ML18018A832

Forwards Addl Info Re Draft SER Open Items,In Response to Mechanical Engineering,Power Sys & Reactor Sys Branch Concerns.Westinghouse Owners Group Jul 1977 Rept & Sept 1977 Suppl Will Be Used in Derivation of Setpoints

ML18018A832
Person / Time
Site:	Harris
Issue date:	10/12/1983
From:	Mcduffie M CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
LAP-83-475, NUDOCS 8310180311
Download: ML18018A832 (28)

Text

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AGCE<<SSION NBR:8310180311 . DOC ~ DATE: 83/10/12 NOTARIZED ~ NO DOCKET' FACIL:50 400 Shear on Hyr ris Nuclear power Plant~ 'Unit 1i Car ol ina 05000400 50 401'Shearon Harr is Nuclear Power Plant< -Uni,t 2g Carolina 05000001 AUTH ~ NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MCDUFFIE'iM.A. 'Carolina .Power 8 Light:Co.

RE<<C IP. NAME RKC IP IDENT AFFILIATION

,DENTON~H;R,. Office>> of Nuclear'eactor 'Regulationr Director>>

SUBJECT! For wards addi .info re dr af t 'SER open "itemsg in>>response'>to Mechanical Engi.neeringg'Power 'Sys 8 'Reactor"Sys Branch concerns l']estinghouse>> Owners Group Jul; 1977 eept>> 8 'Sept 1977

>suppl will be used in der ivation of *setpoints; DISTRIBUTION 'CODE'8001'S COPIES'IRECEXVED;LTR, "ENCL . - ', IZEc.-

TITLE: Licensing <<Submittal: )PSAR/FSAR Amdts" 8 Related>>Correspondence'EOIPXKNT-NOTES!

~COPIES "RKCI'PIENT ~COPIES ID CODE/NAME, L'TTR ENCL ID '<<CODE/NAME. LTTR ENCL.

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NRR/DL/ADL 0'" NRR L83 'BC 1 0 NRR L83= LA 0 BUCKLEYgB 01 1 1

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Dear Mr. Denton:

Carolina Power 6 Light Company here transmits one original and forty copies of additional information requested by the NRC as part of the safety review of the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. The cover sheet of the attachment summarizes the related Open Items addressed in the attachment along with the corresponding review branch and reviewer for each response.

We will be providing responses to other requests for additional information shortly.

Yours very truly, M. A. McDuffie Senior Vice President Nuclear Generation FXT/k)r (8170FXT)

Enclosure CC; Mr. B. C. Buckley (NRC) Mr. Wells Eddleman Mr. G. F. Maxwell (NRC-SHNPP) Dr. Phyllis Lotchin Mr. J. P. O'Reilly (NRC-RII) Mr. John D. Runkle Mr. Travis Payne (KUDZU) Dr. Richard D. Wilson Mr. Daniel F. Read (CHANGE/ELP) Mr. G. 0. Bright (ASLB)

Mr. R. P. Gruber (NCUC) Dr. J. H. Carpenter (ASLB)

Chapel Hill Public Library Mr. J. L. Kelley (ASLB)

Wake County Public Library 8310i80311 831012 FDR ADOCK 05000400 E PDR 411 Fayetteville Street o P. O. 8ox 1551 o Raleigh, N. C. 27602

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LIST OP OPEN ITEMS/NEW ISSUES, REVIEW BRANCH AND REVIEWER Mechanical Engineering Branch/D. Terao Open Item 343 Power Systems Branch/0. Chopra Open Items 307, 344, 387, 389 Reactor Systems Branch/E. Merinos Open Items SO, 209, 214 (8170FXTlcv)

~ ~

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant DSER Open Item No. 343 Revised Response The staff's review of the FSAR finds that specific information related to the design and construction of ASME Class 1, 2, and 3 piping supports needs to be clarified in order to complete our review. SRP Section 3.9.3 states that our review includes an assessment of design and structural integrity of the supports. 3he review addresses three types of supports:

1) plate and shell,

2) linear, and

3) component standard types .

For each of the above three types of supports, provide the following information {as applicable) for our review:

a) Provide the design and service loading combinations used for ASME Class 2 and 3 supports including the corresponding design and service limits and deformation limits used.

b) Describe which parts of the supports are designed and constructed as component supports and which parts are designed and constructed as supplemental building steel (NF vs. AISC).

c) Provide the basis used for the design and construction of all ASME Class 1, 2, and 3 component supports. In addition, address which codes and standards were used as the basis for the welding procedures and for preservice and inservice inspection procedures associated with component supports.

Response

The following is a revision to a previously submitted response to DSER Open Item No. 343.

a) The design and service loading combinations used for ASME Class 2 and 3 supports including design service limits and deformation limits are included on revised FSAR Table 3.9.3-7.

b) The design and fabrication of pipe supporting elements utilized Section III of the ASME Code (i.e., 1971 Edition with Addenda through Summer of 1973). The rules for component supports and components standard supports {Subsection NF) was not in effect at this time. Requirements for design and fabrication of pipe supports was therefore referenced to ANSI 331.1 Code which was in effect.

The only exceptions to these requirements are for mechanical and hydraulic snubbars which are described in FSAR subsection 3.9.3.4.2.

c) As stated above, the design and construction of all ASME Class 2 and 3 component supports are in accordance with ANSI 831.1. Welding is performed to procedures qualified to ASME Section IX. Inspection is performed to AWS 'D1.1 requirements.

Westinghouse does not supply any piping supports for Shearon Harris.

For Class 1 component supports Westinghouse designs to ASME Code Subsection NF stress limits as noted in Table 3.9.1-3. The analysis of these supports is further described in FSAR Section .3.9.1.4.7.

The stress limits used by Westinghouse for ASlK Class 2 and 3 component supports are described in FSAR Section 3.9. 3.4.1.

Component supports for Class 1 auxiliary lines are designed similarly to those for Class 2 and 3 except for welded pipe attachments which are subject to Class 1 analysis and within Westinghouse scope of supply.

.Buckling is a consideration in the design of supports/restraints on this project, and criteria used is similar to that from the AISC Code.

The allowable stress for compression members is limited to 0.6 and 0.9 of the critical buckling stress for normal/upset, and emergency loading conditions respectively.

In contrast, NF criteria limits the allowable stress for compression members to 0.66 of the critical buckling stress for normal/upset, and emergency loading conditions.

Table 3.9.3-7 will be revised in a future amendment to the FSAR. A mark-up of the table is attached to this revised response.

(8 131NECt da)

SH?iPP CESAR TABLE 3.0e3 7 DESIGN LOADIE CMEZMATIONS FOR NO!f-NSSS SOPH.EED ARK OIE CASS 2 Ne 3 CNpomeS Condition Cclassification Koadin Coabination Se"Ac.C Lrr +S Weal Internal pressure + veight + sustained F~vcs sly(

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~Ctp~cy Vaulted Internal pressure + might + sustained loads + SSK + pipe rupture and/or jet

~ g iapingeeent effects vhcre applicable Notes:

(1) OIE has been considered for all Seismic Category I components (2) Includes teaporary loads ouch as relief raise thrusts dependinN upon the specific plant process conditice.

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Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Draft Safety Evaluation Report Open Item 307 Compliance with BTP PSB-l, "Adequacy of station electric distribution system voltages" .

Clarification The NRC (O. Chopra, Power Systems Branch) has requested that CP&L provide additional information on the capability of Class 1E motors to operate at 75%

voltage for 1 minute. Additionally, information has been requested on the voltage profile on buses when powered from the main generator. This was in reference to undervoltage relays.

Response

1. All Class 1E motors have been purchased with the capability to start and accelerate driven equipment at 75% of rated voltage as well as with a positive torque margin at that voltage (see attached specification sheets). On the basis of the capabilities, it is CPSL's evaluation that all such motors will operate for one minute at 75% of rated voltage without suffering any damage.

2. To assure no spurious operation of the undervoltage initiated load shedding scheme during operation on the Hain Generator and Auxiliary Transformers, a worst case condition was studied. With the auxiliary system fully loaded and the generator at minimum voltage the starting of the Normal Service Water Pump (NSWP) (3000hp) was studied. This is determined to be the worst case based on studies previously performed.

The study was performed with NSWP No. 1B starting on Bus No. 1E. Results for the "A" Train would be similar.

Voltage caparisoned on bus No. 1B-BB ~durin starting of NBNP No. 1B sas 6.111kV (88.6% of 6.9kV).

During normal operation the 27A relays will operate at the 89% setting.

However, in the absence of an accident signal, the 60 second time delay will block bus isolation. Since the NSWP motor starting time is substantially less than this, there can be no spurious tripping of the bus. Note that the bus voltage drop is clearly not of a magnitude to cause operation of the 27 relays (set at 72%).

(8152PSAtda)

$$

Pro)ect Identification Specification Ebasco 214-70 Motors for Station Auxiliary Service No, CAR-SH-E-12 Furnished With Driven Equipment Rated up to 460 Volt and 250 HP (Excluding Va1ve Motors)

6. (Cont'd) STARTING DUTY with motor terminal voltage maintained at 110 percent of rated value (Cont'd at, rated ambient temperature, The motor must a1.so be able to start o,.

and accelerate driven equipment at 80 percent rated voltage at rated for Clawss~IE Jt -"Al *-U*

store without exceed he e i h e eu R5 acccrdance~>~~HA S~tndatds MG-i 7~ Alternating-current motors operating with rated terminal TORQUE-voltage and rated frequency shall have torque values in accordance CURRENT &

with the requirements determined by the nat'ure of driven HORSEPQTER starting voltage and voltage dips while motor is running equipment~-'inimum REQUIREMENTS Locked rotor current of polyphase squirrel-cage induction motors shall not exceed 600 percent of rated full-load current. Any Rotor requiring more than 600 percent locked rotor current shall be identified in the Seller's proposal.

~ 1 The breakdown torque of the motor shall exceed by 8 per-cent the minimum required torque to prevent stalling during the run voltage dip specified in List of Motors (Line 8) and shall withstand without damage the thermal and mechanical effects of the dip while runnin with full load at rated~volta e and frequenc

.2 Motors shall have a permissable lock rotor time eaual to or more than the starting t ime. s

~3 The rated horsepower of the motors shall exceed by a minimum of five percent (57) the maximum brake horsepower required by the driven equipment under any condition of continuous operation,

8. Moto'rs shall be self-ventilated. ENCLOSURE

~ 1 All motors located outdoors~ shall be as follows: VENTILATION AND 20 hp & below - Totally Enclosed PROTECTION 25-250 hp - Weather Protected Type I (NEMA)

~ 2 The term Totally-Enclosed Types~ as used in this Spec-ification~ includes totally-enclosed nonventilated, totally-enclosed fan-cooled, explosion-proof, dust-ignition-proof and other totally enclosed types, 3 ea

rogect Identification Specification Ebasco 214-70 No. CAR-SH-E42.

Motors for Station Auxiliary Service Furnished With Driven Equipment Rated up to 460 Volt and 250 HP (Excluding Valve Motors)

29. (Cont'd) LIST OF MOTORS (Cont'd)

Line Item No. *t uantit

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S ch S eed Fre uenc Hz t*

Min Start Volta e Run Volta e Din Sec 257. 10 Sec 9 Location 10 Insulation Class B Encl & Vent 12 Tem Ambient/Rise 'C 13 Shaf t 14 Connection 15 Bearin s External Cable

• 16 Lu Size MIN.

17 Conduit Size 18 S ace Heater Conduit Box Size 20 Bearin /Winding Te Det

• Seismic *t D h v 21 Coefficient ~Dh v

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22 Normal Max Brake - HP

• 23 Normal Down/u Thrust

• 24 Momenta Down/u Thrust

• 25 Manufacturer 26 27 Tota Integrate Radiation Dose - Absor ed Rads t*

28 ibration Detectors 'es No *

+ To be completed by Seller.-

t Refer to driven e'quipment specification.

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0 Ebasco Specification 8-69 Motors For Station Auxiliary Service Furnished With Driven Equipment, Part One - Specific Requirements Pro]ect Identification No. CAR-SH-E-12A ll. THERMOCOUPLES

.01 All Motors, except those having antifriction-type bearings, shall have bearing thermocouples, with conductor terminals as described in Electrical Attachment No. 1 of this Specification. Thermocouples to mea-sure bearing temperature shall be installed as closely as possible to the bearing hot spot.

.02 Motor bearing thermocouples shall conform to Ebasco Specification 300-70, a copy of which is attached.

12. STARTING DUTY Squirrel cage induction motors shall be designed for 'full-voltage starting.

They shall withstand all thermal and mechanical stresses and give satisfac-tory performance when started with their driven equipment connected with supply frequency at rated value and with motor terminal voltage maintained at 110 percent of rated value at rated ambient temperature. The motor must also be able to start and accelerate driven equipment at 80 percent rated Btalf ageM~it ~aguenc~ teen~ted voltage at rated fre~uenc for lass IE motors without exceeding the~er-missible temperature in accordance with NEMA Standards MG-1.

13. TCR UE CURRENT AND HORSEPOWER RE UIREMENTS

.01 Seller shall supply, in addition to the usual motor drawings, five (5) copies of the following motor curves, to be used for relay settings:

a - Startin Characteristic Curve A plot of current vs time as motor accelerates from zero to full speed with normal starting loads.

This curve should be plotted for 80 percent, 90 percent, 100 percent and 110 percent of the rated nameplate voltage.

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with this standard sham be capable of acosleratW withoet ~rlous temperature risc when the apj4ed eonsideradoct To +~ ~

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uolttce laMMa the lknlts set ba lid. torque requirements, ssad acceieratkxa thae. the Oachgthe accelerathg period, the connected torqw manufacturer shall be 4ruishcd witit +<<o~ ~

sham be equal to or Iesa thea a torque that varks as the formatiaa:

apace of the speect and Is equal to 100% of 0>> motor (1) The expected voltage Mooed torque sa rated speed. motor termfnals under starthg condkkee (2) Thc total load hertia(it%a) referred to d>>

l3.2 13esiea HT motors havhg perfonnance characser.

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(2) The maximum vah>> of load tocquc after break away does not exceed l00% of flood torque. l43 ICorncatary opcradecL. Motors shal bc capewe (3) Tbc maxlmwn vah>> of the load hats does not of momentary operatke (for up to 60 seconds) uccder exceed thc vahac listed h Table 4. runnhg conditions at rated load and frequency <<Ith a (4) Thc product of the Iood hts (in per unit of the minimum of 7S% of rated voltage at thc motor tersad-vatws Istcd h Tabk 4) multipbcd by thc valw of load saals.

lorque (lac per unit of fuII4oad torqw) Is equal to or less than 030 pcr walt. Fohn WI 1S. Stra Transfer i or Redoing

14. Varla6on from Rated Voltage arsd Rated A motor is Inherently capabk of developing transient Fceqacsaey torque (and current) consklerably la excess of lated lorque when exposed to an outwf phase bus tacacsfer li.l ltcaaachg. Idotors shaII operate succcssfuIIy under or momentary voltage hterruption and reciociag ocr running conditions at rated load with variation h the thc same buL The magnitude of this uansient torque voltage or thc frcqwncy up to thc Mowing: can range from approximately 2 to 20 th>>s ratecl (1) Pius oc mhus 10% of rated voltage. with rated torqw and Is a function of thc machhc, operating cca-frequency. ditions, sw Itching times, system incr tia, etc.

(2) plus or minus 5% of rated frcqwncy. with rated To limit the poasibitity of damaging thc motor or voltage. driven cquipmcnt, or both, It Is recommended that the (3) A combined variation in voltage and frequency power su ppiy system be designed so that the result>>lt of 10% (sum'of absolute values) of the rated values, vectorial volts per hertz between the motor rcskluaI provided that the frequency valiatfon does not exceed volts pcr hertz and the incoming source volts pcr hertz phrs or mhus S% of rated I'rcqucncy. Fcr fonnance at thc inslant the transfer or reclosing Is compktcd withia this voltage and I'requ:ncy variatlon wiII not docs not exceed l33 pcr unit volts pcr hertz on the aeorssardy bc in accordance with the standards cstab- motor rated vollage and frequency bases (sce Fig. 1).

lbhed for opcraoon at rated voltage and frequency.

of le StartingMotors c ytoocr~latine wsanlainina S$ %

avxQiary cyacma acr often incapable of raced cnotoc rollacc dwtnS acarcioe of i+1,1 having performance charactcrisths in cbc hgest moron. Thc linnliiac raioca of ror tace and (lo.

accordaxe with t tus standard shall. at rated frequency. ctvcncy nndcr crhich a cnocor wgt cucccrcfatty alan and accelerate lo runninz lpced depend on lhc tnafpn brea<<a j

start %id accelerate to runnin speed a load that meets the lpccd locqw currc of lhc nocor at ralcd rollacc and the torqw chalacteristks and inertia requirements ffcciococr and lbc lpccddontoc calve of thc load cadet acafl spewed ks SccUoa 13 of this standard provided that hS condi lions (ace Id %2I.

12

Ebasco Specification 8-69 Motors For Station Auxiliary Service Furnished With Driven Equipment Part One - Specific Requirements Pro]ect Identification No. CAR-SH-E-12A

13. TOR UE CURRENT AND HORSEPOWER RE UIREMENTS (Cont'd)

.01 (Cont'd) b - Locked Rotor Thermal Limit Curve A plot of current vs time to show the locked rotor current and safe time at 80 percent, 90 percent, 100 percent and 110 percent of the rated nameplate voltage.

c - Runnin Thermal Ca abilit Curve A plot of current vs time to show safe time limit for overcurrent condition from rated full load cur-rent to locked rotor current.

Alternating current motozs operating with rated =

terminal voltage and rated frequency shall have torque in accordance with the requirements determined by the nature of the dziven equipment, minimum starting voltage, and voltage dips while motor is running.

Locked rotor current of polyphase squirrel cage induction motors shall not exceed 600 percent of rated full load current. Any motor requiring more than 600 percent locked rotor current shall be identified in Seller's proposal.

1 - The breakdown torque of the motor shall exceed by 8 percent the minimum required torque to prevent stalling during the run voltage dip specified in List of Motors (Line 8) and shall withstand without damage the thermal and mechanical effect of the dip while running with full load at rated voltage 'and frequency.

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SHEARON HARRIS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT DRAFT SER OPEN ITEM 344 SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION Reviewer requested additional information concerning testing of switchyard breakers.

Response

Installation and initial testing of switchyard breakers is done in accordance with the Manufacturer's instructions.

The following maintenance is performed as normal procedure for SHNPP switchyard breakers:

I. Yearly Maintenance (External) a) moisture content of SF6 gas b) ductor test c) check mechanism cabinet heaters d) all alarms to be checked to audible or visual display point e) visually inspect and clean bushings f) check controls and wiring g) check foundation clamps for tightness h) check that breaker is properly grounded i) check mechanism cabinet gaskets to be in place and weatherproof j mechanism,

) perform maintenance operational checks on pneumatic operating pnematic system, SF6 gas system k) check for proper operation of pressure switches and alarms

1) cleaning and painting as required II. General Maintenance (every 5 years) a) moisture content of SF6 gas b) ductor test c) check mechanism cabinets heaters d) all alarms to be checked to audible or visual display point e) visual inspection and cleaning of bushings f) check controls and wiring g) check foundation clamps for tightness h) check that breaker is properly grounded i) perform maintenance and operational checks on pneumatic operating mechanism and pneumatic system j) evacuate SF6 gas from breaker; perform maintenance on the teflon nozzles, contact settings and line-to-ground capa-citors; check bolts for proper torque; clean breaker tank, pull rod, insulating pedestal, teflon nozzles, etc.; replace desiccant:

(8051NEClcv)

k) pull vacuum on breaker and fillwith SF6 gas recheck moisture content of SF6 gas 1) m) check proper operation of pressure switches and alarms n) repeat ductor test o) painting and cleaning as required p) analyze breaker to check timing III. Factors that may effect maintenance schedule:

a) fault operations b) total of 750 operations on breaker c) high moisture content in SF6 gas d) major SF6 gas leak e) mechanical or electrical f ailure inside tank f) contact resistance (high) g) relocation of breaker Please note that manufacturer's instruction manuals may also be utilized for specific data and tolerances concerning operational checkout and maintenance. Additionally, maintenance items outlined above may be modified subject to manufacturers recommendations.

(8051NEClcv)

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Draft Safety Evaluation Report Open Item 387 Power Systems Branch (Interconnections Between Safety and Non-Safet Buses)

In a telephone conversation between the NRC (0. Chopra, Power Systems Branch) and Carolina Power 6 Light Company, the NRC requested that we clarify our reference to a permissive signal in chapter 7 of the FSAR.

Response

Permissive signals are not discussed in Chapter 7. FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.2.5 will be amended in a future amendment to the FSAR to delete reference to Chapter 7.

(8167PSAtda)

A,-i SHNPP FSAR driving force. As it can be seen, the above conditions would require a transient analysis to predict exact performance of the motor. However, based on experience, the time delay associated, with the undervoltage relays and control circuits and the differential time between tripping and closing of breakers will allow sufficient time for the residual. voltage to decay to an acceptable level.

8.3.1 ~ 1.2.5 Interconnections Between Safety and Non-Safety Related Buses The interconnections between safety and non-safety related buses are as follows:

a) 6.9 kV Bus Ties ESF buses lA-SA and 1B-SB are normally connected to non-safety related buses 1D and 1E, respectively through bus ties. Each bus tie consists of a nonsegregated phase bus duct terminated at a normally closed circuit breaker at each end. The circuit breaker located at the ESF bus together with its associated relaying serves as the isolation device, as described in Section 8.3.1.2.14(a). Upon loss of offsite power, the circuit breakers at both ends of the bus duct ties are automatically tripped. In addition, the bus duct, bus duct supports, non-safety related 6.9 kV switchgear and supports, are designed to maintain structural integrity during and after a design basis earthquake, by the methods discussed in Section 3.10.

b) 6.9 kV ESF Bus Feeder Circuits - One 6.9 kV ESF bus feeder breaker in each division is connected to a non-safety related 6900/480V station transformer (1Al and 1B1), which in turn feeds a non-safet'y related 480V power center bus. As in the case of the 6.9 kV bus ties, the 6.9 kV circuit breaker together with its associated relaying serves as the isolation device. Upon a loss of ofzsite power, this circuit breaker is automatically tripped and prevented from being reclosed until receipt of a permissive signal from the emergency load sequencer> es dkeeas Beginning with the transformer feeder cable emanating from the 6.9 kV ESF switchgear, all equipment and devices connected downstream are non-Class IE and non-safety related. However, to provide further design'margin, the feeder cable to the 6900/480V transformer is qualified as Class IE equipment and installed in cond~it embedded in the concrete floor. In addition, the non-safety related 6900/480V transformer, 480V power center, supports and all devices installed in the po~er center are fully qualified as Class IE equipment. 'Ihe DC control power supply for this power center is from the safety-related DC system through isolation devices as described in Section 8.3.1.2.14(a) ~ 'Ihe auxiliary AC power supply for the 480V transformer and power center is from the non-safety-related system. Signals from the emergency load sequencer pass through isolation devices prior to entering non-safety-related power distribution equipment.

8.3. l. 1. 2.6 Redundant Bus Separation Separation of redundant 6 9 kV and 480V power centers, the 480V redundant gCCa and 208/120V power panels, the 120V uninterruptible AC buses and inveztezs and the 125V DC batteries and chargers and distribution panels hag been accomplished through spatial separation or provision of fire zesistant barriers. The two redundant diesel generators are housed in sepazate fize resistant rooms in the Diesel-Generator Building which .is a Seismic Category'-I s true ture.

