4-1 Rev.1/29/98 L________--_____-_
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^
+
.- ~
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;;m',<w w E 6.0 SCENARIOA '7 ,
A. , , , y g , J' l 5.1 Narrative Summary (Estimated drill time 3 hours) The plant has been operating at 100% power when a crack occurs in the Recirculation System suction piping that results in a leak rate of greater than 50 gpm. It is assumed { that the operators responded using plant Abnormal Operating Procedures, (AOP), and Emergency Operation Procedures, (EOP), to this condition by initiation of Torus cooling and performed containment venting to maintain the containment pressure below 2 psig.
]
The operating crew took the appropriate actions to shutdown the unit and stabilize the l _ plant. EAL FA1 Alert "Any Loss or any Potential Loss of either Fuel Clad or RCS l { Barrier" has been declared due to RCS Leakage above 50 gpm, and required l notifications are completed. I Feedwater and Condensate failed during the transition of power supplies and have not been restored. RCIC is maintaining level as needed. The simulator is frozen at this point and theTSC and Operating crew is brought in for tumover of the simulated events that happened earlierin the moming, i l Tumover l I The Emc gency Response Organization (ERO)has been mobilized. All IES Emergency i i Response facilities (TSC, OSC, EOF, JPIC, ORAUODEF, ORAA) have been staffed and are in operation. The offsite agencies are informed and the Emergency Operating Centers for the State and Counties are in operation. All support functions of these facilities will be simulated by controller injects. I l The scenario begins with the operating crew following the steps of EOP 1, RPV Control and EOP 2, Primary Containment Control. After the crew has had time to settle in to the existing plant conditions, a very large l break of the Recirculation piping occurs. This will result in a rapid depressurization of : j the RPV with level decreasing below Top of Active Fuel (TAF). The Control Room crew l l will follow the sten = ?n Emergency Operating Procedure ALC in an attempt to restore l ' RPV level to % A9 .iowever, due to a calibration error associated with the Low Pressure Pern.N:.e interlock logic, and other valve faults, ECCS systems inject valves for the Low Pressure Coolant injection (LPCI) and Core Spray (CS) systems will be closed and unavailable for injection. Altemate RPV injection from Emergency Service Water (ESW), RHR Service Water (RHRSW), and General Service Water (GSW) are also unavailable because they inject via the LPCI injection valves. The condensate pumps will be unavailable due to a fault that has occurred during the open circuit transfer. The amount of time required to initiate condensate is considered 1998 SAM Pilot sm41 coc 5.1-1 Rev. 2/4/98
too long to prevent core damage during a DBA LOCA. In addition the limited inventory ' in the hotwell and CST is insufficient to maintain icng-term adequate core cooling. HPCI , and RCIC will be ineffective due to the depressurized RPV. l The A CRD pump is tagged out and the B CRD pump trips on low suction pressure due to clogged filters. The crew will be able to inject to the RPV uaing both SBLC pumps for attemate injection. However, the low flow rate and limited suction inventory from the CST cannot maintain sufficient RPV water level to prevent core damage. Sprays can successfully be used to mitigate containment pressurization The crew will control primary containment parameters per EOP 2 by utilizing RHR for Torus and Drywell Sprays. The crew will determine that RPV level cannot be restored and maintained above -30 in, using the available injection systems and that SAG Entry is required. The Shift Manager and Operations Supervisor in the TSC will coordinate the transition from the EOPs to the SAGS. The Emergency Coordinator in the TSC will assume control of directing the overall plant emergency response. In SAG 1, the Accident Management Team should determine that RPV level cannot be restored and maintained above -144 in. (BAF). They should also recognize.that RPV injection flow rate is below Minimum Debris Retention injection Rate (MDRIR), if Drywell sprays were used to control Drywell pressure following the LOCA, the Accident Management Team (AMT) should follow the guidelines of PCF-8, "Inside Pressure Suppression Pressure" and recognize the core may melt through the RPV and pressure suppression capability must be maintained. The Accident Management Team, (AMT), may elect to use service water systems to flood containment, but should secure injection from extemal sources before pressure suppression capability is lost. The core will continue to heat up until vessel breach occurs. The AMT should recognize
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the vessel breach and follow the guidelines of PCF-2, "Has core debris breached the RPV". The priority at this time should be to submerge debris in primary containment. Water on the Drywell floor from Drywell Sprays and LOCA quenches ex-vessel debris. No subsequent Drywell failure or containment temperature heatup due to ex-vessel debris. Drywell hydrogen concentration and radiation levels will be increasing. Containment pressure will continue to increase while the containment flooding actions are being taken. The AMT should be considering containment venting and its consequences. Containment pressure will continue to increase to 53# and the AMT should vent the containment to maintain pressure below 53#, The scenario will end after the containment is vented. 1998 SAM Pilot sm4tooc 5.1-2 Rev. 2/4/98
5.2 Initial Conditions THIS IS A DRILL DAILY PLANT STATUS REPORT 06-Feb.-94, 5:09 AM OPERATIONS REPORT: The plant operated at 100% power throughout the past 24 hours. Days on Line 145 Days since lost time accident 1566 Days until next refuel outage 55 A CRD pump is tagged out for speed increaser work PLANT PARAMETERS Plant Performance Summary Core Performance Summary Generator Gross 567.5 MwE 100.4% Core Flow 46.5 x 106 Lbm/Hr 95.0% Generator Net 538.0 MwE Load Line 102.7% Reactor Power 1657.6 MwTh 100.0% CMFCP 0.900 Gross Efficiency 34.3% CMFLPD 0.885 Gross Heat Rate 9969 Btu / Kwhr MAPRAT 0.920 Cooling Tower Fans OOS None Cycle exposure 8916.2 MWD /sT Condenser Performance Summary Circ Water & Tower Summary LP Condenser Pressure 1.9 in Hg LP Cond inlet A: 68.9 F B: 69.8 F HP Condenser Pressure 2.3 in Hg Cross-over A: 84.6 F B: 85.2 F Ambient Temperature 25.8 'F HP Cond Out A: 98.6 F B: 98.1 F Dew Point Temperature 18.9 F Tower Outlet A: OOS F B: 71.2 F Wet Bulb Temperature 118.0 F 1998 SAM Pilot sasa ooc 5.2-1 Rev.1/29/98
Drywell Leakage Summary Chemistry Summary identified 1.49 GPM Offgas Activity 5.93E-07 pCi/cc Unidentified 0.02 GPM Pretreat Activity 5.5 mR1Hr Hold Up line flow 34 SCFM Rx Conductivity: 0.088 pmho/cm H2 Injection Flow: 6.1 SCFM RWCU Beds in Service: 2 LIMITING CONDITIONS OF OPERATIONS (LCOs): NONE PRIORITY MAINTENANCE ITEMS: 1P209A "A" CRD pump is tagged and disassembled for rebuild. EP-CMAR -002, EP-TAG-002 WORK REQUESTS: NUMBER EQUIP. ID CONCERN SUS . A46996 CV1204 Steam packing leaking slightly. 45.01 A46895 TR43838 Chart not advancing. 73.01 A46999 DOOR-246 Magnet loose on door. 99.27 A46898 TRS4141 Low glycol tank temperature alarm comes in momentarily 72.01 Tagouts are in place for the following: 1P-209A "A" CRD pump is tagged out for repair. The pump was making a grinding noise and is disassembled for rebuild. EP-CMAR -002, EP-TAG-002 All other plant equipment is operable and conditions / parameters are as expected. 1998 SAM Pilot sm42 ooc 5.2-2 Rev.1/29/98
l initinting Events 0630 it was noticed that Drywell temperature and pressure were slowly increasing 0645 Drywell venting commenced per Operating Instruction (01) 573, " Containment", to maintain Drywell pressure < 2# 0700 Fast power reduction performed per integrated Plant Operating Instruction (IPOI) 4, (Shutdown). Manually scrammed the Reactor. Completed the immediate Actions of ' IPOl 5 (Reactor Scram). Primary Containment isolation System (PCIS) Groups 2,3,4 Isolations verified complete. Verified Drywell venting secured. EOP 1, "RPV Control" entered on RPV level < 170 inches. Open circuit transfer of non-essential busses
. occurred. Condensate and Feed Systems tripped off and depressurized.
0705 Entered EOP 2, " Primary Containment Control" on Drywell pressure of 2# 0710 Declared an ALERT, FA1, "Any ioss or potential loss of either fuel clad or RCS barrier". 0721 All required notifications completed per Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP) 1.2. " Notifications". 0722 Simulator frozen. Turnover i ! The Emergency Response Organization (ERO)has been mobilized. All IES Emergency i Response facilities (TSC, OSC, EOF, JPIC, ORAUODEF, ORAA) have been staffed and are in operation. The offsite agencies are informed and the Emergency Operating Centers for the State and Counties are in operation. All support functions of these facilities will be simulated by controller injects. I
~ Current step and parameter being maintained in the following Emergency Operating l procedures, (EOP).
1 EOP1
. RC/L +170 in. to +211 in.
. RC/P-1 Defeat 11
. RC/P-4 Defeat 17
. RC/P-5 Press. Set lowered to 700#
EOP2
. PC/H Defeat 16
.' . T/L-1 Normal
. T/T-1 Torus cooling in service
. DW/T-3 Defeat 4, main intake coils bypassed l . PC/P-1 Venting secured, no sprays have been used 1997 Exerces sm4 ooc 5.2 - 3 Rev.1/29/98 2
4 5.3 Scenario Timeline Approximate Table Top input Plant Symptom or Event Description Expected Action Time Conditions i 0700 Initial simulator setup conditions are established.
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Begin Drill 50 gpm break flow was Participant briofing initiate RHR identified and the ERO is staffed. Torus water temperature Vent containment to increasing ) maintain pressure below 2 ! Reactor has been psig scrammed Drywell and Torus pressure increasing towards 2 psig Just prior to tumover RPV FW/ Condensate lost due to fault during open break flow has increased and containment pressure circuit transfer. , has exceeded 2 psig. I Both loops of RHR are being used for Torus I cooling Following the Using the plant Start drill briefing simulator Per Play Large LOCAinitiatedin increase in Drywell pressure Direct injection with low recirc suction line pressure systems
)
Reference Decrease in RPV pressure Time = 0 Fuel zone waterlevel downscale Per Play HPCl/RCIC trip on low RPV pressure decreasing inject with SBLC RPV pressure rapidly Both CRD pumps RPV level decreasing rapidly unavailable Pressure and Temperature rise Low pressure injection in containment ( valves fail to open i SBLC available with j total flow of 55 gpm j Per Play RHR loops assumed to Continued level decrease to -30 Declare that RPV level be operating in 1) DW inches cannot be restored and spray mode, and 2) maintained above -30 in Torus cooling Enter SAGS 1998 SAM Pilot sm43 ooc 5.3-1 Rev. 2/4/98
Approximate Table Top input Plant Symptom of Event Desenption Expected Action . Time Conditions Approx. 20 Entry into SAG calls for Level decreasing Enter SAG-1, PCF-8 minutes after containment flooding onset of Use RHRSW to flood LOCA 6000 gpm service water containment available - used through DW sprays isolation of one RHR loop to maintain in Torus
' ' ~
M cooling Hydrogen concentration 30 min. ( Switch off strDul&f SAG branch PCF-8 increasing in Drywell Begin Paper Simulator result should Data be consistent with data increasing radiation in Drywell at 30 minutes after and Torus LOCA to provide a smooth transition Drywell temperature controlled at < 200 *F using DW sprays 35 min. Data provided at a minimum of every 5 minutes 50 minutes Torus level exceeds Torus waterlevel at +13.8 feet Secureinjection from 13.8 ft - assume extemal sources isolation of RHRSW. (RHRSW)
- Re-establish RHR loop to DW sprays 60 minutes Vessel Breach Pressure rise in Drywell Vessel breach ide '.lified based on plant conditions Dry.vell temperature increasing and signatures increar,e in DW and Torus Switch strategies to
~ hydrogen concentration branch PCF-2 65 minutes Hesume containment PCF-2 flooding from external sources Re-initiate RHRSW to DW sprays at 6000 gpm RHRSW available at 6000 gpm through DW sprays 90 min.- Data provided every 5 Torus waterlevelincreasing Consideration for minutes containment venting Torus pressure at 18 psig and ; increasing ' l 1998 SAM Pilot sessooc 5.3-2 Rev. 214/98 !
9 Approximate Table Top input Plant Symptom or Event Desenption
- Expected Action Time Conditions Time Jump -
162 min. Containment flooding Torus pressure at 38 psig Consideration for occurring containment venting Containment water level at 52 feet 192 min. Torus pressure at 53 psig Before 53 psig - Containment venting Per Play Terminate Drill I l l 1998 SAM Pilot sm43 ooc 5.3-3 Rev. 2/4/98 j
p 5.4 Termin:tian Crit;ris end Actions 5.4.1 Termination Criteria l The following are criteria for terminating this Drill. A real event occurs at the plant that, in the opinion of the (actual) Operations Shift Supervisor, presents a threat to personnel or plant safety and/or requires the declaration of a real emergency. OR l The Sequence of Events and the scenario has been initiated and played out to the expected conclusion l AND Lead Facility Controllers have determined that the objectives of the Drill: have been met
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have been met to the extent that they are likely to be l have not been met and the reasons therewith are understood , AND Drill termination is appropriate. l I I 1998 SAM Pilot smaooc SA-1 Rev. 2/4/98 L___-______-_______---
I l 5.5 Simulator instructions l Simulator setup: Reset to IC-104 I Check malfunctions built into IC; some may be on Gould Check H & V remote functions per current (real) met conditions initial Malfunctions STCS01 Core spray inj fail STCS02 Core spray inj fail Event Triggers NONE Overrides A CRD lights for tag out Tagout items "A" CRD pump is tagged out for repair of " grinding noises" and small sealleak. EP-CMAR-002, EP-TAG-002 TIME EVENT 0715 DRILL BRIEFING 0630 It was noticed that Drywell temperature and pressure were slowly increasing l. 0645 Drywell venting commenced per Operating instruction (01) 573, j " Containment", to maintain Drywell pressure < 2# 0700 Fast power reduction performed per integrated Plant Opera;ing instruction l (IPOI) 4, (Shutdown). Manually scrammed the Reactor. Completed the immediate Actions of IPOl 5 (Reactor Scram). Primary Containment isolation System (PCIS) Groups 2, 3,4 Isolations verified complete. Verified Drywell venting secured. EOP 1, "RPV Control" entered on RPV level < 170 inches. I l 1998 SAM Pilot sw45 Doc 5.5-1 Rev.1/29/98 i L_______--___________-._____--_________.- --- __ - - - - - - -- - - - _ _ - . - _ - - - __
Open circuit transfer of non-essential busses occurred. Condensate and Feed Systems tripped off and depressurized. 0705 Entered EOP 2, " Primary Containment Control" on Drywell pressure of 2# 0710 Dec'ared an ALERT, FA1, "Any loss or potential loss of either fuel clad or RCS barrier", 0721 All required notifications completed per Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIP) 1.2. " Notifications". 0722 Simulatorfrozen Shift Tumover Following Drill Briefing The Emergency Response Organization (ERO)has been mobilized. All IES Emergency Response facilities (TSC, OSC, EOF, JPIC, ORAL /ODEF, ORAA) have been staffed and are in operation. The offsite agencies are informed and the Emergency Operating Centers for the State and Counties are in operation. All support functions of these facilities will be simulated by controller injects. Current step and parameter being maintained in the following Emergency Operating procedures, (EOP). EOP1
. RC/L-1 +170 in, to +211 in.
- RC/P-1 Defeat 11
. RC/P-4 Defeat 17
. RC/P-5 Press. Set lowered to 700#
- EOP2
. PC/H-1 Defeat 16
. T/L-1 Normal
. T/T-1 Torus cooling in service
. DW/T-3 Defeat 4, main intake coils bypassed
. PC/P-1 Venting secured, no sprays have been used 0730 PAGE ANNOUNCEMENT TO COMMENCE EXERCISE MFS Pilot STCS01 CS inj fail 1998 SAM Pilot sw46 ooc 5.5 - 2 Rev.1/29/98
7 STCS02 CS inj fail l STRH01 LPCI inj fail STRH02 LPCIinj fail HP02 HPCI Trip RR30 25% Coolant Leakage EG01A Gen UO FWO2A Cond pump trip A FWO2B Cond pump trip B RR15A 100% DBA LOCA RX01 Fuel Clad Failure RC02 RCIC Trip RR19A0 Fuel zone fail RR19B0 Fuel zone fail RR19C0 Fuel zone fail RR19D 0 Fuel zone fail I GOULD PCMH2DW(1/12)@ 2.0 PCMH2SP(1/8)@ 0 Per Play DRILL IS TERMINATED ANNOUNCE DRILL IS TERMINATED Commence facility critiques, l l 1998 SAM Pilot swasooc 5.5-3 Rev.1/29/98
i 4 PARTICIPANT COMMENT SHEET INSTRUCTIONS Exercise participants are encouraged to respond to all applicable areas or to write N/A across areas not applicable to their position. Please elaborate and make recommendations for any observed problem, weakness, or noteworthy items. Please complete this form as quici:ly as possible following the drill and return it to the Emergency Planning Department These comments are in regard to the February 6,1998, SAM Pilot Demonstration Drill. i Location: CR TSC Your comments are greatly appreciated. In order to provide feedback and to follow up on comments as necessary, we need your name along with your comments. Thank you for providing your observations. f _ Name: (Print) Phone #: l Signature: l 1998 SAM Pilot swa poc 6-I Rev. 2/4/98 l L________________________-____ 2
SAM DRILL COMMENT SHEET
- 1. Facilities The facility was: Good Adequate inadequate Which areas showed need for improvement?
Data Display Communications Equipment Available Staffing Habitability Other Comments-
- 2. Scenario The scenario was: Good Adequate inadequate Which areas showed need for improvement?
,_ _ Realism Operations Data Rad Data Time Jumps Met Data Amount ofinformation Available Other Comments 1998 SAM Pilot samooc 6 -2 Rev. 2/4/98 L _ _ __- _ __-__-_--------- - - - -
SAM DRILL COMMENT SHEET
- 3. Procedures t
i Procedures were: Good Adequate inadequate Which areas of the procedures showed a need for improvement? Availability Clarity Ease of Use l EOPs SAGS ___ TSGs Other l Comments: l l l 4. Trainina Previous training adequately prepared me to respond for my position. Yes No This drill adequately prepared me to respond for my position. l l Yes No in what ways could training have been improved? l Comments: l 1998 SAM Pilot swoo poc 6 -3 Rev. 2/4/98
SAM DRILL COMMENT SHEET
- 5. Specify any other areas which were noteworthy or in need of improvement Comments:
1998 SAM Pilot mooc 6 -4 Rev 2/4/98
O 9 .
.7.0 PLANT SCENARIO DATA .
The following pages will be used as simulated plant data to be handed out for participant use after the simulator is frozen. I l l l l l 1998 SAM Pilot sm-mooc 7,3 Rev. 2/4/98
ATTACHMENT 5 , \ 3377 DAEC Rd. Pan. IA $2324 , UTILITIES Memorandum NG 98-0327, Rev 1 TO: Paul Sullivan , Manager, Emergency Planning FROM: Roy Harter SAM Project Team DATE: February 20,1998
SUBJECT:
DAEC SAM Pilot Demonstration Drill Critique FILE: A-304.1 Backaround: On Friday, February 6*, IES conducted a simulated severe accident drill to demonstrate the use of the draft DAEC Severe Accident Guidelines (SAGS) and Technical Support Guidelines (TSGs). A narrative summary of the drill and the actual drill time line are provided as attachments. The drill was one of several NEl sponsored pilot demonstrations intended to provide the NRC with a representative sample of how the various Owner's Group j Severe Accident Management Guidance (SAMG) would be implemented. In this drill, the DAEC demonstrated the plant-specific implementation of the BWR ] 1 Owner's Group (BWROG) SAMG. The pilot demonstration drill provided the DAEC with an opportunity to further j evaluate the plant's emargency response capability and the impact of SAMG on that capability. The drillincorporated a critique process similar to that utilized in Emergency Planning (EP) exercises at the DAEC. The goal of SAMG implementation is to enhance existing severe accident response capabilities. Self-assessment criteria addressing these areas is
- therefore performance based, aimed at gauging whether enhancements have l taken place and whether the guidelines are effective in practice.
i Consistent with the evaluation criteria established in NEl 91-04, the following areas were assessed during the drill: EP interface and impact, training, EOP l interface, communication, decision making, and drill conduct and effectiveness. l Page1 moa s w c ,,iv ,1 m e ,, i u ee. m oc , , .. ,
I Drill Participation: i The pilot demonstration was set up to exercise only limited elemnts of the DAEC Emergency Response Organization (ERO). The DAEC ERO contains a broad cross-section of the plant staff designed to provide the necessary resources required to respond to a wide-variety of challenges. For the purposes of this drill it was concluded that all elements of the ERO were not required to be staffed. As stated earlier, the drill was focused on demonstrating the use of the draft DAEC SAGS and TSGs. Because the SAGS and TSGs are utilized by a small group within the ERO, it was concluded that use of these products could be effectively demonstrated with limited ERO participation. This would be consistent with the scope of future SAM training drills. Other considerations in determining the number of drill participants included the desire to minimize the impact on the plant's preparations for the upcoming refueling outage and the necessity to accommodate the expected lartje number of drill observers (40-50 people) in the TSC. As a result of the above considerations, drill participation was limited to the following ERO members: (1) &mergency Coordinator - Participated on a limited basis to facilitate communications between the Accident Management Team (AMT) and Drill Controllers acting in lieu of unstaffed ERO positions. (2) TSC Accident Management Team (AMT):
. TSC Operationc Supervisor - primarily responsible for SAG use and Decision Making. (Note: This position is not yet part of the TSC organization but will be assigned te the TSC when SAMG is implemented at the DAEC.)
. TSC Operations Liaison - primarily responsible for EPG/ SAG Assessment e Reactor Engineer- primardy responsible for Core / Reactivity Assessment
. Safety Analysis Engineer - primarily responsible for Plant / System Status Assessment
. SPDS Operator- primarily responsible for Control Parameter Assessment (3) Control Room Operating Crew (located in the simulator)- primarily responsible for implementation of SAG actions directed by the TSC AMT.
Prior to entering the SAGS, operators utilized Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) to respond to the simulated drill conditions and to demonstrate the transition between EOPs and SAGS. (4) Drill controllers assumed all ERO positions that were not staffed. (5) A member of the SAM Team served as the TSC " Log Taker" to record actions taken by the AMT during the scenario. This function would normally be,the responsibility of the TSC-Control Room Communicator and the TSC Electronic Status Board Recorder. Page 2 e, ,e . , w e,,,,,,,e e,,, vee.,, ee 3 -.
s s Drill Critiaue Criteria:
, Drill evaluators and SAM Team members evaluated the performance of drill participants using the following criteria specified in the drill scenario package:
(1) Was the SAG entry requirement recognized in a timely manner based on existing plant conditions? (2) Was the transition from EOPs to SAGS well defined and clearly . communicated? (3) Was Command and Control clearly understood by all participants? (4) Were individual roles in the drill clearly understood? (5) Was trending and forecasting of plant control parameters timely and well communicated? (6) Were mitigation strategies selected using a team approach based on j available tools and information? l (7) Was due consideration given to both the positive and negative impacts- l associated with mitigation strategies? ' l . (8) Were required SAG actions communicated to implementors? (g) Were the implemented strategies checked for effectiveness to determine whether additional strategies should be attempted? t (10) Were entry conditions to applicable guidelines evaluated with regard to changes in plant conditions? (11) Were parameters associated with RPV breach signature closely monitored and evaluated? j (12) Was consideration given regarding the selection of the correct SAG branch? Since the entire ERO was not utilized in the drill, the drill evaluation criteria focused on the use of the SAGS, the effectiveness of TSGs in supporting SAG decision making, and communication and team work among AMT members. A complete set of drill critique comments prepared by evaluators and SAM. Team members is provided as an attachment. A debrief was conducted immediately Mter completion of the drill in which drill participants were requested to provide faedback on the following areas: ERO facilities, the drill scenario, procedures utilized in response to the simulated event, the effectiveness of training previously provided to drill participants, and any general recommendations for improvement. A summary of participant comments is provided as an attachment. Page 3 . e ., , . ., -,.- --... . - --. ..-- .- -. -.
1 o l Drill Critiaue Summary: , This following is a summary of evaluator and SAM Team member critique comments, comments have been grouped into related areas: Drill Scenario and Execution (
. In general, the AMT functioned well together and responded appropriately to changing plant conditions. The SAGS and TSGs appeared to be effective tools to support defined AMT functions.
. The drill scenario appeared to be well-planned and adequately exercised the SAGS, TSGs, and ERO for the defined purpose of the drill. Once the drill was underway, parameter values and trends seemed reasonably believable.
= lnitial conditions were clearly established and appeared to be understood by the drill participants. Adequate time was provided for the drill participants to familiarize themselves with the plant status, obtain tumovers, and establish communications between the control room and TSC.
. The drill was initiated using the simulator to facilitate evaluation of the transition from EOPs and SAGS and the resulting transfer of command and control. - It was concluded that the transition was clearly identified and smoothly effected.
. The TSC personnel used in the drill were intentionally limited to the Accident Management Team, with the drill controllers simulating all other positions.
The focus of the drill was therefore confined specifically to the use of the SAGS and TSGs. This approach did not permit evaluation of integrated ERO activities. Consideration should be given to performing an integrated drill with full TSC and ERO manning to more fully assess the integration of SAMG and AMT responsibilities into the existing ERO structure.
. AMT discussions were amplified for the benefit of drill observers. While the drill participants appeared to be accustomed to this situation after a short time, having face-to-face communications broadcast to the room seemed unnatural.
Team members cannot be expected to act and function normally when there is no distinction between exploratory exchanges with other individuals and general group announcements. Amplifying all communications may have diluted the effectiveness of periodic group briefings. It was generally agreed that this issue was a result of the desire to allow drill observers to overhear AMT discussions and would not have occurred had normal TSC communications been utilized, e Although the AMT appeared to have a common understanding of the initial plant conditions described by the drill controller, no formal team briefing was delivered by the Emergency Coordinator or TSC Operations Supervisor at the beginning of the drill. Page 4 enev 4,- e,...,..e e, ,,xe..e ee ,, -,
f s s
- A bell was rung every time that paper data was updated alter the simulator was turned off. While use of paper data introduces some elements of artificiality, the bell was perhaps too s+rong a reminder to the AMT of the need to review plant data and look for changes. Consideration should be given in subsequent drills to simply changing the data without calling particular attention to it unless an alarm would actuate because of a parameter cha.nge.
. The drill structure may have resulted in the AMT placing to much reliance on information provided by the plant process computer. This may have resujted in alternative methods of monitoring, validating and tracking parameters as described in the TSGs not being fully explored.
. The use of time jumps was difficult for the crew to get used to. The expectations of the crew of plant conditions is tied to real time and their extensive knowledge of the plant. Time jumps disrupt this intuitive knowledge l and special attention is required in the drill to emphasize the need to adjust to
! the use of time jumps.
- It was recommended that oxygen levels in the containment be more 1 representative of that which exists during the expected transients - during the drill oxygen concentration was always zero, may actually be 2-3%. 1 TSC Layout and Operations
. Procedural tracking and status-keeping tools used during the drill were limited l
, to the SAGS and TSGs. Again, it is recommended that consideration be given l l to a more integrated EP drill to assess how some of the TSG tools would be coordinated with the use of existing resources and tools (e.g., status boards) in the TSC.
- No laydown space was provided for the EOPs and SAGS. The panels were '1 simply stacked on the floor, leaning against the edge of a table. This l arrangement appeared inconvenient - on several occasions panels fell over or were bumped into by controllers, observers, and AMT members. It is recommended that better laydown space be provided. One option might be to locate another table behind the Operations Liaison for the flowcharts. Another might be to mount the flowcharts on the wall, visible to the entire TSC. The Emergency Coordinator also noted during the drill debrief that the laydown )
area was inadequate and that facility improvements may be warranted.
. Trend plots were maintained on individual pages within the Safety Analysis Engineer's notebook. 4 a result, trend infonnation was not routinely j evaluated by other AMT members and trend information was disseminated only when requested by the TSC Operations Supervisor during briefings.
Nevertheless, the Safety Analysis Engineer seemed diligent in monitoring trends and reporting significant changes during briefings. AMT members suggested that trends plots could be projected on the wall- evaluators were unsure if they would be beneficial or a distraction to the rest of the TSC staff. The use of trend plots should be evaluated further during future drills. Page 5
. It was generally felt that the SPDS Operator required more specific direction ,
over the course of the drillwith regard to wiat parameters should be monitored and tracked. SPDS provides generic templates of key plant l
- parameters and it did not appear that the SPDS screens were routinely alternated and evaluated for changes or fully utilized to provide data for the AMT.
. SAGS were tracked by the TSC Operations Supervisor and Operations Liaison working in cooperation. This arrangement appeared effective and is preferable to that used during SAG validation, when the TSC Operations Supervisor and Emergency Coordinator were tracking the SAGS.
. Most activity centered around and was controlled by the TSC Operations Supervisor. This was probably appropriate since the TSC Operations Supervisor was the designated SAG Decision Maker and the focus of the drill was SAG and TSG use. However, there was less interaction between th'e Operations Supervisor and other team members than might have been expected. While communications were improved over that observed during validation, there seemed to be a tendency for the Operations Supervisorto become overly involved in discussions with the control room with a resulting adverse impact on TSC responsibilities and communications. At the same time, the communications between the control room and the TSC were judged to be a strength. Consideration might be given to using the Operations Liaison when direct communications are established with the control room, freeing the Operations Supervisor to become more intimately involved in'TSC operations.
. It was noted that restrictions on ERO staffing for the drill resulted in some communication paths not being available to the AMT, most notably the TSC-Control Room Communicator. Communications should continue to be evaluated closely during SAM drills to ensure that the AMT communicates effectively both intemally with the TSC staff and externally with the control room and other ERO locations.
. It was noted that communications between the Emergency Coordinator and TSC Operations Supervisor were sometimes inconsistent with regard to i priorities and actions being taken. The need for clear and effective communications should be stressed during subsequent training and continually be evaluated. It may be beneficial to have a standard briefing form prepared for the TSC Operations Supervisor to facilitate consistent and meaningful briefings (e.g., identify priorities, system utilization, significant changes in trends, SAG actions being taken, etc.)
AMT Actions l l
. SAG entry requirements were recognized by the control room and TSC l personnel and appropriately evaluated. The transition from EOPs to SAGS was smoothly effected.
Page 6
e The injection priorities defined by the SAGS were recognized and appropriately implemented by the AMT in each path of the SAGS exercised. The need for venting was properly evaluated and balanced against the ' potential for radioactivity release.
. The TSC Operations Supervisor provided periodic team briefings and all team members appeared to be aware of the plant status and their individual roles.
However, the TSC Operations Supervisor provided few explicit directions to other team members it was therefore not always clear that team objectives were clearly understood and that activities of the other team members were specifically directed towards support of required decisions. While detailed directions are deemed unnecessary within a well-functioning team, reviewing team objectives and necessary tasks would ensure that activities are properly directed and coordinated. .
. Following entry into Path #5 in the SAGS, the AMT began watching for signs of RPV breach by core debris, but there was no discussion ofinterim core states prior to breach. While core melt progression is not entirely clear and does not directly impact SAG strategies, recognition and consideration of the probable state of the core at a given time during the event may be useful in evaluating parameter trends and determining appropriate mitigative actions.
. There was some uncertainty on the part of 'MT members ts to whether a core breach had occurred. While the entry to SAG Path #1 may actually have been slightly premature, the uncertairities were fully discussed by the AMT and a conservative judgment made that was deemed to be appropriate given available information. The AMT members commented after the drill that previous training on core breach signature was good and useful in working through this complicated decision.
. There appeared to be some confusion over which containment water level indication to use and whether the containment was, in fact, filling. Initially, all actions and decisions were based upon the torus water level listed on the displayed paper data. Containment water level was not requested by the AMT because of their assumption that the data sheets provided by controllers provided all key data that they needed to evaluate. As a result, during one of l the time jumps, the AMT was surprised when it was reported that containment water level was at 56 feet. Several significant decisions, including the timing of containment venting, were potentially affected by this confusion. While the l situation may not have arisen if the nature of the paper drill data had been i more carefully described at the beginning of the drill, several important concems were identified that should be addressed during SAM training:
=> The expected response and limitations of torus water level instruments should be understood by the AMT.
=> As containment flooding progresses, monitoring and trending should shift to the wide-range containment water level instruments.
Page 7
- e. , . ,. - - . . . - . , - - . . . . , . . . , y ,. m.
a
=> Decisions should not be based upon any single instrument or source '
of data. Expected responses should be verified using multiple, diverse indications.
. The AMT noticed an apparent discrepancy between the injection rate and the flooding rate, as indicated on the torus water level instrument. Subsequent discussions with operators and AMT members indicated previous negative training on actual times required to flood the containment.
. An estimate of the expected change of containment water was requested by the AMT to engineering (simulated by the drill controller). It is recomme5ded that this correlation be developed and placed in the TSGs as an aid to the AMT. It might also be helpful to develop a calculational aid to predict the expected rate of pressure increase while flooding.
. At one point during the drill, there seemed to be confusion as to whether actions were being based upon drywell pressure or torus pressure. Standard terminology should be used during communications between AMT members to avoid such confusion. Use of the term " containment pressure" should probably be avoided within the context of SAG use since it is not clear whether drywell or torus pressure is of concem.
SAGS e it was the conclusion of drill participants and evaluators that the SAGS . provided necessary and appropriate guidance to mitigate the events encountered in the drill scenario. Human factor design considerations . associated with the format and structure of the SAGS appeared to be a strength and allowed the SAGS to be utilized effectively by the AMT.
. Both the farge, single page SAG 1 flowchart and the related 11x17 inch sets of the SAG flooding paths were utilized. The 11x17 inch sets of the SAG J flooding paths were not laminated or bound, making them difficult to use and tended to clutter the table used by the AMT. A decision should be made as to whether both presentation formats are useful. If the 11x17 inch sets of the SAG flooding paths will be used, they should be laminated and bound to facilitate their use and verified against SAG 1 to ensure that they are consistent and accurate.
. in Path # 1 of SAG 1, the " Containment Level /PresitJre Limits" block seemed to conflict with the Drywell Spray" bloci; un when to secure outside injection when related to the ability to maintain 53 psig. The wording of this instriJction and the coordination between the actions prescribed when containment level / pressure limits' are approached and those related to operation of ,
containment sprays should be reevaluated. l
. The reference to " Detail E" on SAG 3 should be eliminated. SAG 3 was, revised prior to the drill to reflect the recent implementation of NUMARC EALs
- when this change was made " Detail E" was eliminated. i Page 8 )
e, ,e . ., ,,w,e,,,..,,,, e,. ...,. .., oc - s,m.,
Containmentwaterlevel(wide-range)
=> Suppression Chamber pressure
=> The torus & drywell H2 & O2 chart needs to be separated into separate charts
=> The torus and drywell radiation chart needs to be separated into separate charts.
. A number of editorial enhancements were identified in the TSG reference manual (e.g., Table 6.1-2 refers to O psig for DW Spray Termination verses 2 psig). A complete set of these comments are provided in the evaluator report provided by E. Bums and J. Gabor.
. The DW Spray discussion and pro / con table should be revised to reflect restrictions on system use due to the torus cooling interlock.
. It was recommended that additional TSG aids / guidance be developed to identify operational restrictions and limitations associated with flooding (e.g.,
the need to isolate or transfer CAM sample lines prior to the lines being flooded, loss of H2/02 monitoring when sample lines are covered, loss of purge / vent / CAD capability when associated penetrations are covered, etc.).
. As noted previously, it may be beneficial to have a standard briefing form prepared for the TSC Operations Supervisor to facilitate consistent and meaningful briefings (e.g., identify priorities, system utilization, significant
, changes in trends, SAG actions being taken, etc.) l l l l Page 9 e,m..s ..,- --...-..,--. ,,,...., -. - . . .
a Recommendations and Follow.-Up Actions: , Requests for follow-up action to address concems identified during the drill critique have been identified below. Action Request (AR) 98-0377 has been generated to allow the drill critique report to be filed for historical purposes. It is requested that Emergency Planning evaluete comments in the drill critique summary to identify lessons learned and good practices that may be of benefit during future SAM training and drills. Lessons leamed from this drill should be reviewed with the AMT during future SAM drills and training. Addendum ARs have been generated to apply the appropriate resources to resolution of the identified concem as noted below:
. Consideration should be given to performing an integrated drill with full TSC and ERO staffing to more fully assess the integration of SAMG and AMT responsibilities into the existing ERO structure. AR 98-0377.01 has been assigned to Emergency Planning to determine the need for an integrated SAM drill.
. The TSC facilities should be evaluated and modified to provide a better laydown space for the EOPs and SAGS. Considering that the SAGS may potential be used to direct plant operations, having the SAGS stacked on the floor is not deemed prudent. Option that should be considered are: locate another table behind the Operations Liaison for the fiswcharts, mount the flowcharts on the wall, build a slanted laydown area in the TSC (similar to that in the main control room) where the EOPs and SAGS could be stored and used - this could be a relatively inexpensive structure made by the carpenters.
AR 98-0377.02 has been assigned to Emergency Planning to determine the need for an integrated SAM drill. ,
. Evaluate possible enhancements to communications and the conduct of briefings between AMT members and between the TSC Operations Supervisor and Emergency Coordinator. Briefings should be held frequiently enough to assess changing plant conditions and should identify priorities, system utilization, parameters that should be closely monitored, significant changes in trends, etc. Enhancements may include greater emphasis in training, additional practice during training drills, or the development of checklists to facilitate consistent and meaningful briefings. AR 98-0377.03 has been assigned to the SAM Project Team to evaluate this recommendation.
- Consideration should be given to using the Operations Liaison when direct communications are established with the control room, freeing the Operations Supervisor to become more intimately involved in TSC operations. This may be evaluated further during future SAM training drills to determine whether changes should be made. AR 98-0377.04 has been assigned to the SAM Project Team to evaluate this recommendation.
Page 10 m,m s , w e,tir, vin e,1 i.uw., . m = . wr mi
. A TSG aid should be developed that correlates the expected change of containment water at representative flooding rates. Consideration should also be given towards developing a calculational aid to predict the expected rate of pressure increase while flooding. AR 98-0377.05 has been assigned to the SAM Project Team to ensure that this concern is addressed in training.
. A TSG aid should be developed to identify operational restrictions and limitations associated with flooding (e.g., the need to isolate or transfer Containment Atmosphere Monitoring (CAM) sample lines prior to them being flooded, loss of H2/02 monitoring when sample lines are covered, loss of purge / vent capability when associated penetrations are covered, etc.). AR 98-0377.06 has been assigned to the SAM Project Team to ensure that this concem is addressed in training.
. The 11x17 inch sets of the respective SAG flooding paths should be laminated and bound to facilitate their use. In addition, the 11x17 inch sets of the respective SAG flooding paths should be compared against SAG 1 to ensure that they are consistent. AR 98-0377.07 has been assigned to SAM Team to verify and prepare these documents.
. SAG and TSG training should emphasize the following instrumentation concerns:
=> Expected response and limitations of torus water levelinstruments.
=:> Necessity to shift monitoring and trending from the torus to the wide-range containment water level instruments as containment floodi,ng progresses.
=> Not making decisions based upon any single instrument or source of data. Expected responses should be verified using multiple, diverse indications.
AR 98-0377.08 has been assigned to the SAM Project Team to ensure that this concern is addressed in training. Recommended changes to SAGS /TSGs have already been documented, are currently being addressed by the SAM Project Team, and do not require ARs to track their resolution. Assessments performed by the SAM Project Team during project closure will ensure that lessons learned have been addressed prior to completion of the SAM Project. In addition, QA will perform independent reviews of corrective action results and document their assessments in Quarterly QA Surveillance Reports. Page 11 cm s ,- e.3,,.--,, c,, , , , , . . , ~ ,, m. ,
.O l
ec: (w/ attachments) , B. Wohlers, K. Morgan, Documaster , cc' (w/o attachments) J. Franz, D. Wilson, G. Van Middlesworth, R. Anderson, M. McDermott, K. Young, K. Peveler, D. Curtland, J. Van Sickel, J. Kalamaja, J. Kartick, l C. Sullivan, M. Davis, M. Brandt, B. Hopkins, D. Woodward, M. Pettengill, T. Evans, D. Jantosik, R. Palla (US NRC), D. Desaulniers (US NRC), J. O'Brien (US NRC), J. Foster (US NRC), Emerson (NEI), B, Lutz (Westinghouse), BWROG EPC Distribution Page 12 co et s ,,wn c,Tir, Tin c,T useerin oc, 7T wHu
i n DrillSelf-Assessment ATTACHMENT 1 Self-Assessment of Accident Manaoement Pilot Demonstration _ Drill (2/6/98) Performed by TSC Staff and Control Room Staff EC: Gary Van Middlesworth Will develop standardized briefing forms from EC/ OPS Supervisor to Security, Health Physics NRC, others. This would be meant to improve communication within the TSC. OPS Suoervisor Mike Davis Summary of Drill
. Started with small break
. Began shutdown
~
- Initiated torus cooling and drywell spray (split flow) e Large break occurred shutdown process
. HPCl/RCIC tripped e Low pressure inject valves failed closed
, . TSC allowed time for EOPs to recover level l
- Then concluded shift to SAG was necessary l e Used Leg 5 of SAG e Waited until vessel breach to shift strategies
. Entered Leg 1 of SAG e Monitored levelincrease Discussed early vent Decided to wait for vent 1 c1249704-3282 02/10/96 ;
92/PI'cl 0300 S3III1I1n S3I WdEP:TO 86, 21 80W
I , l DrillSelf-Assessment I
. Monitored levelincrease
- Discussed early vent Decided th wait for vent Comments
. Containment water level was misleading to the AMT
. Communication to Control Room was excellent
. Projections were excellent I
. AMT was very supportive of decisions that I (OPS Supervisor) needed to make OPS Liaison: No Comments l
Shift Manaoer: J hn VanSickle
. Tough playing the scenario after the simulator was not used (i.e., after
- 30 min.) I
. EOP informatiol n chart updates would be desirable sample linds .
(This is consid,ered useful, but minor enhancement.) 1
. Time to raise level in containment appeared to be much too short I
(Time jump may not have been obviously interpreted in estimating level increase,) SPDS Operator I
.. Thought Controllers had corrupted SPDS operator access to his software prog /am for control parameter assessment
{ Safety Analysis Enoineer: I l . Containment Pressure vs. Torus Pressure was confusing i,n l communicating data with AMT 2 C1249704-32'82 02/1W98 92/ST'd t 3300 S3IIIII1n 53I WdEP:TO 96, 2T hl0W 'l o
s i DrillSelf-Assessment
. Tools were being used effectively Some additional plots would be useful to add to the TSG tools Manaaer EP: Paul Sullivan Instrumentation anomalies were considered and AMT should be able to cope with them Controller Jim Kalamala Simulator actions were performed effectively and efficiently. Even actions after the simulator was out of play were performed D
I I e 4 e 9 3 C1249704 3282 02/10/96 l ,, , ow e 3, .,, m -- ... ~.+e ~ -- * * > ' t.
Attachment 2 PILOTDEMONSTRATION DRILL
SUMMARY
e r l l 4
'4 C7 / > T
- J ... .
**ud ***e***ia , . , ,, _ ,,,
A Drill Observation Summan P! LOT DEMO DRILL DRILL SCENARIO
SUMMARY
RESULTS _TSC Crew _ Gary VanMiddlesworth' Plant Manager (EC) Mike Davis Operations Supervisor Merle Pettengal Operations Liaison Brad Hopkins SAE AMT EVALUATIONS Matt Brandt RE Richard Woodward SPDS , Initial Setu_g 06:30 Noted rise in dry well temperature pressure 06:45-07:00 Fast power reduction PCIS isolation has occurred 07:05 Entered EOP-2 on 2# 07:10 EAL declar'ed: ALERT- CALL OUT THE TSC EOP Action Summary to OPS Liaison (1) EALs resulted in ALERT (2) Pressure set down to 700 lb. (3) Torus cooling in service (4) Bypassed H2/02analyzers isolation interlock (5) Were venting until PCIS closed isolation lines (no radiation) 1 1249704-3286 02/13/98 47fot*A 9"*'" C"JT ' T7T ' n e77 i u** . m oc et w'
d Drill Observation Summary 07:53
. SPDS Operator: Attempting to establish the data logging and trencling.
. TSC is opemtional and in communication with control room
. Simulator frozen
. Communication via headphone between Shift Manager (CR) and Operations Supervisor. (TSC)
. Priorities for TSC & OSC solicited from Shift Manager By OPS Supervisor.
Restore condensate /feedwater to service Establish cooldown for RPV e Consideration regarding circulating water and losing it - open circuit failure
. Bypass valves are closed (some question about this)
EC: Established communication with control room 08:07 Simulator out of freeze 08:11 Big loads off non-essential buses not there (SAE asked and discussed with AMT) AMT Briefino Drywell pressure is rising, but still in EOPs; control room has control; no major concems identified. Status: 08:16 RPV injection - 1 CRD pump I
.CS run on min flow RHR on torus cooling 2 suero4-32es onnme es ce a m m e,rit, vin est us~~ . m oc se ma
e 3 Drill Observation Summary RCIC has not been used Both condensate pumps are unavailable (Never appear to tell that drywell sprays are being used) 08:21 Drywell radiation monitor not operational- asking for readout SPDS Operator has not established data trending capability 08:22 Rx level drops ldsntified the LOCA Core uncovered l Drywell pressure 14 psig inject valves don't open .
]
Try to manually open l l (Did not appear to identify or discuss the drywell pressure and temperature trace; SPDS was available to provide information to AMT) RCIC/HPCI Tripped i 08:29 Check SAT cuive for instrumentation l General Emergency Declared ' RE (Matt Brandt) identified to AMT that RPV breach could occur in 40 minutes. I Mike Davis deferred to control room. 1 08:27 Briefing EC 08:29 Trying to get LPCl injection valves open . Trying to get condensate pump started i Failing both of these then: Fuel failure is imminent RPV breach within 40 minutes Level indicators are judged to be suspect 3 1249704-3286 42/13/98 anny ,e - w" "'' *** "'-- ~~ -~ '
0 Drill Observation Summary 08:32 Meet entry into SAG (recognition at 10 minutes) Making transition Torus Sprays have been initiated Drywell Done smoothly The flow split between torus and drywell are not identified to AMT. 08:33 OSC sent to get BORON and tank filled 08:34 OPS Supervisor moved directly to Leg 5 because all level indicators are downscale and no foreseeable opportunity to recoverlevel
. Priority Torus level < 13.8 feet Have sprayed -wateris on floor Will pursue aligning exterior sources Status of Instrumentation RPV waterlevel downscale 08:38 Requested RPV pressure reading RE (Matt) at 5 psig - 6 RE (Matt) asked for bottom head temperature OPS Liaison (Merie)- asked about RHRSW injection .
RE (Matt) is reporting drywell radiation SAE'(Brad) plotting H2in torus and drywell 08:45 Will raise level to 13 feet in torus Asked about spraying Willinitiate drywell sprays OPS Liaison (Merte) wants to vent torus to stay below PSP
- Aligning extemal sources 4
1249704-320'6 02/13/98 l g,7 . g vswa esviv, vin e,v e u-~ . m ee >v ww' e
l' 4 i Drill ObservationEummary Spray have just been initiated Willlook at RPV breach signature 8:50 Drywell radiation will be used to estimate fuel damage (Reactor Engineer) RAD in drywelli and torus Looking at possibility of vent Pass sample requested Drywell pressure noted 7 psig (vent not necessary) Recommended 2 mile evacuation - Controller Reviewing SAG-3 08:55 Want to refill SLC 08:57 Switch to paper data occurs (simulator tumed off) H2analyzers switched from alignment on SPDS 09:00 Operations Supervisor Continue in' Leg S PSP ok ' Fuel damaged (H2 and RAD) RPV intact (signature being tracked) Water on drywell floor Injecting into containment from outside
- Will secure at 13 feet Instrument techs backfilled reference legs Need bottom head temperature (request made by SAE/RE)
H2is being monitored in torus RAD is higherin drywell Asked about instrument problems Operations Liaison - Don't vent for H2 if RAD too high l .: S 124s704-3266 42/13/96 l
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Drill Observation Summary Do want spray on 09:04 Operations Supervisor want to stay on main Boron tank and shoot more Boron. 09:08 New data RHRSW injection being terminated based on torus water level (at 12.9 feet)
- Will continue to spray from toms SAE (Brad) anticipating vent for pressure
- Mike says not yet needed SPDS Operator efficient at providing all data requested 09:17 Declared RPV breach, based on high bottom head temperature Entered Leg for RPV breach Maximize injection flow from extemal sources Maximize drywell sprays OPS Liaison wants to vent torus if this will make vent later better ,
PSAP can estimate the release 1500 ci/see offgas will exceed EPA limits (noted by AMT) Sprays above may not maintain pressure Trying to decide on whether to vent torus 09:32 Wind blowing towards Cedar Rapids deferring vent decision until 53 psig Will not vent RPV per SAGS 9:41 Brief - 8800 gpm RHRSW (74*F) RPV breached declared at 0917 Drywell pressure may be decreasing Not considering venting 6 1249704-32es-02/13/98 e , ,e-, . ; s w e,...,,,e r-- ...,~..e -- - m. j
t i DrillObservation Summary Wind is blowing toward Cedar Rapids Hydrogen is high 2 trigger points for venting
- H,/0,> limits
- 53 psig Vent not considered option at this point -
09:42 " Analyzer" H2 upscale high Investigating MDRIR flow rate 9:45 injecting into containment OPS Liaison (Merie) is concemed about conflict between inflow and rise in torus level (50,000 gallons) SAE (Brad) is evaluating - requested engineering calculations to assure no loss of water. 09:59 Asked to have correlation between torus level and containment water level, This was provided. 14 feet- narrow range 14.1 feet - containment level 10:00 Briefing Maximized drywell sprayinjection Injecting from SBLC At 83.5 feet will transfer to data path Monitoring for potential to vent in future Containment pressure H,/02 limits 7 1249704-3266 42/13/95
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t a f DrillObservation Summary TIME JUMP AT 10:00 to 11:00 1 11:05
- Holding off venting because low level and evacuation estimated complete at 12 noon
- Containment pressure at 24 psig
- Trending information being done Not expecting pressure to exceed 53 psig in 4 hours (Based on LOCA trace in TSG tools)
- Haven't asked for containment water level 11:18
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- Appears to have asked for cont. wl and told it's 15.8 feet from the "SPDS" data (Comment: Need to have plant system status board active during drill),
Engineering calculation torus water level never came back to provide guidance to amount of water injected Difference between the drywell prest,ure and toms pressure was discussed - no corrosion 11:20 Pdor to 16 Feet Vent the torus Should ese hard pipe vent if available (rupture disks) 0 Otherwise vent drywell
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11.25 Containment WL reported at 56 feet - therefore can't vent torus Will vent drywell Dick Woodward (SPDS Operator) projected 53 psig at 11:35 Control Room should have volunteered info on cont. waterlevel 8 1agro4 3286.c2n3/9e opfc7.s %,wa e,,..,v m es,.. *.., m - . . wv.
t 4 Drill Observation Summary Brief Expect to vent at 53 psig regardless of evacuation. Watering until last possible time before vent is undertaken. Using the drywell vent. Requested the containment water level. 11:35 53.6 psig
- Said start venting Opened vent valves in drywell No direction given on what procedure to use or what control ban'd to use")
Prep to vent not fully discussed Contamination expected in RB Withdrew team from Rb 11:40 Drill concluded N Subsequent discussions with Jim Kalamaja (Controller in the Simulator) indicated that the Operations Supervisor and the Shift Manager had extensive discussions regarding venting and control of the vent. This discussion was not obvious to the controllers in the TSC. The discussion concluded that a control band of 45-50 psig would be used per the SEP. i 9 1249704-3286 02/13/98 ce,c . ,,wa eariv, vin e, vive ~.m oc vwi}}