05000298/FIN-2012007-03: Difference between revisions
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (Created page by program invented by StriderTol) |
||
| Line 15: | Line 15: | ||
| CCA = N/A for ROP | | CCA = N/A for ROP | ||
| INPO aspect = | | INPO aspect = | ||
| description = The team identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix 8, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, which states, in part, measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and non-conformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. Specifically, in 2005, the licensee performed a review of the c swing battery charger disconnect switch fuses and their ratings, documented in Condition Report CR-CNS-2005-09378. However, the actions associated with this Condition Report did not evaiuate the Updated Safety Analysis Report emergency event function which states that each battery charger shall have adequate capacity to restore its battery to full charge from a totally discharged condition while carrying the normal station steady state direct current load. This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 2012-01 1 The team determined that the failure to adequately assess all design requirements during the review of Condition Report CR-CNS-2005-09378 was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the team determined that the finding represented a loss of system safety function requiring a Phase 2 evaluation. The Region IV Senior Reactor Analyst concluded that a Phase 3 evaluation was needed to address the issue because it departed from the guidance provided for Phase 1 or Phase 2. Using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, and Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model, the Senior Reactor Analyst identified that the frequency of events where the defective swing charger would affect core damage sequences were very low, that a station blackout restored by offsite power within one hour would not be expected to result in a failure of the swing charger, and it would be likely that the other battery charger would successfully charge the associated direct current bus and battery and result in a successful recovery. Therefore, the issue was determined to have very low significance (Green). This finding did not have a crosscutting aspect because the most significant contributor did not reflect current licensee performance. | | description = The team identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix 8, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, which states, in part, measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and non-conformances are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action taken to preclude repetition. Specifically, in 2005, the licensee performed a review of the c swing battery charger disconnect switch fuses and their ratings, documented in Condition Report CR-CNS-2005-09378. However, the actions associated with this Condition Report did not evaiuate the Updated Safety Analysis Report emergency event function which states that each battery charger shall have adequate capacity to restore its battery to full charge from a totally discharged condition while carrying the normal station steady state direct current load. This finding was entered into the licensee\'s corrective action program as Condition Report 2012-01 1 The team determined that the failure to adequately assess all design requirements during the review of Condition Report CR-CNS-2005-09378 was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the team determined that the finding represented a loss of system safety function requiring a Phase 2 evaluation. The Region IV Senior Reactor Analyst concluded that a Phase 3 evaluation was needed to address the issue because it departed from the guidance provided for Phase 1 or Phase 2. Using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, and Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) model, the Senior Reactor Analyst identified that the frequency of events where the defective swing charger would affect core damage sequences were very low, that a station blackout restored by offsite power within one hour would not be expected to result in a failure of the swing charger, and it would be likely that the other battery charger would successfully charge the associated direct current bus and battery and result in a successful recovery. Therefore, the issue was determined to have very low significance (Green). This finding did not have a crosscutting aspect because the most significant contributor did not reflect current licensee performance. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 19:47, 20 February 2018
| Site: | Cooper  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000298/2012007 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | V Ferrarini R Kopriva T Farnholtz S Garchow R Latta B Correll G Morris M Williams |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |