IR 05000413/2014003

IR 05000413-14-003, 05000414-14-003; on 4/1/2014 - 6/30/2014; Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Integrated Inspection Report

ML14213A354
Person / Time
Site:	Catawba
Issue date:	08/01/2014
From:	Gerald Mccoy NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB1
To:	Henderson K Duke Energy Corp
References
IR-14-003
Download: ML14213A354 (38)

Text

UNITED STATES ust 1, 2014

SUBJECT:

CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000413/2014003, 05000414/2014003

Dear Mr. Henderson:

On June 30, 2014, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Catawba Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results which were discussed on July 7, 2014, with you and other members of your staff. The inspectors documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report. The inspectors did not identify any findings or violations of more than minor significance.

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 2.390, Public Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Gerald McCoy, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos.: 50-413, 50-414, 72-45 License Nos.: NPF-35, NPF-52

Enclosure:

Integrated Inspection Report 05000413/2014003, 05000414/2014003 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

REGION II==

Docket Nos.: 50-413, 50-414 License Nos.: NPF-35, NPF-52 Report Nos.: 05000413/2014003, 05000414/2014003 Licensee: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Facility: Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Location: York, SC 29745 Dates: April 1, 2014 through June 30, 2014 Inspectors: A. Hutto, Senior Resident Inspector R. Cureton, Resident Inspector R. Williams, Senior Reactor Inspector (Section 1R08)

M. Coursey, Reactor Inspector (Section 1R08)

C. Dykes, Health Physicist (Sections 2RS3, 2RS4)

W. Loo, Senior Health Physicist (2RS1, 2RS2, 4OA1)

J. Rivera, Senior Health Physicist (2RS1, 2RS5)

P. Cooper, Reactor Inspector (Section 4OA5.3)

Approved by: Gerald McCoy, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 1 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000413/2014-003, 05000414/2014-003; 4/1/2014 - 6/30/2014; Catawba Nuclear Station,

Units 1 and 2, Integrated Inspection Report.

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by the resident inspectors and six Region-based reactor inspectors. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process revision 5. No

NRC-Identified

or self-revealing findings were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

Unit 1 began the inspection period at or near 100 percent Rated Thermal Power. On May 6, 2014, the Unit was shutdown for a refueling outage. Unit 1 was restarted on June 24, 2014, and reached 100 percent Rated Thermal Power on June 30, 2014.

Unit 2 operated at or near 100 percent Rated Thermal Power for the entire inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection

a. Inspection Scope

Adverse Weather Preparation: The inspectors reviewed the licensees preparations for adverse weather associated with hot ambient temperatures including a review of procedures and work orders implemented by the licensee to ensure plant equipment is adequately protected during the hot weather season. The inspectors also performed field walkdowns to assess the material condition and operation of ventilation and cooling equipment as well as other preparations made to protect plant equipment from high seasonal temperatures. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the licensees corrective action program to assess the licensees ability to identify and resolve deficient conditions associated with hot weather protection equipment prior to seasonal high temperatures.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Evaluation of Summer Readiness of Offsite and Alternate AC Power Systems: The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures and measures designed to monitor and maintain availability and reliability of both the offsite AC power system (grid) and the onsite alternate AC power systems prior to the onset of summer weather conditions and the resulting higher load demand on the grid. This included the review of the licensees station, nuclear division, and power delivery group procedures defining the coordination of activities that could impact the on-site and offsite AC power systems and the communication protocols established between the power delivery group and Catawba to verify that the appropriate information is exchanged when issues arise that could impact the AC power systems. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

Partial Walkdowns: The inspectors performed three partial system walkdowns during the activities listed below to assess the operability of redundant or diverse trains and components when safety-related equipment was inoperable. The inspectors performed walkdowns to identify any discrepancies that could impact the function of the system and, therefore, potentially increased risk. The inspectors reviewed applicable operating procedures and walked down system components, selected breakers, valves, and support equipment to determine if they were in the correct position to support system operation. The inspectors reviewed protected equipment sheets, maintenance plans, and system drawings to determine if the licensee had properly identified and resolved equipment alignment problems that could cause initiating events or impact the capability of mitigating systems or barriers and entered them into the corrective action program.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• 1B residual heat removal (ND) pump while the 1A ND pump was unavailable for planned maintenance

• 1B auxiliary feedwater (CA) pump while the 1A CA pump was unavailable for planned maintenance

• 1A diesel generator (DG) while the 1B DG was unavailable for outage maintenance activities Complete System Walkdown: The inspectors conducted one detailed walkdown/review of the Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater system. The inspectors used licensee procedures and licensing and design documents to verify that the system (i.e., pump, valve, and electrical) alignment was correct; valves and pumps for diesel support systems did not exhibit leakage that would impact their function; major portions of the system and components were correctly labeled; hangers and supports were correctly installed and functional; and essential support systems were operational. In addition, pending design and equipment issues were reviewed to determine if the identified deficiencies significantly impacted the systems functions. Items included in this review were: the operator workaround list; the temporary modification list; and outstanding maintenance work requests/work orders. A review of open Problem Investigation Program reports (PIPs) was also performed to verify that the licensee had appropriately characterized and prioritized safety-related equipment problems for resolution in the corrective action program. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

Fire Protection Walkdowns: The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the four plant areas listed below to assess the licensees control of transient combustible material and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression capabilities, fire barriers, and any related compensatory measures. The inspectors observed the fire protection suppression and detection equipment to determine whether any conditions or deficiencies existed which could impair the operability of that equipment. The inspectors selected the areas based on a review of the licensees safe shutdown analysis probabilistic risk assessment and sensitivity studies for fire-related core damage accident sequences. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Unit 1 mechanical penetration room 543 feet level

• Unit 2 mechanical penetration room 577 feet level

• Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater pump room

• Unit 2 essential switchgear room (2ETB)

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), Individual Plant Examination, and flood analysis documentation associated with internal plant areas to determine the effect of flooding. The inspectors reviewed the licensees internal flood protection features for the auxiliary building 543 feet and 522 feet elevations including curbs, floor drains and sump pumps credited to protect safety related equipment on these elevations. The internal areas were selected and walked down based on the flood analysis calculations. Through observation and design review, the inspectors verified that curbs were intact, floor drains were unobstructed, and that material condition of safety related sump pumps and sump level instrumentation were good, and that the equipment was operable. The inspectors reviewed corrective action program documents to verify that the licensee was identifying issues and resolving them.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R08 Inservice Inspection Activities

a. Inspection Scope

Non-Destructive Examination Activities and Welding Activities: The inspectors conducted an onsite review of the implementation of the licensees inservice inspection (ISI) program for monitoring degradation of the reactor coolant system, emergency feedwater systems, risk-significant piping and components, and containment systems in Unit 1. The inspectors activities included either a direct observation or a review of non-destructive examinations (NDE) to evaluate compliance with the applicable edition of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code (BPVC),Section XI and Section V (Code of record: 1998 Edition with 2000 Addenda)requirements, and to verify that indications and defects (if present) were appropriately evaluated and dispositioned in accordance with the requirements of the ASME Code,Section XI, acceptance standards or an NRC-approved alternative.

• Ultrasonic Testing (UT) on Weld C1.C5.11.0030, 14 Elbow-to-Pipe Weld, ASME Class 2 (direct observation)

• UT on Weld C1.C5.11.0031, 14 Pipe-to-Elbow Weld, ASME Class 2 (direct observation)

• UT on Weld C1.G3.1.0013, 1.5 Pipe-to-Nozzle Weld, ASME Class 1 (records review)

• UT on Weld C1.G12.1.0003, 1.5 Nozzle-to-Pipe Weld, ASME Class 1 (records review)

• UT on Weld C1.G3.1.0001, 1.5 Nozzle-to-Pipe Weld, ASME Class 1 (records review)

• Liquid Penetrant Testing on Weld 1CA91-4, 4 Pipe-to-Component weld, ASME Class 2 (records review)

• Magnetic Particle Testing on Weld 1KD15-29, 8 Pipe weld, ASME Class 3 (records review)

• Direct Visual Examination of the Reactor Pressure Vessel Bottom-Mounted Instrument Penetrations, ASME Class 1 (records review)

The inspectors reviewed the welding activities referenced below and reviewed associated documents in order to evaluate compliance with procedures and the ASME Code. The inspectors reviewed the work order, repair and replacement plan, weld data sheets, welding procedures, procedure qualification records, welder performance qualification records, and NDE reports.

• Weld 1KD15-29, 8 Pipe weld, ASME Class 3

• Weld 1CA91-4, 4 Pipe to Component weld, ASME Class 2 During non-destructive surface and volumetric examinations performed since the previous refueling outage, the licensee did not identify any relevant indications that were analytically evaluated and accepted for continued service. Therefore, no NRC review was completed for this inspection procedure attribute.

Pressurized Water Reactor Vessel Upper Head Penetration Inspection Activities: For the Unit 1 vessel head, a bare metal visual examination (BMV) was required this outage pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55a. The inspectors reviewed portions of the Unit 1 BMV examination and reviewed NDE reports for vessel upper head penetrations to determine if the activities, including the disposition of indications and defects, were conducted in accordance with the requirements of ASME Code Case N-729-1 and 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D). In particular, the inspectors evaluated if the required visual examination scope/coverage was achieved and limitations (if applicable) were recorded in accordance with the licensee procedures. Additionally, the inspectors evaluated if the licensees criteria for visual examination quality and instructions for resolving interference and masking issues were consistent with 10 CFR 50.55a.

The licensee did not identify any relevant indications that were accepted for continued service during the BMV exam. Additionally, the licensee did not perform any welding repairs to the vessel head penetrations since the beginning of the last Unit 1 refueling outage; therefore, no NRC review was completed for these inspection procedure attributes.

Boric Acid Corrosion Control Inspection Activities: The inspectors reviewed the licensees boric acid corrosion control (BACC) program activities to ensure implementation with commitments made in response to NRC Generic Letter 88-05, Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary, and applicable industry guidance documents. Specifically, the inspectors performed an onsite record review of procedures, and the results of the licensees containment walkdown inspections performed during the current spring refueling outage. The inspectors also interviewed the BACC program owner, conducted an independent walkdown of containment to evaluate compliance with licensees BACC program requirements, and verified that degraded or non-conforming conditions, such as boric acid leaks, were properly identified and corrected in accordance with the licensees BACC and corrective action programs (CAP).

The inspectors reviewed the following condition reports and associated corrective actions related to evidence of boric acid leakage to evaluate if the corrective actions completed were consistent with the requirements of the ASME Code Section XI and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.

• WR 1076998 - Minor boric acid leak

• WR 1062569 - Boric acid packing leak

• WR 1102665 - Boric acid leak from pump seal The inspectors reviewed the following engineering evaluations completed for evidence of boric acid leakage to determine if degraded components were documented in the CAP.

The inspectors also evaluated corrective actions for any degraded components to determine if they met the ASME Section XI Code.

• C-13-05494 - Active boric acid leak from valve 1-NM-VA-0083

• C-13-00248 - Active boric acid leak from pipe cap of 1-NS-VA-5

• C-14-00843 - Brown boric acid found on 1-NS-FE-5020 flange Steam Generator Tube Inspection Activities: The inspectors observed the following activities and/or reviewed the following documentation and evaluated them against the licensees technical specifications, commitments made to the NRC, ASME Section XI, and Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 97-06 (Steam Generator Program Guidelines):

• Reviewed the licensees in-situ steam generator (SG) tube pressure testing screening criteria. In particular, the inspectors assessed whether assumed NDE flaw sizing accuracy was consistent with data from the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) examination technique specification sheets (ETSS) or other applicable performance demonstrations

• Compared the numbers and sizes of SG tube flaws/degradation identified against the licensees previous outage Operational Assessment

• Reviewed the SG tube eddy current testing (ET) examination scope and expansion criteria

• Evaluated if the licensees SG tube ET examination scope included potential areas of tube degradation identified in prior outage SG tube inspections, and/or as identified in NRC generic industry operating experience applicable to the licensees SG tubes

• Reviewed the licensees implementation of their extent-of-condition inspection scope and repairs for new SG tube degradation mechanisms. No new degradation mechanisms were identified during the ET examinations

• Reviewed the licensees repair criteria and processes

• Verified that primary-to-secondary leakage (e.g., SG tube leakage) was below 3 gallons per day, or the detection threshold, during the previous operating cycle according to licensee procedures

• Evaluated if the ET equipment and techniques used by the licensee to acquire data from the SG tubes were qualified or validated, to detect the known/expected types of SG tube degradation in accordance with Appendix H, Performance Demonstration for Eddy Current Examination, of EPRI Pressurized Water Reactor Steam Generator Examination Guidelines, Revision 7

• Reviewed the licensees secondary side SG Foreign Object Search and Retrieval activities

• Reviewed ET personnel qualifications Identification and Resolution of Problems: The inspectors reviewed a sample of ISI-related problems that were identified by the licensee and entered into the CAP as problem identification program (PIP) reports. The inspectors reviewed the PIPs to confirm the licensee had appropriately described the scope of the problem, and had initiated corrective actions. The review also included the licensees consideration and assessment of operating experience events applicable to the plant. The inspectors performed this review to ensure compliance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requirements. Documents reviewed are listed in the

.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification (LOR) Program and Licensed Operator Performance

a. Inspection Scope

Quarterly Resident Inspector Licensed Operator Performance Review: The inspectors observed operators in the main control room and assessed their performance during a makeup to the Unit 1A containment penetration valve injection surge tank, a valve stroke of 1SV-26B (steam generator C block valve) in preparation of an inservice test of 1SV-7 (steam generator C PORV). The inspectors also observed Unit 1 shutdown and startup activities for refueling outage. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the two activities listed below for items such as: 1) appropriate work practices; 2) identifying and addressing common cause failures; 3) scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b) of the Maintenance Rule; 4) characterizing reliability issues for performance; 5) trending key parameters for condition monitoring; 6) charging unavailability for performance; 7) classification and reclassification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2); and 8) appropriateness of performance criteria for structures, systems, and components (SSCs)/functions classified as (a)(2) and/or appropriateness and adequacy of goals and corrective actions for SSCs/functions classified as (a)(1).

For each item selected, the inspectors performed a detailed review of the problem history and surrounding circumstances, evaluated the extent of condition reviews as required, and reviewed the generic implications of the equipment and/or work practice problem. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• PIP C-14-2353, C-14-2590, 1A and 1B diesel generator bearing rotations

• PIP C-14-5614, Unit 1 containment penetration super system is being declared Maintenance Rule A(1) due to exceeding the performance criteria for low safety significance

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following five activities to determine if the appropriate risk assessments were performed prior to removing equipment for work. When emergent work was performed, the inspectors reviewed the risk assessment to determine that the plant risk was promptly reassessed and managed. The inspectors reviewed the use of the licensees risk assessment tool and risk categories in accordance with Nuclear System Directive (NSD) 415, Operational Risk Management (Modes 1-3), to verify there was appropriate guidance to comply with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Equipment protection plan for Unit 1 standby makeup pump out of service for emergent maintenance

• Outage Risk Review Report

• Critical Plan for 2A DG Bearing Position Inspection (Orange Risk Condition)

• 91-01 Plan for draining below the reactor vessel flange for head removal

• Complex Activity Plan for work activities and mitigation strategies necessary to conduct 1EDE and 1ETA maintenance

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the technical adequacy of the six operability evaluations or functionality assessments listed below to determine if Technical Specification (TS)operability was properly justified and the subject components and systems remained available such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred. The inspectors reviewed the operability determinations to verify that they were made as specified by NSD 203, Operability. The inspectors reviewed the UFSAR to determine that the systems and components remained available to perform their intended function. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• PIP C-14-03654, 2B DG AC kilowatt meter fluctuating excessively

• PIP C-14-3427, 1SA-144 valve stem made from defective raw material

• PIP C-14-3857, During bench testing of a Limitourque actuator for 1NV-312A, a vapor corrosion inhibitor was installed in the actuator limit switch compartment. A caution tag with installation recommendations was also located in the limit switch compartment that states, For nuclear actuators, the vapor corrosion inhibitors must be removed to maintain actuator qualification

• PIP C-14-5014, 1A DG bearing #6 was found out of position

• PIP C-14-6558, Non-conservative error in critical heat flux correlation factors

• PIP C-14-6687, 2B service water strainer has approximate 6 gpm leak

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R18 Plant Modifications

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the following permanent plant modification to verify the adequacy of the modification package, and to evaluate the modification for adverse affects on system availability, reliability and functional capability. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• EC 113174, Add LD Manual Valve to 1A Diesel Engine

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the five post-maintenance tests listed below to determine if procedures and test activities ensured system operability and functional capability. The inspectors reviewed the licensees test procedures to determine if the procedures adequately tested the safety function(s) that may have been affected by the maintenance activities, that the acceptance criteria in the procedures were consistent with information in the applicable licensing basis and/or design basis documents, and that the procedures had been properly reviewed and approved. The inspectors also witnessed the tests and/or reviewed the test data to determine if test results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety function(s). Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump #2 performance test following preventive maintenance

• 1A diesel generator operating procedures and performance test following outage maintenance

• B train nuclear service water flow balance following outage maintenance

• 1B diesel generator operating procedures and performance test following outage maintenance

• Unit 1 zero power physics testing following core re-load

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted reviews and observations for selected outage activities to ensure that: 1) the licensee considered risk in developing the outage plan; 2) the licensee adhered to the outage plan to control plant configuration based on risk; 3) that mitigation strategies were in place for losses of key safety functions; and 4) the licensee adhered to operating license and TS requirements. Between May 6, 2014, and June 24, 2014, the following activities related to the refueling outage were reviewed for conformance to applicable procedures and selected activities associated with each evaluation were witnessed:

• Outage risk management plan/assessment

• Clearance activities

• Reactor coolant system instrumentation

• Plant cool down

• Mode changes from Mode 1 (power operation) to No Mode (defueled)

• Shutdown decay heat removal and inventory control

• Containment closure

• Refueling activities

• Plant heatup/mode changes from No Mode to Mode 1

• Core physics testing

• Power escalation

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

For the seven tests listed below, the inspectors witnessed testing and/or reviewed the test data to determine if the SSCs involved in these tests satisfied the requirements described in the Technical Specifications, the UFSAR, and applicable licensee procedures, and that the tests demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their intended safety functions.

Surveillance Tests

• PT/2/A/4350/002 B, Diesel Generator 2B Operability Test

• IP/2/A/3200/001 A, Solid State Protection System (SSPS) Train A Periodic Test

• PT/1/A/4200/009, Engineered Safety Features Actuation Periodic Test

• MP/0/A/7150/006, Ice Condenser Lower inlet Doors Inspection and Testing In-Service Tests

• PT/1/A/4200/031, SV Valve Inservice Test; Enclosure 13.3 1SV-7 Train A (1SVSV0072) Inservice Test & Enclosure 13.4 1SV-7 Train B (1SVSV0073)

Inservice Test

• PT/0/A/4400/022A, Nuclear Service Water Pump Train A Performance Test; 13.2, Train A IST/Comprehensive Test without the RN Trains Isolated Containment Isolation Valve Tests

• PT/1/A/4200/001 I, As Found Containment Isolation Leak Rate Test (penetrations M372 and 373)

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

a. Inspection Scope

Hazard Assessment and Instructions to workers: During facility tours, the inspectors observed labeled radioactive material, postings for radiation areas, high radiation areas (HRAs), and locked high radiation areas (LHRAs) in the radiologically controlled area (RCA), independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI), Unit 1 Containment, and other storage locations. The inspectors reviewed survey records for several plant areas including surveys for alpha emitters, hot particles, airborne radioactivity, gamma surveys within areas of high dose rate gradients, and pre-job surveys for upcoming tasks.

Inspectors independently surveyed areas in the plant and compared results to radiological conditions and postings. The inspectors also reviewed air sample records and evaluated locations of continuous air monitors (CAMs).

The inspectors discussed changes to plant operations that could contribute to changing radiological conditions since the last inspection. Inspectors attended pre-job briefings for selected Unit 1 refueling outage tasks and reviewed radiation work permits (RWP)details to assess communication of radiological control requirements and current radiological conditions to workers to include radiography, steam generator, and core barrel move activities. RWPs for work in airborne areas were also reviewed to assess airborne radioactive controls and monitoring to include Unit 1 steam generator work activities and core barrel movement.

Hazard Control and. Work Practices: The inspectors evaluated access barrier effectiveness including key control for selected Unit 1 and Unit 2 locked HRAs (LHRA),and very HRAs (VHRA) locations. Changes to procedural guidance for LHRA and VHRA controls were discussed with radiation protection (RP) supervisors. Controls and their implementation for storage of irradiated material within the spent fuel pool (SFP)were reviewed and discussed the SFP Reactor Engineer. Controls for areas where dose rates could change significantly as a result of plant shutdown and refueling operations were also discussed. The inspectors observed activities in potential airborne areas associated with SG work activities for removal of manways and diaphragms and installation of nozzle dams; radiography of condensate feed line; core barrel move; and reactor head set.

Occupational workers adherence to selected RWPs and RP technician (RPT)proficiency in providing job coverage were evaluated through direct observations and interviews with licensee staff of selected refueling outage activities. Electronic dosimeter (ED) alarm set points and worker stay times were evaluated against area radiation survey results for jobs in upper and lower containment, and the Auxiliary and Turbine Buildings. ED alarm logs were reviewed and worker response to dose and dose rate alarms for selected work activities was evaluated. RPT coverage and actions at the U1 lower and upper containment single point of accesses (SPAs) were reviewed and discussed in detail.

Control of Radioactive Material: The inspectors observed surveys of potentially contaminated materials and personnel being released from the RCA and SPAs using small article monitors, personnel contamination monitors, and portal monitor instruments. The inspectors discussed equipment sensitivity, alarm setpoints, and release program guidance with licensee staff. In addition, the inspectors reviewed controls for hand surveying large tools and equipment for release from the RCA and SPAs. The inspectors compared recent 10 CFR Part 61 results for the Dry Active Waste radwaste stream with radionuclides used in calibration sources to evaluate the appropriateness and accuracy of release survey instrumentation. The inspectors also reviewed source inventory and discussed leak tests for selected sealed sources and discussed nationally tracked source transactions with RP staff.

Problem Identification and Resolution: The inspectors reviewed selected corrective action program (CAP) reports associated with radiological hazard assessment and control. The reviewed items included selected CAP reports, self-assessments, and quality assurance audit documents. The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify and resolve the issues in accordance with procedure NSD-208, Problem Investigation Program (PIP), Revision (Rev.) 41.

RP activities were evaluated against the requirements of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Chapter 12; Technical Specifications (TS) Section 5.7; 10 CFR Parts 19 and 20; and approved licensee procedures. Licensee programs for monitoring materials and personnel released from the RCA and SPA were evaluated against 10 CFR Part 20, and IE Circular 81-07, Control of Radioactively Contaminated Material.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS2 Occupational ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) Planning and Controls

a. Inspection Scope

Work Planning and Exposure Tracking The inspectors reviewed exposure estimate planning for selected refueling outage work activities. ALARA planning packages were reviewed for the following high collective exposure tasks: SG primary side work; reactor head disassembly and re-assembly; radiography of condensate feed line; and shielding installation and removal. For the selected tasks, the inspectors reviewed established dose goals and discussed assumptions regarding the bases for the current estimates with responsible ALARA planners. The inspectors evaluated the incorporation of exposure reduction initiatives and operating experience, including historical post-job reviews, into RWP requirements. Day-to-day collective dose data for the selected tasks were compared with established dose estimates and evaluated against procedural criteria (trigger points) for additional ALARA review. Where applicable, changes to established estimates were discussed with ALARA planners and evaluated against work scope changes or unanticipated elevated dose rates. The inspectors also reviewed and discussed the minutes from ALARA Committee meetings held in 2013 and 2014.

Source Term Reduction and Control: The inspectors reviewed the collective exposure three-year rolling average from 2011 - 2013. The inspectors reviewed historical dose rate trends for reactor coolant system piping and compared them to current refueling outage data. Source term reduction initiatives such as crudburst/cleanup, zinc injection, fuel cleaning, and the use of temporary shielding were reviewed and discussed with Chemistry and RP staff.

Radiation Worker Performance: The inspectors observed radiation worker performance via remote monitoring during primary side SG activities including manway and diaphragm removal and nozzle dam installation; core barrel move; radiography of condensate feed line; and reactor head set. Radiation worker and RPT performance was also observed and evaluated as part of Inspection Procedure (IP) 71124.01 and documented in section 2RS1.

Problem Identification and Resolution: The inspectors reviewed and discussed selected CAP documents associated with ALARA program implementation. The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify and resolve the issues in accordance with licensee procedure NSD 208, Problem Investigation Program (PIP), Rev. 41. The inspectors also evaluated the scope and frequency of the licensees self-assessment program and reviewed recent assessment results.

ALARA program activities were evaluated against the requirements of UFSAR Section 12, TS Section 5.4, 10 CFR Parts 19 and 20, and approved licensee procedures.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS3 In-Plant Airborne Radioactivity Control and Mitigation

a. Inspection Scope

Engineering Controls: The inspectors reviewed the use of temporary and permanent engineering controls to mitigate airborne radioactivity. In addition, during observations of jobs in-progress, for the refueling outage, and containment walk-downs, inspectors observed the placement and use of high efficiency particulate (HEPA) negative pressure units, vacuums and air sampling equipment. The inspectors evaluated the effectiveness of continuous air monitors and air samplers placed in selected work areas of the plant to provide indication of increasing airborne levels.

Respiratory Protection Equipment: Inspectors reviewed the use of respiratory protection devices to limit the intake of radioactive material, including devices used for routine tasks and devices stored for use in emergency situations. Inspectors observed the physical condition of Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) units, powered air purifying respirators, and device components staged for routine and emergency use throughout the plant. SCBA bottle air pressure, hydrostatic testing, the number of units, and the number of spare masks and air bottles available were also evaluated by inspectors. The inspectors reviewed maintenance records for selected SCBA units for the past year and evaluated SCBA and Negative Pressure Respirator (NPR) compliance with National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health certification requirements. The inspectors also reviewed records of Grade D (or better) air quality testing for supplied-air devices and SCBA bottles. In addition, the inspectors walked-down the compressor used for filling SCBA bottles. Control room operators and health physics personnel were interviewed on the use of the devices including SCBA bottle change-out and use of corrective lens inserts. Respirator qualification records and medical fitness cards were reviewed for selected emergency responder personnel. In addition, qualifications for individuals responsible for testing and repairing SCBA vital components were evaluated through review of training records. The inspectors evaluated the licensees program for airborne monitoring, including the presence of alpha emitters, as part of IP 71124.01.

Records of monthly and quarterly inventory and inspection of the equipment were also reviewed by the inspectors. The inspectors discussed the process for issuing respirators, and reviewed training, fit-test, and medical evaluation completion for selected individuals qualified for respirator and/or SCBA use.

Problem Identification and Resolution: CAP documents associated with airborne radioactivity mitigation and respiratory protection were reviewed and assessed. The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify and resolve the issues in accordance with procedure NSD-208, Problem Investigation Program (PIP), Rev. 41.

Licensee activities associated with the use of engineering controls and respiratory protection equipment was reviewed against 10 CFR Part 20; UFSAR Chapter 12; Regulatory Guide 8.15, Acceptable Programs for Respiratory Protection; and applicable licensee procedures. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment

a. Inspection Scope

External Dosimetry: The inspectors reviewed National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program certification data and discussed program guidance for storage, processing, and evaluation of results for active and passive personnel dosimeters currently in use. Comparisons between ED and thermoluminescent dosimeter data were discussed. The inspectors reviewed ED alarm logs and reviewed licensees dosimeter incident reports and assessment actions for selected alarm events.

Internal Dosimetry: Program guidance and assessment results for internally deposited radionuclides were reviewed. Program guidance, instrument detection capabilities, and select results for internally deposited radionuclides were reviewed. The inspectors reviewed selected Whole Body Count (in vivo) analyses that occurred during 2014.

Capabilities for collection and analysis of special bioassay samples were discussed with licensee staff, there were no dose assessments based on biological samples to review.

Special Dosimetric Situations: The inspectors reviewed records of monitoring for declared pregnant workers from January 2012 to year-to-date for Calendar Year (CY)2014 and discussed monitoring guidance with dosimetry staff. The inspectors evaluated the licensees use of multi-badging, extremity dosimetry, and dosimeter relocation within non-uniform dose rate fields and reviewed assessments performed during the previous outage. Neutron monitoring guidance and implementation for at power containment entries and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) activities were reviewed and discussed. In addition, the adequacy of dosimetry program guidance and its implementation for shallow dose assessments and supporting calculations for personnel involved in selected contamination events were evaluated.

Problem Identification and Resolution: The inspectors reviewed and discussed selected CAP documents associated with occupational dose assessment. The reviewed items included PIP, self-assessments, and quality assurance audit documents. The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify, characterize, prioritize, and resolve the identified issues in accordance with licensee NSD 208, Problem Investigation Program (PIP), Rev. 41.

RP program occupational dose assessment guidance and activities were evaluated against the requirements of UFSAR Section 12; TS Sections 5.4, Procedures, and 5.7, High Radiation Area; 10 CFR Parts 19 and 20; and approved licensee procedures.

Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS5 Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation

a. Inspection Scope

Radiation Monitoring Instrumentation: During tours of the auxiliary building and radiation control area exit point, the inspectors observed installed radiation detection equipment including area radiation monitors (ARM)s, continuous air samplers (CAMs), liquid and gaseous effluent monitors, personnel contamination monitors (PCMs), small article monitors (SAMs), and portal monitors (PMs). The inspectors observed the physical location of the components, noted the material condition, and compared sensitivity ranges with UFSAR requirements.

In addition to equipment walk-downs, the inspectors observed response checks of various portable and fixed detection instruments, including ion chambers, telepoles, and high-purity germanium detectors. For the portable instruments, the inspectors observed the use of a high-range calibrator and discussed periodic output value testing with an RPT. The inspectors reviewed the last two calibration records and evaluated alarm setpoint values for selected ARMs, PCMs, PMs, SAMs, effluent monitors, and a whole body counter. This included instruments used for post-accident monitoring such as containment high-range ARMs. Radioactive sources used to calibrate selected ARMs and effluent monitors were evaluated for traceability to national standards. Calibration stickers on portable survey instruments and air samplers were noted during inspection of storage areas for ready-to-use equipment. The most recent 10 CFR Part 61 analysis for dry active waste was reviewed to determine if calibration and check sources are representative of the plant source term. The inspectors also reviewed countroom quality assurance records for gamma ray spectrometry equipment and liquid scintillation detectors.

Effectiveness and reliability of selected radiation detection instruments were reviewed against details documented in the following: 10 CFR Part 20; NUREG-0737, Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements; TS Sections 3.3 and 5.4; UFSAR Chapters 11 and 12; and applicable licensee procedures.

Problem Identification and Resolution: The inspectors reviewed selected CAP documents in the area of radiological instrumentation. The inspectors evaluated the licensees ability to identify and resolve the issues in accordance with procedure NSD-208, Problem Investigation Program (PIP), Rev. 41. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors sampled licensee data to confirm the accuracy of reported PI data for the eight indicators during periods listed below. To determine the accuracy of the reported PI elements, the reviewed data was assessed against PI definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Indicator Guideline, Rev. 6. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

• Emergency AC Power, Unit 1 & 2

• High Pressure Safety Injection, Unit 1 & 2

• Auxiliary Feedwater, Unit 1 & 2 The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures and methods for compiling and reporting the PIs including the Reactor Oversight Program Mitigating Systems Performance Indicator Basis Document for Catawba. The inspectors reviewed the raw data for the PIs listed above for the period of April 1, 2013, through March 31, 2014.

The inspectors also independently screened TS Action Item Logs, selected control room logs, work orders and surveillance procedures, and maintenance rule failure determinations to determine if unavailability/unreliability hours were properly reported.

The inspectors compared the licensees raw data against the graphical representations and specific values contained on the NRCs public web page for 2013-2014. The inspectors also reviewed the past history of PIPs for systems affecting the Mitigating Systems Performance Indicators listed above for any that might have affected the reported values. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

• Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness For the assessment period from January 2013 through May, 2014, the inspectors reviewed ED alarm logs and selected PIPs related to controls for exposure significant areas. The inspectors also reviewed licensee procedural guidance for collecting and documenting PI data.

Cornerstone: Public Radiation Safety

• Radiological Control Effluent Release Occurrences For the assessment period January 2013 through May 2014, the inspectors reviewed cumulative and projected doses to the public contained in liquid and gaseous release permits and PIPs related to Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) issues. The inspectors also reviewed licensee procedural guidance for collecting and documenting PI data.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution

.1 Daily Review

As required by Inspection Procedure 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, and in order to help identify repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for follow-up, the inspectors performed screening of items entered into the licensees corrective action program. This was accomplished by reviewing copies of PIPs, attending selected daily Site Direction and PIP screening meetings, and accessing the licensees computerized database.

.2 Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed an in-depth review of the following issue within the mitigating systems cornerstone entered into the licensees corrective action program.

PIP C-14-01434, 2KC-C37A failed to fully close after securing 2A2 KC Pump during IWP The inspectors reviewed the actions taken to determine if the licensee had adequately addressed the following attributes:

• Complete, accurate and timely identification of the problem

• Evaluation and disposition of operability and reportability issues

• Consideration of previous failures, extent of condition, generic or common cause implications

• Prioritization and resolution of the issue commensurate with safety significance

• Identification of the root cause and contributing causes of the problem

• Identification and implementation of corrective actions commensurate with the safety significance of the issue Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Semiannual Trend Review

a. Inspection Scope

As required by IP 71152, Problem Identification and Resolution, the inspectors performed a review of the licensees Corrective Action Program (CAP) and associated documents to identify trends that could indicate the existence of a more significant safety issue. The inspectors review was focused on repetitive equipment issues, but also considered the results of daily inspector CAP item screenings discussed in Section 4OA2.1 above, licensee trending efforts, and licensee human performance results. The inspectors review nominally considered the six month period of January 2014 through June 2014, although some examples expanded beyond those dates when the scope of the trend warranted. The review also included issues documented outside the normal CAP in major equipment problem lists, plant health team vulnerability lists, focus area reports, system health reports, self-assessment reports, maintenance rule reports, and Safety Review Group Monthly Reports. The inspectors compared and contrasted their results with the results contained in the licensees latest quarterly trend reports.

Corrective actions associated with a sample of the issues identified in the licensees trend report were reviewed for adequacy.

b. Findings

No findings were identified. In general, the licensee has identified appropriately addressed trends within their CAP and no new trends were identified.

4OA3 Followup of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (NOED)

(Discussed) Unresolved item (URI)05000413/2014002-01, NOED to allow bearing replacement and testing of the 1A diesel generator This URI was initiated for the inspectors to review the licensees root cause and corrective actions for the rotation of the 1A diesel generator (DG) connecting rod bearing

1. 7. During inspection on the 1B DG on the following week, the #1 connecting rod bearing was also found to be rotated.

As the licensee was finalizing the root cause analysis for the above bearing rotations, a third bearing rotation was discovered on the 1A DG while performing inspections during the May 2014 Unit 1 outage. The #6 connecting rod bearing was discovered to have rotated approximately 80 degrees since the bearing was last inspected in March. As a result of the latest discovery, the licensee has extended the root cause analysis and implemented a number of corrective actions on the Unit 1 DGs to address potential parameters that could reduce margin to bearing movement. The 1A DG #6 connecting rod was replaced as the original connecting rod was found to be slightly over-bore by 0.001 -0.002 inches. The lube oil systems on both Unit 1 DGs were modified to allow warm up of the entire lube oil system prior to planned engine starts and high point vents were installed. Four additional bearings on the 1A DG and three additional bearings on the 1B DG were replaced due to having a similar operating history and the same manufacturer as the bearings that had rotated. Lube oil was changed from a 40/50 weight blend to a straight 40 weight as recommended by the manufacturer to reduce viscosity at lower starting temperatures. To provide added assurance that the corrective actions are effective, the licensee plans to perform additional interim bearing inspections for the next refueling cycle.

The inspectors have reviewed the licensees prompt determination of operability after the repair of the 1A EDG #7 bearing rotation which concluded that the unit 1 DGs were operable and no issues were identified.

4OA5 Other Activities

.1 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Radiological Controls

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures and observed operations associated with storing spent fuel in the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) in accordance with Inspection Procedure 60855.1. The inspectors observed the condition of ISFSI storage cask vents and temperature monitoring equipment to verify that the vents were free of obstructions and the the monitoring equipment were operating correctly. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/189, Inspection to Determine Compliance of Dynamic

Restraint (Snubber) Program with 10 CFR 50.55a Regulatory Requirements for Inservice Examination and Testing of Snubbers

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a review of the implementation of the licensees snubber program to verify compliance with the requirements of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.55a, as discussed in Regulatory Information Summary (RIS)2010-06, Inservice Inspection and Testing of Dynamic Restraints (Snubbers). The inspectors reviewed the licensees actions taken as a result of RIS 2010-06, which included a NRC relief request for its third 10-year Inservice Inspection (ISI) interval for the examination and testing requirements of snubbers. The inspectors interviewed the snubber program owner and conducted an independent walkdown to evaluate compliance with licensees program requirements. The inspectors reviewed the methodology for snubber population selection and selected 16 snubbers, listed in the

, based on risk-informed insights to review performance history, plant conditions, snubber classification, and accessibility to verify the visual examination of the selected snubbers was performed during every refueling outage of the current 10-year interval. For the selected snubbers, the inspectors reviewed the functional test records during the current 10-year ISI interval to verify these activities were in accordance with the previously approved relief request. The inspectors also observed in-process calibration and bench testing of one of the selected snubbers and verified that the test parameters met the acceptance criteria specified in the procedure. The inspectors reviewed the process for snubber service life monitoring and determined that the selected snubbers were being monitored and maintained. Additionally, the inspectors verified that the current and a sample of past degraded or non-conforming conditions were properly identified and corrected in accordance with the licensees corrective action program. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

On July 7, 2014, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. Kelvin Henderson and other members of licensee management. The inspectors verified that no proprietary information was retained by the inspectors or documented in this report.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

T. Arlow, Emergency Planning Manager

D. Barker, Operations Manager

J. Batton, Steam Generator Maintenance

E. Benfield, Radiation Protection Supervisor

D. Cantrell, Chemistry Manager

C. Cauthen, Steam Generator Maintenance

T. Hamilton, General Manager, Nuclear Engineering

R. Hart, Regulatory Affairs Manager

K. Henderson, Site Vice-President

G. Houser, NDE Supervisor

R. Hudson, ISI Coordinator

T. Jenkins, Maintenance Manager

C. Kamilaris, Organizational Effectiveness Director

B. Leonard, Nuclear Training Manager

B. Mitchell, Boric Acid Program Manager

T. Pasour, Regulatory Affairs

K. Phillips, Work Management Manager

M. Shutt, Lead Engineer Snubber Program.

P. Simbrat, Regulatory Affairs

T. Simril, Plant Manager

J. Smith, Radiation Protection Manager

W. Suslick, Director, Nuclear Engineering

S. West, Director, Nuclear Plant Security

LIST OF REPORT ITEMS

Closed

TI 2515/189 TI NRC Temporary Instruction, Dynamic Restraint Program (Section 4OA5.2)

Discussed

05000413/2014002-01 URI NOED 14-2-001 to allow bearing replacement and testing of the 1A diesel generator (Section 4OA3)