05000458/FIN-2012009-07: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 93800 | | Inspection procedure = IP 93800 | ||
| Inspector = S Graves, S Garchow, G Miller, S Alferink, V Gaddya, | | Inspector = S Graves, S Garchow, G Miller, S Alferink, V Gaddya, Barrettb Tindell, E Uribe, B Hagar | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = The team identified an unresolved item associated with the licensees implementation of Procedure EN-OM-119, Onsite Safety Review Committee, Revision 8. The function of the onsite safety review committee was to provide an independent review by site management personnel to assure the plant is operated and maintained in accordance with the operating license and applicable regulations. Items typically reviewed by the committee include plant modifications, procedure changes, license amendment requests, and plant restart issues following a planned or unplanned outage. The team observed a meeting of the onsite safety review committee on May 31, 2012, prior to restart of the plant following the May 24 event. The team identified several cases where the information provided to the committee members prior to the meeting was incomplete or out-of-date, or new information was provided to the committee members and evaluated during the meeting. Examples of issues observed by the team included: The document provided to the committee members describing the main feed pump motor failure had not been updated to reflect information gathered through discussions with the vendor and a visit to the vendor facility by River Bend personnel, or information involving inspection criteria developed during a conference call with other Entergy plants. This information was provided during the meeting and affected the conclusions in the document associated with the cause of the failure and extent of condition inspections. The committee members were not provided the revised version of the data package assembled using Procedure GOP-003, Scram Recovery, Revision 22, from the May 24 scram event which had been submitted to the committee for approval. The document describing the results of the lockout relay failure investigation did not include information about extent-of-condition testing conducted during the two days prior to the meeting, which had included four additional relay failures. During the committee review of the cable splice failure, additional relevant information from ongoing extent-of-condition inspections in underground cable vaults was provided directly to the committee members for evaluation during the meeting. The document provided to the committee members for the reactor core isolation cooling system inadvertent isolation event on May 21 did not include information on the modification that had been developed to resolve the spurious isolation issue. The modification had already been installed in the plant. The 50.59 evaluation with associated engineering package for the installed modification was provided to the committee members for review and approval during the meeting. Part of the onsite safety review committee restart review included a review of issues categorized as degraded or nonconforming. The list of degraded or nonconforming conditions provided to the committee members for review had not been updated since the reactor scram on May 21. The committee directed the presenter to update the list with justification for why the items had not been completed, noting the difficulty of scheduling corrective actions in the current outage given the incremental increase in scope of the outage. The team determined the poor quality of the information packages provided to the onsite safety review committee for review required the committee to perform or direct the work of the line organization to obtain the information. This appeared to be contrary to procedure and had the potential to hinder the effectiveness of the committee in providing an independent review function. The team considered the independent review function to be an important means to verify the effectiveness of safety-significant decisions and to clearly demonstrate nuclear safety as an overriding priority in decision-making. The team concluded additional inspection is required to assess the effectiveness of the stations implementation of the procedure for the onsite safety review committee | | description = The team identified an unresolved item associated with the licensees implementation of Procedure EN-OM-119, Onsite Safety Review Committee, Revision 8. The function of the onsite safety review committee was to provide an independent review by site management personnel to assure the plant is operated and maintained in accordance with the operating license and applicable regulations. Items typically reviewed by the committee include plant modifications, procedure changes, license amendment requests, and plant restart issues following a planned or unplanned outage. The team observed a meeting of the onsite safety review committee on May 31, 2012, prior to restart of the plant following the May 24 event. The team identified several cases where the information provided to the committee members prior to the meeting was incomplete or out-of-date, or new information was provided to the committee members and evaluated during the meeting. Examples of issues observed by the team included: The document provided to the committee members describing the main feed pump motor failure had not been updated to reflect information gathered through discussions with the vendor and a visit to the vendor facility by River Bend personnel, or information involving inspection criteria developed during a conference call with other Entergy plants. This information was provided during the meeting and affected the conclusions in the document associated with the cause of the failure and extent of condition inspections. The committee members were not provided the revised version of the data package assembled using Procedure GOP-003, Scram Recovery, Revision 22, from the May 24 scram event which had been submitted to the committee for approval. The document describing the results of the lockout relay failure investigation did not include information about extent-of-condition testing conducted during the two days prior to the meeting, which had included four additional relay failures. During the committee review of the cable splice failure, additional relevant information from ongoing extent-of-condition inspections in underground cable vaults was provided directly to the committee members for evaluation during the meeting. The document provided to the committee members for the reactor core isolation cooling system inadvertent isolation event on May 21 did not include information on the modification that had been developed to resolve the spurious isolation issue. The modification had already been installed in the plant. The 50.59 evaluation with associated engineering package for the installed modification was provided to the committee members for review and approval during the meeting. Part of the onsite safety review committee restart review included a review of issues categorized as degraded or nonconforming. The list of degraded or nonconforming conditions provided to the committee members for review had not been updated since the reactor scram on May 21. The committee directed the presenter to update the list with justification for why the items had not been completed, noting the difficulty of scheduling corrective actions in the current outage given the incremental increase in scope of the outage. The team determined the poor quality of the information packages provided to the onsite safety review committee for review required the committee to perform or direct the work of the line organization to obtain the information. This appeared to be contrary to procedure and had the potential to hinder the effectiveness of the committee in providing an independent review function. The team considered the independent review function to be an important means to verify the effectiveness of safety-significant decisions and to clearly demonstrate nuclear safety as an overriding priority in decision-making. The team concluded additional inspection is required to assess the effectiveness of the stations implementation of the procedure for the onsite safety review committee | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 19:47, 20 February 2018
| Site: | River Bend  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000458/2012009 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
| Type: | URI: |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 93800 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | S Graves S Garchow G Miller S Alferink V Gaddya Barrettb Tindell E Uribe B Hagar |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |