ML18038A078

Control Sys Common Sensor Line Failure Analysis Evaluation Rept for Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 2.

ML18038A078
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	07/31/1985
From:	Bennett D GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML18038A077	List: ML18038A076 ML18038A078 ML18038A079
References
CON-IIT07-450-91, CON-IIT7-450-91 NUREG-1455, NUDOCS 8511070124
Download: ML18038A078 (142)

Text

CONTROL SYSTEMS COMMON SENSOR LINE FAIIURE ANALYSIS EVALUATION REPORT FOR NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 2 JULY 1985 PREPARED FOR NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER COMPANY 852i070i24 85ii04 PDR ADQCK 050004i0 E PDR

CONTROL SYSTEMS COMMON SENSOR LINE FAIIURE ANALYSIS EVALUATION REPORT FOR NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 2 JULY 1985 PREPARED FOR NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER COMPANY PREPARED BY D. E. BENNETT GENERAL ELECTRlC COMPANY NUCLEAR ENERGY BUSINESS OPERATIONS SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA 95125 APPROVED BY:

el~~/s-)

A. Koslov, Technical Leader - Regulatory Compliance Engineering Nuclear Services Products Department M. A. Smith, Manager - Regulatory Compliance Engineering Nuclear Services Products Department E. C.

F E+Echert, Manager g/Md~

- Plant Operational Performance Engineering Plant Performance Engineering C

C ..Yin Project Licensing Engineering Safety 'n Xicensing Operation 12-2534 1

CONTROL SYSTEMS COMMON SENSOR LINE FAIIURE ANALYSIS EVALUATION REPORT FOR NINE MILE POINT NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 2 The information contained herein, supplemented by the existing FSAR Chapter 15 transient analyses, documents an evaluation of the Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 2 control systems interaction due to a common sensor line failure.

l. 0 PURPOSE The general purpose of the Common Sensor Line Failure Analysis was to review the failure events of non-safety grade Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit 2 (NMP2) control systems which utilize common sensor lines or sensor signals. The specific purpose of the analysis and this report.

was to supplement the existing NMP2 FSAR Chapter 15 Accident Analyses and respond to the NRC's NMP2 FSAR Question 421.42 concerns pertaining to the failure of,a common sensor line and sensors.

2.0 CONCLUSION

The conclusion of this evaluation is that the limits of minimum critical power ratio (MCPR), peak vessel and main steamline pressures, and peak fuel cladding temperature for the expected operational occurrence category of the identified events would not be exceeded as a result of a common sensor line failure. Although transient category events have been postulated as a result of this study, the net effects have been determined to be less severe than and bounded by the events in Chapter 15.

3.0 ANAIYSIS METHODOLOGY In conjuction with the NMP-2 Control Systems Common Power Source Failure Analysis (CPA) portion of the overall NMP2 Control Systems Failure Analysis Program, a comprehensive approach was developed and implemented to address the general purpose of the analyses as well as the specific NRC NMP2 FSAR Question 421.42 concerns. The activity list, Table 1.1, and following descriptions highlight the methodology used to perform the analysis.

It should be noted that this study used the event-consequence logic of the NMP2 FSAR Chapter 15 analysis, but it started the logic chain from a specific source (e.g., a single common sensor line failure) rather than a system condition (e.g., feedwater runout). By approaching the study in this manner, a great deal of confidence can be placed in the study conclusions. The soundness of the total plant design is demonstrated by its being tolerant of these effects.

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3.1 System Identification The scope of control systems to be analyzed was established by first compiling a complete list of the Nine Sile Point Nuclear Station Unit 2 systems and subsystems. Next, the list was reviewed to confine the analysis to only those systems which, in their normal (automatic, available) control mode, have the potential to affect reactor pressure if vessel (RPV) pressure, water level, or power level changes.

3.1.1 All the HMP2 plant instrumentation and control systems were identified, listed, and agreed upon as complete by the two principal analyzing engineer groups, i.e., General Electric Company (GE) and Stone and Webster Engineering Corporation (SWEC).

.3.1.2 System and component elimination criteria (see Table 1.4) were 'derived and agreed upon by the principals to delete non-electrical, non-opera-tional, or non-control systems or components (including some previously analyzed systems and components already addressed in FSAR Chapter 15) from the systems identified in 3.1.1 above (see Tables 1.2 and 1.3). If there was. any uncertainty as to whether or not a system met, the criteria, it was retained for further analysis. Those systems that met the criteria for elimination were so noted in the complete system list, leaving the remaining control systems to be analyzed.

3.2 Commmon Sensor Line or Sensor Identification The Common Sensor Failuxe Analysis portion of the Control Systems Failure Analyses then identified strategic reactor process sensor lines or sensors commonly shared by two or more plant systems, at least one system of which was a non-safety grade system identified in Section 3.1.2 above.

3.3 Failure @pe Determination Based on conservative assumptions, a complete and instantaneous sensor line break or plug during normal, full power reactor operation was detexmined to be the bounding failure types for each sensor line analyzed.

3.4 Definitions E Common Instrument Line: A line providing a process pressure signal to two or more instrument sensors (pressure to electrical current instru-ment, P/I, transmitters) which serve two or more instrument systems, of which at least one system is a non-safety grade control system, e.g.,

Feedwater Control System (C33).

Common Instrument Sensor: An instrument sensor which provides inputs to two or more instrument systems, of which at least one system is a non-safety grade system.

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Line Failure Types:

Broken: An instantaneous instrument line break (guillotine break) that vents to an ambient pressure (near atmospheric pressure) environment.

Plugged: An instantaneous instrument line plug (complete blockage, pinch) maintaining as-failed line pressure at the instrument sensor and essentially inhibiting any monitoring change, especially actual process, vessel, or line parameter changes.

Note: In the case of di fferential pressure sensing instruments monitoring reactor pressure vessel water level, a plugged reference or variable line could result in,a more complex response. The conservative response, however, is still an inhibited response, i.e., no actions would occur.

Primary Effects: The specifically identified direct, instantaneous effects, if any, on the sensor or component resulting from the failure.

Usually, the sensed input signal to the sensor component goes to a minimum or maximum value or, in the case of a sensor line plug, remains relatively constant at an inaccurate (as-failed) value, insensitive to any actual process changes.

Secondary Effects: The indirect effect, instantaneous or delayed, if any, on the specifically identified sensor or prominent subsequent instrument loop components, i.e., indicators, trip units (trips, permis-sives, initiators), controls {controllers, valves), or devices (relays or lights).

RPV Liquid Level Pressure or Power Level Effects: Any actual or pro-bable reactor pressure vessel liquid level, pressure or power level change directly or indirectly attributable to the identified failure and component actions or inactions.

I Combined Effects: The systematic evaluation of the identified lines and sensors primary and secondary effects and the resulting action(s), if any, which would most likely result as a direct accumulation of each, or all, sensor failures and RPV pressure, liquid, and power level change effects on plant performance.

3.5 Line-Group and Component Tabulation and Failure Analysis The sensor instrumentation directly connected to and receiving an input signal from the identified sensing line or sensor were individually identified, grouped, listed, and analyzed to determine what, if action would result from the occurrence of each line/sensor failure type any, described in Section 3.3. The primary, secondary, and RPV parameter change effects, if any, were then identified, analyzed, and tabulated.

Note: Because signals from these common lines and sensors were fre-quently utilized by components previously deleted as part of .step 3.1.2 above, for completeness, these and questionable, non-safety or control components were retained in the analysis groups.

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3.6 Combined Failure Effect Analysis The components and their failure effects identified in Section 3.5 were evaluated and reviewed for cumulative effects by the principal parties to identify the prime component and combined component failure event scenarios listed and discussed in the Common Sensor Iine Failure Analy-sis and Evaluation Suassary, Table 1.5, and more comprehensively in the Sensor Line Failure Analysis load sheets, Appendix A. 'ommon 3.7 Comparison of Analysis Result to FSAR Chapter 15 The consequences of the postulated failures and their associated process disturbances. were compared to the consequence of the. events analyses described in NMP2 FSAR Chapter 15. Where the Chapter 15 event descrip-tion contained consequences of the postulated failure, the Chapter 15 event was considered to bound the postulated failures.

4.0 ADDITIONAL SINGLE FAIIURE IN AN ACCIDENT MITIGATING SAFETY SYSTEM 4.1 Subsequent to completing the Common Sensor Failure Analysis evaluations, each postulated failure was reviewed to conservatively select a specific sensor line failure which, in combination with an additional single component failure in a reactor accident mitigating safety system, would result in a "worst case" failure event not previously identified.

Because an RPV Line 3 break, unlike a Line 2 or 4 break (see Table 1.5),

would not normally lead to a relatively prompt reactor scram, but like Lines 2 and' interfaces with multiple strategic instruments and systems, this line in combination with the additional single component failure described below was postulated as the "worst case" identified failure.

Concurrent with the Line 3 failure event described in Table 1.5, the RPV level sensor B22-N080B is assumed to fail upscale, inhibiting a Divi-sion 2, RPS Channel B low RPV water level 3 reactor scram (see Appen-dix A). This RPS Channel B inhibit, together with a postulated single upscale failure of the RPV level sensor B22-N080D (on Line 5), which inhibits a Division 4, RPS Channel D low RPV water level 3 reactor scram, would preclude the initiation of a low RPV water level 3 reactor scram from occurring as indicated in Table 1.5.

4.1.2 While the actual RPV water level decrease would continue, activating low RPV water level 4 and 3 alarms, the normally expected low water level 4 reactor recirculation pumps and flow runback, being a function of the selected failed Line 3 feedwater control RPV level sensor C33-N004B high level signal, would not occur. Under these conditions, the NMP2 plant emergency procedures would specifically direct an operator to insert the reactor control rods via manually initiating a complete RPS trip.

Continued operator inaction would lead to automatic protection when the water level reaches low RPV level 2. At this level, the Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) feature will be initiated providing full control rod insertion and reactor shutdown.

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4 4.2 The additional single failure analysis results were evaluated and compared. with the FSAR Chapter 15 analyses. No single completely bounding failure was identified. The postulated double failure, i.e.,

lin>> failure and device failure occurrence, similar to other selected highly unlikely double failure occurrences, was not specifically addressed in Chapter 15.

4.3 While the NMP2 FSAR Chapter 15 did not directly address the above described postulated failure event, the responses to NRC's previous NHP2 FSAR Question 42] 2'I and the RP2 Safety Evaluation (SER)

Section 7.2.2.7 do satisfactorily address similar events.

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P TABLE I.l CONTRO~. SYSTEMS COMMON SENSOR LINE FAILURE ANALYSIS ACTIVITIES AND ASSIGNMENTS NO. ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION SECTION ASSIGNMENT I. System Identification 3.1 GE and SWEC

2. Common Sensor Line or Sensor 3.2 GE and SPEC Identification

3. Failure Type Determination 3.3

4. Line-Group and Component Tabula- 3.5 GE and SPEC tion and Failure Analysis

5. Combined Failure Effect Analysis 3.6

6. Comparison of Analysis Results 3.7 GE to FSAR Chapter 15, and 3.8 Exceptions

7. Additional Siugle Failure in an 4.0 .GE Accident Mitigating Safety System

8. Major Event Resolution and 2.0 Chapter 15 Modification (if required)

9. Draft and Final Report Compiling 12-2493 (1)

J TABLE 1.2 CONTROL SYSTEMS FAIIURE ANALYSES IDENTIFICATION AND ELIMINATION OF SYSTEMS FOR THE COMMON POWER SOURCE AND COMMON SENSOR OR SENSOR LINE FAIIURE ANALYSES NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY (NSS) SYSTEMS SCOPE SYSTEM ID SYSTEM DESCRIPTION ELIMINATION CODE+

B13 Reactor Nl, N2 B22 Nuclear Boiler B22A Process Instrumentation N3, N4 B22B Jet Pump Instrumentation N2 B22C Auto Depressurization N6 B22H Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff N6 B35 Reactor Recirculation None C12A Reactor Manual Control None C12B Control Rod Drive Hydraulic None C22 Reduadant Reactivity Contzol N6 C33 Feedwater Control None C41 Standby Liquid Contxol N6 C51 Neutron Monitoring C51A Startup Range Monitoring N3 C51B Power Range Monitoring None C51C Startup Range Detector Drive N3 C5 1D Tzaversing Incore Probe (TIP) Calibration N4 C72 Reactor Protectioa N6 RPS MG Set Control ,. N6 C88 Engineering Test and Information N2, N5 C91 Performance Monitoring N2, N5 D13 Process Radiation Moaitoring None Steam Line Radiatioa Monitoring N6 D24 Post Accident Sampling N2> N5 E12 Residual Heat Removal

+See Table 1.4 for code criterion explanation.

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SYSTEM ID SYSTEM DESCRIPTION ELIMINATION CODE+

E21 Low Pressure Core Spray N6 E22 High Pressure Core Spray N6 E31 Leak Detection N6 Steam Teak Detection N6 Reactor Core Isolation Cooling N6 Fll Reactor Fuel Service Equipment N3 F12 Servicing Aids N2 F13 Reactor Vessel Service Equipment N2 F14 In-Vessel Service Equipment N2 F15 Refueling Equipment N3 F16 Storage Equipment N2 F17 Under-Vessel Service Equipment N3 F24 GE/NED Equipment (Vessel Components/Test N3 Equipment)

F41 Startup Equipment N3 G33 Reactor Water Cleanup N5 G36 Filter/Demineralizer (RWCU) N5 H13 Control Room Panels (Portions) All relevant components are included in other Local Instrument Panels (Portions) identified systems Fuel (Reactor) Nl Core Management Services Nl L12 Fuel Design Services Nl

• See Table 1.4 for code criterion explanation.

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TABLE 1.3 CONTROL SYSTEMS FAILURE ANALYSES IDENTIFICATION AND EIIMINATION OF SYSTEMS FOR THE COMMON POWER SOURCE AND COMMON SENSOR OR SENSOR LINE FAILURE ANALYSES BALANCE OF PLANT (BOP) SYSTEMS SCOPE SYSTEM ID SYSTEM DESCRIPTION ELIMINATION CODE+

AAS Breathing Air N4 12-9 ABD Auxiliary Boiler Blowdown N3, N4 10-6 ABF Auxiliary Boiler Feedwater and N3, N4 10"2 Condensate ABH Auxiliary Boiler Chemical Feed N3, N4 13-11 ABM Auxiliary Boiler Steam N3) N4 10"1 Annunciator Input N2 ARC Condenser Air Removal None 5-1 ASR Auxiliary Steam - Radwaste N3,N4 3"10 ASS Auxliary Steam - Nuclear None 3-9 Battery System CCP Reactor Plant Component Cooling Water None 9-1 CCS Turbine Plant Component Cooling Water None 9<<7 Electrical Equipment - Control Room CES Electrical Equipment - Local

• See Table 1.4 For code criterion explanation.

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1 SYSTEM ID SYSTEM DESCRIPTION ELIMINATION CODE+

CMS Containment Atmosphere Monitoring N2 33"2 CNA Auxiliary Condensate N5 4-4.1 CND Condensate Demineralizer N5 4-7 CNM Condensate None 4-1.3 CNO Condensate Booster Pump tube Oil N5 4-10 System CNS Condensate Makeup/Drawoff N5 4-3 CPS Primary Containment Purge N3 22-23 CRS Cold Reheat None 3"2 CWS Circulating Vater None 2-1 DCS Decontamination System N3 28"1 DER Reactor Building Equipment Drains NS 32-9 DET Turbine Building Equipment Drains N5 32-11 DFD Standby Diesel Generator Building N5 23"11 Floor Drains DFE Service Building Equipment Drains 23-8 DFM Miscellaneous Building Floor Drains N5 23-12 DFR Reactor Building Floor Drains N5 23-6

• See Table 1.4 for code criterion explanation.

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SYSTEM ID SYSTEM DESCRIPTION ELIMINATION CODE-DPT Turbine Building Floor Drains 23"7 DFM Radwaste Building Floor Drains N4, N5 23-10 DRS Drywell Cooling 22"22 DSM Moisture Separator Vents and Drains None 32-7 DSR Moisture Separator Reheater Vents and None 32-6 Drains DTM Turbine Building Miscellaneous Drains None 32"5 DWS Domestic Water N4 23-1 EGA Standby Diesel Generator Air Startup N4, N6 12-4 EGF Standby Diesel Generator Fuel N4, N6 8-9 EGP,EGS Standby Diesel Generator Protection N7 24-9 EJS Standby Station Service Substation N7 24-11.2 ENS Standby Station Service Supply Nj 24-9 Breakers Earthquake Recording 'ystem N2 ESS Extraction Steam None 3-4 EXS Main Generator Excitation System N5 FOF Diesel Pire Pump Fuel Oil N4 8-10 FPF Fire Protection - Foam 15"4

+See Table 1.4 for code criterion explanation.

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SYSTEM ID SYSTEM DESCRIPTION ELIMINATION CODE*

FPG Fire Protection - Haloa 15"5 FPL Fire Protection - CO~

15-3 FPM Fire Detection 15-7 FPW Fire Protection - Water N4 15"1 FWL FDW Pump Auxiliary tube Oil N3, N5 7-3 FWP FDW- Pump Seal and Leakoff N5 6-4 FWR FDW Pump Recirculation None 6-3 FWS Feedwater System Noae 6-1 GMC Generator Stator Cooling Water None 16-8 GMH Generator Hs and COg None 16-7 GML Generator Leads Cooling None 16-1O GMO Geaerator Seal Oil N5 16-6 GSN Nitrogen System N4, N6 14-1 GTS Standby Gas Treatment N6 27-15 HCS Hydrogen Recombiaer N6 27-13 HDH High Pressure FDW Heater Drain None 6-6

• See Table 1.4 for code criterion explanation.

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SYSTEM ID SYSTEM DESCRIPTION ELIMINATION CODE*

HDL Low Pr. ssure HN Heater Drain None 4-2 Hot Reheat None HVC Control Building A/C N4 22-9 HVE Service Building A/C N4 22"2 HVG Glycol Heating N4 22-17 HVH Hot Water Heating 22"16 HVI Auxiliary Boiler Room Ventilation 22-29 HVK Control Building Chilled Water N4 22-12 HVL Auxiliary Service Building N4 22-11 Ventilation HVN Ventilation Chilled Water N4 22-14 HVP Diesel Generator Building Ventilation N4 22-7 HVR Reactor Building Ventilation N4 22-1 HVT Turbine Building Ventilation N4 22-3 HVW Radwaste Building Ventilation N4 22-5 HVY Yard Structure Ventilation N4 22" 8 IAS Instrument Air None 12-1 IHA Annunciator System N2

• See Table 1.4 for code criterion explanation.

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SYSTEM ID SYSTEM DESCRIPTION ELIMINATION CODE" IHC Computer I/O TSC/CR/EOF-ERF N2 ISC Containment Isolation N6 27-19 LMS Containment Leakage Monitoring 33-1 IOS Turbine Generator Oil Conditioning N4 16-3 and Storage Vibration and Loose Parts Monitoring N2 LWS Radioactive Liquidwaste N5 31-1 Material Handling System N3 Meteorological Monitoring System N2 MSS Mainsteam None 3-1 MWS Makeup Water N5 9-15 NJS Normal Station Service - Substation 24-10 NNS Normal Station Service - 4 kV Supply 24-8.4 24-8.6 NPS Normal Station Service - 13.8 kV N7 24"8.2 Supply OFG Offgas None 31-4 PBS Sanitary Drains N4 23-3 Radiation Monitoring System N6, N2 Remote Shutdown System

• See Table 1.4 for code criterion explanation.

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SYSTEM ID SYSTEM DESCRIPTION ELIMINATION CODE*

SAS Service Air N5 12-2 SBPR Steam Bypass and Pressure Regulator None SCC Off-Normal Status Indicator N2 SCM Post-Accident Monitoring N2, N5 SFC Fuel Pool Cooling and Purification N4, N6 34-2 SPF Res Sta Xfmr Hi-Side Line Protection N7 24"7.1 SPG Main Generator Protection N7 24-2.1 SPM Main Xfmr Protection N7 24-3 SPR Res Sta Xfmr Protection N7 24-5 SPS Norm Sta Xfmr Protection N7 24-4 SPU Unit Protection 24-1 SPX Station Aux Power Xfmr Protection N7 24-6.1 SRR Roof Drainage N4 23-2 SRW Storm and Waste Water N4 23-4 SSP Post-Accident Sampling N2, N5 21-8 SSR Reactor Plant Sampling N2, N5 21"2

• See Table 1.4 for code criterion explanation.

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SYSTEM ID SYSTEM DESCRIPTION EIIMINATION CODE+

SST Turbine Plant Sampling 82, 85 21-1 SSW Radwaste Building Sampling N2, N5 21"4 SVH HN Heater Relief Vents and Drains N3, N5 32-14 SVV Main Steam Relief Valves - Vents and N6 32-8 Drains SWP Service Water 9" 10 SWP Seal Water Radwaste 31-6 SWT Traveling Screen Wash and Disposal N4 9"13 SXS Transient Analysis N3, N2 SYD Synchronizing - Standby Station N7 24-12.3 Service SYG Synchronizing - Main Generator 24-12.1 SYS Synchronizing - Normal Station N7 24"12.2 Service TMA Turbine Trips None 1-4 TMB Turbine Generator E.H. Fluid System None 16-5.2 TME Turbine Generator Gland Seal and None 16>>1 Exhaust TMG Turbine Generator Turning Gear N3 16-4 TMI Turbine Generator Supervisory None Instrument TML Turbine Generator tube Oil 16-2

• See Table 1.4 for code criterion explanation.

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J SYSTEM ID SYSTEM DESCRIPTION BI,IMINATION CODE+

TMR Unit Runback None 1"7 TMS Turbine Generator Exhaust Eood Spray N3, N5 16-9 VTP Turbine Plant Equipment Vents N5 32-18 WOS Waste Oil Disposal N4 16-12 WSS Radioactive Solid Waste N5 31-3 WTA Chemical Feed - Acid N5 13-20 WTH Chemical Feed - Hypochlorite N5 13-4 WTS Water Treating - Raw Water N5 13"1 YUC SWYD Supply to Res Station Service N7 24-7.2 YXC 345 kV Motor-Operator Disc Switch 24-7.3 YXL 345 kV Line Protection 24-3.2 Station Grounding - Instruments and N7 Controls

• See Table 1.4 for code criterion explanation.

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TABLE 1.4 CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURE ANALYSES SYSTEM AND COMPONENT ELIMINATION CRITERIA CODE ELIMINATION CRITERION+

Nl Non-electrical systems or components, i.e., solely mechanical oz software systems or components. Examples:'he Reactor Assembly, vessels,-. steam turbines. Note: 'ny. associated electrical control components might be relevant and are to be reviewed. Examples: vessel liquid level, pressure and temperature controls, and turbine speed controls.

N2 Non-control type electrical systems or components, i.e., systems or components having no direct or indizect controlling or controlled function, including permissive input and output signals (strictly

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passive systems and components). Examples: the Nuclear Boiler Process Instrumentation sensors, transmitter lights, meters or recorders, which

'nly provide pure information, i.e., measurement indications, and records. Note: Such information, although possibly of interest or importance to acceptable reactor operation and operating personnel's manual control actions is not considered relevant to initiating or prohibiting any automatic electrical contxol actions for the purpose of the control system failure analyses.

N3 Non-operational type electrical control systems or components, i.e.,

systems or components not operating or required to be operable during normal reactor power operations. Examples: the Refueling Interlock Control System, the startup range portion of the Neutron Monitoring System, the turoine generator turning gear controls.

Operational electrical control systems or components which have no direct or indirect interaction with normal reactor operating control systems or components. Examples: non-safety related heating and air conditioning contxol systems, lighting controls.

N5 Operational electrical control systems or components which do directly or indirectly interact with reactor operating control systems or components but which can in no way effect changes in the reactor vessel liquid, pressure, or power levels. Examples: the Radwaste Control System, sump pump level controls.

Operational electzical control systems or components, or portions of systems or components, wh'ich perform direct plant safety functions.

Examples: the Reactor Protection System, the main steam line radiation monitoring portion of the Process Radiation Monitoring System, or the steam leak detection tempezature elements and controls of the Ieak Detection System.

• In some cases, more than one criterion may apply.

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r CODE EIININATION CRITERIO&

Note: hny related res1 ouse of these safety systems or components to conditions or actions brought about by non-safety related control system or component .actions, resulting directly or indirectly from a power source or sensor line failure, are to be xdentxfxe

'C'on-safety and analyzed. Example: a reactor vessel low water level RPS trip and a subsequent reactor scram resulting from a loss of feedwater flow which was, in turn, directly or indirectly caused by a non-safety power source failure, e.g., a feedwater pump motor power failure.

N7 Electrical power systems or components involved in distribution, transformation, or interruption of electrical power. Example: The 125 Vdc control power for a condensate pump circuit breaker.

However, controls for these systems/components might need to be con-sidered if the loss of such control power could lead to the failure of other systems and components.

• In some cases, more than one criterion may apply.

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TABLE 1.5 COMMON SENSOR LINE:-.'AILURE ANALYSIS EVALUATION

SUMMARY

LINE FAIIURE BOUNDING

- NO. TYPE EVENT DESCRIPTIOP FSAR SEC Broken None Plugged Ndne Broken (1) I.ow reactor pressure, vessel (RPV) steam dome 15.3 pressure indication (not actual) trips reactor 15.2.3 recirculation pumps A and B runback to the IZMG 15.2.7 set. Core flow and reactor power decrease.

Core void swell increases RPV level, probably to the high level 8 turbine trip and subsequent if If the high level 8 trip is reactor scram. (2) not reached, and controlling feedwater (FM),

the high RPV level indication (not actual) decreases FV flow and RPV actual level to an eventual low level 3 reactor scram.

Plugged Inh'bited response. Alternate channels provide desired information and required actions, if needed.

Broken If controlling feedwater, the high RPV level 15.2.7 indication (not actual) decreases feedwater flow and RPV level to an eventual low level 3 reactor scram.

Plugged Inhibited response. Alternate channels provide desired information and required actions, if needed.

Broken Low reactor steam dome pressure indication (not 15.3 actual) trips recirculation pumps A and B 15.2.3 runback to IZMG set. Core flow and reactor power decrease. Core void swell increases RPV level, probably to high level 8 turbine trip and subsequent reactor scram.

Plugged Inhibited response. Alternate channels available.

Broken None Plugged None Broken Low RPV level indication (not actual) trips RPS 15.2. 7 C and D logic channels causing a low level 3 reactor scram.

Plugged Inhibited response. Alternate channels available.

• See Appendix A, Common Sensor Iine Load Sheets for complete description.

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LINE FAILURE BOUNDING NO. TYPE EVENT DESCRIPTION FSAR SEC actual) 7 Broken Low RPV level indicatioa (not trips RPS 15.2.7 A and B logic channels causing a low level 3 reactor scram.

Plugged Inhibited response. A1.teraate channels available.

8 Broken None Thru Plugged None 12 13 Broken RPV level decreases and stabilizes at lover level Plugged None 14 Broken High steam line A flow indication (not actual) 15.2.4 closes HSIV, reactor scrams.

Plugged Inhibited response. Alternate channels available.

15 Broken RPV level decreases and stabilizes at lower level Plugged None 16 Broken High steam line B flow indication (not actual) 15.2.4 closes MSIV, reactor scrams.

Plugged Inhibited response. Alternate channels available.

17 Broken RPV level decreases and stabilizes at lower level Plugged None 18 Broken High " earn line C flov indication (not actual) 15.2.4 closes HSIV, reactor scrams.

Plugged Inhibited response. Alternate channels available.

19 Broken RPV level decreases and stabilizes at lover level Plugged None 20 Broken High steam line D flow indication (not actual) 15.2.4 closes HSIV, reactor scrams.

Plugged Inhibited response. Alternate channels available.

21 Broken Low feedwater flow indication (not actual) runs 15. 3 back recirculatioa pumps A aad B to LZMG set. 15.2. 3 Core flov and reactor power decrease. Core void swell aad ZW flow increase. RPV level iacreases, probably to a high level 8 turbine trip and subsequent reactor scram.

Plugged Inhibited response. Alternate channels available.

+See Appendix A, Common Sensor Line I.oad Sheets for complete description.

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LINE FAILURE BOUNDING NO. TYPE EVENT DESCRIPTION+ FSAR SEC Broken High feedwater flow indication (not actual). If 15.2.7 controlling feedwater, FV flow and RPV l~vel decrease to an eventual low level 3 reactor scram Plugged Inhibited response. Alternate channels available.

23 Broken Low feedwater flow indication (not actual), runs 15.3 back recirculation pumps A and B to LE2!G set. 15.2.3 Core flow and reactor power decrease. Core void swell and ZV flow increase. RPV level increases, probably to a high level 8 turbine trip and subsequent reactor scram.

Plugged Inhibited response. Alternate channels available.

24 Broken High feedwater flow indication (not actual). If 15.2.7 controlling feedwater, PW flow and RPV level decrease to an eventual low level 3 reactor scram.

Plugged Inhibited response. Alternate channels available.

Broken Slight decrease in RPV level and power Plugged None 27 6 Broken Slight power level fluctuation 28 Plugged None 29 Broken None Thru Plugged None 36

+See Appendix A, Common Sensor Line Load Sheets for complete description.

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APPENDIX h CONTROL SYSTEMS COtSOH SENSOR LIHE FAILURE ANALYSIS NINE NILE POINT 2 SHEET 1 Oi 1 I RPV LIQUID I LIME I SYS I SENOR I FAILURE LEVEL PRESSURE OR MO. ID ID NO. PRIHARY EFFECTS SECONDARY EFFECTS ONER LEVEL EFFECTS COMBINED EFFECTS I b22 M027 lQEIHW DIFFERENTIAL I LI-R60S HIGH LEVEL IMDICATIOHIHo NE I I I PRESSURE (DP) SIGHAL (IHD)

I I I PLUGGED I INACCURATE DIFFERENTIAL I LI-R605 INACCURATE SHQFDONH I NONE I MOXE I I PRESSURE (DP) SIGXAL I LEVEL IHD I I I I I I I C33 I XOIT I RROEEX I HAXIHNI DIFFERENTIAL I LI-R608 HIGH LEVEL I MOME I MONE I I PRESSURE (DP) SIGNAL IH.')ICATION (IHD) I I I I I I I PLUGGED IMACCllRATE DP SIGNAL I Ll-R60$ INACCURATE MIDE I HOME I XONE I RAICE LEVEL IHD CL1 ~ 1 REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (RPV) HB TOP HEAD TAP {LEVEL REFERENCE IEG)

0 APPENDIX h CONTROL SYSTKNS COtSON SENSOR LINE FAILURE ANALYSIS NINE MllE POINT 2 SHEET I OF 3 I RPV LIQUID

) LINE ) SYS SENSOR ) FAILURE I LEVEL PRESSURE OR ID ID NO. TYPE PRIMARY EFFECTS SECOHDARY EFfECTS POVKR LEVEL EFFECTS COtSI RED KFFECTS B22 I X073L BROKEN I MAXIMUMDP SIGNAL ) LIS-N673L IHD HIGH LEVEL.

DIV 3 ~ I/2 HPCS UN LEVEL 2

) INITIATlON INHIBITED.

) LS-H674L HIGH LEVEL 8 HPCS I/2 SHUTDOWN.

I PLUGGED ) INACCURATN DP SIGNAL ) LIS-X673L, IHD INACCURATE. MONE i NOME

) DIV 3, I/2 HPCS UN LEVEL 2 I

) IHITIATlOH INHIBITED.

) N674L HIGH LEVEL 8 HPCS I/2

) SHUIDOQI INHIBITED.

I X073R BROKEN HAKIMl5 DP SIGNAL ) LIS-M673R IND HIGH LEVEL, ) MOME I XONE' I DIV 3, I/2 HPCS IlN LEVEL 2

) IHITIATION IHHIBITED.

l LS-H674R HIGH LEVEL 8 HPCS I/2 SCRAM TRIP.

I PLUGGED j INACCURATE DP SIGHAL ) LIS-N673R IND INACCURATE. HOME

) DIV 3, I/2 HPCS LEVEL 2 I Hl TIATIOH I HH I BITKO.

) LS-H674 LEVEL 8 HPCS I/2

) SCRAH TRIP INHIBITED.

I E22 I M07$ C ) BROXEX HIMIHSI PRESSURE SIGNAL ( PIS-H678C IHD UN PRESSURE. i HONE I NONE I DIV 3e RPS (C) I/2 HIGH I

) PRESSURE SCRAH AND PS-H679C, t

) DIV 3, HS4 (C) I/2 RHR ISOLATION INHIBITED.

I

) PLUGGED INACCURATE PRESSURE SIGNAL ( PIS N678C IHD INACCURATE. HONE ) MONE I DIV 3o RPS (C) I/2 HIGH

) PRESSURE SCRAH INHIBITED.

( MS4 (C) RHR ISOLATIOH.

I X080C ) BROKEN ) MAXIHUH DlffKRENTIAL ) LIS-H680C IND HIGH LEVEL. ) NONE I HOHE

) PRESSURE SIGNAL ) DIV 3, I/2 RPS (C) LOV I LEVEL 3 SCRAM TRIP I INHIBITED.

I I PLUGGED l INACCURATE DIFFElmllTIAL I LIS-H680C IHD INACCURATE. ) HONE

) PRESSURE SIGNAL I DIV 3s I/2 RPS (C), LEVEL 3 I SCRAH TRIP INHIBITED.

CL2. I RPV HI4 - 3404 TAP (LEVEL REFEREHCE LKG)

~ ~

h

APPENDIX h CONTROL SYSTEHS COHHOM SENSOR LIHE FAILURE ANALYSIS NINE NILE POINT 2 SHEET 2 OF 3 RPV LIQUID LINE I SYS SENSOR ) FAILURE ) LEVEL PRESSURE OR MO. ID ID MO. TYPE PRIHARY EfFECTS SECONDARY EFfECTS BNER LEVEL EFFECTS COHB I HED EFFECTS 2 I b22 I MOSIC I BROKEN HAXIHUH D1iiEREMTIAL I LIS-N68IC IND HIGH LEVEL.

PRESSURE SIGNAL ) DIV 3, I/2 LEVEL 2 AND

) LS-N684D, I/2 LEVEL I, HS4 t ISOLATION INHIBITED.

I I PLUGGED I INACCURATE DIFFERENTIAL f LIS-N681C IHD INACCURATE. I MONE ) MONE

) PRESSURE SIGNAL DIV 3y I/2 NS4 LEVEL- ly2 AMD I I I BOP ISOLATIOMS INHIBITED. I I I I I C33 ) M004A I BROKEN I MAXIHUH DIFFERENTIAL I Ll-R606A IND HIGH LEVEL. ) HOME ) MONE

) PRESSURE SIGNAL LS-K624A LEVEL 8, I/3

( TURBINE AND FEEINATER (W)

( PUHPS (3) SHUTDONN TRIP.

) IF SELECTED, LI-R608 IND

) HIGH LEVEL, LS-K626h/8 llW

) LEVEL RECIRC PUHP h/8

) RUNBACK INHIBITED.

} IF CONTROLLIMG, FH FUN lllLL I RPV LEVEL DECREASES. LOH ) RPV LOQ LEVEL 3 REACTOR

) DECREASE I LEVEL 3 SCRAH PROBABLE. I SCRhll.

I I PLUGGED I INACCURATE DIFFEREIITIAL ) Ll-R606A IHD IHACCURATE. ) NONE l NOME I PRESSURE SIGNAL K624A LEVEL 8 ~ I/3 TURB IHE I AND FH PUHPS TRIP INHIBITED.

) IF SELECTED, R608 IHD I INACCURATE> K626A/8 RECIRC PUMP h/8 RUNBACK IHHIBITED.

IF CONTROLLING: fV fIlN I CONTROL IHACCURATE I

l C33 I M005 BROKEN ) HINIHUH RPV PRESSURE AND I Pl-R605 IND LN RPV PRES- NONE MOME

) HIHIHUH RPV DIFFERENTIAL I SURE. 833-K6618, K6658, I TEMPERATURE (DT) SIGNALS ) K6688 RPV TUERHAL SHOCK IHTERLOCKS RECIRC PUHPS h

) AND 8 HIGH RPV DT START I PERHISSIVE INHIBITED.

I I PLUGGED I INACCURATE RPV IRESSURE AND ) Pl-R605 INACCllRATE. RPV DT HOME I DT SIGNALS I THERHAL SHOCK IHIERMCKS I IHHISITED.

CL2.2 RPV N14 340 TAP (CONT'D)12-24VS (3)

APPENDIX h CONTROL SYSTEMS COHHOH SENSOR LIME FAILURE ANALYSIS NINE NILE POINT 2 SHEET 3 OF 3 RPV LIQUID LINE I SYS I SENSOR FAILURE LEVEL PRESSURE OR MO. ID ID NO. TYPE PRIMARY EFfECtS SECONDARY EFFECTS POWER LEVEL EFFECTS COHBINED EFFECTS 2 I C33 MOOEA I BROEEN MINIMUM PRESSURE SIGHAL I PI-R609 IHD MM STEAM DONE I REACTOR POWER DECREASES. I RPV HIGH LEVEL 8 TURBINE I NZImN RPV DT SIGNAL I PRESSURE ~ RECIRC PUMPS A&B I RPV LEVEL IHCREASES. I TRIP AMD REACTOR SCRAM.

I CAVITATION INTERLOCX RUNBACK I PROBABLE HIGH LEVEL b TRIP/

I TO LlIIG SET. I SCRAH.

I I I PLUGGED I INACCURATE PRESSURE SIGNAL I Pl-R609 IND IHACCURATE. I MONE I MOME I RECIRC PIRIPS h&B CAVITATIOH I RUNL<CK TO IFNG SET I IHHll:ITED.

I LTI15 I BmmEN I IIIHINN DP SIGNAL I LI-IlS IND LOM LEVEL. I NONE I MONE I I I I I I PLUGGED I INACCURATE DP SIGNAL I LI-115 IND IMACCURATK. I NONE I MONE CL2.3 RPV H14 340o TAP (CONTEND) 12-2477 (4)

APPENDIX h CONTROL SYSTEttS NtON SENSOR LINE FAILURE ANALYSIS HIRE ttILE POlltT 2 SHEET I OF 3 RPV LIQUID LINE I SYS I SENSOR FAILURE I LEVEL PRESSURE OR NO. ID ID NO. TYPE PRIMARY EFFECTS SECONDARY EFFECTS POWER LEVEL EFFECTS COttBIHED EFFECTS 3 I B22 I X044B BRtNEX I INEIHtbl DP SIGNAL I LR-R615 IMD HIGH LEVEL IM I XONE I XONE I I FUEL lADE. I I I I PLUGGED IXACCURATE DP SIGNAL LR-R615 IXD IXACCURATE. I MOME I XONE I I I B22 I M062B I NNNEH I HIMIHtbI PRESSURE SIGNAL I PR-R623B IHD LOW PRESSe POST I HONE I NQE I ACCIDENT ttOXITOR. I I I PLUGGED INACCURATE DP SIGNAL I PR-R623B IND IXACCtmhTE. I NONE I I I B22 I XOIBB I BROEEX I HIMIHNI PRESSURE SIGNAL I PIS-N678B IND LOW PRESS. I MONE I MONE I DIV 2, RPS (8) I/2 HIGH I PRESS SCRAH AND PS-H679B I DIV 2, HS4 (D) I/2 RHR I ISOLATION INHIBITED.

I I PLUGGED 1MACCURATE PRESSURE SIGNAL I PIS-N6188 IND IHACCURATE I MONE I DIV 2, RPS (8) I/2 HIGH I PRESS SCRAH INHIBITED. MS4 (B) RHR ISOLATION.

I E12 I X058B I BROKN I ttlNIÃlt DP SIGNAL I dPIS-N658B IND ttIN DP. RHR I NONE I MOXE I INJ VALVE F042B OPENING I PERttlSSIVE.

I PLUGGED I IXACCURATE DP SIGNAL dPIS-N6588 IND INACCURATE. I MONE I MONE RHR INJ VALVE F0428 OPENING I INHIBITED.

I E12 I XOSSC I BROKQI I HIXIHtbl DP SIGXAL I dPIS N658C IND HIN DP RHR I NOXE I NONE I IHJ VALVE F042C OPEHIKG I PERHISSIVE.

I I PLUGGED I IMACCIIRATE DP SIGXAL I dPIS-M658C IND INACCURATE. I NOHE I XOIE I RHR IHJ VALVE F042C OPENING I IXHIBITED.

I I RSS LT112 I BROEEX I HAXltmH DP SIGNAL I Ll ll2 IXD HIGH LEVEL I NONE I XONE I I I I I I PLUGGED I IMACClUULTE SIQthL I Ll-112 IND INACCURATE I MONE I MONE I I I I I I RSS I PT113 I BROEEM I IIINIHtbt PRESSURE SIGNAL I Pl-113 IMD LOM LEVEL I XONE I MONE I I I I I I PLUGGED I INACCURATE PRESSURE SIGNAL I Pl-113 IHD INACCURATE I NOIE I XOXE I I I I I CL3.1 RPV Nl4 2004 TAP (LEVEL REFERENCE LEG)

APPENDIX A CONTROL SYSTKHS COHHOH SEHSOR LIHE FAILURE AHALYSIS MIHE NILE POINT 2 SHEET 2 OF 3 RPV LIQUID

) LINE I SYS ) BEMSOR I FAILURE I LEVEL PRESSURE OR XO. ID ID NO. TYPE PRIMARY EFFECTS SECONDARY EFFECTS POHKR LEVEL EFFECTS COHBIHKD EFFECTS I B22 I Moaoa l BROKEN I HAEIIaa DP SIGNAL ) LIS X680A IHD HIGH LEVEL. ( MONE 1 MOXE I DIV 2>> I/2 RPS (B) QN

) LEVEL 3 SCRAM INHIBITED.

I PLUGGED I INACCURATE DP SIGXAL ) LIS N680B IND INACCURATE. ) HOWE i MOME I I I OTHKRHISE>> SA!K AS BROKEN. 1 I I l I I I E22 I MOBIB I BROKEN I IQXuSRI DP SIGNAL I LIS-M68)B IHD HIGH LEVEL. ( NOME NONE I DIV 2>> 1/2 NS4 LOU LEVEL 2

( AND LS-H684B>> I/2 NS4 UN

( LEVIL I ISOLATIOHS I INHIBITED.

I I PLUGGED l INACCURATE DP SIGNAL I LIS-H681B IND IHACCIJRATK. ) MONE I NONE I I I OTHERW]SE>> SANE AS BROKEN. ) I I I I l

$22 I X091B i BROKEN I IQXINN DP SIGXAL ) LIS-H691B/F IHD HIGH LEVEL. I NONE ( MOHE I M09lf I DIV 2, I/2 ADS (h) RHR (h) ~

I LEVEL I AHD LS"H692B/F I/2

) RCIC LEVEL 2 IHITIATIOH I INHIBITED. LS-H693B/F

( DIV 2, I/2 RCIC LEVEL 8 I SHUIIuW.

I PLUGGED ( INACCURATE DP SIGNAL ) LIS-H691B/F IHD IHACCURATE. i HONE ( XONE I H693B/F DIV 2, I/2 RCIC

) LEVEL 8 SHUTIXNH IHHIBITED>>

I OTHERWISE, SANE AS BROXKH.

I B22 HAXIIRRI DP SIGHAL ) LIS-X695B IHD HIGH LEVEL. ) XOXE M095B I BROKEN ) ) MOXE I DIV 2>> I/2 ADS DN LEVEL 3 I TRIP PKRHISSIVE INHIBITED.

I I PLUGGED i INACCURATE DP SIGNAL ) I.IS-H6958 IMD IHACCURATE. ) XONE ) XONE

) OTHKRHISE>> SANE AS BROKEN

) LINE.

t 3 B22 I N402B I BROKEN I IQXIlftRI DP SIGNAL J ATlIS IHD HIGH LEVEL. DIV 2, i MONE ) NOME

( X402F I/2 RRCS LEVEL 2 ARI, SLCS IHITIATIOH AHD RKCIRC PUMP

( AMD RVCU SHUnOW INHIBITED.

I PLUGGED I INACCURATE DP SIGHAL ) ATlS IHD IHACCURATK, OTHER t HOWE I NOXE

) MISE>> SANE AS BROKEN.

l CL3.2 RPV N14 - 200~ TAP (CONT'D)

APPENDIX h CONTROL SYSTEMS COt0tON SEXSOR LIME FAILURE ANALYSIS NIHE MILE POINT 2 SHEET 3 OF 3 I RPV LIQUID

) LINE I SYS ) SEXSOR ) FAILURE I LEVEL PRESSURE OR MO. ID ID MO. TYPE PRIMARY EFFECTS SECONDARY EFFECTS PtNER LEVEL EFfECTS COMBINED EFFECTS 3 I B22 l M403b I BROKEN I MIMIMW PRIURE SIGNAL I ATMS IND ON PRESSURE DIV 2g I NONE I MOME I/2 RRCS HIGH PRESS RECIRC PUMP, RitCU TRIP ARD ARI, SLCS IMITIATIOM IXHIBITFD.

P lRGKD i INACCURATE PRESSURE SIGNAL ATMS IND IHACCURATEs OTHER t NONE I MONE I ) MISE SAME AS BROKEN. I l I I I I I B22 ) R004B BROKEN I MIMIMlktPRESSURE SIGNAL ( Pl tt004B IND MIMIMW PRESS I MORE ) HONE I I I I t PLUGGED ) INACCURATE PRESSURE SIGNAL ) PI-2004B IND INACCURATE I NOME ) HOME I I I I B22 ROOSB I BROKEN MAKIMW DP SIGNAL I DPI R009 IND HIGH LEVEL ) NOXE I NOME I I I PLUGGED ) INACCURATE DP SIGNAL I DPI,R009 IND INACCURATE I NOHE I MOME I I I I B35 I M040 I BROKEN I MINIMUM PRESSURE AHD MAKIMW I K667h AXD 668h ON RPV PRESS t NONE ) XONE

) RPV DIFFERENTIAL TEMPERATURE ) TtlERMAL SHOCK INTERLOCKS AND )

(DT) SIGNALS I RECIRC PUMPS h AND B HIGH I RPV DT START PERMISSIVE I INHIBITED.

I INACCllRATE PRESSURE AXD RPV ( SAME AS BROKEN. ) MONE

) DlFFEREtlTIAL TEMPERATURE I SIGNALS I

C33 ) X004B BROKEN I MAKIMW DP SIGNAL i Ll-R606B IHD HIGH LEVEL. i NONE ) NOME 1 LS-K6248 HIGH LEVEL 8, I/3 I TURBlHE AHD FH PUMPS TRIP.

IF SELECTED'I R608 IHD I HIGH LEVEL, LS-K626A/B ON I LEVEL TRIP AHD RECIRC PUMP l RUNBACK TO LFMG SET i -INHIBITED.

I IF COHTROLLIMGs FM FON i RPV LEVEL DECREASES. EVER- ) RPV LOQ LEVEL 3 REACTOR

( REDUCED. I TUAL LEVEL 3 SCRAM PROBABLE. t SCRAM.

I I I INACCURATE DP SIGNAL ) R606B IHD lltACCURATE. K624B ] MOME I HONE I LEVEL Bo I/3 TURBINE AHD FH i PUMPS TRIP INHIBITED. IF

) SELECTED, LI-R608 IHD IHACCURATE, LS-K626h/B FM/

I RECIRC PUMP TRIP/RUHBACK I IlAlIBITED IF COHTROLLIHGe

) INACCURATE LEVEL CONTROL.

CL3.3 RPV M14 2004 TAP (CONT'D)

I I APPENDIX h CONTROL SYSTEttS COttttON SEHSOR LIHE FAILURE ANALYSIS HIHE NILE POINT 2 SHEET I OF 2 I RPV LIQUID

) LINE ) SYS ) SENSOR ) FAILURE ) LEVEL PRESSURE OR MO. ID ID NO. TYPE PRIMARY EFFECTS SECONDARY EFFECTS POQKR LEVEL EFFECTS COtS I MED EFFECTS 4 ) B22 ) HO73C ) BROKEN ) HAIIHUti DP SIGNAL ) LIS N673C/G HIGH LEVEL IHD l HONE NONE

) llO730 ) DIV 3e LEVEL 2o I/2 HPCS I IHITIATIOH IHHIBITEOI

) LS H674C/G DIV 3y LEVEL 8 ~

) 1/2 HPCS SHUIDOQI TRIP.

I I PLUGGED I 1NACCURATE DP SIGNL ) N673C/G IHD INACCURATE. 1/2 ) MONE ) NOHE

) LEVEL 2 HPCS INITIATION AHD I/2 LEVEL 8 HPCS SRUTI' IttHIBITED.

I NO78A ) BROKEN ) HIMIHUtt PRESSURE SIGNAL ) PIS-M67SA IMD LOtt PRESSURE. ) HONE ) NOHE I DIV II RPS (A) I/2 HIGH

) PRESS SCRAM AND PS-H679A,

) DIV I HS4 (A) 1/2 TRIP (RHR I/2 ISOLATIOH TRIP)

) INHIBITED.

I l PLUGGED I INCCURATE PRIIIE SIGNAL l N678A IHD INACCURATE. DIV I HONE ) NONE I~ RPS (h) I/2 SCRAtt AND ttS4 (A) RHR ISOLATION IHHIBITED.

I

) RSS ) LT116 ) BROXKN tthElttUtl DP SIGNAL I LI-116 IMD HIGH LEVEL. NOHE ) NOME

) I

) PLUGGED INACCURATE DP SIGNL ) Ll-116 IltD INACCURATE. ) NOHE ) MOHK I I I I

) B22 ) NOBDA ) BROKEN ) tthXINRt DP SIGNAL ) LIS-H6SOA IND HIGH LEVEL I NOHE ) MOHE I DIV lo 1/2 RPS (h) LEVEL 3

) SCRAM IHHIBITKD.

I

) PLUGGED INCCllRATE DP SIGNAL ) N6&OA IHD INACCURATK, OTHER ) liONE ) MOME

) MISE, ShtfE AS BROXEN. I I I I I I B22 NOR IA BROKEN ) HAKItttN DP SIGNAL I LIS M681A IND HIGH LEVEL. I MOME ) NONE

) DIV 1, 1/2 HS4 LEVEL 2 AHD

) LS>>H684h DIV 1 ~ 1/2 HS4

) LEVEL I ISOLATIOltS

) INHIBITED.

I PLUGGED ) IHACCURATE DP SIGNAL I N68lh IMD INACCURATE, OTHER- HONE ) NONE

) WISE ~ ShtjK AS BROXEH.

Cl.4. I RPV H14 160o TAP (LEVEL REFERENCE LKG)

APPEHDIX A I

CONTROL SYSTEMS COHHON SENSOR LINE FAILURE ANALYSIS MINE NILE POINT 2 SHEET 2 OP 2 I RPV LIQUID I LINE I STS I SENSOR I FAILURE ) LEVEL PRESSURE OR MO. in in NO. TYPE PRIMARY EFFECTS SECONDARY EFFECTS ONER LEVEL EFFECTS COlBINED EFFECTS C33 M004C BROKEN HAKISBI DP SIGNAL ) LI-R606C IND HIGH LEVEL. I MOME

) LS-K624C I/3 HIGH LEVEI B I TURBINE AMD Bt PUlP TRIPS.

I I PLUGGED I INACCURATE DP SIGNAL ) R6O6C IND INACCURATE. I HONE / MOME

) LS-X624C I/3 HIGH LEVEL B

) TURBINE AHD FH PlÃP TRIPS

) INHIBITED.

I C33 I NODBC I BROKEN NININQI PRESSURE SIGNAL ) K716B RUNS BACK ASB RECIRC I DECREASE IM PSKR LEVELS ( RPV HIGH LEVEL B TURBINE f MAXIMUMRPV DT SIGNAL I PUMPS AHD FLAN Vlh RECIRC I IHCREASE IN RPV LEVEL. t TRIP AND REACTOR SCRAM+

I CAVITATIOH INTERLOCKS. ) PROBABLE RPV HIGH LEVEL I I I I TURB I HE TRIP/SCRAH. I I I I PLUGGED I INACCURATE PRESSURE SIGNAL ) K116B RECIRC CAVITATIOX ) NOME t MOHE I PREVEHTIOH INTERLOCKS I INHIBITED.

CL4.2 RPV N14 )6O TAP (CONT'D)

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APPENDIX h CONTROL SYSTKHS COHHON SEHSOR LINE FAILURE AHALYSIS NINE HILK POINT 2 SHEET 3 OF 3 RPV LIQUID LIXE SYS I SENSOR I FAILURE I IEVEL PRESSURE OR XO. IO ln XO. TYPE PRIHARY EFFECTS SECONDARY EFFECTS POVER LEVEL EFFECTS COHBIXED EFFECTS S I B22 I N402A I BROKEN I HAXIHNI DP SIGNAL I ATHS IND HIGH LEVEL. DIV I, I XONE I/2 RRCS DN LEVEL I ARI, I SLC'S ~ RECIRC> AMD RlCU TRIPS I INHIBITED. I I I I PLUGGED I INACCURATE DP SIGNAL I ATHS AXD INACCURATE, OTHER- I NONE I XOXE I I MISE, SAHE AS BROXEX. I I I I I I I B22 M403A I BROEEM HIMIHNI PREBBURE SIMlL I ATHS IHD LOU PRESSURE. DIV I XONE I MOME I I I, I/2 RRCS HIQI RPV DOHE I PRESS RECIRC PUHPs RVCU SYS I TRIP AHD I/2 ARI ~ SLCS INI-I TIATIOUS INHIBITED.

I PLUGGED I INACCURATE PRESSURE SIGNAL I ATHS IND INACCURATE> OTHER- I NONE I NONE I 'MISE, SANE AS BROXEH.

CL5.3 RPV H14 204 TAP (CONT'D) 12-2417 (12)

APPENDIX h CONTROL SYSmttS COHUON SENSOR LIME FAILURE ANALYSIS HINK MILE POINT 2 SHEET 1 OF 2 I RPV LIQUID I LINK SYS SENSOR FAILURE LEVEL PRESSURE OR NO. ID ID HO. TYPE PRltthRY EFFECTS SECONDARY EFfECTS POttER IEVEL EFFECTS COtiBIMKD EFFECTS 6 ) l22 ROOS I BROKEN ) ttAIItRBI DP SIGNAL I DPI-R005 IXD HIGH LEVEL, } NONE ) HOXE I I I FUEL AREA I I I I I I I I PLUGGED I IXACCURATE DP SIGNAL I R005 IND INACCURATE ) HONE ( NOME I I I I I RSS I LT11$ I BROKEN ttIHIHW DP SIGNAL I LI-ll5 IXD uN LEVEL ( MONE ) NONE I I I PLUGGED I INACCURATE DP SIGNAL LI-115 IMD INACCURATE I MONE I I I I B22 I M080C I BROKEN I ttIMltSBI DP SIGNAL ) LIS"N680C IMD llN LEVEL. I MONE ) RPV LOM LEVEL 3 REACTOR

) DIV 3, LEVEL 3 RPC (C) 1/2 I SCRAM lmEX COtSINED VITtt

) SCRhtt. ) B22-M080D 1/2 SCRAM BEUN.

I I PLUGGED INACCURATE DP SIGNAL X680C IND INACCURATE. DIV ) XONE I MONE 3 LEVEL 3 RPS (C) 1/2 SCRhtt I I INHIBITED; I I I I B22 XOBOD I BROKEN ttlMltfW DP SIGNAL LIS-M680D IND UN LEVEL. ) NOME ) RPV LOM LEVEL 3 REACTOR I DlV 4, LEVEL 3, RPS (D) 1/2 SCRAM VHBI COtSIMED ttITH

) SCRAN. I B22-X080C I/2 SCRAtl ABOVE.

I I I PLUGGED IXACCURATE DP SIGNAL ) H680D IHD INACCURATE. DIV f XOHE ( NOtm I hi LEVEL 3e RPS (D) I/2 f SCRhtt INHIBITED.

I

) B22 ( M095A ) BROKEN HIHIHUtt DP SIGNAL ) LIS-H695A IHD IAN LEVEL. ) NONE ) XONE I DIV I, 1/2 ADS (A) UN I LEVEL 3 IMITIATIOH-I PLUGGED I INACCURATE DP SIGNAL ) X695h IHD INACCURATE. DIV f NONE ) MONE 1, LEVEL 3 ~ 1/2 ADS (h)

IHITIATIOH INHIBITED.

CL6. 1 RPV H13 104 TAP (LEVEL VARIABLE LKG)

APPENDIX h CONTROL SYSTBS COtSON SENSOR LINE FAILURE ANALYSIS NINE NILE POINT 2 SHEET 2 OF 2 I RPV LIQUID

) I,IXE ) SYS SENSOR ( FAILURE LEVEL PRESSURE OR MO. ID ID NO. TYPE PRIMARY EFFECTS SECONDARY EFFECTS POWER LEVEL EFFECTS CONBINED EDICTS 6 C33 ) M004A BROKEN MIMISW DP SIGNAL i LI-R606h IND lAN LEVEL. ) MONE I MONE

) LS-K624A LEVEL S, 1/3

) TURBIHE AND FW PUMP TRIPS I IHHIBITEO.

) IF SELECTED, LS-K626h/b LOW ( REACTOR POWER DECREASES. I RPV HIGH LEVEL S TURBINE I LEVEL TRIP RUNS BACK BOTH I RPV LEVEL INCREASES, I TRIP AMD REACTOR SCRAN PRE-I RECIRC PUHPS TO LFHG SET. ) PROBABLE HIGH LEVEL S I CLUDED BY RPV IlN LEVEL 3

) IF CQITROLLIXG, FV FuW I TURBIXE TRIP, REACTOR SCiUuI. ) REACTOR SCRAH FltON B22-MOSOC

) INCREASES. I ) AHD XOSOD ABOVE.

I I I PLUGGED ) INACCURATE DP SIGNAL ) R606 )HD IXACCURATE. I NONE ) NOME

) LS-K6?4h AND IF SELECTED, I LS-K626A/B TRIP INHIBITED.

) IF COHTROLLIHG, LEVEL I CONTROL INACCURATE.

CL6.2 RPV N13 10 TAP (CONT'D) 12-2411 (14)

APPENDIX h CONTROL SYSTEMS COMMON SENSOR LIHE FAILURE ANALYSIS NINE MlLE POINT 2 SHEET I OF 2 RPV LIQUID LIXE SYS I SENSOR FAILNE I LEVEL PRESSURE OR XO. ID HO. TYPE PRIMARY EFFECTS SECONDARY EFFECTS POMER LEVEL EFfECTS COMBINED EFFECTS I I R22 M027 BROEEN I MINIMNI DP SIGNAL I LI-R605 IMD LOM LEVEL I NOME I HOME I I I I PLUGGED I INACCURATE DP SIGNAL I R605 IMD INACCURATE I NOHE I XONE I I I I BROEEM I MINIMIS DP SIGXAI I LIS-N6SOA IHD LOU LEVEL. I MOME I RPV LOM LEVEL 3 REACTOR I DIV le RPS (h) LEVEI 3, l/2 I SCRAM %HEM COMBINED NITS I SCRAM TRIPS. I B22-HOSOB I/2 SCRAM BEUN.

I I I PLUGGED I WLCCURATE DP SIGNAL I LIS-H680A IND INACCURATE. I XONE I XONE I DIV I, RPS (A) LEVEL 3 SCRAM I I TRIP INHIBITED. I I

XOSOB I REDEEM I MIMIMNIDP SIGXAL LIS-H6SOS IHD LSt LEVEL I NOXE I RPV LOM LEVEL 3 REACTOR DIV 2 ~ RPS (B) LEVEL 3 ~ I/2 I SCRAM MHEN COMBIHED NITH I SCRAM TRIPS. I B22-HOSOA I/2 SCRAM ABOVE.

I I I PLUGGED INACCURATE DP SIGNAL I H6SOB IHD IHACCURATE. DIV I MORE I NOME I 2o RPS (B) LEVEL 3e I/2 I SCRAM TRIP INHIBITED.

I I RSS LT116 I BROIEM I MIMIIGBI DP SIGNAL I LI-116 IHD UW LEVEL I NONE I I I I I PLUGGED I INACCURATE DP SIGNAL I LI-116 IND IMACCURATE I NONE I I I B22 I X095B BROEEM I MIMIMN DP SIGNAL I LIS H695B IHD U% LEVEL. I HONE I DIV 2, I/2 LEVEL 3 AOS (B)

I INITIATIOM.

I PLUGGED I INACCURATE DP SIGNAL I H695B IHD 1HACCURATE. DIV I HONE I HOME I 2o I/2 LEVEL 3 ADS (B) IXI I TIATION IHHISITED.

CL7,1 RPV Ml3, 1904 TAP (LEVEL VARIABLE LEG)

APPENDIX h CONTROL SYSTEHS COHHOH SENSOR LINE FAILURE ANALYSIS HIRE MlLE POIHT 2 SHEET 2 OF 2 I RPV LIQUID I LIXK I SYS I SENSOR I FAILURE LEVEL PRESSURE OR XO. ID ID NO. TYPE PRIHARY EFFECTS SECOXDARY EFFECTS BNER LEVEL EFFECTS COHSIMEO EfFECTS 7 I C33 I M0048 BROKEN HINIHtN DP SIGNAL I LI-R606B IHD QN LEVEL. I MOHE I NOXE I lS-K6248o I/3 HIGH LEVEL I TIIRBINE AHD Bt PUHP TRIPS I INHIBITED.

IF SELECTED, LT-K626h/8 flN I REACTOR POVER DECREASES AXD I RPV HICH LEVEI 8 SCRAH PRE-I LI:VEL TRIP. BOTH RECIRC I LEVEL INCREASES. PROBABLE I CLUDED BY RPV LON LEVEL 3 PUMPS RUH BACK TO LFHG SET. I RPV HIGH LEVEL 8 REACTOR I SCRAH FROH 822-MOSOA AND B lf COHTROLLIHG, FV FLOP I SCRAH. I TRIPS ABOVE.

I IUrmaSES. I I I I I PLUGGED I IXACCURATE DP SIGNAL I R6068 IND INACCURATE. K6248 I MONE I MOME I/3 HIGH LEVEL TURBINE AND I FM PUMP TRIP INHIBITED.

IF SELECTED, K626A/8 UN I LEVEL TRIP AND RECIRC I RUNBACK IHHIBITED.

IF COHTROLLIHG, IHACCURATE LEVEL CONTROL, I

C33 I N004C BROKEN I HINIHUH DP SIGNAL I LI-R606C IND LOM LEVEL. I HONE I MOME I LS-K624Co I/3 MICH LEVEL 8 I I TURSIHE AHD Rl PUHP TRIPS I IHHISITED.

I PLUGCKD I INACCURATE DP SIGNAL I R606C IHD INACCURATE> OTHER- I HONE ~ I MOXE I I MISE, SAHE AS BROKEN. I I I I I I I C33 I N017 BROKEN I HINIHUH DP SIGXAL I LR-R60$ IHD UN LEVEL I HONE I HONE I I I I I I PLUGGKD I INACCURATE DP SIGNAL I R608 IHD INACCURATE I HONE I NONE I

CL7.2 RPV N13 190 TAP (CONT'D)

APPENDIX h COHIROL SYSTEMS COHHOH SEHSOR LIHE FAILURE AHALYSIS HIHE NILE POINT 2 SHEET I OF I RPV LlllUID LIME ( SYS FAILURE LEVEL PRESSURE OR

( SENSOR (

ID ID NO. PRIMARY EFFECTS SECONDARY EFFECTS POMER LEVEL EFFECTS B22 I X013L HIMNW DP SIGNAL ( LIS-N673L IXD UN LEVEL. NONE I DlV 3, I/2 LOM LEVEL 2 HPCS

( IHITIATIOH. LS-H674L HIGH LEVEL 8 HPCS SIIUIIXNM

( INHIBITED.

I PLUGGED ( INACCURATE DP SIGNAL ( N673L IHD IHACCURATE. DIV ( MONE I MOXE I 3, I/2 MM LEVEL 2 HPCS IMITIATIOH IHHIBITED, OIHER-I MISE, SAME AS BROIEM.

I B22 X013R I BROKEN HIXIHW DP SIGNAL ( LIS-N673R IXD LOM LEVEL. ( NONE I DIV 3, I/2 LOM LEVEL 2 HPCS

( INITIATION. LS-M674R, I/2 I LEVEL 8 HPCS TRIP INHIBITED.

I I M613R IHD INACCURATE. DIV I NONE ~

I PLUGGED I INACCURATE DP SIGNAL ( MONE I I 3, I/2 LEVEL 2 HPCS IHITIA-I I TIOH IHHIBITEDo OTHERMISEs I ( SANE AS BROKEN.

I I B22 ( M081C BNNEX I HIXIHlw DP SIGXAL ( LIS-N681C IXD ON LEVEL. ( NOME ( XONE I DIV 3, I/2 LEVEL 2 NS4 AND I

( LS-N684C, I/2 LEVEL I HS4 I I ISOLATIOHS. I/2 STANDBY GAS I

( TREATMENT IHITIATIOH. I I I I PLUGGED I INACCURATE DP SIGNAL ( N681C IHD INACCURATE. DIV ( MONE XONE I 3~ I/2 LEVEL I AND 2o HS4 I ISODLTIOH TRIP MllBlTED.

CLS. I RPV H12 3404 TAP (LEVEL VARIABLE LEG)

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APP h CONTROL SYSTEHS COtSON SENSOR LINE Fhl LURE ANALYSIS NINE MILE POINT 2 SHEET 1 Oi I RPV LlqUID LINE l SYS I SENSOR ihlLURE LEVEL PRESSURE OR XO. ID ID MO. TYPE PRItthRY EFFECTS SECONDARY EFFECTS POMKR LEVEL EFFECTS 12 I R22 8032 RROEEX 8AIMkI DP SIGNAL I DPI-R613 IXD HIGH DPIFMM I NONE ) NOME I I PLUGGED ) INACCURATE DP SIGNAL DPI-R613 IND IXACCURATE XONE I MONE I

I C12 MOOS NNNEX 8AXIHNI DP SIGNAL ) DPI-R009y R602 8108 DP ) NONE I MOXE I l I PLUOGED l INACCURATE DP SIQULL I R009e R602 IMACCURATE ) MONE ) NONE I I I I C12 E011 RROEEM 8AEINW DP SICXAL l DPI R005 ~ R603 81GH DP NONE I MOXE l I I I I I PLUGCED I INACCURATE DP SIQULL ) R005, R602 INACCURATE ) NONE f XOXE I I I I I I E22 N057 RROKEX 8AEIHNI DP BIGNAL I 8657 IND, HIGH DP ) NONE ) NOXE I I I

) PLUGGED ) INACCURATE DP BIQULL 8657 IXD MLCCURATE I MONE ( XONE CL12.1 RPV Nll BOTTO8 HEAD TAP (LEVEL VARIABLE LEG) 12-2477 (21)

4 APPENDIX A CONTROL SYSTEMS COtSOH SENSOR LINE iAILURE ANALYSIS NINE NILE POINT 2 SHEET 1 Oi I I RPV LlljUID I LINE I SYS I SENSOR I ihlLURE I LEVEL PRESSURE OR NO. ID ID MO. TYPE PRIMARY EFFECTS SECONDARY EFFECTS POVER LEVEL EFFECTS COHBI RED EFFECTS X003l il-R603h Ii COHTROLLING,UNFH FLMFLON.

13 I C33 BROKEN NINIIGW DP SIGNAL I IHD STEAN ) RPV LEVEL DECREASES, STABIL- ( NONE

) 1ZES AT LOMB LEVEL I DECREASES. I I I I PLUGGED I INACCURATE DP SIGNAL ) il-R603A IHD INACCURATE. I NOME ) NONE

) IF COHTROLLIHG, FN HlN I RESPONSE REDUCED.

I K31 MO86C BROKEN MNIIGBl DP SIGNAL ( DPIS.N686C IHD UN FUN. I MOME X086D ( DPIS-N686D IMD UN FlAN I I STEAN LINE A HIGH FUN HSIVs I

( CLOSER INHIBITED. I I I I PLUGGED INACCURATE DP SIGNAL i N686C/D IMD INACCURATE, I MOME I OTHUNISE, SAHE AS BROKEN.

I I

I CL13.1 HAIN STEAN LINE h, FE HOOSA MICH PRESSURE TAP 12-2477 (22)

0-APPENDIX h CONTROL SYSTEHS COHHOM SENSOR LINE FAILURE ANALYSIS MINE HILE POINT 2 SHEET I OF I I RPV LIQUID I LINE I SYS SENSOR FAILURE I LEVEL PRESSURE OR MO. ID ID MO. TYPE PRIMARY EFFECTS SECONDARY EFFECTS POVKR LEVEL EFFECTS 14 C33 X003A l6$m I MAXIHtH DP SIGNAL ( FI-R603A IMD HIGH FUN.

STEAM ) RPV LEVEL INCREASES, STABIL- ) MONE I 1 l IZES AT HIGHER LEVEL I IF CONTROLLIXG, FV FlAN I i INCREASES.

I l PLUGGED I INACCURATE DP SIGNAL Fl-R603A IND INACCURATE. ] MOME I MONE

)

li FIAN CONTROLLINGi REDUCED EV RESPONSE.

)

I

) l31 ) X086C ( BROEEX ) HAIISW DP SIGNAL I DPIS-M686C/D HIGH STEAM ) IISIV CLOSURE, SUBSEQUENT I HSIV CLOSlmE, REACTOR SCRAM i X086D I FUNI. STEAN LINE h HIGH I REACTOR SCRAM.

I FLOU HSIVs CLOSURE. I I I PLUGGED I INACCURATE DP SIGNAL ( X686C/D IND INACCURATE. ( MONE XONE

) STEAN LIME h HIGH FUAI HSIVo I I CLOSURE INHIBITED.

CL14.1 HAIN STEAN LINE A, FN-M005h LOU PRESSURE TAP 12-2471 (23)

APPENDIX h CONTROL SYSTEMS COHHON SENSOR LINE FAILURE ANALYSIS NINE MILE POINT 2 SHEET I OF I RPV LIQUID LINE I SENSOR FAILURE LEVEL PRESSURE OR I SYS NO. ID ID NO. TYPE PRIMARY EFFECTS SECONDARY EFFECTS POVER LEVEL EFFECTS COMB INED EFfECTS 1$ I C33 I M03B I BROKEN I IIIMIHWDP SIGNAL I FI-R6038 IND IAN STEAN FlAN. I RPV LEVEL DECREASES, I MoME I lf CONTROLLIMG, FM FUN I STABILIZES AT LOMER LEVEL.

I DECREASES. I I I I PLUGGED I INACCURATE DP SIGNAL I R603B IND INACCURATE. I NONE I MONE I I If CONTROLLIMG, REDUCED FN I I I I FLOM RESPONSE. I I I I I I I E31 M081C I BROKEN I HINIHW DP SIGNAL I DPIS-N618C/D IAN STEAN FLO'M. I NONE I NONE Nosm I STEAN LINE B HIGH FLOM HSIVa I I CLOSURE INHIBITED. I I I I PLUGGED I INACCURATE DP SIGNAL I N681C(D IMD INACCURATE, I MoNE I NONE I OTHERMISE, SANE As BaokEN.

CL15. I HAIN STEAM LINE B, FE-N0058 HIGH PRESSURE TAP 12-2471 (24)

APPENDIX h CONTROL SYSTEMS COtSOM SENSOR LIME FAILURE ANALYSIS NINE NILE POINT 2 SHEET I OF 1 I RPV LIQUID

) LINE ( SYS ( SENSOR FAILURE ) LEVEL PRESSURE OR ID ID MO. TYPE PRIMARY EFFECTS SECONDARY EifECTS BNER LEVEL EFFECTS COMBINED EFFECTS C33 I N003B BROEEN I NAXIHW DP SIGNAL" ) FI-R603B HIGH STEAN FuN. ) RPV LEVEL IMCREASESi I NONE

) IF COMTROLLIMG, W FUN I STABILIZES AT HIGHER LEVEL.

I INCREASES. I I

I PLUGGED i INACCURATE DP SIGNAL R603B IHD INACCURATE. I NONE I NONE IF COhTROLLIHG, REDUCED FW I FaOV amPOMSE.

I E31 ) N087C I BROKEN I NAXIlfQIDP SIGNAL ) DPIS-MCi87C/D HIGH STEAN ) NSIV CLOSURE, SUBSEQUEHT J NSIV CLOSURE, REACTOR SCRAII I N087D I FUN. STEAN LIME B NIGH ) REhCTOR SCRAM.

I FLON ItDIVe CLOSURE. I I I I PLUGGED I INACCURATE DP SIGNAL ) N687C/D IND IHACCllRATE. I MONE HONE I STEAN LIME B HIGH HlN NSIia I

) CLOSURE INHIBITED.

CLI .I MAIM STEAM LIHE B, FE-H005B 1AN PRESSURE TAP 12-2477 (25)

APPENDIX h CONTROL SYSTEMS COSOM SENSOR LINE FAILURE ANALYSIS NINE NILE POINT 2 SHEET I Oi I RPV LIQUID I LIHX ) SYS SENSOR ) FAILURE I LEVEL PRESSURE OR MO. ID ID MO. TYPE PRIMARY EFFECTS SECONDARY EFFECTS HNER LEVEL EffECTS COtSI RED EFFECTS 17 I C33 I MOO3C ) Emm NIMOGN DP SIGNAL ) fl R603 IMD LOQ STEAN FuN. I RPV LEVEL DECREASES, I NONE

) If COHTROLLIKG, FN fuN I STABILIZES AT GNKR LEVEL.

I DECREASES. I I I I PlljGGED I INACCURATE DP SIGNAL ) R603C IHD INACCURATE. I MOME

) lf COHTROLLIHG, REDUCED Rt I NONE

) HlN RESPONSE.

I E31 I N088C I EROKEM I NIMml DP SIGNAL ) DPIS-M688C/D QN SYPH FDN. ) NORE ) NOHE i STEAN LINE C HIGH FUN NSIVa I I CLOSURr. IMHIalTED. I I I INACCURATE DP SIGNAL ( N688C/D IMD IHACCURATEs I MOME I NONE I OTNERNISE, SANE AS RROEEH.

CL17.1 HAIH STEQl LINE C, FE-HOOSC HIGH PRESSURE TAP 12-2477 (26)

APPENDIX A CONTROL SYSTEMS COMMON SEHSOR LIME FAILURE AMALYSIS NINE MILE POINT 2 SHEET 1 OF I I RPV LIQUID

) LINE I SYS SENSOR FAILURE LEVEL PRESSURE OR HO. ID ID NO. TYPE PRIMARY EFFECTS SECOHDARY EFFECTS POMER LEVEL EFFECTS COMBINED EFFECTS 14 I C33 M003C I BROKEN ) !QXINRI DP SICHAL ) Fl-R603C HICH STEAM FlAN. ( RPV LEVEL INCREASES, I MOME

) IF COHTROLLIHG, FN FIAN I STABILIZES AT HIGHER LEVEL.

) INCREASES. I I I

) PLUGGED ) 1MACCURATE DP SIGNAL ) R603C IND INACCURATE. f MONE I MONE f IF COHTROLLIHG, REDUCED W f FIAW RESPONSE.

) E31 ( MOddC ) BROKEN ) MAXIMIZE DP SIGNAL ( DPIS-M688C/D HIGH STEAM ( MSIV CLOSURE. SUBSEQUENT I MSIV CLOSURE REACTOR SCRAM l MObbD ) FIAT. STEAM LINE C HIGH I REACTOR SCRAM.

) FIATS MSIVa CLOSURE. I I I

) M688C/D IND INACCURATE. ) MOME ) NONE

) STEAM LIME C HIGH FuN MSIVa I

) CLOSURE INHIBITED.

CL18.1 HAIN STEAM LIHE C, FE-N005C IAN PRESSURE TAP

APPENDIX h CONTROL SYSTEMS COtSOM SENSOR LINE FAILURE ANALYSIS NINE NILE POINT 2 SHEET I OF I RPV LIQUID LIME SYS I SENSOR FAILURE LEVEL PRESSURE OR NO. ID ID NO. TYPE SECONDARY EFfECTS POIKR LEVEL EFfECTS COHBIMED EFFECTS 19 I C33 I N003D ) BROEEN HINIHtRI DP SIGNAL ) FI-R603D IND UN STEAN F lN. ) RPV LEVEL DECREASES, I ) IF CONTROLLING, FM FllN I STABILIZES AT DNER LEVEL.

I ) DECREASES. I I I I I PLINY I 1NACmRATE DP SIGNAL ) R603D IND INACCURATE. i NONE I MOME

) IF CONTROLLING, REDUCED FV I Fue HESPONSE.

I I E31 I N089C BROKEN HIMIHtRI DP SIGNAL ( DPIS"H689C/D uN STEAM PION. I NOME I MONE I N089D" I STEAU LINE D HIGH fuN HSIVs

( CLOSCIR INHIBITED.

I I PLUGGED IMACCImATE DP SIGNAL ) N689C/D IND INACCURATE, I MOME

) OTHEIaaSE, SAHE AS BROXEN.

CL19.1 HAIN STEAM LINE D, FE-M005D HIGH PRESSURE TAP l2-2417 (28)

APPENDIX A CONTROL SYSTEMS COtSON SENSOR LINE FAILURE ANALYSIS NINE NILE POINT 2 SHEET I OF I I RPV LIQUID

) LIME I SYS SENSOR ) FAILURE ) LEVEL PRESSURE OR NO. ID ID MO. TYPE PRI NARY EFFECTS SECOHDARY EFFECTS ONER LEVEL EFFECTS 20 C33 M003D I RROKEM I NAXIIRRI DP SIGNAL ) Ff-R603D IND HIGH STEAN I RPV LEVEL IHCREASESo I FLOlt. IF COHTROLLINGo FV I STABILIZES AT NIGHER LEVEL.

) FLOM INCREASES. I I I PNGGED INACCURATE DP SIGNAL ) R603D IND INACCURATE. IF ) NORE ) MONE

( CONTROLLING, REDUCED FV FllW I I

) RESPONSE. I l I I E31 I N089C I RROEEM I HAXIISBI DP SIGNAL ) DPIS-M689C/D NIGH STEAN ) HSIV CLOSURE, SUBSEQUENT ) HSIV CLOSURE, REACTOR SCRAll I M089D ) FLOlt. STEAM LINE D NIGH I REACTOR SCRAIl

) FLOM HSIVs CLOSURE. I I I PLUGGED I INACCURATE DP SIGNAL ) N689C/D IHD INACCURATE. I NOME I NOME I STEAN LINE D MIGS HlN HSIVa I I CLOSURE IMRISITED.

CL20. I HAIN STEAH LIHE D, FE-H005D LOM PRESSURE TAP i~ ~eve /col

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APPENDIX A CONTROL SYSTEMS COHHOH SENSOR LIME FAILURE ANALYSIS NINE NILE POINT 2 SHEET I Oi I I RPV LIQUID I LINE I SYS ) SENSOR I FAILURE I LEVEL PRESSURE OR MO. ID ID MO. TYPE PRIMARY EFFECTS SECONDARY EFFECTS POOR LEVEL EFFECTS COMBINED EFFECTS 23 I C33 I M0025 I BROKEN I NMINW DP SIGNAL ) Fl-R604B IMD ilN FM FUN I REACTOR PONER DECREASES, RPV I RPV HIGH LEVEL B TURBINE t FS-K6ISA/B RECIRC PUMPS TRIP LEVEL INCREASES, PROBABLE I TRIP AMD REACTOR SCRAM.

) TO LFIIG SET. Ii CONTROL- ) MIGM LEVEL 8 TURBINE TRIP I LIMO, FV FUN INCREASED. ) AND SCRAII.

I I I PLUGGED I INACCURATE DP SIGNAL I R-604B IHD INACCURATE. ( NOME I K61$ h/B FV LINE B LOM FUN I RECIRC PUHPS TRIP INHIBITED.

lf CONTROLLIHG, REDUCED W l YIOQ CHANGE/RESPONSE.

CL23. I HAIN FEEWATER LINE B, FE-H001B HIGH PRESSURE TAP

APPENDIX h CONTROL SYSTEMS COMMON SENSOR LINE FAILURE ANALYSIS MINE MILE POINT 2 SHEET I OF 1 RPV I.IQUID

) LINE I SYS SEHSOR I FAILURE LEVEL PRESSURE OR MO. ID ID MO. TYPE PRIMARY EFFECTS SECONDARY EFFECTS POVER LEVEL EFFECTS COMBINED EFFECTS 24 I C33 MOO2B I BROm I MAXIMlNDP SIGNAL ) Fl-R604B IHD HIGH Rf FLtN. ) RPV LEVEL DECREASES, I RPV llW LEVEL 3 REACTOR

) FS-E618A/B F11 LINE B UN I PROBABLE llN LEVEL 3 SCRAM. ) SCRAM.

) FUN RECIRC PUMPS TRIP IHHIBITED IF CONTROLLING' l 4 FQN DECREASES ~

I I PLUGGED I INACCURATE DP SIGNAL ) R604B IHD INACCURATE. IF ) MONE i COHTROLLIHG, FV FIOM CHANGE/ I RESPONSE REDUCED'THERHISE ~ I I SAME AS BROEEN CL2 .I MAIN FKEDVATER LIHE B, FE-HOOlB UN PRESSURE TAP 12-2477 (33)

APPENDIX h COHTROL SYSTEMS COHHOM SENSOR LIME FAILURE ANALYSIS MINE NILE POINT 2 SHEET I OF I I RPV LIQUID

) LINE I SYS I SENSOR I FAILURE I LEVEL PRESSURE OR MO. ID ID MO. TYPE PRIMARY EFFECTS'ECONDARY EFFECTS POIIER LEVEL EFFECTS COMBINED EFfECTS 2S I CWI I 2CMH- I BROEEM I HIMIHW PRESSURE SIGNAL ) 2CNN-PIOA fEED PUHP SUCTION ( SLIGHT DECREASE IM RPV ) MONE Psnh I PRESSURE QN ANNUNCIATION, ) LEVEL. REACTOR POOR IS

) 2CMH- INDICATIOM STARTS STANDBY ) REDUCED, PSIAA I f CONDENSATE BOOSTER PUMP,

) lCMH- ) TRIPS FEED PUMP 2FNS-PIA,

) FIANT RUNBACK TO 6$ PERCENT

) OF RATED LOAD.

I I PLUGGED I INACCURATE PRESSURE SIGHAL ) INDICATOR PIIOA IMACClSATR. f MONE

) PUtlP 280-Plh lllLL COHTIHUE

) TO RUM IF SUCTION PRESSURE l 1$ LM RESUL'IIHG IN PUMP

) DAMAGE. STANDBY CONDENSATE I PUMP START INHIBITED.

) MOTE: ONLY h LINE INSTRU-( MENTS LISTED, B AHD C LIME I HSTRUHENTS AMD EFFECTS I SIHIMt.

I CL25. I REACTOR FEEDMATER PUMP h SUCTION LIHE TAP Vlbh

APPEHDIX A COHTROL SYSTEHS ColQIOH SENSOR LINK FAILURE AHALYSIS HIHK ttILK POINT 2 SHEET ) Oi I RPV LIQUID LINK SYS SENSOR I FAILURE I LEVEL PRESSURE OR No. ID ID NO. TYPE PRIttARY EFFECTS SECONDARY EFFECTS POMER LEVEL EFFECTS ~ COHBINKD EFFECTS 26 DSR 2DSR ) BROKEN ) Ii INITIALSTAHDPIPK LEVEL ) "HolsTURE sEPARAT0R REHEATER I SLIGHT DECREASE IN FEEWATKR TKHPERATURE MILL RESULT IH NONE LT65A I ) ABOVE BROKEN LIHK, ALL I DRAIHS TROUBLE" ANNUNCIATION.I 2DSR- I IHSTRUHKHTS OH STANDPIPE I RKHEATER DRAIH I IHCREASE OF CORE POMKR MHICH I Ls68h I I SENSE DN LEVEL. I ascslvaa ZDSR-TK6A I MlLL BK CotfPKHSATED BY 2DSR- I ) HORHAL 'MATER LEVEL DRAIN ttODULATION OF CORE FlAW.

LS6lh I I CONTROL VALVES 2DSR I VK65h i I INCREASE IH 2DSR-TK6A LEVEL

) 2DSR- I ) 2DSR-LVY65h, ZDSR-LVZ65A, MILL RESULT IH 'MATER BACKUP L868A I I AHD HIGH MATER LEVEL DRAIN To REHEATER. TEHPERATURE oi I

) 2DSR- I I CONTROL VALVE 2DSR-LV68h STEAN TO LOM PRESSURE I,T68h I ) CLOSES. PARTIAL LOSS Oi TURBINE MILL REDUCE. THIS I I FEEWATER HEATIHG AT 6TH tthY RESULT IN TURBINE VIBRA-

) POIHT HEATERS 2R5-E6A, ) TIONS, TRIPi AHD REACTOR I 2R5-E68, AND 285-K6C. 8CRAH.

I DRAIH RECEIVER LEVEL MILL I INCREASE.

I BROKEN I li LHITIAL STANDPIPE LEVEL I BKMM BRGKEN LINE, ALL I

) "ttOISTURK SEPARATOR RKHEATKR I DRAINS TROUBLE" ANNUNCIA SLIGHT DECREASE IN iKEWhTKR I TEHPERATURE MILL RESULT IN I IHSTRUHEHTS ON STANDPIPE ) TIOH DRAIN VALVES I IHcaahse oF coaK POMKR MHlcH I I SKHSK HIGH LEVEL. ) 2DSR-LVX65h, ZDSR-LVY65A) I MlLL BE COHPEHSATED BY I 2DSR-LVZ65A, 2DSR-LV68A ttODULATIOH OF CORE FlAN

) OPEH. PARTIAL LOSS OF I LOSS Oi HOISTURK SEPARATOR FEKDMATER HEATIHG AT 6TH REHEATER REDUCES DN PRESS.

I POINT HEATERS ZR5-E6hi I TURBINE EFFI CIEHCY.

) ZR5-E68, AND 2R5-86C.

) REHEAT STEhtt SUPPLY VALVES

) Rt?SS-AOV92A AND B CLOSE.

) Loss 0F B0TH ttolsTURE

) sEPARATDR REHKATEas. REHEAT I I STEAN COHTROL VALVE DRAIH I ZHSS-ttOV9h AHD B I VALVES 2HSS ttOV9h AND B OPEN. I I I PLUGGED I ALL IHSIRUHKNTS SENSE I HIGH LEVEL IN DRAIN RECEIVER I POSSIBM TURBINE VIBRATIONS~ ) HONK I INACCURATE PRKSBURE. I tthY NOT OPEN DRAIN VALVE I TRIPq AHD REACTOR SCRAM, I 2DSR-LV68h RESULTIHG IN

) MATER BACKUP TO RKHKATER.

I NOTEs ONLY h LINE IHSTI?U-I ttKNTS I,ISTKD, B AND C LINE

) IHSTRUHKHTS AND EFFECTS I SIHILAR.

I CL2 ~ I ttOISTURE SEPARATOR RKHEATER DRAIN RECEIVER TAHX h LEVEL STAHDPIPK 12-2477 {35)

APPENDIX h CONTROL SYSTEHS COHHOH SENSOR LIHE FAILURE ANALYSIS HIHE NILE POIHT 2 SHEET I OF I I I I RPV LIQUID

) LINE ) SYS ) SENSOR ) FAILURE ) LEVEL PRESSURE OR NO. ID ID HO. TYPE PRIMARY EFfECTS SECONDARY EFFECTS POMER LEVEL EFFECTS I COMB RED EFFECTS 27 I HDL ) 2HDL- BROKEN I IF INITIAL STANDPiPE LEVEL ) NONE ( NONE I NONE I LSIA ) ABOVE BROKEN LIHE, ALL I 2HDL- ) IHSTRUHEHTS ON STANDPIPE L87A ) SENSE LOM LEVEI..

I BROKEN I IF INITIAL STANDPIPE LEVEL IST POIHT HEATER MATER LEVEL I LOSS OF CONDENSATE HEATER I NONE I BELOM BROKEH LINE> ALL I HIGH ANNUNCIATION. 4TH ) STRING A REDUCES FEEDMATER IHSTRUHENTS ON STANDPIPE POINT HEATER DRAIN PUHP ) TEHPERATURE TO REACTOR> CORE I SEHSE HIGH LEVEL. I 2HDL-Plh TRIP. LOSS OF FLOM ) POMER IHCRFASES. REACTOR I TO CONDENSATE SYSTEH. I RECIRCULATION FLOM DECREASES I t HOISTURE SEPARATOR DRAIN I REESTABLISHIHG POMER LEVEL.

) RECEIVER 2DSH-TK4h AND TK4B I HORHAL DRAIH VALVES t 2DSH-LVX75h AND 2DSH-LVX75B t CLOSE. 6TH POINT HEATER I HORHAL DRAIN VALVE 2HDH-LV6h CLOSE. CONDENSATE IiEATER I STRING h OUTLET VALVE 2CNH-HOV32A AHD INLET VALVE 2CNH-HOV33h CLOSE.

I I PLUGGED I ALL IHSTRUHENTS SEHSE f POSSIBLE CONDENSATE HEATER ) HONE ) NONE I INACCURATE PRESSURE I STRING "A" ISOLATION LOSS ~

I IAiEH IST POINT HEATER

) 2CHH-Elh LEVEL IS NIGH,

) MATER INDUCTIOH INTO TURBINE I MILL RESULT IH TURBINE I VIBRATIONS, POSSIBLE TllRBIHE I TRIP LEADIHG TO REACTOR SCRAM.

I I HOTE: ONLY h LINE IHSTRU I HENTS LISTEDi B AND C LINE IHSTRUHEHTS AHD EFFECTS I SIHILAR.

I CL27. I IST POIHT CONDENSATE FEEDMATER HEATER h LEVEL STAHDPIPE 12-2477 (36)

APPENDIX h COHTROL SYSTEHS COHHOH SENSOR LIHE FAILURE AHALYSIS HIHE NILE POINT 2 SHEET I OF I I I I RPV LIQUID

) LIHE ) SYS J SEHSOR ) FAILURE ) LEVEL PRESSURE OR HO. ID ID HO. TYPE PRIHARY EFFECTS SECONDARY EFFECTS POWER LEVEL EFFECTS COHBIHED EFFECTS I

28 ) HDL I 2HDL- I BROKEH I HIGH LEVEL SIGNAL ( "2ND POINT HEATER WATER I LOSS OF CONDEHSATE FEEDWATER I NONE LSSA I LEVEL HIGH" AHHUNCIATION. I HEATER STRING A. REDUCES I I 4TH POIHT HEATER DRAIN PUHP I FEEDWATER TEHPERATURE TO 2HDL-Plh TRIP. HOISTURE REACTOR, CORE POWER IHCREASES.)

I SEPARATOR DRAIN RECEIVERS REACTOR RECIRCULATIOH FLOW 2DSM-TK4A AND 2DSH-TK4B I DECREASES, REESTABLISHIHG

) HORHAL DRAIN VALVES I POWER LEVEL.

2DSH-LVX75h AND I 2DSH-LVX75B CLOSE. 6TH I POINT HEATER NORHAL DRAIH VALVE 2HDII-LV6h CLOSES.

CONDENSATE HEATER STRING h J OUTLET VALVE 2CNH-HOV32h I AHD INLET VALVE 2ChH-HOV33A I CLOSE.

I I PLUGGED I IHACCURATE PRESSURE SIGNAL POSSIBLE CONDENSATE HEATER ) HONE NONE

) STRIHG "h" ISOLATION LOSS I I WNEH 2ND POINT HEATER 2CNH-E2A LEVEL IS HIGH.

I HIGH WATER INDUCTIOH INTO I TURBINE WILL RESULT IN

) TURBINE VIBRATIONS, POSSIBLE I TURBINE TRIP, REACTOR SCRAH.

) NOTE: ONLY A LINE IHSTRU-I HENTS LISTEDo B AND C LINE INSTRUHEHTS AHD EFFECTS I SIHILAR.

I CL2B.I 2HD POINT CONDEHSATE FEEPWATER HEATER h TAP VISA (LEVEL REFERENCE LEG) 12-2477 (37)

APPENDIX h COMIROL SYSTEMS CONHOH SEHSOR LIME FAILURE ANALYSIS MIME MILE POIHT 2 SHEET I OF I I RPV LlqUID

( LIME ) SYS I SENSOR ) FAIUJRE ) LEVEL PRESSURE OR MO. ID lD NO. TYPE PRINARY EFFECTS SECONDARY EFFECTS POlKR LEVEL EFFECTS 29 MDL ) 2HDL I BROKEN I QW LEVEL SIGNAL I 2HD POINT HKhTER MATER LEVEL I POSSIBLE TURBINE TRIPo i MONE LOII ANMUMCIATIOHy OTHKRMISE ~ ) REACTOR SCRAM I SHE AS PLUGGED LIME 2S i ABOVE I

PLUGGED I INACCURATE PRESSURE SIGNAL I SANE AS BROKEN ( SANK AS BROXKN t NOTE: ONLY h LINE INSTRU-I MENTS LISTED' AND C LIME IHSTRUHENTS AMD EFFECTS I SIMILAR.

I CL29. I 2HD POINT COMDEHSATK FEEWATKR HEATER h TAP VI9h (LEVEL VARIABLE LEG) 12-2477 (38)

I v APPENDIX h CONTROL SYSmfS COIDION SENSOR LINE FAILURE ANALYSIS HINE IflLE POINT 2 SHEET I OF I I RPV LIqUID I I,INE ) SYS I SENSOR PAILURK ) LEVEL PRESSURE OR ID ID NO. TTPK PRIMARY KfFECTS SECONDARY EFFECTS POMER LEVEL EffECTS 30 HDL I 2HDL- BRDKKM ( IF INITIALSTANDPIPE LEVEL I ~'3RD POIHT HEATER MATER ) SLIGHT DECREASE IN FEEDMATER ] MOXK I LT3A I ABOVE BROKEX LINE, ALL I LEVEL PAP AHNUNCIATlOH. ] TEMPERATURE MILL RESULT IN )

) 28DL ) IMSTRNfEHTS OX STANDPIPE j 3IID POINT HEATER 2CHlf-E3h I INCREASE OF CORE POMER I LS9A ) SKXSK LOM LEVELS ) HORlfhL LEVEL DRAIN VALVE ) COHPEHSATKD BY IIODULATIOM OF (

2BDLa ) 2IIDL-LOV3h AHD HIGH LEVEL ) CORE FLOM. INCREASE IH IS13h ( DIIAIM VALVE 2HDL-LV23A i HEATER MATER LEVEL POSSIBI.Y I 2HDL I CASK IIEATER MATER LEVEL I MILL LEAD TO MATER INDUCTIOH l LS23A I Ml!.L INCREASE. LOSS OF CON- INTO TURBINE RKSULTIHG IN

) 2BDL- ) DEHSATK HEATIXG AT 3RD POINT I TURBIXE TRIP.

LT23A ) BEATER DRAIN COOM' 2QII-DCL3A.

I BROKEN ) IP INITIAL STANDPIPE LEVEL ) "3RD POINT BEATER MATER ) DECREASE IH FEEDMATER t NONE I BELOM BROKEM LIME> ALL ) LEVEL HIGH" ANNUIICIATIOH. I TEMPERATURE MILL RESULT IX

( IHSTRINEHTS OH STANDPIPE ) DRAIX VALVES 2HDL-LV3A AND ) INCREASE OF CORE POMER )

I SENSE HIGH LEVELS ] 2HDL-LV23A OPEN. 3RD POIHT t COlfPEHSATED BY IfODULATIOM OP I I HEATER 2CHH-E3A EXTRACTION ) CORE PLOM.

) STEAN ISOLATION VALVE I 2ESS-IIOV15A AHD HON-RETURN

( VALVE 2ESS-HRVI6A CLOSE.

( LOSS Oi CONDENSATE BEATING

) AT 3RD POIHT HEATER 2CIIH-E3A I

) AND DRAIN COOLER 2CNII-DCL3A. I I I I PLUGGED I ALL IMSTRUHEHTS SENSE ) HIGH MATER LEVEL HAY NOT I POSSIBLE MATER IHDUCTIOM MOME I INACCURATE PRESSURE ISOLATE HEATER EXTRACTION INTO TURBINE RESULTIHG llf

) STKhff VALVES. I TURBINE TRIP, REACTOR SCRAIf.

) HOTEi OHLY h LINE IHSTRU-I IfENTS LISTED, B AND C LIXE I INSTRUMENTS AMD EFFECTS

) SIMILAR.

I CL30. 1 3RD POIHT CONDENSATE FEEDMATER HEATER h LEVEL STANDPIPE 12-2471 (39)

APPEXDIX A CONTROL SYSTENS CONNOH SENSOR LINE FAILURE AHALYSIS MIHE NILE POINT 2 SHEET I OF I RPV LIQUID l LIME I SYS I SRHSGR ) FAILURE LEVEL PRESSURE OR NO. ID ID NO. TYPE PRI NARY EFfECTS SECOHDARY EFFECTS POMER LEVEL EFfECTS I CONE NED EffECTS 31 XDL I 2HDL- I BROKEN ( ALL INSTRUMENTS OH STAHDPIPH ) "4TH POINT HEATER 2CNN-E4h INCREASE IX HEATER MATER t

) I.T4A I ) SENSE uJM LHVEL, IF INITIAL ) MATER LEVEL LOM" AHHUHCIA- LEVEL MILL LEAD TO MATER I 2HDL- I ) STANDPIPE LKVHL ABOVE BROXRX ) TIOH, FALSE IHDICATIOH.2HDL IHDUCTIOM INTO TURBI HE LSIDA I i LIME. ) LIC4h. HORNAL LEVEL DRAIX POSSIBLY RESULTIHG IH

) 2HDL I I VALVE 2HDL-LV4A AMD HIGH I TURBINE TRIP, REACTOR SCRAM.

L814A I ) LEVEL DRAIH VALVE 2HDL-LV24h f 2HDL- I i CLOSE. 4TH POINT HEATER LS24A l ) MATER LEVEL INCREASES. LOSS )

I 2XDL- I ) Of HEATER DRAIH PUMP ihfM TO I LT24A I ) CONDENSATE SYSTE!l. I I l I I BROKEN ) ALL IMSTRUHHMTS ON STANDPIPE TH POINT HEATER MATER DECREASE IH FEEDMATER ( NOXH t SENSE HIGH LEVHLr IF INITIAL LEVEL HIGH ANNUNCIATION~ TENPERATlJRE MILL RESULT IH I STAXDPIPH LEVEL BHLOM BROHKX I FALSE INDICATION. 2HDL-LIC4A.I INCREASE OF CORE POMER MHICH I I LINE. I VALVES 2HDL LV4A AHD I MILL BE CONPENSATED BY I 2NDL LV24A OPEN ~ LOSS Of I INSULATIOH OF CORK FLOll.

I 4TH POINT HEATER DRAIN PUNP

) FLOM TO CONDENSATE SYSTEN.

) 5TH POINT HEATER NORNAL I DRAIH VALVE 2HDL-LV5A CLOSES I t MOISTURE SEPARATOR DRAIH

) RECEIVER TAHE 2DSN-TX4h AND

) TK4B. DRAIN VALVES

) 2DSN-LVX75A AND 2DSN-IVX75B

) CLOSE. EXTRACTIOH STEAN I ISOLATIOH VALVE 2ESS-NOV22A

) AHD NOM-RETURN VALVE

) 2RSS-NRV23A CLOSE. LOSS OF I CONDENSATE NRATIXG AT 4TH

) POINT HEATER.

I t PLUGGED ( ALL IMSIRUNEMTS SEMSH I HIGH MATER LEVEL IH HEATER I POSSIBLE MATER IHDUCTIOH ( XOXH I CONSTANT PRESSURE 2CHN-E4A HAY HOT ISOLATE ) INTO TlJRBINE RESULTING IH t HEATER EXTRACTION STEAN I TURBINE TRIP, REACTOR SCRAN.

) VALVES.

i NOTE: ONLY h LINE IMSTRU-I NEHTS LISTEDr b AND C LINE I HSTRINENTS AND EFFECTS I SINILAR.

I CL31. I 4TH POINT CONDENSATE FEEDMATER HEATER h LEVEL STANDPIPE 12-2477 (40)

APPENDIX h CONTROL SYSTEttS NtOH SENSOR LINE FAILURE ANALYSIS MIME NILE POINT 2 SHEET I OF I I RPV LIQUID I LINE I SYS I SENSOR I FAILURE I LEVEL PRESSURE OR lm. ID ID MO. TYPE PRIllARY EFFECTS SECONDARY EFFECTS POMER LEVEL EFFECTS COttBI RED EFFECTS 32 I HDL I 2HDL I BRORRM I IF INITIALSTANDPIPE LEVEL I "STH POINT HEATER MATER SLIGHT DECREASE IN FEKDMATER I XONE LTSA I I ABOVE BROKEN LINE, ALL I LEVEL LOM" AHHttHCIATIOH. TEMPERATURE MILL RESULT IH I 2tmL>> I I INSTRNIKMTS OX STAXDPIPE I STH POIHT HEATER XORtthf. INCREASE OF CORE POMKR MHICH I LSIIA I I SENSE LOQ LEVEL I MATER LEVEL DRAIN VALVE . I MILL BE COMPENSATED BY 2HDL I I 2HDL-LVSA AND HIGH MATER MODULATION OF CORE FLOQ.

LS25i I I LEVEL DRAIN VALVE 2llDL-LV25A I INCREASE IM HEATER MATER I 2HDL- I I CLOSE. PARTIAL LOSS OF COH- I LEVEL MILL LEAD TO MATER LT2SA I I DKXSATK HEATINO AT 4TH POIHT I INDUCTIOtl INTO TURBINE I 2HDL- I I HEATER 2CNtt-E4h. ST8 POINT I RESULTIHG IM TURBINE TRIP, I I HEATER 2CNH-ESA QATKR LEVEL I REACTOR SCRhtt.

I I MILL IltCREASR. I I I I I BROKEN I IF INITIAL STANDPIPE LEVEL I "STH POIHT HEATER MATER I DECREASE IX FEEDMATER I MOME I BELOM BROtmX LINE, ALL I LEVEL HIGH" ANNUNCIATION. I TE!fPERATURE MILL RESULT IM I I IMSTRUttEHTS OM STANDPIPE I DRAIX VALVES 2HDL-LVSA AND INCREASE OF CORE POQKR MHICH I I SENSE HIGH IIVILo I 2HDL-LV25h OPEH. PARTIAL MILL BE COtiPKMSATED BY LOSS OF CONDENSATE HKATIXG I ttODULATIOH OF CORE FLOQ.

I AT 4TH POINT HEATER I 2CNtt-K4A. STH POINT HEATER I 2CNtt-ESA EXTRACTION STEAN I ISOLATION VALVE 2ESS-ttOV2SA I CLOSES. LOSS OF CONDENSATE I HEATIHG AT STH POINT HEATER I 2CtOI-RSA.

I I PNGGRD I ALL INSTRlWKXTS SEltSE I HIGH MATER LEVEL IH HEATER I POSSIBLE ltATER IHDUCTIOX I XONE I INACCURATE PRESSURE. 2NH-ESA tthY NOT ISOLATE lltTO TURBINE RESULTING IM I mama RXTRACTIOX STRAH I TURBINE TRIP, SCRAM.

I VALVE. I I NOTE! ONLY A LINK INSTRU-MENTS LISTED' AND C LINK INSTRUttKXTS AXD EFFECTS I SIMILAR.

I CL32. I STH POINT CONDENSATE FEEDMATER HEATER A LEVEL STAXDPIPE 12-2477 VII)

APPENDIX h CONTROL SYSTKtlS CotSON SENSOR LINE FAILURE ANALYSIS HIHK NILE POINT 2 SHEET I OF I I RPV LIQUID I LINK I sYs I sENsoR I FAILURE. I LEVEL PRESSURE OR MO. ID ID MO. TYPE PRIHARY EFFECTS SECONDARY EFfECTS POMKR LEVEL EFfECTS

$3 I HDH I 2HM" I BRGKKN I IF INITIAL STANDPIPE LEVEL I 6TH POINT HEATER MATER I SLICHT DECREASE IM FKKDMATKR I MOME LT6A I IS ABOVE BROKEN LIHEi ALL I LEVEL UN" ANNUNCIATION. I TEttPKRATURE MILL RESULT IN 2HDH- I IHSTRQIKMTS OM STANDPIPE SIXTH POINT HEATER 2fMS-K6h I INCRKAGK oF coaK PerKR LSIA I SENSE llN LEVEL. I NORMAL MATER DRAIH VAI.VE I COMPENSATED BY tiODULATION OF I 2HPga I 2HDH-LV6h AND MICH MATER I CORE FLOM. INCREASE IN LSSA I LEVEL DRAIH VALVE 2HDH-LV26h I HEATER MATER IXVEL MILL LEAD I I 2MDH- I MILL REHAIH FULLY CLOSED' I TO MATER INDUCTIOH IHTO I LS26A I HEATER MATER LEVEL MILL I TURBINE REsULTING IN TURBINE I I 2MDH- I I INCREASE PARTIAL LOSS PF I TRIP, aKACToa SCRAH. I LT26A I I COHDKMSATK HEATING AT FIFTH I I PO'IMT HEATER 2CMH-K5A.

I I I BRDKKH I IF INITIALSTANDPIPE LEVEL I 678 POINT HEATER MATER LEVEL I DECREASE IH FKKDMATKR I MOME IS BELOM BROKEN LINE, ALL I MICH AMHilNCIATION. DRAIH I TEMPERATURE MILL RESULT IN INSTRUtGUITS OIt STANDPIPE I VALVES 2HDH-LV6A AMD LV26h I INcaEASF. oF coaE PeeR I I SKMSK HIGH LEVEL. I OPEN ,PARTIAL LOSS OF COM I coHPKMSATKD BY HGDULATION oF I I DENSATE 'HKATIMG AT HEATERS I coRE FLet.

I 2CNH-ESA, 2FMS-E6A EXTRAC- I I TION STEAN ISOLATIOH VALVE I I 2ESS-HOV3ho HON-RKTURH VALVE I I 2ESS-MRV34A SCAVENGING STEAN I INLET VALVE 2DSR-ADVS IA, AHD I I HOISTURE SEPARATOR RKHEATER I I DRAIN RECEIVER 2DSR-TK6A AMD I I TK68 DRAIN YALYEs I 2DSR-LVX65A AND LVX65B.

I CLOSE. LOSS OF TOTAL FEED I MATER HEATING AT 2FMS-K6h.

I PLUGGED I ALL IHSTRWEHTS SKHSK I MICH MATER LEVEL HAY HOT I POSSIBLK MATER INDUCTIOM I I IMACCURATK PaKBSURK I ISOLATE HEATER 2FMS-K6A IHTO TURBINE RESULTING IN I EXTRACTIOM STEAtt VALVES. I TURBINE TRIP, REACTOR SCRAH.

I MOTE: ONLY h LINE INSTRU-I HKHTS LISTED, B AND C LINK IHSTRUHENTS AMD EFFECTS I SIHILAR.

I CL33.1 6TH POIHT CONDENSATE FEEDMATER HEATER h LEVEL STANDPIPE

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APPENDIX h COHTROL SYSTEtfS CfHfMON SENSOR LINE FAILURE AHALYSIS MIME NILE POINT 2 SHEET 1 OF 2 f

RPV LIQUID

) LINE ) SYS ) SENSOR ) FAILURE ) LEVEL PRESSURE OR I NO. ID ID HO. TYPE PRIMLY EFFECTS SECONDARY EFFECTS POHER LEVEL EFFECTS COtfBINED EFFECTS 35 I tfSS ) 2MSS- ) RROEEH tfIMINN PRESSURE SIGNAL ) OPENS THE POLUNING: I DECREASE IM FEEDMATER I PT103 ) ) TUllBIHE STOP VALVE ABOVE ) TEtfPERATURE MILL RESULT IH )

2HSS- ) SEAT DRAIN VALVES, ) INCREASE OF CORE POftKR PTI04 2MSS-MOV2IA, 2tfSS-MOV2IBg ) COMPENSATED BY MODULATION OF )

) 2tfSS- I 2MSS-MOV21C ~ 2MSS-MOV21D I ) CORE FIAN. INCREASED STEAM

) PTI77 ) ) MAIH STEAM LIME HEADER DRAIN ) FLOM TO MAIN CONDENSER MILL I (C33- I VALVES'MSS AOV191 ~ t REDUCE STEAM BYPASS R007) ) ) 2MSS-AOV]94> 2MSS-AOV203 ~ ) CAPABILITY.

) 2tlSS-AOV205) 2tfSS-AOV209 I

) RKHEhT STEAM LOAD COHTROL I AtfD PIPING DRAIN VALVKe

) 2tSS-AOV201; EXTRACTIOM

) HEADER DRAIN VALVES, 2DTM-AOVI04, 2DIM-AOV1051

) EXTRACTION LINK DRAIN

) VALVES, 2DIM-AOV2A,

) 2DTM-AOV2B, 2DTN-AOV2C, 2DTM-AOV3A, 2DTM-AOV3B,

) 2DTM-AOV3C, 2DTM-AOVSA>

) 2DTtf-hOVSB, 2'-hOVSC, 2DTM AOVSA ~ 2DTM AOVBB~

2DTM-AOVSC; AUXILIARYSTEAM

) TO OFFGAS DRAIN VALVE, 2ASS-AOV144 RKBOILER STEAM

) LINK DRAIN VALVES, 2DTM-AOV104 ~ 2DTM-AOVI281

) TURBINE STEAM IHLET LOft

) POINT DRAIN VALVES, I 2MSS-MOVIOho 2MSS-MOVIOCs

) AUXII.IARY STEAM LINE DRAIN I VALVES> 2DTM AOV7A~

) 2DTM-AOV7B, 2DTM-AOV30A, 2DTM AOV30Bt 2Dllf AOV3 thy

) 2DTM-AOV3IB, 2DTM-AOV101 ~

2DTN-AOV107 > 2DTM-AOV142, I 2DTM AOVI43) 2DTM-AOV156;

) TURBINE GENERATOR GLAND SEAL

) AND EXHAUST STEAM DRAIN VALVE) 2DTM AOV1021 MOISTURE

) SEPARATOR ASB TO TURBIHK I DRAIN VALVES'DTM MOV79h

) AHD 2DSM-MOV79B: COLD REHEAT

) STEAM DRAIN VALVES, 2CRS-MW7h, 2CRS-MOV7B, I (CONTINUED)

CL35.1 HP TURBINE Tl TAP V92

0 APPENDIX A CONTROL SYSTEMS COMttON SENSOR LINK FAILURE AHALYSIS NINE MILE POINT 2 SHEET 2 OF 2 I RPV LIQUID I LlHE I SYS I SENSOR I FAILURE I LEVEL PRESSURE OR HO. ID ID NO. TYPE PRIMARY EFFECTS SECONDARY EFFECTS POVKR LEVKI. EFfECTS COMBINED EFFECTS 35 MSS i 2MSS- BROKEN ) MINIMUM PRESSURE SIGNAL I 2CRS-MOVShs 2CRS-MOVSBe PT103 (CONTINUED) 2CRS ttOV9hy 2CRS MOV98 ~

I 2MSS- 2CRS-MOVIBA, 2CRS-MOVISB; PTIO4 CROSS AROUND PIPIHG DRAIH I 2MSS- I VALVES~ 2HRS MOVI o

) PTll7 2tmS-MOV2; STEAM LINE DRAIN I (C33- ( VALVES, 2tlSS-AOV85A, NOOI) 2MSS AOV85B ) 2MSS AOVSSC ~

) 2MSS-AOV85D; AHD REHEATIHG STEAM PIPING DRAIN VALVEi 2MSS-tlOV I 99.

FALSE le t!AIN

) TlMINE STEAM FuN INPUT TO RECORDER

( C33-R609.

I PLUGGED I INACCURATE PRESSURE SIGNAL I NONE ) NONE HONE CL35.2 HP TURBINE Tl TAP V92 (CONTEND) 12-2411 (45)

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4 g APPENDIX h COMTROL SYSTEMS COtutOX SENSOR LIHE FAILURE ANALYSIS XIHE ttILE POINT 2 SHEET I OF I I RPV LIQUID I LINE I SYS I SEXSOR I FAILURE I LEVEL PRESSURE OR NO. ID ID MO. TYPE PRltthRY EFFECTS SECONDARY EFFECTS POltKR LEVEL EFFECTS COtmINED EFFECTS 2TIUt" REDEEM I ttlMIHtRI PRESSURE SIGNAL I OPENS THE FOLUNING: ) NONE ( NONE PSI30 l ) TURBINE STOP VALVE ABOVE I I SKAT DRAIH VALVES, I 2HSS ttOV2IA) 2HSS-ttOV2IB) 2ttSS ttOV2 I C) 2ttSS ttOV2 ID)

I HAIN STEAN LINE HEADER DRAIN l VALVES) 2ttSS AOV 1 9 1 ~

2HSS AOV194) 2HSS AOV203 ~

2ttSS AOV205, 2HSS-AOV209 ~

I CONTROL VALVE BEFORE SEAT

) DRAIN VALVE, 2ttSS-ttOVI47.

I

) CLOSE THE FOLLOWING:

) SCAVENGING STEAN COXDENSER ISOLATION VALVES, l 2DSR-AOV82A) 2DSR-AOV828)

I 2DSR-AOV83h) 2DSR-AOV838, I 2DSR-AOV84h) 2DSR-AOV84B.

I I OPEtt THE FOLUNIHG:

( TURBINE GENERATOR GLAND SEAL )

I AHD EXHAUST STEhtt DRAIN I VALVE>> 2DTtt AOV102)

I AUXILIARYSTKhtt LIHE DRAIN

) VALVE 2DTtt-hOV I 56.

I PLUGGED ) INACCURATE PRESSURE SIGNAL ) XONE ) NOHE ) XONE CL3 ~ I ttOISTURE SEPARATOR REHEATER STEAH illN CONTROL VALVES IHSTRUttKHT AIR SUPPLY LIHE 12"2477 {46)

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