8.. l-10a

Shearon Harris Nuclear Ebwer Plant Draft SER Open Item 389 PSB Issue Containment Electrical Penetrations Su plemental Information The NRC (0. Chopra, Power Systems Branch) requested that CP6L provide additional information on short circuit protective devices for circuits that pass through containment penetrations.

Response

Regulatory Guide 1.63 requires two short circuit protective devices for each circuit that passes through the containment penetrations. For circuits which are powered from the control power transformers, the secondary side of the transformer is protected by one fuse and are fault current limited due to the impedance of the control transformer. Since the control transformer limits sustained fault current below the continuous rating of penetration, two independent circuit interrupting devices are not required.

The NRC described the following event. A short circuit is present on a circuit from the MCC control transformer. The fuse then fails to clear the fault which eventually causes the transformer to fail in a manner which would directly connect the primary side (480V) to the secondary side.

Carolina Power & Light Company feels the failure of a fuse is an incredible event. In addition, the subsequent failure of the control transformer in the manner described is also highly unlikely.

(8092NECccc)

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Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Draf t SER Open Item 50 The applicant indicates that failure of the interlocks in the residual heat removal (RHR) valves will require approximately four hours for restoration of RHR function. However the applicant does not state the alternate means for maintaining plant cooldown during the four hours of unavailability of RHR.

Response

The auxiliary feedwater system and the steam generator power-operated relief valves can be used to perform the safety function of removing residual heat for a 16-hour period using a Seismic Category I water supply.

(8137NLUccc)

Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Draft SER 0 en Item 209 The applicant in its evaluation of the most limiting single failure during plant transients has not evaluated the effects of operator errors, as required in the SRP. Clarification is required for this omission.

Response

Though operator errors do not appear to be expl'icitly addressed,'they have been considered and found to be bounded by the most limiting single failures listed.

(8137NLUccc)

Shearon Harris Nuclear Powex Plant Draft SER Open Item 214 In order to determine adequacy of the low temperature overpressure protection system, clarification is required with regard to the charging pump flow rates (different flow rates are indicated in various sections of the FSAR), PORV and safeties relief rates, and temperature sensors accuracy based on the applicant's stated experimental data.

Response

The flow rates mentioned in the various sections of the FSAR for the centrifugal charging/SI pumps may vary widely because the pump flow rates depend on the mode of system operation, (e.g., charging vs. safety injection), the number of pumps running, RCS pressure, and other factors. For example, the safety injection system throttle valves are adjusted such that a single, charging/SI pump will deliver 650 gpm with the reactor coolant system fully depressurized. In the charging mode during low pressure operation the charging pump flow is manually throttled such that the maximum letdown is 120 gpm. 'Jhe charging pump performance characteristics can be found in the FSAR, Figure 6.3.2-9.

The relief capability during low temperature operation is provided by utilizing two pressure power-operated relief valves, which have a minimum C

v coefficient of 57.

The setpoints for the low temperature overpressure system are determined such that the reactor vessel's Appendix G curve is not exceeded. These setpoints include consideration for heat input and safety injection mass input overpressure transients. Note that Technical Specifications limit the number of charging/SI pumps during low temperature operation to one pump.

The Westinghouse Owners'roup report (July 1977) and its Supplement (September 1977), will be utilized in the derivation of the setpoints. If the reactor vessel's pressure temperature limits change as a result of the vessel's material surveillance program, the overpressure protection system setpoints will be reviewed and re-evaluated as necessary to ensure that the vessel's Appendix G limits are not exceeded. Any revision to the setpoints will be re-submitted as a Technical Specification revision for your review. Initial setpoints are expected to be available when SHNPP finalizes its Technical Specification submittal.

In regard to comments on fluid and thermal mixing tests mentioned in our response to SRQ 440.106, the report describing these tests can be found in EPRI Report NP-2935, March 1983, "Thermal Mixing in a Cold Leg and Downcomer at Low Flow. Rates."

(8137NLUccc)

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