IR 05000400/2007002

IR 05000400-07-002, on 01/01/2007 - 03/31/2007; Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1; Routine Integrated Report

ML071200367
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	04/30/2007
From:	Randy Musser NRC/RGN-II/DRP/RPB4
To:	Duncan R Carolina Power & Light Co
References
IR-07-002
Download: ML071200367 (20)

Text

ril 30, 2007

SUBJECT:

SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 05000400/2007002

Dear Mr. Duncan:

On March 31, 2007, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Shearon Harris reactor facility. The enclosed integrated inspection report documents the inspection findings, which were discussed on April 11, 2007 with you and other members of your staff.

The inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.

The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified by the NRC.

However, two licensee identified violations, which were determined to be of very low safety significance, are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report. The NRC is treating these violations as non-cited violations (NCVs) consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy because of their very low safety significance and because they are entered into your corrective action program. If you contest these non-cited violations, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN.: Document Control Desk, Washington DC 20555-0001; with copies to the Regional Administrator Region II; the Director, Office of Enforcement, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC Resident Inspector at the Shearon Harris facility.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) components of NRCs document system

(ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Randall A. Musser, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Docket No.: 50-400 License No.: NPF-63

Enclosure:

NRC Inspection Report 05000400/2007002 w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

_________________________

OFFICE RII:DRP RII:DRP RII:DRP SIGNATURE SON PBO by email MFK1 by email NAME SNinh PO'Bryan MKing DATE 04/26/2007 04/27/2007 04/27/2007 5/ /2007 5/ /2007 5/ /2007 5/ /2007 E-MAIL COPY? YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO

REGION II==

Docket No: 50-400 License No: NPF-63 Report No: 05000400/2007002 Licensee: Carolina Power and Light Company Facility: Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Location: 5413 Shearon Harris Road New Hill, NC 27562 Dates: January 1 through March 31, 2007 Inspectors: P. OBryan, Senior Resident Inspector M. King, Resident Inspector Approved by: R. Musser, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 4 Division of Reactor Projects Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000400/2007-002; January 1, 2007 - March 31, 2007; Shearon Harris Nuclear Power

Plant, Unit 1; Routine Integrated Report.

The report covered a three-month period of inspection by resident inspectors. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 4, dated December 2006.

A. Inspector-Identified and Self-Revealing Findings None.

Licensee-Identified Violations

Violations of very low safety significance, which were identified by the licensee have been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. These violations and corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 40A7 of this report.

REPORT DETAILS

Summary of Plant Status

The unit began the inspection period at full rated thermal power, and operated at full power for the entire inspection period.

REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity

1R04 Equipment Alignment

a. Inspection Scope

Partial System Walkdowns:

The inspectors performed the following three partial system walkdowns, while the indicated structures, systems and components (SSCs) were out-of-service (OOS) for maintenance and testing:

• B residual heat removal system with A residual heat removal system out-of-service on January 10, 2007.

• A emergency diesel generator with B emergency diesel generator out-of-service on January 19, 2007.

• A essential services chilled water chiller with B essential services chilled water chiller out-of-service on February 14, 2007.

To evaluate the operability of the selected trains or systems under these conditions, the inspectors reviewed valve and power alignments by comparing observed positions of valves, switches, and electrical power breakers to the procedures and drawings listed in the Attachment.

Complete System Walkdown:

The inspectors conducted a detailed review of the alignment and condition of the instrument air system. To determine the proper system alignment, the inspectors reviewed the procedures, drawings, and Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) sections listed in the Attachment.

The inspectors walked down the system, to verify that the existing alignment of the system was consistent with the correct alignment. Items reviewed during the walkdown included the following:

• Valves are correctly positioned and do not exhibit leakage that would impact the function(s) of any given valve.

• Electrical power is available as required.

• Major system components are correctly labeled, lubricated, cooled, ventilated, etc.

• Hangers and supports are correctly installed and functional.

• Essential support systems are operational.

• Ancillary equipment or debris does not interfere with system performance.

• Tagging clearances are appropriate.

• Valves are locked as required by the licensees locked valve program.

The inspectors reviewed the documents listed in the Attachment, to verify that the ability of the system to perform its function could not be affected by outstanding design issues, temporary modifications, operator workarounds, adverse conditions, and other system-related issues tracked by the Engineering Department.

The inspectors reviewed the following ARs associated with this area to verify that the licensee identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions:

• AR 103051103051 Single Point Failure of Instrument Air Dryer.

• AR 154069154069 Missing Valve in IA Lineup Previously Identified.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R05 Fire Protection

a. Inspection Scope

For the twenty-four areas identified below, the inspectors reviewed the licensees control of transient combustible material and ignition sources, fire detection and suppression capabilities, fire barriers, and any related compensatory measures, to verify that those items were consistent with final safety analysis report (FSAR) Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System, and FSAR Appendix 9.5.A, Fire Hazards

Analysis.

The inspectors walked down accessible portions of each area and reviewed results from related surveillance tests, to verify that conditions in these areas were consistent with descriptions of the applicable FSAR sections. Documents reviewed are listed in the

.

• 261' level of the reactor auxiliary building including zones 1-A-4-CHLR and 1-A-4-COR (2 areas)

• A emergency diesel generator rooms including zones 1-D-1-DGA-RM, 1-D-3-DGA-ES, 1-D-DTA, 1-D-1-DGA-ASU, 1-D-1-DGA-ER, and 1-D-3-DGA-HVR (6 areas)

• emergency service water intake structure including zones 12-I-ESWPA, 12-I-ESWPA-BAL, 12-I-ESWPB, 12-I-ESWPB-BAL, and 5-S-BAL (5 areas)

• emergency diesel generator fuel oil storage enclosure including zones 1-O-PB, 1-O-PA, an 5-O-BAL (3 areas)

• 236' level of the reactor auxiliary building including zones 1-A-3-PB/1-A-3-TA, 1-A-34-RHRA, 1-A-34-RHRB, 1-A-BAL-G, and 1-A-BAL-H (5 areas)

• 236' level of the reactor auxiliary building including zones 1-A-3-MP, 1-A-3-COR, and 1-A-3-COME (3 areas)

The inspectors reviewed the following ARs associated with this area to verify that the licensee identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions:

• AR 224571224571 Fire Watch Observation.

• AR 226459226459 Logic Flaw in SSD Reporting of New Manual Actions.

• AR 227744227744 Transient Combustable Material Not Permitted.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures

a. Inspection Scope

External Flooding The inspectors walked down the diesel generator and reactor auxiliary buildings, which contain risk-significant SSCs and are susceptible to flooding from external sources. The inspectors verified that the area configurations, features, and equipment functions were consistent with the descriptions and assumptions used in FSAR section 2.4.10, Flood Protection Requirements, and in the supporting basis documents listed in the

. The inspectors reviewed the operator actions credited in the analysis, to verify that the desired results could be achieved using the plant procedures listed in the

.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

On March 19, 2007, the inspectors observed/completed licensed-operator performance during requalification simulator training for crew C, to verify that operator performance was consistent with expected operator performance, as described in Exercise Guide DSS-011. This training tested the operators ability to place the plant in a safe condition following a loss of coolant accident. The inspectors focused on clarity and formality of communication, the use of procedures, alarm response, control board manipulations, group dynamics and supervisory oversight.

The inspectors observed the post-exercise critique to verify that the licensee had identified deficiencies and discrepancies that occurred during the simulator training.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed four degraded SSC/function performance problems or conditions listed below to verify the licensees handling of these performance problems or conditions in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, and 10CFR50.65, Maintenance Rule. Documents reviewed are listed in the Attachment.

• Failure of valve 1SW-1208, service water control valve to B train essential services chiller.

• Failure of the B essential services chilled water chiller.

• Degraded thrust bearing on the C charging and safety injection pump.

• Surveillance failures of the A train sequencer.

The inspectors focused on the following attributes:

• Appropriate work practices,

• Identifying and addressing common cause failures,

• Scoping in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(b),

• Characterizing reliability issues (performance),

• Charging unavailability (performance),

• Trending key parameters (condition monitoring),

• 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification and reclassification, and

• Appropriateness of performance criteria for SSCs/functions classified (a)(2)and/or appropriateness and adequacy of goals and corrective actions for SSCs/functions classified (a)(1).

The inspectors reviewed the following ARs associated with this area to verify that the licensee identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions:

• AR 216877216877 1SW-1208, B-SB WC-2 TCV Failed Open.

• AR 221640221640 B ESCW High Chill Water Temperature.

• AR 222825222825 1CS-CSIPC, Outboard Thrust Bearing Damage.

• AR 226035226035 A Sequencer Maintenance Rule Unavailability Margin.

• AR 225697225697 Sequencer Train A Wiring Discrepancies.

• AR 225025225025 Sequencer A UR2/SA Failure to Initiate Load Banks 3, 4, 6, and 7.

• AR 220923220923 Loose Terminal Lugs on UR1 Relay, A Train Sequencer.

• AR 224317224317 A-SA Sequencer Declared Inoperable.

• AR 220768220768 A Train Sequencer Load Block 1 Failure.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees risk assessments and the risk management actions for the plant configurations associated with the four activities listed below. The inspectors verified that the licensee performed adequate risk assessments, and implemented appropriate risk management actions when required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4). For emergent work, the inspectors also verified that any increase in risk was promptly assessed, and that the appropriate risk management actions were promptly implemented.

• Tornado watch issued on January 6, 2007.

• Winter weather advisory with planned maintenance on the B train emergency diesel generator on January 18, 2007.

• Failed A sequencer on January 30, 2007.

• Maintenance on B emergency diesel generator with B reactor makeup pump out of service on February 16, 2007.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R15 Operability Evaluations

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed five operability determinations addressed in the ARs listed below. The inspectors assessed the accuracy of the evaluations, the use and control of any necessary compensatory measures, and compliance with the TS. The inspectors verified that the operability determinations were made as specified by Procedure OPS-NGGC-1305, "Operability Determinations." The inspectors compared the justifications made in the determination to the requirements from the TS, the FSAR, and associated design-basis documents, to verify that operability was properly justified and the subject component or system remained available, such that no unrecognized increase in risk occurred:

• AR 218793218793 M&TE Gauge Found Out of Calibration.

• AR 219477219477 B EDG Test Postponed Due to Excessive ECP Relay Vibrations.

• AR 216433216433 Non-Q Parts Install in Q-Class A Instruments.

• AR 220768220768 A Sequencer Load Block 1 Failure During EPT-033.

• AR 222825222825 1CS-CSIPC, Outboard Thrust Bearing Damage.

The inspectors reviewed the following ARs associated with this area to verify that the licensee identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions:

• AR 124482124482 Incorrect Q-Class for FT-0652SW & FT-0653SW.

• AR 222825222825 C CSIP Bearing Damage.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R19 Post Maintenance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

For the five post-maintenance tests listed below, the inspectors witnessed the test and/or reviewed the test data, to verify that test results adequately demonstrated restoration of the affected safety function(s) described in the FSAR and TS. The tests included the following:

• OST-1008, RHR Pump Operability Quarterly Interval Modes 1-2-3 and OST-1804, RHR Remote Position Indication and Timing Test 18 Month Interval Modes 5,6, after repairing actuator for 1RH-20 on January 10, 2007.

• OST-1215, Emergency Service Water System Operability Train B Quarterly Interval Modes 1-2-3-4, after conducting maintenance on 1SC-37 on January 17, 2007.

• OST-1008, RHR Pump Operability Quarterly Interval Modes 1-2-3 after conducting maintenance on valve 1SI-326 on January 8, 2007.

• OPT-1512, Essential Chilled Water Turbopaks Units Quarterly Inspection/Checks Modes 1-6, after conducting repairs on February 7, 2007.

• EPT-033, Emergency Safeguards Sequencer System Test Train A, after conducting wiring repairs on March 19, 2007.

The inspectors reviewed ARs, associated with this area, to verify that the licensee identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions:

• AR 221640221640 B ESCW High Chill Water Temperature.

• AR 220768220768 A Sequencer Load Block 1 Failure During EPT-33.

• AR 220923220923 Loose Terminal Lugs on UR1 Relay on A Sequencer Cabinet.

• AR 224317224317 A-SA Sequencer Declared Inoperable.

• AR 224951224951 ESF Sequencer 1A-SA Failure During OST-1094.

• AR 225025225025 Sequencer A UR2/SA Failure to Initiate LBS 3,4,6 and 7.

• AR 225697225697 Sequencer Train A Wiring Discrepancies.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing

a. Inspection Scope

For the five surveillance tests identified below, the inspectors witnessed testing and/or reviewed test data, to verify that the systems, structures, and components involved in these tests satisfied the requirements described in the TS and the FSAR, and that the tests demonstrated that the SSCs were capable of performing their intended safety functions.

• OP-155, Diesel Generator Emergency Power System on January 19, 2007.

• *OST-1011, Auxiliary Feedwater System Operability Test Monthly Interval Mode 1-4 on January 22, 2007.

• OST-1124, Train B 6.9 KV Emergency Bus Undervoltage Trip Actuating Device Operational Test and Contact Check Modes 1-6 on January 23, 2007.

• OST-1094, Sequencer Block Circuit and Containment Fan Cooler Testing Train A Quarterly Interval All Modes on March 7, 2007.

• EST-201, ASME System Pressure Tests on March 25, 2007.

• This procedure included inservice testing requirements.

The inspectors reviewed the following ARs associated with this area to verify that the licensee identified and implemented appropriate corrective actions.

• AR 168811168811 Near Miss on 1AF-129 Post Maintenance Testing.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed an emergency preparedness drill conducted on January 30, 2007 to verify licensee self-assessment of classification, notification, and protective action recommendation development in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix E.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

.1 Routine Review of ARs

To aid in the identification of repetitive equipment failures or specific human performance issues for followup, the inspectors performed frequent screenings of items entered into the CAP. The review was accomplished by reviewing daily AR reports.

.2 Annual Sample Review

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors selected AR 79228 for detailed review. This AR was associated with the corrective action for a fire that developed in the motor-driven fire pump as a result of a failure in 6.9kV rated cabling. This AR included corrective action that is relevant to all 6.9kV rated cables. The inspectors reviewed this report to verify that the licensee identified the full extent of the issue, performed an appropriate evaluation, and specified and prioritized appropriate corrective actions. The inspectors evaluated the report against the requirements of the licensees corrective action program as delineated in corporate procedure CAP-NGGC-0200, Corrective Action Program, and 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.

b. Observations and Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

On April 11, 2007, the resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr.

Duncan and other members of his staff. The inspectors confirmed that proprietary information was not provided or examined during the inspection.

4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violations

The following violations of very low safety significance (Green) were identified by the licensee and are violations of NRC requirements which meet the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as NCVs.

• Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that written procedures be established, implemented and maintained covering the procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. That appendix discusses Administrative Procedures for Shift and Relief Turnover

(1g) and Administrative Procedures for Log Entries, Record Retention, and Review Procedures (1h). Contrary to the above, on February 5, 2007, the licensee failed to implement established administrative procedures resulting in an 18 hour2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> delay in declaring the B train of WC-2A essential services chiller inoperable. This failure to implement established administrative procedures is of very low safety significance and has been entered into the licensees corrective action program (AR 221803221803. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not represent a loss of system safety function, the single train of the ESCW system affected did not lose functionality for greater than the TS allowed outage time, and the finding was not potentially risk-significant due to external events.

• Technical Specification 6.8.1 requires that written procedures be established, implemented and maintained covering procedures for fire protection program implementation. Contrary to this requirement, the licensee did not follow fire program implementation procedure FPP-013, Fire Protection - Minimum Requirements, Mitigating Actions and Surveillance Requirements when an hourly fire watch was not established for fire barrier deficiencies. Two examples of this deficiency were identified. The first example was inadequate protection of cables in the turbine building which could lead to the loss of power to valve 1CS-231. This failure to implement fire protection program procedures is of very low safety significance because it represents a low degradation of the systems required to reach safe shutdown. The second example was inadequate protection of cables which could lead to the loss of power to B Train ESW Traveling Screens, suction strainers, and screen wash. This failure to implement fire protection program procedures is of very low safety significance because the configuration of the cable run exposed by the lack of fire watch represents a low degradation of the barrier for systems required to reach safe shutdown. These failures to implement established fire protection program procedures are of very low safety significance and have been entered into the licensee's corrective action program (AR 226458226458and AR 227885227885.

ATTACHMENT:

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee personnel

D. Alexander, Superintendent, Environmental and Chemistry

C. Burton, Director, Site Operations

D. Corlett, Supervisor - Licensing/Regulatory Programs

R. Duncan, Vice President Harris Plant

M. Findlay, Superintendent, Security

W. Gurganious, Training Manager

K. Henderson, Maintenance Manager

C. Kamiliaris, Manager - Nuclear Assessment Manager

E. McCartney, Plant General Manager

T. Natale, Manager - Site Support Services

S. OConnor, Manager - Engineering

J. Pierce, Supervisor - Nuclear Assessment

T. Pilo, Supervisor - Emergency Preparedness

G. Simmons, Superintendent - Radiation Control

J. Warner, Manager - Operations

E. Wills, Manager - Outage and Scheduling

NRC personnel

R. Musser, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 4

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

None.

Closed

None. .